Motion to Dismiss — Griffith v. California

FILE COPY

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United

October Term, 1960

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Van M. Grirrvitu.

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OCT 14 iS

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Supreme = US.

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Appellant,

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Poorik or THE SiAtTE oF Calg hogs ia. acting by

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through the Department o: Pulte Works,

Appelle

ryyor Los ANGELES, a miimecipal corporation; ef

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MOTION TO DISMISS.

-

RoGkeR ARNEBERGH,

City Attorney,

. .

BoURKE JONES,

Assistant ( ty elttorn 4

. CLAUDE EK. TLitner,

Deputy City [tternes

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SUBJECT INDEX

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Statement of facts ....... AE Sy Be s sieladiasoscaeieaiacianatanaaliaet ey

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The judgment appealed from rests upon am adequate non-

federal basis ... ........... ails chicas bhaaiaacaes es adameeaadimebileamoneas ae

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The federal questions sought to be reviewed were not ex-

pressiy passed tapon by the stale Courts... eee ealnbeeen ?,.

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The instant appeal does not present a substantial federal

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TABLE OF AUTMORITIES CITED

.. - + CASES PAGE

ad «

Barrington ve Missouri, 205 U. S$. 483, 27 S. Cy. 582, 51 L:

) Fe | Snes URINE’ SRLS 10

Buck v. Peopie of the State of California, 343 U. S. 9, 72

eee 5 eS NTS en

*

Hammerstein v. Superior Court of California, 340 U. S. 622,

Nae MOL eh... ateiecionee ae

. House v. Road Improvement District No, 2, 206 U.S. 175,

O46 eee, OO hiner 11, 13

International Steel & Iron Co, v. National Surety Co., 297

U. S. 657, 56 S. Ct. 619, 80 L. Ed. 961...........0.2.---- —

"yneh vy. New York e& rel, Pierson, 203 U. S. 52, 3% S. Ct.

ene: =e

Michigan Sugar Co. v. Michigan, I83°U. 5. 112, 22S Ct.

581, 46 L. Ed. 829. ...... PR ata Pe ae ne ae ep oe CADW Se 11

Parker y. McLain, 237 U. S. 409, 35 S. Ct. 632, 59 L. Ed.

105] eee 6, 13

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 €. 5S. 206,

S&S. Ct. 528, 82 L.Ed. 3 ii odeneegenieabacaiaaal 12

Stembridge vo State of Georgia; 3430 S. 341.72 S. Ctr. 834,

06 L. Ed. 1130... at a Tee cana Va

Thomas v. lowa, 209 U.S. 258, 28S. Ct. 487, 32 L. Fd. 782.. Lh.

iHited States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State of Oklahoma,

24%) U.S. 141, 39S. Ct. 399, 63 L.. Ed. 876........, wieauies

Valley Steamship, Co. v. Wattawa, 24. S. 202, 37 S. Ct.

323. Ol L. Ed. JOR4 cae , Bea: te

Zorach vy. Clausen’ 343 U.S. 306, 72 8. Ct. 079, 96 L.Ed.

asa wivecanevessescnonssacvensveotiebSnsrsnentatncbeapacsoiementnnnenstatt eiasciai 8

Zucht v. King. 260 U.S. 174, $3. S. Ct. 24, 07 L. Ed. 194... 13

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STATUTES

California Code of Civil Procedure. Sec. 124013).

California Rules on Appeal, Rule 28(b)

California Streets and Highways Code, See. 103.5 ...............

United States Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10. .....

United States Constitution, I4th Amendment .

6, 11

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IN@rHE '

Supreme Court of the United States

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October Term, 1960

Se. sncnnilinnion

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Van M. GrirritH, ‘

Appellant,

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE oF CALIFORNIA, acting by and

through the Department o: Public Works,

" Appellee, |

City oF Los ANGELES. a municipal corporation, et al., a5

2 , . . Appellees.

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MOTION TO DISMISS. ~

not expressly passed upon.

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The appellee, Citing Los Angeles, a municipal cor-

poration, hereby maves to dismiss the appeal heretofore

filed, with this Honorable Court by Van M. Griffith.

Such motion is based upon the following grounds:

1» The judgment appealed from rests upon an ade-

quate non-federal basis.

2. The federal questions sought td be reviewed were .

3. The appeal does not present a Substantial federal ee

question. '

. * » .

-- The Statement of Jurisdiction filed by the appellant

* heraggn contains. several misleading statéments and omis-

perggn . v

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atefiets

sions which it is-necessary to point out and correct be-

fore we can properly discuss and elaborate upon each of

our above-mentioned grounds in support of our Motion to

Dismiss.

Statement of Facts.

The following: statement of facts is based upon the

_ factual statement of the California District Court of

Appeal set forth in its opinion (which must be accepted

‘as true since appellant herein never filed a petition for

rehearing before that court under Rule 28(b) of the

Rules on Appeal adopted by the Judicial Council of the

State of California requesting ‘a correction of the rec-

ord before filing his petition for, hearing in the Cali-

fornia Supreme Court).

In 1897 appellant’s father deeded. to the City of Los

Angeles in fee simple and without condition 3000 acres

of land whith the City of Los Angeles dedicated to park

purposes. In 1898 appellant’ s father deeded to the City

of Los Angeles some 3015.788% acres of land, including

the 3000 acres deeded the prev ious. year, which later

deed contained the provision: =~ * ;

“ . . this gift and grant is made, and said proper-

ty is hereby conveyed upon condition that said land

shall be used ‘and maintained by said City of Los

Angeles and its successors in interest and estate,

exclusively as a public park and pleastire ground,

. for the amusement, recreation, health and pleasure

of its inhabitants.” and upen the further condition

that the name of said park . , . be continued as

the official name and designation ” said park; and

whenev er said tract of land hereby conveyed, or

any paré thereof shall cease to be used as a park,

and for pleasure, amusement, recreation, health, and

ss

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uses incident to the aforesaid uses according to the

intents and meanings of the same, and if said City

_ or its successors in interest or estate shall at any

$ time change the official name of said park from

Griffith Park to some other name ‘or. designation,

then the lands hereby conveyed shall immediately

upon the happening of either of gaid events, re-

vert to said parties of the first part or to their

heirs. It is understood that the use of any part of

said premises ... for railroad or other transporta-

tion purposes for carrying the inhabitants’ of sat

City into and threugh said park, shall not be con-

sidered a violation of any of the conditions upon

which this donation and grant are made, “oie

herein to the contrary thereto notwithstagding. .

These lands, together with others subsequently sail

by the City of Los Angeles. were and are known as

Griffith Park. .

In 1955 the California State Highway Commissien by

» “resolution authorized, and the State of California com-

menced, a proceeding to condemn the interests of the

.,, City af Los Angeles and of- appellant Van M. Griffith

?and others in approximately 200\acres of said park lands

to make way for the construction of a state freeway

therein.

The City of Los Angeles answered and denied the,

state’s right {Wecondemn such land, but stipulated with

the state that the value thereof was $3,750,000. Ap-

pellant Gritfith’s answer to the complaint consisted pri-

\Leaely of the contention that the state could/not con-

demn such land because: 1) «contrary to the ths of - ;

the 1898 ‘deed, and 2) contrary to the City Charter, but

’ es no right to reversion or compensation for the

i

taking of his claimed interest therein. Some 3/2 years

after he had filed his answer, and shortly before the ac-

tual trial of the matter, Griffith sought leave to file a

cross-complaint, which leave was- demed.

Thereafter lhe trial court determined that the use of

Griffith Park lands for the construction of a freeway

_ Was not prohibited by the terms of the 1898 deed; that

the condemnation of such lands was, permissible; that

no part of Grif fish Park reverted to appellant and that

he had rio compensable interest therein. The above rul-

ings were affirmed in the C alifornia District Court of

Appeal and appeliant’s Petition for Hearing: in the Cali-

fornia Supreme Court was denied.

In tire light of the foregoing it is submitted that ‘af

pellant’s factual references in his Statement of Juris-

diction are in error or incomplete in thé following ma-

teria) respects : a.

1. Appellant omits any_ reference (other than by

quoting from the-opinion—of the District Court of Ap

peal) to the foct that his father had conveyed a sub-

stantial portion of the Griffith Park lands to the City

f tos Angeles in 1897 in fee simple and without con-

dition: and that it is only the additional lands conveyed

by the 1898 deed which were subject to the provisions

of that later deed.

2. Appellant omits any reference to whet, if any,

gf the additional lands conveyed by the 1898 deed were

condemned.

3. Appellant has only partially set forth the condi-

tions to the 1898 deed (Statement of Jurisdic.ion, page

3) and has failed to mention the substance or set torth

the whole thereof as we have quoted above.

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4. Appellant in framing his question No. 1 (State-

ment of Jurisdiction, page 3) incorrectly refers to the

state freeway as being “inconsistent” with the dedica-

tion of the subject land for park purpages under the 1898

deed. He avoids mentioning the explicit provision of the

1898 deed, hereinabove quoted, that “the use of any

part of said premises for . . . transportation purposes,

for carrying inhabitants of said City into and through

said park, shali not be considered a violation of any of

the conditions upor which this donation and grant are

made”, and further avoids mentioning the trial court and

District Court ‘of Appeal rulings in -interpreting such

phrase that the use of the subject land for freeway

purposes is consistent with the-terms of the 1898 deed.

(Statement of Jurisdiction, Appendix, page 16.)

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a *

_ The Judgment Appealed From Rests Upon an

Adequate Non-Federal Basis.

As we unjlerstand the rather lengthy federal questions

urged by appellant as a basis for this appeal (Statement

of Jurisdiction, pp. 3 to 6), they are essentially as s fol-

iows:

1. That by reason of (a) Griffith Park having

reverted to him, and éb) ne compensation Having

been paid for the taking of Rivefsid¢ Drive within

Griffith Park, the-condenination of a portion of Grif-

fith Park by the State of California for its “incon-

sistent” use as.a state. freeway without appellant's

\

being comperisated therefore is in violation of the

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2. That by reason ot (a) his being denied eave

to file a cross-complaint. (b) the taking of Grif-

-fith Park lands in violation ot the 1898 teed, and

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(c) his réversionary interest having been taken with-

out compensation, he has been denied due process of

‘ law under the 14th Amendment to the United States |

Constitution.

« .

3. That by reason of the passage of (a) Sec-

tion 103.5 of the California Streets and Highways

Code, (b) a resoiution of the State Highway Com-

mission. and (c) an ordinance of the City 6f Los

Angeles, and a resolution of the Board of Recrea-

tion and Park Commissioners of such’ City, the

obligation of the’ 1898 deed has been impaired (pre-

sumabk’ in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the

United States Constitution). :

, A careful reading of the above federal questions posed

by appellant shows that his claim of the denial to him

of certain federal constitutional rights is based upon

his misstatement of: the answers to certain basic ngn-

federal questions.. As was stated in Parker u, McLain,

237 U. S. 469, 35 S. (t. 632, 59 L. Ed. 1051, a fed-

eral question resting on false assumptions is without

merit and affords no basis for review by the United

States Suprene Court. We submit that the opinion of

the District Court of Appeal on certain non-federal ques-

tions renders unnecessary a specific determination upon

the federal questions urged by appellant and provides an

adequate non-fgderal basis upon which the judgment of

the District Court of Appeal may be sustained. Such

determinative non-federal rulings of the District Court

of Appeal are as follows: .

1. The ‘taking of lands and the construction of

a freeway in Griffith Park by the State of Cali-

a

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fornia is consistent with and Ghot_ prohibited . “4 the

_terms of the’ 1808 deed-of-certain. of-the-Grifftth-———*

Park lan Is to the City 61 Los Angeles and did not

cause a reversion thereof to appellant (Statement

of Jurisdiction, Appendix, p. 16).

°2. In any event, the -189X deed denveyed a ice

simple subject to a condition subsequent which’ re-

quired acreentry in order to terminate the estate

granted if the conditions were breached (Statement

Jurisdiction, Appendix, page 13), and even as-

suming that the state's condemnation of asportion of

Griffith Park and its construction of a freeway

thereon constituted such a breach, appellant hever

exercised his right of reentry (Statement of Juris-

diction, Appendix, pp/ 15 and 16), and thus the

City’s fee simple estate continued (Statement of Ju-

risdiction, Appendix, p. 13) and such park lands

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did not revert to appellant. ie Ҥ-

3. Riverside Drive constituted a_portion of ’ the

freeway easements taken by the State of California

for which compensation was paid to the City of Los

Angeles (Statement of Jurisdiction, Appendix. p.

“11). :

4. The granting or dental to appellant: by the

trial court of leave to file a cross-complaint after

his filing of an answer to the complaint is a matter

cf discretion with the tnal court and no showing of

abuse of discretion by the trial court’s denying such

leave was shown by appellant under the facts of this

»

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» case (Statement of Jurisdiction, Appendix, py. 8 and

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» 5. It was impossible in any event to award ap- .

pellant any compensation for the taking of his re-

versionary interest because he offered no proof as

to the value thereof, if any, nof did fe ever claim

other than the value of the entire fee (Statement of

Jurisdiction, Appendix, _pp., 19 and 21).

6. The California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec-

tion 1240(3) (the validity of which is not attacked

by appellant herein) ‘authoriz&ftke state to acquire

the questioned freeway easement in the instant case

(Statement of Jurisdiction, Appendix, p. 4).

The law is clear that, the United States Supreme Court

will not take jurisdiction of a matter where the judg-

_mentwof the. staté court could be supported upon an ade-

quate non-federal ground. ( Stembridge v. State of Geor-

gia, 343. U. S. 54L, 72 S. Ct. 834, 96 L. Ed. 11

| Buck wv. People of the State of California, 343 CS.

OY, 72 S. Ct. 502 9% I. Ed. 775: Zorach v..Clauson,

- 343: U.S 5. 306, 72. Ct. 679,96 L. Bd. 954; Hdmmer-

stein v. Superior (‘ost of California, 340 U.S. 622, 71

S. Cr. 521, 95 L. a. 586). It is submitted that. ade-

. «quate non-federal grounds exist in the instant, case to

support the judgment of the District Court’ of Appeal of

the State of California and that this’ Honorable Court

should therefore refuse jurisdiction of this appeal.

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IT. .

The Federal Questions Squght’' to Be Reviewed

- Were Not Expressly Passed Upon by the State

Courts.

Although appellant suggests that he has urged and the

California trial and appellate courts have determirfed fed-

eral questions thraughout the-proceeding’s ( Statement of

Jurisdiction, pp. 7-9), actually appellant urged such

contentions only at pages 38-40 of his Opening Brigt in

the District Court of Appeal. Further, such contentions

were never expressly passed upon by any California court

as federal questions. - gad .

Appellant claims; page 7 of his Statement of Juris-

déction, that the federal question of impairment of the

obligation of a contract was «raised in paragraphs VII,

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IX and X1.of ‘his answer to the complaint. A reading:

of those paragraphs reveals that his ony claim therein

was that thé construction of the subjéct freeway would

violate the terms,of the 1898 deed and would’ violate

the provisions of the City Charter. He nowhere .alleged

~~ any-aet ef statute as being violative of the United States

Constitution, nor does he now set forth in what manner

the trial court ruled upon such alleged federal constitu-

tional issue.

‘ o .

Appellant next refers .to the content of his proposed

cross-complaint as having” raised a federal question.

(Statement of Jurisdiction, pp. 7 and.&.) That cross-

comyflaint- was never filed. (Statement of Jurisdiction.

p. 12). Appellant merely sought lea® to file same... which

leave the trial court denied in the exercise. of its undis-

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puted disctetion. . Aypellant makes no contention that the

action of the trial judge was based upon any ruling under

the federal constitution. y

Appellant next cites as federal ttestions his objec--

fions presented. in the pretrial, conference and in. the

trial court that he had been “denied his day in, court”

by the denial of his request for leave to file a crdss-

complaint (Statement of Jurisdiction, p. 8). ,We have .

read appellant's “Objection . .. to Pre Tria! Conference”

fand all the pages of the Reporter's Transcript cited by

hint anc are unabie to find wherein he claims his rights

tinder the federal constitution have been denied nor have

we been able to find where: the trial court’s rulings on

such objections were based upon federal constitutional

law. Moreover, discretionary action of a state court

denying leave to file a particular document, which action

is reviewed and affirmed .by a state appellate court, is

solely a state affair ‘and “does not _— a federal ques-

tion (Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U..S. 483, 27 S. Ct.

.” 582. 51 L. Ed. 890).

Appellant’s referenge to the trial pate Findings of

Fact (Statement of Jurisdiction, p. 8) as having ruled

‘upon a federal constitutional point is equally unavail-

ing. A search ‘of the record ret iyals that the federal

cofistitution was. not even referred to therein by the trial

court.

Where a party claims that a federal question was prop-

erly raised! in the state courts, he must show that such

question arose from “distinct and positive” averments

and not frommere inference. “The statutory require-

ment is not met unless the pafty unmistakably declares

shat he invokes, for the protection of his rights, the Con-

stitution, or some treaty, statute, commission, or attthor-

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ity, of the ere States.” (Michigay Sugar Co. ~@.

Michigan, 185 U. S..112, 22S. Ct. SBT, FT, BA RQ),

To the same rn see also House v. Road Improve-

ment J)istrict No, 2, 266 U. S. 175, 45 S. Ct. 60. 69

L. Ed. 229; Valley Steamship Co. v. Waitawa, 244

U.S. 202. ves Ct. 523, OL L. Ed. 1084; Thognas v.

lowa, 209 U.S. 258%, 28 S. Ct. 487, 52 L. Ed. 782. «

Further, a a that a federal question has been ju-

dicially. passed upon must similarly. be supported by un-

equivocally clear language. ( Lyne hv. New York or rel.

Pierson, 293 U. S. 52, 55 S. Ct. 16, 79 L. Ed, 101).

o%&

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At page 9 of his Statement of Jurisdiction appellant

refers the first point at which we can agree that he

raisps_a. federal question—rhis Opening Brief in the Cali-g,

fornia® District ‘Court of “Appeal wherein, at pages 38 to

40, he urged as violative of both i state and federal

constitutions, that: mo

l. The taking of Griffith Park lands, without

- compensation to him j& in’ violation of the M4th

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2. The taking of Griffith Park lands for state

freeway purposes violates the due process clause of

the I4th Amendment to the United States Constitu- .

tion.

3. The enactment of Section 103.5 5 of the Streets

_ and Highways Code and’ the adoption by the

~Mate Highway Commission of a resolution authoriz- — * ”

ing the eendemnation of Griffith Park lands for a

state freeway impairs the obligation of a contract

® in violation of Article 1. Section 10 of the _Uniged

States C onstitutipn.

The District "Court of Appeal in answering such con-

——tentions stated only that the exercise of the power of

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eminent domain did not interfere with the ‘inviolability

of contracts, cited two federal cases im support ‘thereof,

and ‘then hen concinded (Statement of Jurisdiction, "Appendix,

p. 17) that the, resolytions of the California State High-

way Commission: authorizing: the condemnation of Grif-

fith Park lands could not be “unconstitutional as impair-

ing the obligations of the contract between the donots of

Griffith Park and the City of Los Angeles,” and that _

_° “the constitutional inhibition of any state law impairing

\ the obligation of contracts is not a lim on any statute ©

authorizing the state or any department thereof to exer-

_ cise the power of eminent domain.”" In peither instance,

however, did the, District Court of Appeal mention

| whether it was making such comment with respect to the

~ . sis federal or the California Constitution or both.

In the case of Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson,

203 U. S..52, 55 S. Ct. 16, 79.1., Ed. 191, relator sought. .

relief in the state courts, urging both state and federal

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nes constitutional grounds. The state court denied such re-

f e lief, citing federal cases under the federal constitution,

but did not specify that it was basing its opinion on the.

federal constitution. The United States Supreme Court

| © in denying certiorari rec ignized that the state court opin-

| ion may have been based upon the state constitution and®

, - determined that when if ws not evident whether a federal

cgiestion had been passed” upon by the state court, it

will be presumed that the decision was based upon state

law. To the same effect, see also mpg ag Bell

ve F Tele phone Co. v Oklahoma, 303 U. S. 206, 58 S. Ct.

- 528, 82 L. Ed. 751, and Jute ‘astional ye & Iron Co.

”

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N@onal Surety Co., 297 U.S. 057, 56S. Ct. 619. +

80 L. Ed. 961. It is submitted that, applying the prin-

ciple of the above discussed /.yich case to the present

case, appellant has tailed to show wherein the. California

District Court of Appeal or any of the other California

_cotirts passed spon a question winder the federal constitu-

f

“tion? % } °

III. F

The Instant Appeal Does Not — a Substantial

Federal Quest on. .,

It is submitted that it is evident from a reading of the

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pleadings in the trial court, the briefs in the appellate

courts and the decisions of the trial court and of the

District Cottrt of Appeal, that the within matter was

tried and determined on state issues; that the questions

involving the federal constitution were :presented by ap-

pellang in ‘only one of the three state courts and even

then those questiorls were presented in a most. cur-

sory manner and were based upon false and frivoloys

premises as discussed above/ It is submitted that anf

such circumstances such questions will not be considered

as substantial federal questions upon which’ to base an

appeal to this Honorable Court. @Parker v. McLain, 237

U.S. 469, 35S. Ct. 632, 59 L. Md. 1051; Zucht v. King,

200 [. S. 174, 43°S. GU" 24, 67 L. Ed. 194; Palley

Steamship Co. v. Wattawa, 244 U. S. 202, 37'S. Ct.

523, 61 L. Ed. 1084; United States Fidelity & Guaranty

Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 250 U. S. 111, 39 S.Ct.

399, 63 1. Ed. 876: House v. Road Improvement Dis

trict No. 2, 206 U.S. 175, 45S. Ct. OO, 69 L.. Ed. 22%

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For-each and every of the reasons set forth abovg it is.

ré’pectfully submitted that the within appeal to this Hon-

orable Couft ‘should be dismissed. ;

_. Respectfully. submitted,

Rocer ARNEBERGH, ~—.

_ CityrAttorney,

BourKE JONES,

Assistant City Attorney,

Ciappe E. HILKER,

' Deputy City Attorney,

Attorneys for Appellee, City of Los Angeles.

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