Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Hoskyn & Co. v. Silver Line

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Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1944

Ark, av

No. 435

IN THE

HOSKYN & CO., INC., et al., Petitioners,

against

| SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ELECTRIC

CORP., et al., Petitioners,

against

SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.

CHINA GENERAL EDISON CO., INC., Petitioner,

against

SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SILVER LINE, LTD.

in opposition to

PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI

GerorceE DE Forest Lorn,

Counsel for Respondent.

Tuomas F. Daty,

of Counsel.

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INDEX

PAGE

I. Previminary STATEMENT —~ ee

Il. Srarement or Facr _- 5

ARGUMENT

Point I. The District Court’s and the Cireuit

Court of Appeals’ finding on the facts that the cause

of the fire was not proved being amply supported

by the evidence should not be disturbed _-.--.-..-. 7

Point II. The District Court and the Circuit %

Court of Appeals properly found that the cause of

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Respondent’s theory concerning the cause j

of the fire ____ pee 28. ee :

Potnt III. The cases cited by petitioners in their :

e . . . . . . &

brief are not in conflict with the decisions below. if

Nor were petitioners required to carry more than the FS

ordinary burden placed upon them by the Fire Stat- :

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be eS rN DAES Raa ele Ser SOCCER:

Cases CITED :

Boston C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co. v. Seaboard Transpor- ’

tation Co., C. C. A., Ist Cir. (1921), 270 Fed. 525; fl

cert. denied, 256 U. S. 692 _______--- Ragas He 21 ‘

Commercial Molasses Corporation v. New York Tank ‘

Barge Corporation (1941), 314 U.S. 104. 21 4

PRE a REI REE BRS My ty A ESO ge Ree Shs Lert yt aS

LTE RSI tL TAS TAC RR LAER IRENE NL SCR A SI SLC AR II RTI Tittle LENG LIOR PIPE conc cma .

ii INDEX |

PAGE

General Pictures Company v. Electric Company (1937),

964 0. 8. 175 _..--.------~---------------------- 5

Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. U.S. A., et al.,

(The Zaca), C. C. A., 2nd Cir. (1939), 105 Fed. (2d)

160; cert. denied, 308 U. S. 611 -------.--- even | |

Interlake Iron Corp. v. Gartland S. 8. Co., C. Go Ay

6th Cir. (1941), 121 Fed. (2d) 267; cert. denied, 314

U. 8 681 —...._-..---~-.----~------------------ 21

Just v. Chambers (1940), 312 U. 8. 383 -------------- 8

Southern Power Company v. N. C. Public Service Com-

pany (1923), 263 U. S. 508 ---------------------- 5

Texas & No. O. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks (1929), 281 U. S.

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FREON REAR OM ENE TEEN MN RC eR OP OY

% ARAB GE EOE Noe pe er

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroper Term, 1944

AVS ,uU “MY

No. 430

HOSKYN & CO., INC., et al., Petitioners,

against

SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ELECTRIC

CORP., et al., Petitioners,

against

SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.

CHINA GENERAL EDISON CO., INC., Petitioner,

against

SILVER LINE, LTD., Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SILVER LINE, LTD.

in opposition to

PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI

Preliminary Statement

The petitioners seek Writs of Certiorari addressed to

the United States Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit to the end that the affirmance by the Cireuit Court

of Appeals for the Second Cireuit of the judgments of the

2

United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York may be reviewed here.

Kighteen libels were filed in the District Court in or

about the early part of 1938 as a result of a fire on board

respondent’s vessel, the M. V. SiLvercyPREss, on January

13, 1937 while anchored in the harbor at llo Ilo, P. I. These

libels were by the order of the District Court consolidated

for the purpose of trial under the title of Hoskyn & Co.,

Inc. against Silver Line, Ltd.

Before frial, counsel had selected the following four

cases as typical and stipulated that the decision as to the

cause and liability for the fire in those cases would control

the decision of the other fourteen cases upon that issue:

Hoskyn & Co., Inc., et al.; International Standard Electric

Corp., et al.; China General Edison Co., Inc.; Pacific Com-

mercial Company.

The cases were tried as one before the District Court

for twelve consecutive court days. The trial ended April

22, 1942. Subsequently, exhaustive briefs were submitted

to the District Court by both parties. The District Court

on January 11, 1943 filed an opinion dismissing all of the

libels. (R. pp. 1296-1332) On March 25, 1943, the Court

filed a supplemental opinion. (R. pp. 1332-1337) In that

opinion it found in favor of libellant in the case of Pacific

Commercial Company on the ground that as the proximate

cause of the loss was the over-carriage of the goods from

Manila to Ilo Ilo and not the fire, respondent was not

entitled to the benefit of the Fire Statute. Decrees were

entered in the District Court in favor of the respondent in

the first three of the above cases and in favor of libellant

in the fourth case. Because of the small amount involved

($80.) in that case, respondent did not feel that an appeal

was warranted. Petitioners appealed from the decrees in

the first three cases and the United States Cireuit Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decrees in

those cases with a decision written by Judge CHase on June

8, 1944 (143 Fed. (2d) 462). Petition for a rehearing was

denied on June 26, 1944.

3

Although petitioners claim there is a conflict with deci-

sions of other Cireuit Courts of Appeal, as explained below

(Point III), there is no such conflict. None of the reasons

set forth in Rule XXXVIII 5(b) is present in this case.

The sole question presented to this Court is whether the

petitioners discharged the burden which petitioners con-

cede in their brief (p. 10) is placed upon them by the Fire

Statute (46 U. S. C. 182) of showing that the fire was

caused by respondent’s neglect. The District Court ruled

on the facts that they did not meet that burden and the

Cireuit Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling on the facts.

The following language from Judge CHase’s opinion

shows the precise nature of the question involved and, by

the same token, makes obvious the reasons why certiorari

should not be granted. Inter alia, Judge Cuase wrote:

“It was accordingly found, and is not now seriously dis-

puted, that the vessel was unseaworthy when she sailed

and continued to be unseaworthy up to the time of the

fire, and that such condition was due to the neglect

of the owner. Consequently the issue is further nar-

rowed to the question whether it was shown that the

neglect of the owner which allowed the No. 2 starboard

auxiliary to be used while it remained in the condition

that made the ship unseaworthy caused the fire. Com-

pare Christopher v. Grueby, 1 Cir., 40 F. (2) 8.

“This was an extremely difficult question to re-

solve in point of fact because the engine room was

gutted and when it could be entered after the fire so

much damage had been done that no definite evidence

concerning the cause of the fire could then be obtained.

‘‘Some facts as to conditions in the engine room

just before the fire were proved, however, and there

was evidence that a relief valve in one of the engine’s

cylinders then opened and let out hot gases and sparks.

The libellants directed most of their energies to at-

tempting to show that the fire was caused by the spray-

ing of oil from a small intake pipe against the hot ex-

haust pipes and the hot cylinder head when exces’ e

vibration caused the pipe to break. Yet there was no

4

evidence that such a pipe did in fact break before the

fire started. The respondent put forth a (fol. 1373)

contrary theory supported by the testimony of its

expert to the effect that an overhead fuel pipe in the

engine room might have sprung a leak, with results

later to be given. Yet there was no credible evidence

that such a leak did occur so all was left to specula-

tion. Such an occurrence, however, could not reason-

ably be connected with the owner’s proved neglect to

repair the engines. So there was expert testimony

pointing to a possible cause of the fire connected with

the owner’s neglect to put the auxiliaries in good re-

pair after notice and testimony just as expert point-

ing to a possible cause unconnected with any neglect

of the owner. There was also evidence of an unusual

loss of lubricating oil but that, too, indicated only a

lack of engine repair and mostly in respect to the main

engines which were idle when the fire started. The

trial judge could not find whether either theory as to

the cause of the fire was the correct one, or what did in

fact cause it.

‘The word ‘theory’ has been used deliberately for

it is apparent that no one can do more on the evidence

in this record than to speculate, and right there the

weakness of the libellants’ cause is revealed. The

statute placed upon them a burden it was impossible

to carry, as will now be seen from a discussion of the

available and proved facts in connection with the

operation of a Diesel engine of the multiple-cylinder

four-cycle type of the auxiliaries in this vessel.”’

After discussing the evidence adduced, Judge CHASE

concluded :

‘‘It is no wonder that on this sort of evidence the

trial judge could not decide which, if either, of these

theories showed how the fire was caused or find what

as a matter of fact did start it, and he had to leave

that vital question unanswered. There is, therefore,

nothing in this record which shows reversible error in

respect to any of the decrees.

‘On the contrary there is ample support for the

negative finding that the cause of the fire was not

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5

proved. Consequently it was not shown that any neg-

lect of the owner caused it and such a finding is to be

given effect on appeal. Compare Petterson Lighter-

age & T. Corp. v. New York Central R. Co., 2 Cir., 126

F. (2) 992. That leaves the libellants short of having

proved a cause of action, for the unseaworthiness of y

the ship did not alone deprive the respondent of the re

penefit of the fire statute. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. g

Co. v. United States, supra.”’ a

f

The United States District Court for the Southern Dis- :

trict and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for :

the Second Circuit, after an exhaustive review of the facts, 4

held that petitioners did not show that the fire was caused '

by respondent’s neglect. The Supreme Court of the United :

States is now asked to be the third court to pass on that ,

factual question. 4

The petition falls squarely within the frequently an- .

nounced rule of this Court that ‘granting of the writ would é

not be warranted merely to review the evidence or infer- i

ences drawn from it.’’ ;

General Pictures Company v. Electric Company ;

(1937), 304 U. S. 175, at page 178; E

Southern Power Company v. N. C. Public Service

Company (1923), 263 U. 8. 508.

Statement of Fact

At the trial petitioners read into the record the testi-

mony of one Ingram, a disgruntled and thoroughly dis-

credited former employee of the respondent, with respect

to conditions in the engine room of the vessel. Ingram

had been an engineer on the SILVERCYPRESS and was present

in the engine room immediately before and at the time

the fire broke out. (Opinion of the District Court (3981-

3982, 3990; 2700-2727, 9736-2785, 3195-3212, 3220-3231." )

Ingram was the only factual witness called by petitioners.

* References are to folios of the record unless otherwise stated.

The only other witness called by them was an expert on

Diesel engines.

Prior to the trial, pursuant to an order of discovery,

a large number of documents was produced from the files

of respondent, many of which were offered in evidence by

petitioners and many by respondent. (Opinion, District

Court, 3897)

On its behalf, respondent called as witnesses or read

into evidence the depositions of various of its engineers

and others. It also called as witnesses three experts

thoroughly familiar with the operations of Diesel engines.

(722, 1310, 1768, 1774, 2021-2027, 2062, 2072-2080, 2152,

9244, 2264-2271, 2818-2950, 2951-3053, 3050-3194)

The Sitvercypress under Lloyd’s inspection and at the

time of the fire was classed by Lloyd’s as + 100 A-1.

(3077) She was a modern vessel built in 1930, being com-

pleted in June of that year. She and other ships of the

respondent made around-the-world voyages carrying cargo

and passengers from the United States to Manila and

Far East ports where they also picked up cargo and

passengers for the return to the United States. Each

voyage took about four and one-half months to complete.

(724, 3056, 3060, 3061) The voyage on which the fire oc-

curred commenced at New York on November 24, 1936.

Thereafter, on the afternoon of January 12, 1937, the

Srivercypress brought up to anchor in the harbor at Tlo

Ilo, P. I. Immediately after anchoring at 3:30 P. M., the

ship commenced discharging cargo from all holds. This

continued throughout the night and until the fire broke out

in the engine room at 3:45 A. M. on the 13th. The fire

took hold very rapidly and within a matter of a few minutes

after the start of the fire, flames and sparks coming out

of the engine room skylights were blown aft and ignited

the cargo in the after holds of the ship, the hatch covers

being off all holds to permit the unloading of the cargo.

The fire burned for over seven days, not being extinguished

until January 20, at 4:20 P. M. (Chief Officer’s Log, Exs.

4-35-a; 4-35-c; 3517; Lib. Ex. 21, at 3666)

Other pertinent facts will be referred to hereafter.

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7

POINT 1

The District Court’s and the Circuit Court

of Appeals’ finding on the facts that the cause

of the fire was not proved being amply sup-

ported by the evidence should not be disturbed.

The District Court in its Supplemental Opinion (3997)

suecinetly stated its reasons for dismissing the libels in

the following language:

‘Inasmuch as the record disclosed that the fire

resulted from one of two or more Causes, and the causal

connection between the fire and any particular cause

and the personal negligence of the Respondent was

not established by the required measure of proof, the

Respondent was exonerated under the Fire clause.”’

The pertinent finding of fact was:

‘8. The precise origin of the fire was not estab-

Pn _ y ro

lished and resulted from one of two or more causes.

(4019)

and the Court’s conclusion of law was:

«3. The libellants failed to establish, by the re-

quired measure of proof, a causal connection between

the fire which destroyed the ‘Silvercypress’ and her

cargo, and the unseaworthiness of the vessel due to

the personal neglect of the respondent.

‘4. The respondent is, therefore, entitled to the

benefit and protection of the Fire Statute, no oe ae

(4022)

The Circuit Court of Appeals in commenting on and

in concurring with the District Court’s finding of fact

stated:

“On the contrary there is ample support for the

negative finding that the cause of the fire was not

proved.’’ (C. C. A. Opinion, p. 1375)

8

Accordingly, since the District Court and Cireuit Court

of Appeals have found as a fact, which fact is amply sup-

ported by the evidence (as hereinafter demonstrated),

«“* * * that the cause of the fire was not proved,’’ such

finding should not be disturbed.

Just v. Chambers (1940), 312 U. S. 383;

Texas & No. O. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks (1929), 281

U. S. 548.

POINT II

The District Court and the Circuit Court of

Appeals properly found that the cause of the

fire was not proved.

The fire started on the top of or near the No. 2 auxiliary

generator. Petitioners’ ‘“theory’’ of the fire is that the

No. 2 generator was overheated from improper timing,

that excess vibration due to the faulty condition of the

engine broke or fractured a 1%” fuel pipe leading from a

fuel pump on the No. 2 generator to a cylinder of that

generator, that the break or fracture of the small fuel pipe

resulted in the spraying out of a cloud of oil in vapor form

which came in contact with the overheated engine, thus

causing the fire, and that the fire was supported by large

quantities of lubricating oil which had escaped from the

crankeases of the main engines. (Opinion, C. C. A., pp.

1371-1374)

No eyewitness testified to any such conditions existing

at the time of the fire. The ‘‘theory’’ consisted merely of

conclusions drawn by petitioners from purely circumstan-

tial evidence. (Opinion, C. C. A., p. 1372) Their own fac-

tual witness Ingram, who was present in the engine room

before and at the time of the fire, did not testify to the

existence of any such conditions at the time of the fire.

Petitioners’ ‘‘theory’’ as to the cause and the extent

of the fire necessarily implies: (a) abnormal vibration of

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the No. 2 generator causing a 1%” pipe (carrying one gal-

lon of fuel oil an hour) to break; (b) late timing of the :

venerator causing the exhaust manifolds to become over- 3

heated; and (c) large quantities of lubricating oil on the :

tank tops and in the bilges.

A. Vibration

We deal first with petitioners’ contention that the fire

was caused by the breaking of a small 14” fuel pipe, which

break was caused by vibration resulting from the unsea-

worthy condition of the engine. This point was urged

strongly below both in the District Court and the Circuit

Court of Appeals. The District Court, however, made no

finding that any vibration, abnormal or otherwise, existed

in these engines, particularly in No. 2, or that such a small

fuel pipe broke, and the Cireuit Court of Appeals expressly

found that there was no evidence ‘‘* * * that there was

vibration which in fact caused a leak in a fuel pipe in the

manner described.’? (Opinion, C. C. A., p. 1374)

The testimony of petitioners’ own factual witness

Ingram negatives the inference that there was any abnor-

mal vibration present in these engines. Ingram testified

in one of his several opinions as to the cause of the fire

that in his opinion one of the small 14” pipes on the No. 2

generator fractured due to vibration caused (according

to him) by the tieing back of the governor handle or throttle

on that generator. (2663, 2673) When the load was

taken off that engine, this tieing back is said by him to

have caused the engine to race and, accordingly, vibrate.

(2663) Ingram does not otherwise refer to vibration of

the generator at all. Ingram’s explanation for vibration

is not advanced by petitioners for obvious reasons. It was

shown definitely on the trial that it would have been a

mechanical and electrical impossibility to operate the gen-

erators at all under the conditions prevailing previous to

and at the time of the fire with the governor handles tied

back. (C. C. A. Opinion, pp. 1873-4; 2029, 2131, 2341, 2498)

10

The District Court did not believe Ingram’s impossible

story. Indeed, even petitioners’ expert did not believe

Ingram’s testimony (561) and did not use it as a basis

for any opinion expressed by him. He admitted that the

No. 2 generator could not have operated with the gover-

nor handle tied back. (2498) After offering Ingram’s

testimony, petitioners do not now rely upon it at all, nor

could they, as it contradicts their theory of vibration. It

seems obvious that if any abnormal vibration existed,

Ingram, the disgruntled employee, need not and would not

have invented his impossible story to explain the supposed

breaking of the small fuel pipe.

Thus, petitioners’ case as to vibration was founded only

on the opinion testimony of their expert witness. His opin-

ion, however, was only to the effect that there ‘‘might have

been’? abnormal vibration in the engines. (337, 339) His

opinion was based on an examination of the records and

exhibits in the case. His testimony that there ‘‘might

have been’’ vibration is flatly contradicted by all of re-

spondent’s fact witnesses and is negatived by petitioners’

own witness Ingram, who testified, as pointed out above,

that vibration only existed when the load was taken off the

generator and the governor handle tied back, a condition

which petitioners’ expert rejected as impossible. (777,

785, 1391, 2498) It was further refuted by the respondent’s

experts who (from an examination of the same records as

were examined by petitioners’ expert) gave as their opin-

ions that there was nothing in such records to indicate

any abnormal vibration in any of the generators. (2114,

2319) Under these circumstances, it is obvious why the

Cireuit Court of Appeals found as a fact that there was no

evidence ‘‘* * * that there was yibration which in fact

caused a leak in a fuel pipe in the manner described”’

(C. C. A. Opinion, p. 1374) and why the District Court

made no finding that any vibration, abnormal or otherwise,

existed in these engines or that it caused a fuel pipe to

break.

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11

B. Timing

Petitioners lay emphasis here, as they did in the District

Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals, upon an alleged

defective condition of the timing apparatus on the No. 2

generator. The reason for this emphasis is the assumption

by the petitioners that if the so-called ‘‘late timing’’ could

be established as having existed at the time of the fire, it

would necessarily lead to the inference that the engine

itself, or at least the exhaust pipes or exhaust manifold

of that engine, was white hot, and to the further inference

that loose fuel oil escaping from the assumed fracture of

a small fuel pipe on No. 2 generator was ignited by these

white hot exhaust pipes or manifold. It is obvious, there-

fore, that this is a theory as to the cause of the fire built

upon a number of successive inferences, none of which is

justified by the known facts.

Before examining the successive steps necessary to sus-

tain this theory and pointing out their speculative natures,

respondent calls attention to the fact that the Circuit Court

of Appeals found that there was no evidence that faulty

timing ‘‘did in fact overheat the engine just before the

fire’? (C. C. A. Opinion, p. 1374), and the District Court

made no finding that the timing of the No. 2 generator

was “‘late’’ or that the engine was overheated at the time

of the fire.

Every instance which appears in the record of any ‘‘late

timing’ of the engines is definitely shown by the factual

witnesses or by the records to have been corrected long

before the fire. (754, 756, 761, 763-4, 1291, 1424, 1428-1431,

1717, 2088-2097, 2115, 2303, 2318, 2349-50) Since peti-

tioners did not establish that ‘‘late timing’’ existed at the

time of the fire, the subject becomes of no importance be-

cause it is not claimed, nor could it be, that ‘‘late timing’’

of an engine at an earlier date created an overheating of

the engine exhaust or manifold at the time of the fire.

That the timing of the generators, particularly the No.

2, was in order on Voyage 17 and on the night of the fire

is substantiated by the testimony of petitioners’ own factual

witness Ingram as well as by other witnesses. Ingram

makes no mention whatsoever of the alleged defect or loose-

ness in the sprocket wheel of No. 2 generator which, if it

existed, petitioners contended would result in late timing.

Furthermore, he admitted in his testimony that the ‘‘late

timing’’ which may have existed on a previous voyage had

been corrected before the start of the voyage on which the

fire occurred. (2618)

It thus appears that petitioners’ contention here and in

the District Court that late timing existed in the No. 2

generator at the time of the fire is not only based upon

inference but is contrary to the known facts.

Moreover, the known facts do not sustain petitioners’

contention that an overheated exhaust pipe or manifold

ignited the fuel oil. The known and undisputed fact is that

the safety or relief valves on the Nos. 2 and 3 cylinders

of the No. 2 generator had been opening intermittently for

some minutes before and up to the start of the fire with

the result that white hot flames and sparks were being shot

out from them. (2626, 2822, 3586, 3607, 3623, 3649; Dis-

trict Court Opinion, 3919) It further disregards the fact

admitted by all of the witnesses, including petitioners’ own

expert, that the white hot flames and sparks shot out from

the relief valves could, without any intervening cause, ig-

nite loose fuel oil on or in the vicinity of the No. 2 generator.

(630, 1480, 1813, 2142, 9338) Ingram referred to another

possible cause for the ignition of fuel oil in his eyewitness

reference to sparks being thrown out by the No. 1 generator

commutator. (3609)

C. Lubricating Oil

Petitioners’ brief (Point II) states that leakage of

lubricating oil in the two main engine crankcases was aD

inevitably important contributing cause of the fire on the

SILVERCYPRESS.

As a matter of fact, lubricating oil is not once men-

tioned in the findings of the District Court, and the Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals expressly found that leakage of

——

13

lubricating oil was not a contributing cause of the fire

(C. C. A. Opinion, p. 1371), although in both courts this

point was strongly urged by petitioners.

The statements in the District Court’s opinion referred

to by the petitioners in their brief at pages 28 and 29

merely recount testimony of witnesses as to whether or

not there was a loss of lubricating oil on the previous

voyage, and conjectures as to how such loss may have

occurred. There was no finding by the District Court on

the subject of the presence of lubricating oil on the tank

tops or in the bilges. Furthermore the comments in its

opinion relate to the previous voyage and the subsequent

repairs made in New York included tightening all holding

down bolts on both main engines, removing and cleaning

the sealing bars on the starboard engine and rejointing

them, and rejointing the worst sealing bars in the port

engine. There is no mention of any loss of lubricating oil

in any of the testimony subsequent to these repairs; nor

is there a single word of testimony that there was lubricat-

ing oil on the tank tops or in the bilges at any stage of

Voyage 17. Indeed the evidence is to the contrary. (Ex-

hibit LL; 933-936)

Moreover, there is no evidence that even on the pre-

vious voyage the so-called ‘‘shortage”’ found its way to the

tank tops or the bilges or that if it did it would have

contributed to the fire on Voyage 17. In fact, there is a

real question of whether there was any leakage at all.

The Chief Engineer of the Sitvercypress did not be-

lieve that lubricating oil was leaking out of the crankcases

of the main engines. In an endeavor to account to his

owners for a ‘‘shortage’’ of lubricating oil, he reported

by letter on September 25, 1936 that

‘‘T have made a thorough examination of cofferdams,

dry tank, tank tops and pipe lines and have not been

able to find any appreciable leakage. * * *

«* * * J think there can be no doubt the reason for

this big shortage is entirely due to the amount of

sludge and water taken from the system. * * ae

NE BE Re TT hye IA NEED RAGES FORA ST EDL SER RIO DET A At DEE RIB Ge NS Pa I AN AT a ES ae

14

have not been able to find out how the water got into

the system; * * *.’? (Lib. Ex. 4-25, 3459, 3460)

Moreover, in a further report to his owners, dated Decem-

ber 2, 1936, he again attributed the ‘‘shortgage’’ to con-

tamination by sea water leaking into the main engine lubri-

cating oil system rather than to oil leaking out. (Lib. Ex.

4-28-b, at 3483) Others were of the opinion that there was

no shortage and hence no appreciable leakage but that

the lubricating oil was being consumed in the engines.

797, 1356, 2277-2281) But even if we assume that the

‘‘shortage’’ of lubricating oil was fully accounted for by

leaks rather than by contamination by sea water or con-

sumption, and even if we assume that the lubricating oil

went on to the tank tops and from them into the bilges,

nevertheless, such loss over a period of seven months would

not be material in so far as the fire on January 13 was con-

cerned.

The construction of the tank tops was such that no

substantial quantity of oil could accumulate on them.

(Resp. Exs. PP and ZZ; 905, 3808, 3856) Not only the

construction of the tank tops but the constant rolling of

the ship at sea makes it inevitable that any liquid, either

water or oil, present there would go into the bilges. More-

over, they were hosed down each Saturday (792), and re-

spondent’s second engineer testified that they were clean

the Saturday before the fire. (794-5) Petitioners imply,

at page 30 of their brief, that the second engineer was tes-

tifying untruthfully when he stated that the tank tops were

hosed down each Saturday. They neglect to point out

that his testimony to that effect was substantiated by their

own witness Ingram. (2565)

The 6,000 gallon loss of lubricating oil reported on the

previous voyage and referred to by petitioners in their

brief consisted of a ‘‘shortage’’ of 4950 gallons on the

voyage to Hongkong and 1440 gallons between Singapore,

the next port of call after Hongkong, and New York. (Lib.

Exs. 4-39, 4-28-b, at 3533, 3482)

RADE Sa PS NAINA ae CN 9 tea EN EE Ne AIRE ARNO A ETE DES So SUNT LPIA OU SILER IETS ELLE AOS LEASE

‘a EST SS ae

15

| The tank tops, bilges, etc., were thoroughly cleaned at

Hongkong on the previous voyage. (Bill of A. Hong, Lib.

Ex. 4-21-c, at 3424; 909-12) Hence, any shortage prior to

that time certainly has no bearing on the fire. The re-

corded ‘‘shortage’’ between Singapore and New York

of 1440 gallons on that voyage, divided by the number of

days shown gives a ‘‘loss’’ of about 24 gallons per day.

This would mean that no more than 4 gallons could leak

out during any one watch of which presumably 2 gallons

would be on the starboard side and 2 gallons on the port

side, and, of course, it is undisputed that the bilges were

pumped out each watch. (797-8, 2686) Furthermore, the

main engines had not been running from 2:49 of the after-

noon of January 12, the day previous to the fire (Chief

Officer’s log Ex. 4-35 a, b, ¢, at 3517; C. C. A. Opinion,

p. 1371), so that no oil could have leaked out from that

time until the fire, and the bilges had been pumped

just before going into port. (797) Petitioners, however,

have intimated that although the bilges were pumped

out each watch and had been pumped out before go-

ing into Ilo Ilo, nevertheless, a large quantity of oil

still could have remained in the bilges. This is an in-

ference contrary to the facts. The evidence shows (1022)

that the bilge pump suctions, which are at the after end of

the engine room bilges, are no more than 3 inches from

the bottom of the bilges and that the vessel being down

by the stern, all the contents of the bilges would be pumped

out except for a small bit in the immediate vicinity of the

bilge suctions. &

Even petitioners’ witness Ingram (2567) says there was

only a ‘‘skim of oil on the water’’ in the bilges the day

before the fire; in other words, a trace of oil which, of

course, is present in any motorship. That they were in

normal condition was confirmed by respondent’s witness.

(797-8)

Obviously, if there had been any substantial accumula-

tion of oil on the tank tops or in the bilges, not only Ingram,

but the other engineers would have seen it, and the Chief

Engineer would have reported it. It is ridiculous to be-

—

16

lieve that the Chief Engineer would have wasted his time

trying to account to his owners for a ‘‘shortage’’ of lubri-

cating oil if it had shown up on the tank tops or in the

bilges. Similarly, Ingram would have seized upon this as

one of his most vital criticisms of the ship rather than a

casual reference to a ‘‘skim’”’ of oil.

Furthermore, we point out that the Chief Engineer’s

list of repairs (3505, et seq.) to be made at Hongkong on

the last voyage made no reference whatsoever to any de-

fective condition of the sealing bars and holding down bolts

in either main engine and no reference to any leakage of

oil from those engines.

Reference is made in petitioners’ brief to their witness

Ingram’s testimony that shortly after the fire broke out,

flames mounted up on the other side of the engine room.

However, they neglect to point out that Ingram did not

attribute the outbreak of fire on the port side to the alleged

leakage of lubricating oil. (2666, 3656-8)

From the above it is apparent that petitioners failed to

prove the three essential elements necessary to their theory

as to the cause of the fire, namely (a) vibration which

caused the breaking of a pipe; (b) defective timing which

caused the engine to overheat; and (c) leakage of lubri-

eating oil which caused the fire to spread. Proof of all

three elements is necessary to sustain petitioners’ theory

and hold the respondent for the fire. This is a case where

failure of proof went, not only to one essential element but

toall three. Petitioners failed in the following respects: (a)

They drew one inference when several might have been

drawn. (b) They disregarded known facts material to

any explanation of the fire. (c) They based inference upon

inference as a substitute for proof.

Respondent’s Theory Concerning the

Cause of the Fire.

Petitioners’ ‘‘theory’’ as to the cause of the fire ignores

the only two things that are known concerning conditions

in the vicinity of the No. 2 generator at the time the fire

y bn

. erat ie Per ea ical le ele

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17

broke out. These are (1) that the relief or safety valves

on the No. 2 and 3 cylinders of the No. 2 generator, as

pointed out above, were lifting and discharging white hot

flames and carbon sparks; (2626, 2681, 2723, 2822, 2852,

2867, 2921, 3586, 3609, 3623, 3630, 3647, 3649) (2) that

there was a considerable quantity of fuel oil on the floor

plates at the forward end and outboard of the No. 2 gen-

erator just previous to and at the time of the fire. (2634,

2674, 3608; Diagram, 3616, 3665)

Respondent’s witnesses testified that in their opinion

(which took into consideration the known facts) the fire

occurred in the following manner:

A large overhead fuel pipe broke or speane a sub-

stantial leak. [Concededly, the breaking of such an over-

head fuel pipe could not be charged to respondent’s

neglect. (C.C. A. Opinion, pp. 1371, 1375) ] The oil there-

from fell or was sprayed onto the cylinder tops and around

the No. 2 generator and an unknown quantity of this oil,

falling on the air intakes of the cylinders, was drawn into

the cylinders by suction, causing overloads in the cylin-

ders, the overloads causing the relief valves to lift; that

part of the oil which fell from the large overhead pipe

on to the generator itself was heated to its fire point by

the normal operating heat of the generator, and gave off

an inflammable vapor; the continuous opening of the relief

valves (caused by the excess oil from the air intake over-

loading the cylinders) permitted hot carbon and flame to

shoot out at each explosion and, thus coming in contact

with the vaporized oil, ignited it. (1473-86, 1813-15, 2138-45,

2335-41; Dist. Court Opinion, 3968-3981; C. C. A. Opinion,

pp. 1374, 1375)

That fuel oil leaking from an overhead fuel pipe sucked

into the air intakes would bring about a condition of ex-

cessive fuel in the cylinder which in turn would cause the

relief valves to lift with the result that the loose fuel oil

admittedly in the vicinity heated to its fire point by the

normal operating heat of the generator would be ignited

was admitted by everyone, including petitioners’ expert.

BLT A NY RETOLD: IRE LOOSE OG Gah IME LENE ASE IGE LG cs BOO! BE BEE EL IO ORS: DR I PES WANDS

ee en RR a Te te ae ae

(C. C. A. Opinion, pp. 1374-5; 594, 630, 1479, 1480, 1813,

2141-2, 2338) Unlike petitioners’ ‘‘theory’’, this theory

does not require an inference that the exhaust manifolds

were abnormally heated, for, as pointed out above, the

white hot flames and carbon shot out from the lifting relief

valves admittedly would have been sufficient to ignite the

loose fuel oil.

Respondent’s witnesses pointed out that there was no

other source for the large quantities of fuel oil which

ignited immediately, nor any explanation other than the

breaking of a large fuel supply pipe for the size of the

fire which filled the engine room in a few minutes.. In

commenting on petitioners’ theory that a small fuel pipe

or by-pass valve on the No. 2 generator fractured, they

testified that in their opinion the quantity of fuel oil,

amounting to about one gallon an hour, which would flow

from such broken 1%” fuel pipe or by-pass valve could noi

have caused the fire of the magnitude described by Ingram.

(2143, 2339, 2406) Their opinion also finds support in the

written statement made by one of respondent’s engineers

after the fire (3689) that a 34” branch overhead fuel pipe

had been found broken off and his testimony covering his

conversation with Ingram after the fire. (1796) Once

this fuel supply pipe was broken, oil would continue to flow

out of it by gravity until the tank—said by Ingram to

contain 1700 gallons (2683) was empty. It is further borne

out by Ingram’s testimony that there was a considerable

quantity of fuel oil on the floor plates at the forward end

of and the outboard side of the No. 2 generator just previous

to and at the time of the fire. (2634, 2674, 3608; Diagram,

3616, 3665)

The breaking or leaking of a large overhead fuel pipe is

almost the only explanation for the presence of the fuel oil

that Ingram states he saw glistening on the floor plates.

This oil, Ingram stated, extended the whole way from

where he was standing (Diagram Ex. 19, 3616) around back

of the generator No. 2 and to the starboard bilge outboard.

«te

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19

As heretofore pointed out, the presence of this oil is not

even mentioned by petitioners in their brief. That it was

fuel oil is absolutely clear from Ingram’s testimony to the

effect that he knew it was fuel oil because it was the color

of brandy, whereas lubricating oil is greeny blue in color.

(2635)

There are many reasons which might cause such an

overhead pipe to break, among them the following: The

rolling of the ship in a seaway which causes the weights

in the engine room to pull away from the side of the ship

which sets up strain, resulting eventually in the fracturing

of pipes. (1392, 1576) Crystallization of the metal is an-

other cause of pipes giving out. (2048) The laboring of

a ship in heavy weather will cause pipes to fracture, al-

though such fractures may not show up for some time

after the heavy weather was encountered. Pipes break or

fracture for no apparent reason whatsoever. (430, 2147,

2356-7, 2417)

Petitioners in their brief imply as they did below that

it is far-fetched to believe that if the leak had occurred in

an overhead pipe, the men in the vicinity would not have

been covered with oil while standing at the No. 2 generator.

However, as no one knew the exact location of the overhead

fuel pipe, no one can say for certain where the break or

fracture occurred. (1987, 2196) Furthermore, no one

knows in what way the oil would have been falling out from

the break or fracture. It might have sprayed in any direc-

tion. It was the considered opinion of the experts that it

did not necessarily have to fall straight down, nor that it

would necessarily fall upon the two men standing at the

No. 2 generator. (2199-2202, 2408)

It is thus apparent that the inferences which petitioners

sought to draw, and which inferences ignore the two known

facts in this case, i. e., the lifting of the relief valves and

the quantity of fuel oil on the floor plates at the forward

end and outboard of the No. 2 generator, are not the only

or probable ones which can fairly and reasonably be drawn

from the facts. Nor, as shown above, did petitioners’

~se

20

theory as to the cause of the fire fairly and reasonably

exclude any other explanation for it.

It is thus obvious that the finding of the District Court

and the Circuit Court of Appeals that the cause of the fire

was not proved and that petitioners accordingly failed to

meet the burden placed upon them by the Fire Statute is

amply supported by the evidence.

POINT III

The cases cited by petitioners in their brief

are not in conflict with the decisions below. Nor

were petitioners required to carry more than

the ordinary burden placed upon them by the

Fire Statute.

It was and is conceded by petitioners that the so-called

Fire Statute applied in these cases; that the burden was

upon them to show that the fire which destroyed or damaged

their cargo was caused by the neglect of the owner and

that it is immaterial whether the vessel was or was not

seaworthy. (Petition, p. 10)

Accordingly, the situation was like any other where a

claimant brings himself within an exemption in which event

the libellant must prove that he was negligent.

Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. U. S. A., et

al. (The Zaca), C. C. A., 2nd Cir. (1939), 105

Fed. (2d) 160; cert. denied, 308 U. S. 611.

There can be no argument with the cases cited by peti-

tioners in their brief. Nor is there any conflict between

the decision below and the decisions of other Circuit Courts

of Appeal cases. In fact, we agree entirely with the prin-

ciple laid down in the cases cited from other Circuit Courts

of Appeal. That principle is that a recovery should be

allowed only where the only reasonable inference which

can be drawn from all the circumstances lead to the conelu-

sion that the negligence of the person sought to be charged

21

with liability was a substantial factor in causing the injury

for which indemnity is sought. In other words, that the

owner was guilty of neglect which caused the fire.

Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. U. S. A,

et al. (supra);

Interlake Iron Corp. v. Gartland S.S.Co., C. C. A.,

6th Cir. (1941), 121 Fed. (2d) 267; cert. denied,

314 U. S. 681.

In the instant cases, however, both the District Court and

the Circuit Court of Appeals found on the facts that peti-

tioners failed to show that it was the owner’s neglect which

caused the fire.

Both courts found that on the evidence it could not be

decided ‘‘how the fire was caused or find what as a matter

of fact did start it, * * *.’? (C. C. A. Opinion, pp. 1372,

1375) Under such circumstances, petitioners did not meet

the burden concededly placed upon them by the Fire Stat-

ute, for, as stated by this Court in Commercial Molasses

Corporation v. New York Tank Barge Corporation (1941),

314 U. S. 104, at page 112, ‘‘Wherever the burden rests,

he who undertakes to carry it must do more than create

a doubt which the trier of fact is unable to resolve.’’

See also, Boston C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co. v. Sea-

board Transportation Co., C. C. A., 1st Cir.

(1921), 270 Fed. 525; cert. denied, 256 U. S.

692.

The petition should be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

GroRGE DE Forest Lorp,

Counsel for Respondent.

Tuomas F. Daty,

of Counsel.

Dated, New York, September 21, 1944.

CPY7595

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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