Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Hoskyn & Co. v. Silver Line
Supreme Court brief1944
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Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser Term, 1944
Ark, av
No. 435
IN THE
HOSKYN & CO., INC., et al., Petitioners,
against
| SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ELECTRIC
CORP., et al., Petitioners,
against
SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.
CHINA GENERAL EDISON CO., INC., Petitioner,
against
SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SILVER LINE, LTD.
in opposition to
PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI
GerorceE DE Forest Lorn,
Counsel for Respondent.
Tuomas F. Daty,
of Counsel.
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INDEX
PAGE
I. Previminary STATEMENT —~ ee
Il. Srarement or Facr _- 5
ARGUMENT
Point I. The District Court’s and the Cireuit
Court of Appeals’ finding on the facts that the cause
of the fire was not proved being amply supported
by the evidence should not be disturbed _-.--.-..-. 7
Point II. The District Court and the Circuit %
Court of Appeals properly found that the cause of
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Respondent’s theory concerning the cause j
of the fire ____ pee 28. ee :
Potnt III. The cases cited by petitioners in their :
e . . . . . . &
brief are not in conflict with the decisions below. if
Nor were petitioners required to carry more than the FS
ordinary burden placed upon them by the Fire Stat- :
I See cee Sl Sh Ne MOLES Sernesi ierecncs Senden’ ke
be eS rN DAES Raa ele Ser SOCCER:
Cases CITED :
Boston C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co. v. Seaboard Transpor- ’
tation Co., C. C. A., Ist Cir. (1921), 270 Fed. 525; fl
cert. denied, 256 U. S. 692 _______--- Ragas He 21 ‘
Commercial Molasses Corporation v. New York Tank ‘
Barge Corporation (1941), 314 U.S. 104. 21 4
PRE a REI REE BRS My ty A ESO ge Ree Shs Lert yt aS
LTE RSI tL TAS TAC RR LAER IRENE NL SCR A SI SLC AR II RTI Tittle LENG LIOR PIPE conc cma .
ii INDEX |
PAGE
General Pictures Company v. Electric Company (1937),
964 0. 8. 175 _..--.------~---------------------- 5
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. U.S. A., et al.,
(The Zaca), C. C. A., 2nd Cir. (1939), 105 Fed. (2d)
160; cert. denied, 308 U. S. 611 -------.--- even | |
Interlake Iron Corp. v. Gartland S. 8. Co., C. Go Ay
6th Cir. (1941), 121 Fed. (2d) 267; cert. denied, 314
U. 8 681 —...._-..---~-.----~------------------ 21
Just v. Chambers (1940), 312 U. 8. 383 -------------- 8
Southern Power Company v. N. C. Public Service Com-
pany (1923), 263 U. S. 508 ---------------------- 5
Texas & No. O. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks (1929), 281 U. S.
ee le Oe ah ede
FREON REAR OM ENE TEEN MN RC eR OP OY
% ARAB GE EOE Noe pe er
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroper Term, 1944
AVS ,uU “MY
No. 430
HOSKYN & CO., INC., et al., Petitioners,
against
SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ELECTRIC
CORP., et al., Petitioners,
against
SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.
CHINA GENERAL EDISON CO., INC., Petitioner,
against
SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SILVER LINE, LTD.
in opposition to
PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI
Preliminary Statement
The petitioners seek Writs of Certiorari addressed to
the United States Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to the end that the affirmance by the Cireuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Cireuit of the judgments of the
2
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York may be reviewed here.
Kighteen libels were filed in the District Court in or
about the early part of 1938 as a result of a fire on board
respondent’s vessel, the M. V. SiLvercyPREss, on January
13, 1937 while anchored in the harbor at llo Ilo, P. I. These
libels were by the order of the District Court consolidated
for the purpose of trial under the title of Hoskyn & Co.,
Inc. against Silver Line, Ltd.
Before frial, counsel had selected the following four
cases as typical and stipulated that the decision as to the
cause and liability for the fire in those cases would control
the decision of the other fourteen cases upon that issue:
Hoskyn & Co., Inc., et al.; International Standard Electric
Corp., et al.; China General Edison Co., Inc.; Pacific Com-
mercial Company.
The cases were tried as one before the District Court
for twelve consecutive court days. The trial ended April
22, 1942. Subsequently, exhaustive briefs were submitted
to the District Court by both parties. The District Court
on January 11, 1943 filed an opinion dismissing all of the
libels. (R. pp. 1296-1332) On March 25, 1943, the Court
filed a supplemental opinion. (R. pp. 1332-1337) In that
opinion it found in favor of libellant in the case of Pacific
Commercial Company on the ground that as the proximate
cause of the loss was the over-carriage of the goods from
Manila to Ilo Ilo and not the fire, respondent was not
entitled to the benefit of the Fire Statute. Decrees were
entered in the District Court in favor of the respondent in
the first three of the above cases and in favor of libellant
in the fourth case. Because of the small amount involved
($80.) in that case, respondent did not feel that an appeal
was warranted. Petitioners appealed from the decrees in
the first three cases and the United States Cireuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decrees in
those cases with a decision written by Judge CHase on June
8, 1944 (143 Fed. (2d) 462). Petition for a rehearing was
denied on June 26, 1944.
3
Although petitioners claim there is a conflict with deci-
sions of other Cireuit Courts of Appeal, as explained below
(Point III), there is no such conflict. None of the reasons
set forth in Rule XXXVIII 5(b) is present in this case.
The sole question presented to this Court is whether the
petitioners discharged the burden which petitioners con-
cede in their brief (p. 10) is placed upon them by the Fire
Statute (46 U. S. C. 182) of showing that the fire was
caused by respondent’s neglect. The District Court ruled
on the facts that they did not meet that burden and the
Cireuit Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling on the facts.
The following language from Judge CHase’s opinion
shows the precise nature of the question involved and, by
the same token, makes obvious the reasons why certiorari
should not be granted. Inter alia, Judge Cuase wrote:
“It was accordingly found, and is not now seriously dis-
puted, that the vessel was unseaworthy when she sailed
and continued to be unseaworthy up to the time of the
fire, and that such condition was due to the neglect
of the owner. Consequently the issue is further nar-
rowed to the question whether it was shown that the
neglect of the owner which allowed the No. 2 starboard
auxiliary to be used while it remained in the condition
that made the ship unseaworthy caused the fire. Com-
pare Christopher v. Grueby, 1 Cir., 40 F. (2) 8.
“This was an extremely difficult question to re-
solve in point of fact because the engine room was
gutted and when it could be entered after the fire so
much damage had been done that no definite evidence
concerning the cause of the fire could then be obtained.
‘‘Some facts as to conditions in the engine room
just before the fire were proved, however, and there
was evidence that a relief valve in one of the engine’s
cylinders then opened and let out hot gases and sparks.
The libellants directed most of their energies to at-
tempting to show that the fire was caused by the spray-
ing of oil from a small intake pipe against the hot ex-
haust pipes and the hot cylinder head when exces’ e
vibration caused the pipe to break. Yet there was no
4
evidence that such a pipe did in fact break before the
fire started. The respondent put forth a (fol. 1373)
contrary theory supported by the testimony of its
expert to the effect that an overhead fuel pipe in the
engine room might have sprung a leak, with results
later to be given. Yet there was no credible evidence
that such a leak did occur so all was left to specula-
tion. Such an occurrence, however, could not reason-
ably be connected with the owner’s proved neglect to
repair the engines. So there was expert testimony
pointing to a possible cause of the fire connected with
the owner’s neglect to put the auxiliaries in good re-
pair after notice and testimony just as expert point-
ing to a possible cause unconnected with any neglect
of the owner. There was also evidence of an unusual
loss of lubricating oil but that, too, indicated only a
lack of engine repair and mostly in respect to the main
engines which were idle when the fire started. The
trial judge could not find whether either theory as to
the cause of the fire was the correct one, or what did in
fact cause it.
‘The word ‘theory’ has been used deliberately for
it is apparent that no one can do more on the evidence
in this record than to speculate, and right there the
weakness of the libellants’ cause is revealed. The
statute placed upon them a burden it was impossible
to carry, as will now be seen from a discussion of the
available and proved facts in connection with the
operation of a Diesel engine of the multiple-cylinder
four-cycle type of the auxiliaries in this vessel.”’
After discussing the evidence adduced, Judge CHASE
concluded :
‘‘It is no wonder that on this sort of evidence the
trial judge could not decide which, if either, of these
theories showed how the fire was caused or find what
as a matter of fact did start it, and he had to leave
that vital question unanswered. There is, therefore,
nothing in this record which shows reversible error in
respect to any of the decrees.
‘On the contrary there is ample support for the
negative finding that the cause of the fire was not
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5
proved. Consequently it was not shown that any neg-
lect of the owner caused it and such a finding is to be
given effect on appeal. Compare Petterson Lighter-
age & T. Corp. v. New York Central R. Co., 2 Cir., 126
F. (2) 992. That leaves the libellants short of having
proved a cause of action, for the unseaworthiness of y
the ship did not alone deprive the respondent of the re
penefit of the fire statute. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. g
Co. v. United States, supra.”’ a
f
The United States District Court for the Southern Dis- :
trict and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for :
the Second Circuit, after an exhaustive review of the facts, 4
held that petitioners did not show that the fire was caused '
by respondent’s neglect. The Supreme Court of the United :
States is now asked to be the third court to pass on that ,
factual question. 4
The petition falls squarely within the frequently an- .
nounced rule of this Court that ‘granting of the writ would é
not be warranted merely to review the evidence or infer- i
ences drawn from it.’’ ;
General Pictures Company v. Electric Company ;
(1937), 304 U. S. 175, at page 178; E
Southern Power Company v. N. C. Public Service
Company (1923), 263 U. 8. 508.
Statement of Fact
At the trial petitioners read into the record the testi-
mony of one Ingram, a disgruntled and thoroughly dis-
credited former employee of the respondent, with respect
to conditions in the engine room of the vessel. Ingram
had been an engineer on the SILVERCYPRESS and was present
in the engine room immediately before and at the time
the fire broke out. (Opinion of the District Court (3981-
3982, 3990; 2700-2727, 9736-2785, 3195-3212, 3220-3231." )
Ingram was the only factual witness called by petitioners.
* References are to folios of the record unless otherwise stated.
The only other witness called by them was an expert on
Diesel engines.
Prior to the trial, pursuant to an order of discovery,
a large number of documents was produced from the files
of respondent, many of which were offered in evidence by
petitioners and many by respondent. (Opinion, District
Court, 3897)
On its behalf, respondent called as witnesses or read
into evidence the depositions of various of its engineers
and others. It also called as witnesses three experts
thoroughly familiar with the operations of Diesel engines.
(722, 1310, 1768, 1774, 2021-2027, 2062, 2072-2080, 2152,
9244, 2264-2271, 2818-2950, 2951-3053, 3050-3194)
The Sitvercypress under Lloyd’s inspection and at the
time of the fire was classed by Lloyd’s as + 100 A-1.
(3077) She was a modern vessel built in 1930, being com-
pleted in June of that year. She and other ships of the
respondent made around-the-world voyages carrying cargo
and passengers from the United States to Manila and
Far East ports where they also picked up cargo and
passengers for the return to the United States. Each
voyage took about four and one-half months to complete.
(724, 3056, 3060, 3061) The voyage on which the fire oc-
curred commenced at New York on November 24, 1936.
Thereafter, on the afternoon of January 12, 1937, the
Srivercypress brought up to anchor in the harbor at Tlo
Ilo, P. I. Immediately after anchoring at 3:30 P. M., the
ship commenced discharging cargo from all holds. This
continued throughout the night and until the fire broke out
in the engine room at 3:45 A. M. on the 13th. The fire
took hold very rapidly and within a matter of a few minutes
after the start of the fire, flames and sparks coming out
of the engine room skylights were blown aft and ignited
the cargo in the after holds of the ship, the hatch covers
being off all holds to permit the unloading of the cargo.
The fire burned for over seven days, not being extinguished
until January 20, at 4:20 P. M. (Chief Officer’s Log, Exs.
4-35-a; 4-35-c; 3517; Lib. Ex. 21, at 3666)
Other pertinent facts will be referred to hereafter.
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7
POINT 1
The District Court’s and the Circuit Court
of Appeals’ finding on the facts that the cause
of the fire was not proved being amply sup-
ported by the evidence should not be disturbed.
The District Court in its Supplemental Opinion (3997)
suecinetly stated its reasons for dismissing the libels in
the following language:
‘Inasmuch as the record disclosed that the fire
resulted from one of two or more Causes, and the causal
connection between the fire and any particular cause
and the personal negligence of the Respondent was
not established by the required measure of proof, the
Respondent was exonerated under the Fire clause.”’
The pertinent finding of fact was:
‘8. The precise origin of the fire was not estab-
Pn _ y ro
lished and resulted from one of two or more causes.
(4019)
and the Court’s conclusion of law was:
«3. The libellants failed to establish, by the re-
quired measure of proof, a causal connection between
the fire which destroyed the ‘Silvercypress’ and her
cargo, and the unseaworthiness of the vessel due to
the personal neglect of the respondent.
‘4. The respondent is, therefore, entitled to the
benefit and protection of the Fire Statute, no oe ae
(4022)
The Circuit Court of Appeals in commenting on and
in concurring with the District Court’s finding of fact
stated:
“On the contrary there is ample support for the
negative finding that the cause of the fire was not
proved.’’ (C. C. A. Opinion, p. 1375)
8
Accordingly, since the District Court and Cireuit Court
of Appeals have found as a fact, which fact is amply sup-
ported by the evidence (as hereinafter demonstrated),
«“* * * that the cause of the fire was not proved,’’ such
finding should not be disturbed.
Just v. Chambers (1940), 312 U. S. 383;
Texas & No. O. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks (1929), 281
U. S. 548.
POINT II
The District Court and the Circuit Court of
Appeals properly found that the cause of the
fire was not proved.
The fire started on the top of or near the No. 2 auxiliary
generator. Petitioners’ ‘“theory’’ of the fire is that the
No. 2 generator was overheated from improper timing,
that excess vibration due to the faulty condition of the
engine broke or fractured a 1%” fuel pipe leading from a
fuel pump on the No. 2 generator to a cylinder of that
generator, that the break or fracture of the small fuel pipe
resulted in the spraying out of a cloud of oil in vapor form
which came in contact with the overheated engine, thus
causing the fire, and that the fire was supported by large
quantities of lubricating oil which had escaped from the
crankeases of the main engines. (Opinion, C. C. A., pp.
1371-1374)
No eyewitness testified to any such conditions existing
at the time of the fire. The ‘‘theory’’ consisted merely of
conclusions drawn by petitioners from purely circumstan-
tial evidence. (Opinion, C. C. A., p. 1372) Their own fac-
tual witness Ingram, who was present in the engine room
before and at the time of the fire, did not testify to the
existence of any such conditions at the time of the fire.
Petitioners’ ‘‘theory’’ as to the cause and the extent
of the fire necessarily implies: (a) abnormal vibration of
oe , i ‘ SME RENAN EOE, SEITEN He BL EERIE i 2 rs
the No. 2 generator causing a 1%” pipe (carrying one gal-
lon of fuel oil an hour) to break; (b) late timing of the :
venerator causing the exhaust manifolds to become over- 3
heated; and (c) large quantities of lubricating oil on the :
tank tops and in the bilges.
A. Vibration
We deal first with petitioners’ contention that the fire
was caused by the breaking of a small 14” fuel pipe, which
break was caused by vibration resulting from the unsea-
worthy condition of the engine. This point was urged
strongly below both in the District Court and the Circuit
Court of Appeals. The District Court, however, made no
finding that any vibration, abnormal or otherwise, existed
in these engines, particularly in No. 2, or that such a small
fuel pipe broke, and the Cireuit Court of Appeals expressly
found that there was no evidence ‘‘* * * that there was
vibration which in fact caused a leak in a fuel pipe in the
manner described.’? (Opinion, C. C. A., p. 1374)
The testimony of petitioners’ own factual witness
Ingram negatives the inference that there was any abnor-
mal vibration present in these engines. Ingram testified
in one of his several opinions as to the cause of the fire
that in his opinion one of the small 14” pipes on the No. 2
generator fractured due to vibration caused (according
to him) by the tieing back of the governor handle or throttle
on that generator. (2663, 2673) When the load was
taken off that engine, this tieing back is said by him to
have caused the engine to race and, accordingly, vibrate.
(2663) Ingram does not otherwise refer to vibration of
the generator at all. Ingram’s explanation for vibration
is not advanced by petitioners for obvious reasons. It was
shown definitely on the trial that it would have been a
mechanical and electrical impossibility to operate the gen-
erators at all under the conditions prevailing previous to
and at the time of the fire with the governor handles tied
back. (C. C. A. Opinion, pp. 1873-4; 2029, 2131, 2341, 2498)
10
The District Court did not believe Ingram’s impossible
story. Indeed, even petitioners’ expert did not believe
Ingram’s testimony (561) and did not use it as a basis
for any opinion expressed by him. He admitted that the
No. 2 generator could not have operated with the gover-
nor handle tied back. (2498) After offering Ingram’s
testimony, petitioners do not now rely upon it at all, nor
could they, as it contradicts their theory of vibration. It
seems obvious that if any abnormal vibration existed,
Ingram, the disgruntled employee, need not and would not
have invented his impossible story to explain the supposed
breaking of the small fuel pipe.
Thus, petitioners’ case as to vibration was founded only
on the opinion testimony of their expert witness. His opin-
ion, however, was only to the effect that there ‘‘might have
been’? abnormal vibration in the engines. (337, 339) His
opinion was based on an examination of the records and
exhibits in the case. His testimony that there ‘‘might
have been’’ vibration is flatly contradicted by all of re-
spondent’s fact witnesses and is negatived by petitioners’
own witness Ingram, who testified, as pointed out above,
that vibration only existed when the load was taken off the
generator and the governor handle tied back, a condition
which petitioners’ expert rejected as impossible. (777,
785, 1391, 2498) It was further refuted by the respondent’s
experts who (from an examination of the same records as
were examined by petitioners’ expert) gave as their opin-
ions that there was nothing in such records to indicate
any abnormal vibration in any of the generators. (2114,
2319) Under these circumstances, it is obvious why the
Cireuit Court of Appeals found as a fact that there was no
evidence ‘‘* * * that there was yibration which in fact
caused a leak in a fuel pipe in the manner described”’
(C. C. A. Opinion, p. 1374) and why the District Court
made no finding that any vibration, abnormal or otherwise,
existed in these engines or that it caused a fuel pipe to
break.
PLE ae re ea ERS BRN REACH NENA EES _
a WPA EIA are
11
B. Timing
Petitioners lay emphasis here, as they did in the District
Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals, upon an alleged
defective condition of the timing apparatus on the No. 2
generator. The reason for this emphasis is the assumption
by the petitioners that if the so-called ‘‘late timing’’ could
be established as having existed at the time of the fire, it
would necessarily lead to the inference that the engine
itself, or at least the exhaust pipes or exhaust manifold
of that engine, was white hot, and to the further inference
that loose fuel oil escaping from the assumed fracture of
a small fuel pipe on No. 2 generator was ignited by these
white hot exhaust pipes or manifold. It is obvious, there-
fore, that this is a theory as to the cause of the fire built
upon a number of successive inferences, none of which is
justified by the known facts.
Before examining the successive steps necessary to sus-
tain this theory and pointing out their speculative natures,
respondent calls attention to the fact that the Circuit Court
of Appeals found that there was no evidence that faulty
timing ‘‘did in fact overheat the engine just before the
fire’? (C. C. A. Opinion, p. 1374), and the District Court
made no finding that the timing of the No. 2 generator
was “‘late’’ or that the engine was overheated at the time
of the fire.
Every instance which appears in the record of any ‘‘late
timing’ of the engines is definitely shown by the factual
witnesses or by the records to have been corrected long
before the fire. (754, 756, 761, 763-4, 1291, 1424, 1428-1431,
1717, 2088-2097, 2115, 2303, 2318, 2349-50) Since peti-
tioners did not establish that ‘‘late timing’’ existed at the
time of the fire, the subject becomes of no importance be-
cause it is not claimed, nor could it be, that ‘‘late timing’’
of an engine at an earlier date created an overheating of
the engine exhaust or manifold at the time of the fire.
That the timing of the generators, particularly the No.
2, was in order on Voyage 17 and on the night of the fire
is substantiated by the testimony of petitioners’ own factual
witness Ingram as well as by other witnesses. Ingram
makes no mention whatsoever of the alleged defect or loose-
ness in the sprocket wheel of No. 2 generator which, if it
existed, petitioners contended would result in late timing.
Furthermore, he admitted in his testimony that the ‘‘late
timing’’ which may have existed on a previous voyage had
been corrected before the start of the voyage on which the
fire occurred. (2618)
It thus appears that petitioners’ contention here and in
the District Court that late timing existed in the No. 2
generator at the time of the fire is not only based upon
inference but is contrary to the known facts.
Moreover, the known facts do not sustain petitioners’
contention that an overheated exhaust pipe or manifold
ignited the fuel oil. The known and undisputed fact is that
the safety or relief valves on the Nos. 2 and 3 cylinders
of the No. 2 generator had been opening intermittently for
some minutes before and up to the start of the fire with
the result that white hot flames and sparks were being shot
out from them. (2626, 2822, 3586, 3607, 3623, 3649; Dis-
trict Court Opinion, 3919) It further disregards the fact
admitted by all of the witnesses, including petitioners’ own
expert, that the white hot flames and sparks shot out from
the relief valves could, without any intervening cause, ig-
nite loose fuel oil on or in the vicinity of the No. 2 generator.
(630, 1480, 1813, 2142, 9338) Ingram referred to another
possible cause for the ignition of fuel oil in his eyewitness
reference to sparks being thrown out by the No. 1 generator
commutator. (3609)
C. Lubricating Oil
Petitioners’ brief (Point II) states that leakage of
lubricating oil in the two main engine crankcases was aD
inevitably important contributing cause of the fire on the
SILVERCYPRESS.
As a matter of fact, lubricating oil is not once men-
tioned in the findings of the District Court, and the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals expressly found that leakage of
——
13
lubricating oil was not a contributing cause of the fire
(C. C. A. Opinion, p. 1371), although in both courts this
point was strongly urged by petitioners.
The statements in the District Court’s opinion referred
to by the petitioners in their brief at pages 28 and 29
merely recount testimony of witnesses as to whether or
not there was a loss of lubricating oil on the previous
voyage, and conjectures as to how such loss may have
occurred. There was no finding by the District Court on
the subject of the presence of lubricating oil on the tank
tops or in the bilges. Furthermore the comments in its
opinion relate to the previous voyage and the subsequent
repairs made in New York included tightening all holding
down bolts on both main engines, removing and cleaning
the sealing bars on the starboard engine and rejointing
them, and rejointing the worst sealing bars in the port
engine. There is no mention of any loss of lubricating oil
in any of the testimony subsequent to these repairs; nor
is there a single word of testimony that there was lubricat-
ing oil on the tank tops or in the bilges at any stage of
Voyage 17. Indeed the evidence is to the contrary. (Ex-
hibit LL; 933-936)
Moreover, there is no evidence that even on the pre-
vious voyage the so-called ‘‘shortage”’ found its way to the
tank tops or the bilges or that if it did it would have
contributed to the fire on Voyage 17. In fact, there is a
real question of whether there was any leakage at all.
The Chief Engineer of the Sitvercypress did not be-
lieve that lubricating oil was leaking out of the crankcases
of the main engines. In an endeavor to account to his
owners for a ‘‘shortage’’ of lubricating oil, he reported
by letter on September 25, 1936 that
‘‘T have made a thorough examination of cofferdams,
dry tank, tank tops and pipe lines and have not been
able to find any appreciable leakage. * * *
«* * * J think there can be no doubt the reason for
this big shortage is entirely due to the amount of
sludge and water taken from the system. * * ae
NE BE Re TT hye IA NEED RAGES FORA ST EDL SER RIO DET A At DEE RIB Ge NS Pa I AN AT a ES ae
14
have not been able to find out how the water got into
the system; * * *.’? (Lib. Ex. 4-25, 3459, 3460)
Moreover, in a further report to his owners, dated Decem-
ber 2, 1936, he again attributed the ‘‘shortgage’’ to con-
tamination by sea water leaking into the main engine lubri-
cating oil system rather than to oil leaking out. (Lib. Ex.
4-28-b, at 3483) Others were of the opinion that there was
no shortage and hence no appreciable leakage but that
the lubricating oil was being consumed in the engines.
797, 1356, 2277-2281) But even if we assume that the
‘‘shortage’’ of lubricating oil was fully accounted for by
leaks rather than by contamination by sea water or con-
sumption, and even if we assume that the lubricating oil
went on to the tank tops and from them into the bilges,
nevertheless, such loss over a period of seven months would
not be material in so far as the fire on January 13 was con-
cerned.
The construction of the tank tops was such that no
substantial quantity of oil could accumulate on them.
(Resp. Exs. PP and ZZ; 905, 3808, 3856) Not only the
construction of the tank tops but the constant rolling of
the ship at sea makes it inevitable that any liquid, either
water or oil, present there would go into the bilges. More-
over, they were hosed down each Saturday (792), and re-
spondent’s second engineer testified that they were clean
the Saturday before the fire. (794-5) Petitioners imply,
at page 30 of their brief, that the second engineer was tes-
tifying untruthfully when he stated that the tank tops were
hosed down each Saturday. They neglect to point out
that his testimony to that effect was substantiated by their
own witness Ingram. (2565)
The 6,000 gallon loss of lubricating oil reported on the
previous voyage and referred to by petitioners in their
brief consisted of a ‘‘shortage’’ of 4950 gallons on the
voyage to Hongkong and 1440 gallons between Singapore,
the next port of call after Hongkong, and New York. (Lib.
Exs. 4-39, 4-28-b, at 3533, 3482)
RADE Sa PS NAINA ae CN 9 tea EN EE Ne AIRE ARNO A ETE DES So SUNT LPIA OU SILER IETS ELLE AOS LEASE
‘a EST SS ae
15
| The tank tops, bilges, etc., were thoroughly cleaned at
Hongkong on the previous voyage. (Bill of A. Hong, Lib.
Ex. 4-21-c, at 3424; 909-12) Hence, any shortage prior to
that time certainly has no bearing on the fire. The re-
corded ‘‘shortage’’ between Singapore and New York
of 1440 gallons on that voyage, divided by the number of
days shown gives a ‘‘loss’’ of about 24 gallons per day.
This would mean that no more than 4 gallons could leak
out during any one watch of which presumably 2 gallons
would be on the starboard side and 2 gallons on the port
side, and, of course, it is undisputed that the bilges were
pumped out each watch. (797-8, 2686) Furthermore, the
main engines had not been running from 2:49 of the after-
noon of January 12, the day previous to the fire (Chief
Officer’s log Ex. 4-35 a, b, ¢, at 3517; C. C. A. Opinion,
p. 1371), so that no oil could have leaked out from that
time until the fire, and the bilges had been pumped
just before going into port. (797) Petitioners, however,
have intimated that although the bilges were pumped
out each watch and had been pumped out before go-
ing into Ilo Ilo, nevertheless, a large quantity of oil
still could have remained in the bilges. This is an in-
ference contrary to the facts. The evidence shows (1022)
that the bilge pump suctions, which are at the after end of
the engine room bilges, are no more than 3 inches from
the bottom of the bilges and that the vessel being down
by the stern, all the contents of the bilges would be pumped
out except for a small bit in the immediate vicinity of the
bilge suctions. &
Even petitioners’ witness Ingram (2567) says there was
only a ‘‘skim of oil on the water’’ in the bilges the day
before the fire; in other words, a trace of oil which, of
course, is present in any motorship. That they were in
normal condition was confirmed by respondent’s witness.
(797-8)
Obviously, if there had been any substantial accumula-
tion of oil on the tank tops or in the bilges, not only Ingram,
but the other engineers would have seen it, and the Chief
Engineer would have reported it. It is ridiculous to be-
—
16
lieve that the Chief Engineer would have wasted his time
trying to account to his owners for a ‘‘shortage’’ of lubri-
cating oil if it had shown up on the tank tops or in the
bilges. Similarly, Ingram would have seized upon this as
one of his most vital criticisms of the ship rather than a
casual reference to a ‘‘skim’”’ of oil.
Furthermore, we point out that the Chief Engineer’s
list of repairs (3505, et seq.) to be made at Hongkong on
the last voyage made no reference whatsoever to any de-
fective condition of the sealing bars and holding down bolts
in either main engine and no reference to any leakage of
oil from those engines.
Reference is made in petitioners’ brief to their witness
Ingram’s testimony that shortly after the fire broke out,
flames mounted up on the other side of the engine room.
However, they neglect to point out that Ingram did not
attribute the outbreak of fire on the port side to the alleged
leakage of lubricating oil. (2666, 3656-8)
From the above it is apparent that petitioners failed to
prove the three essential elements necessary to their theory
as to the cause of the fire, namely (a) vibration which
caused the breaking of a pipe; (b) defective timing which
caused the engine to overheat; and (c) leakage of lubri-
eating oil which caused the fire to spread. Proof of all
three elements is necessary to sustain petitioners’ theory
and hold the respondent for the fire. This is a case where
failure of proof went, not only to one essential element but
toall three. Petitioners failed in the following respects: (a)
They drew one inference when several might have been
drawn. (b) They disregarded known facts material to
any explanation of the fire. (c) They based inference upon
inference as a substitute for proof.
Respondent’s Theory Concerning the
Cause of the Fire.
Petitioners’ ‘‘theory’’ as to the cause of the fire ignores
the only two things that are known concerning conditions
in the vicinity of the No. 2 generator at the time the fire
y bn
. erat ie Per ea ical le ele
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17
broke out. These are (1) that the relief or safety valves
on the No. 2 and 3 cylinders of the No. 2 generator, as
pointed out above, were lifting and discharging white hot
flames and carbon sparks; (2626, 2681, 2723, 2822, 2852,
2867, 2921, 3586, 3609, 3623, 3630, 3647, 3649) (2) that
there was a considerable quantity of fuel oil on the floor
plates at the forward end and outboard of the No. 2 gen-
erator just previous to and at the time of the fire. (2634,
2674, 3608; Diagram, 3616, 3665)
Respondent’s witnesses testified that in their opinion
(which took into consideration the known facts) the fire
occurred in the following manner:
A large overhead fuel pipe broke or speane a sub-
stantial leak. [Concededly, the breaking of such an over-
head fuel pipe could not be charged to respondent’s
neglect. (C.C. A. Opinion, pp. 1371, 1375) ] The oil there-
from fell or was sprayed onto the cylinder tops and around
the No. 2 generator and an unknown quantity of this oil,
falling on the air intakes of the cylinders, was drawn into
the cylinders by suction, causing overloads in the cylin-
ders, the overloads causing the relief valves to lift; that
part of the oil which fell from the large overhead pipe
on to the generator itself was heated to its fire point by
the normal operating heat of the generator, and gave off
an inflammable vapor; the continuous opening of the relief
valves (caused by the excess oil from the air intake over-
loading the cylinders) permitted hot carbon and flame to
shoot out at each explosion and, thus coming in contact
with the vaporized oil, ignited it. (1473-86, 1813-15, 2138-45,
2335-41; Dist. Court Opinion, 3968-3981; C. C. A. Opinion,
pp. 1374, 1375)
That fuel oil leaking from an overhead fuel pipe sucked
into the air intakes would bring about a condition of ex-
cessive fuel in the cylinder which in turn would cause the
relief valves to lift with the result that the loose fuel oil
admittedly in the vicinity heated to its fire point by the
normal operating heat of the generator would be ignited
was admitted by everyone, including petitioners’ expert.
BLT A NY RETOLD: IRE LOOSE OG Gah IME LENE ASE IGE LG cs BOO! BE BEE EL IO ORS: DR I PES WANDS
ee en RR a Te te ae ae
(C. C. A. Opinion, pp. 1374-5; 594, 630, 1479, 1480, 1813,
2141-2, 2338) Unlike petitioners’ ‘‘theory’’, this theory
does not require an inference that the exhaust manifolds
were abnormally heated, for, as pointed out above, the
white hot flames and carbon shot out from the lifting relief
valves admittedly would have been sufficient to ignite the
loose fuel oil.
Respondent’s witnesses pointed out that there was no
other source for the large quantities of fuel oil which
ignited immediately, nor any explanation other than the
breaking of a large fuel supply pipe for the size of the
fire which filled the engine room in a few minutes.. In
commenting on petitioners’ theory that a small fuel pipe
or by-pass valve on the No. 2 generator fractured, they
testified that in their opinion the quantity of fuel oil,
amounting to about one gallon an hour, which would flow
from such broken 1%” fuel pipe or by-pass valve could noi
have caused the fire of the magnitude described by Ingram.
(2143, 2339, 2406) Their opinion also finds support in the
written statement made by one of respondent’s engineers
after the fire (3689) that a 34” branch overhead fuel pipe
had been found broken off and his testimony covering his
conversation with Ingram after the fire. (1796) Once
this fuel supply pipe was broken, oil would continue to flow
out of it by gravity until the tank—said by Ingram to
contain 1700 gallons (2683) was empty. It is further borne
out by Ingram’s testimony that there was a considerable
quantity of fuel oil on the floor plates at the forward end
of and the outboard side of the No. 2 generator just previous
to and at the time of the fire. (2634, 2674, 3608; Diagram,
3616, 3665)
The breaking or leaking of a large overhead fuel pipe is
almost the only explanation for the presence of the fuel oil
that Ingram states he saw glistening on the floor plates.
This oil, Ingram stated, extended the whole way from
where he was standing (Diagram Ex. 19, 3616) around back
of the generator No. 2 and to the starboard bilge outboard.
«te
te
19
As heretofore pointed out, the presence of this oil is not
even mentioned by petitioners in their brief. That it was
fuel oil is absolutely clear from Ingram’s testimony to the
effect that he knew it was fuel oil because it was the color
of brandy, whereas lubricating oil is greeny blue in color.
(2635)
There are many reasons which might cause such an
overhead pipe to break, among them the following: The
rolling of the ship in a seaway which causes the weights
in the engine room to pull away from the side of the ship
which sets up strain, resulting eventually in the fracturing
of pipes. (1392, 1576) Crystallization of the metal is an-
other cause of pipes giving out. (2048) The laboring of
a ship in heavy weather will cause pipes to fracture, al-
though such fractures may not show up for some time
after the heavy weather was encountered. Pipes break or
fracture for no apparent reason whatsoever. (430, 2147,
2356-7, 2417)
Petitioners in their brief imply as they did below that
it is far-fetched to believe that if the leak had occurred in
an overhead pipe, the men in the vicinity would not have
been covered with oil while standing at the No. 2 generator.
However, as no one knew the exact location of the overhead
fuel pipe, no one can say for certain where the break or
fracture occurred. (1987, 2196) Furthermore, no one
knows in what way the oil would have been falling out from
the break or fracture. It might have sprayed in any direc-
tion. It was the considered opinion of the experts that it
did not necessarily have to fall straight down, nor that it
would necessarily fall upon the two men standing at the
No. 2 generator. (2199-2202, 2408)
It is thus apparent that the inferences which petitioners
sought to draw, and which inferences ignore the two known
facts in this case, i. e., the lifting of the relief valves and
the quantity of fuel oil on the floor plates at the forward
end and outboard of the No. 2 generator, are not the only
or probable ones which can fairly and reasonably be drawn
from the facts. Nor, as shown above, did petitioners’
~se
20
theory as to the cause of the fire fairly and reasonably
exclude any other explanation for it.
It is thus obvious that the finding of the District Court
and the Circuit Court of Appeals that the cause of the fire
was not proved and that petitioners accordingly failed to
meet the burden placed upon them by the Fire Statute is
amply supported by the evidence.
POINT III
The cases cited by petitioners in their brief
are not in conflict with the decisions below. Nor
were petitioners required to carry more than
the ordinary burden placed upon them by the
Fire Statute.
It was and is conceded by petitioners that the so-called
Fire Statute applied in these cases; that the burden was
upon them to show that the fire which destroyed or damaged
their cargo was caused by the neglect of the owner and
that it is immaterial whether the vessel was or was not
seaworthy. (Petition, p. 10)
Accordingly, the situation was like any other where a
claimant brings himself within an exemption in which event
the libellant must prove that he was negligent.
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. U. S. A., et
al. (The Zaca), C. C. A., 2nd Cir. (1939), 105
Fed. (2d) 160; cert. denied, 308 U. S. 611.
There can be no argument with the cases cited by peti-
tioners in their brief. Nor is there any conflict between
the decision below and the decisions of other Circuit Courts
of Appeal cases. In fact, we agree entirely with the prin-
ciple laid down in the cases cited from other Circuit Courts
of Appeal. That principle is that a recovery should be
allowed only where the only reasonable inference which
can be drawn from all the circumstances lead to the conelu-
sion that the negligence of the person sought to be charged
21
with liability was a substantial factor in causing the injury
for which indemnity is sought. In other words, that the
owner was guilty of neglect which caused the fire.
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. U. S. A,
et al. (supra);
Interlake Iron Corp. v. Gartland S.S.Co., C. C. A.,
6th Cir. (1941), 121 Fed. (2d) 267; cert. denied,
314 U. S. 681.
In the instant cases, however, both the District Court and
the Circuit Court of Appeals found on the facts that peti-
tioners failed to show that it was the owner’s neglect which
caused the fire.
Both courts found that on the evidence it could not be
decided ‘‘how the fire was caused or find what as a matter
of fact did start it, * * *.’? (C. C. A. Opinion, pp. 1372,
1375) Under such circumstances, petitioners did not meet
the burden concededly placed upon them by the Fire Stat-
ute, for, as stated by this Court in Commercial Molasses
Corporation v. New York Tank Barge Corporation (1941),
314 U. S. 104, at page 112, ‘‘Wherever the burden rests,
he who undertakes to carry it must do more than create
a doubt which the trier of fact is unable to resolve.’’
See also, Boston C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co. v. Sea-
board Transportation Co., C. C. A., 1st Cir.
(1921), 270 Fed. 525; cert. denied, 256 U. S.
692.
The petition should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
GroRGE DE Forest Lorp,
Counsel for Respondent.
Tuomas F. Daty,
of Counsel.
Dated, New York, September 21, 1944.
CPY7595
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