Appendix — Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner
Supreme Court brief1944
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
18
APPENDIX A
Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion.
THE TAX COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Docket No. 108431.
— — ane a aon
Spencer, Wuite & PRENTIS, LNC.,
Petitioner,
v.
CoMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
enecetenmasens otitis -———----- -—- ---
Epear A. B. Spencer, Esq., and Tuomas P. Morrissey, sq,
for the petitioner.
Tuomas H. Lewis, Jr., Esq., and Parrick J. CAVANAUGH,
Esq., for the respondent.
Oprer, Judge: Petitioner in this proceeding challenges
respondent’s determination of income and excess-profits
tax deficiencies in the amounts of $71,828.41 and $34,049.38.
respectively, for the fiseal year July 1, 1937, to June 30,
1938. The suestion involved is whether petitioner may
deduct as incurred or accrued expenses the sum of $827,-
500.00 for work or services to be performed subsequent
to the tax year in issue.
Finpincs or Fact.
Petitioner is a corporation organized July 16, 1919, and
existing under the laws of the State of New York, having
its principal office at 10 East 40th Street, New York City.
19
Appendix A.
Its tax return for the period in question was filed with
the Collector of Internal Revenue, 3rd New York District.
Petitioner was engaged in the general construction and
engineering business, doing the installation of foundations,
the underpining of buildings, and short-term construction
contracts dealing largely with sub-surface and hydraulic
conditions. Although the majority of the contracts per-
formed were short-term contracts completed within one
year, prior to December 11, 1933, petitioner had been in-
terested in various long-term contracts as consulting en-
gineers, syndicate participants or as contract managers
under service contracts. Its books have been kept and re-
turns made for fiseal years beginning on July 1 and ending
on the next succeeding June 30, and always, on the accrual
basis.
On December 11, 1933, petitioner applied to the Commis-
sioner for consent to change its method of accounting and
reporting in connection with long-term contracts to the
completed contract basis. The application was disap-
proved because it was not submitted within the ninety days
after the beginning of the taxable year.
On June 29, 1937, petitioner entered into and in July,
1937, commenced performance of a unit price contract,
designated as No. 761 on its books, with the Board of
Transportation of the City of New York for subway con-
struction on Route 101, Seetion 6, which was under 6th
Avenue from West 9th Street to West 18th Street in Man-
hattan. Petitioner was engaged in work on this contract
among others during the fiseal year involved.
The contract required performance of thousands of types
of operations, but designated specific prices for only a few
items which were known as pay items. In making bids
under the contract, petitioner included in the bid price
for pay items the cost of performing those operations
for which no price was specified, and in this manner dis-
tributed the cost of operations not specified as pay items
Stee rors
ES EN ENE ETE ALY CIE CRM 2 PNET GOP TBI EDO IE LENE RAI AEE ABRIL NEN EOL SOSAD IE EEL IE ADEE IEE REE RE SR Ra _—_
Appendix A.
over the pay items to which they were related, or ratably
over all the pay items. The non-pay items included such
things as the taking up and relaying of sidewalks and
roadways, support and maintenance of building, water
mains and gas pipes, administration and engineering ex-
penses. The contract was subject to a performance bond
and provided for progress payments under Article XXXV
and XXXVI, which provided in part as follows:
PAYMENTS TO CONTRACTOR
ArticLeE XXXV. Partial Estimates. In order to as-
sist the Contractor to prosecute the work advantage-
ously, the [City] Engineer shall, from time to time as
the work progresses, but not more often than once a
month, make in writing an estimate such as in his
opinion shall be just and fair, of the amount and value
of the work done and materials incorporated in the
work by the Contractor according to the terms of this
contract (but it is understood that in making such
estimates the Engineer shall not necessarily be gov-
erned by the prices contained in the Schedule of
Prices); * * * The first such estimate shall be of the
amount and value of the work done and materials
incorporated in the work since the Contractor com-
menced the performance of this contract on his part.
Kvery subsequent estimate except the final estimate
shall be of the amount and value of the work done
and materials incorporated in the work not ineluded
in the last preceding estimate; * * *
ArticLE XXXVI. Not by Strict Measurement. Such
estimates shall not be required to be made by strict
measurement, but they may be made by measurement
or by estimation or partly by one method and partly
by the other, and it shall be sufficient if they are ap-
proximate only.
ioe prepa ORT Meee . RETR RAEN ORDO OE AN BONAR AM LN LARGE IRAP I RAR OR Rob
21
Appendix A.
The first certification of work completed by the city was
made approximately three months after commencement of
work on the contract and certifications were generally made
each month thereafter during the period here involved.
Article XXXIIL of the contract provided for the reten-
tion by the city of 15 percent of the amounts of work
certified to be complete as follows:
ArticLte XXXIIL. Retained Percentage. (a) In ad-
dition and as further security there shall be deducted
and retained 15 per centum of the amounts certified
from time to time to be due to the Contractor * * *.
Such retained percentages shall be held as further
security for the faithful performance by the Contrac-
tor of all the conditions, covenants, and requirements
specified and provided for in this contract. The Con-
tractor may from time to time withdraw portions of
the amounts so retained upon depositing with the
Comptroller, United States Government securities or
corporate stock or bonds ef the City of a market value
equal to the amount so withdrawn, in which event the
provisions of this Chapter in respect of securities shall
apply to such securities deposited. * * *
The city retained 15 percent of the certified amounts in
accordance with the above provision. The full amount of
retained percentages from the inception of the contract
in July, 1937, to June 30, 1938, in the amount shown
below, was accrued and entered on petitioner’s books as
accrued income, and reported on its return as income for
the period in question.
The certified estimate of work completed to June 11,
1988, was $3,532,121.58, and to July 11, 1938, was $4,013,-
590.61. There was no separate certification by the city
{PTE ARETE ESTP LEE CPEB DOGO E CISD ID Ah ND PP PEDIC AIRE A PITA AL ERE ORL AN OMA a MORI OES
22
Appendix A,
of work completed to June 30, 1938, but by interpolation
on the basis of the working days involved—petitioner esti-
mated that to be $3,853,641.43 and the amount earned from
June 11 through June 30 to be $321,519.85. That amount
was included in petitioner’s return as part of its gross
income, being the gross receipts from contract No. 761.
Part of that amount was considered by petitioner to be
accrued income, and the total was made up as follows:
(a) Moneys earned under contract
certified and paid .......... $3,002,303.34
(b) Amount certified under contract
but retained by the City of
New York pursuant to the
SOE UU sak cakecsueener 529,818.24
(c) Amounts not vet certified under
ING oo ole de eG Se ale aur S2LAOL85S
$3,853,641.43
Because of the inclusion, in the contract price of pay
items, of the contract cost of other operations which were
not completed at the same time as the particular pay
item, the petitioner received certifications for progress
payments for pay items completed, which included certain
amounts which it considered allocable to operations which
would be performed subsequent to the pay items for which
progress payments were certified.
As of June 30, 1938, petitioner estimated that up to that
date the sum of $3,853,641.43 above set forth included
payment for certain non-pay operations uncompleted by
that date, under the caption ‘‘Contract 761 Deferred,”
and entered on its journal as of June 30, 1938, the follow-
ing ‘‘for incurred expense”’:
iti ANGRY Nag EE 30 0 STRODE IER ATP EIA TUE TESA ee MEO AOE SESE a ©
Appendix A.
1. Moving off job, clean up, ete., 60% of
ET Cet iuc osha ape rok ae ss $60,000.00
2. Repairs to buildings damaged by subway
construction and legal expenses, ete. .. 50,000.00
3. Completion of excavation by removing
braces, timbering, sheeting, installing
backfill, 91,500 vards @ 1.25 .......... 114,500.00
4. Restoration of subsurface structures,
damages vault construction .......... 40,000.00
5. Clean up of Kast Tunnel caulking ...... 15,000.00
6. Supervision, office expenses for 3 mos.
Electricians, mechanics $5,000 per mo.
te See rer 10,000 per mo.
Office expense ........ 1,000 per mo.
$16,000 x 3 48,000.00
EE Wliralcen nd awniciiaiei 96 $327,500.00
The above total of $327,500 was reported on Schedule
N (Balance Sheet) of petitioner's return as ‘* Liability to
restore property under contracts.’’ It was also ineluded
in the cost of operations in Schedule A (Net Income
Computation), with a resulting diminution in net income
for excess-profits tax computation.
Costs of contract No. 761 paid and accrued to June 30,
1938, other than the $2.7,500 above, amounted to $2,860,-
110.76 and the total cost paid and acerued with respect
to that contract as reported by petitioner was the sum
of the two figures. The petitioner’s estimate was that
the contract was 60 per cent complete, whereas after
actual completion it was found that the contract was 53.9
percent complete as of June 30, 1938. The sum of $327,500
did not represent obligations to subcontractors, material-
men, labor or any ereditor. The work was actually per-
formed after June 30, 1938, at a eost of $339,090.40.
ee ee ee
24
Appendix A.
In his notice of deficiency respondent denied the dedue-
tion of the $327,500, stating:
Unallowable deductions and additional income
(a) Reserve for expenses ................ $327,500
* * bod
(a) The deduction of a reserve of $327,500 for
future expenses is held to be unallowable under the
provisions of Section 42 of the Revenue Act of 1938,
and Article 42-4(a), Regulations 101.
OPINION.
The extent to which petitioner’s books and tax returns
correctly set forth its gross income from the subway con-
tract is not in issue although it returned as income stipv-
lated percentages which under that contract the City of
New York reserved the right to and did retain, and which
petitioner could not demand or lay claim to as a matter
of right until performance was complete; although under
those circumstances the liability to pay was not yet suff-
ciently definite to warrant accrual, Cleveland Trinidad
Paving Co., 20 B. T. A. 772, alfirmed (C. C. A., 6th Cir.)
62 Fed. (2d) 85; Benjamin Franklin Patterson, 21 B. 1.
A. 8, although the amounts so withheld were greater than
the expense items which petitioner seeks to accrue and
deduct, and would more than offset them; and although
petitioner’s attention was repeatedly drawn to the prob-
lem thus involved throughout the progress of the hearing.
Nevertheless, petitioner steadfastly refused to place the
question in issue, and stood its ground that it was re-
quired to report such amounts as income, and that no
error existed in that respect and no claim for reduction
or elimination of the deficiency was being made on that
ground.
PP DOSEL AA REIL ILO LL LORE DL AGED IO VELL
25
Appendix A.
Respondent not unnaturally made no contrary conten-
tion, and we accordingly accept for purposes of this pro-
ceeding the hypothesis that no adjustment need or can be
made in the gross income reported by petitioner. For
similar reasons and under similar circumstances, no fur-
ther notice need be paid to the ‘‘interpolated’’ accrual
for work presumed to have been performed between June
11, 1938, when the work done under the contract was ¥
estimated for payment by the parties, and June 30, 1938,
the close of petitioner’s fiscal year, although here the
figures of gross income on the one hand and claimed de-
duction on the other are so close as to be virtually
identical.
It does not follow, however, that this aspect of the
situation can be overlooked in disposing of petitioner's
contention. The explanation given in petitioner’s brief
for the inclusion of the retained percentage in its re-
ported income is that:
BES A Se oS ha cS na ee ROS aes
These sums were included in income, since part of
the expense to earn them was carried into expense
paid and accrued.
Thus, because some of the expenses of carrying out the
contract had actually been paid or incurred and, there-
fore, were properly accrued, petitioner insists upon re-
turning payments under the contract to which it was not
yet entitled, and for the securing of which it would be
required to undertake additional obligations. And having
returned that income, it insists that such future and un-
obligated expense must be an appropriate present dedue-
tion as an offset against the still inchoate receipts.
In claiming the right to deduct estimated future costs
of completing the specified phases of the contract, peti-
tioner’s primary postulate accordingly is that the obliga-
tion to perform the work for which it claims the right
EHS GTR RI. NES LIP AP OBO BI ISIE GRE LOGE LL LITRE IONE ATLA LB IIE GEOL AG AL LEE GE ORILLIA SOLS hn NER ASST Cay ORY
26
Appendix A.
of accrual arose not merely because of the contract but
essentially by force of the circumstance that the future
work in question had been paid for in full in advance,
The argument thus runs that since the city had paid for
the work but petitioner had not yet performed it, two
things followed: First, that there accrued against peti-
tioner a liability measured in dollars and cents to per-
form the work for which it had received payment; and
second, that since it had received the money, its net in-
come would be distorted if it did not offset against that
the corresponding obligation to render the services for
which payment had been received.
But we must consider throughout that the basic premise
for this reasoning involves the assumption that the work
in question had actually been paid for in full, or at least
to a sufficient extent so that the cost of completing the
remainder of the work would be greater than the pay-
ments yet to be received. It must, of course, be con-
ceded that such was clearly not the ease to the extent of
any actual receipt of cash. Petitioner’s assertion is based
on its use of the accrual method of bookkeeping. If,
however, the payments still to be made were not properly
accrued, they no more form the basis for a premise that
the work had been paid for in full, even on an accrued
system, than would be the case with a cash basis tax-
payer where payments in eash or its equivalent had not
yet been realized. It follows in the first place, therefore,
that in this proceeding there are not before us the neces-
sary faets upon the strength of which the legal conten-
tion advanced by petitioner actually can be supported.
And if there is any distortion of income, which is by no
means clear, it derives from petitioner’s voluntary in-
sistence upon returning unaccruable income, rather than
upon the failure to permit the accrual of offsetting deduc-
tions.
bo
7
Appendix A.
This is not to say that were it otherwise there would
be a sound legal foundation for a determination in peti-
tioner’s favor. In those cases where a question somewhat
analogous has arisen, the decisions have been uniform
in denying to a taxpayer the privilege of accruing items
which are not yet in the ‘form of cash liabilities to ascer-
tainable creditors. Thus, in Amalgamated Housing Corp.,
37 B. T. A, 815, affirmed (C. C. A., 2nd Cir.), 108 Fed.
(2d) 1010, the fact that the petitioner was required to
make certain repairs and to redecorate and that its
monthly rentals were the source of funds for that pur-
pose was not considered sufficient to justify a deduction
of the estimated future cost of defraying the expense of
renovation in excess of expenditure actually incurred.
“Although the petitioners were obligated to renovate they
had no liability to pay anyone anything until someone
had performed some services. The accrual is for services
in renovating, not of the duty to renovate.”’ Similarly,
in Clay Sewer Pipe Association, Inc., 1 T. C. 529, an obli-
gation on the part of petitioner to make expenditures
for furnishing services for which it had already received
payment was not thought to be sufficient to justify either
an exclusion of the amount received from its gross income
or the deduction as an accrued liability of the proposed
expenditures. ‘*But even so, that it [the petitioner] in-
tended and may have been obligated in the taxable year
to expend that excess in later years in furnishing the
services for which it was paid in the taxable year, affords
no basis for an expense accrual in the earlier year. Dur-
ing the taxable year no such expenditure had been made.
No item of future expense had been contracted for.’? See
also Jahncke Shipbuilding Co., 11 B. T. A. 479; Hallack
& Howard Lumber Co., 18 B. T. A. 954. As respondent
not inaptly suggests, the present petitioner ‘‘contends that
it should be allowed to deduct an obligation to incur ex-
pense in some later period * * *.’’
rac besr terres ELE YES
ae 1
28
Appendix A.
In its main brief petitioner quotes from In re Harring.
ton, 1 Fed. (2d) 749, to the effect that ‘‘the regular and
long-standing methods of accounting employed by the tax.
payer, established in due course and for no ulterior pur.
pose, are to be indulged.’’ But it takes the wind out of
its own sails by conceding in the reply brief that ‘‘It is
true that this petitioner never before made accruals ex.
actly the same as made at and as of June 30, 1938, and
under discussion herein, and the reason therefor is simple.
This was the first time that it had carried out in its own
name a subway contract of the Board of Transportation
of the City of New York which required such accruals
to be made to properly report income.’’ The evidence
showed that other instances asserted by petitioner to be
similar were in reality no more than proper accruals of
actually incurred expenses.
There is some interchange between the parties as to
what the effect would have been had petitioner consistently
adopted the percentage of completion basis of reporting
its income. Since it does not purport to have done so,
the discussion is in all likelihood academic. Petitioner
complains that an application by it for leave to report
on the completed contract basis was denied by respondent.
But the denial apparently with respect to an earlier year
was communicated to petitioner more than 90 days prior
to the commencement of the tax year in issue and gave
as its reason that the application in question was not
‘‘filed within 90 days of the beginning of the taxable
year.”
It does appear, however, as petitioner contends with
plausibility in its reply brief, that the income it would
have been required to report under a percentage of com-
pletion system would have included only the proportionate
amount of total payments which reflected work actually
done. This, of course, would eliminate the present prob-
lem; and if so, it may, on the one hand, rebut any sug-
29
Appendix A,
gestion that there was no method by which petitioner
could legally record its actual income and, on the other,
furnish the explanation why in situations of this kind no
contention like the present appears in the discoverable
authorities.
That the petitioner has been unable to suggest prece-
dents in its favor, and that neither party has produced
acase precisely in point seems to us a powerful rejoinder
to the contention that what was done here was either
ordinary and usual accounting practice, or a require-
ment for the accurate reflection of petitioner’s net income.
The absence of earlier instances in the law books dealing
with situations of this character is most easily explained
on the assumption that it is not usual or frequent for
bookkeepers to indulge in such a practice. On the con-
trary, in both theory and result there is every probability
that a distortion of income would follow upon the adop-
tion of such a procedure. Petitioner’s accounting witness
was requested to state his theory as to how subsequent
accruals for obligations incurred upon performance of
the work in question should be treated. He answered:
There would be a liability for that $327,500 for
work and materials actually done and incurred. And
since there was no additional cost it would merely
mean a transfer from this account that we call in the
tax return * * * ‘‘liability to restore property under
contract”’ * * *
In other words, you close that account out?
The Witness: We would close that account out and
merely substitute for that a liability for the work
that had been done but not paid for.
The evidence falls short of establishing definitely that
this theory in fact was followed or to what extent, if any,
there ever were made against the accrued future liability
any counter-balancing entries for liabilities actually in-
SOF URS OR NN RU ETI AN AIEEE
DNase ia i a ee ee
30
Appendix A.
curred for the work in question. Of course, if this was
not done, it would tend to distort income for later years
by presenting petitioner at that time with the equivalent
of a double deduction; and even though, upon the termina.
tion of the entire contract after a number of years, a
balancing entry were made, the failure to make current
entries from year to year as liability for the work itself
was incurred and the corresponding failure to eliminate
from accrual the cost items already compensated for,
would tend to distort the income of the intervening years,
But even if the theory had been followed, there still
remains the inescapable necessity of distinguishing be-
tween the subsequent or new account for liabilities actu.
ally incurred which on its face would appear to be a
proper and traditional accrual, and the earlier account
which petitioner here seeks to deduct, which obviously
was of a character so different that the creation of the
new account would necessitate the elimination of the old,
and which in this respect appears to partake more nearly
of the characteristics of a reserve. In other words, if
there were a reasonably safe and certain method for ae-
complishing petitioner’s purpose, and at the same time
securing the protection of the revenue by providing
against future distortion of income through debits. of
periodic accruals of expenses already deducted, it would
seem to be by some system of reserve accounting. This
is accordingly no mere matter of the choice of words, but
a substantive proposition of real significance.
Yet the treatment employed by petitioner upon. the
approval of which it now insists is to deduct the disputed
items as incurred liabilities. They were not. originally
characterized as reserves and it is with some asperity
that petitioner rejects the attempt to place them in that
category now. It says, for example, in its reply brief:
The use by respondent of the expression ‘‘reserve
for unineurred costs” is completely unwarranted,
any: , . ‘“ “ " OED SEL Seay e ORNE Piat RAAT t AINDRE TS VIER Fateh 3A See 8 pepe
31
Appendix A,
since the items being discussed are ‘‘accruals of in-
curred costs.’? On the trial hereof, respondent also
tried (unsuccessfully) to inject the question of re-
serves into this case and now does so again.
Speen PETE TORE NNR IE ag
We are thus precluded from considering whether a
reserve under such circumstances might eliminate some
of the objections to the procedure to which petitioner has
resorted. For a reserve account placed upon the books
of the petitioner would necessarily continue to appear
thereon until by counter-balancing entries it had been
written off. There might thereby be furnished some ‘
assurance that when by subsequently incurred expenses
petitioner’s forecast of future costs actually materialized,
they would furnish the occasion for offsetting items in
the reserve rather than for deductions from current. in-
come, the final outcome of which would enable both pe-
tioner and respondent to avoid duplicating deductions
and to give appropriate treatment to any closing balance,
so that ultimately the exact financial result of the contract
could be reflected in the tax returns.
But the continued resistance to the concept of a reserve
makes any such eventuality seem unlikely. We remain
for this additional reason unpersuaded that the treatment
adopted by petitioner was necessary for an accurate re-
flection of its income. Dealing, as we must, with the
narrow issue before us, and laying to one side any specu-
lation concerning the correctness of the gross income
reported or the effectiveness that might otherwise have
been contributed by the use of a completed contract, or
percentage of completion, or even reserve, system, we
reach the result that petitioner’s claim in the form pre-
sented to us cannot be sustained.
Decision will be entered for respondent.
Enter:
Entered June 21 1943
15 Sil
32
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
For THE Seconp Circuit
No. 304—October Term, 1943.
(Argued June 15, 1944 Decided July 10, 1944.)
SPENCER, Wuitr & Prentis, Inc.,
Petitioner,
—against—
CoMMISSIONER oF INTERNAL RevENUE,
Respondent.
Before:
Avcustus N. Hanp, Cuase and Frank,
Circuit Judges.
Petition by Spencer, White & Prentis, Ine., to review an
order of the Tax Court of the United States determining
deficiencies in its income and excess profits taxes in the
amount of $71,828.41 and $34,049.38 respectively for the
fiscal vear July 1, 1937 to June 30, 1938. Affirmed.
Kpear A. B. Spencer, Attorney and counsel for
Petitioner, Spencer, White & Prentis, Ine.
SamMvue O. Crark, Jr., Assistant Attorney Ger-
eral, Sewall Key, Robert N. Anderson and
Harry Baum, Special Assistants to the At-
torney General, for the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
— ——- Ee PE IO ERA TN, SOIT
33
Appendix B.
Per Curiam:
The taxpayer is a New York corporation engaged in
general construction and engineering business. It installed
foundations, underpinned buildings and entered into short
term construction contracts dealing with sub-surface and
hydraulic conditions. Most of its contracts were short term
contracts completed within one year, but it was also inter-
ested in various long-term contracts. Its books were kept
and its returns made for fiscal years beginning on July 1
and ending the following June 30, but always on the accrual
basis. On December 11, 1933, it applied to the Commissioner
for a consent to change its method of accounting for long-
term contracts to the completed contract basis but failed
to obtain a consent because the application was not sub-
mitted within ninety days after the beginning of the tax-
able vear as required by Article 41-2 of Treasury Regula-
tions 94, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1936.
On June 29, 1937 the taxpayer entered into and in July
1937 began to perform a unit price contract with the Board
of Transportation of the City of New York for subway con-
struction under Sixth Avenue, from West 9th Street toWest
I8th Street, in the Borough of Manhattan. It was engaged
in work on this contract during the fiscal year ended June
30, 1938. The contract required the performance of thou-
sands of types of operations, only some of which were known
as pay items. In making bids under the contract, the tax-
payer included in the bid prices for pay items the cost of
those operations for which no price was specified and in
this manner distributed the cost of the operations not
specified as pay items over the pay items to which they
were related or ratably over all the pay items. The non-
pay items included such things as the taking up and relay-
ing of sidewalks and roadways, support and maintenance
of buildings, water mains and gaspipes and administration
and engineering expenses.
34
Appendix B.
The contract provided for progress payments to the tax-
payer based upon certified partial estimates, to be made
from time to time by the city engineer, of the value of the
work done and materials incorporated in the work. The
first certification of work completed was made approxi-
mately three months after the work was begun and cer-
tificates were generally made each month thereafter. The
contract was subject to a performance bond and as further
security to retention by the City of 15% of the amounts
certified.
The taxpayer in its income tax statement returned as
gross income, accrued under the contract during the fiseal
vear July 1, 1937 to June 30, 1938 inclusive, a total which
was made up as follows:
(a) Moneys earned under contract certi-
fied and paid $3,002,3038.34
(b) Amount certified under contract but
retained by the City 529,818.24
(c) Amount earned but not vet certified 321,519.85
$3,853,641.48
The total of $3,853,641.48 included by the taxpayer as gross
income in its return for the fiscal vear in question covered
not only the contract price for pay items completed but
some non-pay items vet to be performed. This resulted
from the fact that the cost of non-pay items was included
in the cost of pay items.
The taxpayer acerued on its books as of June 30, 1988,
the suin of $327,500 as a‘‘liability to restore property under
contracts’? which was the estimated cost of items which it
had carried in its accrual of gross income. This amount
of $327,500 it deducted in its tax return as ‘‘increased ex-
penses’’. But this amount did not represent obligations due
-
35
Appendix B.
to sub-contractors, materialmen, laborers or other creditors
and was an estimate of the cost of work under the contract
performed after June 30, 1938, at a cost of $339,090.40. The
Commissioner disallowed the deduction and assessed a de-
ficiency in the taxpayer’s income tax of $71,828.41 and in
its excess profits tax of $34,049.38 and the Tax Court
reached the same result as the Commissioner,
The question before us on this appeal is whether the esti-
mated future cost of work which had not been performed
in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1938, was a proper ac-
erual deduction from the income of that year. We think
that under the authorities the Commissioner and the Tax
Court were right in disallowing the deduction and that the
order determining the foregoing deficiencies against the
taxpayer should be affirmed.
It is conceded that the receipts by the taxpayer, though
they exceeded the amount due for the work that had been
performed under the contract were properly returned as
income. But the fact that payments would have to be made
by the taxpayer in a future vear for work which had not
been done in the year in question did not give rise to a
proper tax deduction. It is argued that it did give rise to
such a deduction because a liability existed to perform the
work during that year. This theory, however, proves too
much, for under it a taxpayer on the accrual basis could
estimate the entire gross income which might be received
from his contract, though no work had been begun, could de-
duet the estimated expense of performance and could com-
pute the taxes accordingly. In other words, if an estimate
was possible, there would be room to make returns involv-
ing anticipated results of great uncertainty. Moreover, if
the taxpayer’s theory were applied consistently, in the
present case, the income derived from the contract would
have to be returned for the fiseal year ending June 30,
1937, rather than for the year ending June 30, 1938, be-
36
Appendix B.
cause the contract went into effect during the former year
and the obligations of the parties then became fixed inter
sese.
The difficulty with the taxpayer’s claim is that it ignores
the fact that our income tax law is based upon annual
periods of computation and that it seeks to have the taxes
computed under a system which Justice Roberts, in Secu.
rity Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 287,
termed ‘‘partly annual and partly transactional’’. In
Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 516,
519, the same Justice said: ‘‘It has never been questioned
that a taxpayer who accounts on an accrual basis may, and
should, deduct from gross income a liability which really
accrues in the taxable year. It has long been held that in
order truly to reflect the income of a given year, all the
events must occur in that year which fix the amount and
the fact of the taxpayer’s liability for items of indebted-
ness deducted though not paid; * * *’’. The liability for
the estimated deduction clearly had not accrued during the
year in which deduction was sought. The only thing which
had accrued was the obligation to do the work which might
result in the estimated indebtedness after the work was
performed.
It is well settled that deductions may only be taken for
the year in which the taxpayer’s liability to pay becomes
definite and certain, even though the transactions (such as
the contract in the present case) which occasioned the lia-
bility, may have taken place in an earlier year. Brown v.
Helvering, 291 U. S. 193; American Hotels Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 134 F. (2d) 817; Amalgamated Housing Corp v.
Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 817, aff’d 108 F. (2d) 1010; ef.
Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. 8. 281,
287; Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359. Here
the work for which the deduction is sought was unper-
formed and its cost was, as we have already indicated, no
37
Appendix C.
more than a fair estimate. Such a deducation as the tax-
payer seeks had not ‘‘acerued during the taxable year”’
= therefore, did not meet the requirements of Section
(a) of the Revenue Act of 1936.
The petitioner’s reliance upon United States v. Ander-
son, 269 U. S. 422, is misplaced. There the deduction of
certain estimated tax liabilities set up in a reserve entered
on the taxpayer’s books in accordance with a Treasury
Regulation was allowed, though the taxes had not been
assessed. But all the events had occurred which determined
the liability to pay the tax. Here liability for the work done
after July 1, 1938, had not been ineurred for the work had
not been performed. Cf. Lucas v. American Code Co., 280
U.S. 445.
The contention that the deduction of future expenses
was consistent with the taxpayer’s former accrual method
of accounting clearly is without substance fortified as it is
by only a single entry some years before. The claim that
the Tax Court erred in its findings and in its failure to
make certain findings is likewise without merit. The con-
tention seems to rest on a confusion of facts with conelu-
sions of law.
The order of the Tax Court is affirmed.
APPENDIX C
Statutes Involved
Revenve Act—1936
See, 21. Net Income.
“Net income’? means the gross income computed under
wetion 22, less the deductions allowed by section 23.
“See. 23. Deductions from Gross Ineome.
“In computing net income there shall be allowed as de-
iuctions:
ele ses REP TN TMS IB PESO LO LOVIN TT
PEPIN SOT he a Tight eA PD
38
Appendix C.
‘“(a) Expenses—
(1) In ceneraL.—aAll the ordmary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including a reason-
able allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered; traveling ex.
penses (including the entire amount expended for
meals and lodging) while away from home in the pur.
suit of a trade or business; and rentals or other pay-
ments required to be made as a condition to the con-
tinued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or
business, of property to which the taxpayer has not
taken or is not taking title or in which he has no
equity.’
‘*Part [V—AccountTiInG PERIops AND MEetTHOops
or ACCOUNTINNG
‘“*See. 41. General Rule.
The net income shall be computed upon the basis of
the taxpayer’s annual accounting period (fiscal year
or calendar year, as the case may be) in accordance
with the method of accounting regularly employed in
keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such
method of accounting has been so employed, or if the
method employed does not clearly reflect the income,
the computation shall be made in accordance with
such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner
does clearly reflect the income.
‘““See, 42, Prriop 1x wuicnu ITEMS or Gross INCOME
INCLUDED.
‘‘The amount of all items of gross income shall be
included in the gross income for the taxable year in
which received by the taxpayer. * * *”’
‘*See. 43. Preriop FoR WHICH DeEpDUCTIONS AND
Crepits TAKEN.
“‘The deductions and credits (other than the divi-
dends paid credit provided in section 27) provided for
719 ce are Eres eg wena — 7
FELLER, SEED PRIOR Te aI ee tee Peet s
39
Appendix C.
in this title shall be taken for the taxable year in
which ‘paid or accrued’ or ‘paid or incurred’, depend-
ent upon the method of accounting upon the basis of
which the net income is computed, unless in order to
clearly reflect the income the deductions or credits
should be taken as of a different period. * * *’’
The Regulations Involved
Regulations 94—The Regulations of respondent for the
year in question provided as follows:
‘Art. 21-1. Meaning of income. * * *
‘‘(d). The normal taxes and surtaxes imposed on
individuals and on corporations are computed upon
net income less certain credits. Although taxable net
income is a statutory conception, it follows, subject to
certain modifications as to exemptions and as to de-
ductions for partial losses in some eases, the lines of
commercial usage. Subject to these modifications stat-
utory net income is commercial net income. This ap-
pears from the fact that ordinarily it is to be com-
puted in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the books of the tax-
payer (see section 41).
‘‘Art. 23(a)-1. Business expenses.—Business ex
penses deductible from gross income include the or-
dinary and necessary expenditures directly connected
with or pertaining to the taxpayer’s trade or busi-
ness, except the classes of items which are deductible
under the provisions of articles 23(b)-1 to 23(q)-1.
‘Art. 41.1. Computation of net income.—Net in-
come must be computed with respect to a fixed period.
Usually that period is 12 months and is known as the
taxable year. Items of income and of expenditures
which as gross income and deductions are elements in
the computation of net income need not be in the form
of cash. It is sufficient that such items, if otherwise
properly included in the computation can be valued in
terms of money. The time as of which any item of
I IE NENT IEE PIE EE HN NOPE SH RIERA NET EESTI SRA EOE EAT
™
gross income or any deduction is to be accounted for
must be determined in the light of the fundamental
rule that the computation shall be made in such a
manner as clearly reflects the taxpayer’s income. [/f
the method of accounting regularly employed by him
in keeping his books clearly reflects his income, it is
to be followed with respect to the time as of which
items of gross income and deductions are to be ac-
counted for (See article 42-1 to 42-3)’’ (Italics ours).
* * * * * * *
‘*Art. 41-2. Bases of computation and changes
in accounting methods.—A pproved standard methods
of accounting will ordinarily be regarded as clearly
reflecting income . A method of accounting will not
however, be regarded as clearly reflecting income
unless all items of gross income and all deductions
are. treated with reasonable consistency. See section
48 for definitions of ‘paid or accrued’ and ‘paid or
incurred.’ All items of gross income shall be included
in the gross income for the taxable year in which they
are received by the taxpayer, and deductions taken
accordingly, unless in order clearly to reflect income
such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a
different period. * * * A taxpayer is deemed to have
received items of gross income which have _ been
credited to or set apart for him without restriction
See articles 42.2 and 42.3) * * * (Italies ours).
“‘The true income, computed under the Act and, if
the taxpaver keeps books of account, in accordance
with the method of accounting regularly employed
in keeping such books (provided the method so used
is properly applicable in determining the net income
of the taxpayer for purposes of taxation), shall in all
cases be entered in the return.”’
‘*Art. 41-3. Methods of accounting.—It is recog-
nized that no uniform method of accounting can be
prescribed for all taxpayers, and the law contemplates
that each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems
of accounting as are in his judgment best suited to his
purpose. Each taxpayer is required by law to make
40
Appendix C.
POEMS OLD 2 er eiupits ay H2>e
41
Appendix C.
a return of his true income. He must, therefore, main-
tain such accounting records as will enable him to do
so (See section 54 and article 54-1) (Italics ours).
‘Art. 43.1. ‘Paid or incurred’ and ‘paid or ac-
erued.’—(a) The terms ‘paid or incurred’ and ‘paid or
accrued’ will be construed according to the method of
accounting upon the basis of which the net income is
computed by the taxpayer (See section 48(c).) The
deductions and credits provided for in Title I (other
than the dividends paid credit provided in section 27)
must be taken for the taxable year in which ‘paid or
accrued’ or ‘paid or incurred’, unless in order to
clearly reflect the income such deductions or credits
should be taken as of a different period. If a tax-
payer desires to claim a deduction or a credit as of a
period other than the period in which it was ‘paid or
accrued’ or ‘paid or incurred’, he shall attach to his
return a statement setting forth his request for con-
sideration of the case by the Commissioner. * * *”’
‘** Art. 43-2. When charges deductible—Each year’s
return, so far as practicable, both as to gross income
and deductions therefrom, should be complete in it-
self, and taxpayers are expected to make every rea-
sonable effort to ascertain the facts necessary to make
a correct return. The expenses, liabilities, or deficit
of one year cannot be used to reduce the income of a
subsequent year. A taxpayer has the right to deduct
all authorized allowances, and itefollows that if he
does not within any year deduct certain of his ex-
penses, losses, interest, taxes, or other charges, he
cannot deduct them from the income of the next or
any succeeding year. It is recognized, however, that
particularly in a going business of any magnitude
there are certain overlapping items both of income
and deduction, and so long as these overlapping items
do not materially distort the income they may be
included in the year in which the taxpayer, pursuant
to a consistent policy, takes them into his accounts.
Judgments or other binding adjudications, such as
decisions of referees and boards of review under work-
‘
— 5
42
Appendix C.
men’s compensation laws, on account of damages for
patent infringement, personal injuries, or other cause,
are deductible from gross income when the claim is so
adjudicated or paid, unless taken under other methods
of accounting which clearly reflect the correct dedue-
tion, less any amount of such damages as may have
been compensated for by insurance or otherwise * * *.”
I. T. 1273.
I. T. 1273-1—C. B. page 10, in so far as applicable herein
reads as follows:
“A taxpayer who reports on the accrual basis takes
all deductions at the time they accrue. There must
be an actual liability incurred before any amount may
be acerued. Where a liability has actually been in-
curred and is uncertain only as to the exact amount
and the exact date it must be discharged, an amount
representing a reasonable estimate may be set up as
an accrual. On the other hand, if an actual liability
is not incurred until the happening of some con-
tingency, no amount can be accrued until the con-
tingency happens.”’
SEE RAL ARES ETA ERY ERR
Ce Ne Oa ame
aE nt ae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.