Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner

Supreme Court brief1944

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Opinions. below. - - . . --...--------------------------------

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Question presented. ----....-...--------------------------- 2

Statute and regulations involved. -...........--.--------.--- 2

Statement ____ _- — -- ac cts sa hn aes on etal aad eo 2

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Conclusion - - - - - - - - Ceeblb was kdnncéssnnthevnns Rees 10

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CITATIONS

Cases:

Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Guitteau, 123 F, 2d 20- 9

Amalgamated Housing Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A.

OFT, amis. 306 FB WO si win no ct ace ve ncshetenses Ss

American National Co. v. United States, 274 U. 3 ee 7

Bonded Mortgage Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F. 2d 341___-_-- 9

smh ©; TROVE, De Uy Bi Bk nied pe enncwcnsee neces 6,8

Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., , 2s ye ee 8

Clay Sewer Pipe Ass’n v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 130- - _- 8

Dixie Pine Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U. 8. 516___-_-_---- 6,7

Retna ¥. BMeion, BOG UT. BUG soc nncsdcwciadenss aeons 8

Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. 8. 445_-.-.--------- 6,7

Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U. S. 115_..----------- 6, 7

North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417_.-----.----- 8

Ohmer Register Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F. My eee 9

Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. 8. 281- . 6,8, 10

United States v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 72 F. 2d 755.. eres 9

United States v. Anderson, 269 U. 8. 422__._.-.------- 3 6

Statute:

Revenue Act of 1936, c. 690, 49 Stat. 1648:

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PE SR an dccnsivatukras ddataleent eaten Seen aueen 12

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Miscellaneous:

Treasury Regulations 77, Art. 933 ...................< 8

Treasury Regulations 94:

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616675441

Ynthe Supreme Gourt of the Waited States

OcToBEeR TERM, 1944

No. 612

SPENCER, WHITE & PRENTIS, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The memorandum opinion of the Tax Court (R.

78-91) is not reported. The opinion of the Cir-

euit Court of Appeals (R. 265-269) is reported

in 144 F. 2d 45.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Cireuit Court of Appeals

was entered on July 27, 1944 (R. 271). The pe-

tition for a writ of certiorari was filed on October

19, 1944. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked under Section “0 (a) of the Judicial Code,

as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.

(1)

Pe ER EER OS PPS IG PPM LO ETS | EN

2

QUESTION PRESENTED

Taxpayer, keeping its books and filing its re.

turns on the accrual basis, was obligated to per.

form certain additional work in completing a con.

tract, for which it would not be further reim.

bursed. However, no liability for the necessary

labor and materials had been incurred. The ques.

tion is whether taxpayer is entitled under See-

tions 23 (a) and 43 of the Revenue Act of 1936

to deduct the estimated cost of future performance

as an expense incurred during the taxable year.

STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent statute and regulations appear in

the Appendix, infra, pp. 11-15.

STATEMENT

Taxpayer is a New York corporation organized

in 1919 and engaged in the general construction

and engineering business. Its books have always

been kept and its returns made on the accrual

basis, and for fiscal years beginning July 1 and

ending June 30. (R. 78, 79.)

The majority of the contracts received by tax-

payer were short-term contracts completed within

one year, but it was also interested in various

long-term contracts. On December 11, 1933, it

applied to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

for consent to change its method of accounting

and reporting in connection with long-term con-

3

tracts to the completed contract basis. The appli-

eation was disapproved because it was not sub-

mitted within the requisite 90-day period after the

beginning of the taxable year. (R. 79.)

On June 29, 1937, taxpayer entered into a ‘‘unit

price’ contract with the City of New York for

subway construction, and commenced performance

in July of that year. Taxpayer was engaged in

work on this contract (designated as No. 761

on its books) and on other contracts during the

fiscal year ending June 30, 1938. The contract

required the performance of thousands of types

of operations, only some of which, known as ‘‘pay

items,’’ had specified prices. Taxpayer included

in its bid price for the so-called pay items the

cost of performing operations not specified as pay

items, thereby distributing the cost of performing

non-pay items over the pay items. The non-pay

items included such things as the taking up and

relaying of sidewalks, water mains and gas pipes,

and general administration and engineering ex-

penses. (R. 79-80.)

The contract provided for progress payments

to taxpayer based upon certified partial estimates,

to be made from time to time by the city engineer,

of the value of the work done and materials in-

corporated in the work. ‘The first certification of

work completed was made approximately three

months after work was started and certifications

were generally made each month thereafter. The

RUNES E 7 ERR O RL SERIES RE PE ee See

ot ERP

contract was subject to a performance bond and

as further security provided for retention by the

city of 15% of the amounts certified. (R. 80-81.)

There was no separate certification by the city

of work completed as of June 30, 1938, but there

were certified estimates as of June 11, 1938, and

July 11, 1938. Taxpayer included in its gross

income returned for the fiscal year ending June

30, 1938, the sum of $3,853,641.43, made up as

follows: (1) $3,002,303.34, representing the

amounts certified and paid to June 11, 1938; (2)

$529,818.24 representing the percentage retained

by the city out of the amounts certified to that

date; and (3) $321,519.85, representing the amount

earned from June 11, 1938, to June 30, 1938,

The last figure was reached on the basis of the

certifications of work completed as of June Ul,

1938, and July 11, 1938, respectively, and on the

basis of the number of working days between

June 11 and June 30. (R. 81-82.)

The total of $3,853,641.43 certified for the fiscal

year ending June 30, 1938, and included by tax-

payer as gross income in its return for that year

covered not only the contract price of ‘‘pay items”

completed, but some non-pay items yet to be per-

formed. This resulted from the fact that the cost

of non-pay items was included in the contract

price of the pay items. Taxpayer estimated that

the future cost of performing these uncompleted

operations would total $327,500. (R. 82-83.) As

5

of June 30, 1938, under the caption ‘‘Contract 761

Deferred,”? taxpayer entered on its journal the

following as ‘‘for incurred expense’’ (R. 83):

1. Moving off job, clean up, etc., 60% of $100,000__---- $60, 000. 00

2. Repairs to buildings damaged by subway construction

and legal expenses, ete 50, 000. 00

3, Completion of excavation by removing braces, timber-

ing, sheeting, installing backfill, 91,500 yards

OD Fa a 114, 500. 00

4, Restoration of subsurface structures, damages vault

construction 40, 000. 00

5. Clean up of East Tunnel Caulking_------------------ 15, 000. 00

6. Supervision, office expenses for 3 mos.

Electricians, mechanics__--------- $5, 000 per mo.

| a A

Office expense. --- 1,000 per mo.

$16, 000X3 48, 000. 00

ji | _.-. $327, 500. 00

The above total of $327,500 was reported on

Schedule N (Balance Sheet) of taxpayer’s return

as “Liability to restore property under contracts.”

It was also included in the cost of operations in

- Schedule A (Net Income Computation), with a

resulting diminution in net income for excess

profits tax computation. (R. 83.)

The sum of $327,500 deducted for ‘‘incurred

expense’ did not represent obligations to sub-

contractors, materialmen, laborers, or any other

creditor. The work was actually performed after

June 30, 1938, at a cost of $339,090.40. Taxpayer

had estimated that as of June 30, 1938, the con-

tract was 60% completed; after actual comple-

tion it was found that it was then 53.9% com-

pleted. (R. 83.)

°

ae PRAEIAL IL EMIS NS LIE PUTO EME RIT POLI BE RY IOINE EN IONE LEE SS REE MRT BS

6

Taxpayer’s costs under the construction contract

paid and accrued to June 30, 1938, apart from

the $327,500 entered on its journal as above,

amounted to $2,860,110.76. In its return for the

fiscal year ended June 30, 1938, taxpayer, in addi-

tion to deducting that amount, treated the $327,

500 estimated cost of future work as an accrued

expense and also deducted that sum from its gross

income for that year. The Commissioner disal-

lowed the $327,500 deduction for future expenses

and computed a deficiency in taxpayer’s income

and excess profits tax in the amounts of $71,

828.41 and $34,049.38, respectively. (R. 39-43,

83-84.) The Tax Court sustained the Commis-

sioner’s determination (R. 92), and the Circuit

Court of Appeals affirmed (R. 270-271).

ARGUMENT

1. Taxpayer’s assertion (Pet. 6) that the de-

cision below is “probably in conflict’? with de-

cisions of this Court is without substance. To

reflect taxable income on the accrual basis for a

given year “all the events must occur in that

year which fix the amount and the fact of the

taxpayer’s liability for items of indebtedness de-

ducted though not paid.’? Dizie Pine Co. v. Com-

missioner, 320 U. S. 516, 519; see also Security

Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281; Brown

v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193; Lucas v. Ox Fibre

Brush Co., 281 U. 8. 115; Lucas v. American Code

Co., 280 U. S. 445. Neither United States v. An

OTE EAS SILI ET I LE TEL EE LOE LITLE LNT EIS TF CERI ee on Or aE a Se ae

‘

derson, 269 U.S. 422, nor American National Co.

v. United States, 274 U. S. 99, upon which tax-

payer relies (Pet. 7-8), holds otherwise. In the

Anderson case it was held that a liability for a

munitions tax had been ineurred in the year prior

to assessment because (269 U. S. at p. 441) all

the events had occurred in that year which fixed

the taxpayer’s liability to pay the tax and its

amount. Similarly, in the American National

Company case a bonus expense was held deducti-

ble because the taxpayer’s obligation to pay and

the amount payable became definite in the year

of deduction. Both of these cases were distin-

guished by this Court in Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush

Co., 281 U. S. 115, and Lucas v. American Code

Co., 280 U. 8. 445; they were cited in Dizie Pine

Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 516, 519, note 6,

as illustrative of the long settled principle there

reaffirmed. Where, as in the instant case, the

items deducted represented an estimated amount

of anticipated expenses to be incurred in furnish-

ing work and materials in a later year (R. 82-83),

not even the fact of liability is established and

the deduction is clearly premature. There was

no existing debt to accrue.

That taxpayer was obligated to furnish the work

and materials to the City of New York without

further compensation does not, as it urges (Pet.

8, 10-11), warrant an offsetting deduction in the

taxable year of the estimated future expense of

performance, for it is fundamental that income

616675—44——_2

MRPs esse Ts RL eee dt

8

is to be determined and taxed on an annual, not

a transactional, basis. Security Mills Co. v. Com-

missioner, 321 U. 8. 281; Heiner v. Mellon, 304

U.S. 271; Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282

U.S. 359. This principle requires that payments

received under a claim of right and without re-

striction as to their use be reported by a taxpayer

on the accrual basis in the year received, notwith-

standing that he may later be required to restore

the payments or their equivalent. North Ameri-

can Ou v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417; Brown v. Hel-

vering, 291 U. 8. 193. By the same token, the

taxability of a payment for services may not be

defeated by cutting across annual accounting pe-

viods and relating back expenses incurred in a

later year in performing the services. Clay

Sewer Pipe Ass’n v. Commisioner, 139 F. 2d 130

(C. C. A. 3d); Amalgamated Boniins Corp. \

Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 817, affirmed, 108 F.

2d 1010 (C. C. A. 2d). Neither items of income

nor outgo may be accelerated or postponed

order to reflect the net result of a given transac-

tion. Security Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321

U.S. 281."

* Permission to change from the accrual to the “long-term

contract” method of accounting may, under certain condi-

tions, be granted by the Commissioner. See Article 41-2 of

Treasury Regulations 94 under the 1936 Act (Appendix,

infra, pp. 138-14). Taxpayer in 1933 applied for such per-

mission under the corresponding Article 322 of Treasury

Regulations 77 under the 1932 Act, but the application was

denied because not timely filed (R. 79, 214-217, 252-258).

SO MD PN t

SNEED EAL TR EOE ei aE: OE SOIT REPRINTS Sts ag EN RO I —

9

2. The decision below does not conflict, as tax-

payer alleges (Pet. 9-10), with Bonded Mortgage

Co. Vv. Commissioner, T0 F. 2d 341 (C. C. A. 4th),

Ohmer Register Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F. 2d

682 (C. C. A. 6th), Air-Way Electric Appliance

Corp. V. Guitteau, 123 F. 2d 20 (C. C. A. 6th), or

United States v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 72 F. 2d

755 (C. C. A. 10th.) The extracts cited from

those decisions merely express the general prin-

ciples of accrual which were followed by the court

below.

3. Taxpayer attempts (Pet. 12-13) to inject

a question concerning the amount of gross income

to be reported. The only issue raised by the Com-

missioner’s deficiency notice (R. 39-43) and the

pleadings, and to which the Tax Court addressed

itself (R. 84), was the propriety of the claimed

deduction. The Tax Court did volunteer the sug-

gestion that taxpayer might have overstated gross

income by including in payments received from

the city amounts certified but withheld as security

(R. 84), but taxpayer insisted that it correctly

reported gross income (R. 84-85). The Tax

Court held that the deduction was not allowable

in any event (R. 87). The Circuit Court of Ap-

peals likewise addressed itself (R. 267) to the

single issue raised by the Commissioner's disal-

lowance of the deduction.

4. There is no merit in taxpayer’s contention

(Pet. 13-15) that the Tax Court’s findings of faet

an

10

are unsupported by substantial evidence. The

material facts are not in dispute. As the court

below pointed out (R. 269), ‘‘The contention seems

to rest on a confusion of facts with conclusions

of law.”’

5. Taxpayer’s assertion (Pet. 15-17) that this

case presents an important question is predicated

upon nothing more than the suggestion that the

decision below is not in accord with the comment

by an author of a text on taxation, whose cited

views concerning Section 43 of the Revenue Acts

are inconsistent with Security Mills v. Commis-

stoner, 321 U. S. 281.

CONCLUSION

There is no occasion for further review. The

decision below is controlled by settled principles

of tax accounting. Neither a conflict of decisions

nor a question of general importance is presented.

The petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES Fady,

Solicitor General.

SAMUEL O. CLarK, Jr.,

Assistant Attorney General.

SEWALL Key,

J. Louis Monarcu,

Harry Baum,

Special Assistants to the Attorney General.

NOVEMBER 1944.

EPMA RTM fae ESE a

i ins wala Retr eo ET ee

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner · 323 U.S. 780 | Frix