Reply Brief — Barry v. Reading Co.

Supreme Court brief1945

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 929, October Term, 1944.

‘

PAULINE EK. BARRY, Administratrix of the ESTATE

OF RALPH EF. BARRY, deceased,

Petitioner,

Vs.

READING COMPANY,

Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIR.

CUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD

CIRCUIT.

MILFORD J. MEYER,

1900 North American Bldg.,

Philadelphia 7, Pa.,

Attorney for Petitioner.

SAMUEL SHAPIRO, :

Harry G. Fuerst,

Of Counsel.

a: Oe OD

Martin & Lyle, 302 Penfield Bidg., Phila., Pa.

Pr yee baa MORON

PRESCOT NRO ee sap Mae PEON EP LR SHEER MOT

TE OE he re

TABLE OF CASES CITED

PAGE

Baily v. Central Vt. Ry., Ine., 319 U. 8. 350, 63 S. Ct.

PE ROMAN ln cE Rae by eels Ke oa ws tT nee oe xa 13

Blair v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 65S. Ct. oO, 046 ....... 10

Boston Excelsior Co. v. Sweatt, 229 F. 321............. 4

Chicago, St. P.& C. Ry. Co. v. Kulp, 102 FP. 2d 352, 3458

(CCA-8) certiorari denied 307 U.S, 686 ......... 5

Chicago, St. P.M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Muldowney, 130 F. 2d

971, 975 (cert. den. 317 V. 8, 700, 68S. Ct. WOOP ccs 18

Craig v. United States, 81 F.2d 816 (CCA-9), certiorari

Gotiod 200 UT). B. GOD ow. ccc wdc cccsrvcncceee 6

Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 24 364 (CCA,2), cer-

tiorari denied, 268 U. S. 706.2... 0. .05.05....... 5

Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Knott, 159 P. 847,60 Ok1.175.. 14

Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 309........... 6

Jacobs v. Reading Co., 130 F. 24 612 ................. 7

Keenan v. Director Gen., 285 F. 286 (CCA-2), cert. den.

Ps OO OO OU OE vas vcd isc e.. ce. 9

Kelly. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 125 8S. W. 818, 141 Mo.

UN SMEs C0 es Weistas cee ee neeeeb on ch | 14

Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 317 U. 8. 481, 489; 63

RMR MUN DA 6.5 Gun wath ba od hae dalianaee elon ce 8

London Guarantee Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F. 24325 ......... 5

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stewart, 283 Ky. 585, 142 8S. W.

Err iukch ach aeastens unt eA te nk 8

Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Summerlin, 18 F. 2d 950... .. 13

Marathon Lumber Co. v. Dennis, 296 F.471........... 4

INDEX

PAGE

Phila. ete. R. Co. v. Fessler, 295 F. 650 (CCA-3), cert.

den. 264 U. S. 585; 44S. Ct. 334 2... ... eee ewes )

Ryan v. United States, 99 F. 2d 864 (CCA-8), certiorari

i ils GD bah be adpenswenevingaensens 6

St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Bishop, 33 S. W. 2d 383, 182

Ark. 763 (cert. den. 283 U. 8. 854, 51S. Ct. 647 ..... 13

Stewart v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 187 F. 2d 527 ............ 4

Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29; 64S. Ct.

EP 5 claw dnkticde pike he et ebeoeeorcs 12, 13

Union Pacific R. Co. v. Huxoll, 245 U. S. 535, 38 S. Ct.

Gee ktakh tc daa nohs ended bdeee sid oe ae ekwagpnis 9

United States v. Block, 88 F. 2d 618, 620 (CCA-2) ..... a)

United States v. Freundlich, 95 F. 2d 376, 379 ......... 5

United States v. Lonardo, 67 F. 2d 883 ........ Sa aeees 5

Worthington v. Elmer, 207 Fed. 306 ................. 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

II Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 437, p. 414 ............ t

Il] Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.) See. 1018, p. 687 .. 5

ARGUMENT.

The brief filed by counsel for the respondent goes far

beyond the issues presented by the petition and brief in

support thereof. Petitioner did not attempt to argue the

merits of the case in this preliminary proceeding. How-

ever, the issues having now been raised, a reply in kind

necessarily is indicated.

All of the criticisms made of the petitioner’s Statement

of the Case are based upon a view of the evidence that is

entirely one-sided. The facts concerning the general negli-

gence of the respondent as we stated them therein are those

which the jury may well have found had the issues been

properly presented to them by the trial court. On the other

hand, the evidence of respondent’s witnesses as to the effi-

ciency of the brake was entirely inadmissible and should

never have been submitted to the jury. Nowhere has

petitioner sought to give the impression that a properly

instructed jury was required to accept petitioner’s evi-

dence or the inferences therefrom drawn by her counsel. In

stating the conflicts in the evidence on the issues presented

in the petition, respondent has made it eten more apparent

that these issues are such as should move this Court to

grant certiorari and to consider whether or not this em-

ploye’s widow and her child have not been denied their

constitutional right to a fair trial on every issue presented

by the evidence.

(1)

Respondent states its position on this point in the lan-

guage of the majority opinion of the Circuit Court of

Appeals (382-383). No better answer could be conceived

than the clear and simple language of the dissenting opinion

of Judge Biggs (384-387). The great importance of an

OF SLO

ah a a nn ee Se ee ree ee

Argument

authoritative decision construing this Order of the Com-

mission is made apparent by this diversity of opinion.

In all of its argument as to the required dimensions of

the brake-shaft and ratchet-wheel, respondent has com-

pletely ignored the basic requirement of the Order: that

the ratchet-wheel be ‘‘secured.’’ A hand brake is not

‘‘efficient’’? under the Act unless the ratchet-wheel is se-

cured to the brake-shaft. Although the obvious meaning

of the word ‘‘secured’’ is easily ascertained, it is not neces-

sary to go beyond this very Order to find the intent of the

Commission in using the term. The same Order uses it

in four other places: ‘‘to secure the hand brake wheel’’;

‘secured to brake shaft drum’’; and ‘‘secured by riveting’’

in two places. And the terms ‘‘securely supported’’ and

‘*securely fastened’’ are used no less than eleven times

in the following standards. Here are three methods of

‘*securing’’ appliances provided for in a single Order: by

a square fit, by riveting, and by a key. Is it conceivable

that the result to be accomplished is different in any one

method of ‘‘securing’’ than in any other? Certainly the

effect of riveting or use of a key is to make the two parts

operate as a single unit, without looseness or play. Equally

true it must be that in using a square fit the application

must be such that the same result is obtained. The min-

imum relative dimensions of one and one-fourth (114)

inches in diameter for the brake shaft and one and five-

sixteenths (15/16) inches square for the ratchet-wheel

can leave a space of only one-thirty-second (1/32) of an

inch on each side of the shaft so that the two parts will

operate as a unit—be ‘‘secured’’. When the play between

them increases beyond this dimension—up to three-six-

teenths (3/16) of an inch as in the instant ease—or when

the parts are not ‘‘secure’’ but are ‘‘loose’’ as described

by the witnesses, there can be no doubt that a violation

of the Act and the Regulations exists and should be recog-

nized by the Court.

Respondent entirely overlooks the fact that the Commis-

Argument

sion has specifically declared that “brake shaft loose’’

or *‘ratchet wheel loose’? are defects which render the hand

brake inefficient. At no time during the trial was the

jury instructed or permitted to know that the brake had

to conform to these regulations and that, if it did not, a

violation of the Act existed.

On the contrary, the instructions of the Court were en-

tirely misleading: they interpreted the Order of the Com-

mission as requiring only compliance with minimum di-

mensions; and they permitted the jury to find that the brake

was safe and efficient even though its parts were loose

in direct violation of the defect classification.

(2)

Respondent has made no attempt to justify the admission

of the testimony here in question. It ignores the primary

distinction between the testimony of plaintiff’s expert and

that of defendant’s car inspectors. Witness Tettemer was

asked by plaintiff to express his opinion solely upon facts

already proved and admitted in the record. Defendant’s

inspectors, on the contrary, were permitted to give testi-

mony based upon no admissible evidence and in the face

of admissions by the first inspector to see the car that he

did not know whether it was in the same condition as at

the time of the accident (215a-216a, 223a).

The authorities cited certainly do not support any theory

that secondary and speculative evidence may be admitted

in the unreviewable discretion of the Trial Judge while

the party offering it is clearly shown to be suppressing the

primary and available evidence in the ease. If the issue

is in fact one of discretion, we do not hesitate to say that

the admission of this evidence amounted to a clear abuse

of it.

In its quotation from Dean Wigmore, respondent has

Argument

omitted a pertinent sentence. We quote from the last edi-

tion of his work:

‘““They may be roughly grouped into two classes,—

those in which the evidence has been received without

any preliminary showing as to the influential circum-

stances remaining the same in the interval (thus leay-

ing it to the opponent to prove their change by way of

explanation in rebuttal), and those in which such pre-

liminary showing is required. Whether it should be

required must depend entirely on the case in hand, and

it is useless to look or to wish for any detailed rules.”’

Il Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 437, p. 414.

In the case of Marathon Lumber Co. v. Dennis, 296 F 471,

cited, it was the plaintiff who was permitted to show the

subsequent existence of a defect in an axle which remained

in the possession of the defendant. The same is true of the

draincock in O’Brien v. Las Vegas & T. R. Co., 242 F. 850

and Boston Excelsior Co. v. Sweatt, 229 F. 321, cited. In

none of the numerous eases cited by Wigmore will it be

found that without prior proof of similarity of conditions,

proof of subsequent condition of an appliance capable of

being dismantled in a few minutes (215-216a) has been

admitted.

(3)

It is difficult to conceive that Respondent had read the

ease of Stewart v. B. d O. R. R. Co., 137 F 2d 527, before

writing its brief. Judge Hand specifically states (529):

“Tt . . . excluded his affidavit (Exhibit A) in spite

of the fact that Edman testified the affidavit was true

and though it contained evidence somewhat inconsistent

with his other testimony.”’

es

Argument

The exclusion of the testimony was one of the grounds for

reversal of the court below. The opinion does cite two de-

cisions of the New York Courts but it also relies upon

United States v. Freundlich, 95 F 2a 376, 379.

The Federal rule is not at variance with the cited ease:

United States v. Lonardo, 67 F 2d 883 ;

London Guarantee Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F 2d 325.

Respondent’s quotation from Dean Wigmore ignores the

more progressive rule which he discusses at length in the

third edition of his work.

III Wigmore on Evidence (8rd Ed.) See. 1018,

p. 687:

“It does not follow, however, that Prior Self-

contradictions, when admitted, are to be treated as

having no affirmative testimonial value, and that any

such credit is to be strictly denied them in the mind of

the tribunal. The only ground for doing so would be

the Hearsay rule.... The whole purpose of the

Hearsay rule has already been satisfied.”

Even the general rule, that prior contradictory state-

ments, the truth of which is denied or not affirmed, may be

used only for impeaching purposes has received responsible

criticism and has been strictly limited, so that some affirma-

tive weight may be given them, if the witness is subject to

cross-examination:

Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 2a 364 (CCA-2),

certiorari denied, 268 U. S. 706 ;

Curtis v. United States, 67 F. 24 943, 945, 946

(CCA-10) ;

United States v. Block, 88 F. 2d 618, 620 (CCA-2) ;

Chicago, St. P. é C. Ry. Co. v. Kulp, 102 F. 2d 352,

308 (CCA-8) certiorari denied 307 U. S. 636.

Argument

It is an established principle that where a witness called

by a party testifies adversely, he may be impeached by con-

tradictory statements to overcome the effect of his adverse

testimony, and if he does not admit the truth of the contra-

dictory statements, the party has the right to introduce other

evidence to show that the facts are otherwise than as testi-

fied to by the witness: (Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S.

303, 309.) It is submitted that, by the same principle, there

can be no evidence of greater weight than the prior signed

statement of the witness himself, when he admits truth of

the contradictory statements, that the facts are otherwise

than as he has testified.

It is an elementary rule of evidence that where a witness

gives self-contradictory testimony, the trier of the facts may

accept whichever of the contradictory versions he believes

to be true.

Craig v. United States, 81 F. 2d 816 (CCA-9),

certiorari denied 298 U. S. 690;

Ryan v. United States, 99 F. 2d 864 (CCA-8),

certiorari denied 306 U.S. 635.

In Craig v. United States, 81 F. 2d 816, the court said (p.

828) :

‘*The mere fact, however, that a witness’ testimony

is self-contradictory does not prevent its constituting

substantial evidence.’’

There is no difference in principle between the situation

where the witness gives contradictory testimony while testi-

fying, either on direct examination or on cross-examination,

and the situation here presented where the witness being

examined under oath as to the truth of the prior state-

ments, in effect, gives self-contradictory testimony by affirm-

ing the truth of the prior statements. In both situations the

contradictory statements constitute affirmative, substantive

and substantial evidence.

on ee

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

BUREAU OF SAFETY

CLASSIFICATION OF

SAFETY APPLIANCE DEFECTS

a

July 1, 1935

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1935

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D, C,

Price 5 cents

ge

REFERENCE LETTERS

(A) Considered as defeets only when contour lines

allow lost motion sufficient to approach the danger

point as shown by standard worn coupler limit gage.

(B) In determining defects of this class car must be

standing on approximately level track when measure-

ments are taken. State height.

(C) Describe defects.

(D) Considered as defeets only when unsafe or

inoperative.

(2)

CLASSIFICATION OF SAFETY

APPLIANCE DEFECTS

COUPLER

(State name and type of coupler.)

Nao oe WH =

. Knuckle missing.

- Knuckle worn. (A)

. Knuckle wrong. (D)

. Knuckle pin bent.

- Knuckle pin broken.

. Knuekle pin missing.

16.

. Knuckle thrower missing, defective or inoperative.

. Coupler body broken.

. Coupler body missing.

. Coupler out of contour (A)

. Coupler too high. (2)

. Coupler too low. (B)

. Carrier iron defective. (C)

. Draft gear or attachments defective. éC)

. Exeessive free slack in draft gear. (More than 1's e

inches.) (C) t

ENUCKELE

. Knuckle broken. —

bet 2]

Knuckle pin worn. » (A)

(C)

127922235 (3)

see Ee en ee

Peewee,

35.

36.

4

LOCK BLOCE

. Lock block bent.

. Lock block broken.

. Lock block missing.

. Lock bloek worn. (A)

. Lock block diseonnected.

. Lock block wrong. (D)

. Lock block inoperative.

5. Lock block key missing.

5. Lock block trigger missing.

. Lock set missing.

. Lock lift defective or inoperative. (C)

. Lock lift missing.

. Lock lift wrong or incorreetly applied. (C-D.)

UNCOUPLING MECHANISM

(State nance of patented uncoupling mechanism

found defective.)

. Uncoupling lever bent. (D)

. Uncoupling lever broken.

. Uncoupling lever missing.

. Uncoupling lever wrong or incorrectly applied.

(C)

(Includes uncoupling levers too long, too short,

or otherwise of wrong dimensions, or not hav-

ing the required elearance around handle.)

Uncoupling Jever disconnected.

' (This refers to uncoupling levers consisting of

two or more sections.)

Uncoupling lever inoperative.

|

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

hf

*Uncoupling lever handle too low.

*Uncoupling lever stop broken, loose or incorrectly

applied. (C)

. *Uncoupling lever stop missing.

. Uncoupling chain or other connecting device broken

or disconnected. (C)

. Uncoupling chain or other connecting device miss-

ing.

» Uncoupling chain or other connecting device

kinked.

. Uneoupling chain or other connecting device too

long.

- Uncoupling chain or other connecting device too

short.

END LOCK

(Refers to bracket or casting supporting outer

end of uncoupling lever.)

End lock or casting bent.

kend lock or casting broken.

end lock or casting loose. (D)

End lock or casting missing.

End lock or casting wrong. (D)

(Refers to bracket or casting supporting inner

end of uncoupling lever.)

Keeper bent.

* Defects 37, 38, and 39 apply only to levers of the rocking or push

down type.

: ug

:

d

| Seeman aan eae ee ee

. Keeper broken.

. Keeper loose. (D)

. Keeper missing.

. Keeper wrong. (D)

VISIBLE PARTS OF AIR BRAKE

. Air brake cut out.

. Cylinder and triple valve not cleaned within re-

quired period. State type of equipment and

date of last cleaning.

. Cylinder and triple cleaned; no date.

. Air hose missing.

. Air hose defective. (C)

. Angle cock missing.

. Angle cock defective. (C)

. Angle cock handle broken.

. Angle cock handle missing.

. Brake pipe broken.

. Brake pipe loose.

. Angle cock bracket defective.

. Conducting pipe defective.

(Refers to connection between brake cylinder

and reservoir.)

. Branch pipe defective.

(Refers to the connection between brake pipe

and triple valve.)

. Cut-out cock defective. (C)

. Cut-out cock missing.

. Cylinder casting defective.

. Cylinder loose or missing. (C)

baat tS ee

—

bMS

ea eh oh off oth of)

lat

PPB Aide

7

. Reservoir casting defective.

- Reservoir loose or missing. (C)

. Triple valve defective. (C)

. Triple valve missing.

- Release valve defective. (C)

. Release valve missing.

. Release rod defective. (C)

. Release rod missing.

. Release rod disconnected.

- Retaining valve defective or insecurely fastened.

(C)

- Retaining valve missing or incor rectly applied. (C.)

. Retaining pipe defective.

5. Retaining pipe missing.

}. Piston travel excessive.

(Considered as defect when travel exceeds 10

inches.)

. Push rod defective. (C)

. Push rod missing.

. Air brake inoperative.

HANDHOLD

(State location.)

. Handhold bent.

. Handhold broken.

- Handhold loose.

. Handhold missing.

- Handhold wrong dimensions. (©

5. Handhold net having proper clear length or

clearance. (C)

- Handhold incorrectly located or applied. (C)

8

HANDRAIL

(State location.)

Handrail bent or not having proper clearance.

(C-D)

. Handrail broken.

. Handrail loose.

. Handrail missing.

. Handrail wrong dimensions. (C)

. Handrail incorrectly located or applied. (C)

LADDER

(State location.)

. Ladder tread bent.

. Ladder tread broken.

5. Ladder tread loose.

. Ladder tread missing.

. Ladder tread without foot-guard.

. Ladder tread not having proper clear length or

clearance. (C)

. Ladder treads incorrectly spaced.

. Ladder stile bent.

. Ladder stile broken.

. Ladder stile loose.

. Ladder missing or loose. (C)

. Ladder incorrectly applied. (C)

. Ladder incorrectly located. (C)

. End ladder clearance inadequate. (C)

|

117.

118.

119.

. Running board wrong dimensions. (C)

. Running board not properly secured to car. (C)

. Running board brace broken.

- Running board brace loose.

. Running board brace missing.

. Running board cleat broken.

. Running board cleat loose.

. Running board cleat missing.

. Running board obstructed. (C)

9

RUNNING BOARD

(Includes both longitudinal and latitudinal

running boards. State location of defect.)

Running board broken, or decayed. (C) (D)

Running board loose.

Running board missing.

Running board saddle block missing or defective

BRAKE SHAFT

. Brake shaft bent. (D)

. brake shaft broken. —

. Brake shaft loose. om

. Brake shaft missing.

. Brake shaft wrong dimensions. (C)

. Brake shaft welded.

. Brake shaft incorrectly applied. (C)

. Brake shaft top nut missing or insecure. (C)

. Brake shaft not properly secured to prevent being

raised out of operating position. (C)

127932— 35——2

(Rebs NRE AES

:

a

ais AE SiS

sgh du ta

10

BRAKE WHEEL

139. Brake wheel with insufficient clearance. (C

Note.—This applies both to (a) clearance around

rim of brake wheel, and to (b) the distance from out-

side edge of brake wheel to a vertical plane parallel

with end of car passing through inside face of knuckle

when closed with coupler horn against buffer block or

endsill.

140. Brake wheel bent. (D)

141. Brake wheel broken.

142. Brake whee! loose.

143. Brake wheel missing.

144. Brake wheel incorrectly applied.

145. Brake wheel wrong dimensions.

RATCHET WHEEL

146. Ratchet wheel broken.

147. Ratchet wheel loose.

148. Ratchet wheel missing.

149. Ratchet wheel incorreetiy applied.

150. Ratchet wheel wrong dimensions or insufficient

number of teeth. (C)

BRAKE PAWL

151. Brake pawl broken.

152. Brake pawl loose.

153. Brake pawl missing.

154. Brake pawl inoperative. (C)

155. Brake pawl ineorreetly applied. (C)

BRAKE STEP

155. Brake step bent or broken. (C-D;

to eh diem

178.

11

. Brake step loose.

. Brake step missing.

. Brake step incorrectly applied. (C)

. Brake step wrong dimensions. (C)

. Brake step brace bent. (D)

. Brake step brace broken. p

. Brake step brace loose.

. Brake step brace missing.

. Brake step brace incorrectly applied or wrong

dimensions. (C)

BRAKE SHAFT STIRRUP

. Brake shaft stirrup bent.

. Brake shaft stirrup broken.

. Brake shaft stirrup loose.

. Brake shaft stirrup missing.

. Brake shaft stirrup wrong. (D) ‘

BRAKE SHAFT SUPPORT

. Top brake shaft support broken.

. Top brake shaft support loose.

. Top brake shaft support missing.

. Top brake shaft support incorrectly applied.

. Brake shaft bracket loose.

. Brake shaft bracket missing.

. Brake shaft bracket ineorreetly applied.

RATCHET BRAKE

(State name of ratchet brake found defective)

Ratchet lever bent, broken or with improper

clearance. (C)

Se eae ae

et

a

best

179.

180.

181.

182.

183.

184.

185.

186.

187.

188.

189.

190.

191.

192.

193.

194.

195.

196.

197.

198.

12

Ratchet lever missing.

Ratchet pawl broken or missing. (C)

Ratchet pin or key missing.

Ratchet cap missing.

Ratchet gear broken.

GEAR BRAKE

(State name of gear brake found defective.)

Gear brake defective. (C)

BRAKE CHAIN

Brake chain disconnected.

Brake chain broken.

Brake chain missing.

Brake chain worn or wrong dimensions. (C-D)

Brake chain ineorreetly sceured to shaft.

Brake chain incorrectly applied or too long. (C)

HAND BRAKE ROD

Hand brake rod disconnected, broken or missing.

(C)

Hand brake rod worn or defective. (C-D)

Hand brake rod too long.

Hand brake sheave wheel defective or missing. (C)

TOP TRUCK ROD

Top truck rod disconnected, broken, or missing.

(C)

Top truck rod worn or defective. (C-D)

Top truck rod improper length. (D)

as-is sas to ai

199.

200.

201.

202.

203.

204.

205.

206.

207.

208.

209.

210.

211.

212.

213.

214.

215.

216.

217.

13

BOTTOM TRUCK ROD

Bottom truck rod disconnected, broken, or miss-

ing. (C)

Bottom truck rod defective. (C)

Bottom truck rod improper length. (D)

CYLINDER ROD

Cylinder rod disconnected, broken or missing. (C)

Cylinder rod defective. (C)

Cylinder rod improper length. (D)

FLOATING LEVER FULCRUM

Floating lever fulcrum broken, loose, missing or

defective. (C)

CYLINDER LEVER

Cylinder lever disconnected, broken, bent, or

missing. (C)

Cylinder lever guide defective. (C)

rae

BSE RR PARR, Sa a

14

FLOATING LEVER

218. Floating lever disconnected, broken, bent, or

missing. (C)

219. Floating lever guide defective. (C)

220.

221.

TRUCK LEVERS

222. Truck live lever disconnected, broken, bent, or

missing. (C)

223.

224.

225. Truck dead lever disconnected, broken, bent, or

missing. (C)

226. Truck dead lever defective. (C)

227. Truck dead lever fulerum disconnected, broken,

missing, or defective. (C)

228

229.

BRAKE BEAM

230. Brake beam safety support defective. (C)

231. Brake beam or attachments defective. (C)

(Report guide pins missing on outside hung

brake beams only.)

232. Brake beam fulcrum defective. (C)

BRAKE SHOE

233. Brake shoe missing.

234. Brake shoe broken. (D)

235. Brake shoe key missing.

15

BRAKE HANGER

236. Brake hanger bent. (D)

237. Brake hanger broken.

238. Brake hanger missing.

239. Brake hanger wrong. (C-D)

240. Brake hanger support defective. (C—D)

241. Brake hanger connecting pin missing. (State

location.)

242. Brake hanger connecting pin wrong. (State

location.)

COTTER KEYS FOR FOUNDATION BRAKE

RIGGING :

243. Brake hanger pin cotter key missing. (State

location.)

244. Floating lever connecting pin cotter key missing.

245. Cylinder lever connecting pin cotter key missing.

246. Dead lever connecting pin cotter key missing.

247. Live lever connecting pin cotter key missing.

HAND BRAKE

249. Hand brake missing.

250. Hand brake inoperative. (C)

251. Hand brake inefficient. (C)

SILL STEP

252. Sill step bent.

253. Sill step broken.

254. Sill step loose.

255. Sill step missing.

256. Sill step wrong dimensions. (C)

257. Sill step incorrectly located or applied. (C)

leru

RSE RAS > D

«

CDCR ORR Cate OES

et RS

25s.

259.

260.

261.

262.

263.

264.

265.

266.

267.

268.

269.

mS bo

Ns

Ve AON — Ss

WM ht et

“Isisi sg

16

PLATFORM SILL STEP

(Hangers and back stops to be included under

following numbers and described in cone

covering remarks.)

Platform sill step bent.

Platform sill step broken.

Platform sill step loose.

Platform sill step missing.

Platform sill step wrong dimensions. (C)

Platform sill step incorrectly applied. (C)

SIDE DOOR SILL STEP

Side door sill step bent.

Side door sill step broken.

Side door sill step loose.

Side door sill step missing.

Side door sill step wrong dimensions. (C)

Side door sill step incorrectly located or applied.

(C)

FOOT-BOARD SILL STEP

. Foot-board sill step bent.

. Foot-board sill step broken.

2. Foot-board sill step loose.

. Poot-board sill step missing.

. Foot-board sill step wrong dimensions. (C)

Foot-board sill step incorrectly located or applied.

(C)

PILOT SILL STEP

. Pilot sill step bent.

- Pilot sill step broken.

278.

279.

280.

281.

282.

283.

284.

285.

286.

287.

288.

289.

290.

291.

292.

293.

294.

295.

296.

297.

298.

299.

300.

17

Pilot sill step loose.

Pilot sill step missing.

Pilot sill step wrong dimensions. (C)

Pilot sill step incorrectly located or-applied. (C)

STEP FOR HEADLIGHT

Step for headlight bent, broken, loose or missing.

(C)

Step for headlight not suitable for use. (C)

POWER BRAKE

Power driving-wheel brake missing.

Power driving-wheel brake defective. (C)

Locomotive not equipped withzappliances for

operating train brake systems.

ASH PANS

Ash pan defective. (C)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935

Argument

The Federal decisional law governs each and every one of

the issues arising in a suit under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act and the Safety Appliance Acts:

Jacobs v. Reading Co., 130 F. 2d 612.

This must necessarily include uniformity in the rules

governing the admissibility and effect of the evidence in

causes that are governed and controlled by Federal Acts.

(4)

It is difficult to conceive that respondent seriously urges

that it was misled by the brevity of the averment of general

negligence. That it fully comprehended its purpose and

meaning is apparent from the nature of defendant’s Answer.

The defense of contributory negligence there specifically

raised (6a) had no possible reference to any other part of

the Complaint. This defense was never withdrawn or

stricken. In addition the defendant was fully aware of its

rights under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules. Under it

defendant could have moved ‘‘for a more definite statement

or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred

with sufficient definiteness or particularity. . . .’”’ That the

averinents were sufficiently definite and particular is evi-

denced by defendant’s failure to so move, and that they were

understood precisely in the light that they were pleaded is

unquestionably demonstrated by the defense offered. It

must further be stated that full and complete depositions

were taken prior to trial so that the evidence upon which

was based the claim of liability under the Federal Employ-

ers’ Liability Act was entirely familiar to it.

In our original Brief we have pointed out that there is no

pre-trial order limiting the issues at the trial. Certainly

the loose language of counsel in discussion cannot now be

Argument

construed as a waiver of petitioner’s substantive and con-

stitutional rights:

Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 489;

63 S. Ct. 347.

Respondent’s reliance upon the case of Louisville € N. R.

Co. v. Stewart, 283 Ky. 585, 142 S. W. 2d 119, is indicative

of the weakness of its position. That decision recognizes

that the duty to provide a safe place to work is not limited

to defects in defendant’s realty. This duty of the emplover

extends to the operations of its employees and of its equip-

ment. Had the Stewart case been tried under the Federal

Rules instead of the hide-hound Kentucky practice, we have

no doubt that the conclusion reached must also have been

different.

An argument is made that plaintiff’s submission of 18

other requests indicated an abandonment of her Request #2.

This hardly merits discussion. The Request +2 (345a) com-

pletely covered the question involved and the existence of

many other requests could not limit or affect the error in

refusing te give it.

Respondent’s justification of the Court’s refusal to charge

in accordance with plaintiff’s second oral request (341a) is

purely captious. The request was not refused by the Trial

Judge because of any nice distinctions in the language used.

The Court refused to accept the language and the theory

forming the basis of the request precisely as he had elimi-

nated this theory from the entire charge.

The basic fallacy of respondent’s position is clearly dem-

onstrated in its next argument. It analyzes the testimony in

the light most favorable to it, assuming the truth of patently

unbelievable evidence given by its own witness. Petition-

er’s position here is not that the jury must have disbelieved

this testimony but that she had a constitutional right to have

it submitted to the jury ina proper charge. We do conceive

that the testimony of the witness, Rihm, was entirely un-

believable in the face of the physical facts and the patent

Argument

conclusion that no one else but Barry could have set the }

brakes on his car. The proximity of the two drafts as they

proceeded down the hump (21a, 22a) was sufficient for the

jury to find that they had been crowded; Rihm’s admission

that he violated the rule, custom and practice in not keeping

a lookout to the rear (25a, 309a, 312a) was a clear act of

negligence. Rihm was an inexperienced or green brakeman

(308a). The relative speeds of the cars appears at 31la;

the purpose of Rihm’s stopping at 315a; the collision at 315a;

that Barry’s car immediately stopped at 310a; that the car

could not physically have gone 8 or even 3 or 4 car lengths

is fixed by the position of Barry’s body (30a, 51a).

Respondent’s discussion of the Coupler Act violation is

entirely misleading. The evidence of the violation never

appeared in the case until defendant called its last witness

(308a). No amendment was necessary in order to submit

the issue to the jury: Rule 15(b). And it was for the jury

to decide whether the failure to stop the car at once by

coupling did or did not proximately contribute to Barry’s

death: Union Pacific R. Co. v. Huvoll, 245 U. 8. 535, 38

8S. Ct. 187.

At page 23 of its brie*, respondent contends that the

coupler act applies only to those actually engaged in

coupling. The law is to the contrary both before and after

the Lang case which it cites:

Phila. etc. R. Co. v. Fessler, 295 F. 650 (CCA 3),

cert. den. 264 U.S. 585; 44S. Ct. 334;

Keenan v. Director Gen., 285 F. 286 (CCA 2), cert.

den. 261 U. S. 616, 43 8S. Ct. 361.

Respondent’s argument that the cause was in fact sub-

mitted to the jury under the Federal Employers’ Liability

Act is pure ‘‘shadow-boxing.’’ Any fair reading of the

charge will indicate that the Act was cited by the Trial

Judge for jurisdictional purposes only and that nowhere

did he indicate that plaintiff was entitled to relief there-

under independent of her rights under the Safety Appliance

10

Argument

Acts. Every direction in the charge was centered upon the

alleged violations of the brake Act and even the right of

recovery on this issue was effectually eliminated by the

Court’s erroneous construction of the Act and its erroneous

charge as hereinbefore indicated. To quote the Act but fail

to charge that recovery may be based upon it in whole or in

part can hardly be construed to be a submission to the jury

of ‘‘the right of the plaintiff to recover under the Federa}

Kmployers’ Liability Act.’? Your Honorable Court very

recently declared in

Blair v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 65 8. Ct. 545, 546:

‘*To deprive railroad workers of the benefit of a jury

trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away a goodly

portion of the relief which Congress has afforded

them.’’

And again at page 547:

“The nevligence of the employer may be determined

by viewing its conduct as a whole. ... And especially

is this true in a case such as this, where the several

elements from which negligence might be inferred are

so closely interwoven as to form a single pattern, and

when each imparts character to the others.’’

(5)

Respondent’s argument o» this point entirely ignores the

language of the charge. Ai no time during the charge was

the jury told that they were permitted to draw reasonable

and justifiable inferences from the evidence in order to

determine whether or not the accident occurred by reason of

the defendant’s negligence. The jury’s right to consider

even the circumstances was limited by the charge to a prior

finding of a defect or inefficiency in the brake (339a) :

\W

Argument

‘Now, if you find that there was a defect in this

brake, or it was an inefficient brake, you may take all

of the cireumstances. . . .”’

The jurors were thus told by the Court that they could not

consider the circumstances unless they found a defect, lan-

guage which effectually prevented them from finding from

the circumstances that the brake was inefficient, despite the

plaintiff’s specific request, at the conclusion of the Court’s

charge, that the jury be told that if they found any part of

the brake or its appurtenances inefficient, or if the brake as

a whole, in its entirety, failed to function when called upon

to so function in the ordinary and usual manner, that under

those circumstances it would be sufficient to afford the

plaintiff the right of recovery in this case. This request was

denied and exception granted.

In addition to this glaring error, the trial judge specifie-

ally refused to charge the jury as to the inferences that

might be drawn in favor of the plaintiff by reason of the

death of the decedent (340a, 341la). He conceived the rule

to be that the inference (or presumption as it is frequently

called) is of moment only in considering the question of the

contributory negligence of a decedent.

In the leading case of Worthington v. Elmer, 207 Fed.

306, a brakeman was last seen on a car upon which it was

his duty to set the brakes. His car collided with another

car and he was killed. The nearest brake on the next car

was found to be defective. The court there said (308, 309) :

‘‘From the facts just pointed out and the most natural

and reasonable inference deducible therefrom, it was

entirely justifiable to conclude that Rice continued in

the performance of his duty respecting the brake on the

box car between the time he was seen setting the oppo-

site brake and the collision. As was said in Maguire v.

Fitchburg Railroad, 146 Mass. 379, 15 N. E. 904,

respecting the evidential effect of finding a deceased

12

Argument

employee’s body at a place where his duty had called

him:

‘©éThe jury might well have believed that he was

on the track in the performance of his duty and in

the exercise of all the eare to be expected of a prudent

Snel ns Oe:

‘“‘This is in principle like the presttmption of per-

formance of duty, which, in the absence of evidence to

the contrary, is indulged in favor of one who is injured

at a railroad crossing: that is, that he stopped, looked

and listened before attempting to cross. Baltimore &

Potomae R. R. v. Landrigan, 191 U. 8. 461, 472, 474,

94 Sup. Ct. 137, 38 L. Ed. 262; P., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.

y. Scherer, 205 Fed. 356, decided by this court May 6,

1913: Gates v. Beebe, 170 Mich. 107, 112, 185 N. W. 934.

The principle so alluded to is applicable under other

and varying cireumstances, where there is an absence,

as here, of direct testimony on the subject in dispute.”

In the case of Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S.

29, 64S. Ct. 409, Mr. Justice Murphy said:

‘The absence of eye witnesses was not decisive.

There was testimony that his duties included staying

near the north or rear end of the engine as it made its

backward movement out of track B-28. The location

of his severed hand, cap, lantern and the pool of blood

was strong evidence that he was killed approximately

at the point where the engine began this backward

movement and where he might have been located in the

performance of his duties. To this evidence must be

added the presumption that the deceased was actually

engaged in the performance of those duties and exer-

cised due care for his own safety at the time of his death.

Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 200 U. S. 480, 488, 26

S. Ct. 303, 306, 50 L.. Kd. 564; Atchinson, Topeka &

Santa Fe R. Co. v. Toops, supra, 281 U. §. 356, 50S. Ct.

13

Argument

283, 74 L. Ed. 896; New Aetna Portland Cement Co. v.

Hatt, 6 Cir., 231 F. 611, 617.”’

‘*His activities, we have a right to assume, centered

around the successful completion of his undertaking:”’

Chicago, St. P. M. € O. Ry. Co. v. Muldowney, 130

F, 2d 971, 975 (cert. den. 317 U. S. 700, 63S. Ct.

526).

In a case such as this, depending as it must entirely upon

circumstantial evidence, the completely erroneous impres-

sion left upon the minds of the jury by such instructions

without qualification must be apparent. Taking the lan-

guage of the Court and applying it to this record, it consti-

tuted a direction to the jury to find for the defendant. As

the Judge stated, no one saw Barry leave the brake step.

There was direct evidence that the brake and the step were

defective, but there were also circumstances from which the

jury may have concluded that whether defective or not, it

failed to operate efficiently and stop the ear. What caused

Barry to fall was a matter solely for inference. As in all

circumstantial evidence cases, the inferences reasonably to

he drawn from all the evidence could have proved the

plaintiff’s case. To eliminate and exclude the right of the

jury to draw such inferences would be to say that no reeov-

ery could be had in any ease in which an eye-witness could

not be produced to describe all of the operative facts.

Cases resting on circumstantial evidence much less per-

suasive than the case at bar, have been held to be for the

jury under proper instructions:

Baily v. Central Vt. Ry., Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct.

1062;

Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29:

64S. Ct. Rep. 409;

Louisville € N. Ry. Co. v. Summerlin, 18 F. 2d. 950;

St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Bishop, 33 S. W. 2d. 383,

182 Ark. 763 (cert. den. 283 U. S. 854, 51 S. Ct.

647) ;

Nteee

“Be

Be as TO nn ase a

a

Spars

14

Argument

Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Knott, 159 P. 847, 60 Ok.

175;

Kelly v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 1258. W. 818, 141 Mo.

Respectfully submitted,

MILFORD J. MEYER,

Counsel for Petitioner.

SAMUEL SHAPIRO,

HARRY G. FUERST,

Of Counsel.

aE EA a Oe

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.