Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commissioner
Supreme Court brief1944
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CITATIONS
Cases:
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 S660: =. 2-5 n5.neeoss- 8
United States v. Joliet & Chicago R. Co., 315 U.S. 44..--- 7
United States v. Morris & Essex R. Co., 135 F. 2d 711,certi-
orari denied, 320 U. 8. 754- ---- - - - -----------------7- 9
United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. 8. 399. ------------------ 9
Statutes:
Revenue Act of 1928, ¢. 852, 45 Stat. 791, Sec. 311__---- 2,8,9
Revenue Act of 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169, Sec. 311_----- 3, 8,9
(1)
587464—44
Ee Re
Ynthe Supreme Court of the United States
OctToBeR TERM, 1943
No. 933
THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
PETITIONER
V..
CoMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Board of
Tax Appeals (R. 160-164) is not officially re-
ported. The opinion of the Circuit Court of
Appeals (R. 457-465) is not yet reported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
was entered on April 12, 1944 (R. 466). The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed April
26, 1944. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under Section 240 (a) of the J udicial
Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.
(1)
QUESTION PRESENTED
The respective taxpayers executed long-term
contracts leasing all of their properties to the
petitioner in consideration of stipulated rentals
to be paid by the lessee quarterly or semian-
nually directly to the lessors’ stockholders of rec-
ord as dividends upon their shares of stock. In
addition to being lessee, petitioner was a ma-
jority or substantial stockholder of each of the
lessors. The taxpayers have not paid the income
taxes due in respect of their rental incomes and
have no properties upon which levies may be
made, the leased properties having been so inter-
mingled with properties of petitioner that segre-
gation is impossible. The question is whether
petitioner is liable as transferee for the unpaid .
taxes under Section 311 (a) (1) of the Revenue
Acts of 1928 and 1932 by reason of the rental
dividends received by it as stockholder of the
respective lessors.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Revenue Act of 1928, ¢. 852, 45 Stat. 791:
Sec. 311. TRANSFERRED ASSETS.
(a) Method of collection—The amounts
of the following liabilities shall, except as
hereinafter in this section provided, be as-
sessed, collected,~and paid in the same
manner and subject to the same -provisions
and limitations as in the case of a deficiency
in a tax imposed by this title (including the
provisions in case of delinquency in pay-
ment after notice and demand, the provi-
sions authorizing distraint and proceed-
ings in court for collection, and the
provisions prohibiting claims and suits for
refunds) :
(1) Transferees.—The liability, at law or
in equity, of a transferee of property of a
taxpayer, in respect of the tax (including
interest, additional amounts, and additions
to the tax provided by law) imposed upon
the taxpayer by this title.
* * * * *
Any such liability may be either as to the
amount of tax shown on the return or as
to any deficiency in tax.
* * * * *
(f) Definition of ‘““transferee.’’—As used
in this section, the term ‘‘transferee’’ in-
cludes heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee.
Section 311 of the Revenue Act of 1932, ¢. 209,
47 Stat. 169, is identical.
STATEMENT
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue deter-
mined that petitioner was liable as transferee
under Section 311 of the Revenue Acts of 1928
and 1932 for unpaid income taxes due and owing
for 1931, 1932, and 1933 from six corporations of
which it was a stockholder. (R. 23-25, 180.)’
In the interest of brevity, record references are limited
herein to the evidence and proceedings relating to the Gold
LORRI I PORN TS LIE RRL MEAT RY APNE RONN ae AIRRY ee
4
The taxes which the Commissioner has thus
assessed against the petitioner are the >. See
(R. 24-25, 161):
Taxpayer 1931 1932 1933
Gold & Stock Telegraph Co_-......-....---------- $36, 000 $41, 250. 00 $41, 250. 00
Pacific & Atlantic Telegraph Co...........-...-.-- 9, 600 11, 000. 00 11, 000. 00
New York Mutual Telegraph Co--........------- 18, 000 20, 625. 00 20, 625. 00
Franklin Telegraph Co--....--..----.-.---------- 2, 640 3, 437. 50 3, 437. 50
Southern and Atlantic Telegraph Co............-|------------ 6, 531. 25 6, 531. 25
Empire and Bay States Telegraph Co.!......-.--- 776 776. 00 776. 00
1 The amount of the taxes of the Empire and Bay States Telegraph Company sought to be
collected from petitioner has been limited to the dividends received for the respective years
. from this corporation, the taxpayer’s liability for each year having exceeded petitioner's
dividends on the shares of stock owned by it in the lessor company (R. 143-146, 424, 426),
The amount of petitioner’s annual dividends exceeded the liabilities of the respective tax
payers in ihe companion cases.
The foregoing taxes were assessed and war-
rants of distraint issued against the respective
lessor corporations but no part thereof was col-
lected (R. 180). Thereupon the deficiencies listed
above were asserted against petitioner as trans-
feree (R. 180). The Commissioner’s determina-
tion that petitioner was liable as transferee was
based upon its receipt of dividends upon the
stock which it owned in the taxpayer corpora-
tions (R. 173-174). It is conceded that the tax-
payers primarily liable have no property or funds
with which to satify their own obligations (R.
173-174).
The following schedule shows in the case of
each taxpayer the amount of its outstanding
and Stock Telegraph Company, unless differences or pecu-
liarities make references to the companion proceedings
desirable.
| ,
5
capital stock, the number of shares owned by
petitioner and the annual dividends allocable
to those shares (R. 172, 177, 263, 269, 300, 309,
346-347, 353, 380-381, 387, 418, 419, 424).
Total shares of tax- Annual divi-
payer outstanding Shares | dends allo-
Taxpayer owned by] cable to
petitioner} petitioner’s
No. Par value shares
Gold & Stock Telegraph Co.........-------] 50,000 | $5,000, 000 20,476 | 1 $176, 856.00
Pacific and Atlantic Telegraph Co. ......-- 80,000 | 2,000,000 | 58,877 58, 877.00
New York Mutual Telegraph Co-......--- 100,000 | 2, 500,000 96, 372 144, 558. 00
Franklin Telegraph Co-.--.....-.-.--------- 9, 961 996, 100 6, 320 15, 800. 00
Southern and Atlantic Telegraph Co-.....- 37, 962 949, 050 15, 639 19, 548. 75
Empire and Bay States Telegraph Co-...-. 3, 000 300, 000 194 776.00
| The amount of the annual dividends upon Western Union’s stock in the Gold and Stock
Telegraph Company amounted to $153,336 for the year 1931 and to $176,856 for 1932 and 1933
(R. 177).
The earliest lease involved was that of the
Pacific and Atlantic Company, which was ex-
ecuted in 1873 for a period of 999 years (R. 282-
286) ; and the latest lease was that of the Empire
and Bay States Telegraph Company, executed in
1890 for a period of 99 years (R. 436-441). The
other leases were for periods of either 99 years
or 999 years (R. 189-196, 320-326, 364-367, 400-
407). The respective instruments provided that
in consideration of the lease of the properties, the
lessee was to pay an amount equivalent to a speci-
fied percentage on the capital stock of the lessor
corporations, and that these payments should
be made directly to the stockholders of the lessors
in proportion to their stock holdings as shown
by the books at the time the payments were due
(R. 191). In some instances the rental dividends
6
were payable quarterly (R. 191, 438), and in other
instances semiannually (R. 283, 322, 365, 403).
Since petitioner was both lessee and a_ stock-
holder of the lessors, the payment of the rentals
and collection of its share of the dividends was
handled in the following manner: the total
rental was charged upon the books as an ex-
pense to a rental account (R. 177). The portion
of the total payable to stockholders other than
petitioner was deposited in a special account,
upon which dividend checks were drawn payable
directly to each of the stockholders (R. 177).
The portion belonging to petitioner by reason of
the shares of stock owned by it in each of the
lessor corporations was credited to its dividend
income account (R. 177).
The properties leased to petitioner have been
so intermingled with its own properties that seg-
regation is admittedly impossible (R. 173, 263-
264, 301, 347, 382, 420). The payment of divi-
dends upon the stock of the lessor companies was
guaranteed by petitioner and this was evidenced
in some instances by endorsements on each certifi-
eate (R. 173).
The United States Board of Tax Appeals stated
that it felt constrained to follow certain decisions
of the Second Circuit which it cited and held ac-
cordingly that petitioner was not liable as trans-
feree, sustaining petitioner’s contention here, in-
dicating that its own opinion was otherwise (R.
161-164). The Second Circuit, overruling its own
7
earlier decisions followed by the Board, agreed
with that tribunal and thy Commissioner that
petitioner was liable (R. 457-464). As to taxes
owed by two of the lessor companies, however, the
court affirmed the decision of the Board because
of prior decisions of the court that petitsoner was
not liable for taxes owed by the same companies
in earlier years, which rendered the issues as to
liability for taxes upon the incomes of those com-
panies res judicata (R. 464-465).
ARGUMENT
The taxpayer lessors leased all of their prop-
erties to petitioner for terms of 99 years or 999
years. Petitioner agreed to pay rent in the form
of dividends directly to the lessors’ stockholders
of record as their interests should appear at the
dates the rental dividends became payable. The
properties leased have been so intermingled with
the properties of petitioner that segregation is
admittedly impossible and the taxpayers have no
other assets upon which levies may be made to
effect collection of the income taxes due from the
taxpayers in respect of the rentals thus paid.
That such rentals constituted income taxable to
the lessors is settled (United States v. Joliet &
Chicago R. Co., 315 U. 8. 44). Under these cir-
cumstances the Commissioner’s determination to
pursue the dividend distributions into the hands
of petitioner, the majority stockholder of four of
the taxpayers and a substantial stockholder of
8
the other two, was proper under the provisions of
Section 311 of the Revenue Ac«s of 1928 and 1932
(Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. 8. 589). The
decision below holding petitioner liable as trans-
feree is correct and there is no occasion for
further review.
In effect the taxpayers declared dividends in
the amount of their entire incomes and petitioner
urges that by such action a corporation can create
rights in its stockholders superior to the tax
claims of the Government. This view has been
correctly rejected by the court below, overruling
its own earlier decisions to the contrary. It is
strenuously urged, however, that the decision be-
low construing and applying the federal revenue
statute encroaches upon and is in conflict with the
general rule that property rights must be deter-
mined under local law. (Pet. Br. 12-15.)
There is no conflict. The federal law grants
to the Government certain rights in the case of
transferred assets as an aid in tax collections, but
this does not preclude the operation of state law
in the event of any controversy concerning the
property rights of the parties interested in the
leases. We are not concerned here with any con-
flict of interest between the lessor and the lessee or
the stockholders of the lessor, and we are not con-
tending that the transfers by the lessors of their
properties to the lessee were invalid. It is be-
cause the conveyances to the lessee were valid
9
that it is now necessary to collect the lessors’
annual income taxes from the instant distributee,
which, together with other stockholders, has been
siphoning off the rental incomes of the lessors
before they reached the tills of these companies.
We think it clear that distributions of dividends
by a corporation without any provision for the
payment of annual income taxes make the re-
cipients distributees within the meaning of Sec-
tion 311 (f) of the federal statutes, and it matters
not whether the distributions were authorized by
the directors before or after they knew of the
incidence of such taxes. However, if there were
any inconsistency between the federal and local
law, it is settled that federal revenue statutes are
to be construed in the light of their general pur-
pose to establish a nation-wide scheme of taxation
uniform in their application, and not subject to
state limitation unless the language of the statute,
or its necessary implication, makes its application
dependent on state law (United States v. Pelzer,
312 U.S. 399).
The fact that the Government may have an
alternative remedy through applications for in-
junctions (United States v. Morris & Essex R.
Co., 1385 F. 2d 711 (C. C. A. 2d), certiorari denied,
320 U.S. 754) does not indicate that the statutory
remedy invoked here is improper.
We are here concerned only with the simple
fact that annual transfers were made to the stock-
10
holders of the full amounts of the taxpayers’ in-
omes without provision for the sovereign’s taxes.
[his is the conventional situation in which a
transferee liability arises.
CONCLUSION
| The petition for a writ of certiorari should be!
denied.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FAHY,
Solicitor General.
SAMUEL O. CuLaRK, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General.
SEWALL KEY,
J. Louis MonaRCH,
Pau. R. RUSSELL,
Special Assistants to the Attorney General.
May 1944.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1944
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