Appendix — Treffry v. Taylor

Supreme Court brief1966

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a. o * ~.-

* Totes Supseme Court, U.S.

FILED

No. 29] , JUN 24 1966

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

ROBERT C. TREFFRY, et al., Appellants

LOUISE ‘TAYLOR, as Director of Licenses for the State

of Washington,

_ Appellee,

THE ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF

AMERICA, SEATTLE NORTHWEST CHAPTER,

INC.; HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION .OF —

GREATER SEATTLE, and- HOME BUILDERS

ASSOCIATION OF GREATER TACOMA, INC.,

_ Intervenor-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT

OF TYE STATE OF WASHINGTON

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Francis J. CONKLIN

Gonzaga University School w Law

Spokane, Washington

Rime

REILEY AND ANNIS

Expon H. Ret1tey

Eucene I. ANNIs

757 Lincoln Building

. Spokane, Washington

In the Supreme Court of the United States

ROBERT C. TREFFRY, et al., Appellants

8 ;

LOUISE TAYLOR, as Director of Licenses for the State

of Washington,

Appellee,

THE ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF

AMERICA, SEATTLE NORTHWEST CHAPTER, ~

INC.; HOME B®BILDERS ASSOCIATION OF

GREATER SEATTLE, and HOME BUILDERS

ASSOCIATION OF GREATER TACOMA, INC.;

Intervenor-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT

_OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

‘Francis J. CONKLIN

Gonzaga University School of Law

Spokane, Washington

REILEY AND ANNIS

Epon H. ReILey

Eucene I. ANNIS

757 Lincoln Building

Spokane, W. ashington

INDEX TO APPENDIX

, Page

oe a a ee

Opinion of the State Supreme Court... ....2 ;

Dissenting Opinion of or Rosellini C. i ;

Concurring a aera | ee

Memorandum Opinion of the Trial Court . . . 19

Findings of Fact and Conclusions “i Law of ~~

Trial Court Wer oe ae ee a ee ee

° %e

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— PAGE .

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF WASHINGTON

REMITTITUR

No. 37801

_ Spokane County No. 171271

This is to certify that the opinion of the Supreme Court of

the State of Washington filed on November 24, 1965, be-

came the final judgment of this court in the above entitled

oe ee eee tted to the

superior court from which the appeal was taken for further

proceedings in accordance with the attached certified copy

of the opinion.

Pursuant to Rule 55 on Appeal, costs are taxed as follows: |

_The Petition for Rehearing was Denied on January 27,

1966. ’

The cost bill of intervenors/appellants is disallowed,

costs are taxed in favor of a t against respon-

rT io) Dena r ny Hundred Eleven re prima

1l and in favor of respondents and against

intervenors/appellants in the amount of Two Hundred

Sixty-three 21/100 ($263.21) Dollars. a

ce: Court Repobter |

Hon. Joun J. O'Conneti Lycetre, Diamonp & Sytvester

Mr. Lioyvp Peterson _ Mr. Lyze ly Iversen:

Mr. R. Teo Borrticer

ReiLey AND ANNIS

Mr. Etpow H. Retrey

Mr. Joun R. Knamen

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set

hand and dilinedl Gea seal of eat Count ab Olputpia, Gite 0

day of February, A.D. 1966.

WILLIAM M. LOWRY

Clerk of the Supreme Court, State of Washington

OPINION OF STATE SUPREME COURT

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spo-

kane County, No. 171271, William H. Williams, J., entered

March 24, 1964. Reversed. -

Action to enjoin enforcement of a statute. Defendants ap-

peal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

The Attorney General, R. Ted Bottiger, Special Assistant,

and Lloyd W. Peterson, Assistant, for appellants.

Reiley & Annis, by Eldon H. Reiley and Eugene I. Annis,

for respondents.

Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester and Lyle L. Iversen, for

intervenors.

Ort, J.—This appeal presents a single issue: Does the

title to er 77, Laws of 1963, p. 476, “An Act providing

for the registration of contractors; and prescribing penal-

_ ties,” violate article 2, § 19, of the state constitution, “No

bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall

expressed: in the title”? i )

‘The trial court held that the act was unconstitutional for

the reason that “The bonding provi in Section 4 of said

law and the insurance provision in Section 5 of The Act

are not germane or related to the subject of registration.”

The questioned act contains 12 sections. Section 1 defines

the term “contractor.” Section 2 requires the contractor to

procure a certificate of registration from the D t

of Licenses before engaging in the contracting business,

and provides penalties for violation. Section 3 prescribes

the information the contractor must furnish to the depart-

ment in his application for registration, prior to issuance

of the certificate. Section 4, p. 477, wna es

Each applieert shall, at the time of lying for a

) certificate of registration, file with the director of. li-

Sf a surety running to the state of Washing-

4 if a general contractor, in the sum of two thousand

3 \

dollars; if a specialty contractor, in the sum of. one

thousand dollars, conditioned that the applicant will

pay ‘all taxes and contributions due to state of

Washington, and will pay all persons furnishing labor

or material or renting or supplying equipment to the

contractor and will pay all amounts that may be ad-

judged against the contractor by reason of negligent»

or improper work or breach of contract in the conduct

of the contracting business. Any on having a claim

against the contractor for any of the items referred to

in this section may bring suit upon such bond in the

superior court of the county in which the work is done

or of any county in which jurisdiction of the contractor

may be had. A copy of the complaint shall be served

by registered or certified mail upon the director of li-

censes at the time suit is started and the director shall

maintain a record, available for public inspection, of

all suits so commenced. Such service shall constitute

service on the surety and the director shall transmit

the complaint or a copy thereof to the surety within

forty-eight hours after it shall have been received. The -

surety upon the bond shall not be liable in an aggre-

pe a Se Se ee Oe

d, but in case claims pending at aniy one time ex-

ceed the amount of the bond, claims shall be satisfied

from the bond in the following order:

(1) Labor, including employee benefits;

(2) Taxes and contributions due the state of Wash-

ington; ~

(3) Material and equipment;

(4) Claims for breach of contract.

In the event that any final judgment shall impair the

liability of the surety upon the bond so furnished that

there shall not be in effect a bond undertaking in the

full amount prescribed in this section, the director shall

suspend the registration of such contractor until the

bond liability in the required amount unimpaired b

unsatisfied judgment claims shall have been snare te |

ee 408 eet Oe ee «ee

a al Al a A

In lieu of the surety bond — by this section

the contractor may file with-the director a cash deposit

or other negotiable security acceptable to the director.

In the event of a judgment being entered against

_ such deposit, the director of licenses shall upon receipt

of a certified copy of a final judgment, pay from

amount of the deposit said judgment.

Section 5, p. 479, provides: ~s

At the time of registration the applicant shall furn-

ish to the director satisfactory evidence that the ap-

. plicant has procured and has in effect public liability

and property damage insurange covering the sj

cant’s contracting operations in the sum of not less

than twenty thousand dollars for injury or goon

property and fifty thousand dollars for injury or -

age including death to any one person and one hun-

dred thousand dollars for injury or damage including

~ death to more than one person.

In the event that such insurance shall cease to be ef-

fective the registration of the contractor shall be sus-

pended until such insurance shall be reinstated.

Section 6 authorizes .the Director of Licenses to issue a

certificate for one year upon compliance with the provisions

of the act..Section 7 prescribes the fees to be paid for

registration. Section 8 requires a certificate of registration

as a prerequisite to commencing an action in any court to

recover for the performance of work as a contractor. Sec-

tions 9 and 10 grant certain exemptions. Section 11 is the

oo clause, and § 12 dec the effective date

) act. : |

In adjudica.ing the sufficiency of the title to a legislative

enactment, we have adhered to the following general rules:

[1,2] The title to a bill need not be an index to its con-

tents; nor is the title expected to give the details contained

in the bill. Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211

P.2d 651 (1949); Cory v. Nethery, 19 Wn.2d 326, 142 P.2d

488 (1943); Sorenson v. Kittitas Reclamation Dist., 70 -

5 os

‘Wash. 528, 127 Pac. 102 (1912); State ex rel. Zent v. Nic-

‘ols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac 728 (1908); State ex rel. Cole

v. City of New Watcom, 3 Wash. 7, 27 Pac. 1020 (1891).

When the words in a-title can be given two interpreta-

tions, one of which renders the act unconstitutional and

the other constitutional, we adopt the constitutional inter-

pretation and sustain the constitutionality of the act. Mar-

tin v. Aleinkoff, 63.Wn.2d 842, 389 P.2d 422 (1964); State

ex rel. Dawes v. Highway Comm'n, 63 Wn.2d 34, 385 P.2d

376 (1963); Engen v. Arriold, 61 Wn.2d 641, 379 P.2d 990

. bred Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, 347 P.2d 1081

(1959); Hammock v. Monroe Street Lumber Co.,54 Wn.2d -

294, 339 P.2d 684 (1959).

The test of the sufficiency of a title is that it must give

notice of its object so Saga read to. lead to an inquiry

into its contents. Rourke v. Department of Labor & In-

dus., 41 Wn.2d 310, 249 P.2d 236 (1952); Cory v, Nethery,

-_ Sorenson v. Kittitas Reclamation Dist., supra. The

title to an act may be general, and all matters incidental

or germane thereto may -be written into the body of the

law. Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n. supra; In re Peterson’s

Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935); National Ass'n of

Creditors, Inc. v. Brown, 147 Wash. 1, 264 Pac. 1005

(1928), and case cited.

The crucial words in the questioned title are “contrac-.

tors,” “registration,” and “penalties.” Are these words suf-

ficient notice of the object of the act so as reasonably to lead

to further inquiry into the contents of the-act? If*so, the

title meets the test of sufficiency.

[3] Upon reading the title to this act, a contractor en-

gaged in business in the state of Washington would be ~

to inquire whether his business was within the purview

of the regulatory measure. The first section of the act would

give him the answer. If his business required that he regis-

ter he would then reasonably seek further information

from the act to determine whether he qualified for a cer-

tificate of registration. Section 4, supra, would put him on

notice that, in order to qualify and be issued a certificate

of registration, he would be required to furnish. a surety

bond to the state for the payment of the obligations enu-

merated in § 4. Section 5, supra, would put him on patice

that a public liability and property damage insurance

is required. |

Every legislative enactment requiring registration is an

exercise of the legislature's police power, and is, by its

nature, regulatory of the sujbect matter. The word “regis- —

tration” encompasses all regulatory provisions which the

legislature enacts, in the proper exercise of its police power.

~~ We conclude that the title to chapter 77,. Laws of 1963,

gave sufficient notice of the object of the act so as reason-

ably to lead to further inquiry into the contents of the act,

and thus meets the test of sufficiency.

Does the act embrace more than one subject?

* [4] Since regulation is inherent in every legislative en-

actment requiring registration, all matters incidental and

- germane to registration may be written in the body of the

law. In the instant case, the legislature, in the proper exer-

cise of its discretion, has required that, as a condition prece-

dent to the issuance of a certificate of registration, the

applicant is required to establish his financial responsibil-

ity. This requirement, although regulative in nature, is ger-

mane to the subject of registration.

We hold that the requirement of establishing financial

responsibility does not introduce another. subject, and that

chapter 77, Laws of 1963, aX embrace more than one

subject.

The respondents contend that, although the trial court

held the act unconstitutional because of a defective title,

the trial court’s judgment can be sustained upon any other

constitutional ground within the pleadings and the proof.

Respondents’ eo further alleged that the act is

unconstitutional because (1) it is violative of the due pro-

cess and equal protection clauses of the federal and state

constitutions in that the bond or financial rete a

requirement is unreasonable and confiscatory, the act is

‘a

discriminatory and creates arbitrary classifications, and re-

quires registration as a condition precedent to maintain-

ing an action predicated upor a construction contract and

(2) that the provisions of the act, taken as a whole, con-

stitute imprisonment for debt in violation of art. 1, § 17,

of the state constitution. .

Although these constitutional issues were presented to

the trial court, the. court did not predicate its judgment

upon any of these alleged constitutional violations. We

must assume that the trial court found them to be without

merit.

[5] A legislative enactment requiring the registration of

contractors is an exercise of the police power of the state..

Clarke v. Dwyer, 56 Wn.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960); Par-

rott & Co. v. Benson, 114 Wash. 117, 194 Pac. 986 (1921);

State v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co., 90 Wash. 416, 156

Pac. 837 (1916); State v. Bowen & Co., 86 Wash. 23, 149

Pac. 330 (1915). ~

The exercise of police power by the legislature is an at-

tribute of sovereignty. It is an essential element of the

power to govern. The only limitation upon the exercise

of this sovereign power by a legislative y is that the

questioned enactment must reasonably tend to correct some

evil or promote some public interest, and that it must not

be violative of any positive mandate of the constitution.’

Clark v. Dwyer, supra, at 482, and case cited.

One who attacks the classification provisions of a legis-

lative enactment has the burden of establishing that the

classification is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, inequit-

able,.and unjust. State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 368,

382 P.2d 497 (1963), and cases, cited. To require the fur- -

nishing of a bond to insure compliance with the law is a -

reasonable exercise of police power. Clark v. Dwyer, supra;

State .ex rel. Milwaukee Grain Elevator Co. v. Robinson,

186 Wash. 557, 59 P.2d 365 (1936); State v. Seattle Taxicab

& Transfer Co., supra; State v. Bowen & Co., supra; Fer-

guson-Hendrix Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,

~ 79 Wash. 528, 140 Pac. 700 (1914); State ex rel. Davis-

Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (191%). -

Eh lll,

ee a ee

oo et Bh eee

The wisdom, necessity or expediency of a legislative en-

actment is not subject to judicial review. Port of Tacoma

v. Parosa, 52 Wn.2d 181, 324 P.2d 438 (1958); Bulette v.

Bremerton, 34 Wn.2d 834, 210 P.2d 408 (1949); Gazzam.

{i ®. Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 262, 29 -

Wn.2d 488, 188 P.2d 97 (1947);°State ex rel. Govan. v.

Clausen, 108 Wash. 133, 183 Pac. 115 (1919).

[6] The imposition of a fine or imprisonment for viola-

tion of a legislative enactment is not imprisonment for

debt, but’ a statutory penalty imposed upon any person

who shall knowingly and intentionally violate a lawful

mandate of the legislature. Decker v., Decker, 52 Wn.2d.

456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958); Austin v. Seattle, 176 Wash. 654,

| 30 P.2d 646, 93 A.L.R. 203 (1934); State v. Seattle Taxicab

& Transfer Co. supra.

Applying the above rules to chapter 77, Laws of 1963,

we hold that the standards fixed by the legislature for the

registration of contractors and the classifications prescribed

_ by. thé act do not violate any of the constitutional mandates |

relied upon by respondents.

judgment of the trial court is reversed, aa the cause

: Fie ed with instructions to enter judgment in accord-

ance with the views herein expressed.

FINLEY, WEAVER, HunTeR, Hamitton, and HAtg, JJ.,

concur. 7

Hu, J., concurs in the result.

DonwortH, J. (dissenting )—My reasons for disagreeing

with the holding of the majority that the title of chapter 77,

‘Laws of 1963, is adequate in the face of art. 2, § 19, of

our constitution (which requires that the subject of a

ited. bill shall be expressed in its title) may be —

stat | a

The past and present legislative history of statutes and

bills veiling and licensing various occupations and busi-

nesses convinces me that the title of the 1963 act violates

the constitutional provision referred to above.

This act is the first (and only ) time the legislature has

used the word “registration” in the title of an act to describe

regulation and licensing of an occupation or business. The

‘appendix attached to this dissent cites the 14 prior acts

and their titles. As we were advised by counsel during

oral argument, the legislature has recognized the difference -

between the words “registration” and “regulation” by their

action in the 1965 extraordinary session when legislation

amending RCW 18.27.010-100 (Laws of 1963, ch. 77) was

introduced in the House of Representatives (House Bill

No. 292) ‘with an amended title, reading as follows:

An Act Relating to the regulation of contractors;

prescribing penalties; and repealing chapter.77, Laws

of 1963 and RCW 18.27.010 through 18.27.100.

As this court stated in In re Bale, 63 Wa.lad 88, 89, 385

P.2d 545 (1963):

(. . . Assuming it to. be true . . .-that these bills

never came to a vote. before the entire. legislature, the

fact that they were introduced and referred to com-

mittees has some probative value relative to the legis-

lature’s intent.

The bill which was originally introduced was a re-enact-

ment of chapter 77, Laws of 1963, with a new. title, in

which the word “registration” was changed to read “regu-

lation. ‘iin

The House passed the bill shies considerable amendment

activity pertaining mainly to the inclusion or exclusion of

sections 4 and 5. Not once ‘did the House consider using.

the word “registration” in the title of the amendatory act,

even when the House Committee on Licenses removed .

sections 4 Powe a bond) and 5 (requiring the public

liability. insurance), and advised passage without those

_ provisions. The House itself recognized that what the bill

_contemplates is not mere “registration” but “regulation.”

eee,

Bill No. 292 passed the House without section 4 (re-.

quiring the bond) but with section 5 (requiring the public

liability insurance). The bill was sent to the Senate where

its consideration was indefinitely postponed: on May 7,

1965, the last day of the extraordinary session.

This history is relevant because the legislature has, in

effect, demonstrated that it recognizes that there is a sig-

nificant difference in the meaning of “registration” and

“regulation” to legislators, once the error.is called to their

attention. Whatever the cause of the failure of the Senate

to act on the bill, there is nothing in the record of the legis-

lature to indicate that such inaction was in any manner

‘related to the replacment of the word “registration” with

“regulation” by the House so as to correct the title of the

act. It is clear -that the House and probably the Senate,

entertained the belief that the present title is inadequate

to cover all the provisions of the 1963 act, as required by

art. 2, § 19. However, the majority opinion appears to

_— this past and present legislative history and holds

at these two words are legally synonymous, although they

are not synonymous according to either the dictionary or

the legislative usage. I, therefore, feel compelled to discuss

the merits of the issue of whether “registration” means the

same as “regulation.”

The purpose of Const. art. 2, § 19, has been stated and

restated by this court. The latest expression is in Young

Men’s Christian Ass'n v. State, 62 Wn.2d 504, 506, 383

P.2d 497 (1963): as |

The purposes of this constitutional mandate are: (1)

to protect and enlighten the members of the legislature

against provisions in bills of which the titles give no

intimation; (2) to apprise the people,+through}such

‘publication of legislative proceedings as is: ysually

made, concerning the subjects of legislation that are’

being considered; and (3) to prevent hodgepodge or

logrolling legislation.

Also, see Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 378 P.2d 464

(1963), and cases cited, including Gruen v. State Tax

. . I]

Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), which state

precisely the same points. In the-Gruen case, there is an

excellent discussion of the decisions of ‘this court wherein

it has held that a title may be restrictive ‘or general. The

rules were succinctly restated by the Gruen opinion in 35

-Wn.2d at 22, 23 where it was said:

Titles to statutes may be general or restrictive; or,

in other words, broad or narrow, since the legislature

in each case has the right to determine for itself how

comprehensive shall be the object of the statute. And it

also has a wide discretion in the particularity of the

title selected to express it, set ed that, by a fair

construction, such title complies with the constitution-

“i ‘provision in. question. j

A general title may be said to be oné which is broad

-and comprehensive, and covers all legislation germane

to the general subject stated. It is not an objection that

it covers more than the subject of the body of the act,

but it must not, in any event, cover less. It is not neces-

sary that it index the details of the act, or give a synop-

sis of the means by which the object of the statute is to

be accomplished. All matters which are germane to the

subject may be’ embraced in one act. Under the true

rule of construction, the scope of the general title

should be held to embrace any provision of the act,

: directly or indirectly related to the subject expressed

in the title and having a natural connection thereto,

and not foreign thereto. Or, the rule may be stated as

follows: Where the title ofa legislative act expresses

a general subject or p e which is single, all matters

which are naturally and reasonably connected with it,

and all measures which will, or may, facilitate the ac-

complishment of the purpose so stated, are ny

included in the act and are germane to its title.

On the other hand, a restrictive title is one where a

particular part or branch of a subject is carved out and.

selected as the subject of the legislation. If the legis-

lature seeks this method, and notwithstanding.a gen-

eral title could have been adopted which would have |

—

ie.

’ ,

| conned the entire subject and authorized le

_ upon the whole of it, the body of the act must be con-

fined to the particular portion of the subject which is

expressed in the limited title..The courts caunot en-

large the scope. of the title. They are invested with no

_ ‘dispensing power. The constitution has made the title -

the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what

shall have operation. It is no answer to say‘ that the

title might have been more comprehensive, if, in fact,

the — hes not seen fit ta. make it-so. (Italics

mine ;

The major issue on this appeal is whether the title, as

worded by the legislature, gives adequate notice of the in-

for the applicant contractor to receive a “certificate of reg-

istration.” The title reads: “An Act providing for the re

tration of contractors; and prescribing. penalties.” The

i word in the title with regard to this ners is toes

tration.” * | |

The trial court reasoned in his memorandum opinion oo

“registration” is a word of relatively narrow meaning, and,

as used in the title of the act, in icates a listing of con-

tractors, but not.the regulation of contractors. The trial

court expressed the belief that the subject matter of the

provisions of sections 4 and 5, requiring bonds and insur-

ance, respectively, is related to and germane to regulation

but not to mere registration. Respondent has argued, and

the trial court believed, that registration is a much nar-

rower subject than regulation; that r tion is actually

only a part of an over-all program of regulation of con-

tractors created by this act.

| r ain the optidéa dat ihe tial ects 1 ndent-

are correct. Theirs is the most acceptable view of the prob-

lem—for to hold. that bonding and insyrance are germane

- to registration is to hold that “registration” and “regulation”

are synonymous. To me, the meanings of the two words

are clearly different. Registration connotes merely a listing

of contractors or, at most, an official certification list; regy-

lation connotes requirements and controls established for

’ clusion of requirements of bonds and insurance in order —

; ie en : :

the operation of a contracting business wide in a 22

; .

licensing of persons wy to engage in that occupation

‘upon their compliance with certain conditions.

_ has argued | that registration ist generic.” * The

; may be generic in 4 nce be

: Linde of registration for

lem is that registration odfenally |

general public or to the b

surance are required in o or a contractor to. obtain

a certificate of registration. Webster’ s Third Internationgd

Dictionary. (1961)-at 1912, gives several ‘meanings, none

of which is fpr ‘enough to give this kind of ‘notice. As

pointed out above, in referring to the appendix to this.

dissenting o y ered a careful examination of all. statutes.

enacted by the legislature pertaining to licensing or regu-

_ lation of various professions ‘or businesses shows that, in

every single instance where the state. requires bonds or

- insurance, the title either broadly refers to the subject .

matter by characterizing the subject as oo (i.e. re-

lating to the regulation or licensin an area of com-

-merce) or specifically: mentions te bond or insurance re-

quirements. -

Appellant also argues that iain and insurance may be

required as prer equisites to registration, and that, by simp-

‘ly using the word “registration” in the title; the public is put

on inquiry as to what the prerequisites to’ registration: are.

I agree that bonding and insurance may be made prerequi-

sites to‘registration if are included in the title. How- -

_ ever, I disagree with appellant's contention thet simply

because “registration” is to be required, the public is put

on inquiry as to the prerequisites of registration, re ess

of whether the prerequisites are germane to the word “reg-

istration.” I recognize that “registration” may give notice

of some prerequisites, such as supplying ic informa-

po (as hid. pet in section 3 of the act).. the registration

to “financial ability of contractors,” it might give

mabe that certain financial uisites were involved.

Sections 4 and 5 pertain to financial ability of contractors.

The subject of fivanctal ability is important in the regula-

tion of contractors—but it has relationship to registration

RE PRINTER wo Prenwe

Gr,

. - and registration are related to the

po preteen pg earl por ra par

rogder subject of regu- _

lation. Financial ability has no diggct, connection with.

registration, unless it is made a special prerequisite. to

qualify for registration outside the normal meaning of the

_ word registration itself. =~

”” “tT conclude, therefore, that the title of chapter'77, Laws

of 1963, is “restrictive” within the meaning of the Gruen

‘case, supra. 5 oe. ;

. Reference has been made to the appendix which cites the

statutes of this state regulating or licensing persons in cer-

tain businesses wherein bonds or insurance are required

as prerequisites. In none of the titles of these statutes does

the-word “registration” even appear, although a form of

registration through licensing is required as a part of the

system of regulation. Neither the sublic nor the legislature

has any warning or:any way of knowing of the broad re-

quirements and provisions of the act when the legislature

‘ suddenly introduces the new. and much narrower word .

“registration” rather than: broader words such as the word

“regulation” that has heretofore been used. The natural

inference is that the words “registration” and “regulation”

cannot and should not be construed synonymously because

heretofore “registration” has been only a possible (but not

-tiecessary ) part of regulation.

For the reasons stated above, I am firmly of the opinion ~

that the constitutional requirements of art. 2 § 19, have

’ not been met because the title is not broad enough in scope. —

Of course, courts can and should construe a word reason-

ably, but, as the court stated in Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n,

supra at 23: “The courts cannot enlargé the scope of the

title. They are invested with no dispensing power.” As I

read the majority opinion, this court is doing just that in

. . ; . _—

“The majority attempts to er ag see: gl with

“regulation.” It appears to me that’ the majority opinion

has assumed its answer to the constitutional issue by look-

ing atthe body of the act before it has determined the

eee eee

“ :

"meaning - the title, and has thus violated one of our basic

rules in the application of Const. ee ¥

The following quotation from the majority opinion dem-

onstrates this misconception of our rule:

; Boo reading the. title to this act, a ‘eontinctot en-

' paged in busines i in the state of Washington ‘would be

—- e whether his business was within the

view of

that he register, he would then reasonably seek further

‘information from the agt to determine whether he

qualified: for a certificate of registration. Section 4,

- supra, would put him on notice that, in order to’ qualify

» and be issued a certificate of registration, he would be

required to furnish a: Surety bond to the state for the

payment of the obligation, enumerated in § 4. Section

5, supra, would put him on notice that a public liability

: and property damage insurance policy is required.

Every legislative enaotinent requiring registration is

- an exercise of the legislature’s police power and is, by

its nature, regulatory of the sabjeck matter. The word

“registration” encompasses all dandy provisions

which the legislature enacts, in the proper e exercisé of

its police power. .

In the quoted portion of its opinion, I think that the ma-

jority is in error iri two-respects. First, it begs the qugstion —

in its first sentence, and later in its second paragraph, by

an ipse dixit su —s by no case authority, no examples

of statutes,

understanding of the word “register” as reflected by mod-

ern dictionaries. Indeed. the majority opinion appears to a

say that “registration” is broader in meaning and cormeta-

~ tion than “regulation,” pee it states that the word “reg-

istration’ encompasses all regulatory provisions which the

legislature enacts, in the proper its police pow--—

er. As explained ‘above, it seems to me much more appro-

priate to view regulation as the encompassing concept—

registration may be a ‘a put = not a necessary

e regulatory measure. ‘The first section of the aa

act would give him the answer. If his business required _

no reference to even the Gommon man’s |

part) of a regulatory echesto. The majority's use of these :

important terms seems to me, at least, inappro riate, and

ce illogical. How can an unnecessary part eater

Shane the whoue? : 8

The greater error, however, i is the second one, : when. the

majority states that a contractor may refer to the body of -

the act to obtain notice of what the act contains and thereby

attempts to show that its understanding of ‘the word “reg-

istration” is correct. This is a violation of oné of our: basic

rules for the anes of Const. art 2, § 19.

majority is stated in Great North-

672, 680, 10}; P.2d 985 (1940):

e In cena of thegugtion whether the title of |

an act is in compliance wi ee oe require-

em Ry. v. Cohn, 3"

ment invoked by .responden title must be con-

strued with referenoe to, the language used in the title

only and not in the light of the context of the act.

’ This rule was quoted with approval and resifirmed in

Gruén v. State Tax Comm'n, supra at 9.

The legal authority relied on by the majority for holding

that resort must be to the examination of the body of

the act in pve to understand the title appears to-be its

paraphrase of a part of a sentence in Rourke v. Department

of Labor & Indus., 41 Wn.2d 310, 249 P.2d 936 (1952).

-That opinion does not hold, or even suggest, by it treat-

ment of the case, that this court or a legislator or the public

must look to the sections or the body of an act to obtain: ~

notice: of what the subject of the act is. |

In the :Rourke case, in the next two paragraphs imme-

diately following the sentence paraphrased by, the major-

ity, this court stated, at p. 312: | ah

; A title may be general or restrictive, that is, it may

_- be either broad and comprehensive and cover all leg-

' islation germane to the general subject stated, or it may

be one in n Which a seca part or branch of the sub-

MW er oe

ects carved ot and selected asthe ub of the og |

islation.-Gruen v., State Tax Comm'n, ee

A testrictive title is not regarded as liber Hi ass

‘ “general one, and provisions of the bill which it does

not fairly embrace cannot be given: force.: Gruen v.*

State Tax. Commission, supra, p. hes

‘ By ‘these rules, we conclude that ‘the title of the

uestioned act is restrictive; and does not comply with

the second clause’of the constitutional vse hg

cause. it (1).does not give notice oo ee as /

employers, are affected by the act, but refers only. to

employees; (2) contains iio reference to medical and

surgical care, but only to compensation; (3) \does not .

mention charitable instifictions, but the body of the

act’ mentions ‘and. excludes. churches and. pieiiitenel

institutions, from its provisions; (4) is silent regarding

the workmen’s compensation law and does not indicate

that amendment of that law is intended, yet the act it- _

self refers tothat law for construction of the word

“extrahazardous” and for the determinations of com —-—

‘tributions and benefits, and purports to extend the

coverage of that law. (Italics mine. +)

We should aoe that the Rourke case was heard en banc.

__ There was only gne dissenter. 3 re

As I vdiitesendl the Rourke majority opinion, , this court

held that the title. was restrictive without looking at the

body of the act. It then held that several things, which

were plausibly related to the title but not included within

its scope, wére outside the title. For example, employers

_ were not given notice that they were within the scope of |

the act because the title oe SoA | only to “employees” even |

though it is obvious that « every “employee” must have an

| employer, as the dissent. in, that case points out. Withoat

- going: further into the details of the Rourke case, suffice ©

it to say that, in my-opinion, that case is no eothyety ke———

the majority's statement that the sections of the act give

notice to or inform anyone of anything. The constitution

requires that the subject of an act shall: ‘be — in :

Db.

ee eae in

» its ttio, whi 2 naturally eliminates the ee of the act as

performing is office. |

Of course, there is a valid: reason - sions to the

body. of an act when applying art: 2. § 19. One must look’ «

at the body of the act to determine if it is within the sco bop.

. of the title after one has determined the scope of the ti

But that is not what the majority has done in this case. .

. has confused the issue of the meaning of “registration” by

looking at ‘the. body. of the act to see if, after the court.

"learns what provisions the act contains, it can find any

plausible-connection of any’ kind. between those provisions’ -

and the title: That reasoning is contrary to the decisions

in both the Rourke case, supra, and the Gruen case, supra.

Yet, those are cases which constitute a part of the basic

authority relied, on: by the majority to support its position

in this case. No other cases. cited y the majority —

their approach. i ;

In summary, it is my opinion that the title of he bill

involved in this case violates the second mandate of Const.

art. 2 § 19, that the subject of the bill shall be expressed

in the title: For this reason, I dissent from the majority

opinion. I do not disagree with the majority as to the other

issues raised by respondent. .

I would affirm the trial court’s jadgment on this inane.

Ahereby effecting the dissolution of pending injunction

and the dismissal of the action.

ROSSELLINI, CG. j., concurs with Donwort, J. |

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE.

OF: WASHINGTON. IN AND FOR THE

COUNTY OF SPOKANE -

ROBERT C. TREFFRY, et al,

q 8 ee.

. LOUISE . TAYLOR, as Director of

Licenses of the State of Washington, »

Defendant,

THE ASSOCIATED GENERAL |

CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA,

SEATTLE NORTHWEST CHAP.

TER, INC.; HOME BUILDERS:

ASSOCIATION OF GREATER SE-

ATTLE, and HOME BUILDERS

ASSOCIATION OF GREATER

TACOMA, INC., 7

: : Intervenors.

: hae

+ NO. 17127F -

MEMORANDUM OPINION

* Hon. WM. H. Wits, Judge

January 20, 1964

The plaintiffs, some eight ion purportedly acting on’.

_ behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, bring:

this action and ask that the court permanently enjoin the

; , defendant, Louise Taylor, the Director of Licenses of the

"State of cn! from qahnotag Chapter 77, Laws of

1968, or any portions thereof.or in any manner performing

any act giving effect to the provisions of that said act, and |

further declare that’ Chapter 77, Laws of 1963 of the State

of Washington, is “ unconstitutional and also award judg-

_ment to the plaintiffs and all others similarly situated in the

amount of the sums of money, if any, they paid to the de-

fendant under the provisions of that act. Following the in- _

stitution of this:action the court-on September 9, 1968, al-

lowed the Associated General Contracts of America, Seattle »

Northwest Chapter, Inc.; Home Builders Association of |

Greater Seattle, and Home Builders Association of Greater

| Tacoma, Inc. to intervene.

Chapter 77, Laws of 1963, is an act which provides for

_ the registration of ‘all persons engaged in the contracting

business as defined -by the act. In. addition there are pro- >

“visions requiring the posting of a bond, the obtaining of —

liability insurance andthe giving of certain information

with reference to the busiiess.,The act also provides for _

_ certain priorities in actions against the bond required and

also the exceptions of certain individuals or firms from the —

provisions of the act. A’ violation of the act by a contractor

_exposes him to prosecution for a misdemeanor and also pro-

hibits him from the use of the courts of this state to en-

force any of the contracts into which he may have entered

in violation of the: act. .

Ttis the position of the defendant wll also the iidinaene,

that ‘the plaintiffs here have no standing i in court because |

there is no judicial controversy in existence, and likewise,

‘that this court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter of the

action. It is their saseceer that since the act has not actually

Re ae co

" béen enforced against the plaintiffs; there is no judicial con:

ae troversy and that what the plaintiffs are asking for is mére-

| ly an advisory opinion rather than a declaratory judgment:

“They also contend: that since the plaintiffs are asking for

money damages, ‘the action must be brought in Thurston

County as required by R.C.W. 4.92.010. It was the opinion

of the court at.the time the motion to dismiss was first

’ raised, that this court did have jurisdiction and it is still, of

that opinion. (State ex rel Robinson v. Superior Court, 182

Wash. 277; and Statejex rel Flemming v. Cohn, 12 Wn, 2d

_ 415) The question raised by the. prayer of the plaintiffs’

; complaint wherein they ask for damages against the state

need not be decided in view of plaintiffs’ contention at the -

trial that if-that portion of the: relief sought would: deprive

this court of gies: then ed would wae that it be.

stricken.

€

| As to the ‘iiiaiion of. chvethes’s or not ‘there is a judicial |

controversy present it is the court’s feeling that now as at

the time of trial, there is such an issue. The ‘defendant

stipulated that had the plaintiffs made application for a

registration certificate, they would -have been refused by .

| the Director of Licenses without first posting the bond as |

required by Section 4 of the statute. In view of plaintiffs’

_ testimony and allegations that they are unable to obtain a

_ bond arid further because of the self-execyting features of

| the statute. which deprived plaintiffs the use of the courts

_of this state to\enforce their contracts if they fail to register

in accordance‘ with the provisions of the act, it seems to

this court that a judicial controversy is present. Therefore, |

plaintiffs’ have standing in this court (Uhden, Inc. v.

affected by the law.

Greenough, 181 Wash. 412). hime defendants feel |

that plaintiffs should go through the formality of applying

for a certificate of registration without first having acquired

a bond and be.refused which defendant has stipulated

would happen, or else go ahead and participate in the con- _

tracting business and thus be guilty: of a misdemeanor and

have to suffer the consequences of having committed a

crime before this action can be brought to determine the

constitutionality of the act. - aA:

It js the contention of the plaintiffs that the act is un-

constitutional for the following reasons:

‘(1) It violates Article 1 of Sicilia 10 ‘of the United

_ States Constitution in that it impairs the obligation of con- -

tracts.

(2) That the effect of the acti that it takes property

~ without due process of law in violation of the 14th Amend-

ment of the United States. ‘onstitution, and Article i. Sec-

a 3 of the Washington State Constitution.

" (8). It violates Article 1, Section 12 of the Washingtén |

State Constitution and the 14th Amendment of the U !

States Constitution in that the effect of the act is deny

the ual protection of the laws to the plainiffs dit con- .

fers privileges and immunities upon

(A) It violates Article 1, 17 of the Was gtor

Constitution in that a violation (of the act would

imprisonment for debt under 2 of the act

; ot 3 %»

‘2(5) eins Article 2, Section’19 of the Washington

State Constitution in the bill embraces more thin the

one subject pet forth 1 the title of .” act.

_ In view of the court's a to plaintiffs’ 5th —"

final contention, it is unnecessary to discuss the first four.

— 2, Section 19, provides as follows:

“No bill shall embrace more than Gro sabiont and that

_ shall be included i in the title.”

It is plaintiffs’ position that the title of Chapter 77, Laws

of 1963, is a restrictive one and not general, arid that the

"_ provisionsof the act include subjects which do not fall with-

- in the restrictive title. The plaintiffs argue Section 4

providing for the furnishing of a bond ax{d Section 5.re-

quiring liability insurance, are not germane to or related in _

any way to the subject of registration. On the.

. defendants assert that the purpose of the act is the

‘tion of contractors and that the title contains only one sub-

ject, namely, registration and that the provisions for a bond

and liability insurance are part of the registration proce-

dyes and, therefore, germane and related to the general

purpose of the act. aa

The purposes of the constitutional. provision asa

tort enc aN apne So to apprise.

the people ger y concerning the subjects of legislation

being considered, and to prevent hodge-podge or log rolling

legislation. The title of an act need not be an index to the

fontents of the enactihent or express in detail every phase

of the subject dealt with in the act, but it is sufficient if

the title gives such notice as should reasonably lead to an

‘

Fed

a *

‘

a aa, |

‘

‘contend

"24

. inquiry into the body of the act itself, or indicates, to an

inquiring mind, the scope and purpose of the law (State .

ex rel Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 32 Wn.

2d, 18). A title may be general or restrictive, that is, it may

- be either broad and comprehensive and cover all legislation _

germane to the general subject stated, or it tay be one in

which a particular part or branch-of the subject is carved

out and selected as the subject of the legislation. A restric-

; tive title is not regarded as liberally as is a general one, and’

provisions of the bill which-it does not fairly embrace can-

not be given force (Gruen v. State Tax Commission, 35 Wn. -

2d, Sa ;

Y It appears to the court when you consider the act in its

entirety that its general purpose is to regulate the contract-

ing business. This is done by requiring the contractors to

(1) register, (2) furnish a bond or cash deposit; and (3)

furnish liability insurance. With these provisions the act

regulates the industry by limittng the contractors who may |

participate in it to those who furnish certain information

require for registration and in addition give evidence of

financial responsibility to the extent of $2,000.00 and lia-

bility insurance. To say that the ‘purpose of the act is to

“means the same as the word regulation. Registration is only

a part of regulation. To hold that it means what defendants

would be to unreasonably enlarge the mean-

ing and effect given it in the law. It has been defined as:

“The act of making a list, or catalogue, or schedule, or

dum of facts to serve as memorials or evidence.” 34

‘Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, 1026. .

eae

® |

“To register is to enter in a register; to record formally pe

and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list. As a noun,

the word means official record:” In re Plumb, 7 N.Y.

‘Supp. 492.

In our statutes the word “registration” is used interchange-

ably with the word “license” or “certify.” For example, af-

ter fulfilling the necessary educational requirements and

paying a fee, etc., under R.C.W. 18.74.040 one would be-

‘come a registered physical therapist, and under R.C.W. 18.

43.050, a registered ‘professional engineer. At the same time -_

under R.C.W. 18.32.090 one would become a licensed den-

tist, and under R.C.W. 18.25.020, a licensed chiropractor,

and under R.C.W. 18.83.080, one would become a certified

psychologist. These terms for all practical purposes mean

the same. ‘Any person desiring to work in those fields must

measure up to the standards of education, training, experi-

ence and ability required by the statute as a condition pre-

cedent to the issuance of the license, certificate of registra-

tion or certificate. Licensing and registration are concerned

- with and associated generally with the competency and

’ . ability of the applicant, not with his ability to furnish a

' bond, In the title of all of our statutes requiring a bond as :

a condition to the issuance of a certificate of, registration,

or license, either broader terms or a more detailed index of

- the provisions of the act are used than the bare reference

+o regulation, licensing or certification. Neither or both of

the terms, ““Relating to” or “Regulating” appear in all the

licensing or registration statutes. Also those statutes con-

taining a bonding requirement as a condition of doing busi-

ness but nbdt requiring a license or ‘registration,. contain

_ either or both of the above terms and/or a reference to.

9s © Vr fee

bonding in the title. scehiaeiinsiiei Mia registra-

tion’ " means in a more liberal sense, the same as “license”

or in the strictér senée-the en entering of names and informa-

tion in a register as hefetofdre defined. Under neither

‘meaning can bonding be considered germane or related to:

registration. . i,

Counsel has not cited nor has the court been able to find,

any precedent in the statutes or cases of this or any other

jurisdiction for including under the limited subject of regis-

tration, provision for bonding and insurance. The court has

reviewed all of the statutes cited by defendants which con-

tain bonding and licensing provisions, and also reviewed ~

all of the remaining Session Laws codified under Chapter

18 of the Revised Code of Washingtva and is unable to find

any instance where the legislature has given to the term

“registration” the broad meaning contended for by defend- “<

ants. The term registration is restrictive. It does not suggest

to a person that there will be any provisions in the act other

- than those ordinarily associated with registration as hereto-_ sees

_ fore defined and used inthe -statutes. * °

The case of State v. geen Taxicab ae Deane Co.,

90 Wash. 416, involved the constitutionality of an act en-

titled: : Pt, fe Pee

“An Act Relating to and Regulating Common Carriers

of Passengers Upon Public Streets, Roads and High-

ways, Providing for the issuance of Permits;.Prescrib-

ing Penalties for Violations, and _— When This

Ace Shall Take Effect.”

Section 2 of that act provided dist anyone peer ee a com-

mon carrier of passengers on public streets for hire had to

- -

post the surety bond in the sum of $2500.00. The State.

brought an action against the defendants and from 4 verdict

finding the defendants guilty of violating the act, they ap- .

pealed and questioned the constitutionality of the act on

the grounds that the title:

“Gave no hint that a ‘eid is to ve poigetend be-

fore they will be permitted to engage in the business

of carrying passengers.

The Court in disposing of that contention stated as follows:

uestionably the subject matter of the act is the

oe ion of common carriers of and the

requirement that certain classes of such carriers -hall

give a bond to cover losses caused by negligence in

the exercise of the business is not so far foreign to the

| subject as to be embraced in a title which re-

ers only to the general subject.” (Emphasis mine ) :

(From ‘that language it is apparent that’ the Supreme

Court has held that bonding is germane to the general sub-

ject. of regulation. With this I agree. ‘However, being ger-

~~. mane to regulation does not make it germane to registration.

Registration i is a more restrictive term than regulation and,

therefore, will not be regarded as liberally. From the reason-

_ ing of the: court it is apparent to me it would not give the -

same liberal construction to the term registration and the

im bonding features of the act, would, therefore, not be ger-

mane to that restrictive term. It is obvious from the lan-

guage used that the court felt that bonding was somewhat

foreign to the general subject of regulation but not so far

_ foreign as to make the act unconstitutional. You will note

that the court did not relate the bonding provision to that’

portion of the title providing for the “issuance of permits.”

| Ties timpninct of iieiilns nani tg tet: antleigaas t0 the

issuing of a license or registration certificate, but the court

did not hold bonding relating té that.section of the title but

7 instead held that it related to the serieral subject of “regu-

lation.”

__ Itis, therefore, my | ebbiclindtii: that the | term “registration”

is restrictive and that ‘the legislature through the title to

Chapter 77, Laws of 1983, has carved out a branch of the |

general sdbject of tegulation of contractors and, therefore,

the title cannot be regarded as liberally as if it were a gen-

eral one. In view of that it is the holding of this court that

| the bonding provisions. in Section 4 and the insurance pro-

eo. «f,e

: the subject of registration contained i in the title and, there-

fore, the bill is in-violation of Article 2, Section 19 of the

_ Washington State Constitution, in ‘that the act,contains

more than the one subject contained in the title. For that’

reason the act is unconstitutional and plaintiffs’ prayer-ask-

. ing for an injunction against the defendant, Louise Taylor

as Director of Licenses of aad state of Washington, will be

granted.

~ WILLIAM: H. WILLIAMS

. . JUDGE

29 “a

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF

/LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT ;

(The iccatiden cath phs and Finding of Fact I Te-

mit to the indentity of of ae anal contractors are omit-

FINDINGS OF FACT

_ y ie

This action was commenced by the named iii asa

class action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all

others similarly situated. There are one hundred eighty-

five other contractors who are residents of Spokane County,

‘Washington and who have similar claims against the de-

fendant, who knew of and consented to this law suit and

whe have authorized and delegated the plaintiffs to com-

mence this action on their behalf. There are additional

_other persons, the exactznumber and identity of whom is |

unknown, @ho have similar claims against defendant. As

to such additional persons, the laintiffs have taken all

reasonable steps to advise them of this law suit. The plain-

tiffs have interests in common with all such other persons

as to the issues raised in this law suit.

. ‘ Il :

The named laintiffs eaeianie: represent the ra de-.

scribed in Fg of ea No. II as to the issues raised in

this law suit: ~— So

~The members of the class described in viii of a

No. II are so numerous as to nak it rer. to bring

them all before the court.

c pint commenced this action on July 26th, 1963,

By enge the constitutionality of Chapter 77, Laws of

1963 of the State of Washington (herein referred to as “The

~ Act”), which was to- become effective on August Ist, 19638,

; 80, | |

’ to nies the enforcement of The Act and to seek a refund

of registration fees. After commencement of. this’ action,

plaintiffs voluntarily droppéd their prayer for.a refund of

ee .

VI.

_ The defendant is the | Director of Licenses of the State |

of Washington and was sued in that capacity.

Vil

In July, 1968, prior to the commencement of this action, _

~ plats, Treffry, Smith, Turnbull, Jamieson and Eb-

plied for the bond required by Section 4, of The .

Peet each of the said tiffs were refused a bond.

That the made a reasonable effort to obtain a bond as

required by Section 4 of The Act, but have been unable to

obtain the bond because of an inability to comply with the

- financial. Barros requirements established by the

* bonding companies which were contacted. That the reason

aii ) dher Soiled atend halk tp ceeded with thet

"credit reputations or ability'as contractors. The bonding

__ companies contacted are large, well established, reliable

and reputable — —: ~

VIil .

‘The plaintiffs Tornow and Koeppel aid not apply fora -

t pr rior to the commencement of this action, but ~

, ony ds that had the plaintiffs Tornow and Koeppel

be pliéd for a bond at that time they would have been re-

ae a bond for the same reason Treffry, Smith, Turnbull,

— and Ebright were refused. The plaintiff William

iis ar, Inc. was and is bondable un er The Act.

IX: fe : “

The court finds that the underwriting requirements were

stabilized throughout the a = that the primary

underwriting requirement fo nd is substantial net

- worth or substantial net quick assets on the part of a con-

- tractor and that this requirement must be met notwith-

standing the credit reputation and arora ability ;of

the contractor.

$1:

The underwriting requirements for a‘bond are that the

applicant must have a net worth of $25,090.00 if ke is seek- -

‘ing a $1,000. bond or a net worth of $35,000.00 if he is seek-

ing’a $2,000 bond, or in the alternative net quick assets of

$10,000.00 for a $2,000 bond or net quick Raney Coons

isn bond. ge

There i isa direct ia between ratgeth underwritin

requirements established b ies an

the conditions opscope of the oe to ry cen . The con-

ditions of the bond required by Section 4 of The Act are

such that the underwriting requirements are more stringent

than for other ae bonds required by this. state.

xO .

The plaintiff, Treffry, at all times lide material, had

no cash or negotiable securities or other assets of the

_ acceptable to the defendant as a a in lieu of the bond

required by Section 4. The. plaintiff Treffry has been un-

_able to obtain.a bank loan fans the Old And Bank in

Spokane to provide him with a sufficient amount of cash

to deposit to comply _— the requirements ot Section: 4

of The Act. .— :

That of the plaintiffs Smith, Turnbull, Jamieson, Ebright,

Tornow and Koeppel, some are in the same situation as

plaintiff Treffry. That ‘others of the plaintiffs could borrow

the funds necessary to satisfy the ya of Section 4

" The Act with varying degrees of difficulty. .

XIV |

If The Act is pe a the plaintiffs and others similarly

"situated will have to choose between going out of business,

or complying with The Act with the cere degrees ‘of

difficulty, or operate in violation of The Apt risking the

penalties in Section 2°and Section 8. | =

_ The defendant stipulated and the court finds it a fact

that the defendant would have refused to have registered

oe the plaintiffs had they applied for registrftion prior to July

4 of The Act. i

effective in the ‘interim.

. the defendant to register contractors, except it enjoined

29, 1968, without complying with the provisions of Section - |

* The Act, as originally written, would have gone into ef-

fect on Au 1, 1968. The original complaint in this ac-

tion was filed on fuly 26, 1963. On that date, this court

signed a temporary restraining order ex parte, enjoining the

enforcement of The Act. The complaint and temporary re-

straining order were served on the defendant and the At- -

torney General on July 29, 1968. After being served with

the temporary restraining order on id 29,1963, the de-

_ fendant, in obedience to the terms of that order, refused to .

further process applieations for registration and did not

further“ process any applications for registration until on.

or after August 5, 1963.

= XVII

’ Had thé plaintiffs applied for registration between July

29, 1968, and August 5, 1963; their applications would not

have been processed by the defendant. 3

On August 5, 1963, this court, after hearing argumeiit -

from the Attorney General and counsel for plaintiffs, signed

a temporary injunction which, by its terms, became effect-.

ive August 30, 1963, mig: ape temporary restraining order

temporary injunction allowed

the defendant from enforcing Sections 4 and 5 of The Act

and it required ‘the defendant to register contractors,

whether.or not.they complied with’said sections.

Between August 5 and August.30, 1968, all vf the named

: _ plaintiffs registered under the terms of the temporary in-

aoe

junction lertthout complying with Section: 4 of The Act.

aad registration fees were _ under protest. =

' Ai of October 4, 1968, 5,919 contractors had registered .

under The Act. Of these,.3,899 registered under the terms. ~

of the temporary injunction (without — sao Sec: ).:

tion 4 and/or SoA S ey Oe): |

. . “4 %

res | XXI -

If the enforcement of The ‘Ack - not permanently =

joined, the defendan Oy sogietay, the

do come and others similafly situated, ess they can ogee

comply ection 4 and all other provisions: of The > -

' 3 a ™ e ‘

~~" XE «

' - At the time of commencement of this action, and-at the

- time of trial and at the og timé, the plaintiffs intended

and intend to submit bids for contracting work, to con- —

tract for the pubiiinente of, contracting work, and todo .

work as contractors.

‘Because of the cieadtinnitan nature of their contracting

activities, all of the plaintiffs were or are engaged in the

~ contractual relationships before The Act became effective,

which will require them to perform work as contractors

after{The tetbecones ttfective, if its enforcemient is not

peatualls enjoined. ~

a2 gv? | |

The plaintiffs depend for their livelihood on iti work

__a8.contractors., | ,

a . : Xxx V ; si a

. These plaintiffs, and each of dime: ‘as good credit rec-

cords, regularly pay their debts,. are competent in their re- |

spective: ‘crafts, and their continuation. in a the contracting ~

ee Ne ee

_ suppliers, labor and materialmen’s liens to be fil

‘and to the several

> 34

business in no way harms or threatens-the health, safety,

morals or welfare of the people of the State of Washington.

XXVI

Certain parties, while posing as bs itimate businessmen

_ and members of the contracting industry, have through

fraud or false representations, bilked consumers of this

state of their property or monies.

. XXVII

Certain pasties wilh certain financially insolvent contract-

ors have caused, by their failure to pay their em 1 or .

on prop-

7 of citizens of this state even though these citizens had

y paid ms contractor.

Certain parties and certain financially insolvent contract-

ors have failed to pay their taxes to the Yate of Washingtén

Political — of the state.

XXEX

Certain parties and certain financially insolvent contract- |

ors have avoided their just obligations’to citizens of this

' state by fleeing the state when’ civil actions have been at-

tempted to be brought against them.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes

the followings he

; poe

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ~~

I Tee

This court has jyrisdiction over the sitsject matter of

this action and the parties thereto.

; — oe )

The plaintiffs have standinig to bring thig action at this

time.

MM\./ |

' This is a valid class action seu em on

behalf of all others similarly boa

(IV

By the terms of The Ac& the defendant is charged with

the administration of The Act, and the defendant is author-

ized to and vested with the duty to issue or refuse to issue

certificates of registration to contractors.

The defendant is a proper Sideihest for this action.

VI | St

. This lawsuit presents a justifiable [sic] eneaeay, and is

not a requést for an advisory opinion.

Vil

The bonding provisions in Section 4 of said law ‘al the

‘insurance provision in Section 5 of The Act are not germane

or related to the subject of registration. .

.Chap ptey 77, Laws of 1963 of the’ State of bicenges op

violates Article II, Section 19 of the Constitution of the

State of Washington and said act is, therefore unconsti-

_tutional. ;

oe eT Ce ee eee

2 | 36 q

Plaintiff's prayer for an injunction against the defendant,

as Director of Licenses of the State of Washington, will be

granted and plaintiffs shall recover their costs herein.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 24th day-of March,

1964.

JUDGE |

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.