Jurisdictional Statement — Inland Empire Builders, Inc. v. Washington

Supreme Court brief1964

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Text

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTosex TERM, 1963-4 .

No... 8.2.0).

Hess & Naropick Coxsrruction Co., Inc. and GENERAL

Construction Co., joint venturers, doing business as

Hess & Naropick Construction Co., Inc., &

ASSOCIATES, Appellant,

vs.

Tue State oF WASHINGTON and Wiuam 8S. Scuv-

MACHER, CLARK Squire and A. E. HANKINS the

Tax Commission of the State of Washi n,

Appellees. -

Hess & Naropick Construction Co., Inc.,

a Washington corporation, Appellant,

vs.

THe State oF WaSHINGTON and WiriuiuaM-S. Scuv-

MACHER, CLARK SQuIRE and A. E. NEKINS, as the

Tax Commission of the State of Washington,

Appellees. __

On APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

- , WASHINGTON

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Casey & Prvuzan

By Cari Prvuzan

T. M. Royce :

Attorneys for Appellants

30th Floor, Smith Tower,

Seattle, Washington 98104

Tre ARGUS PRESS, QR SCarrie. wWasninaran

la the

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1963-4

No

Hepp & NARODICK CONSTRUCTION Co., INC. and GENERAL

CONSTRUCTION Co., Joint venturers, doing business as

Hess & NARODICK ConstructTION Co., INc., &

ASSOCIATES, Appellant,

vs.

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON and Wuiuiam S. Scuv-

MACHER, CLARK SgurreE and A. E. HANKINS, as the

Tax Commission of the State of Washington,

Appellees.

No...

Hens & NARODICK CONSTRUCTION Co., INC.,

a Washington corporation, Appellant,

Vs.

TRE STATE OF WASHINGTON and WintiiamM S. Scuvu-

»MACHER, CLARK SQuIRE and A. E. HANKINS, as the

Tax Commission of the State of Washington,

Appellees.

Own APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

WASHINGTON

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Casey & PRUZAN

By CARL PRUZAN

T. M. Roycr

Attorneys for Appellants

30th Floor, Smith Tower,

Seattle, Washington 98104

THE ARGUS PRESS, ake SEATTLE. WASHINGTON

INDEX

111

Pag

AL Opinion Below 2

Ib. Siatement of Grounds 2

(. Question Presented by This Appeal 3

Dotty Statement of the Case 5

I, (2) Federal Question Raised Below 20

ki. The Federal Question Is Substantial 21

Conclusion 25

Appendix A—Opinion of the Washington Supreme

Court “App. A, pp. 3 to 24

Appendix B—Statutes Involved App. B, pp. 1 to 13

TABLE OF CASES

Clallam County, Wasi? a Ud a 263 US. 341

General Motors Corp. vv. Washington, Supreme

Court Docket No. 1071

Green v. Eglin Atr Force Base Housing, Inc., 104

So.(2d) 463 pes iS

Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 205 US. 434.

83 L.Ed. 272, 59 S.Ct. 325

Janes v. United Artists Corp., 305 U.S. 410. 83

L.Ed. 256, 59 S.Ct. 272

Kern Limerick, Ine. ve Scurlock, 340 US. 110, 98

L.Md. 546. 74 S.Ct. 403

Kuapp-Stiles, luc. vg Michigan Dept. of Revenue,

870 Mich. 629. 122 NAVA) 642 9}, 2:

Liringston ve US. 179 BSupp. 9 364 ULS. 281. 4

L.ed.(2d) 1719, 80 S.Cf, 1611

ELS. 0. Boyd, Supreme — Docket No. 1157

STATUTES

ROW s82.04.040

ROW &2.04.050

ROW s2.04.060

“*

~~

“«

~~

“-*

al

»)

*- 2

~~ ~~

“*

~~

So bee

w STATUTES

Page

RCW 82.04.190 a 3

RCW 82.08.010 3

RCW 82.08.0220 3

RCW 82.08.0380 3

RCW 82.08.050 3

RCW 82.32.150 2

RCW 82.52.180 2

28 U.S.C. 1257(2) 3

42 U.LS.CLA. 1594 18

42 U.LS.CLA. 1594a, et seq. 3

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1965-4

No

Hepp & Naropick (‘oNSTRUCTION Co., INC. and GENERAL

CONSTRUCTION ©Oo., joint venturers, doing business as

Hepp & Naropick Construction Co., INc., &

Associates, Appellant,

Vs.

THE Strate oF WASHINGTON and Wiuriam S. Scuv-

MACHER, CLARK Sgurre and A. E. HANKINS. as the

Tax Commission of the State of Washington,

A ppe llees.

No.

Hess & Naropick ConstrucTrion Co., INc.,

a Washington corporation, Appellant,

V8.

THE SratTe oF WASHINGTON and Winiram S. Scuv-

MACHER, CLARK SQUIRE and A. E. HANKINS, as the

Tax Comnussion of the State of Washington,

Appellees.

Ox APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

WASHINGTON

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

A single Jurisdictional Statement is being tiled cov-

ering both cases appearing on the title page. pursuant

to Rule 1503). for the reason that the two cases are

appealed from the same court, and invelve identieal

1

2

questions. The first listed case invelves the construction

of military. housing at Fort Lewis, Washington. The

second listed case involves the coustruction of military

housing at Fairchild Air Foree Base at Spokane,

Washington. All facts referred to herein will be taken

from the record in the first listed case, as will all page

references to the record,

A, OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of

Washington is reported in — Wn.(2d) —, 384 P.(2d)

337. A copy of the opinion is attached hereto as Ap-

pendix A, “*

B STATEMENT OF GROUNDS

(1) Appellant instituted action to recover retail

sales taxes paid under protest, and to enjoin the State

of Washington from collecting further retail sales

taxes assessed against appellants in connection with

the construction of military housing on a military res-

ervation under a contract with the United States, en- .

tered into pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Con-

gress popularly known as the Capehart Act. The action

was brought under Revised Code of Washington 82.32-

180 and 82.32.1590.

(2) The judgment of the Supreme Court of the

State of Washington was entered on August 1, 1963.

The order denying appcllants” petition for rehearing

was entered September 26, 1963. Notice of appeal was

tiled in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington

on December 20, 1963.

(3) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtfof the

A

—

© x

3 , .

United States to review this judgment by appeal is eon-

ferred by Tithe 28, U.S.C. See, 1257(2).

(4) The following decisions sustain the jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court to review the judgment in this

cause on appeal :

Kern Limerich, luc. ve. Scurlock, 340 U.S, 110,

OS L.Ed. 546, 74 S.C t. 403; ~

KS. Boyd, Supreme Court Docket No. 1157;

Giencral: Motors Corp. vo Washington, Su-

preme Court Docket No. 1071;

Livingston ve ULS., 179 F.Supp. 9, 364 U.S.

PS1.4 L.ed.( 2d} 1719, 80 S.Ct. 1611;

James re U si Artists ew .. ao U.S. 410,

83 L.Ed. 256, 59 S.Ct. 272;

Gavinn, White & Prinee ve. Henneford, 205

U.S. 434, 83 L.Ed. 272, 50 BOL 325.

(5) The State statutes involved are Revised Code

of Washington Sections 82.04.040, 82.04.050, 82.04.0600,

82.04.190, S2.0S.010, 82.08.0204, 82.08.0380, 82.08.050,

The above are set forth in Appeudix B.

C. QUESTION PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL

The following question is presented by this appeal:

Publie quarters owned and operated by the United

States are constructed tor the United States on a mili-

tary reservation. pursuant to the provisions of the

Capehart Act (42 ULS.CLA. See. 1594a et seg.). Is the

Washington State retail sales tax statute, as construed

and applied by the Supreme Court of the State, re-

pugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United

States, in that it miposes a state sales tax on the United

4

States or its instrumentality based upon the cost of

such construction to the United States, in violation of

the immunity of the United States and its instrumen-

talities from state taxation ?

In the State of Washington, the retail sales tax is

imposed by statute on the buyer or consumer, and not

on the seller. The statute requires the seller merely to

collect the sales tax on behalf of the State, and pay it

over to the State (Revised Code of Washington 82.08-

050). It was stipulated in the pre-trial order that when =

the appellant contractor submitted its bid to the United

States, it did not include sales tax as an item of cost, or

collect sales tax. The State's assessment against the ap-

pellagit contractor is based squarely upon the claim

that the gontractor should have collected sales tax as

agent of the State, but failed to do so,

As will be demonstrated, the buyer or consumer of

the military housing owned and operated by the Army

can only be the United States or its instrumentality.

Aik? os

The Washington State Supreme Court held that sales

tax should have been collected by appellant.

Thus, the Washington State retail sales tax statute,

as coustrued and applied by the Supreme Court of the

State of Washington, is repugnant to the Constitution

and laws of the United States, in that is does impose

the state sales tax on the United States or its instru-

mentality, in violation of its constitutional immunity

from State taxation.

ets Always

5

D. (1) STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As Capehart” military housing project for the U.S.

Army is Initiatedeand completed as follows:

The Secretary of the Army determines that the

Army requires military housing facilities on a mili-

tary reservation. Plans and specifications are prepared

by the Army Engineers. The United States calls for

bids. The Contractor submits its bid to the United

States accompamedby the required $25,000.00 bid de-

posit. The bid of the successful contractor is accepted

by the United States, in the form of a document entitled

“Letter of Acceptability,” given to the contractor by

the Secretary of the Army ( Ex 3. R. 15-14).

Construction takes place uider the supervision of

the Army (Ex. 8, Pages He Si, 8, I4). As each separate

military housing unit is completed, the\contractor is

required to place it under the control of the Depart-

ment (of the Army)” and the. United States is re-

quired at all times to “maintain aud operate at its own

cost and expense such individual housing unit as pub-

lie quarters” (ex. 8, p. HC-7).

The contract with the contractor contains all clauses

which Federal lav requires in every contract with the

United States for the construction of Federal Public

Works, such as: Buy American Aet, Officials of Con-

gress Not to Denetit, Covenant Against Contingent

Fees, Prohibition of Convict Labor Act, Nondiserimi-

nation in Kmplovinent Act, Davis-Bacon Aet (requir-

ing payment of prevailing wages as determined by the

Secretary of Labor), Eight-Hour Day on Public

» \6

Works Act. Anti-Kickbacks from Public Works Em-

ployees Act, Renegotiation Act, and others (Ex. 8).

In the “Invitations for Bids*’ (Ex. 1, p. 16), the

United States deseribes the project as follows:

“The Housing Contract provides for the con-

struction of Government quarters, and therefere,

no inspection fees or approvals by municipal oF

other governmental authorities will be required.”’

THEONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CAPE-

HART MILITARY PROJECT AND ANY OTHER

PROJECT BEING BUILT FOR THE FEDERAL

GOV ERNM ENT, IS IN THE METHOD. BY

WHICH THE UNITED STATES CHOOSES TO

PAY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION (Ex. 1).

The method by which the United States pays for the

construction is this:

The United States requires that a Delaware corpo-

ration be fotmed. It requires that this corporation

execute and deliver a promissory note to a lending

agency for the amount of the contract price of the

construction. The promissory note is payable in in-

stallments (Ex. 9). Jt is provided that the United

States, and not the corporation, will pay the install-

ments as they become due (Ex. 16). With the proceeds

of this note, the contractor is paid the contract price

for the construction of the military housing for the

United States (Ex. 1, 5, 4,9).

This is the method of financing used by the United

States for the construction of military housing under

the Capehart Act generally, and is the method of ti-

nancing used by the United States for the construction

7

of the military housing on Fort Lewis in the instant

Case,

Since the funds are by this method acquired through

private l@hding institutions, the United States avoids

charging the cost of construction against the national

budget in the vear of commitment. It also obtains for

the United States the privilege of paying the install-

ment note from annual appropriations.

}

The United States also requires the execution of a

mortgage in connection with borrowing the money to

pay for construction. The reason is this: Many institu-

tious Which lend or invest their funds can only do so

on the security of mortgages. These include pension or

retirement trusts, insurance companies, and the like.

The restrictions limiting their investments to mort-

gages are contained in their charters, or their state

law.

Some institutions are permitted to loan only on

F.HL.A. insured mortgages.

Therefore, in order to enable such institutions to in-

vest their funds in the construction of military hows-

ing, the method which the United States has created

for the payment by it of the promissory note, also in-

cludes a ‘mortgage.’ Because of the nature of the

security, the mortgage is one in nage ouly—an illusory

mortgage.

In order to create the illusion of a *tmortgage,’’ the

following sequence of events is required by the United

States.

Th an opinion dated October 22, 1959, rendered by

‘pe

8

the Attorney General of the United States to the See-

retary of Defense, it is stated ; |

“The actual operation of the Capehart Act is

extremely conmplex. Indeed, it has been character-

ized as a jig-saw puzzle on the floor of the Senate.”’

The sequence of events is required by the United

States in the contract created by the contractor's offer

(his ** Bid,’ Ex. 2), and the acceptance of the United

States (its ** Letter of Acceptability ”’ Ex. 3).

eh exact texf of each document hereinbefore and

hereinafter referred to, is prescribed and required by

the United States (R. 18).7 :

The requirements of the United States are these ;

(1) That the contractor cause to be incorporated a

Delaware corporation (Ex. 1, p. 4).

(2) That the corporation be capitalized for $1,000.00

—-100 shares at $10.00 each (Ex. 1, p. 4).

(3) That the contractor subsétibe for all of the stock

(Ex. 1, p. 4).

(4) That the egutractor elect officers and directors

(Ex. 1).

(5) That the stock certificate be endorsed in blank

by the contractor (Ex. 1). ‘

(6) That the officers and directors of the corporation

‘sign resignations (Ex. 11.

\

(7) That the endorsed stock certificate and the res-

ignations be placed in irrevocable eserow (Ex. 11).

(8) That the terms of the escrow be that these docu-

ments shall be delivered to the Secretary of the Army

J

} en

9

of the United States, immediately upon completion of

construction (Ex. 11).

(9) That at the same time the resignations and stock

are placed in eserow for the United States, the Seere-

tary of the Army exeeute a document entitled ** Lease”

ho the Delaware corporation (Ex. 6). Ps

(10) That this *lease’* be of the land owned by the

United States, on which the military heusing is to be

erected (Ex. 6). \

(11) That the corporation turn over to the Army,

as the stated consideration for the “lease,” the $1.

GOU.00 paid to the corperation for the purchase of its

capital stoek (Ex. 1).

(12) That a document extitle&® Department of the

Army Housing Conutraet™ be tk by the following:

The United States, the contractor, and the Delaware

corporation (Ex.8).

(13) That these documents provide that the lessor,

rather than the lessec, has the exclusive right of posses-

sion of the leased grotud during the entire term of the

lease! (Ex. 8 p. HC-7).

(14) That the Delaware corporation exeeute and

deliver a promissory note,.pavable in installments, to

some lending institution (Ex, 9).

(15) That the installment note be in a sum equal to

the amount of the contractor’s successful Bid, previ-

ously accepted by the United States (Ex. 1).

(10) That the United States erecute a document in

which it is agreed that the United States, ratherthan”

ot

od

10

the Delaware corporation, will pay the promissory note

(Ex. 16).

(17) That the Delaware corporation execute and de-

liver a document entitled ** Mortgage.’ te **secure’’ the

promissory tiote Which the United States has agreed to

pay (Ex. 10).

(18) That the mortgaged property be not the land,

or the buildings to be erected, but only the Delaware

corporation's non-existent leasehold interest (Ex. 10).

(19) That the F.LHLA. agree in advance to insure the

note and “mortgage’’ immediately upon completion

of construction (Ex. 5).

(20) That the contractor construct the military

housing im accordance with its accepted Bid to the

United States (Ex. 1). .

(21) That the lending agency use the proceeds of

the loan represented by the promissory note to pay the

contractor for the construction of the military housing

(Ex. 3).

(22) That progress payments and final payment to

the contractor be made only with the approval of the

United States (Ex. 8, p. HC-3).

(25) That the docunients provide that during the

entire term of the illusory ‘tlease,”* the lessee Delaware

corporation is prohibited from occupancy of the leased

premises, and that during the term of the ‘lease’ the

lessor United States shall maintain and operate at its

omwn cost and copoeunse such individual housing units as

Public Quarters” CIEX. 8, p. HO-7).

* * *

11

The following nomenclature is used in the doeu-

ments:

The contractor is called Eligible Builder.”

The figurehead) Delaware corporation is called

** Mortgagor- Builder.”

The document tn which the United States agrees that

it will pay the installment note executed by the figure-

head corporation is entitled*Guaranty’” (Ex. 16).

The so-called “Guaranty” is not a guaranty, but is a

direct statement that the United States, rather than

the figurehead corporation, will pay the loan, This docu-

ment states:

“This guaranty, executed this 12 day of May,

ds, by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(hereinafter called the * Department’) represented

by the Secretary of the Army (hereinafter called

the *Secretary’),

WITNESSETH:

**** The Department will, subject to, the con-

ditions stated in the foregoing guarantek, make

each periodic payment becoming due to the mort-

gagee on said note in accordance with the terms

thereof WITHOUT ANY REQUIREMENT

THAT THE MORTGAGEK SUALL HAVE

MADE A PRIOR DEMAND TO THE MOR®-

GAGOR-BULLDER (the figurehead corporation )

FOR SUCIL PAYMENT.” are

NOTE: The Attorney Generai of the United States

on October 22, 1959, rendered an opinion to the Seere-

tary of Defense. in part as follows:

“See also * * * 105 Congressional Record A

4156 pointing out * * * that a guaranteed mortgage

12

¥

constitutes a truly direct obligation’ of the United

States." * * *

“TL conclude that Congress has the power to

authorize the Secretary to guarantee Armed Serv-

ices Housing mortgages * * * My conelusion that

the Secretary's loan guaranty under See, 403 (Ce)

of the act constitute a valid obligation of the

United States is fully supported by pertinent

congressional statements."

On page 2 of Exhibit 1, **Invitation for Bids,”’ the

United States describes this so-called **Guaranty”” in

the following words:

‘Payment of the mortgage indebtedness of the

mortgagor-builder is undertaken by the Depart-

ment (of the Army ).”

* * *

As stated, the illusory ‘*mortgage”’ and the promis-

sory note signed by the figurehead corporation, but

payable directly by the United States, is also insured

by the F.H.A. The reason for this is not that the direct

obligation of the United States to pay the note is not a

sufficiently sound security. The actual reason is stated

by the Attorney General of the United States in the

above described Opfhion rendered to the Secretary of

Defense, as follows:

“Two preliminary questions present themselves.

First. why Congress provided tor double protec-

tion: Le. Insurance by the (F.H JA.) Commissioner,

and guaranty by the Secretary (of Defense)...

The duplication of insurance by the Commissioner

and guaranty by the Secretary is based on the con-

sideration that, while, basically, Armed Services

Liousing constitutes a responsibility of the Depart-

ment of Defense, mortgages insured by the Federal

?

13 4

Housing Administration can be financed relatively

easily because virtually all states have legislation

making them legal investments for banks and

similar institutions. The enactment of state legisla-

tion making mortgages insured or guaranteed by

the Seeretary legal investments throughout the

nation, aud thus generally acceptable to institu-

tional investors, probably would have taken tive

vears, to Judge from past experience. In these cir-

cumstances it appeared desirable that Armed

Services Housing mortgages should carry the

customary insurance by the Fedezal Housing Com-

missioner as Well as a guaranty by the Secretary

of Defense.”’

* * 7

The cutive military housing project is not paid for

through this round-about Capéhart method. The doeu-

nents provide that certain “improvements and utili-

ties’? shown on the plans and specifications are to ve

furnished by the United States, and not by the eon-

tractor. The United States enters into separate eon-

tracts with others to furnish these improvements and

utilities, and pays for them directly.

Payments under such separate contracts will

he made by the Department (of the Army) from

sources other than mortgage proceeds. ”*

Part of the project is thus paid for directly by the

United States, in the usual way, and part of the project

is paid from the proceeds of the note and **mortgage”’

signed by the tigurehead corporation.

* * *

Kven though all the buildings are to be built by one

contractor, pursuant to one Bid made to aud accepted

14

by the United States, there may be more than one

Delaware corporation involved in the financing. This

is because the amount Involved may be too great for

any one private institution to loan. In such eases, the

United States allocates detinite portions of the single

contract price among two or more Delaware corpora-

tious. Except for the ** Hiousing Contract’? (Ex. 8), a

full set of documents as above described are made and

executed relating to each corporation.

Thus, in the instant case, the plaintiff contractor’s bid

accepted by the United States was approximately

36,000,000.00. The Uniced States directed that three

Delaware corporations be created, and that each one—

execute a promissory note for approximately $2,000,-

000.00, The United States then executed three separate

documetits in which it agreed that it, rather than these

corporations, Would pay the three notes. The sum of the

three notes equalled the amount of the plaintiff’s Bid

which the United States had accepted (Ex. 1, p.3).

The ** Housing Contract’? (Ex. 8) shows clearly that

the United States required the creation of the **mort-

gagor-builder’

corporation, that the corporation is an

instrumentality of the United States, a figurehead of

the United States — in fact, to all intents and purposes

it is the United States. The ** Housing Contract’? shows

that the United States and the Contractor are the oniy

parties in interest in either the ‘*lease’* or that contract.

The contract is exactly the same as if the United States

and the contractor were the only two parties named to

the agreement.

The named parties to the **housing Contract”’ are:

15

(1) “THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

acting by and through the Department of the Army

(hereinafter called ‘The Department’’) and repre-

sented by the Contracting Offieer,”’

(2) “HEBB & NARODICK CONSTRUCTION

CO. INC. & ASSOCLATES (hereinafter called the

‘eligible builder’ or the *Contractor’),”’

(3) “ALC HOUSING INC. Now 1, ALC HOUS-

INC INC. No. 2, and ALC HOUSING INC. No. 3.

Delaware corporation (each and all of which are herein-

after referred to as the *mortgagor-builder’)."’

Following is a brief summary of some of the pro-

Visions of the ** Housing Contract’’ and —T not

previously mentioned : :

(1) The Housing Contract is entitled

“DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HOUs-

INC CONTRACT.” (Ex. 8, p. 1) ~

(2) The tirst ** Whereas” clause shows that it is the

Army, not the tigurehead corporation, Which is con-

tracting for housing: ~

* Whereas. Tithe LV of the Housing Amendments

of 1955, as amended * * * authorizes THE DE-

PARTMENT TO CONTRACT, ON THE BASIS

OF COMPETITIVE BIDS. FOR THE CON-

STRUCTION OF HOUSING * * * (Ex. 8, p. 1)

(3) The ‘Lessee’ is prohibited from ever oecupy-

ing the Jeased preperty — either before or after con-

struction (Ex. 8. p. HC-7; Ex. 6, p. 2).

f

(4) The “Lessee” is required to consent to giving

the Army Lessor exclusive possession of the leased

prenuses for the full term of the so-called lease. ** with-

16

out charge or cost to the Department.’ The ** Lessee ”’

gets no compensation in return for giving the Army

lessor the exclusive right of possession (Ex. 8, p. HC-7).

(5) The *Lessee** cannot engage in any other en-

deavor, on the leased premises, or elsewhere, because

(a) its Articles of Incorporation prohibit it from: en-

gaging in any other endeavor, and (b) the ** Lease’

provides that the premises are ‘tte be used solely for

the purposes of constructing thereon an Armed Services

Housing Project” (ex. 6, p. 1).

(6) The **Lessee™* has no voice in what is doue with

U.S. had already aec-

~

the leased premises, because the,

cepted the contractor's bid to construct a projeet on the

entire leased premises in accordance with plans and

specitications drawn by the U.S. (Ex, 2. Bid, and Ex. 3,

Letter of Acceptability ).

(7) The *t Lessee” is prohibited from asking the bank

to pay out any money to the contractor from: the ¥6,-

000,000.00 note which it signed. The U.S. has the sole

voice in that respect (Ex. 8, p. HC-3).

(8) The tigurehead corporation is prohibited from

entering into atiy agreement with the contractor CEx.

8, p. HC-5).

(9) The ‘Lessee’? is ‘trequired”’ to sign’ whatever

form of Building Loan Agreemer. is acceptable to

the U.S. (Ex. 8. p. HIC-8).

(10) Even personal property which the contractor

is required to furnish — which never becomes part of

the real estate — belongs to the U.S., rather than the

Lessee,” and the **Lessee"* is prohibited from using

the same during the term of the lease (Ex. 8, p. HC-9).

17

(11) The U.S. has the right to extend the time for

completion of the project as long as it desires (Ex. &,

p. H€-16),.

(12) Any articles of property belonging to the con*

tractor which he fails to remove from the leased

premises when the job is ¢ompleted, are deemed aban-

doned to the U.S. Lessor. rather than to the ** Lestee

(Ex. 8, p. HO-20).

(15) [t is specitieally provided that whenever words

“satisfaction.” “required,”’ *tordered,”’ *‘acceptable,”’

“approved,” ete. are used, those words refer to the

“satisfaction,” “approval,” ete. of the ULS., not of the

figurehead (Ex. 8, p. HO-31).

(14) ‘Phe ‘Determination of Completion’’ is made

solely by the United States (Tex. 8, p. HC-7).

(15) Tho United States, not the figurehead, has the

right to ternunate the coutract and assess liquidated or

actual damages against the contractor (EX. 8, p. He.

34) | /

e ; / é

,

4

(16) The figurehead corporation is specifically re-

heved of every single obligation nominally placed upon

it by the Housing Contract, by a specitie provision in

the Housing Contract itself that all obligations of the

figurehead shall be performied either by the United

States or by the contractor (Ex. Ss. p. 8, He-9).

The cliguhle builder shall bear all expenses * * *

and qauarantes the discharge of all duties of the

ercept * * * the obliga-

tious of the mortyaqor-builders which the De part

oe FP

> ball

mortgaqor-builders *

ment shall have quarantecc

THUS, IN THE **HOUSING CONTRACT”

18

ITSELF. THE CONTRACTOR AND THE UNITED

STATES AGREE THAT THERE IS NOT A

SINGLE OBLIGATION PY RPORTEDLY

PLACED UPON THE FIGUREHEAD CORPORA-

TION, WHLCH IS NOT EITHER THE OBLIGA-

TLON OF THE CONTRACTOR, OR THE OBLIGA-

TION OF THE UNTTED STATES — PROVING

BEYOND DISPUTE THAT THERE ARE-ONLY—.-

TWO REAL PARTIES ‘TO THIS “CONTRACT?

THE CONTRACTOR, AND THE UNITED

STATES.

(17) The contract provides that the project is not

subject to local real or personal property taxes. The

United States agrees to hold the njortgagee harmless,

from payment of such taxes, and contends that such

taxes are not applicable (Ex. 8. p. HC-8). 0

(18) Par. 3 of the ** Lease’ requires ‘*that the les-

see shall place each housing unit in the Project under

the control of the Department as soon as it is available

for occupancy as determined by the Commissioner

Nore: This is meaningless language, beeause :

a. The Capebart Act, 42 USCA 1594, requires that

this identical clause be inserted in the contract between

the United States and the Contractor: _

The Secretary of Defense is authorized to enter

inte ventracts with any eligible bidder to provide

for the construction of urdeotly needed housing

on lands owned * * * by the U.S. for the purpose of

providing suitable living accommodations for

military personnel * * * Any such contract shall

provide that each housing unit in the project shall

be placed under the cOntrol of the Secretary of

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Defense as soon as the unit is available for oc-

cupancy * * * .”’

b. The ** Housing Contract’* provides that the Con-

tractor shall place each unit as completed *‘under the

control of the Department’ (Ex. 8, p. 7).

c. The figurehead never has any right of possession

to turn over to fhe United States.

d. Art. XX of the Housing Contract provides that

every obligation purportedly placed upon the figure-

head shall be performed instead by the contractor.

(19) Par. 5 of the lease provides: \

‘That the buildings and other improvements re-

quired to be furnished the project in accordance

with the Drawings and Specifications SHALL BE

AND BECOME REAL ESTATE AND PART

OF THE LEASED PREMISES AND PROP-

ERTY OF THE UNITED STATES.”

Nore: As each unit is completed, the contractor is

required to place it under the sole control of the Army

(Ex. 8, p. 7). The Lessee is prohibited from occupancy

at any time during the lease (Ex. 8, p. 7). This clause

goes further and says that the buildings as built be-

come the property of the United States.

(20) The Federal Tort Claims Act applies to the

project (Ex. 6, p.9). ;

21) The contractor is required to ereet on the

*‘leased’* premises a large sign which tells the world

that the project is that of the Army, and that the ap-

pellant is the contractor for the United States, A draw-

ing of the required sign is contained in the Housing

Contract (Ex. 8, p. HC-39) facing this page.

20

D. (2) FEDERAL QUESTION RAISED BELOW

By their Complaint (R. 5-4). their contentions in the

Pre-trial order (R. 14). and the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law proposed by them (R. 64-67), ap-

pellants raised in the Superior Court the federal ques-

tions sought to be Mviewed here, namely that levying

a State sales tay on the construction of the military

housing is prohibited by the supremaey clause of the

Constitution of the United States.

On appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, appel-

lants likewise raised the federal questions sought to be

reviewed here in the assignment of error in their Open-

ing Brief (R. 74) and in the arguments presented there-

in, and in their Reply Brief (R. 78).

The Supreme Court of Washington passed upon

these Federal questions by holding that the Capehart

corporation which the U.S. required be created was

uot its instrumentality, that the U.S. was not the buyer

of the military housing, that assessing State sales tax

against thé Capehart corporation was not a tax by a

State upou the U.S. or its instrumentality, and that the

Washington State sales tax statutes required that the

sales tax be assessed against the Capehart corporation

(Appendix A). Quotations from the opinion are set

forth in the following section.

E. THE FEDERAL QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL

The Federal question is substantial for the following

reasons:

*

1. The State court held pr efteect that the United

States or its instramnentality is subject to State sales

/

21

4

-

tax. Four members of the Washington State Supreme

Court dissented on this basis, in the 5 to 4 decision below.

2. The State court decision is contrary to and sub-

stantially destroys the intent of Congress in substi-

tuting Capehart Act military housing (built by and for

and financed by the U.S.) for the Wherry Act housing

(under which landon a military reservation was truly

leased to a private) corporation which privately and at

its OW expense constructed the housing for its own use

as rental property ).

3. There is now a diversity of opinion by highest

State courts on the identical question —/the instant

decision by the Washington State Supreme Court being

directly contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court

of Florida, Green v. Eglin Air Foree Base Housing,

fuc., 104 So.(2d) 465, and directly contrary to the

decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, Knapp-

Stiles, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Revenue, 370 Mich.

629, 122 N.W.(2d) 642. Florida and Michigan both

hold that State sales tax cannot apply to Capehart

housing contracts In that it would be a tax by a State

upon the United States or its instrumentality (the

Aigurehead corporation it required solely for its own

— financial ends).

In the Green case, the Florida Supreme Court held:

“That Centex is a contractor employed by the

United States is quite obvious. The United States

advertised for bids for the work to be done. It

accepted Centex’s bid. It signed the contract with

Centex and it is in process of supervising the con-

struction. It arranged the method by which Centex

will be paid and it is obligated to eventually pay

22

the cost of construction by paying off the mort-

gages. It would seem to be-equalty obvious that

the materials purchased go into and become a pa¥t

of the publie works owned by the United States.

* #

“It is very doubtful if these corporations should

be regarded as anything other than agencies or

instrumentalities of the Federal Government. In

Clallam County, Wash. v. United States, 263 U.S.

341, the Supreme Court held that a corporation

created for the purpose of operating a sawmill and

‘ailroad in the promotion of the war effort during

the tirst World War and which was wholly owned

by the United States was an agency of the United

States and that its property was, therefore, im-

mune from State taxation. In describing the cor-

poration there involved they used language pe-

culiarly applicable to each AFB corporation:

‘**The incorporation and formal erection of a

new personality was only for the convenience of

the United States, to carry out its ends.’

“The creation of the AFB corporations was

only for the convenience of the United States to

enable it to finance military construction in a

manner determined by the Congress to be most

conducive to the rational interest.”’ (Emphasis

ours )

Similarly, in the Anapp-Stiles case, the Supreme

Court of Michigan held With reference to identical

Capehart housing:

| ‘*We agree with the holding of the trial court

that plaintiff’s housing censtruction contract is

with the United Stytes acttyg through its instru-

mentality, the Deyartment Cof\ the Army ).”’

To like effect, the four dissentin? judges of the Su-

\

+

ge

preme Court of the State of Washington in the instant

case held:

**Contemporaneous with the signing of the hous-

ing contract, the stock of the corpoye ction in the

instant case was irrevocably placed in escrow,

together with the resignations of the officers and

directors, to be delivered to the United States at

the conclusion of the construction of the housing.

There was no possible contingency for the return

of the stock to the stockholders or the documents

of resignation to the officers and directors. The

corporation owned nothing of any value in the

housing being constructed. It served solely as a

meaus to the end of obtaining military housing for

the United States. There was no possibility for it

to engage in any purpose other than to serve the

end of obtaining military housing for the United

States on this exclusive project. Because it had no

purposes independent of those of the United

States, the corporation was nothing more than an

instrumentality thereof. * * * it was nothing more

than an instrumentality of the United States

Government; that it had no commercial purpose

other than the Gmvenience of the United States,

serving as a means to the end of obtaining this

military housing; and that the sovereign immunity

of the Federal Government applies.”’

The majority OpRHen in the instant case, on the

other hand, without pointing to one single fact to

support its statement, holds:

“The mortgagor-builder corporate entity

created for the purpose \of constructing and

financing Capehart housing ‘serves a separate and

distinct function from that of the United States.”’

=

son

<a

24

This diversity of opinion in State Court rulings

should be resolved by this Court.

4. Of great substantial importance, is the fact that

in the Capehart Act, Congress has conceived a new and

useful method of financing Federal projects. It does so

by the use of private banking or institutional capitai

which the United States directs be borrowed with the

aid of its instrumentality, the creation of which is

commanded by the United States. The loan executed

by this instrumentality of the United States is to be

repaid to the lender directly by the United States, and

not by its’instrumentality.

Congress may well determine to use this method of

Federal financing, and other methods akin thereto, for

future military projects and for future Fe... .al non-

military projects.

The instant 5 to 4 decision of the Supreme Court of

the State of Washington, if allowed to stand — that

when the United States determines to finance its-public

projects in this manner, the entity which the United

States requires be created solely for its own financial

ends is not an instrumentality of the United States and

is subject to State taxation — can well substantially

impair or destroy the desiFable flexibility of method

available to Congress in financing necessary Federal

projects. .

5. In addition, we adopt in full the reasons set forth

in the corresponding portions of their Jurisdictional

Statement by the two other companion cases with which

we were cousolidated for trial and which are simul-

taneously on appeal to this Court. In the interests of

25

brevitw’ we are adopting their reasons by reference,

instead of repeating the same herein.

CONCLUSION

The question presented is so substantial as to require

plenary copsideration, with briefs on the merits and

oral argurent, for their resolution.

Respectfully submitted,

CasEY & PRUZAN

By Cart Pruzan

T. M. Royce

Attorneys for Appellants

30th Floor, Smith Tower,

Seattle, Washington 98104

/

|

|

(APPENDICES

\ A AND B

\

~~,

Appendix A-—Opaaon of the Supreme Court of the

State of Washington App. A. pages 3 to 24

Appendix B—statutes Tnivelved App. B, pages 1 te 13

—

6

Appendix A, Page 3

APPENDIX A

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF WASHINGTON

[ Nos. 36226, 36227, 36228, 36229. En? Bane. August 1,*

1963 |

Lan Murray ef al., Appellants, v. THE STATE OF

WASHINGTON et al., Respondents. ®

INLAND Ewpire BuILpERS, INc., cf al., Appellants, v.

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Respondents.

Hepes & Nakopick ConstRUCTION Co., INc., et al.,

Appellants, v. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON et al.,

Respondents. \

HeBB& NARODICK CONSTRUCTION Co. INC... Appellant, v.

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ef al., Respondents.*

Consolidated appeals from judgments of the Supe-

rior Court for Thurston County, Nos. 32176, 32186,

02195, 32196, Charles T. Wright, J.. entered July 3,

1961. Affirmed.

Consolidated actions to recover taxes paid under pro-

test. Plaintiffs appeal from: judgments in favor of the

defendant.

Bogle : Bogs & Grates, Edward Gi. Dobrin, and Rich-

ard S.Spraguc, for appellants Murray ef al,

Allen, DeGarmo & Lecdy and Seth W. Morrison, tor

appellants Inland Empire Builders, Ine... ¢¢ a/.

Casey & Pruzan, by Car) Pruzan, tor appellants

Hebb & Narodick Construction Co. Ine. ef al.

The Attorney General, John W. Riley, Chief Assist-

aut, and Timothy BR. Malone, Assistant, for respond-

elts.

ws

4

Appendix A, Page 4

Orr, C, J.—This abpeal is a consolidation of four ae-

tions browght by several contractors to recover a retail

sales tax paid \under pfotest, and to enjoin the State

Tax Commission from assessing the sales tax in con-

nection with the construction of Capehart Act housing

at military installations in Washington.

From adverse judgments, the contractors appeal.

’

The facts upon which these appeals are predicated

are not in dispute. The legal issue involved js whether

the transactions, pursuant to which the military haius-

ing was constructed, are shielded from state taxation by

the sovereign immunity granted to the United States

government by the federal.and state constitutions.

Each of the appellants was awarded contracts under

the previsions of the Capehart Act (69 Stat. 651-654 as

amenaed ). Since the contract provisions are identical,

we will refer only t. the material portions of the docu-

ments in cause No. 36226. The procedure for the execu-

tion of a contract under the act, in so far as here ma-

terial, may be stated as follows:

The Secretary of Defense, after determining a need

for military housing, issues an invitation for bids. Thos

contractor submitting the lowest acceptable bid re-

ceives « ** Letter of Acceptability’ from the Secretary.

The letter requires the successful bidder to establish a

private *tmortgagor-builder’’ corporation under the

laws of the state of Delaware, and to qualify it to do

business in the state involved. The contractor furnishes

the corporation with $1,000 for capital stock, purchases

all of it, and elects its officers and directors. The United

States government executes to the corporation a 55-

ie"

Appendix A, Page 5

vear lease of the real estate upon which the housing is

to be constructed, The corporation is to obtain private

financing by giving a mortgage on its leasehold, and

obtain a commitment from the Federal Housing Ad-

ministration to insure its mortgage loan. Phe mortgage

loan in is the amount of the contractor's bid,

The * Letter of Acceptability’ prescribes the “initial

closing” procedure, Which entails the exeention of the

following documents :

(1) The 55-vear lease between the United States and

the corporation forge consideration of $1,000, paid by

the corporation to the United States government. The

corporation agrees, during the period of construction,

to maintain insurance and to save the United States

government harmless from many laws, ordinances, and

regulations applicable to the leased premises, with re-

gard to construction, sanitation, leenses or permits te

do business.

) The corporation executes a note, seeured by a

ae de chattel mortgage on its real-estate lease shold,

to the private lender. g

(3) The eorporation, contractor, and the United

States execute a housing contract which provides that

all construction is to be inspected and supagaised by the

United States; that progress payvinents are to be made

by the corporation freta the mortgage loan, upon re-

quest of the contractor aud approval of the United

States, and that, upon full payment, title to the housing

units vests in the United States, subject to contractor

Viability for latent defects, The contract further pro-

vides that the contractor shall act as agent for the cor-

Appendix A, Page 6

poration, guarantee its performance, and furnish a

performance bond to the corporation and the mort-

gagee. ’

(4) An irrevocable escrow agreement is executed

which provides that the resignations of the officers and

directors of the corporation, and the stoek certificates

of the corporation, endorsed in blank, are to be placed

in escrow, With instructions to the escrow holder to

deliver these documents to the United States upon com-

pletion and acceptance of the project.

(5) The United States execites a written guarantee

to pay the mortgage installment payments to the pri-

vate mortgagee and or the Federal Housing Adminis-

tration, the insurer.

The provisions of the Capehart Act were fully com-

plied with by the contractors involved in these appeals.

+

Appellants’ assignments of error raise two principal

issues: First, the appellant contractors contend that,

under Washington law, the consumer of the housing

project is the party liable for payment of the sales tax,

and that, as a result of the statutory method for the

construction of Capehart housing, the United States

is the consumer and, therefore, its constitutional immu-

nity from state taxation applies. Secondly, appellants

contend that the mortgagor-builder corporation is au

agency of the United States and, as such, is immune

from state tax

(1] The function of interpreting state statutes to de-

termine who is liable for payment of a sales tax is re-

served to the state courts involved. Alabama v. King &

Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 86 L.Ed. 3, 62 S.Ct. 48, 140 A.L.R.

dppendia A, Page ?

615 (1941): Kern-Limerich, Tne., ¢ Scurlock, 347 U.S.

110, 98 L.Ed. 546, 74. S.Ct, 408 (1954).

RCW 82.08.020 provides that ** ... there shall be eol-

Jected a tax on each retail sale in this state... °’ A retail

sale is detined in RCW 82.04.050 as including

the sale of or charge made for tangible personal

property consumed and or fyr labor and services ren-

dered in respect to the follawwing: ... (b) the construet-

ing... of new or existing-Muildings or other structures |

under, upon, or above real property of or for consum-

ers,... °° ([talies ours. ) .

. A consumer is detined in RCW 82,04.190(4) as ** Any

person Who is an oener, lessee or has the right of posses-

sion to or an easement in real or personal property

...°’ (Italies ours.)

RCW 82.08.050 provides in part:

The tax hereby imposed shall be paid by the buyer .

to the seller, and each se//er shall collect from the bayer

the full amount of the tax payable in respect to each

taxable sale... oa

** Tn case any sylter fails to collect the tax H®rein im-

posed... he shall... be personally liable to the state

for the amount of the tax."* (Italics ours. )

Appellants concede that a retail sat. as defined in

RCW 82.04,050, did oeenr, but contend that the eon

sumer defined in ROW 82.04.190, sind the buver denen

nated in RCW 82.08.0500 are synonymous, and that the

United States governinent is the consumer and taxable

party because it becomes the owner of the housing

units upon their completion and acceptance.

Appendix A, Page 8

[2] With this contention, we do not agree. One of

the purposes of RCW = 82.04.050 is to define the event

that gives rise to a taxable transaction, which is the

rendition of labor and services in the construction of

new buildings upon real property of or for consumers.

RCW 82.04.190 establishes the means by which the con-

sumer is identified. These sections do not designate the

party lable for payment of the tax in any given trans-

action. RCW 82.08.050 provides that the retail sales tax

shall be borne by the buyer, who is primarily liable for

payment of the tax. Aveser v. Evorett,47 Wn.(2d) 666,

289 P.(2d) 343 (1955).

We must therefore determine who is the buyer under

the facts of the instant case. In this regard, appellants

contend that the United States is the buyer because it

bears the economic burden of paying lfor tha military

housing, by virtue of its guarantee of the mortgage

obligation.

In Alabama v. King & Boozer, supra, the state of Ala-

bama, pursuant to a statute which imposed the sales tax

upon the purchaser, levied a sales tax upon the sale of

lumber to a contractor who was constructing installa-

tions for the Army. It was there contended that the

sales tax could not be collected from the contractor for

the reason that the United States was the purchaser,

within the meaning of the Alabama statute. In answer-

ing this contention, the Supreme Court of the United

States held: one

** .. The taxing statute, as the Alabama courts have

held, makes the ‘purchaser’ liable for the tax to the

seller, who is required ‘to add to the oF price’ the

/

y

— /

Appendix A, Page 9

amount of the tax and collect it when the sales price is

collected, whether the sale is for cash or on credit. Who,

in any partictlartransaction like the present, is a ‘pur-

chaser’ within the meaning of tue statute, is a question

of state law on which only the Supreme Court of Ala-

bama can speak with final authority. But it seems plain,

as the Government concedes and as we assume for pres-

ent purposes, that under the provisions of the statute

the purchaser of tangible goods who is subjected to the

tar measured by the sales price, is the person who or-

| ders and pays for them when the sale is for cash or who

is legally obligated to pay for them if the sale is ‘on

credit....°’ (Italics ours. )

The court concluded :

“We cannot say that the contractors were not, or

that the Government was, bound to pay the purchase

price, or that the contractors were not the purchasers

on whom the statute lays the tax. The added ¢ircum-

stance that they were bound by their contract to furnish

the purghased material to the Government and entitled

to be reimbursed by it for the cost, including the tax, no

more résults in au infringement of the Government im-

munity than didthe tax laid upon the coutractor’s gross

receipts from the Government in James v. Dravo Con-

tracting Co., supra [302 U.S, 134].

[3.4] Applying this rule, the buyer is the person who

is legally obligated to pay the seller in any transaction,

The housing contract executed by the parties provided

that “The mortgagor-builder [corporation | shall pay

the eligible-builder [contractor] for the performance

of this Housing Contract, and au other obligations of

pe

J Appendix A, Page 10

the eligible builder herein, ...°’ By the express terms

of the contract, the corporation, and not the United

States, was obligated to pay the appellant contractors ;

hence, the corporation was the buyer under the statute.

Under the provisions of the Capehart Act and the facts

in the instant cause, the United States government was

not obligated to pay the seller. The fact that the ulti-

mate economic burden of the tax may fall upon the

United States does not vitiate a state tax on the trans-

actions. Alabama v. King & Boozer, supra; Kern-Lim-

erick, lne., v. Scurleok, supra; United States v. Detroit,

305 U.S. 466, 2 L.Ed. (2d) 424, 78 S.Ct. 474 (1958) ; EB. T.

Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. State, 44°Wn.(2d) 339,

267 P.(2d) 667 (1954).

Qur conclusion in this regard is also supported by

the following cases:

United States v. Harrison & Grimshaw Constr. Co.,

305 F.(2d) 363 (1962), involved the question of vy, nether

the provisions ofthe Miller Act applied to the perform-

ance bond given by the eligible builder under a Cape-

hart Act. contract. The court held (p. 368) :

‘+... The projects are of a private nature until eom-

pletition and assumption of control by the government.

The mortygagor-builder has a contract with a construc-

tion company to build the project. The constructor looks

io the mortgagor-builder for payment for his work and

owes to the mortgagor-builder the obligation to per-

form....°” (Ltalies ours. )

In Jn re S.S. Silberblatt, Inc., v. Tar Comm. of the

State of New York, 5 N.Y.(2d) 685, 159 N.E.(2d) 195,

186 N.Y.S.(2d) 646 (1959), it wassaid :

Appendix A, Page 11

‘*Likewise, we must reject appellant’s contention

thatthe subject mortgages, as dipect obligations to the

pated States, are immune from State or loeal taxa-

tion, as provided in section 3701 of the Reyised Statutes

of the United States (U.S. Code, tit. 31-6 742) which

exempts ‘Except as otherwise provided by law, all

stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other ébligations of

the United States’ since they are not ‘of the same type

as those specifically enumerated’ in the statute (Smith

ve Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 117). Under the arrangement

authorized by the Enabling Act, it is clear that the de-

vice employed was designed to relieve the Government

of its financially burdensome obligation to provide

ly using for its military personnel and at the same time

avoid increasing the national debt. It did not pledge its

credit in the usual sense, but merely guaranteed each

‘periodic payment’ based on a monthly average of $90

per family unit.”

4

Congress, in its discretion, by enacting the Capehart

law. chose to leave the hazards of construction, the pur-

chasing of proper materials, and the furnishing

proper labor performance to private contractors

private lenders. It chose to guarantee only the ment

to the private lender, after units accepts 0 the gov-

ernment were ereeted upon the leased premises. We

conclude, therefore, that the mortgagor-builder corpo-

ration was the party legally obligated to pay the con-

tractor. and that it was the buyer denominated in RCW

82.08.050.

Is the mortgagor-builder corporation an agency of

the United States?

2

>

Appendix A, Page 12

Appellants contend that title to the units, when built

in accordance with the contracts, vested in the Unite®

States; that the United States controlled and dictated

the terms of the construc¥jon contracts, and that it

guaranteed the mortgage obligation and ultimately

gained ownership of all of the corporation’s capital

stock ; hence, the corporation is a government agency.

¥ -

In support of this contention, appellants rely on

Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 68 L.Ed.

328, 448.Ct. 121 (1923) ; Green v. Eglin AFB Housing,

Inc., 104 So.(2d) 463 (Fla. 1958) ; and Knapp-Stiles,

Inc.,v. Michigan Department 6f Revenue, CCH 2 Mich.

Tax Cases £¢ 200-202 (1962 }.

The Clallam County case held that a corporation, or-

ganized pursuant to a World War I emergency act

which authorized the Director of Aircraft Production

to establish one or more we NaC AE to produce

war ruaterials, was an agency of the United States and,

as such, its activities were exempt from state taxation.

The case is not apropos. The Director of Aircraft Pro-

duction was, by law, an agent of the government. In the

instant case, the successful bidders were not author-

ized agents of the government. Furthermore, the facts

in the cited case did not disclose any evidence of an

intent to distinguish the corporate activities from those

of the United States. In this regard, the court stated

(p. dto): °°... This is not like the case of a corpora-

tion having its own purposes as well as those of the

United States...”

In the Green case, the court stated (p. 467) :

“+... The question here is the extent of an ecemp-

Appendix A, Page 13

tion granted by state statute. Had the legislature in-

tended to limit the exemption to that required by the

Federal Constitution there would have been no occasion

whatever to go further than to say ‘* There shall also be

exempted all sales made to the United States.’’ But the

legislature intended to grant a greater exemption and

made that intent clear...’ ”’

In Arapp-Stiles, Inc., v. Michigan Department of

Revenue, sapra, the court stated:

‘At the outset, it may be noter. that the question is

not whether the State has the power to impose such tax

upon contractors who are performing contracts with

the United States.

e+

*“_*

**Michigan has the power to impose such a tax. Has

it done so? Or has it, by the language of the statute, ex-

empted the sales here involved from the tax?...”

In the Green and Kuapp-Stiles cases, the result was

determined by interpreting a state exemption statute

much broader than our own, for which reason the cases

are distinguishable.

[5] The mortgagor-builder corporate entity created

for the purpose of constructing and financing Capehart

housing serves a separate and distinct function from

that of the United States. That such a corporation is

not an agency of the United States is sustained by the

following decisions:

In Ji re S.S. Silberblatt, Inc.. v. Tac Commission of

the State of New York, supra, the New York Court of

Appeals held that the mortgagor-builder corporation

Appendix A, Page 14

was subject to that state’s mortgage recording tax,

stating (p. 641):

‘*The appellant's contention that this petitioner and

the five corporate mortgagors are instrumentalities of

the Federal Government or its agencies and, as such,

are exempt from State and local taxation, is without

substance. ... At the time of the execution, delivery and

recording of these mortgages, each of the mortgagors

Was a private corporation, all of the capital stock of

which was privately owned. They were created for a

commercial purpose for private profit, as distinguished

from a governmental purpose. In the absence of statute

to the contrary, it may not be assumed that a govern-

mentié? function was involved. They possess all of the

requisit S$ and responsibilities of corporate existence

and, #s such, are an entity separate and apart from the

United States (United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491)

and this is so, notwtthstanding the fact that all of the

capital stock of each’ corporation will ultimately bee

owned by the Federal Government (Sloan Shipyards

vu. United States Flect Corps, 258 U.S, 549, 42 S.Ct.

386, 66 L.Ed. 762) ...°’ (Italics eurs )

In United States v. Ft. George G. Meade Defense

Housing Corp. No. 1, D.C., 186 F.Supp. 639 (1960), it

was held that the leasehold interest acquired by the

mortgagor-builder corporation from the United States

Was subject to the Maryland mechanics’ lien law be-

cause

the so-called Capehart Act contemplates leav-

ing the entirg arrangement for the financing and con-

struction of Capehart housing projects in the hands of

Appendix A, Page 15

private enterprise until the point at which the govern-

snent has secured the capital stock of the Housing Cor-

poration..."

The reasoning in the following cases, although not

arising from Capehart transactions, supports the view

that the mortgagor-builder corporations are not agen-

cles of the government.

In BE. 7. Du Pout de Nemours & Co. v. State, 44 Wn.

(2d) 339, 267 P.(2d) 667 (1954). it was contended that

the Du Pont Company was an agent or instrumentality

of the United States in its operation of the Hanférd

Engineer Works. We held (pp. 349, 350) :

2. the fact that the government reserved and exer-

cised the right to restrict or control the action of the

cont aetor as to its general activities does not establish

the existence of an ageney relationship. 4

“Tt is also without signiticanee that all of the real

and personal property utilized in performing the con-

tract was owned by the government, | Citing cases. | The

sume is true with regard to the fact that the govern-

ment exerted unusual supervisory controls over every

phase of the contractor's activity. [Citing case. ]"

lu (united States v. Brown, D.C. 41) F.Supp. 83>

(1941). the contention was rejected that certain Re-

gional Agricultural Credit Corporations, created pur-

suant to federal chaectment. were imumune from state

taxation beeause the United States owned all of the

capital stock of the corporations. The court said (p.

R4()) :

"Whether or not these Regional Corporations shall

enjoy sovereign immunity from taxation is wholly a

Appendix A, Page 16

question of Congressional intent. They are purely com-

mereial corporations exercising no sovereign function.

In the absence of statutory provision, there is no rea-

son why they should be exempted from taxation, espe-

cially in view of Congressional policy concerning this

type of corporation, evidenced by many statutory pro-

Visions expressiy subjecting the real property of

similar corporations to taxation.

“The mere fact that the United States owns all the

capital stock of these corporations is not alone suffi-

cient to endow them with sovereign immunity, nor do

they acquire such immunity merely because they are the

medium through which the Government carries out

certain proprietary activities. Note, 33 L.Ed. 799 et seq.

“When a corporation Is created for commercial as

distinguished from Governmental purposes, it is ordi-

narily implied in the absetice of statutory provisions |

to the contrary, that such corporation shall have all the

requisites and responsibilities of corporate: existence,

even though the United States owns all the stock” Such

a corporation is an entity separate from the United

States. United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491, 41 S.Ct.

105, GQ Lied. 368."°

We conclude that the mortgagor-builder corporation,

having served an independent and distinet purpose in

the taxable event, is not a federal agency.

Further, Congress has not expressed a legislative in-

teut to lmmunize a Capehart corporation from state

taxation. The invitations to bid expressly provided :

‘Nothing in this Invitation for Bids shall be deemed

Appendir 1, Page 17

to relieve the eligible builder of any liability for the

payment of sales or use taxes properly levied.”’ |

For the reasons stated, the sales tax was ‘*properly

levied”? upon these transactions. Appellants, under the

statute, were obligated to colleet the tax from the mert-

gagor-builder corporations. Having failed to colleet it,

appellants are liable for the tax, ROW 82.08.050, supra.

The judgments are affirmed.

FIncey, Rosennini, HamMinron, and HALE, Won

eur.

Hunter, J. (dissenting )—The majority say that the

sales tax must fall upon the person legally obligated to

pay for construation of the military housing. With this

l agree.

The majority then state that, by the express terms of

the contract with the mortgagor-builder, the Delaware

corporation, and not the United States was legally ob-

ligated to pay the appellant contractors; hence, the eor-

poration Was the buyer under the statute, The fact that

the ultimate economic burden of the tax may fall upon

the Uiited States does not constitute it as the person

legally obligated to pay the tax. Neither do I disagree

With this rationale.

Lt is mv disagreement with the majority in the dis-

position of the issue relating to Whether the mortgager-

builder corporation is am iustitimentality of the Urited

States that bring ne toa result contrary to that of the

Inajority in this case. ;

Under the established rule for the construction of

contracts, a contract must: be picked up bw its tour

4

Appendix A, Page 18

corners and considered in its entirety. In so doing, it is

inescapable to conclude other than that the prime pur-

pose ef the housing contract was the construction of

military housing for the exclusive use of the United

States. It was necessarily the obligation of the govern-

ment to pay for this housing and, although it. did not

wish to be directly obligated, the United States, in

causing the Delaware corporation to be organized, did

so to provide a means to carry out its obligation te com-

pensate the contractors for the construction of this

housing.

© In Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 68

L.Ed. 328, 44. 8.Ct. 121 (1923), it was held that a corpo-

ration created for the purpose of operating a sawmill

and railroad for the promotion of the war effort and

wholly owned by the United States was an instrumen-

tality of the United States. The court there said:

**In short the Spruce Production Corporation was

organized by the United States an an instrumentality

for carrying on the war, all its property was conveyed

to it by or bought with money coming from the United

States and was used py ut solely as means to that end,

and when the war was over it stopped its work except

so far as it found it necessary to go’on in order to wind

up its affairs.... . oS

- ; - —\\

“ee — \

The State claims the right fo tax on the sound

that taxation of the-mgency may ‘he taxation of the

means employed by_the/government and invalid upon

admitted grounds, but that taxation of the property of

the agent is not taxation of the means. We agree that it

Appendix A, Page 19

34 not always. or generally, taxation of the means,’ as

said by Chief Justiee Chase in Thomson v. Pacifie Rail-

road, 9 Wall 579, 591, But it may be, and in our opinion

clearly is when as here not only the agent was created

but all the agent's property was acquired and used, for

the sole purpose of producing a weapon for the war.

This is not like the case of a corporation having its own

purposes as well as those of the United States and in-

terested in profit on its own account. The incorpora-

tion and formal crection of a new personality was only

for the convenience ofthe United States to earr ry out its

ends....°” (Italies mine. )

Contemporaneous With the signing of the housing

contract, the stock of the corporation in the instant

case Was irrevocably placed in escrow, together with

the resignation of officers and directors, to be deliv-

ered to the United States at the conclusion of the con-

struction of the housing. There was 10 possible con-

tingency for the return of the stock to the stockholders

orthe documents of resignation to the officers and diree-

tors. The corporation owned nothing of any value in

the housing being constructed. It served solely as a

means to the end of obtaining military housing forthe

United States. There was no possibility for it to en-

gage in any purpose other than to serve “the end of

obtaining military housing for the United States on

this exclusive project. Because it had no purposes in-

dependent of those of the United States, the corpora-

tion Was nothing more than an instrumentality thereof.

The appellants cite Green ve Eglin AFB Housing,

Tue. 104 So.(2d) 463 (Fla. 1958), which is persuasive

Appendix A, Page 20

of their contention. There, under the authority of the

Capehart Act, the government entered into a contract

virtually identical with that of the instant case for the

construction of military housing at the Eglin Air Force’

Base in Florida. The Florida court in effect found that

the Delaware corporations wét government instru-

mentalities, stating:

+ <The AFB corporations were*created at the direc-

tion of the United States for the sole purpose of bor-

rowing money to be expended in conStructing facilities

needed by the United States, to be repaid by the United

States and further securing the payment of this money

by a mortgage upon property of the United States.

These corporations will continue in existence until the

mortgage debts are paid, so as to provide a party

against whom the mortgages may be foreclosed in the

remote contingency that the United States defaults in

its obligation to pay the mortgage debt.

***Kven if we regard the AFB corporation as private

enterprises, their interest in the property is so neglible

—lessees without right of use or possession—as to make

it entirely unrealistic to hold that it destroys the status

of these building?as a part of the public works of the

United States.

_***Itis very doubtful if these corporations should be

regarded as anything other than agencies or instru-

mentalities of the Federal Government. In Clallam

County, Wash. v. United States, 268 U.S. 341, 44 S.Ct.

121, 68 L.Ed"328, the Supreme Court held that a cor-

poration created for the purpose of operating a saw-

mill and railroad in the promotion of the war ef-

Appendix A, Page 21

fort during the first*World War and which was wholly

owned by the United States Was-an ageney of the

United States and that its property was, therefore, im-

mune from state taxation. In describing the sorpora-

tion there involved the [sie] used language peculiarly

applicable to each AFB corporation: **The incorpora- .

tion and formal erection ef a new personality was only

for the convenience of the United Stgtes, to carry out

s wnds.”* The creation of the AFB corporations was

for the convenience of the United States to enable

ned by the Congress to be most condueive to the |

national interest....7°”’

The limited function of the Delaware corporation,

its power and purpose are aptly stated by the Michigan

court in Anapp-Stiles, Lue, ve Michigan Depart ment

of Revenue, CCIL2 Mich. Tax Cases ©* 200-202 (1962).

There, as here, the contracts were for military housing

under the Capehart Act. The court said relative to the

corporations :

. In the Invitation for Bids, which is prepared

and issued by the United States, acting through the

Department of the Air Force, there is found in Para-

graph 1, above quoted, the following:

**The statute further conteyiplates that the Govern-

ment-owned housing site be leased to a mortgagor or

borrower corporation which will act as a channel for

the proceeds of the mortgage loan from the leuder-to

the successful bidder ;

**And a review of the documents—the lease, the con-

tract, and the mortgage is convincing that this is sub-

Appendix A, Page 22

tantially the only funetion that the Delaware corpora-

tion do perform.

They have no real powers except to do the bidding

of the United States. ...

The corporations do pot determine the terms of the

contract. That is all done before the corporations come

into existence. They do not determine whether the con-

tract has been performed. They cannot modify its

terms. They cannot terminate it.

“True, the corporations had a lease upon the prem-

ises. While this is nominally for a fifty-five vear term,

in fact, the actual possession, maintenance and opera-

tion of the housing is in the hands of the United States

and its Air Force as soon as the housing is ready for

occupancy.

“The United States alone determines the terms of

the contract. It alone can modify or terminate it. It

alone determines when it has been performed.”’

An analysis of Zn re S. S. Silberblatt, Inc., v. Tar

Comm, of the State of New York, 5 N.Y.(2d) 635, 159

N.E.(2d) 195, 186 N.Y.S.(2d) 646 (1959), cited by the

majority, discloses that the opinion is based on tne

errolgous premise that the Delaware corporations were

* , ereated for a commercial purpose for private

profit. as distinguished trom a governmental purpose.”’

As heretofore stated, consideration of the housing con-

tract in its entirety cannot support such a conclusion.

The analysis of the housing coutract and the reasoning

of the dissent in the SWherblatt case is correct.

:

Appendix A, Page 23

i —

pes... Although finder our State law the tax is intey

posed upon the recording of the mortgage (Franklin

Soc. v. Bennett, 282 N.Y. 79), this case is controlled by

Federal law under which the tax is on the mortgage

itself, Which is a Federal instrumentality exempt from

State taxation (Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261

US. 374; .... ). Unhke the Wherry Act, the Cape-

hart Act, under which this military housing project

Was authorized, renders petitioner-appellant merely a

builder and not a private sponsor ofAhe military hous-

ing. The United States, theengh its Department of De-

fense, is the spousor, financier and owner of the entire

project. The mortgagor corporations are mere fictions,

and they and the mortgagee banks had no other fune-

tion in this business than to act as agents for the Fed-

eral Government (Clallam County v. United States, 263

ULS. 541. 345, 44 S.Ct. 121, 68 L.Ed. 828; Railroad Co.

vr. Poniston, DS Wall 5, 42, 85 U.S. 5, 42, 21 L.Ed. 787)

The majority attempt to distinguish the Clallam

County case on thesbasis that the corporation there had

no purpose other than to produce war materials for

the United States government, and it quotes from the

Clallam County case as follows:

so This is not like the case of a corporation hav-

ing its own purposes as well as those of the United

States....’”’

The inference from this qf@ftation which is desired by

the majority is that the Delaware corporation had pur-

poses other than those of the United States govern-

ment. This is erroneous and unsupported by the record,

Appendix A, Page 24

The holding of the cases cited by the majority, E. I.

Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. State, 44 Wn. (2d) 339,

267 P.(2d) 667 (1954), and eat Statés v. Brown, 41

F.Supp. 838 (1941), is not inconsistent with the Clallam

County case since the corporations, in those cases, were

not instrumentalities of the United States because they

had separate commercial purposes for private profit.

In the instant case we should oitep that, although the

mortgagor-builder is the ‘*buyer’’ to whom the retail

sale of the housing project construction was made, it

was hothing more than an instrumentality of the United

States government; that it had no commercial purpose

other than for the convenience of the United States,

serving as a means to the end of obtaining this military

housing ; and that the sovereign immunity of the federal

government applies.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed,

and the cause remanded with instructions to enter

judgment restraining the Tax Commission from im-

posing the tax and to permit recovery of the tax which

appellants paid under. protest.

>

HILL, DonwortHh, and WEAVER, JJ., coneur with

HUNTER, J.

Appeudir B, Page 1

APPENDIX B

STATUTES INVOLVED

Revised Code of Washington

RCW 82.08.010 Definitions. For the purposes of

this chapter:

(1) **Selling price’* means the consideration, whether

money, credits, rights, or other property, expressed in

the terms of money paid or delivered by a buyer to a

seller, all without any deduction on account of the cost

of tangible property sold, the cost of materials used,

labor costs, interest, discount, delivery costs, taxes, or

any other expenses whatsoever paid or accrued and

Without any deduction on account of losses; but shall

not include the amount of cash discount actually taken

by a buyer;

(2) **Seller™’ means every person making sales at re-

tail or retail sales to a buyer or consumer, whether as

agent, broker, or principal;

(3) ** Buyer” and *tconsumer”™ include, without lim-

iting the scope hereof, every individual, receiyer, as-

signee, trustee in bankruptey, trust.festate, firm, eo-

partnership, joint venture, club, company, Joint stock

company, business trust, corporation, association, so-

ciety, or any group of individuals acting as a unit.

whether mutual, cooperative, fraternal, nonprofit. or

otherwise, municipel corporation, quasi municipal cor-

poration, and also the state. its departments and insti-

tutions and all political subdivisions thereof, irre

spective of the nature of the activities engaged in or

Appendix B, Page 2

-

functions performed, and also the United States or any

instrumentality thereof ;

(4) The meaning attributed in chapter 82.04 to the

terms ‘*tax vear,’’ ‘ttaxable yvear,’’ **person,’’ **com-

pany,’” “‘sale,”’ ‘salle at retail,”’ *tretail sale,”’ ‘sale at

wholesale,”’ **wholesale sale,”’ **business,’’ *‘engaging

in business,’’ *tcash discount,”’ ‘*sucecessor,’’ **con-

sumer,” “in this state’’ and ‘within this state’’ shall

apply equally to the provisions of this chapter. ...

RCW 82.08.020 Retail sales tax imposed. There is

levied and there shall be colleeted a tax on each retail

sale in this state equal to three and one-third per cent

of the selling price: Provided, That from April 1, 1959

the tax imposed by this seetion shall be equal to four

per cent of the selling price. The tax imposed under

this chapter shall apply to suecessive retail sales of the

same property and to the retail sale of intoxicating

liquor by the Washington state liquor stores. ...

RCW: 82.08.030 Exemptions. The tax hereby levied

shall not apply to the following sales:

(1) Casual and isolated sales of property or service,

unless made by a person who is engaged in a business

activity taxable under chapters 82.04., 82.16 or 82.28:

Provided, That the exemption provided by this para-

graph shall not be construed as providing any exemp-

tio nfrom the tax imposed by chapter 82.12;

(2) Sales made by persons in the course of business

activities with respect to which tax liability is speecifi-

cally imposed under chapter 82.16, when the gross pro-

ceeds from such sales must be included in the measure

of the tax imposed under said chapter ;

“Appendix B, Page 3 *

(3) The distribution afd newsstand sales of news-

papers ; ,

(4) Sales which the state is prohibited from taxing

under the Constitution of this state or the Constitution

or laws of the United States;

(5) Sales of motor véhicle fuel used in aireraft by

the manufacturer thereof for research, development,

and testing purposes and sales of motor vehicle fuel

taxable under chapter 82.36: Provided, That the use

of any such fuel upon which a refund of the motor ve-

hicle fuel tax has been obtained shall be subject to the

tax imposed by chapter 82.12 ;

(6) Sales (including transfers of title through de-

cree of appropriation) heretofer or hereafter made of

’ the entire operating property of a publicly or privately

owned public utility, or of a complete operating inte-

gral section the . to the state or a political subdivi-

sion thereof for use in conducting any business defined

in subdivisions (1), (2). (8), (4). (5), (6), (7), (8),

(9), (10) or (11) of RCW &82.16.010;

(7) Auction sales made by cr through auctioneers of

tangible personal property (including household goods )

which have been used in conducting a farm activity,

when the seller thereof is ua farmer and the sale is hed]

or conducted upon a farm and uot otherwise ;

(8) Sales to corporations which have been imeorpo-

rated under any act of the congress of the United

States and whose principal purposes are to furnish vol-

unteer aid to members of armed forces of the United

States and also to carry on a system of national and

international relief and to apply the same in mytigat-

Appendix B, Page 4

ing the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire,

floods, and other national calamities and to devise and

carry ou measures for preventing the same ;

(9) Sales of purebred livestock for breeding pur-

poses where the animals are registered in a nationally

recognized breed association; sales of cattle and milk

cows used on the farm;

(10) Sales of tangible personal property (other than

the type referred to in subdivision (11) hereof) for

use by the purchaser in conitetion with the business

of operating as a private or common carrier by air,

‘ail, or Water in interstate or foreign commerce: Pro-

vided, That any actual use of sueh property in this

state shall, at the time of such actual use, be subject to

the tax imposed by chapter 82.12;

(11) Sales of airplanes, locomotives, railroad cars,

or watercraft for use in conducting interstate or for-

eign commerce by transporting therein or therewith

property and persons for hire or for use in conducting

commercialdeep sea fishing operations outside the

territorial waters ef the state; also sales of tangible

personal property which becomes a component part of

such airplanes, locomotives, railroad cars, or water-

craft, and of motor vehicles or trailers used by the

holder of a carrier permit issued by the Interstate

Commerce Comission authorizing transportation by

motor vehicle aeross the bound. ries of this state, in the

course of constructing/ repairing, cleaning, altering,

cr improving the same; also sales of or charges made

for labor and serviees réudered in respect to such con-

structing, repairing, cleaning, altering, or improving;

+5 neg, SARE ATS Ty aa

Moots. SGh ts) AMIE ee tt vos mn + eee , -

Tp a TH ey LO len ais 07 Cena aee

- Appendix B, Page 5 \

(12) Sales of motor vehicles and trailers to ie used

for the purpose of transporting therein persons or

property for hire in interstate or foreign commerce:

Provided, That the purchaser must be the holder of a

carrier permit issued-by the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission and that the vehicles will first move upon the >

highways of this state from the point of delivery in

this state to a point outside of this state under the au-

thority of a one-transit pernit isshed by the diree-

tor of licenses pursuant to th® provisions of RCW

46.16.100 ;

(12) Sales ef motor vehicles and trailers to non-

residents of this state for use outside of this state, even

though delivery be made within this state, but only

when (a) the vehicles or trailers will be taken from

the point of delivery in this state directly to a point

outside this state under che authority of a one-transit

permit issued by the director of licenses pursuant to the

provisions of ROW 46.16.100, or (b) said motor vehi-

eles and trailers will be registered and licensed imme-

diately under the laws of the state of the purchaser's

residence, will not be used in this state more than three

months, and will net be required to be registered and

lie@nsed under the laws of this state. *

(14) Sales to nonresidents of this state for use out-

side of this state of tangible personal property which

becomes a component part of any machinery or other

article of personal property belonging to such nonresi

dent, in the course of installing, repairing, cleaning.

altering, or improving the same and also sales of or

charges made for labor and services rendered in re-

spect to any tustalling, repairing, cleaning, altering, or

‘

Appendix B, Page 6

improving, of personal property of or for a nonresi-

dent, but this Subsection (14) shall apply only when

the seller agrees to, and does, deliver the property to

the purchaser at a point outside this state, or delivers

the property to a common or bona fide private earrier

consigned to the purchaser at a point outside this state ;

(15) Sales to nonresidents of this state for use out-

side of this state of watercraft requiring coast guard

registration or registration by the state of principal

use according to the Federal Boating Act of 1958, even

though delivery be made within this state, but only

when (a) the watercraft will not be used within this

state for more than forty-five days and (b) an appro-

priate exemption certificate supported by 4dentitication

ascertaining residence as provided by the tax commis-

sion and signed by the purchaser or his agent estab-

lishing the fact that the purchaser is a non-resident

and that the watercraft is for use outside Of this state,

one copy to be tiled with the tax commission with the

regular report and a duplicate to be retained by the

dealer.

(16) Sales of baby chicks and turkey poults for use

in the production for sale of poultty 6r ‘poultry

produets.

(17) Sales to nonresidents of this state for use out-

. side of this state of machinery and implements for use

in conducting a farming activity, When such machinery

and implements will be transported immediately out-

side the state. As proof of exemption, an affidavit or

certification in such form as the tax commission shall

require shall be made for each such sale, to be retained

as a business record of the seller.

Bin ,

SEER

xo Pe BN RA Ot, So Pe ee eee .

. RAR GROSSE Ruane Mine* Riekiaten boa Sey ee Zp SOE OEE 4 Seren .:

Appendir B, Page 7

(18) Sales for use in noneontiguous states, terri-

tories and possessions of the United States, but only

when, as a necessary incident to the contract of sale,

the seller delivers the subject matter of the sale to the

purchaser or his desiguated agent at the usual receiv-

ing terminal of the carrier selected to transport the

goods, under such circumstances that it is reasonably

certain that the goods will be transported directly to a

destination in such noncontiguous states, territories

and possessions. . . .

* * *

RCW 82.08.050 Buyer to pay, seller to collect tax—

Penalties. The tax hereby imposed shall be paid by the

buyer to the seller, and each seller shall colleet from

the buyer the full Amount of the tay payable in respect

to each taxable sale in accordance with the schedule

of collections adopted by the tax commission pursuant

to the provisions of RCW 82.08.060. The tax required

by this chapter, to be collected by the seller, shall be

deemed to be held in trust bv the seller until paid to

the commission, and any seller who appropriates or

converts the tax collected to his own use or to any use

other than the payment of the tax to the extent that

the money required to be collected is not available for

payment on the due date as preseribed in this chapter

shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ‘

In case any seller fails to collect the tax herein un-

posed or having collected the tax, fails to pay it to the

coLimission in the manner prescribed by this chapter,

whether such failure is the result of his own acts or

the result of acts or conditions beyond his control, he

Appendix B, Page §

shall, nevertheless, be personally liable to the state for

the amount of the tax.

The amount of tax, until paid by the buyer to the ,

seller, or to, the commission, shall constitute a debt

from the buyer to the seller and any seller who fails or

refuses to collect the tax as required with intent to vio-

late the provisions of this chapter or to gain some ad-

vantage or benefit, either direct or indirect, and any

buyer who refuses to pay any tax due under this chap-

ter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Where a Buyer has failed to pay to the seller the tax .

imposed by this chapter and the seller has not paid the

amount of the tax to the commission, the commission

may, in its discretion, proceed directly against the

‘buyer for collection of the tax, im which ease a penalty

of ten percent may be added to the amount of the tax

for failure of the buyer to pay the same to the seller, re-

gardless of when the tax may be collected by the com-

mission; and all of the previsions of chapter 82.32, in-

cluding those relative to interest and penalties, shall

apply in addition; and, for the sole purpose of apply-

ing the ‘Various provisions of chapter 82.52, the fif-

teenth day of the month fellowing the bimonthly tax

period in which te purchase was made shall be ¢on-

sidered as the due date of the tax. ... —t

RCW 82.08.060 Collection of tax — Methods and

schedules. The tax commission shall have power to

adopt rules and regulations prescribing methods and

schedules for the collection of the tax required to be

collected by the seller from the buver under this chap-

ter. The methods and sehedules prescribed shall be

_— Po tt > Seb OR ee PS os IR

wee NOES SE FH ey aE - ot

~*~

Appendix B, Page 9

adopted so as to eliminate the collection of fractions

of one cent and so as to provide that the aggregate col-

leetions of all taxes by the seller Shall. insofar as prac-

ticable, equal the amount of tax imposed by this chap-

ter. Such schedules may provide that no tax need by

collected from the buyer upon sales below a stated sum

and may be amended from time to time to accomplish -

&

the purposes set forth herein. ...

* * * af

a

RCW 82.08.140 Administration. The provisions of

RCW 82.04.470 and all of the pyovisions of chapter

$2.32 shall have full force and application with respect .

to taxes imposed under the provisions of this chap-

ar

**SALE DEFINED , -

, RCW $2.04.040 “Sale”? means any transfer of the

ownership of, title to, or possession of property for a

valuable consid: ation and ineludes any activity clas-

sitied as a “sale at retail’ or ‘retail sale’? under RCW

82.04.050. It includes renting or leasing, conditional .

sale contracts, leases with option to purchase, and any

contract under which possessiog of the property Is °

given to the purchaser but title is retained by the

vendor as security for the ‘payment of the purchase

price. It also includes the furnishing of food, drink, or

meals for compensation whether consumed upen the

premises or not.

Casual or isolated sale’? meats a sale made by a per-

son who is not engaged in the bus: ness of selling the type

of property involved.

Appendia I, Pag 10

“SaLe aT Rerai., "RETA SaLe”” DEFINED

RCW 82.01.050 “Sale at retail’ or stretail sale”

tneaRs every sale of tangible personal property (in-

eluding articles produced, fabricated. or imprinted )

other than a sale to one who (a) purchases-for the pur-

goose of resale as tangible personal property in the

regular course of business, or (8) installs, repairs,

cleans. alters, imprints, improves, constructs, or deco-

rates real or personal property of or for cousumers, if

sugh tangible persoual property becomes an ingredient

fr component of such real or personal property, er (Ce)

purchases for the purpose of consuming the property

purchased in producing for sale a new article of tati-

gible personal property or substance, of which such

property becomes au mgredient or componeut or as a

chemical used in processing, when the primary pur-

pose of such chenucal is to create a chemical reaction

directly through contact with an ingredient of a new

article being produced for sale. The tertn also means

every sale of tangible personal properts to persous en-

gaged in auy business Which is taxabie under RCW

S2.04.280, subsection (2), and S2.04.290,

The term ‘sale at retail’? or ‘tretail sale*’ shall an-

clude the sale or charge made for tangibie personal

property consumed and or for labor and services ren-

dered in respect to the fellowing: (a) The installing,

repairing, cleaning, altering, Imprinting, or improving

of tangible personal property of or for coustumers, ex-

eluding, however, services rendered in respect to live

animals, birds and insects: (b) the cousgructing, re-

pairing, decorating, or improving of new or existing

buildings or other structures under, upon, or above

2, bs

Appendia BP, Page 11

real property of or for consumers, including the in-

stalling or attaching of any article of tangible personal

property thefein or thereto, whether or not such per-

sonal property becomes a part of the realty by virtue

of installation, and shall also acelude the sale of serv-

ices or charges made for the clearing of land aud the

moving of earth, excepting the mere leveling of laud

used in commercial farming or agricuiture; (¢) the

sale of or charge made for labor and services rendered

in respect to the cleaning, fumigating, razing or mov-

ing of existing buildings or structures, but shall not

include the change made for Janitollal serviees; (d)

the sale of or charge made for labor and services ren-

dered i respect to automebile towing, armored car

service and sinular automotive transportation services,

but not in respect to those required to report and pay

taxes under chapter 82.16; (e) the sale of and charge

made for the furnishing of lodging and all other serv-

ices by a hotel, rooming house, tourist court, motel,

trailer camp, and the granting of any similar license to

use real property, as distinguished from the renting or

leasing of real property, and it shall be presumed that

the occupancy of real property for a coutinucus period

of one month or niore coustitutes a rental or lease of

real property and vot a mere license to use or enjoy the

sale. :

The term shall net inelude the sle of or charge made

for labor and services neudered in respect to the build-

ing. repairing. or Muproving of any publiely owned

street, place, road. highway, bridge. or trestle which

is nsed for to be used primarily for foot or vehicular

traffie. nor shall it include sales of feed, seed, fertilizer,

A pipe nde i Parag 12

and spray materiils to persons for the purposes of

producing for sale any agricultural product whatso-

ever, including milk, eggs, wool, fur. meat. honey. or

other substances obtained from animals, birds, or

insects.

“Sate at WHoLesaLe,’* ** WHOLESALE SALE’ DEFINED

RCW 82.04.0060 “Sale at wholesale or wholesale”

sale omeans any sale of tangible personal property

whieh is nota sale at retail and means any charge made

for labor and services rendered for persous who are

not consumers, 1 respect to real or personal property,

if such charge is expressly detined as a retail sale by

ROW s2.04.050 when rendered to or for consumers:

Provided, That the the term “real or personal prop-

erty as used in this section shall not juelide any natu-

ral products named in ROW 82.04.100.

GROSS: PROCEEDS OF SALES’? DEFINED

RCW 82.04.070 “Cross proceeds of sales”” menus

the value procepding or accruing from the sale of tan-

gible personal properts aia) or for services rendered,

Without any dedtiction on account of the cost of Prope

erty solu, the cost Of niaterials used. labor costs, inter-

est, discount paid, delivery costs, taves. or auy other

expense Whatscever paid or accrued ana without any

deduction on account of losses.

:

“CONSUMER” DEFINED

RCW 82.04.1990 **Cousumer”” means the following:

(1) Any person who ‘purchases, acquires, owns,

holds. or uses any article of tangible personal property

other than for the purpose (a) of resale as tangible

App nelia PB, Pag ] i

personal property in the regular course of business or

(bh) of incorporating such property as an ingredient

or coliponent of real or personal property when in-

stalling, repairing, cleaning, altering. imprinting, im-

proving, constructing, or decorating such real or per-

sonal property of or for consumers or Ce) of eonsum-

ing such property in producing for sale a new article of

tangible personal property or a new substanee. of

Which such property becomes an jngredient or compo-

nent or as a chemical used in processing, When the

primary purpose of such chemical is to create a chemi-

cal reaction directly through contact with an ingredient

of anew article being produced for sale;

(2) Any person engaged in any business activity

taxable under RCW 82.04.290 ;

(Oo) Any person engaged in the business of contract-

ing tor the building, repairing or improving of any

publicly owned street, place. road, highway. bridge or

trestle Which is used or to be used primarily for foot or

Vehicular traffic as detined in RCW = s2.04.280, in re-

spect, however, ouly to tangible personal property

used or consumed in such business;

(4) Any

right of posse’

versol Whe Is ah owner, lessee or has the

Slon to or au Casement in real or per-

sohal property which is being constructed, repaired,

nproved, cleahed, imprinted, or otherwise altered by

a person engag@l in business. exeluding ouly the United

States, the state, and its political subdivisions in respect

to labor and services rendered to their real property

Which is used or held for public road purposes.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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