Reply Brief for the Petioners — Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
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ae . ir ty. 3 Bthes- Supreme Court, U.S.
Ht risen ree ~T Uo & ee oe
IN THE FEB - — <
“Supreme Gonert of the Anited Stet 10s CLERK
OCTOBER TERM, 1964
“No. 443
>. .
>
. Hvaexes TooL Company
and
‘RayMonp M. Ho..ipay,
. Petitioners,
v.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
| Respondent.
ns
On Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
CouRT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
nee — anna
—— — a
_ REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
’ GHESTER C. Davis
. 120 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10005 ’
- Pau. A. PoRTER
. Victor H. KraMEr
; JABE KRASH -
Dennis ‘G. Lyons
, WERNER J. KRONSTEIN
_ DaNIEL A. REZNECK : |
1229 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 fi
tea for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
ANDREWS, KURTH, € AMPRELL! & JONES
Houston. Texas -
ARNOLD. Forras & PorTER :
Washington. DC.
February 26, 1965
>
Z
@ | &
‘TI.
INDEX .
In determining the jurisdiction of the courts’
over: the complaint of TWA, the dominant
facts alleged and not the conclusory allega-
tions of wrongdoing are controlling ......
The complaint purports’ to charge Tooleo
with a violation of the antitrust laws solely
by reason of its conduct in the furnishing of
aircraft and financing MK Saal RET
Dec. 31, 1960
PAGE .
TaBLE I—Acquisitions of Jet Aircraft to_
‘TABLE it Aeanteitions of Jet Aireraft to
Sept. 30, 1964
TABLE IfI—Acquisition® of Propeller Air-~’
eraft from Jan. 1, 1950 to Sept. 40,
1964 . Mi
Opposite page 10
The jurisdiction of the courts over the anti-
trust ‘violations charged by TWA has been
superseded by the CAB’s regulatory regime;
‘and the CAB’s orders provide a defense
against CRORG CUNNING ooo ce cece p onesies
. A. The provisions and legislative haters of
the Act confirm that the jurisdiction of.
the courts over the antitrust claims
_ charged by TWA has-been superseded by
the Board’s regulatory regime ........
B. Under the statutory scheme-the CAB
10
11
has the power to regulate every aspect of _
-- COB ane
ii
= . - PAGE -
any control relationship which it allows
_ and has done so here with respect to the
conduct forming the basis of the com-
RANE nnn nse Sue isccticccecenssees 16
~ IV. The prayer for treble damages does not vest
the District Court with jurisdiction ....... ' 21
Conelusion ...... cRtakunpednauned ip whi we ee + 28
; ANNEX A—Facts With Respect to Various. Mis-
statements by TWA .........65 055000005 la-18a
- ANNEX B—The luisa: of Aireraft *and Fin-
ancing by TWA and Other Transactions Be-
. fore the CAB Involving the Toolco- ‘TWA =
SIE © dienes send kesdacees rere. *, Lb-42b'
CITATIONS
Cases:
: Borer * Chapman, 119 U.S. 587 (1887) ...... 26
Cobaation Co. Vv. Pacific Westbound Conference, |
336 F.2d, 650 (9th Cir. 1964), petition for
cert. ‘filed 1964, O.T. Wh SN. 85s ceca cok 23. 26
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S.
at Bee eee ae are a ere 6n, 22
Federal Maritime Board vy. Isbrandtsen Co., 356
U.S. 481 (19: 38 )
Friedman v. United States, 310 F.2d 381 (Ct.
Cl. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932 (1963).. 27
ee
iii
vs ; PAGE >
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Cali-:
fornia Gas Co., 102 F.Supp. 685 (S.D. volt
(1952, aff'd, 209 F: 2d 380 (9th Cir.-1953) .-. . .5,23
Luckenbach SS. Co. v. United States, 179
- F.Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1959), —m 364 U.S.
eee rer Pee rrr ee 23-24
Missouri Pac. R. R.v. nee’ 292 F.2d 415 (Sth
Cir. 1961) ..... va ks cane ee aeeeetek cases 27n
N. V. Phillips Gloeilampenfabrieken v. AEC,
316 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1963) | eebawwnas cis. On
‘Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. U nited
States, oe & Fe) ar 22
Peak vy. United States, 353 U.S. 43 (195T) 2... 27
San Diego Building T rades Council y. Garmon,
. 339 U.S. 236 (3059) ........ PEE Pane ere 22n
Traine World Airlines,’ Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d
- 66 (2nd Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 941
CONES Nop i ewbudan vad scWadpececentcxncars 20M
United States Navigation. Co. Vv. Cunard S.S. Co.
ee ee Oe ES. Aico cc kann cicedceecs . .4, 22
. United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414 (1938) .. 26 eS
Statutes and Rules:
Air Mail-Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 936 00.0.0... ul
@layton Act, as amended; 38 Stat. 731, 64 Stat.
1125, 15 U.S.C. $9 12, ef seq.
Section 4(b) ...0....00.00: aces eile eae 26
ME eck cc ucwac Ruekhn se eeaaeae S wee BB
. ry
iv
_ ‘PAGE
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. $s 1301, 2 Seereeee |
Section.102.......... MuenaneaneCeastaces ‘14
Beetham GUS www scsi cncasss Sees eens seen 3
eS ee eeeea 19n, 25n
* Section 408(e) ............. re ree eat 19n
GO eee eee eee 16
Section 414 ....... fer ee ‘.4...14, 15; 17n, 21, 25
14 CER §902.4(f) ...2...... ORE A een 20
M4 CFR. § 3026 ...... pete eee ec —
14 CPR. $900.04 05.2 6........4... Beet okiats 20
14 C.ILR. § 302.18 te Soyer: .. #0
14 C.FLR. § 302. 37
. Miscellaneous;
Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, 102 U.. *
' + Pa LRev. Ue CUED. ix cancccccs ied y 4.. 24n
von Mehren, ‘The Antitrust Laws and Regulated
Industries®. The Doctrine of Primary Juris-
" ” diction, 67 Harv. L: Rev. 929 (1954) .. . '5-6,24n
Note, 64 Harv, L. Rev. 1154 (1951) ............ 24n
Note, 77 Harv. L. Rev. at 166 (1963) .2......... 24n..
IN _
Supreme Court of the United States
: OCTOBER TERM, 1964
No. 443
>.
—_
Hveues Toot Company
and
RayMonp M. HOouuipay, -.
Petitioners,
Vv.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., .
_ Respondent. ©
* ——___
S “ %.
Ox War oF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
CouRT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
- =
~&
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
This reply brief is made necessary by the implicit
distortions of the issues and the explicit misrepresen-—
tations of the record contained ‘in the brief of Trans ©
World Airlines, Ine. (**TW.A’’), and by the misunder-
standing. of the issues revealed in the memorandum. -
of the Civil Aeronautics Board (‘‘Board”’ or “‘CAB’’),
e
bt
-In determining the jurisdiction of the courts over
the complaint of TWA, the dominant facts alleged
and not the conclusory allegations of wrongdoing are
' controlling. ©
In determining whether -a- complaint alleges con-
duct within the jurisdiction -of. the CAB and in de-
termining. whether such conduct has been exempted .
-from the operation of the antitrust laws,, the use of
labels is not controtling.. Rather, what is controlling
are the *‘dominant facts’’ alleged in the ‘complaint
. as to. the conduct of the defendants. Otherwise the
artful pleader conki oust an agency of jurisdiction
_ and confer it on the courts by,-as’ here, paraphrasing
the statute. Otherwise the exemption. would be de-
feated by the very allegation of antitrust violations:
The basic fallacy in the briefs of TWA and of the
Board is the assumption that jurisdiction is deter-
mined by the conclusory allegations of TWA’s com-
plaint rather.than the conduct on w hich it is based.
TWA/’s brief states:
. the Board was never informed of the com-
bination and conspiracy by the defendants to
monopolize ‘the supplying of aircraft to TWA,
‘ nor was-it informed of Tooleo’s foreclosure of
competitive suppliers of aireraft ‘from the TWA.
market, rior of the arrangement whereby Tooleo
denied financing to TWA except on condition that
TWA acquire its aircraft. from Tooleo, nor of
Tooleo’s exploitation of a monopoly over the TWA
market to further its interests as a supplier of
aircraft to other carriers ....”” (TWA Br. p. 113)
Cc
«
® = . = 3.
The Board likewise refers to “the misconduct
alleged in the complaint’’ as if it were. sometliing sep-
- arate and digembodied from Toolco’s supplying of '
’ aireraft and financing: to TWA pursuant to Board
oe
. the claniedinnt alleged in the complaint
was ne more necessary to the consummation of
those transactions than St was ‘to the -origizial
_ acquisition of control.” (Memo. p. 16) %&
But in fact the ‘‘misconduct allege in the cemplaint”’
relates to the very dealings betwee. Tooleo and TWA
—the supplying of équijiment and finaneing by Toolco
to TWA—which the Board had the power to. regulate,
which in fact it undertook to regulate, and the course
-of which it approved in eighteen ordérs, See Point II,
~ éufre. : /-
The CAB assumes that it ian te not possibly have
approved or authorized the conduct of which TWA
complains, because the complaint alleges that it con-
stituted ‘‘an attempt to monopolize’, a *‘tie-in’’ and a
‘‘beyeott’’. What the CAB fails to recognize is that:
it has jurisdiction over conduct, not conclusions of
-law, that it authorizes or approves conduct, not the
name given by a pleader or even the courts. to that
conduct, and that what an érder under Section 408
‘of the Federal Aviation Act (‘‘Act’’) exempts from.
the antitrust laws is conduct and not epithets.
This Court and the lower. federal courts have re- .
peatedly recognized that allegations as to factual
conduct, and not the characterization of that conduct
as an antitrust -violation, control in determining ©
whether a complaint is within the jurisdictién of an .
administrative ageney ‘rather than the courts.
a
‘j
Pe
This Court has stated the test of jurisdiction to be
whether “the dominant facts’’ alleged as to-the de-
fendants’ conduct ‘are subject tg” regulation by the
administrative agency. Wnited States Navigation: Co.
, Cunard S.S. Co,, 284 U. S. 474; 483 (1932):*
In iashoitesh s. S. Co. Vv. United States,.179 F.
Supp. 605, 611 (D. Del. 1959}, aff’ as to this issue,
364 U.S. 280 (1960), the three-judge district -court
_ defined. the issue as whether ‘‘the precise facts form-
img the basis of. plaintiff ’s antitrust action are cogniz-
able hy the Comission,’ ©
. 2 »
Even w where, the conduct alleged may, on the face
of the complaint, appear to violate the antitrust laws,
the courts have no jurisdiction if such .conduct has
been committed by Congress to an administrative
agency for regulation. In Cunard this Court, re*
ferring to an antitrust complaint which on its face
>
charged a violation of the antitrust laws by reason —
of af alleged conspiratorial ‘‘agreement”’, said :
ment, and whether it be lawful or unlawful upon
its. face; Congress undoubtedly intended that the
board should possess the authority primarily to
hear aud adjudge .the matter. . . ..it is not in-
:, possible that, although an agreement be ap-
parently bad on its face, it "properly might,
upon a full consideration of all the att@nding
circumstances, be approved or ajlowed to stand
with modifications.’’ (284 U.S. at 487) .
’ x bo
* .* Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis in this Brief has
been supplied.
rf
; whatever may be the form of the agree- .
»
In Interstate Natural Gas ‘Co. vy. Southern Cali-
fornia Gas Co., 102 F.Supp. 685, 688 (S.D. Cal. 1952),
aff’d, 209 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1953), the edurt sum-
marized. the rulings of this Court on this question as
follows: . .
“ . . The Supreme’ Court has unifort
fused ‘to permit a party, under guise o suing
under the antitrust laws to seek in the courts, by
indirection, determiMations which are Yreserved -
for the Commission jn the first instance. Keogh
v. Chicago & Northwestern .R. Co., 260 U.S. 156,
38S. Ct. 47, 67 L. Ed, 183; Central Transfer Co,
v. Terminal Rhilroad <Ass’n, 288 U.S. 469, 53
S. Ct. 444, 77 L. Ed. 899; Terminal Warehouse
Co. v. Pacifie R. Co., 297 U.S. 590, 56 S. Ct. 546.
80 L. Ed. 827. . As these cases show, the plaintiff
cannot: meke its assault on a matter said not to
be within the jurisdiction of the Commission,
when adjudication must turn on matters .which
‘are within tts jurisdiction... .”’
A leading c6 commentator on the matter has developed
this suite as follows :
‘*) . [There is an important distinction be- *
=~ tw een motions to stay or dismiss based on primary
jurisdiction and those founded on other grounds.
In the latter situation facts properly pleaded are
considered to be adinitted for the purpose of the
motion; in the former such facts are not viewed
as so conclusive as necessarily to render the doe-
_ trine inapplicable, . . . [T]he face of a complaint
is not necessarily himling when a motion against
» the complaint based on primary jurisdiction is
made. It is generally Feeognized that an act
rs oy
tute a vidlation of the antitrust laws. This being
so, the pleader should not be able to oust the
jurisdiction of the agency.-simply by alleging a.
conspiracy or by. alleging activity of such agnature
that it is clearly unlawful whatever the standards
- goyerning competition in the industry may be.
> von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and
Regulated Industries: The Doétrine of Primary
Jurisdiction, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 943-45 (1954)
(footnote omitted) —
Thus, if the-eonduct to which: the complaint re-
lates is within the ambit which Congress has declared
should be ‘regulated: administratively, the matter® is
outside the jurisdiction of the court.* Similarly, if the |
administrative agency has determined: that the con-
duet alleged is in-the, public interest that conduct does
not become a violation of the antitrust laws because
the pleader characterizes ‘it as a “boycott”, 3 an ‘‘at-
tempt to monopolize” or a “‘tie-in’’. fe
v
<
* Even where this Court has found ‘that a practice eould not
‘be sanctioned under the regulatory act, when an antitrust suit
has been brought with respect to..such practice, the Court has
- held that. prior consideration? by the Board is required. See
_ Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) ;
Far East Eanference v.. United: States, 342 US. 570 (1952).
legal under the regulatory statute cannot consti-
&
The complaint purports to sli Toolco with a
- violation of the antitrust laws solely by reason of its
conduct in the furnishing of aircraft and tele
to TWA.
Counsel for TWA, in referring to the violations of
‘the antitrust laws alleged in the complaint, stated to
the District Court: ‘*The erux of-such violations rests
‘upon ‘Tooleo’s acts.and efforts, through the exercise
of its stock control over TWA, to control and dictate
the manner and method by which TWA acquired air-
craft. and the * necessary * finaneing therefor. -
(f. 134)
TWA’s’ chief executive officer on deposition de-
scribed the complaint as ‘‘based upon the fact that Mr.
Hughes had preempted to himself the procurement of
—— planes.and the financing of TW.A’s operations.’’ (See
\ - Tooleo’s Main Brief cat p. 89).
Since tlie exercise of control by a par ent over the |
procurement polici ies of its subsidiary hardly consti-
tutes a. basis*for claiming a violation of the antitrust
eS aa laws, TW A in its brief attempts to create the imprés-
=a sien that Tooleo has engaged in the 'usiness of supply- —
“yl ES ‘and financing to air carriers other than |
TWA. Such an effort necessarily fails because - (1)
‘the dominant facts alleged in the complaint relate
exclusively to the supplying of aireraft and financing |
“by Tooleo to TWA, and (2) Tooleo has never been a
supplier of aircraft to air earricrs ‘generally. The.
a : : : ¢
8
efforts of TWA to draw a contrary conclusion from
the record are based upon a.distortion of what appears
therein. hod | )
There is no allegation in the complaint that Toolco
has sold or leased any aircraft to-any air carrier other
than TWA.* Nor is'there any allegation in the com-
plaint that Tooleo has supplied any eit to any
air carrier other than TWA.
_ The claimed restraints of trade relate solely to the ©
supPlying of aircraft to TWA:
(a) The alleged boycott is a boycott by TWA
of all suppliers of aircraft other than Toold ;
°(b) The alleged tie-in is with respect to aircraft
to be furnished to TWA with financing for sueh.
aircraft ;
(c) There is no allegation of any monopoliza-
tion or attempt, to monopolize that part of the
_- market for aircraft represented by the require-
* ments of carriers other than TWA; and
(d)‘The alleged conspiracy with Atlas Cor-
poration had as its alleged objective the enlarging
of TWA’s requirements for aircraft. 7
TWA’s brief argues that what in fact Tooleo fore-
closed was a substantial segment of ‘‘the entire U.S.
* Six Boeing aircraft are alleged to have been ‘‘diverted’’ to
TWA’s principal transatlantic competitor (A13) anda lease of six
Convair aircraft to have-been ‘‘arranged’’ by the defendants (A14).
These carefully chosen words are designed to obscure the fact
that the salé and lease were made by the mant@&cturers and not
by Tooleo. The details of these transactions as shown in the
record are set forth in Annex A hereto. This Annex also ecor-
rects various other of the more flagrant errors and misstatements
with respect ‘to . the supplying of aireraft contained in: the
Counter Statement of the Case in TWA’s Rrief?
~
.
9
market for U.S. manufactured civilian jet transport
aircraft generally’? and ‘‘the entire U.S. market for
U.S.. manufactured civilian transport aireraft’’
(TWA Br. 138). However, the next paragraph of .
TW.4A’s brief makes it plain that all that the complaint
is talking about is the ‘tpreelusion”’ caused by Toolco’s
control over the furnishing of aircraft to TWA: ‘The
percentages of preclusion alleged [in these markets]
ranged from about 12.5‘7 of all aireraft sold to U.S.
flag carriers (based on TWA’s 12.56. of passenger-
-miles flown in 1960 by scheduled U.S. flag carriers)
to 100°, of TWA’s total jet aireraft requirements.”’
(TWA Br. 138).
Obviously TWA is now embarrassed by the ab-
‘surdity of its claim that Tooleo could violate the anti-
trust laws by furnishing aireraft to TWA. In light
of the undisputed faet that Tooleo has never been a
manufacturer of transport aireratt and thus has not
been in competition with those who do manufacture
aireraft for air carriers, it is diffienlt for TWA to
devise anx restraint of trade at, all. Competition —
among -‘manufacturers is no more restrained if the
needs of TW for aircraft are filled through orders
placed by its parent Tooleo than if the orders ‘are
placed by TWA. On the face of the complaint it ap-
pears that TWA acquired Boeing jet aireraft’ and
Convair jet aircraft. Boeing and Convair were there-
_ fore not excluded from the TWA market. No air
earrier heught aircraft from all manufacturers. There
is no ‘‘hoveott’’ of. suppliers of aircraft or ‘‘tving
arrangement’? or ‘“‘attempt to manopolize’’ unless
trade among competitors is restrained. Here it was
not. : : : :
10
For TWA to claim, as a way out of its dilemma,.
that Tooleo was a supplier of aircraft to air carriers
generally would:be a fraud on the Court in the face.
of the facts which are of public record. The attached:
‘TABLES summarize information contained in public
records of the CAB and demonstrate that Tooleo. had
“not sold or leased a single aircraft to a trunk carrier
‘other than TW.A‘prior to the filing of the complaint.*
The jurisdiction of the courts over the antitrust
violations charged by TWA has been superseded by
_ the CAB’s regulatory regime; and the CAB’s orders
Seems a defense against those claims.
It is the position of petitioners:
(1) That possible restraints of trade, bv per-
sons engaged in a phase of*aeronauties with re-
spect to an air carrier controlled by them,.is a
subject which has been entrusted by Congress ‘to.
the regulatory regime .of the Board, and hence.
the antitrust laws are not directly enforceable
with respect to such restraints; and
(2) That through its two orders permitting
Tooleo to control TWA, and through its 18 orders -
approving ali the aircraft acquisition and financ-
ing transactions between Toolco and TWA, the
* Sine ‘e that date ‘the only such sale or lease of air eraft by it has
been that of four aircraft leased to NortheaSt | Airlines, Tne.
(‘‘Northvast’’) after Tooleo had acquired conttol of Nortiteast
with CAB approval. These leases were approved by the CAB
(see Order No. E-20989 (June 25. 1964) ).
e
_ TABLE I
TOTAL ACQUISITIONS OF JET AIRCRAFT BY U.S. DOMESTIC
* TRUNK CARRIERS AND PAN AMERICAN, *
To December 31, *960!
- 9
ACQUIRED FROM ACQUIRED FROM
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS OTHER ‘‘SuPPLIERS”’
= Boeing -Convair Douglas Jetair Sub ; a
e (707;720) ~880) (DC-8) Ine. Total Tooleo Total
CaRRIERS: sal Cay Se
American 35 — — — . a ene 35
Braniff ; 4. — —- — 4. None 4
Continental 5 — ~ _- 5 -.None 5
Delta wt, 6 — 14 None. 14
Eastern =: — 11 — 11 None 11
National — — 3° =— 3 None te
Northeast’ . — -4 _ a 4: None. 4
Northwest — — 4 — 4 None’ 4
Pan Am 29 — 16 12 46 None 46
TWA —_ — —_ [. = — . 28
United 13 — .- 45 None 45
Western — — — — — : — None —
Total — 86 12 72 1 171 28 199
- ; D . ~
we ° Ds .
‘1 Source: Schedules B-7 and B-43 to CAB Form 41 Reports filed quarterly by
the above-mentioned air carriers and agreements filed’ with the Agree-
ments Section of the CAB. See 14 C.F.R. § 241-22. Includes leasing
arrangements other than interline Ieases. For example, Boeing 707
aircraft were leased to. National and Northeast by Pan .\m and TWA,
respectively. ;
2 One DC-8 was leased by Pan Am from Jetair. Jetair was formed in April 1960
by Panagra and W. R. Grace & Co. 1962 Moody’s Transportation Manual,
p. 1829. : . .
3 Includes 7 Boeing aircraft purchased from Boeing under contracts assigned
to TWA by Tooleo. Of the remaining 21 aircraft, 20 are Boeing 707s and
one is a Convair 880. ;
CARRIERS:
American
Braniff
- Continental
Delta
Fastern
National
Northeast
Northwest
Pan -Am~
TWY re
- United
Western
Total
1 Source:
el
‘ TABLE II
TOTAL ACQUISITIONS OF JET AIRCRAFT BY U. §. DOMESTIC TRUNK _
/ CARRIERS AND PAN AMERICAN
‘To September 30, 19641 ; ‘s ig °
AcquiIrRED From OTHER ‘‘SUPPLIERS’’
‘
Acqurirep From AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS
_ Boeing Convair Douglas Sud Other Air “Miscellaneous Sub.
(707 ; 720;727) (880;990) (DC-8) (Caravelle) _ Carriers! Suppliers - Total Tooleo Total
* 70 20 — —_ — — 90 None 90
9. . _ — — an — 10 None 10
13 —- — — — _ OK None 13
—_ 17 13 _ _ — 30) None 30
23 _ 15 — — 114 49 None 49
— — 11 —— — 11 None 11
— 64 —_— — — ~ — 6¢ =45 104
25 — 5 a — 30 None 30
52 — S&S — 22 16 74 None 74
42 64 — — —_ gz" 56 . 478 103
30 . _ 42 20 a a 112 None 112
12 — en ce — .: — ee None 12
296 434 105 - 20 3 20 487 51 5384
Schedules B-2, B-7 and B-43 to , CAR Form 41 Reports filed quarterly by the above-mentioned air carriers, and
agreements filed with the Agreements Section of the CATR. See 14 C.F.R. $241.22. Includes leasing arrangements
other than interline leases. In order to avoid double counting. transactions among the enumerated.air carriers .
have been excluded from the computations. For example, Eastern has leased from Pan Am four DC-Ss and
Northwest has sold four DC-Ss to National. .
2 One Boeing 720 was purchased by rane | from Aerlinte Eirann Teeranta and two T2Us were purchased by’ Pan Am trem:
Lufthansa. — “
Ten Boeing 720s were leased by Eastern from the Prudential Life Insurance Co. ‘and one DC-& orem Bank of America.
The agreement between Eastern and Prudential was filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission on May 1, 1961, and .-
discloses that the transaction was entered into to enable Eastern to carry out: its contract with Boring to < daeaaed these
aircraft.
-
4 These aircraft were leased by Convair to Northeast beginning in 1960 ; in 1963 all of the aircraft were repossessed by
Convair and sold to TWA; thus only one of the transactions is in¢luded in the tetals.
5 Four CV-880s owned by Toolco have been leased to Northeast pursuant to CAB approval. See Order E-20089 {June'25, 1964).
6 One DC-& was leased by Pan Am from Jetair. Jetair is a corporation which was formed in April 1960 by Panagra and
. W. R. Grace & Co. 1962 Moody’s Transportation Manual, p. 1329.
ts
7 Five Boeing 707s were leased by TWA from Boothe Leasing Corporation between November 1, 1962: and March 12, 1963.
Boothe is a subsidiary of The Greyhound Corporation and leases *
[the] lessee. . .
. equipment purchased from manufacturers chosen by
” 1964 Moody's Transportation Manual, p. 1173. Three Boeing 707s were purchased from See Jet, Inc. in »
1964. On December 26, 1963 the CAB held the proposed conditional sale arrangement exempt _— Section 408.of the Act.
Order E-20804. These aircraft were originally ordered by TWA from Boeing. e
8 This. includes 19 Convair and 7 Boeing jet aircraft acquired by TWA directly from the respective manufacturers under
- contracts assigned to TWA by Toolco in December 1960. (A-21- 3-27). of the remaining 21 aircraft, 20 are Boeing 707s and
one is a Convair 880:
; : oe . . TABLE I
ae gr . ca 1
TOTAL ACQUISIFIONS OF PROPELLER AIRCRAFT BY U.S. DOMESTIC .
TRUNK CARRIERS AND PAN AMERICAN
os .
From January 1, 1950 to September 30, 1964!.
ACQUIRED From .AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS © - Sri A cQuIRED From OTHER ** SUPPLIERS"
v- Lockheed Sakae .
| ° Douglas (049; 649 ; . : Other, =.
Boeing Convair (DC-3; DC-4; . 749; 1049; ‘ Martin . Vickers Air Mise. . Sub
* (377) (220; 440) DU-6; DC-7 > 1649; Electra) (202:404) (Viscount) Carriers! ‘Suppliers Total Tooleo Total
‘CARRIERS : :
“ American _ — 88 35 _. _ 3B — 124 None 124
Braniff — 30 10 11 — —_ 4&5 GF +6 61 None - 61
Continental _ 10 8 , — _ >. 15 _ 23. «8635 ~~) None 35
Delta? . — . 28 . . eB PaaS .- —_— — — .- 38 + 61 None 61
Eastern? ee 20 49 80 60 one — 53 . 214 ‘None 214
National ° — Ht) an 18 — — — — 45 None 45
Northeast — _— 10 — — 11 — ~ 68 27— None - 2
Northwest _— — 26 > 21 : —_ 73 123 ~ 66 None 66
Pan Am - _ 4 73 — . — — 63 13 84 None 84
TWA _ —. _— dD 52 — 7 3 115 oa.
United? Deere D4 _.. 106 : 8 _ - 69 al 48 250 None 2350
Western — — ' _ See 2 ~ — a — 44. None’ +44
Total 2 155 2 246 112 8 ..: @ 39 «1126 5518
— — = a
1 Source: Schedules B-7 and B-43 to CAB Form 41 Reports filed quarterly by the above-mentioned air carriers. See 14 C.F. $241.22. Theludes leasing arrangements other
’ ‘than interline leases. In érder to avoid double counting. transactions among the enumerated air carriers have been excluded from the computations.
2 Includes acquisitions by predecessor airline companies (Chicago & Southern, Colonial and Capital).
3 Douglas aircraft were made available. to certaip of the carriers by the ‘following Bg gy ell U.S. Government (3 to Eastern: 1 to Pan Am); Advance Industries (2 to
Braniff; 1 to Continental): Air Transport Carrier (S tv Northwest }.: Fred B. Ayers & Associates 6 to Northeast): /nfernational Airports (1 to Continental): John Mecla
Industries (1 to Northwest) ; Los Angeles Air Service (2 to Braniff: 1 to Northwest) ; Pacific Air Motors Corp. (2 to’ Northwest); Salem Engineering Corp. (2 to United) ;
Tezras Enginecring Manufacturing Co. (2 to Eastern): U.S. Steel Corp. (2 to United): Philippine Air Lines (1 to American); Transocean Air Lines (2 to Northwest) ;
yemcpy art (2 hd Northwest) :.Compagnia Mezricana dv Aviacion, S.4. (2 to Northwest and 1 to Pan Am): 4e rovias Guest (1 to sertherpat) : Slick Airweys (2 to Pan
); Panair (3 to n Am). : ;
4 Lockheed eat were made av nilable to certain of the constere ad the following “suppliers”: U.S. Gorerhment (1 to TWA?: Master Benipnent Co. (2 to TWA);
BOAC (7 to United); Viasd Intl Ajricaus (2 to Braniff). . , _
5 Two Convair aircraft were made available to Braniff by Philippine Air Lines.
6 Curtis-Wright aircraft were made available to certain of the carriprs by the following “suppliers” : L.-B. Smith & Co, (2 to Braniff): Robert Heacitt Associates (5 to Delta).
7 Five Martin aircraft were made availabk to TWA by Pacitic Air Lines, Inc. ;
. , 8This figure consists of the following equipment manufactured by Lockheed: : ‘six L-'49s, two L-649s and one L-749, eight L-1049s and twelve L-1649s sbdid ‘by Toolco to
TWA (see A-179, A-183, A-185): thirteen L-1649= assigned to TWA under contract between Lockheed and Tooleo (.A-185): the sublease of five L-1049s froni Tuvoleo and .
the guarantee by Tovolco of WA's obligations arising from the purchase of four L-1049s and four L-1649s from Lockheed (R. 359-64: A-196).— ,
- . o
° t
ut
Board exempted from the antitrust laws the - very
» eonduct which underlies TWA’s allegations of
| wine violations. .
A. The provisions and legislative history of the Act con-
firm that the jurisdiction of the courts over the anti-
rye: ace: fr amma mamatatade varanasi
the Board’s regulatory regime.
- The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act
“(reviewed at pp. 53-61 of Tooleo’s Main Brief) fully
reflects the Congressional intent that the antitrust
laws should have no application to assistance given to’
an air carrier by one who acquirés control of that car-
- rier with CAB approval.. Congress relaxed the abso-
lute prohibition in the Air Mail Act of 1934: against
eontrol of an air carrier by.a person engaged in a
phase of aeronautics.’ It did so for good reason. Con-
gress recognized that despite the evils which had
" arisen in the past from contral of: air carriers by air-
craft manufacturers, the assistance which coulil be
given by a person engaged in a.phase of aeronautics
to a fledglipg airline would result in strengthening the —
-air transport industry and in fosteri ing sound competi-
. tion among air carriers. .
The Tooleo-TWA relationship exemplifies why
‘ Congress permitted one engaged in a phase of aero-
nauties to acquire control of an air carrier free from .
the antitrust laws with respect to restraints which
night arise from the exercise of control. The policy
permitted TWA‘s growth and the establishment of
TWA ys an effective competitor, particularly in’ the
international tield.* This growth and the competition
fostered thereby wére mad¢ possible by the contribu-
«tions of Tovleo in the supplying of equipment and
. financing to TW.A, the very conduct whieh TW.A’s
present management clainis | was interdicted | by the
antitrust laws. .
Iy'the period from? 1939 through 1960 TWA. ae-
—— valned at more than $370 million
either with -Tooleo’s financial assistance or through:
Tooleo; the total of Todoleo’s guarantees (including
guarantees of loaus and contracts, underwritings of
bai offerings, and guarantees of working capital: or
nek worth) exceed $220 million and Todleo made cash
loans to TWA of $110 million.**
‘It cannot be a coincidence that the order of the
CAB which authorized Tooleo—a dealer in aircfaft
by virtue of the contracts it liad made for Constella-
tion aircraft—ta control TWA was entered only a
few months after TWA had applied for a certificate
- to compete with the dominant flag, carrier, Pan
American, and its smaller competitor, American
Overseas Airlines. inthe transatlantie’ trade. The
qusmmesteneale : ; 7
* The growth of TW. under the control of Tooleo may be shown
by the following statistics taken from’ the 1960 Annual Report of
the CAB. the 1940 financial statement of TWA (se f. 20541). and
the Handbook of Airline Statisties (CAB 1963) :
1939. 1960 “c Increas»,
. Route Miles . 6.000 - 60,000 VM)"
Revenue Pass, Miles 100.195,000 —5.490,000,000 —5,400°7
Net > Worth $ 5.300.000 =$:126,000.000 «2.300%
Total Assets > $10,000,000 —- $ 453.000,000) 4.400%
Operating Revenue” $ 7.906.000 . $377.000,000 4.700%
Net Profit loss) .
before taxes @ ($ 188000) $ 15,219.00) © —
** No elimination has been mad» for duplication among the
~ three categories. ‘See Annex B, infra. :
-
13
CAB approved TWA’s international certificate in
July 1945, and as the CAB recognized in approv-
ing Toolco’s acquisition of further control, TWA
would not have met the burdens imposed by the
Commencement of international service without the
assistance of Tooleo in the acquisition of aircraft
and financing. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Fur- .
_ ther Control by Hughes Tool Co. 12 C.A.B.. 192
(1950). The subsequent order of the CAB which ap-
proved the increased eontrol was entered in October
1950, only a few mouths after Pan American was per- .
mitted to purchase American Overseas Airlines under
a stern injunetion from President Truman that
TWA2Ls competitive position must ‘he preserved in the
national interest.*
TWA’s competitive position was preserved and im-
proved -hy Tooleo’s assistance -and : under Tooleo con-
® The President's letter teads as follows:
‘*July 10. 1950
‘*My dear Mr. Ryan:
“T have considered the letters from you and the other Board
members in response to my request of June 30. 1950. “in the
North Atlantic Route Transfer Case.
‘*My objective is to accomplish a route pattern in whieh our
. nation may have the benefit of competition to the principal traffic
points in Europe. and. to avoid a monopoly on the part of either
of the United: States carriers.
“Tt is apparent that. as traffic points, London, Paris. Rome.
‘and for the time being Frankfurt are the leading European
cities. Therefore I desire that both remaining carriers be author-
ized to serve each of these poipts. In the ease of Rome, which
one of the carriers now setves both on its Shannon and its Lisbon
routes, the ether carrier should be similarly authorized. As to
Frankfurt which is a principal air traftie point during and prin-
cipally because of the American occupation of Germany, the TW.A
is to serve Frankfurt until the Board shall find that. such service
is no longer required in the interests of the American occupation
of Germany.
** This one should. result in the fullest accpmplishinent
6
eek ae ce
«
“trol, Howevie, in 1963 the lender-controlléd manage--
ment of: TWA entered into ancagreement with Pan
American which would have provided for a consvlida-
tion of :the operations of the two. airlines.*
The intent of Congress to promote the coat: of
the industry is reflected in the basic policy statement *
found in Section 102 of the Act. One of the ways:
this was.to be accomplished was by atthorizing the
Board to permit assistance to air carriers by persons
engaged in a phase of aeronautics free from the re-
‘straints imposed by the antitrust laws. Thus, Con- .
gress in Section 414 of the Act provided immunity
_ fronr all ‘provisions of the antitrust laws.
TWA would frustrate the Congressional intent by
Jimiting the immunizing effect of the Board’s orders’
of the broad national objectives ‘which; especially at this critical
* time, should ‘govern the developntent of United States air trans-
portation and will provide for. vigorous competitive’ growth ‘by
our air’ lines.
- ‘It is most important that this matter be disposed of in the
‘present proceeding without further delay in order that the ecar-
riers concerned may immediately go - ‘forward with plans for
their’ needed further development.
‘‘Therefore, I have decided to approve the sale of Anierican —
/Ovyerseas Airlines with the route adjustments - Set: forth - above.
Please submit an order at. once.
: “Very sincerely yours,
— Harry S. Truman
“Mr: Oswald Ryan
Acting Chairman
Civil Aeronautics Board
Washington 25, D. C.’’
Tram World Airlines v. CAR, isd F.2d 66, 69. n.2 (2nd Cir. 1950),
— petition for review of North Atlantic Route, Transfer
Case, 11 CNB. 676 (1950). .
-* The application to the CAB for approval of this agreement was
withdrawn only after Toolco had filed its complaint with the CAB,
alleging inter alia that three of the directors of Pan American were
also directors of one of-the two insurance , companies which have
the power to control TWA..
a
”
‘making of an investment’in an dir carrier by a person-
ei
' 15
authorizing and ‘approving an acquisition of control.
The. position of TWA appears to be that the transac-
tion resulting in an acquisition of: eontrol is immunized
from the antitrust laws bnt that any exercise of the
control so acquired is subject to all of the provisions -
of the autitrust.laws. However, both the provisions -
such a contention.
Certainly the exemption affurded by the Board’s
control orders was' not intended to cover only the
engaged in a phase of aeronautics. Congress can
‘and the history of the Act demonstrate the iad of.
hardly have intended to immunize from the operation |
of the antitrust laws that which could not be a viola-
tion.* Section 414 necessarily must have interided to
‘immunize an acquisition of control violative of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. s°
Furthermore, if Congress «had intended to limit
the exemption afforded by Section 414 to possible
violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act by reason °
of an acquisition of control it would have said so.
That. the exemption is from all the antitrust laws is
perhaps the most convineing proof of. what Congress
be pefmitted to exercise control free from\ the re-
_ straints which the antitrust lays might impose, sub-
ject only, to regulation by CAB. It is the responsi-
_bilitv of CAB. and not of the courts, to regulate the
eontrol relationship—at ‘least with respect to thai
.* Seetion 7 of the Clayton Act by its own terms is inapplicable
“to corporations purehasing . . . Stoek -solely for investment
and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about.
or in an attempt to bring about the substantial lessening of compe-
tition.’
‘intended. Congress intended that the controller should -:
16
line. of trade or commerce constituting, the ‘*phase
of aeronauties’’ in which the controller is engaged.
This Congressional purpose is further shown by
the exemption afforded to interlocking relationships
between a person engaged in a phase of aeronautics
and an air carrier; approved under Section 409 of the
Act, since control may be exercised through such
_ relationships. f |
B. Under the statutory scheme the CAB has the power to
regulate every aspect of any control relationship which
it allows and has done so here with respect to the con-
duct forming the basis of the comptaint..
The -Board twice approved Toolco’s controlling
TWA, noting in its orders that Tooleo was a **dealer
- in aireraft’’ and was participating in the supplying
of aircraft and financing to TWA. However, the _
‘Board’s,approval was subject toa strict condition re-
quiring that Toolca and. TWA report, and obtain ap- -
proval of, every commercial transaction betw een them
involving more than $200.
The purpose of this stringent condition clearly was
‘to afford the Board continuing control and surveillance
over Tooleo’s dealings with TW.A. It was imposed
as an alternative to a condition. suggested by. the
Board’s public counsel, which called for the automatic
termination of, the control relationship if Tooleo en-
gaged in certain commercial’ transactions with TWA.
(R. 663, R..701; Tooleo Main Brief. pp. 14-15).
Under the conditions imposed hy the Board, Tooleo
was not free to enter into any arrangement’ with
17
TWA—ineluding any whereby it would become the
sole supplier of aircraft or financing—without obtain-
ing Board approval since every transaction was sub-
ject to obtaining approval by the Board. Further-
more, it Would be a violation of the orders of the
Board, and therefore of the Act, to ebtain approval
of any transaction between Tooleo and TWA without
submitting to the Board all relevant aspects of each
such: transaction.
There has in fact been no ebenetions by either TWA
_or the Board that there were any seeret, unreported
transactions between Tooleo and TWA, and in the
light of the regulatory goldfish bowl in which this re-
lationship has existed, there could ‘hardly have been
any. TWA expressly states that: ‘TWA does .not
contend that the Federal Aviation Act has been vio-
lated or that ‘it-is entitled to anv remedy thereunder
with respect to defendants’ practices.’’ (Br. p. 12).
Similarly, the Board has specifically found that Tooleo
did not violate the Act in its renakone with TWA
(Memo p..18).
The CAB agrees that its control orders ‘and various
modifications thereof “permited Toolco to sell or lease
equipment to TWA and to participate in the finaneing
of TWA’s acquisition of equipment’? (Memo p. 4).
The Board bv eighteen senarate transactional: orders
approved all the aireraft aequisition and financing
transactions hetween Toolco and TW A.* The Board
—
® Exe pt for ‘the very early wldvite. the orders uniformly state
that they ‘*permit’’ the transactions requested. All the orders,
iti permitting a specific transaction of a type prohibited by the
control order, obviously bring into play the langnaye of § 414
which provides an antitrust exemption ‘‘to enable such person
to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order.’
(emphasis supplied )
a)
18
°
does not dispute that these orders exempted from the
operations of the antitrust laws the transactions which
it authorized and aepreme.
The CAB cautiously insists that j it did. not exempt
any transactions, agreements, or understandings other
than those which it approved. But, as previously in-:
dicated, by admitting that Tooleo has not violated the’
Act, TWA confirms what is the fact: That there were
no transactions, agreements, or understandings not
submitted to the CAB, and no relevant aspects of the
transactions, agreements, or understandings which
were submitted which were not revealed.* .
As the memorandum of the CAB recognizes (p. 13),
‘tthe CAB may at any time terminate a control relation-
ship “if, upon inquiry, it finds abuses of control which —
require such corrective action in the public interest.’ i
- Itis important to note that CAB also states:
~ “The Board’s failure to initiate an investiga-
tion into Toolco’s control relationship may. be
taken as reflecting the Board’s judgment that, at
‘ that tume and on the facts available to it, Toolco
had not misused its control.’ (Merfio p, 18). Cf.
Toolco-Northeast Control Case, Docket 11620,
(Order E-18470) (R. 833). eee
¢ 3%
Any material change in the phase of -aeronauties in
which Tooleo was involved, or the suggestion of any
--such change, would be.grounds for the Board’s. open-
* The complete chronology of ‘the Tooleo-TWA rélationship as
reported to the CAB is summarized in annee B. infra.
19
. Ing up its orders permitting the contro] relationship.
(Tooleo Main Brief, p. 49. *
Tooleo does not contend, as the CAB suggests, that
the-CAB has the duty to supervise the day-to-day
management of ‘the carrier or to monitor every exer-
cise of control. But the least the CAB knew was
when and from whom and on,what terms TWA ac-
quired aircraft and when and on what terms Tooleo
supplied financing to TWA.
Moreover, TWA has been. free, and is today free, to
present to the CAB any facts of whieh it claims the
CAB is not aware and which it believes would permit
or require the Board to modify any of its outstanding
orders. TWA has not done so. So long as these
orders remain qutstanding the antitrust laws have no
application to the conduct alleged in the complaint.
One shocking aspect of TWA s brief is its denigra-
tion of the transactional erly which approved all
the equipment supplying and financing transactions
between Toolco and TWA. TWA points out that the.
orders were entered in most cases without an .evi-
dentiary hearing or oral argument: (TWA Br: p. 114)
'~ Even the Board sees fit to comment that ‘‘the onlers
were entered solely on the basis of motions filed’ by
TWA and without hearings or adversary pleadings. ’
= Memo. p..4) _
* It will be recalled that we. in 1956, Tooleo gave ‘con-
sideration to engaging in the manufacture of jet aircraft, the
Board entered into an investigation of the matter ynder § 408(e)
with a view toward considering whether a specific approval of
the change in activities of Tooleo as a controlling party should —
he requirgd_nder § 408(b). (See Tooleo Main: Brief. pp. 27.28).
. > ~ 3 : .
uA Seana BPRS Pt Se ga a ean aaS nee REM EES
_
‘But these procedures were those which the Board
itself established for the consideration of proposals
for.Toolco to supply equipment or financing to TWA,
and the procedures .are perfectly adequate. An
application was submitted. which set forth the pro-
‘posed transaction:* .Upon its filing, the. application
was a matter of public record. The applications were
publicized to the aviation industry.** Each of the ap-
plications was subject to scrutiny by the Board’s
staff, and after. formulation of the staff’s reconi-
mendations, by the Board itself. -
If anyone had been’ ‘foreclosed’? from the ‘TWA
market’’, he would have had ample opportunity to
contest any of the applications. The Board’s Rules
of Practice provide: for the filing of answers in op-
position tu applications (14 C,F.R. § 302.6) ; late filing
of such answers on a showing of good eause (14 C.F.R.
§ 302.4(f)); petitions for reconsideration (14 C.F.R.
§ 302.37) ; petitions to intervene (14 C.F.R. § 302.15); -
statements of position (14 C.F.R. (302.14); and gen-
eral motions (14 C.F.R. § 302.18).
The Board had full diseretionary authority to set
down any of the transactional applications for a full
* TWA points to one of the applications and makes some point.
ot the fact that it was only two pages lonz and had attached to it
only two short exhibits. (FWA Br. pp. 30-31) But the application.
chosen relates, to a very simple transaction. The application was
appropriately detailed in view of the subject matter. Other appli-
cations dealing with more complex transactions are much lengthier |
and contain all the appropriate details as to them. See. c.g.. R. 241-
74, R. 292-332. R. 427-90. ©
' . ®*® Written notice of them was published in the weekly CAB
Form R-405, a list of ** Applications And/Or Amendments Thereto
Filed With The Civil Aeronautics. Board During The Week,’’ which
is given publicity throughout the. industry. —
21
public hearing, on the request of its Staff, on its own
motion, or on opposition by a party in interest.
In short, the transactional orders were,: although
éntered pursuant to a suitably flexible administrative
procedure, entered under circumstances which fully
protected the rights of anyone who wished to oppose
them.
"The Board does not deuy that these-orders carry
with Them an exemption from the antitrust laws
under 414 of the Act, touching the transactions. to
_ whieh they relate. .\ demonstration of how little of
substance can be said against the exemptive effect of
these orders is found in the fact that TWA finds
need to refer repeatedly to the. recital in the orders
that the Board was not passing upon the reasonable-
ness for rate-making purposes. This point might
‘have some relevance if the present case were a rate-
making ease; however, it purports to be an antitrust
case.
IV.
The. geaper for treble damages does not vest the
District Court with jurisdiction.
A. Another fallacious assertion inthe briefs of the
Board and TWA is that the prayer for treble damages
—a form of relief which the Board cannot grant—
confers: jurisdiction upon the District Court.* How-
bad — blandly asserts : |
%,
” . The only remedy ordered “by the ruling now under re- -
Pp view is the payment of*money by defendants to TWA to
compensate it for the harm done it anil its independent stock-
—
. ae
oe
. ba .
etek ae Se: SENT
Le a
22.
ever, simee the orders ‘of the Board have exempted the
conduct of which TWA complains from the operation
SS SRRESERS SE a a Accs Na
of the antitrust laws, that conduct could no more be.
made the basis of an award of damages than it could
have been made the basis of an injunction.
Assuming, arguendo, that TWA ’s complaint is con-
-cerned with conduct of Toolco involved in furnishing
aircraft and financing to TWA. which was ‘not ap-
proved by the CAB, it would nevertheless relate to
matters within the regulatory regime of the Board.
The rationale of the classic cases does not suggest that
supersession depends on the remedy available, but
rather on the effect of the agency’s regulatory regime,
and its exem
See United Sta
284 .U.S. 474, 48541932); Far East Conference v.
United States, 342\U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952); Pan
American World Mrways, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 296, 313, n. 19 (1963).* It is therefore, a futile
holders by Tooleo ’s monopolization. of and restraints =
the supply of the jet planes and financing it needed. @The
granting of such relief neither impairs the exercise of any
Board funetion ‘nor interferes with any uniformly applied
ive orders, upon the antitrust laws.”
s Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.,
policy or coherent structure which the Board administers.’’
(TW A Br. p. 101) enseuare vinitted }
* Similar arguments—that the award of damages under another
set of laws, as opposed to the grant of injunctive relief, somehow
does not disturb a regulatory regime—used to be made in sup-
\ . porting the jurisdiction of state courts .to award damages in
areas in the labor relations field in which*the National Labor .
Relations Board moved. This Court gave the conclusive answer
to sucll a contention in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, °59 US, 236 (1959). The Court pointed ont:
‘*Nor is it significant that California asserted its power to
vive damages rather than to enjoin what the Board may rv-
strain though it could not compensate. Our concern is with de-
limiting areas of conduct which must be free from state
-
ey ce
23 ; ie.
maneuver to include a prayer for treble damages in an
‘attempt thereby to confer jurisdiction on the court,
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern California Gas
Co., 102 F.Supp. 685 (S.D. Calif. ee aff?d, 209
F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 19538). | ey
For. example, in a case ainerting a claim for treble
damages with respect to conduct which had not been’
considered by the appropriate ‘regulatory agency, the
court ordered dismissal of the complaint. Carnation
Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 336 F.2d 650
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. pending, No. 657, October Term,
1964. In that case the court stated:
“the considerations which make up és. |
rationale of Cunard and Far East are fully as_
applicable in a treble damage suit as in one
seeking injunction. Preliminary resort to the
Commission is as necessary here in’ order to
secure the uniformity of application of the Con-
gressional scheme ... .”* (336 F. ad at 655)
This Court has affirmed the holding that the question
whether an agency can grant the particular remedy.
‘which a private litigant is seeking is not determina-
tive of the issue whether a‘ regulatory regime super-
sedes the antitrust‘laws. In Luckenbach S.S. Co. v.
United States, 179 F. Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1959), the
_ plaintiff attempted to defeat the superseding regula-
tory regime of the Inteistate Commerce Commission
. by seeking forms of. relief which the Commission .
regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such
rezulation can be as effectively exerted through an award
of damages as through some form of preventive relief, The
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is. designed.
to be. a axe method of governing conduct = controlling
poliey. .. .”’ (359 U.S. at 246-47)
Sat ae weeks PA OE Ee SOREL. o Dees Wor pon hia wtarbe: ND am . eo
. X gee, WASTE BYRD Ss ‘ % Se FR SARS BB aR ‘ eegee oS a ae Cae ‘
Nek mee, pa
could not give. The three-judge district court
commented : , aie
‘***(1) On the question whether the doctrine ap-
plies to problems or relief which are beyond ad-
ministrative eng re the theory seems reason-
-ably clear. . .-. Because of the purpose of the
doctrine—to. assure that ‘the agency will not be
bypassed on what is especially committed to it
—and because resort to the courts is still open
after the agency has acted, the doctrine applies
even if the agency has no jurisdiction to grant
the relief sought. . . .* ~
“The sole question remaining is whether to
dismiss or retain jurisdiction of ‘the antitrust .
charges. The preferred procedure is to dis-
miss. . . .’’ (179 F. Supp. at 613-14).
On the plaintiff’s appeal from the dismissal, this
Court affirmed the dismissal per curiam as to ‘the ~
- antitrust phase of the dispute.” Luckenbach S. 8. Co.
Vv. United States, 364 U.S. 280 (1960). *
Indeed, TV Wa’ s- insistence that: the availability of
the remedy is the determining factor leads it to make
the astounding point that there should be no superses-
sion because. if an antitrust treble-damage suitor
were forced to resort to the Board, the Board might
not simply apply the antitrust laws themselves, but
‘other and ‘different factors may take precedence in
of the relief requested does not affect the supersession question.
See. e.y.. Jaffe, Priyary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, 102 U. Pa.
L.Rey. 577, 579-80 (1954); von Mehren, supra, 67 Harv. L.Rev.
at 945; Notes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1154. 1167 (1951); 77 Harv. L.Rev.
at 166 (1963).
* The commentators seem to be in agreement that the nature
oe
\
. AS 25
the Board’s deliberations ‘and findings.” (‘TWA Br.
se Pee 28 , : :
This is, of course, the very point: The potentially
anticompetitive implications of the exercise of con-
trol by an aircraft supplier or other party engaged
in a ‘phase of aeronauties’’ over an air carrier is a
matter which the Board has the power to regulate. .
In exercising its regulatory powers, ‘the Board must
take into account the policy of the antitrust laws; but
its ultimate legal determination can not be based
solely. on those laws.*
B. -Closely related to the contention that the prayer
for treble damages somehow avoids the operation of
the supersession doctrine, or would permit a court to
iguorg the exemptive force of Section 414 of the Act,
js the suggestion by TWA that the presence of the ..
prayer for treble damages, in any event, would, re-
quire that the Distriet Court not dismiss the action -
but simply stay it. pending action by the Board.
(TWA Br. p. 103). But, even if a reference to the
Board were required, the appropriate procedure in a -
supersession case is not a stay but a dismissal of the
complaint without prejudice to its reinstitution after 2
the administrative processes have been exhausted.** ~
* Paradoxically, while TWA says there should be no super-
session because the Board might apply standards different
from those of the antitrust laws, the Board says that there is no
supersession because the ‘Board ‘‘could only be expected to fol-
iow judicial precedent.’’ (Memo., p. 19) The Board’s statement
is, in view of the powers vested in it under the Federal Aviation
Act to consider factors other than the competition factors in
- arriving at its ‘‘public interest’’ determination—provided that
the antitrust’ factors are not of such magnitude as to bring in
play the proviso of § 408(b)—plainly erroneous.
** TWA contends that, if al] that was required was a stay, the
judgments below, should be affirmed. But as we demonstrated
@ : < ; tl
26
¢
The most recent case in a court of appeals to con-
sider this question ts. Carnation Co. v Pacific W est-.
‘bound Conference, 336 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1964), cur-
rently pending. before this Court on a petition for al -—
writ of certiorari, No. 657, Qetober Term, 1964. There
the Court of Appeals rightly pointed out that the
only possible reason for staying the treble-damage
action rather than dismissing it was to avoid the
running of the ssatute of limitations. (336 F.2d at 667,
n. 32). But, as the.court correctly held, inasmuch as
the statute could not run, since the plaintiff’s cause of
action would not ripen until after the administrative
"proceedings, there: was no. reason not to dismiss on
thi@ ground. Aé cérdingh. that court ordered the
‘compmnnt dismissed. ; | '
This reasoning” is clearly “correct. There is. no
reason why actions seeking damages should be ated
- differently from those seeking equitable remedies, nor '
is'there any reason why actions which’ cannot be
prosecuted should be permitted to. remain on the -
-ealendars of-the federal courts. Section 4(b) of the
Clayton - Act. 15-U.S.C. N 15(b). establishes that an.
action for treble damages must be *‘commenced within -
‘four, vears after the cause of ‘action acerued.”’. But.
“it cannét be that the statute of limitations will be
-allowed to commence to run against a right until that
right. has accrued in a ‘shape to be effectually en-—
foreed.’’ Borer y, Chapman, 119-U. S. 587, 602 (1887) ;
United: States” at Wurts, 303 . US. ‘424, 418 (1938).
in our Main Brief (p. 88, n. 3), in the present podfire of. the
ease, even a holding by this Court .that’ proceedings on the com-~
plaint’should have been stayed pending ‘a reference to the Boar
should not result in an affirmance of the — of the lower’
i Onrte: .
~
v
e-
eos
iad
ie)
“2
7 re
The cause of actioi does not accrue until the time
when one ‘tmnight- have sueeessfully ‘niaintained .
@ [the] suit.” Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43, 45
(1957). + As this.Court said in Peak, this is the com-
mon sense of the niatter, and *‘ecommon sense often
makes good law,"’ Id. at 46. §-::-
Accordingly, the courts have repeatedly held that
when an administrative determination is a necessary
prerequisite to a suit in court, the statute of limita-
tions does not, run until it has been obtained. As
J udge Davis has sai@® in his full consideration of the
point in Friedman v. United States, 310 F.2d 381, 390
(Ce. Ci. a), cert, denied, 373 U.S. 932 (1963) : -
ee
“where an administrative decision is man-
datory the claim is not ready for suit. until such .
a decision is had or is exetised. That is the con-
dition precedent to. the- accrual of: the cause of
action. .. . ."
Or, as J vide Wright put the matter in V. V. Phill ps
Glocilampenfabrie ken ¥.- AEC, 316 F.2d 401, 406
(D.C. Cir. 1963) :
el ae eT * when . . . the claimant must first pre-
serit his claim ‘to an executive tribunal, the -right
¢ - of action does not-.accrue until. the exectitive
tribunal has acted on the claim, . ...’’*
Obviously, there is no.reason for the policy of the
statuté of limitations to operate where a timely ap- .
plication is in fact ‘made ‘before the administrative
agency.
* wa
ee
* See also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Austin, 292 F.2d 415, 419
(5th Cir. 1961). rn ; ey
<0 **
*
- ‘
4
A
4
4
¢
For the -reasons stated in this reply brief and in
Tooleo’s Main Brief, the judgment ‘of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed and the cause remanded
to the. District Court with instructions to dismiss the
Respectfully submitted,
CHESTER C. Davis_
120 Broadway. wat
os New York, N. Y. 10005
Pat A, Porter so ad
Victor H? Kramer
- ABE
Krasy
DENNis G. Lyons.
WERNER J. Kronstery
Dante, A: Reznecx
_ 1229 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Of Counsel:
ANDREWs, Ecru, Ca
Houston, Texas -
Attorneys for Petitioners
¢
MPBELL & JONES a
Gee
ARNOLD, Fortas & Porter . . in
Washington, D.C.
February 26, 1965
a
a
Pacts With Respect to Various Misstaternents by TWA
ANNEX A
Although most of the ‘so-called facts ‘contained in
thé counterstatement of the case in TWA’‘s Brief are
irrelevant to a determination of the issues before .
_ the Court, nevertheless because of the number of er-
roneous and misleading statements contained therein,
Tooleo ‘submits this Annex containing “the facts’ of —
record and publie record, so that the Court will not
he misled.
_As to ie alleged diversion: of it amet to Pan
"America
Notwiti&tanding that TWA ani in its complaint
that “defendants caused six of the Boeing jet-pow-
ered aircraft then on order by Tooleo to be diverted
to the prineipal transatlantic competitor of TWA”
(A13) and argues in its brief to this Court that such
_.transaction would indicate that Tooleo was a. supplier
.of aircraft generally (pp. 24-25). the undisputable
record is quite to she contrary. The testimony -of
TWA below as well as matters of public record estab-
lishes the following: Pa is
During the first half of 1959, in the course of work
on the TWA jet financing plans, it was determined by
TWA management that TWA desired to limit its
initial purchases to twenty-five of the Boeings (fifteen
133s and ten 331s) and twenty of the Convair 880s on -.
-order* by Tooleo; this determination was in accord
‘with the views of Thomas, TWA’s then president.
An ner A
‘ A . . | .
.
2a
that the industry had “bought” an exeessive amount o ;
superior models of aircraft which would they) be avail-
able (see A521-22,° A525-33, A760-65, R. 1072-76;
“see also f. 20898). Thereafter, with the prior ap-
proval of Thomas and the coneurrence by TWA'‘s a
direetors,Tooleo transferred to Pan American its _
rights to acquire six of the excess 707-331s thartmder
construction. at Boeing. (Bee. R. 1364-65, A523-26). °
In July, 1959. Boeing consented to the transfer by
Tooleo to. Pan American of its-orders for these air- “
eraft. (Registration Statethent of Pan American ,
World Airways datéd Juine 29, 1959, p- 11).** Boe-
ing’s consent was mandatory « due to the fact that. ——
under the purchase agreement between Boeing and
Tooleo the latter could not without the prior written
‘ eonsent of Boeing, assign \ its rights under the agree-
ment or enter into a sale or lease or a contract for the
ee
* On October 12, 1959, Mr. Cocke. senior chepneeiiienh of
TWA, testified in the Soutkern Transcontinental Service Case.
Docket No. 7984. On examination by Bureau Counsel, Cocke
confirmed that the, management of TWA had eoncluded that
“*ten to twelve of the 707’s with their early delivery dates’’
were sufficient for TWA _ to. use economical ly ; that this in-
formation was transmitted: to Tooleo; and that thereaftey
Tooleo ‘transferred to Pan American its rights to receive six \
of these long range jets. (Docket 7984, Tr. pp. 11177-83), in
his deposition in the court below, Mr. Cocke reaffirmed the’ tes-
timony that he gave in the Southern Transcontinental case . ( see.
R. 1207 -26). Ca
** The Redistection Statement was filed with the SEC; the
agreement with Tooleo was filed as Exhibit 1I3T. o Q
\
An rier: A
yo GEE Pr Be A 2: aN WEY TRAYS ew n & “> . ecg oS
sat ' oe ae
a
ale or lease of the aircraft prior to delivery thereof
to anyone save TWA.* Sar
4
Il. As to the.contention seenediieg the lease of Con-
' wair 880s to Northeast
* During May 1960 and in connection with an agrée-
“ment between Tooleo and Atlas looking toward the
merger of their respective subsidiaries, TWA and
Northeast. Tooleo agreed to release six Convair 880s
so as to enable Northeast to lease such aireraft from
‘Conyair. As a result of these agreements and. upon
the: ‘petition ‘of a competitor of Northeast. the CAB
- instituted an investigation. Northeast Airlines, Can- —
- eellation and ‘or Suspension, 31 C.A.B-1003 (Time og
__ _—-— 4960). This proveeding was eventually subsumed into”
| the Toolco-Northeast Control Case. -Thereiy the find-
ings of ‘the Examiner which were adopted by the
Board ineluded that: Northeast had been unsuccessful
in numerous attempts to arrange for the purchase ~
of jet aircraft directly from various manufacturers
due to the difficulty of obtaining financing for its
_ equipment program ; in 1959 Northeast was unsuccess-
ful in arranging for the acquisition from Tooleo ot
aircraft in'excess of TWA’s requirements; thereafter |
Convair agreed to lease six 880s to. Northeast, but.
‘the arrangement was not congummated due to delays
in the Convair production schedule; in 1960 Convair
oo
# Tt is to be peted that TWA charges that the ‘ ‘diversi on”
was part of Toolco’s anticompetitive scheme; on the other-hand,
the lending institutions who control FWA would attribute. this
**diversion’’ to Tooleo’s inability to finance the purchase of the
uireraft.
.
.
Annex A
V
agreed to lease six 880s té Northeast provided -that
Tooleo, would release six of the 30 Convair 880s it
had on order; Tooleo and Northeast agreed to this
and agreed further that if arrangements could not be
worked out so that-Convair would lease six aircraft —
to Northeast, Tooleo would lease six aircraft to North-
east at the same terms as those previously agreed upon
between Northeast and’ Convair; thereupon Gon ‘r
and Northeast consummated their leasing agreement. *
The Examiner concluded that:
a review of all of the facts and cireunistances
" discloses that Toolco’s release of “six aircraft to
[Convair] and advance of $9,500,000 to North-
east Was necessary to enable that carrier to put
its jet fleet in operation during the 1960 Florida
winter season. It is clear .:; . Tooleo’s action in -
this respect was of ‘substantial benefit to North-
east.’’ (R. 813; footnote: omitted. )
_, In addition to the foregoing the Examiner found that =
“Tooleo evidently ordered ten jet aircraft from
General Dynamics for TWA in excess of those
finally determined by TWA to be necessary, but
there is nothing to ‘indicate that this. was more
than-a mistake in judgment on Toolco’s part or
that Tooleo attempted to make a profit on such
transactions at the expense of TWA. Nor does
. the — disclose that in the operation of TWA,
tt The record in the 7 oolco-Northeast Control Case also reveals
that it was Convair’s position that it would not release Toolco
from its commitment to purchase the six 880s unless Tooleo would
agree to purchase six other Convair jets (see. e.g. NEA Exhibit
502. pp. zl -22).
. Anner A.
RE EE eg A BS . “ < . ’ i + f°
-
anil ae 7 Ae . - /
Booleo managed its operations in such a way that .
Mee Fi tax benefits which should have imared to TWA
az _ were obtained by Tooleo.”’ (R. 813).*
A
/
=a oo ‘ fghes
‘JIL. As to the contention, that Toolco supplied
\. _ Viscounts to Northeast eee
The charge that + géfendants supplied Northeast
* with ten: Vickers Vise@unt aircraft’? (TWA Br. p. 24)
| -” is another examplg#f TWA’s lack of candor in this
proceeding. Rummel testified that what occurred was
that Hughes had committed to Vickers for the pur-
' chase of fifteen Viscounts for TWA: that TWA
decided they did not -want the aircraft; that-Hughes
felt that/he had’ a morai obligation to Vickers; and
-therefote one of Tooleo’s executives helped Vickers: in
their” attempt to sell or lease the aircraft: and that
/ * in that proceeding the Board specifically dirested the Ex:
/aminer to explore the charges raiséd in TW.A’s_ antitrust
complaint. See Order No. E-17675, p. 4 (Nov. §.. 1961; (R.
760, RO 764); see also Order No. E-17811. 34 C.A.B. 583, 594-95
(1961) <dissent:. Penetrating issiies were formulated and
detailed evidence was requested (see R. 766-56. and after
notice * (R. 786-92) -a -full public hearing pursuant to Section”
40816: was had «<The Examiner found that “*There is* no.
substantial evidence in this record..and none that would ‘sup-
_ port a finding. that Tooleo, in its dealing with either. Northeast
o. in its prior contral of TWA, engaged in improper self dealing —
with either of thes? tw8 companies or that it engaged in unlawful
activities. (R 820). In its order, the Board adopted the find-
ings, conclusions and decision of. the Examiner with certain
modifications not affecting the portions quoted herein (R 837),
and held that it was im the public interest to permit Toolco to
acquire: control of Northeast. Order No. E-18470 (June 19.
1962)" (R 8334 aff’d sub nom. National Airlines Vv. CAB, 321 F.2d
380 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ). .
Anner A | fe
eventual Northeast purchased ten of these aireraft
from Viekers eo R. 800).*
IV. ivasmeimaal i nett conditions by
reason of the Toolco-TW -relationship
In its brief. to this Court TWA appears to find
comfort and support jor" its contentions, primarily
from the testimony of Rummel, and .attempts to con-
vey the impression that his testimony is conclusive
of various sorts of anti ticompetitive wrongdoing on the
part of. the defendants... TWA’s presentation is
_totally mis}pading—in fact testimony of Rummel and
other spokesmen for TWA as reported hereinafter
. is’ indicative of just - how baseless the ‘‘antitrust”’
claim of TWA is.
(1) Rummel testified in ectenso as to the efforts of
TWA throughout the period of Tooleo control to ac-
quire the flight equipment best suited to TWA’s needs, .
and how the merits of the various offerings of aircraft
by practically every manufacturer thereof in the free
* The remaining examples in TWA’ s brief (p. 25) .of ‘situations
in whieh defendants were acting as suppliers. of aircraft are of
**plans’’ and ‘‘attempts’’ by Tooleo. ‘The reeord references sup-
plied to support the examples demonstrate’ that the examples are
amie fictionalized renderings of vague hearsay statements. For
example, TWA states that Toolco attempted to sell certain Con-
vair 880’s to Northwest. However. its supporting referen ©
consists of a statement in a memorandum of ‘‘B: of A.—Gordon”™
which states with respect to the disposition .of 880's in-exeess of
-TW.AA's needs that ‘‘Convair wants 2 of them for N/W as an
‘inducement for N/W to buy 660’s [Convair 990°'s].’" (T-97;
emphasis supplied) In any event, with respect to these so-called
“plans” and ‘‘attempts’’ TWA does not claim that any of thet
were ever consummated.
Annex A
©
eo. @ .
world was considered. (See A586-722). He told of
the usual practice of vircraft manufacturers ‘working
with the various airlines in the development of con)-.
mercial aircraft, and that ‘TWA—while under? the ©
control of Tooleo and because of it—was more sought
after by the ..manufacturers and participated even
~ more actively than other carriers in advancing the
art of commercial aeronautics (f; 14245-54; f. 14263-
85). The advantages to TWA of the competition
which Tooleo and TWA thus fostered were elaborated
_ by Rummel as. follows:
. [When I was s working with Mr. mectie
“on equipment matters, with respect to the develop-
“ment of new*airplane preliminary designs, ad-
vanced models of existing designs; and that sort
of thing, we did a great deal of activity and a
' great deal of exploratory work .at the behest .of
- Mr. Hughes, and a great deal of it was explora-
_tory in nature. That is, much of what we did did
not result finally in a contract. It may have pro-
duced a competitive situation of advantage, it may
have produced. something that looked good,’ but
didn’t really turn-out to be a good possibility, and
I believe that TWA probably did much more of —
this than some of the other airlines.” (A582) .
(2) In the unéxpurgated version of Rummel'’s testi-
mony he chooses. a an example of* the ‘competitive,
situation of advantage”’ the evolution of TWA’s“ae- .
quisition of adinasee aircraft from Martin
(A582). In the late 1940’s TWA began to look to-
ward a ny for its DC-3 short- hau] equip-
ea 2 | Annes 4
s
3
8a
ment ; the only manufacturer then offering twin-engine
commercial aircraft was Convair (which was at that
time controlled by Atlas ‘Corporation* ) ; ; after nego-
" tiations: with Convair were well along it became ap-
’ parent that Martin was interested in returning to the
business; TWA and Hughes were instrumental in
getting Martin to go forward with a program; East-
_ern, who had also been negotiating with Convair be-.
+. @ame interested in the Martin airplane; with the
_ fiiancial assistance of Toolco,** TWA ultimately ac-
. quired by purchase or lease’ over forty aircraft from
Martin (see A583-86,- A808-19). Toolco’s partieipa-
tion in the transaction was the subject of a “ap order
(one A180; R242-74).
(3) In view ot TWA’s eaaphittic condemnation that
“TWA never was permitted to buy Douglas aircraft”
(TWA Br., p..22), the record concerning the decision
by/ TWA to acquire Lockheed Model 1049 aircraft
instead, is apropos. The testimony-of Rummel and
Cocke makes it unmistakably clear .that the decision
of TWA management was made notwithstanding that
“Mr. Hughes was interested in the Douglas aircraft
* See Atlas Corp. “Control of Consolidated Vultee, 9 C.A.B. 921
(1948).
’ **® In order to obtain the consent of Equitable for TWa's
quisition and financing of the Martin contract and for the pequisi-
tion of certain aircraft from Lockheed, Toolco agreed to guarant «
‘the sale of at: least $10 million of TWA common. stock
. (R245-46, R1357 ; f. 20756, f. 20776, f. 22123). - Thus, pursuant
to its agreements with Equitable, Tooleo, atquired.its pro rata
share of two TWA common stock offerings during 1952 (f. 20756 ;
f. 22732-35). Compare TWA Br., p. 18. Tooleo also agreed to
purehase. one Martin and one. Lockheed. ene through Twa
(
Annex A-
s 4 . .
CR ee Ola ee ED ae ea ca
. -=
<~
be
os oe —
rather than the Constellations.” (A491; see A47T-79,
‘A487-91, A800-07). In fact, Rummel pointed to the:
negotiations with Douglas and Lockheed as another
,
“competitive situation of advantage.” He stated that:
3 ‘For example, T am absolutely certain Donald
Douglas, Jr., would say that the only reason on |
earth that the DC-6B exists, which we did not
‘buy, was TWA’s negotiation with Douglas. I
don’t mean to say that it was not a logical devel-
opment that would finally have evolved, but it in
fact did evolve as a result of our negotiation.
There are other cases. . . .”* (A583). -
(4): Both TWA UBr., pp. 21-22) and the Additional —
- Defendants (Br., p. 19) attempt to cast aspersions
upon the second transaction whereby Lockheed, air- -
craft were acquired rather than Douglas; the contract
is castigated alternatively as a tax device and an anti-
competitive maneuver. The former criticism is both _
irrelevant and unfounded,* and in point of fact the
undisputed record elicited from TWA makes: clear
that the antitrust characterization is a complete dis-
tortion.
The 1954 contraet to which Rummel objected was a
development centract for a long-range turbo-prop- air-
craft to be known as the 1449, which in fact was never
acquired by TWA (A824, A829, A479). The aircraft
* It should be obvious that if a person were motivated to avoid
a tax on unreasonable accumulated earnings, he might do so 80 just
as readily and effectively by irivesting his excess in the securities
of an airline as to commit it to a contract to acquire property for
that airline. x
dunes A
Re ieee _ da
which TWA did subsequently obtain was the Model
1649A and that production. contract was elaborately
negotiated with Rummel and at for TWA par-
ticipajjng*in the negotiations (.A832-34, A960, A963-
ee en
During the course of negotiations of the “eontract
for the 1649As, ‘“‘Lockheed had represented frequently, -
and “with a loud voice . . . that the aircraft would be
the fastest, longest ranze, most attractive airplatie
built, and would be better than the DC-7C.”’ (f. 14422)
When built, however, the Model 1649A did not live up
to Lockheed’s representations; it was superior to the .
DC-T7C i in terms of payload and Tange but did not meet
Lockheed’s. claims in the’ contract negotiations with |
respect to sfyed and economy. (See A837) At: one
point Rummel-informed Hughes that the plane had _
numbers of deficiencies, and Hughes asked that TWA .
do nothing which would in any way undermine =
right of TWA to cancel the contract “(A854)..
task force was appointed by Carter Burgess, TW Pe
president, early in March, 1957 to ‘‘determine whether
we [TWA] want the 1649s despite knewn, problems
relating to performance.’ -(Sée A861). However,
despite the deficiencies, the task foree concluded that
‘TWA should aécept delivery of the aircraft notwith-
standing ‘their probable: performance as they .would
-supply needed capacity to°' TW A<and- no practical al-
ternatiye was apparent (A863-64; see also A418). The
Lockheed © equipmeit was acquired purstiant to CAB
approval” (A185).
. @
Annex A
. r] A
lla
(5) TWA would convey that Toolco’s conduct dur- |
ing the jet era* was anticompetitive in that it. was
directed primarily in alternatively (1) counseling
‘‘boycott”’ as to some aircraft manufacturers, (2) deal-
. olng with others while at the same time refusing to
- deal with them, (3) appearing to consort with certain
’ manufacturers while at the same‘timte enjoying inae-
tive competition with them and: others and (4) thereby
and otherwise frustrating - at,every turn the airline.
in which it lteld more than a 70% equity interest in
order to captivate an allegedly captive market. (TWA —
- Br. pp. 15-18, 20-29.) Again this is refuted by truths
-which have been enunciated by the corporate plaintiff
“and remain immutable regardless of the procedural
posture of the case. e
(a) By the end .of 1954 aircraft engine wushaalory :
advanced to the stage. that it was thought feasible to .
develop a pure jet aircraft suitable for use by TWA
-on its domestic and international toutes (A736).
Prior thereto TWA had given active consideration
both to limited range jets such as the DeHavilland
Comet and then to a variety of aireraft being devel-
oped ‘by ‘Beeing, Convair and many other manufac-
turers (A586-88, A624-36, A693-712). In negotiations
with Convair, TWA and Tooleo sought to develop a
jet (known as the Model 18) which could be used in
béth domestic and international service (A737-38).
However, about the middle of 1955 Convair concluded
- that there, was - insufficient difference between the»
* It should be noted that in . listing the ‘‘acts dant ‘to have
been committed by the defendants prior t6 December 1950 pursuant
to this conspiracy’? (TWA’s Brief. pp. 16-18) all of the acts so
identified, apart from Toolco’s acquisition of its ‘stock interest in
TWA, pertain to the *, era.
Annex A
con
12a
Model 18 and airplanes | to be built by estan and
Douglas* to justify the risk (A739-40). Other possi-
bilities were discussed ‘with Convair, including a
double-deck airplane, but the project was turned
down by that company’s. board of. directors (A741).
Prior to the conclusion of negotiations on the Model 18
it became apparent that. serious consideration would
have to be given to available designs to place TWA
in ‘the jet market until a better plane could be pro-
_ duced, and upon.the urging of Rummel negotiations
‘were undertaken with Boeing (A742), However, TWA
did not have the requisite financial resources to place
orders for jet equipment and in December 1955 called
unon Toolco to assume the- necessary burden.** <Ac-
cordingly, beginning in 1956 Tooleo placed orders with
aircraft manufacturers for jet’ equipment assign-
_ to TWA.
* Neither Boeing nor Douglas was offering an : teleraptienet
jet when development of the Model 18 commenced ; thereafter
both manufacturers announced such a long-range version (A735,
A739).
** TWA’s chief financial dfficer wrote:
‘*To your final question, the ability to finance additional
equipment, we know that. the manufacturer would require a
down payment in thé order .of 25% and progress payments
totaling at least another 25% during the suceeding 18 months
from the signing of the contract.
‘However modest TWA’s views might be, the figures indi-..
cate it could not. even with Tool Company assistance to the
extent inditated in preceding paragraphs, generate any ex-
cess cash until 1959 if we assume payment of tht’Tool ‘Com-
pany note during 1958 (which is optimistic). Without labor-
ing the point, I can‘only say, if TWA is to have additional
-a'reraft requiring near-term cash, the T ool Company must
accept the burden for a period extending at, least . beyond
1958.’’ (R1363; emphasis added)
Counpare TWA Br..pp. 22-23.
Annex A *
13a tes
(b), Notwithstanding that Toolco was giving some
consideration toward a more active. role in the de-
velopment of advanced desigir jet equipment,* Toolco
placed an initial order for eight Boeing 707-131 (do-
mestic range) jets; this aircraft was then viewed as
a ‘‘stopgap’” (A755-56). Thereafter, as it became
apy t that newer, superior equipment would not
be produced as had -been hoped for, and upon delivery
positions favorable to TWA _ becoming available,
Tooleo (with the participation of TWA personnel and
. legal counsel) ultimately increased its order to fifteen.
Boeing 707-131s and: also in March. 1956 ordered
eighteen Boeing 707- 331 (international range) jet
aircraft (A756-59). In September 1956, Toolco com-
mitted to-the purchase of thirty Convair Model 880
-aireraft. TWA representatives participated in the
* It should suffice to point ont that Toolea ‘could not avoid
*. CAB serntiny of any such ‘‘plans’’ in a Section 408 context (see
Tooleo Br. pp. 27 28). In addition it should be noted that:
The reference to a joint venture with AVRO (TWA
Br. p. 25) is not even supported by the record references,
which consist of the 1956 TWA motion to the CAB and a:
blind reference to a number of meetings from time to time
during 1954-56 during which AVRO produced plans and in-
formation for review looking toward the development of a
transport airplane (T137-38). This comports with the bal-
ance of Rummel’s testimony concerning various degrees of
negotiation with practically every manufacturer and. poten-
‘tial manufacturer of aircraft in the free world concerning
the development of equipment suitable for TWA’s needs (see
pp. 6a-l2a, supra) ;
(b) The comments referring to Sud- show that the objec-
tive was to secure better delivery*positions for TWA (sec
T140-41 ; f. 13143-44) ;
~ (e) If anything, these ‘‘attempts’’ at joint ventures with
foreign manufacturers would have had the obvious result
.of injecting a new element of competition ameng the then
present manufacturers of commercial transport equipment.
Annex A
99
Vv
l4a
negotiations with ‘Convair, and the order for the 880s
was not placed until after TWA management con-
cluded that TWA wanted ,such aircraft (which were >
smaller and had shorter range characteristics than
the Boeing jets and those which were being offered by
.Douglas). The number of aircraft ordered by Tooleo
was arrived at in light of the demands of Convair and
the then estimated requirements of TWA. (See
A 502-04. A727- 30, A746- 51, A766- 74.) Eo ate
(6) Notwithstanding that the leita! makes clear
that the conduct of Tooleo and Hughes did not. inhibit —
acéess to TWA by aireraft manufacturers but actually
fostered it and stimulated competition, TWA seeks to
avoid the obvious by claiming ‘*boyeott’’ and referring
_ to several isolated instances in which Rummel was .
directed not to negotiate with .a particular manufac-
turer (TWA Br. pp. 20-21). Again TWA distorts the,
record. In its proper context, the testimony of Rum-
mel shows that there was never any continuing. injunc-
tion as to any manufacturer, that all of the nianufae-
turers had ready access to TWA through the vears,
and that the specific directives referred to by TWA
were for proper purposes and were so understood by
Rummel.
(a) Boeing. Rummel testified that in 1953 or
1954 Hughes told him not to do any premotional work
with Boeing (T116; T134). The reason for this was
that Hughes feared that TWA m zht help Boeing-to —
develop an airplane which could be utilized by TW.A’s
Anner A
lia
competitors, a fear that was shared by TWA.* Such
advantage to TWA’s competitors had occurred on
prior o¢casions as, for example, when TWA and
Hughes spearheaded certain design innovations which.
were incorporated in a DC-6B which TWA never
‘ purchased but which enabled. TWA’s competitors at
an earlier date to have. available to them an airplane ©
competitive with ‘that_which- TW.A-operated™ aca
see p. 9a, su (pra).
— (b) Douglas. Rummel also, testified: that he was
instructed not to communieate with Douglas with
respect to jet aircraft (T-135). He stated as -the
reason for such instructions not that’ Hughes did not
-want TWA to enter into any kind of an agreement for
-the purchase of Douglas aircraft, .but. rather that
Hughes’ wanted Douglas to approach him initially
(T-136). Rummel testified that the peopie he knew
at Douglas gave him the impression that .Douglas,did
not want to deal with Hiighes because they felt that
(a) a deal with Hughes could not be concluded and
(b).that TWA would only enter into negotiations with
them in the hope that. they would learn how far
- Douglas had progressed in developing commercial jets
and subsequently utilize om information in a jet
* The Witness: ‘ We had had a number of cases previous
to that time wherein TWA’ s negotiation efforts had produced
airplane improvements‘ which TWA did not finally avail itself
of, but the competition did.*’ The Special Master: *‘You really
helpe& your competitor, then, in fhose efforts?’’* The Witness :
‘Well, this, I think, was a general thing that he [Hughes] was
trying to avoid. I don’t recall whether or not this specific thing
was stated in the conversation or referred to, but I understood
kis feeling on this, in fact I shared it to a great extent. Cate
( T-135; din nee added ) : a rae
Anner-A
° - ; a . a “aaa
“«
16a
which would be sanstionnh from a competing manu-
facturer (T-136-37). The feeling of Douglas that it 3,
could not do business with Hughes may well have ~
arisen from the fact that ‘in two instances Hughes —
had entered into negotiations with Douglas for air-.
- eraft but TWA had determined to purchase Lockheed
aircraft instead (A477-82, A486-502, A552-54, A800-
07}; See f. 12364-66, f. 22621; see pp. 8a-9a, supra). —
(ec) Lockheed. Rummel also testified that.on one —
occasion he was told ‘not to work with’? Lockheed *
(T-133, T-145). According to Rummel, the underly-
ing reason for this was that Hughes, at the time he»
placed this restriction on Rummel, was: already ne-
gotiating with Lockheed for aircraft for TWA and
he thought it best to avoid negotiations with Lock-
heed by any other party since it might only. result in
_confusion (T-133, T-146). Moreover, Rummel tes-
tified that prior to a decision to proceed with the- —
Convair 880 program. consideration was given to ‘a
proposal that Lockheed Electras be purchased in-
stead. Hughes had been interested in the possibili-
ties of Electras (A723-26, 4851-52), and in June of
1956 arranged for a Lockheed representative to meet _
with Rummel, Leslie, and Harry West (counsel for
TWA) in Kansas City. to diseuss‘a program of Boe-
ing jets and Electras (f. 17628-39). Subsequently,
however, TWA management. determined not to ac-
.quire the Electra (A533, A853). -
(d) Convatr.Rumme! said that the apparent reason |
for his instruction not to talk with Convair was that
2 Hughes preferred that he or a Tooleo- representative .
' negotiate:with respect; to 990 aircraft (T-132-33).
‘ Annex. A
my
‘17a | .
At the same time rn es were actively
* meeting with Convair in regard to the 880s (T-116).
* Rummel pointed to the work with Convair and the
development of the Medel 880:as one of the ‘‘competi-
tive situations of advantage’ which resulted from
the .efforts of Tooleo and TWA (see. A582, A586-88,
A590). The reeord is clear that the Convair and
Boeing would not have been in cémpetition with re-
spect to jet aireraft without such efforts.
| (7) In conclusion it may be fairly stated that the
testimony of TWA below establishes the. following:
(a) During the post-war period there have
‘been five major manufacturers of commercial
aircraft in the United States, namely, Lock-
. heed, Douglas, Boeing, Martin and. Convair
(see A592-96). During the same period
TWA acquired aircraft manufactured by Lock-
heed. Boeing, Martin and Convair (see At79-
86, A196-99( A21]-27. A800-02, A817-23). Al-
though no Douglas equipment was acquired by
~ TWA* subsequent to the war (other than sur-
. plus equipment ‘acquired from the government),
in ‘at. least two instances Hughes favored the
* aequisition by TWA of equipment from, Doug-
«
* It is-interesting to note that the -Initial Decision of the
Examiner. in the Toolco-Northeast Control Case contained the
finding: *‘Tooleo owns foir Convair 880's available for air trans-
port purposes. it has contractual rights to five executive-type
Lockheed Jet Star aircraft. has a subsidiary whjch manufactures
two place helicopters, uses. commercial aircraft in its business
operations including a [Douglas] DC-6A.° Convair 440. B-23.
| Douglas]: DC-3, and several Cessnas .. . .*” CR. 814; emphasis
added !
| Annez A .
ec
< ‘ eS Son
18a
las in pounnn te Lockheed equipment but
im each instance the TWA management de-
termined to purchase later models of. the Lock-
heed equipment which it was then using. In- -
deed, Rummel testified that the efforts of TWA |
and Toolco were largely responsible for the de-
velopment of the Douglas DC-6B. He pointed
to the development of this aireraft as one ex-
ample of activities of TWA and Toolco to-
ereate competition among suppliers of aircraft
(see p. 9a, supra). Others included the **Mar-
tin-Convair situation’’ ‘(see p. 8a. supra), and —
the competitive situation whieh developed. be-
tween Boeing aid Convair with. respect to jet
aircraft as a result of the activities of TWA
and Tooleo in ‘trying . . . to get an airplane
that was better for TWA than the: others ap-
peared at that time to be willing to produce."”
(A590) ;
(b) In efforts to acquire the equipment best
suited to TWA’s needs. TWA under Toolco
control. considered the. merits of offerings of
aircraft by practically every supplier thereof
in-the free world (see pp. 6a-l2a, supra): and —
= (ec) Tooleo never attempted. to the know!-
a of Leslie. TWA’‘s. chief tinancial officer
some seventeen years. to force TWA to boy-
‘ eott any supplier of aircraft or to foree TWA
to acquireaireraft from ene aircraft supplier
rather than a A578: see f.
. 12364-66); see also A477). ao
aAnneor A
ee mate -
‘ ’
nee et Rat Me mam tl a, Chee | °
~
ANNEX B
-. The Acquisition of Aircraft end Financing by TWA
and Other Transactions before the CAB Involv-
ing the Toolco-TWA Relationship
?
; The history of the Tooleo-TWA’ relationship ean
be obtained. from the files of the Board. .It is demon-
' strably a history of Toolco’s financial assistance to
TWA in acquiring aircraft during the period of
TWAA’s major expansion. In the period 1939 through
1960 TWA made applications to the Board fgr, and
was granted, increases in its certificated route mileage
from less than 6000 to more than’ 60,000, and was thus
_able to increase its annual revenue passenger miles
from 100,195,000 to 5,490,000,000. In the same period
TW A’s net worth increased from $5,300,000 to $126,-
000,000 and TWA also acquired in the aggtegate of
over 300 aircraft of all types. Of these aircraft. the
vast majority were acquired direétly from the manu-
facturers in transactions reported to the Board, anil
he balance were acquired from the manufacturers
through Tooleo in transactions specifically. approved
hy the Board. Many of the purchases made by TWA
directly from the manufacturers required financial
assistance from Tooleo under arrangements also ap-
proved by the CAB. From the applications of TWA.
the exhibits to its applications, the. orders ‘of the
. Bodrd and the related public documents, ineluding the
Registration Statements af TWA, each of the equip-
~ment acquisitions and financial transactions Which,
involved Toolco can be fully reviewed. -There follows
a summary narrative account of this history, *_
* Alt of the documents referred to and @hich concern Tooles
may be found in the re@irds of the Civil Neronanties Board or
the Securities and Exchange, Comniissign.
4
a
S
A. 1990-1968.
On oveniine’ 19, 1943, Tooleo applied to the Board ~
for approval of or disclaimer of jurisdiction over its
acquisition of control of TWA (R. 183-85). On Octo-
ber 17, 1944 the Board approved Tooleo’s ‘acquisition .
* of control over TWA but limited commercial transac-
tions between the parties absent’ Board approval.
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.,-Controk by
Hughes Tool Co., 6 C.A.B. 153° (1944).* As was
found by: the Board in the 1944 Control Case, Hughes
first became interested in TWA in 1939 as the result
of the solicitation of J ack Frye,-who was then presi-
dent of TWA and a personal friend of Hughes, and
by the-end-of 1942 Tooleo had acquired 45.6% of the
. total outstanding stock of TWA (6 C.A.B. at 154).
In the period between Toolco’s initial acquisition
of stock and its application for approval of eontrol,
TWA engaged in three major financings. The first .
of these was in 1939 when TWA borrowed $300,000 ~
. from the Commercial National Bank & Trust Com-
‘. pany in order to help finance the purchase of five
Boeing Model S-307 aircraft (R. 1336); the seeond—
was in 1940 when it sold to Tooled 119 154 shares of
common stock, par value $5.00, at $14.00 per share,
the proceeds of which were applied to-the purchase .
of the same. Boeinggs{ A948-49 ; R. 671) ; and the third ©
. was in 1940 gyhen "FAVA entered into a $2,250,000 re-
* For a detailed description of the ‘control proceeding, see
Tooleo Main Brief, pp. 12, et seq.
Annes Bo
wha
,*
3b me
vaiving: credit agreement with the Commercial Na-
fiorial Bank and six other banks (R. 1336).*.°
B. 1945 - J |
In 1945 TWA contracted with Lockheed to
- eighteen Model 049 Constellations and eighteer? Modal
_ 649 Constellations (f. 20685). In order to finance this _
and other post-war acquisitions of equipment, TWA
sald to Equitable, on November 30, 1945, $30 million
principal amount of sinking fund debentures.’ Trans- .
continental & Western Air, Inc., Further Control by
Hughes Tool Co., 9 C.A.B. 381, 383, (1948). The pro-
visions of the indenture, pursuant to which the deben-_,
. tures were fssugd required, as was recognized by the
‘Board, that Equitable consent to all future equipment
acquisitions and financings.**
{Im addition to the Equitable financing, TWA deliv--
_ ered to nine banks promissory notes in the aggregate
- principal amount -of $1,700,000. The purpose of this
financing was to enable TWA to repurchasé¢ and re-
build five Boeing 307s it had sold to the government
' (R. 1386; f. 20684-85, f. 20695-96).* * *
*:During the war years..TWA’ purchased or a number
*. of Douglas DC-3 and C-4-aireraft from United States govern-
ment. TWA also purchased three C-54 aireraft from T.A.C.A.
Airways, S.A. (f.20685). —- : . ie”
* * In 1950 the Board found that ‘‘it is impossible now for TWA
t» acquire aircraft _— obtaining prior consent or waivers _
under various financid! agreements it has enterd into in the pax.
including the trast ihdenture covering the debentures held b
Equitable." Trans World Airlines, Inc., Prrther Control by
Nughes Tool Co., 12 C.AB. 192, 208°( 1950). .
/ ***®On May 10, 1945, the Board approved, pursuant to Section _
409 of the Act, the holding by Charles W. Perelle of initerlocking
directorships in Tooleo ‘and TWA. (Order No. 3662 (May 10,
1945) ). x ,
Anner B
I
4b
C. 1946
On May 10th, TWA sold 40 Equitable an additioaal
$10 million principal amouut of sinking fund deben-
tures. (@ C.4,B. at 204; R. 1336; f. 20688). The pur-
pose of this financing was to. enable TWA to pur-
~ chase additional aircraft. During: the same period
TWA contracted with Lockheed to acquire thirteen
additional Model 049 aircraft. (f..20685) However,
- in, the latter part of that tear TWA, after taking -
delivery of the eighteen 049s it had ordered in 1945
and five of the. thirteen it had ordered in, 1946, can-
‘celled its commitnient for the remaining aircraft...
-This decision was arrived at an-account of the finan-—
cial crisis which besct TWA and which came about
as the result of (i) the grounding during July and
August “of all Constellations by the administrator of
Civil Aeronauties, and (ii) a lengthy. pilots’ strike in .
October and Novetiher (f.. 20685; see also Handbook
of Airline Statistics, pp. 511, alt « CAB 1968) ). -
.
.
>
D197 002°C aoe ee .
‘On J anuary oth; the TWA Board of Direttors ‘ac-
oapted a ‘ proposal whereby Tooleo would lend $10
million on the condition that the Board of Directors
“ be'veconstituted so thft-a majority of the directors”
* During thisqear TWA, in connection with the ,repurchase of
aircraft, from ‘the government, also issued Equipment Mortgage
Notes in au.amount: in exeess of $1 million (R. 1336).. TWA also
sold at cost to Tooleo two Lockheed aircraft which it had -re-
purchased from the government and on which Togleo had an op-:
~ tion (f.'20686). This transaction was approved by the aac in
Order No. 4437 (A174-75).
Annex B
“
ob
would be nominees of Tooleo (9 C.A.B. at 381; f.
20589-91, f. 20687 ).* Pursuant to the agreement, |
Tooleo acquired $10 million principal amount’ of. —
TWA’s . 234% ~ subordinated convertible notes.**
(A242; f. 20687), = . ‘
Upon the executionsof the agreement, the TWA
Board was reconstituted (A244). . Tooleo and TWA
requested the Board to approve the loan .and any:
other provision of th¢ agreement under the terms of
‘ the; 1944 control order, as amended, if such approval
were deemed necessary. (R. 714) Although fhe Board
advised TWA’and Toolco that none of the proyisions
of the agreement ‘‘constituted the kind of commercial
transaction intended to be govérned by the conditions
imposed’’ (R. 714) by. the 1944 control order, it ‘insti-
tuted a proceeding to determine whether there may
have been such a change in the character or extent
of the control *by Toolco over TWA so as to consti-
‘tute a-further acquisition of control: requiring ap-
—
* Due to the heavy losses which TWA sustained in 1946, by
the-end of the year it.was in a position where. it could not meet
its next payroll. (12 C.A.B. at 205-06) Tooleo advised TWe\ that
it ‘‘. .. was willing to be of further financial assistance but. was
unwilling to advanee additional money to save the carrier with-
out assurance that the management of the carrier would be re-
ag and. the earrier reorganized and run in agreement with
he wishes of the principal stockholder and/or its representa-
tive.”’, (12 C.A.B. at 206) ae ieee
. ** The notes were convertible info common stock. The con-
version price was the par value thereof or the average of the
‘closing ‘price on the New York ‘Stock Exchange for the ten days
immediate!y preceding the notice of conversion, whichever was
greater. Toolco’s conversion privilege could be exercised at any
time until June 2, 1956, the date on which the notes matured. |
In addition, TWA had the power to reqmre Todito to: convert on
January 1, 1950, at’a price. caleulated by the same method. (9
C.A.B. at 384; f. 20589-90, f. 20687 ¥ ee
Aanes B
6b -
proval under Section 408 of the Act*(Order No. .E-
289; R. 740-42).* This investgation resulted. in the .
Further Control Case and, was terminated in 1950
after the Board approved the further acquisition of
eeontrol as being: consistent with the public interest
standards of the Act. (12 C.A.B. 192; see Toolco
‘Main Brief, pp. 15-20).
Under the provisions of the debenture Equitable’s
consent to the $10 million loan by Toolco was manda-
tory (A243). In order to obtain this consent, on
Jampary 31, 1947 Tooleo, TWA and Equitable entered
into a three-party agreement (R, 1277-85) which pro-
vided, among other things, that if Toolco did not lend . ©
the entire $10 million to TWA or if TWA defaulted
at any time in the payment of principal or interest
on the debentures which had previously "been sold ‘to
Equitable, then Toolco would place its stock in an
Equitable-controlled voting trust ( R. 1280, R. 1307-
23). TWA also agreed to an extension of the date
of maturity of the 1946 debentures from December 1],
1951 to December 1, 1955,.and a retroactive increase in
the rate of interest 3% froni 244%. and an increase
in the redemption price thereof (R. 1286-1300; f.
20688).
_ In March, TWA purehased four Model 049 Con-
stellations from Lockheed. These aircraft were -
financed principally through Equipment ‘Mortgage
* On June 18, 1947, the- Board ordered a limited hearing in
this matter (Order No. E-657; R. 747-48); on July 14 a -pre-
aring conference was held (R. 724-30) ; in September hearings
were held; and on January 30, 1948 the Examiner filed his
report (A228).
dese B
7b
‘Notes in. the amount of $2,815,480 running to Lock-
heed .(R. 1336; f. 20685). ,
In December Tooleo waived its right to require pay-
ment of the subordinated convertible notes or inter--
est thereon in any form other than TWA stock (9
CAB. at 385; f. 20687). The Board noted that this
agreement considerably improved the financial struc-
ture of the airline (12 C.A.B. at.210) and specifically
recognized that the ‘I'WA-Toolco agreement required
TWA to *‘come to Tooleo to obtain consent of the ~
latter before purchasing additional equipment. Cer-
tainly this transaction also represents an element of
new and increased control arising out of. the letter
agreement.’’ (9 C.A.B. at 391).* © |
\\
E. 1948 ++ :
In March TWA concluded a credit agreement with
Lockheed and certain banks whereby more than
$18. million was made available to TWA. The
purpose of this agreement was to finance the pur-
chase of 12 Model 749 Constellations and spares from |
‘Lockheed which TWA had ordered in November,
1947 (f. 20638-41), and to refinance the purchase of
nine 049 aircraft theretofore acquired (f. 20685, f.
20698). Toolco consented to this transaction under
terms beneficial to TWA and in addition consented to
a subordination of the convertible notes which it held
(9 C.A.B. at 385). At the same time Equitable and
oe On April 4. 1947, the Board approved. pursuant to Section
409, the interlock between Tooleo and TWA held by Noah Dietrich.
(Order No. E-429).. : .
Annex B-
h
o
- the partes : 10 the credit agreement entered into a
Multi-Party Agreement whereby Equitable consented
to the aircraft acquisition and financing arrange-
ments on the cendition, among other things. that it-
be given the right to acquire all of the notes issued
pursuant to the credit agreement (f.. =06S8-89).
On June 15th. TWA’s Board authorized an offer to
Tooleo to convert the notes and the interest acerued
thereon into TWA’‘s common stock at #10 per share.
The transaction was not consummated until after (1)
the consent of Equitable was obtained (f. 20689) and
(2) the agreement was approved-by TW A‘s stoek-
holders. ineluding the holders: of a: smajority of com-
mon stock not ewned by Tooleo (12 C.A.B. at 206).
Upon surrender of the notes 1.034423) shares of:
TWA‘s common stock were issued to Tooleo.* (f.
20687). eat
oe .
In October 1948. Tooleo intend to sell. to TWA.
subject to CAB appreval. two Model 049 Constella-
tiotis at Tooleo’s cost. TWA's motion for approval
of this transaction’ recited, inter alia, that:
++. said airplanes are required by TWA for
use in its domestie operations: the manufacture
of airplanes of this model has been discontinued :.
_. and the price to be paid by TWA to Hughes
Tool Company for said airplanes is substantially
helow the price’ paid by TWA for airplanes of
. * Eforts by a minority stockholder of TWA to -njoin the con-
version of the notes Were denied by a federal district court,
Nnetder v. Transcont inental & Western Air. Ine. 4 79 F.Supp. 5289
Dp. p.! 194s.
~
Annex B
9b
°
the same model purchased by it from Lockheed
_ aireraft Corporation in May of 1947.°°* (R. 197)
By order dated January 27, 1949 (No. E-2404; A177-
78), the Board amended its 1944 contro] order so as to
permit the consummation of the above transaction.
The conditionat sales contract was signed on February
1, 1949 (12 C.A.B. at 208). Pridr thereto the aircraft
were ‘used by TWA without charge (R. 197; f.
> 30086).°*? | ;
———
* Submitted’ in support of the motion were affidavits of -the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of TWA and the Treasurer
of Tooleosas well as other relevant documents (R. 195-212). In
addition. the Chief. Carrier Relations Section of the Board, re-
quested Tooleo to submit further information relating to the trans-
action. This request affords ‘a graphic measure of the compre-
hensive nature of the continuing control over Tooleo- TWA affairs
which the Board undertook to exerdise. .[t stated that in. light
of Toolco’s request to sell aireraft to TWA: pe
*.°. Jit is not felt that action can.be taken on this motion
Without first obtaining additional information, such as the full
history ,of the airplanes. including copies of the original bills
- of sale to Hughes Too! Company. a breakdown of the cost
‘elements of each airplane. inchiding the cost of each item of
conversion, the amount of depreciation acerued on egch air-
plane. an appraisal of the planes at cost or marke value,
_ Whichever is lower, by an impartial third party. a statement
et the use made of the planes from the date they were pur-
chased to the present date. including total number of tying
hours: the total number of hours of use of each engine. ‘It is
assumed. of course. that Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc..
has secured all necessary consents and approvals to the pro-
posed purchase required under or by reason of any prior
commitments made by the carfier.” R. 615. ye
** It should also be noted that both of these aircraft Were cop-
verted. at Toolco’s expense. to conform with the other Model 044
Consteliations already owned by TWA. (f. 20686).
»
> Sy
Annec B
10b
F. 1949
During February TWA offered 404,112 shares of its
common stock to its stockholders at $10 per share.
Tooleo agreed to subscribe to its pro rata portion,
namely 297,304 shares. The Board found that **Tool-
co’s advanced commitment.to take up its pro rata -
portion of the carrier’s offering . . made it pos-
sible for the carrier to undertake that. financing at
that time. ”* (12 C.A.B. at 210).
Karly i in “1949 TWA commenced negotiations with
both Lockheed and Douglas for the acquisition of ad-
ditional four-engine equipment. The number of air-
craft to be acquired by TWA wag,-however, dependent
- upod its ability to secure’the: “necessary financing. Dis-
cussions were commenced with the Mellon Bank, which
-was then TWA’s lead bank, and Equitable due to the
position it held over the affairs of TWA. (f. 22078).
The banks insisted as a condition to their participation
in the financing that they be given a. right of first
refusal with respect to any additional debt finanting
proposal by TWA (f. 22056) and together with Lock-
‘heed and. Equitable further insisted, among’ other
things, that Tooleo guarantee that. TWA’s net worth
_ be at least $20 million:as of December 31, (1949, an |
increase of $10 million: (12 C. A.B. at 210;. f. 22078-
80). Tooleo agreed to this demand and a bank credit
was thereafter arranged for the acquisition of twenty.
Model 749A aircraft from Lockheed. the indebtedness~.
to be secured by a chattel mortgage (f. 22015-80).
Anne. B. |
1lb
G. 1950-1954
On oe 28, 1950, TWA requested Board ap-
proval of Toolco’s proposal to sell at. cost, by non-
recourse conditional sales contracts, six Lockheed
049s to TWA.* (R. 213-40). In its motion TWA
noted that four of these aircraft were being acquired
by Tooleo from Air France and the remaining two
from Lockheed** and that: ,
“‘The contracts for the purchase of these air- —
planes were entered tito directly by Hughes, Tool
Company to assist TWA in acquiring such air-
planes. It is impossible for TWA to acquire air-
craft without obtaining prior consents or waivers
under various financial agreements tt has en-
tered into in the past. The Indenture of Detem-
ber 1, 1945, as amended, between TWA and The —
Commercial National Bank and Trust Company
' Of New York, as Trustee, covering the Deben-
tures held by The Equitable Life Assurance So-
eiety of the United States, prohibits, under pres- .
ent. conditions, the acquisition by TWA of any
new atreraft without the consent of the holders
of the Debentures. The Chattel Mortgage of
August 4; 1949 from -TWA to Mellon National
Bank and Trust Company, as Trustee,. prohibits
borrowings, mortgaging. of a or acquisition —
* Among other things furnished by TWA ‘in support of its.
. motion was the conditional sales agreement which set ont in detail
the financing arrangements (R. 217-24). ° .
** Toolco’s purchase contracts with Lockheed and Air Franee
also accompanied the application (R. 225-40).
,;Annexr B
;
Sas eo.) en — . °
ME Sy ERR Te SRNR Rrra ose 9
12b
of aircraft by conditional sales agreement exce pt
after thirty days’ written notice by TWA to, and
negotiations with, the Lending Banks under such -
mortgage. Beeause it would be necessary for
TWA to obtain additional financing to acquire
these six airplanes, TWA could not have entered
into arrangements for their purchase without
- complying with or obtaining consents or waivers
under both of these agreements. By contracting -
to purchase these airplanes immediately Hughes
Tool Company insured that they would be avail-
able to TWA upon the completion. of the neces-
sary clearances under these agreements.” (Em-
phasis added} (R. 215).
In addition, TW A stated that ‘Hughes Tool Co on.
pany is providine TWA with financial arrangements
on better terms than would otherwisethe available.
.’ (R. 216). ‘It compared the 214% interest rate
and a 16°, down payment with a 3% interest rate and
a 35°; down payment in the then recently executed
arrangement made dir “evtly with Lockheed and others
for the purchase of twenty 749.4 Lockheed Conitella-
tions.: “(R. 216). On May 12, 1950, the Board ap-
‘ptoved the proposed’ transaction.* + (Order No. E-
4160; A179-80) — . . : a
At approximately the same time, TWA contracted
with Martin for-the purehase of thirty startin ¢ 404 air-
* Despite the fact that the sale of these aircraft was to be in
the form-of a non-recourse conditional sales contract. TWA had
to seek permission from Equitable and the banks who wer:
parties to the 1949 credit agreements, as Well as Lockheed? drew,
order to enter into this transaction. (f. 22095-22100) :
Anner B
?
“A~
ae
1) RADARS be a MEL
13
craft aid for the lease of twelve Martin® 202A air-
eraft.* (12 C.A.B. at 208, n. 35). Financing for
the purchase of these aircraft was arranged with the ©
‘same banking institutions which had financed the
Lockheed purchases and followed the same basi¢ pat-
tern. _(f. 22640- 1).
In ‘order to obtain Equitable’s consent to the acqui-
sition of the Martin aircraft and the financing thereof,
Equitable demanded. that TWA agree to sell, prior
to December 31, 1951, a sufficient quantity of stock so ~
as to’ realize at least $5 million and that Tooleo agree
to guarantee the performance of TWA’s agreement
or to lend TWA that amount on a subordinated basis.
(R. 245-46, R. 270-72). Tooleo and TWA “formally
— to this demand on April 5, 1950. (R. 245;
f. 20766).
After the agreement with Martin ,was. executed,
TWA concluded that it still needed more aircraft..
On July 27, 1950, TWA éxerciséd option rights to
acquire six additional Model 749As from Lockheed. |
Of these aircraft, one was ordered by TWA at the
request and for the account of Tooleo and was suh-
sequently sold to Tooleo. (R. 245). Of the remain-
ing 749A aircraft the final installment. of the purchase
price of four of these aircraft was financed by Toolco
under a conditional sales agreement because of various
demands of Equitable and others. (R. 244). :
In August 1950, eleven additional Martin 404 air-
craft were ordered by TWA. (R. 243). One of these
* in 1952 TWA pu ‘chased from Martin the haned aircraft.
- 2OTROQ). °
Annex B
¢
ro
aircraft was for the use of Tooleo and was sold to it.
The remaining Martins were financed by the TWA:
banks under an arrangement similar to that. under
which the original thirty Martin 404s were financed.
, (f. 20768).< Toolco took no part in this financing.
. On October 6, 1950, the Board entered its order. in
the Furthér Control Case approving as in the public
interest Toolco’s acquisition of full and complete legal
control of TWA. * (12 C.A.B. at 192).
On December 5, 1950, TWA areeers into a-contract
with Lockheed for the acquisition of ten Model 1049A
aircraft. Thereafter TWA entered into negotiations
for the financing thereof. Said financing was: ar-
_ ranged with the TWA traditional bariking group and
“on January- 15,-1951 a credit agreement was con-
cluded. (f. 22641)
As a condition to ite consent to the creation of this
‘indebtedness Equitable demanded that Tooleo buy:
sufficient shares of TW.A’s common stock (to the ex-
tent sufficient shares were not otherwise sold) to pro- ©
_vide TWA with net proceeds from the sale of the
common stock to realize at least $5 million. (R. 246;
f. 20756, f. 20766). On January 16, 1951, Tooleo and
TWA consented to this demand. ‘ R. 272-74). Se.
* In 1950 the Board also eapeued, r iskant to Section “309 of
the Act, the — of interlocking relationships in Tooleo and
TWA by Thomas A. S'ack. Fred W. Avers ‘and Harry Rovers.
(Order No, E-4223 (May 24. 1950)). Simi'ar approval was also
obtained with respect to Albert ¥. Leste on Aancary 4. 1951
(Order No. E-4999).-. —
nner BR ,
> Benne oe " — as > oo ~ e Es
- ®& Ra) Tae VON Tmgegge Met ASAT TT ERT ee PA
. 15b- . : : . a
In Mareh 1951, TWA moved: the Boatd to enter an
order approving (1) the proposed sale by TWA to
Toolco of one Martin 404 aircraft (see p. 13b, supra) ;
(2). the proposed financing by TWA through Toolco
‘of the final installment of the purchase price of the d
Your Lockheed Constellation 749A aircraft by means —’
of a conditional sales contract (see p. 13b, supra) ; (3)
‘the propoged sale by TWA to Toolco of. one Lockheed
Constellation 749A aircraft (see p. 13b, supra); and
-(4) the agreefients betweeh TWA, Tooleo and Equi-
table dated _pril 5, 1950 and January 16, 1951 (see
pp. 13b, 140, supra).) In that motion TWA submitted
‘all pf the agreements relevant to the various transae-
— —— tions. (R. 248-74). Therein TWA noted, among other
things, that:
(1) “*The putchase y [Tooleo] ot a Martin
-- Modef 404 Aircraft is of potential Benefit to
TWA in that .. . the pureliase price of each air-
plane purchased by TWA is reduced by, $12,500
if the . . . Martin Company sheininatares' more.
than 100 of such airplanes in continuous .produe- .
tion.’ ** (R. 243); . ®
(2) ‘‘[Tooleo] is taking title to these four |
[749.4] airplanes and selltig them to TWA on’ a.
conditional ‘sale basis solely for the purpose of
enabling TWA to finance the acquisition of such
airplanes. - oo CR. 24); - .
(3) “TWA is to pay ['Tooleo] for these airplanes
only the amount which [Toolco] has paid to Lock-
heed, with interest on the unpaid balance as pro-
vided in the conditional sale contract. [Toolco }
_is providing TWA with finaneing: -for the aequisi- , .
iia B cin
e 4 °
= oats a owe . A ” _ . °
GATIVE 8 PAP MM wy % STS pat “So. 3 at 2d ger IA ae a 3G TI RS
16b
tion of these four airplanes on better terms than
would otherwise be available to TWA.” (R. 244);
a) “These four airplanes are required by TWA =
“for use in its domestic and internatiogal opera-
_ tions. The addition of these planes to TWA"s
‘present fleet will permit increased Constellation
serviee and inereased revenue mileage and will :
thus improve TWA’s serv ice to the public.”
CR. 244);
(5) **.. .-The pureheae by [Tooleo] of a Lock-
h®ec Constellation Model’ 749A Airplane [from
TWA] is of substantia? benefit te TWA in that
under [TWA’s contract with Lockheed] the pur-
"chase price of each airplane purchased by TWA
is reduced as.the number .of planes purchased
’ thereunder is increased through the exercise hy
TWA of option rights."* (R. 245) ; ®
(6) “The execution of. [the agreements with
Equitable] were , essential parts of the transac-
tions pursuant to. which TWA. arranged to pur-
_ chase and finanee new fleets of Martin and Con-
stellation aireraft, The execution of the 1950
~ Agreement was made a condition precedent by
Equitable to its consent to the purchase by TWA
of 30 Martin Model 404 aireraft. . . . The execu-
tion of the 1951 Agreement was made a condition
prececent’ by Equitable to its consent to the pur-
chase by TWA of ® Lockiteed Model 1049 Con-
stellation Aircraft... .“ (R. 246); and
(7) “The 1950 Agreement and the 1951 Agree-
ment’ were entered into by [Tooleo} to enable |
~" oo s Annex Bo | “haa
> PN REI ES MEE OES yn cc t
17b
TWA to purchase aircraft required by TWA and
essentialto its future operations. Their purpose
is to aid TWA by providing it with additional
equity capital, whether by sale of stock to =
by sale of allsuch stock to [Tooleo], by the
chase. by [Tooleo] of its pro rata share of stoc
offered to others or by. means of a subordinated
loan. The execution ayxd™performance of both
»*
es
these agreements will be of substantial benefit to -
TWA.” (R. 247)
On. April 15, 1951, the Board ania Tooleo's role”
in the above transactions. (Order No. E-5324; A180-
, :
H. - 1952-1954
-_
’ In February 1962, pursuant to the 1950 agreement .
with Equitable. (p. 13b, supra), TWA made an offer-
ing of 242.987 shares of its $5 par value stock. Tooleo
purchased 204,110 shares at the offering price of
$21.25 per share. (f. 22628). On November 20, 1952,
_ and.as a result of the 1951 agreement (see p. 14b,
supra), TWA offered additional shares of common
stock at a subscription price of $16.00 per share. .
Toolco purchased 265,100 of the approximately 355.-
000 shares ultimately sold. (f. 20756 ).
In July 1953, TW A entered. into letter agreements
Witli Lockheed for the purchase of eight Model 1049G
aireraft, with short-term optien rights to purchasé up
to 12 additional airplanes of the same model. In Sep-
tember of that year TWA exercised’ its option to
a Annes B
, 9 .
we
_ 18b
purchase the additional aircraft’ subject to securing , &
the riecessary financing’ Such financing was there- —
after obtained : -from TWA’s -traditional banking
group. (1954 Annual wins of TWA, p. 4; f. 22606-
20, f. 22773-TA). |
In’ February 1954, TWA soiiieaid that Delta Air-
lines had available for sale three Constellation air-
-eraft which were built: generally to TWA’s specifica-
tions. In. ‘order to. obtain the necessary: financing. as
expeditiously as possible, TWA arranged with Tooleo a
’ sto acquire ‘the aircraft by means of a non-recourse
‘conditional sales contratt, On March ‘25th: TWA re-
quested Board approval of the “WA-Toolco trans-
actions stating that thé sales were to’ be at cost and
the. interest rate and:' TWA’s initial payment were to
é be substantially less’ than comparable :market rates,
(R. 27: )-91). The motion papers included the condi-
tional sales agreement wherein financing and delivery .
prices were set out .as well as Togleo’s letter, agree-
ment with Delta’ which also contained the necessary
financial details. On April 1,.1954 the Board approved -
‘the transactions. between Delta, Toolco and TWA.
(Order Noa, E-8214; A183).: err se -
° ‘for i
—
~
In December, 1954 TWA refunded the i unpaid pak
tion of the Equitable debentures as well as its“exist-
ing bank debt. This refinancing took the. form of a -
* $10 million revolving credit. agreement with a group
of .bariks headed by Irving Trust Company together .
with an agreement with Equitable’ whereby a niaxi-
~ mum of $40 million principal amount of 334% Equip- | -
ment Mortgage Bonds due June 30, 1969,: was> made
Annex B
. . ;
: ‘
ome RS So gk ET EAS tot nt peas Pee She wht tl PP ap ARO eS
eget Pe eeER FERAL FREON LL ME EEE
n..
2
aren |
available to TWA. (1954 Annual Report of TWA,.
p. 4; S.E.C, Form 8K filed January 11, 1955.
I. 1955-1956
As was stated in a note to the TWA finaicial state-
anents contained in the airline’ 8 1955 Annual Report:
— “In November, 1955, the Company was graitted
options ‘by Hughes Tool Company to acquire all
of its rights under two contracts covering the.
purchase of aircraft at an aggregate price.of ap-
proximately $74,000,000 to be delivered. during
1956 and 1957. The options Hee exercisable by
Pwa: during 1956, — to CAB approval.
* (p. 18).
- Thereupon, on May 17, 1956, the CAB approved the -
motion of TWA that it be permitted to exercise op-
tions for the purchase from Tooleo, pursuant to condi-
tional sales ¢ontracts, a substantial fleet of new piston
equipment—eight Model 1049G’s and « twenty-five
Model 1649A’s—then being qnanufactured by Lock-:
heed. In its order granting ynodification of the basic
order in- the 1944 Control Case, the Board stated:
‘*We have considered all of the circumstances
surrounding the proposal and find it in the pub-
lic interest to relax the restrictions in the afore- ‘
mentioned Order No. 3210. .The Board has w-
cently awarded TWA several new route segments
and it, appears that additional aircraft are re-~
quired to implement such services. . Furthermore,
it appears that the new equipment is being made
A nner Bo
20b
available to TWA at cost with the advantage of
earlier delivery than would be" possible if pur-
chases of like equipment had to be made in the
open market. . . .”’ (Order No. E- sesein A185; see -
also R. 292-332). .
— It was recognized by all concerned that the conditional
sales agreements represented temporary financing and
that the obligations would be refinanced when a suit-
able plan could be developed. ‘As in the past, and pur-
‘suant to requirements sefby the lending institutions
whose consent was necessary, the conditional sales con-
tracts were to be without recourse to the general. credit
of TWA.
Commencing in the early part of 1956 and in order
yto assist TWA in the procurement of the most suit-
able fleet of jet aircraft, Tooleo placed orders for |
sixty:three jet aircraft to be manufactured by Boeing
and Convair (and for spare engines and equipment
manufactured by others), under contracts assignable
to TWA. (1955 Annual Report of TWA, p. 4: 1956
Annual Report, p. 3; ef. R. 396, 417-20, 425, 520).
Taoleo’s total commitments in ‘connection with this .
jet equipment program exceeded $300 million (AA
245). The arrangement between TWA and Tooleo o
with respect to this equipment is described in a 1957
' TWA Registration Statement: as follows:
. “*Hughes hae placed orders, under contracts as-.
signable to TWA, for 15 Boeing 707-131 aircraft,
18 Boeing 707-331 aircraft, and 30 Convair 880
aircraft, forHtelivery beginning in 1999. These
contracts are subject to modification as to number
‘Annex BB’
. Bh. Sunt én Wwe M$ ORE ew * “ 4
EERE LEP ONE LER LOLS SLO OTE GE EEN OR A aR Roe
.
y
21b
and model of aircraft covered and as to specifica-
tions of the aircraft,-including seating capacity.
Hughes is not committed to sell any of these air-
craft to TWA, nor is TWA committed to buy any
of them from Hughes. Any such transaetion be-
tween TWA and Hv ghes requires approval of the
Civil Aeronautics Board.’’ (f. 34427)
In addition to the orders it had placed, Toolco be-
> gan to investigate. the feasibility of manufacturing a -
superior type of jet aircraft suitable for use by TWA
interchangeably on its domestic and international
routes, On June 8, 1956, in résponse to a motion by
TWA for approval of the acquisition of jet aircraft
of advanced design which Toolco indteated willingness
to develop and construct for delivery commencing in.
1961 (R. 334-35), the CAB instituted an investigation _
‘“‘to determine (a) whether the proposal of Hughes
Tool Company to manufacture and sell up to-25 jet-
powered aircraft for TWA and other air lines will |
result in a transaction requiring further Board’ con-
sideration, under section 408, of the control of TWA
by’ Hughes Tool Company; (b) if so, whether the |
Board should approve or disapprove such transaction
under section 408(b) of the Act’’ (Order No. E-10360;
A187, A189).* In.view of a number of developments
soon thereafter, Tooleo’s entry into the field of ecom-
mercial jet aircraft manufacture became unfeasible,
and the investigation was ordered terminated in 1958
after TWA withdrew its motion (Order No. E-12604;
A195). .
* As to the scope of the proposed inv estigation, see Toole “0 Main
Brief, pp. 27-28. .
| Anner B
22b
In the meantime, on September 28, 1956, the CAB yon
instituted a separate Section 408 investigation on its -
own initiative into the acquisition by Hughes: of a
possible controlling stock interest in Atlas Corpora-
tion (Order No. E-10646). This proceeding was
ultimately, resolved when the Board approved a stipu-
lation and settlement whereby Hughes submitted him-
self to the jurisdiction of the Board under Section
408 and ‘offered to place his’stock in an irrevocable
voting trust. Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Air-
lines, Possible Common Control Case, 27 C.A.B. 155-
(1958) .*
In order that TWA might be assured of the funds
it required to meet its current needs into 1958, Tooleo
(with the consent of Irving and Equitable) .agreed to
extend a $10 million credit on a basis stbordinated to
Equitable’s position, without any commitment fee (as
- would have been required by the banks), and at an -
interest. cost equivalent to the prevailing prime rate
for commercial loans. On December 18, 1956, pur-
-Suant to a motion by TWA setting forth the relevant ©
facts (R. 336-41),.the CAB approved this TWA-
Tooleo transaction: (Order No. E- 10871; A190).
During 1956 the CAB also seitaieds pursuant to
Section 409, the holding by M. E. Montrose, C. H. :
Price and D. J. Martin of interlocking directorships
* The voting trust was executed pursuant to this order. See
31 C.A.B. 1003, at n. 4 (41960). The trust was extended fron.
time to time during 1961 and the required divestiture upon its
termination was ultimately. deferred indefinitely due to the pend-
eney of the Toolco-Northeast Control Case. See Order No. E-177%2
(Nov. 30, 1961). : .
<
Annex B
NEM LLEIESL ESE LO MEEE LEE ELLE LES LEE LIE ER SOE
23b -
and offices. *‘within the system” of affiliated and sub-
sidiary companies composed of TWA and Toolco.”’
(Order No. E-10024; Order No. E-10310).
J. 1957 |
The contemplated refinancing of existing and future
conditional sales contracts with respect to the acquisi-
tion by TWA of the Lockheed 1049G’s, 1649A’s and
related equipment (see pp. 19b-20b, supra) was con-
summated in mid-1957 with, inter alia, the sale by
- TWA of common stock to its stockholders, principally
Tooleo,* in excess of $43 million. Pursuant to the
motion of TWA (R. 342-57), and upon the finding that
‘‘the proposed refinancing program, including the
possible increased percentage of stock held by. Tooleo
in TWA, raises no_new questions under section 408’’
and that it ‘“‘does not violate the original intent of
the ‘restriction imposed upon transactions between
TWA and Toolco,”’ the CAB approved the transaction
on June 11, 1957 (Order No. E-11432; A192, A193).
As the Board noted in its order, the application of
TWA described the advantages of the proposed finan-
eing plan, including improvement of its debt-equity —
ratio and that it would be left in a more flexible posi-
. tion for future ne of jet equipment (A198 ;
see *. 349-50).
* Tooleo acquired somewhat more than $35 million worth of
the TWA stock, thus increasing: its ownership interest from ap-"
proximately 74% to the present 78.2%. In addition, pursuant |
to its commitment with respect to the establishment of a revolving
credit (see J. 349-52). Tooleo loaned almost $6 million to TW A
in December of 1957. _ (See R. 415-16).
A nnex B
“Ye <p , La STAT PRE NT RR OSB Gy LOSS SERRE
. . r oT : oD ES ti ab €.o
: Po a
By December, 1957 both TW.A and Equitable recog- ©
‘ nized that in light of the downward trend in TWA’s
revenues TWA would have -to obtain $12 million in
additional cash by the end of that year. The necessary =~
funds were then obtained for TWA from the banks .
_ (with the consent of Equitable) on an‘unsecured, 90
day basis (renewable for an additional 90 days), guar-:
anteed by Tooleo (R. 362-63). Tooleo’s guarantee
received CAB approval (Order No. E-1 1334: A 196:
. see » 25b, tnfra).
Also bering December, 1957 Tooleo purchased over -
$1 million of spare parts originally ordered by Linee
_sieree Italian in connection with. four Lockheed
/ 1649A aircraft that airline had contracted to purchase -
frony the manufacturer (the contract had been can-
~. celled). TWA agreed to buy the remainder of such
spare parts and on Deeember 31, 1957 it ‘contracted
with Lockheed to acquire .the four aircraft when
they beeame- available (R. 361; see also A518-19).
Subsequently, -pursuant to approval by the CAB, .
TWA acquired the additional spare parts at Tooleo's ©’
‘cost; the - CAB also approyed Tpoleo’ = guarantee of
conditional ‘sales contrac Thereby TWA was to
dequire the four 1649A°s from Lockheed. (A 196-99;
see p. 25b, infra; see also. R.. 361-64).
K. 1958
_ In transactions—the final ones involving thé aequisi-
‘ tion -of piston aircraft. by TWA—approved by the
CAB as in the -public interest, Tooleo enabled TWA
(i) to sublease five Lockheed 1049H aircraft from
Annex B
25b - | oe
Tooleo and (ii) to purchase an additional four such
“ aireraft from. Lockheed upon financing tetms similar
to the last four 1649's (see-p. 24b, supra), includ-
ing Tooleo’s guarantee. (Order No. E-13334; A196; see —
alsu R. 359-67). In its order the CAB noted TWA’s
statement that the guarantees by Toolco of TW.A’s ob-
ligations (referring to the $12 million loan, see p. 24b,.
supra, and the conditional sales contracts with Lock-
. heed on the 1649's atid 1049H’s) **were of substantial
advantage to the carrier, were purely for TWA’s con-
_Venience and entailed. no cost whatever to TWA.”
(A197).
all TWA’s 1957 Annual Report, issued during March
1958, contains the following significant remarks by
its Senior Vice-President-Finance and’ Treasurer:
~ **The general outlook for business is far less
satisfactory than a year ago. However, there are
several plus factors. The Company. has inte-
grated the 25 1649-A's .into its fleet, its service
standards are at a peak and the Civil Aeronautics
Board has taken some cognizance of the indus-
try’s need for compensatory rates to match the.
continually increasing costs of doing business
which we are hopeful is a precursor to a more
, realistic approach toward the industry’s necessi-
ties.
‘The rate increase effective February 10, 1958 on
domestie passenger traffic is 4% plus $1 per ticket
issued,,palpably but a sop to the industrv’s needs
if it is to attract the capital required for the jet
age. During the:course of the current vear we will
e
Annex B
EE RELL IN TA NNR ERNE CN RTA RMT
. ° eas SEES SY A ee Op Ee PE a ER NA
. .
-26b oa:
“address ‘ourselves actively to this problem since
_ delivery of the jet airplanes under order. by: the
Hughes Tool Company under contracts assignable
to TWA will commence during early 1959.’ (p.7)
TWA ‘continued to operate at a loss ‘despite the in-
creased revenues generated from the introduction into
service of the new Lockheed equipment.
On June 30, 1958, when the $12 million bank loan to_
TWA matured,.TWA was without: sufficient means to_
repay the loan. In view of the position taken by
Equitable, whose. consent to, an extension of the loan
was needed, and the lack of time to negotiate a suit-
able solution of the complex problems, Toolco itself
repaid the loan (pursuant to its Board-approved guar-
antee) with funds it borrowed from the banks. (See
R. 687). ~
L. 1959
_ The first Boeing 707-131. theretofore ordered by
Tooleo came available in January 1959, and was im-.
mediately turned over to TWA by Toolco on the basis
of a day-to-day lease terminable by either party. The
lease’ agreement (including the payment of rentals) .
- Was expressly conditioned upon approval by the CAB
‘and Equitable (R. 375). TWA’s motion to the CAB
_ refers to Toodleo’s order of fifteen 707-131s and states —
further that: ‘Although. TWA has entered into. no
specific commitment to acquire such.aireraft. *+ never-
theless contemplates that certain of ‘these aircraft will
» be made available to it, on terms not yet determined,
- oe xs Annex B
©
for use in TWA’ s certificated opirations. ~ CR. 369).
Noting that in the motion TWA also “‘states that the
aircraft and the spare parts thérefor are necessary to
_- enable it to carry forward its jet training program so .
that it will be in a position to conduct. certificated jet
- service as soon as sufficient jet equipment is delivered”’
_ (A200), the CAB approved the transaction by order
dated. February 26, 1959.. (Order No: E-13542; A199).
Thereafter as a means of temporarily financing the jet
aircraft TWA was to acquire, Tooleo and TWA en-
tered into additional, temporary day-to-day lease ar-
‘rangentents. Toolco undertook the entire risk by pro-
“Viding in the agreements that no rentals would be
payable } nding receipt of the requisite approval by
-both CAB and the lending institutions (eg. R.
633-34).
Pursuant to CAB ene of motions - TWA, all.’
fifteen of the 707-131s ordere¢” by Tooleo (together
with necessary spares) were delivered for use by TWA
between January and August of 1959 (see R. 616-34).
~ On May 15, 1959 the Board entered,an order (E-13873;
A201) in response to a TWA motion of March 13,
1959 (R. 378) permitting TW A to lease up to’ eleven
aircraft from Tooleo as they became available and to
acquire from Toolco up to $3.5 million worth of spare
parts therefor;* however, the Board deferred action
upon an additional request by TWA for permission to
lease thirty spare jet engines from Tooleo, stating fhat .
* # As the Board noted in its order: *‘TWA states that the air-
craft and the spare parts and engines therefor are necessary to’
enable it to carry forward its jet training program and to coni-
mence jet service on its certificated routes... .’’ (A202)
Annex B
4
\ ”
SEE EE NRE aE ERE oP TREE I
— 28b
‘inasmuch as the terms of the spare engine leases have
ndt been filed, the Board cannot at this time determine’
whether modification of Order, No.. 3210 is justified
with regard to the spare wn lease transactions.”’
(A203).* By the time it was necessary for TWA to
move for approval of the balance of the Boeing 707-
131 leases it had become apparent that the program to.
acquire permanent financing was not proceeding as
anticipated. As described by the.Board’s order en-
tered July 1, 1959 (No. E-14169) granting the re-
quested relief, in its motion (R. 3§3-89) :
= . ‘“TWA-states that it had anticipated that defini-
—~ "tive financing arrangements permitting it to oper- ~
-ate these jet aircraft on a permanent basis would
~ have been finalized by. June 30, °1959, but that -
since arrangements for such financing“ have not
as yet been completed the parties to the leases
’ now desire to extend them until September 30,
1959. . . .”” (A205)
Pursuant to the condition imposed in the CAB orders
(see A203, A206), TWA filed copies of the aircraft
leases &s each was executed. (R. 616-34). -
_ By order dated July 22, 1959, pursuant to Section
409, the CAB approved the holding by Raymond M.
Holliday of interlocking directorships - -and offices
“‘within the system ot affiliated and subsidiary com-
* In a subsequent filing TWA advised the Board that it was
able to purchase, from the manufacturer sufficient spare engines
to satisfy interim requirements, and that it decided to defer th:
question of how it should handle the acquisition of its total spare
engine requirement pending accomplishment of a definitiye fi-
nancing program for its jet equipment. (R. 386-87).
Annet B
29h
panies composed of Tooleo and TWA.”’ (Order No. '
E- W251).
So long ; as Toolco was able to carry the entire bur-
den of financing the TWA jet fleet, there did not ap-
pear to be any pressure upon TWA to obtain a per-
manent financing plan. Pursuant to a, motion by —
‘TWA (R. 390-94), the CAB appRey ved abrogation of
the September 30, 1959 termination'date for the day-
to-day leases upon which TWA was able.to operate:
its jet aircraft. (Order No. E-14504; A207). The
-Board found that ‘such a\modification ef the control
relationship ‘*is just and reasonable and in the public
interest,’ but provided that its order ‘‘may be
* amended or revoked at any time at the discrétion of
the Board without hearing.”’ (A208).
On November 6, 1959, TWA moved for CAB ap-
proval of additional day-to-day leases. of up to eight
Boeing 707-331s and eight of the Convair 880s which
were coming available. In its moying papers (R. 395-
404), TWA stated, inter alia: “that Teooleo, had: on
order twelve 331s and thirty 880s; that TWA had no-
commitment to acquire these. aircraft but contem-
plated that certain of them would. We made available
for use in its operations; that the first deliveries of
the Boeings and Convairs were anticipated during
November and December 1959, respectively ; and that
Tooleo was willing to make the aircraft available to
TWA under leases substantially identical.to the ones
theretofore approved and would at TWA’s request
supply the necessary spare parts at cost. In its order
(Order No. E-14877 (Jan. 29, 1960); A209), the
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30b
t Board noted the further statement by TWA that “the
aircraft and spare parts therefor are necessary to
enable it to carry forward its jet training program
and to provide additional jet service over its gerti-
ficated routes pending completion of definitive Mane-
ing arrangements permitting it to operate these air-
craft on.a permanent basis’’ (A209-10), and upon
the finding that to do so ‘‘is just and reasonable and
in the publie interest*’ agreed to a modification of the
basic control order so as to permit the proposed trans-
actions (A210) ; once again, however, it was provided
that ‘‘this order may be amended or revoked at any
time in the discretion of the Board without hearing.\’
(A211).
During 1959 it was also reported to the Board (i) ©
that TWA’s earnings generated sufficient funds as to’
permit repayment of the $12 million note held by
Tooleo by reason of its guarantee of TWA’s December
1957 bank loan, and ‘(ii) that one of the Lockheed
1049H aircraft which TWA had subleased was de-
stroyed and that ‘TWA, pursuant to the provisions of
the Baard-approved agreement, paid Tooleo the agreed
| value. ‘These TWA-Toolco transactions were reported
in a year-end statement filed by TWA pursuant to the
original orders approving Toolco’s control. (See
R. 637 ia a 6 Tee "oe ,
M. 1960
In March 1960, TWA and Tooleo agreed to support
a plan, submittéd by Dillon Read, which contemplated
“that Equitable and one or more other insurance com-
_ Anner B
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31b
panies would supply permanent senior long-term
financing, Irving and associated banks Would suppiy
- short-term and interim senior financing to TWA,
Toolco would accept $100 million of subordinated debt
or equity securities of TWA in payment, pro tanto, of —
TWA’s obligations to Tooleo and also establish a_re-
volving credit in favor of TWA in the amount of $50
“million. Other features presented by the plan in-
cluded: . :
(a) Acceleration of the maturity of ‘and in-
crease in the interest rate on TWA’s sinking fund
bonds-due in 1969 held by eesnerns (see pp. 18b-
19b, supra) ;
(b) A guarantee by a of the payment of
said bonds; and
~-(e) Execution of an agreement which would |
provide that in the event of certain defaults, in-_
cluding a default as a result of a change of. man-
agement, the TWA stock owned by Tooleo would »
be placed in a voting trust’ controlled by the
lenders. (See R. 414-17, R. 459-72),
With the financing: hurdle apparently surmounted,
TWA and Tooleo proceeded with transactions—sub-
ject to approval by CAB and:the lending institutions |
—whereby TWA _ would acquire from Tooleo (1) the
. fifteen Boeing 707-131s then under lease, (2). ten
Boeing 707-331s, (3) twenty Convair 880s, (4) neces-
sary spare parts and engines for these,aircraft, (5)
one’ flight simulator for training crews on the 880s,
and whereby Tooleo would agree, for the benefit of
TWA, to provide (6) its guarantee that a proposed
. Anner B
32b. i
4 offering of TWA equity securities would yield $100
-. million to TWA, (7) its guarantee of a $50 million
_ interim’ bank loan, and (8) the additional loan of up-
_ to $50 million to enable TWA to complete the financ-
-ing plan and maintain its net working | éapital above
$10 million- The motions of TWA with respect to
these transactions (see R. 405-25), received CAB ap-
proval on June 23, 1960. (Order No. E-15430; A211).
- - In its order the Board took cognizance of the yet un-
completed financing (see A212) ang made the follow-
‘ing remarks: mre ; | ,
“Upon the bitte of thé application and the
Yepresentations contained therein, the Board finds
that ‘the acquisition of the 45 aircraft and the
proposed financing program, including the post
sible increased percentage of common stock held, °
by ‘Toolco in TWA, do not appear to violate the: .
intent of the original restrictions imposed on
transactions between TWA and Tooleco.’ Accord-
ingly, further. modification of Order 3210°is just
and reasonable .and -is in the ‘public interest. It
appears, however, that the transactions may
‘ otherwise be subject to section 408 in that they
may involve TWA’s purchase of. a substantial
part of the properties of Tooleco. Howeyer, upon
the basis of the above circumstances, the Board
finds that the enforcement of section 408 would
be an undue burden on TWA by reason of .un-
| usual circumstances ‘affecting its operations and
would not be in the public interest. Therefore,
for’ the reasons expressed above, the Board will
sani ee TWA from. section 408 to the extent that
\ oe Annex B
SS
33b
q
‘such section might prohibit the transactions with-
out prior Board approval.” (A213-14).
During May 1960 agreements were reached whereby.
(1) Tooleo agreed to release six of its excess Convair
880 positions so as to enable Northeast. to lease such
aircraft from Convair, (2) Tooleo agreed to provide
Northeast with up to $9.5 million in direct financial
- assistance, aud (3) there wa submitted a proposal
- involving the merger of Northeast and TWA.* On
the petition of one of .Northeast’s competitors, the
CAB instituted a ‘formal investigation into these mat-’
_ters in July. See Northeast Airlines, Cancellation
and/or Suspension, 31 C.A.B. 1003 (1960). This in-
vestigation was thereafter subsumed into the Toolco-
Northeast Control Case.** (See discussion at pp.
37b-39b, infra). Tooleo negotiated the merger proposal
to remedy the serious seasonal imbalance in TWA’s
route structure.. The’ proposed merger was approved
by Northeast’s Board of Directors on May 16, 1960
-and was then.submitted for consideratioin by- TWA.
At the request of TWA the expiration of the merger
proposal was extended from time to time by Northeast: ~
On March 22, 1961 TWA requested: a further exten-
‘sion to June 30. .This request was denied by North-
* The proposal, submitted to TWA after eiieeute by the North-
east Board of Directors, specifically conditioned vonsummation
upon the consent by (i) a majority of TW.A stock other than that
- held by Toolco, (ii) CAB, (iii) the SEC, which under the In-
vestment Company Act could only give such approval after: find-
“ing that the merger terms were fair and equitable and that the
merger did not involve overreaching on the part of any person
concerned, and (iv). TWA’s senior ‘lenders. (f. 20441- 74).
** The release: of six Convair 880s is discussed more fully at |
pp. 3a-5a of Annex A, supra.
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SUERTE RINE Bp HSE IRE A a PY 8
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34b
east, but it indicated a willingness, to discuss the
matter further at any time (R. 805). In fact the
merger was never consummated.
By May 1960 the lending institutions, ‘including
Metropolitan which had agreed to supply the portion
of the insurance company financing not being supplied
by Equitable, committed themselves to the Dillon Read _
_ plan but upon the condition that they be -permitted
to withdraw their conmitment in the event of a change
- in TWA’s management deemed by them to be adverse.
The maturity of TWA’s sinking fund bonds held by
Equitable was accelerated to the initial closing date
- for the permanent financing and such. indebtedness
-was also guaranteed by Tooico. The injtial closing ~
date was ultimately postponed. to the end of July and
‘the entire program was.submitted to the Board by
Toolco’s motions dated May 9 and July 1, 1960. for
the appropriate approval (R. 412-90). The Board -
reviewed the components of the program which had
been submitted to it, ineluding the acquisition by
TWA from Tooleo of two additional Boeing 707-331s,
and gave its approval to the Tooleo-TW A transac-
tions. (Order No. E-15561; A215; see Order No. E-
15430, 31 C.A.B. 982 ; A211). :
- its order dated June 23, 1960 the Board observed :
. It is true that, should the rights offered °
; to. TWA stockholders be in the form of common
stock and Tooleo purchased all the new stock pur-
‘suant to its guarantee, Toolco’s interest in TWA -
would: inerease from the present 78 pereent to
approximately 90: pereerit. Although, normally,
— Annes -
>
". 85b
an increase of 12 percent jn stock ownership would
be considered substantial. and would give rise .to
a new control relationship under section 408, in
view of the overwhelming control of TWA by —
Tooleo by virtue of Tooleo’s ownership of 78 per-
cent of the stock, the Board concludes, that any
increase of control ‘is insignificant and does not
call for a reexamination of the relationship under
seetion 408."’ (A213)
However, the program there presented was not -con-
summated due to the resignation of TWA’s president,
C harles Thomas, on July 27, 1900.
By motion dated December 22, 1960, TWA sought
appropriate C.A.B. aetion upon the rejuvenated pro-
gram of jet acquisition and financing. Reference was
made to jts earlier motions and approval orders of
the Board resulting therefrom in June and July, and
' that pursuant to such. authorizations TWA had ac-
quired eleven aireraft ‘through temporary debt ti-
‘nancing of TWA, guaranteed by [Tooleo], and the
- issuance of subordinated’ obligations by TWA _ to
[Tooleo] . . .” (R. 492-93). TWA then stated that
the first closing on the definitive financing was to be
on Decenrber 29, 1960, and that: |
. The terms of this financing and of the
transactions between TWA and Hughes relating . |
thereto are to be substantially the same as those
set forth in TW.A’s motions of May 6, 1960 and
‘July 1, 1960, approved by orders of the Board.
dated June 23, 1960 and July 21, 1960. Among
the changes, which it is waren do not affect the
” Anner Bo
° ~ " ferns . e ae ae — _ ™ on a eeten " _ ™
SST RE SS? FESS ER oS GEE REE RR COTATI SERA ND
36b
substance of the transaction, are the deposit by
Hughes at the time of the first closing under the.
definitive’ financing arrangements, of Hughes’
TWA stock, in the voting trust (which was pre-:
viously to be. established’ only nnder certain con- -
ditions) and the granting to Hughes by.the pur-
chasers of TWA’s secured obligations of options
to acquire such obligafions from the holders
thereof under certain conditions.’’ (R. 493-95).
Copies of the various documents relating to the long-
term financing program were submitted with the mo-
tion (R. 494; see R. 497-570). TWA requested speedy
disposition by the Board. (See R..572-73). “By order
dated December 29, 1960 the Board, upon a detailed
discussion of TWA’s ‘jet. acquisition and financing
program: as well as related matters dehors informa-
tion presented in the motions filed by TWA,* exer-
cised jurisdiction and permitted further modification
‘of the basic control orders and exempted TWA from
the requirements of Section 408 insofar as the speci-
‘tied aircraft purchases were concerned. ~ (Order No.
E-16195, A218-27). Thereupon. the trartsaction: Ss were |
consummated. (B64, B85; ef. R. 638-39).
— * We are advised that it was the insistence of the-financial insti-
tutions upon the establishment and terms of the voting trust and
of the conditions for, its dissolution whicgh have been the major
stumbling block in recent weeks to the consummation of TW-A’s -
. initial jet financing program. We have not been told officially
of the reasons which motivated the decision of-the insurance
. - companies and banks to seek this protection. However. we have
not been unaware of _TWA’s problems.*’ (A223; footnote omitted).
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Dp ~_ —w
ANT ENA VERE ASU RE ES
37b
N. 1961 to date
>
During March 1961 Tillinghast was selected as
TWA’s president. Thereafter, TWA entered into
agreements (i) with Boeing for additional jet air-.
craft costing about $187,500,000 and (ii) with Equit-
able, Metropolitan, Irving and associated banks for
$147 million of additional financing. (See, e.g., A17; .
- B64-65, B81). The 1961 loan agreements, to which
‘Tooleo was not privy, contain provisions whereby
‘the lending institutions could accelerate the additional
debt upon. inter alia, a termination of the Voting
Trust for any reason—inéluding operation of law or
action by any court or’ administrative agency.*.
- On June 30, 1961 TWA filed the present complaint
against Tooleo, Hughes and Holliday.
By order dated November 8, 1961 responding to a
joint application by Northeast and Tooleo requesting
permission for emergency financial assistance by
Tooleo for Northeast. the CAB instituted the Toolco- °
Northeast Control Case—an.-expedited. investigation
into the coutrol questions under Section 408 of the
Act.. Therein the Board took cognizance’ of the cur-_
* Such. provision was made notwithstanding that the agree-
ments between TW. A, Too!vo and the lending institutions p:r-
taining to the Voting Trust provided that it would terminate
(a) prior to December 15, 1970 upon exercise of Toolco’s option
to acquire the TW.\ indebtedness and pay the penalty of up to
22°) therennon, or (b) on such date unless extended as provided
therein. (A221-22; see R. 528-70).-
Anner B
ESE TE ETI ES EEO, a
; ; ~
3
38b
rent TWA-Toolco relationship and noted siceitend
the niet
..Tooleo has for many years: been the con-
saalianis shareholder of TWA: Although -Toolco
has made a major financial coutribution to TWA’s
development, the merit of its management of the
carrier has been publicly challenged. . Less than
a year ago we had occasion to comment on some of
the factors which were causes of concern in this
regard: See Order E-16195, dated December 29,
1960. In that order, we allowed to go into effect :
a new TWA financing program, one condition of —
which was that Toolco would place its TWA
*. gtoek in a voting trust for ‘which Toolco ‘has the
eright to designate but one of three voting trus-
tees—an aYangement insisted upon by the car-
rier’s lenders. We also stated therein that we
would anticipate the obtaining of the approval
of the Board before Tooleo could | resume control
over TWA.
**Subsequent to this action, the new manage-
ment of TWA filed a suit against Hughes. Toolco,.
and: an associate of Hughes. - The complaint
alleges various acts on the part of the Tooleo ©
management in derogation of their managerial
responsibilities, and anti-trust violations of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Atlas is named as a
co-conspirator. We must take notice of these
allegatious even though they have not been proven
or established. It is reasonable to anticipate that
efforts will be made to thoroughly explore them
at the hearing.”* (Order No. E-17075 (R. 764) ; see
* salso Order No. E-17811, 34 C A.B. 583, 594-95
(1961) (dissent) ).
Annee B
. 39b
Although penetrating issues were formulated and
detailed evidence was requested,* and after notice**
a full public hearing pursuant to Section 408(b) was
had, both the Hearing Examiner (see R. 792-832); who
determined that there was no evidence to indicate that
the exercise of control by Tooleo over TWA was in a
manner not authorized and approved by the Board
under the Act,***.and the Board (R. 833-46) held
. that it was in the public interest to permit Toolco to
. acquire -control of Northeast. (Order No.- E-18470
~ (June 19, 1962), aff’d sub nom. National Airlines v.
CAB, 321 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ). .
In the fall of. 1963 Toolco entered into a transaction
whereby, Tooleo (1) would,make a public offering of.
some $81 million -principal amount of TWA’ sub-
ordinated income debentures it had acquired in 1961
as a result of the 1960 financing agreements and (2)
would aequire from TWA $30 million of convertible
subordinated debentures.’ On October 21, 1963 the ©
CAB entered an order further modifying the order’
in the 1944 control case so as to permit consummation
of the Tooleo-TWA transaction; the Board denied a
niotion by TWA to dismiss Tooleco’ S application for
approval. (Order No. E-20105).
* See Report of Prehearing Conference (R. 766-86), particu-
larly Issue Of) (R. 773).
** See R. 736-92.
**® The-Examiner found that ‘‘There is no evidence in this
* record, and none that would support a finding, that Toolco, -in
its dealing with either Northeast or in its prior control of TW.\.
> Gngaged.. in improper self dealing with either of these two com.
panies or that it engaged in unlawful activities.’’ (R. 820).
Annex B
i oe
.
- ey Win kee ~~ be oo . rey — n ‘. . > a
PIES SAYS EAST ERS FREES ASS RET ORE TE
40b
In 1964 Tooleo moved the Board for an order dis-
‘ claiming jurisdiction over-or approving Toolco’s ex-
ercise of its option to Acquire from Equitable and
Metropolitan the $92,800,000. of TWA indebtedness
. and thereby. accede to the position of being able to -
’ terminate the Voting Trust.. TWA opposed the motion
on the basis that that transaction would constitute an
acquisition of control without prior Board approval
pursuant to Section 408. On July 10, 1964 the Board
entered an order which denied Toolco’s motion on the
ground that the possibility of simultaneous control
by Tooleo over Northeast and TWA had never been
‘. passed upon by the Board. However, in view of a
suggestion by Toolco that it was willing t@ divest
itself of the power to control Northeast, the Board
proceeded with a declaration of Toolco’s rights, stat-
ing:
‘‘As previously indicated, the Board in :1950
approved, under @ection 408, Toolco’s ownership
of 73 per cent ofthe stock of TWA. The ques-
tion presented is whether or not this approval -
- terminated as a result of the voting trust which
prevented full exercise of the approved control. *
* We conclude that our earlier approval did not so ~
terminate and that resumption of full control by
Tooleo under its option to. purchase the Notes
would not result in an independent acquisition of -
control subject to the a and approval re- .
quirements of section 408. :
‘‘In our view of the matter, we need not reach.
the issue as to whether the voting trust effected
a-complete insulation of Toolco’s control over
Annex B
~: at
41b_-
TWA within the meaning of section 408. Men
if we assumed that Tooleo temporarily lost all
power to control TWA during the period of the
voting trust, this fact would not have effected a
termination of the Board’s prior approval
of the Tooleo control of TWA under the unique
circumstances present. here. In our judgment,
there was involved at most a temporary hiatus
in control imposed upon Toolco by the exigencies
of TWA’s financing requirements. Toolco at all
times has retained the beneficial ownership of the
stock in question. The trust itself is for a tem-
porary period of ten vias and is terminable prior
‘to the end of that peridd ‘upon the discharge of
TWA’s indebtedness to the financial institutions.
We find nothing in either the literal language of
section 408 or its underlying policy: that would .-
' require that. Tooleo be subjected to a second
‘hearing on the very issue which was previously
heard and decided by the.Board. A contrary
reading of the statute would result in harassment
-of Tooleo without vindicating any statutory ob-
_ jectives.’’ (Order No. E-21057. pp. 4-5 (footnotes
omitted)
Thereupon the Board ‘‘declared that Tooleo may ex- _ .
ercise its option to acquire the TWA Notes described’
herein at such time as it submits a plan satisfactory
_to the Board which would effectively divest Toolco
of the power of simultaneously control both zwa and
Northeast . rm s <*
Annex BY
a
SNP YAR NTE ETE RE HY Oe AMEN HE TROTINE TYY
eee ae
On petition by TWA for judicial review, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside the
- Board’s order, apparently holding*that the last-quoted
portion of the order was an abuse of discretion, and
»- remanded the matter to the Board for action not in-
consistent with the decision, See Trans World Air-
lines y. CAB, 339 F.2d 56 (1964). Tooleo, which had .
intervened in the appeal,.and the CAB both filed pe--—
titions for rehearing. .Toolco’s petition also contaimed
a suggestion for rehearing in banc. On January 11,
1965, pursuant to order of thé court, TWA responded
‘to such petition. By order dated February 11; 1965
the Court of Appeals denied the CAB’s petition. ~
Tooleo’s petition was dertied on February 18, 1965.
/
{
>
Annex B —
ERNE RT
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