Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Stoike v. First National Bank

Supreme Court brief1943

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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1943

No. 170

ARTHUR H. STOIKE,

Petitioner,

against

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF THE CITY

OF NEW YORK,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Lowest Wapmonp,

Counsel for Respondent.

Ouiver P. Scarre III,

Of Counsel.

INDEX

PAGE

UR MBOU MIND TORIC a ci ockv esdecconsccnoeicsichalocindsiorce. 1

Ee OF OEE orsecnsdincesoisitidnlin eae A 2

Point I.—To be entitled to judgment for overtime compensa-

tion under the Fair Labor Standards Act, it is necessary for

petitioner to prove that he was engaged in interstate com-

merce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce

Point II.—Petitioner was not engaged in interstate conimerce

within the meaning of Section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Stand-

A BE Se oso edihanenns ee ee os

A. Petitioner's activities, considered alone and without rela-

tion to any other activity carried on in respondent bank

building, obviously did not constitute interstate commerce

B. This Court expressly has held in several recent cases that

an activity “convenient” or “necessary” to or “affect-

ing” interstate commerce is not sufficient to satisfy the

express requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act

that petitioner be engaged in interstate commerce itself.

C. Petitioner’s cleaning, dusting and mopping, either in the

banking quarters or in the tenant space of the bank

building, were not so closely related to any of the bank-

ing services performed. in the banking quarters (assumed

for the purpose of argument, but not conceded, to be

interstate commerce) as to be practically a part thereof

and therefore themselves to constitute interstate com-

IGN tsb aceitad caeaapuceicraro Seidiotoazitinidon wheene ete

Pornt III.—Petitioner was not engaged in production of goods

se ds Bi, ., I ENR

APPENDIX—Opinion of Court of Appeals

OTSA INES HM SIO

12

ii Index

CASES CITED

PAGE

A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517... 4,7

Armbruster v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 166

Towa 155, 147 N. W. 337 .......scccccccecsssseesssesensesenseseneneneeanes 18

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Branson, 242 U. S. 623... 16

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Harrington, 241

Oe ons aioe ieee henidiavons ct oromanensequenicimaatteen icons 19

Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. Co. v. Industrial Commission,

Se er. Oe SA eile in euiieed 14, 15

Chicago & North Western R. Co. v. Bolle, 284 U. S. 74... 17

Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R. Co. v. Wright, 239 U. S.

oe ate, Ie lag sha kicnniiag Napanee pomeeinienah tina tahoe 14, 15

Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis,

I a cin pears coe neODL RE 18

Rete Ha, 6 CR, Se a FF oes ccscs icine 14

Erie R. R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U. S 86 ......ccccccscssesseseseesssonees 14

Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S.

DN oe re he NLL ooh 4 th ct auacsualeivagabaavieisonWh enakinvan iiahadx snc stes 6

Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 572 occ ec 10

Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Cousins, 241 U. S 641.00. 17

Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Peery, 242 U. S. 292 «0.0... 15

Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Development Co., 318 U. S.

ee TERR RE Ay DRE AROMAT RE eee Peer ere 22, 24, 25, 31

Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Development Co., 132 Fed. (2d)

| RS Rees ES Ramat ay eee ee open Dane ea nme EI TT 24

Klochyn v. New York Central R. R. Co., 218 App. Div. 295 20

Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Barlow, 244 U. S. 183 0.0... 19

Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., 45 Fed. Supp. 128 ............ 25

Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., C. C. A., 9th Circuit,

Decided August 17, 19643 ..........0.sccciserscseceesssnssesacescessssnnsane 25

McLeod v. Threlkeld, 7 Labor Cases § 51,162 0.00.00... 5, 11, 12

McCluskey v. Marysville & Northern R. Co., 243 U. S. 36... 15

Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Winters, 242 U. S 3533... 16

Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Nash, 242 U. S. 619 ........

Index ili

PAGE

New York Central R. R. Co. v. Porter, 249 U. S. 168 ...... 15

New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188... 16

New York, New Haven and Hartford R. R. Co. v. Bezue,

ROC Me I resend tein eo fe ok st 16

North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248 ........... 16, 18

Overstreet, et al. v. North Shore Corporation, 318 U. S.

pst tee rate NIRA ah Ca ake Cat UN NER ye REPRE 10, 13

Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 229

ARN ng ome akitstinnatnan let coles cocker eae dens sheied 15, 16

Pallocco v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 N. Y. 110 .................. 16

Philadelphia’ & Reading R. R. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U. S.

BN tecnrhoweign salted thease h Gohan Potintndcaetun GN et eis nee 15

Plass v. Central New England Railway Co., 221 N. Y. 472... 15

Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co., 243

Ser MS A a Levent cadersi ene aconnansied acted ithodohasteea eA eck 16

Southern Ry. Co. v. Peters, 194 Ala. 64, 69 So. 611 |... 18

Stoike v. First National Bank of City of N. Y., 264 App.

Re Rr statarke Sees ceuccsedaicackelen suas iL aeigmnke e 2

Stoike v. First National Bank of City of N. Y., 290 N. Y.

WI Na tnrstss sy abksardeananenencat hcoumtatnente Ger eck ease 2, 26, 33

Sullivan v. N. Y.. N. H. & H. R. Co, 134 Atl 795

cares pe EIDE EOI MEST FIR PeDE eM Oa ny BRECON Gas 19, 22

Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 239

WR IE circ rcionirtns wpeeici eins isk niacsal anal el cine 12, 17, 21

Vollmers v. New York Central R. Co., 223 N. Y. 571 ...... 21

Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88 5

Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564 9

ee. MN. YN. LOH. RR. Co. 29 U.S. 2. ............ 16

STN ts aos

a

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1943

No. 170

ARTHUR H. STOIKE,

Petitioner,

against

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF THE CITY

OF NEW YORK,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Preliminary Statement

The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari addressed to

the Court of Appeals of the State of New York to review :

a decision of that Court to the effect that a night porter

engaged in dusting, scrubbing and cleaning premises

oceupied by respondent and public corridors and wash-

rooms in the tenant space of the First National Bank

Building was not covered by the provisions of the Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 1060; 29 U. S. C. A.

Sections 201-219).

This controversy was submitted to the Appellate Divi-

sion of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First

Department, pursuant to Sections 546-8 of the New York

MOLITOR POR

2

Civil Practice Act upon an agreed statement of facts,

wherein petitioner claimed he was entitled to overtime com-

pensation in accordance with the maximum hours provisions

(Section 7a) of the Federal Fair Labor Standards <Act,

and the respondent denied that petitioner was so entitled.

The Appellate Division granted judgment for the peti-

tioner (264 App. Div. 585) and granted leave to respondent

to appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State of New

York, with a stay of judgment pending appeal, certifying

that in its opinion a question of law was involved which

ought to be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. The Court

of Appeals reversed and entered judgment for respondent

herein (290 N. Y. 195). The opinion of the Court of Ap-

peals is attached hereto in an appendix, to which respond-

ent respectfully refers this Court for a concise and com-

plete statement of the position of respondent herein.

Statement of Facts

Petitioner was hired as a night porter to clean in such

portions of the office building owned by respondent as were

specified from time to time by the head night porter (3,

49).* The operation of the building was under the man-

agement of a real estate management agent. Petitioner

was in the employ of respondent and on the payroll of the

real estate management company for a period of 25 weeks

subsequent to October 24, 1938, the effective date of the

Fair Labor Standards Act, until April 15, 1939 when he

voluntarily terminated his employment, and during such

period was subject to the control of the building superin-

tendent, who, like petitioner, was also on the payroll of

the real estate management agent. Petitioner dusted

tables, chairs, ete. and scrubbed floors and stairs in the

banking quarters and mopped and cleaned the public cor-

References are to record folios.

3

ridors and wash rooms in the tenant space of the building

(49, 50). While during the early part of his employment,

both before and for a short time after the Fair Labor

Standards Act became effective, petitioner did consider-

able work in the early part of each night in the banking

quarters, during the latter part of his employment peti-

tioner spent the greater part of his time cleaning the pub-

lie corridors and washrooms on the floors oceupied by

tenants (50, 51).

During 15 of the 25 weeks of petitioner’s employment

subsequent to the effective date of the Fair Labor Stand-

ards Act petitioner worked forty-eight hours a week.

These were the only weeks during that period in which

petitioner worked hours in excess of the maximum 44 work

week prescribed by the Act for the same period (53).

Petitioner received a regular weekly wage of $27 a week or

an average of 56.25 cents an hour on the basis of 48 hours

a week (55). Petitioner claims he is entitled to overtime

compensation in the amount of $50.63 plus a like amount

as liquidated damages and the costs of this action (55, 56).

Respondent was chartered in 1863 and its charter has

been renewed from time to time. Its sole place of business

is No. 2 Wall Street, New York City. Outside thereof it

maintains no offices, has no agents, and keeps no funds on

deposit other than funds deposited with the Federal Re-

serve Bank of New York (5). Solely at said place of busi-

ness, respondent performs the usual banking services for

its customers, who include individuals, partnerships, cor-

porations, banks and insurance companies. The customers,

whether corporate or individual, whether depositors, bor-

rowers, fiduciary customers or others, are located within

and without the State of New York and are engaged in

many lines of business, some of which constitute interstate

- commerce and some of which do not (25). The services

performed for such customers include: conducting deposit

accounts, lending money, making credit inquiries, and

serving as executor, testamentary trustee, trustee under

ay

inter vivos trusts, trustee under corporate indentures,

depositary and escrow agent, transfer agent, or custodian

of securities (26-41).

The building in which petitioner worked consists of

21 stories, the first four of which are occupied by the bank-

ing quarters of respondent and the remainder of which

are rented to tenants as office space (6).

Pursuant to agreement dated October 27, 1932 between

respondent and Horace S. Ely & Company, the latter be-

came rental and management agent for the building, and

since that time the latter has had complete charge of the

maintenance and operation of the entire building, inelud-

ing the banking quarters.

Upon the basis of the foregoing facts, respondent claims

that the Fair Labor Standards Act is wholly inapplicable

and that petitioner is entitled to no recovery thereunder,

4

POINT I

To be entitled to judgment for overtime compensa-

tion under the Fair Labor Standards Act, it is neces-

sary for petitioner to prove that he was engaged in

interstate commerce or in the production of goods

for interstate commerce.

Section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act in ex-

press and unmistakable terms grants the benefits of extra

compensation for hours worked in excess of the maximum

established therein only to those employees who are en-

gaged in interstate commerce or in the production of

goods for such commerce.

This Court in A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316

U.S. 517, 524 (1942) expressly held that the applicability

of the Act depends solely upon whether each particular

employee’s activities constitute interstate commerce or

5

the production of goods for interstate commerce and not

whether the nature of the employer’s business is such, in

these words:

‘*But the provisions of the Act expressly make its

application dependent upon the character of the em-

ployees’ activities.”’

Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. 8.

88, and McLeod v. Threlkeld, 7 Labor Cases,

§ 51,162, are to the same effect.

POINT II

Petitioner was not engaged in interstate commerce

within the meaning of Section 7(a) of the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938.

A. Petitioner’s activities, considered alone and without

relation to any other activity carried on in respondent

bank building, obviously did not constitute interstate

commerce.

Petitioner’s work in the banking quarters consisted

of dusting chairs and tables, ete. and scrubbing floors and

stairs (49). In the tenant space of the building, where

during the latter part of his employment the greater part

of his time was spent, petitioner mopped and cleaned

the public corridors and washrooms (50-1). Such activi-

ties considered alone and without relation to any other

activities could not conceivably constitute interstate com-

merce. They neither transcended State lines nor partook

of the nature of commerce. In its opinion, the Court of

Appeals at page 200 states:

‘*In the argument before us counsel for the plain-

tiff conceded that dusting and cleaning, as performed

under ordinary circumstances, do not constitute inter-

state commerce.”’

B. This Court expressly has held in several recent

cases that an activity “convenient” or “necessary” to or

“affecting” interstate commerce is not sufficient to satisfy

the express requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act

that petitioner be engaged in interstate commerce itself.

In Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc.,

312 U. S. 349 (1941) the Court, by Mr. Justice Franx-

FURTER, drew a sharp distinction between being in inter-

state commerce and being in some activity merely affecting

such commerce, in the following language at pages 351,

nets

355:

«* * * The ‘commerce’ in which these methods

are barred is interstate commerce. Neither ordinary

English speech nor the considered language of legisla-

tion would aptly describe ihe sales by Bunte Brothers

of its ‘break and take’ assortments in Illinois as

‘using unfair methods of competition in (interstate)

commerce.’ When in order to protect interstate com-

merce Congress has regulated activities which in

isolation are merely local, it has normally conveyed

its purpose explicitly.’’ (Citing among other laws, the

National Labor Relations Act, Sections 2(7), 9(c) and

10(a).)

* * * * *

‘‘The problem now before us is very different from

that which was recently presented by United States

v. Darby * * *. We had there to consider the full

scope of the constitutional power of Congress under

the Commerce Clause in relation to the subject matter

of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This case presents

the narrow question of what Congress did, not what

it could do. And we merely hold that to read ‘unfair

methods of competition in (interstate) commerce’ as

though it meant ‘unfair methods of competition in

any way affecting interstate commerce,’ requires,

in view of all the relevant considerations, much

clearer manifestation of intention than Congress has

furnished.”’

a

In A. B. Kirschbaum Co. vy. Walling, 316 U. S. 517

(1942), this Court declared that the judicial task in each

case is to determine whether Congress exercised its con-

stitutional power to such an extent as to embrace the par-

ticular facts involved. The question to be answered is not

what Congress had the power to do but what Congress

did. Mr. Justice Franxrurrer at page 520, et seq. wrote:

7

‘*To search for a dependable touchstone by which

to determine whether employees are ‘engaged in com-

merce or in the production of goods for commerce’ is

as rewarding as an attempt to square the circle. The

judicial task in marking out the extent to which Con-

gress has exercised its constitutional power over com-

merce is not that of devising an abstract formula.

Perhaps in no domain of public law are general prop-

ositions less helpful and indeed more mischievous

than where boundaries must be drawn, under a federal

enactment, between what it has taken over for admin-

istration by the central Government and what it has

left to the States. To a considerable extent the task

is one of accommodation as between assertions of new

federal authority and historic functions of the indi-

vidual States. The expansion of our industrial econ-

omy has inevitably been reflected in the extension of

federal authority over economic enterprise and its

absorption of authority previously possessed by the

States. Federal legislation of this character cannot

therefore be construed without regard to the implica-

tions of our dual system of government.

‘‘The body of Congressional enactments regulat-

ing commerce reveals a process of legislation which

is strikingly empiric. The degree of accommodation

made by Congress from time to time in the relations

between federal and state governments has varied

with the subject matter of the legislation, the history

behind the particular field of regulation, the specific

terms in which the new regulatory legislation has been

cast, and the procedures established for its adminis-

tration. See, e.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation,

300 U. S. 515. Thus, while a phase of industrial enter-

prise may be subject to control under the National

a

8

Labor Relations Act, a different phase of the same

enterprise may not come within the ‘commerce’ pro-

tected by the Sherman Law. Compare, for example,

United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457,

and Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S.

103, with Labor Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks

Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58, and Labor Board v. Fain-

blatt, 306 U. S. 601. Similarly, enterprises subject to

federal industrial regulation may nevertheless be

taxed by the States without putting an uneconstitu-

tional burden on interstate commerce. Compare

Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, and

Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. 8. 172, with Sunshine

Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381.

‘‘We cannot, therefore, indulge in the loose as-

sumption that, when Congress adopts a new scheme

for federal i:dustrial regulation, it thereby deals with

all situations falling within the general mischief which

eave rise to the legislation. Such an assumption might

be valid where remedy of the mischief is the concern

of only a single unitary government. It cannot be

accepted where the practicalities of federalism—or,

more precisely, the underlying assumptions of our

dual form of government and the consequent pre-

suppositions of legislative draftsmanship which are

expressive of our history and habits—cut across what

might otherwise be the implied range of the legisla-

tion. Congress may choose, as it has chosen fre-

quently in the past, to reenlate only part of what it

constitutionally can regulate, leaving to the States

activities which, if isolated, are only local. One need

refer only to the history of Congressional control over

the rates of intrastate carriers which affect interstate

commerce, and the amendment of August 11, 1939, to

the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, extending the

scope of that Act to employees who ‘shall, in any way

directly or closely and substantially, affect’ interstate

commerce, 53 Stat. 1404. Compare Federal Trade

Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349. The his-

tory of Congressional legislation regulating not only

interstate commerce as such but also activities inter-

twined with it, justifies the generalization that, when

sie

the Federal Government takes over such local radia-

tions in the vast network of our national economic

enterprise and thereby radically readjusts the balance

of state and national authority, those charged with

the duty of legislating are reasonably explicit and do

not entrust its attainment to that retrospective expan-

sion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma

of judicial legislation.

‘““* * * The history of the legislation leaves no doubt

that Congress chose not to enter areas which it might

have occupied. As passed by the House, the bill

applied to employers ‘engaged in commerce in any

industry affecting commerce’, See H. Rep. No. 2182,

7oth Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 2; 83 Cong. Ree. 7749-50.

But the bill recommended by the conference applied

only to employees ‘engaged in commerce or in the

production of goods for commerce’, H. Rep. No.

2738, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 29-30; 83 Cong. Ree.

9158, 9266-67. Moreover, in one of its intermediate

stages, the measure incorporated the Shreveport doc-

trine, Houston, E. d W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States,

supra, in that it was specifically made applicable to

intrastate production which competed with goods pro-

duced in another State. S. 2475, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.,

as recommitted December 17, 1937, §8(a). But, as

reported by the House Committee on Labor, this pro-

vision was deleted. S. 2475, supra, as reported April

21, 1938; see H. Rep. 2182, supra,

‘‘Since the scope of the Act is not coextensive

with the limits of the power of Congress over com-

merce, the question remains whether these employees

fall within the statutory definition of employees ‘en-

gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for

commerce’, * * #”?

In Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. 8. 564,

570, this Court by Mr. Justice Dovenas said:

“In this connection we cannot be unmindful that

Congress in enacting this statute plainly indicated

its purpose to leave local business to the protection

of the states. S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,

10

p. 5; 83 Cong. Ree., 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. Pt. 8, p.

9169. Moreover as we stated in Kirschbaum Co. v.

Walling, supra, 522-523, Congress did not exercise in

this Act the full scope of the Commerce power. We

may assume the validity of the argument that since

wholesalers doing a local business are in competition

with wholesalers doing an interstate business, the

latter would be prejudiced if their competitors were

not required to comply with the same labor standards,

That consideration, however, would be pertinent only

if the Act extended to businesses or transactions

‘affecting commerce.’ But as we noted in the Kirsch-

baum case the Act did not go so far. * * *

‘“‘The fact that all of respondent’s business is not

shown to have an interstate character is not important.

The applicability of the Act is dependent on the char-

acter of the employees’ work. Kirschbaum Co. vy.

Walling, supra, p. 524.”’

Similarly in Higains v. Carr Bros. Co., Inc., 317 U.S.

972, this Court by Mr. Justice Dovatas said at page 574:

‘«“* * * Some effort is made to show that the court

below applied an incorrect rule of law in the sense that

it gave the Act too narrow a construction. In that

connection it is argued that respondent is in competi-

tion with wholesalers doing an interstate business and

that it can by underselling affect those businesses and

their interstate activities. As we indicated in Walling

v. Jacksonville Paner Co., that argument would be

relevant if this Act had followed the pattern of other

federal legislation such as the National Labor Rela-

tions Act * * * and extended federal control to busi-

ness ‘affecting commerce’. But as we pointed out in

Kirschbawn v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, this Act did not

go so far, but was more narrowly confined.’’

In Overstreet, et al. v. North Shore Corporation, 318

U. S. 125, Mr. Justice Murpny stated, at page 128:

‘“‘Our starting point is respondent’s concession

that no question of constitutional power is involved,

but only the ascertainment of Congressional intent,

:

that is, did Congress mean to include employees such

as petitioners within the Act. In arriving at that

intent it must be remembered that Congress did not

choose to exert its power to the full by regulating

industries and occupations which affect interstate

commerce. See Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S.

517, 522-23; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317

U. S. 564.”’

In McLeod v. M. C. Threlkeld, et al., 7 Labor Cases

{ 51,162, this Court by Mr. Justice Reep wrote as follows:

‘In drafting legislation under the power granted

by the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce

and to make all laws necessary and proper to carry

those regulations into effect, Congress is faced con-

tinually with the difficulty of defining accurately the

precise scope of the proposed bill. In the Fair Labor

Standards Act, Congress did not intend that the regu-

lation of hours and wages should extend to the fur-

thest reaches of federal authority. The proposal to

have the bill apply to employees ‘engaged in com-

merce in any industry affecting commerce’ was re-

jected in favor of the language, now in the act, ‘each

of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in

the production of goods for commerce.’ Sections 6

and 7. See the discussion and reference to legislative

history in Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, and

Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564. The

selection of the smaller group was deliberate and

purposeful.”’

It is therefore beyond contradiction that the petitioner

must have been engaged in interstate commerce itself,

rather than an activity ‘‘convenient”’ or **necessary’’ to

or ‘‘affecting’’ interstate commerce, if he is to be included

within the ‘‘commerce”’ coverage of the Act.

12

C. Petitioner’s cleaning, dusting and mopping, either

in the banking quarters or in the tenant space of the bank

building, were not so closely related to any of the banking

services performed in the banking quarters (assumed for

the purpose of argument, but not conceded, to be interstate

commerce) as to be practically a part thereof and there-

fore themselves to constitute interstate commerce.

Just as under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act

(45 U. S. C. A. § 51, et seq.), prior to its amendment in

1939, compensation for injury was provided only for those

employees who suffer injury while employed in interstate

commerce, so under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

the benefits of overtime compensation are extended only to

such employees as are engaged in interstate commerce or

in the production of goods for such commerce. Cases

decided under the former Act afford therefore a reliable

criterion for determining under the Fair Labor Standards

Act whether or not the activities of the petitioner consti-

tute interstate commerce. In Shanks v. Delaware, Lacka-

wanna and Western Railroad Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558 (1915),

this Court pronounced what has with monotonous regu-

larity been recognized to be the ‘‘true test’’ in cases under

the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for determining

whether or not an employee at the time of his injury was

engaged in interstate commerce. That test was declared

to be whether or not at such time despite the fact that

the employer was engaged in interstate commerce, the

employee was ‘‘engaged in interstate transportation or in

work so closely related to it as to be practically a part

of it.’’

This Court in recent cases has applied the same test.

In McLeod v. M. C. Threlkeld, et al., 7 Labor Cases

751,162, Mr. Justice Reep said:

‘‘In the present instance, it is urged that the con-

ception of ‘in commerce’ be extended beyond the em-

ployees engaged in actual work upon the transporta-

tion facilities. It is said that this Court decided an

employee, engaged in similar work was ‘in commerce A

under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and that

it is immaterial whether the employee is hired by the

one engaged in the interstate business since it is the

activities of the employee and not of the employer

which are decisive.

13

‘‘ Judicial determination of the reach of the coverage

| of the Fair Labor Standards Act ‘in commerce’ must

deal with doubtful instances. There is no single con-

cept of interstate commerce which can be applied to

every federal statute regulating commeree. See

Kirschbaum v. Walling, supra, 520. However, the

test of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act that

activities so closely related to interstate transporta-

tion as to be in practice and legal relation a part

thereof are to be considered in that commerce, is ap-

plicable to employments ‘in commerce’ under the

Fair Labor Standards Act.

* * * * *

“*“ * * The test under this present act, to deter-

mine whether an employee is engaged in commerce, is

not whether the employee’s activities affect or indi-

rectly relate to interstate commerce but whether they

are actually in or so closely related to the movement

of the commerce as to be a part of it.’’

In Overstreet, et al. y. North Shore Corporation, 318

U.S. 125, Mr. Justice Mureny wrote, at page 128:

‘‘A practical test of what ‘engaged in interstate

commerce’ means has been evolved in cases arising

under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (45

U.S. C. §§ 51 et seq.) which, before the 1939 amend-

ments (see 53 Stat. 1404), applied only where injury

was suffered while the carrier was engaging in inter-

state or foreign commerce and the injured employee

was employed by the carrier ‘in such commerce’. 35

Stat. 65, * * *

‘We think that practical test should govern here.

LETC UNE INE ON

a

14

‘“‘The Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the

Fair Labor Standards Act are not strictly analogous,

but they are similar. Both are aimed at protecting

commerce from injury through adjustment of the mas-

ter-servant relationship, the one by liberalizing the

common law rules pertaining to negligence and the

other by eliminating sub-standard working conditions.

We see no persuasive reason why the scope of em-

ployed or engaged ‘in commerce’ laid down in the

Pedersen and related cases, cited above, should not be

applied to the similar language in the Fair Labor

Standards Act, especially when Congress in adopting

the phrase ‘engaged in commerce’ had those Federal

Kmployers’ Liability Act cases brought to, its atten-

tion.’’

In cases under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,

application of the ‘‘true test’? has resulted in decisions

which in each instance have depended upon the degree of

physical proximity of the particular activity of the em-

ployee at the time of injury to some specific interstate

transportation engaged in by the carrier. The principal

object for which earriers exist is, of course, transporta-

tion, which is the very essence of commerce. See Chicago

Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Wright, 239 U.S.

548, 550 (1916). This Court has refused to permit a

recovery under the Act by employees who might be said

to be engaged in activities closely related to the general

business of the carrier as a whole but only remotely

related, although ultimately necessary, to the actual move-

ment of trains. Only twice has the Court wandered from

the path, in Erie Railroad Company v. Collins, 253 U. S.

77 (1920) and Erie Railroad Company v. Szary, 253 U. S.

86 (1920), in both of which it was held that the employee

was employed in interstate commerce within the mean-

ing of the Act when he was engaged in preparing supplies

of water and sand for later use by interstate engines.

Both cases were later expressly overruled in Chicago

& Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Industrial Commission,

284 U. S. 296, 299 (1932). The ground for overruling

such decisions was that the relationship between the ac-

tivities of the employee at the time of his injury and the

interstate transportation, for the purpose of which the

railroad existed, was too remote. The “true test” as to

whether an employee was engaged in ‘‘interstate com-

merce’? within the meaning of the Act was whether or

not his activities at the time of injury had such a close

physical relationship to the ‘interstate transportation’

of the carrier as to be a part thereof. By the same token,

the **true test’? in the case at bar must be whether or not

plaintiff’s cleaning, dusting and mopping had such a close

physical relationship to specifie banking services per-

formed in the banking quarters as to be practically a

part thereof. It would, of course, first be necessary to

find that the particular banking services constituted inter-

state commerce,

The Court did not make the same mistake it made in

the two Erie Railroad cases again. Naturally, employees

engaged in the actual movement of trains across state

limes have been held subject to the Act. Chicago Rock

Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Wright, 239 U. S. 548

(1916). But if the injury were received at a time when

the interstate journey had not yet begun or had definitely

terminated, the Act had no application. McCluskey v.

Marysville & Northern Railway Company, 243 U. S. 36

(1917); Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Peery, 242

U. S. 292 (1916). Cf. Philadelphia & Reading Railway

Company v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284 (1920).

Injuries sustained by employees during the repair or

clearance of fixed instrumentalities in use in interstate

commerce such as tracks, tunnels and bridges were covered

by the Act. Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & West-

ern Railroad Company, 229 U. S. 146, 151 (1913); New

York Central Railroad Company v. Porter, 249 U. S. 168,

169 (1919); Plass v. Central New England Railway Com-

re a, |

EUS MOL RENEE TELE INI IE AGMA PSD E75 FAR

Te EG Boar et ae ee ee Cte? OP olt OF eee ol Win er er ee ew To tote. we i ree ray See TS ete ee or ee

pany, 221 N. Y. 472 (1917); Pallocco v. Lehigh Valley

Railroad Company, 2386 N. Y. 110, 114 (1913). But the

Act did not cover injuries received in the course of the

construction of a new track, tunnel or bridge intended

for use by interstate trains. The connection between such

activity and the interstate commerce to which it ultimately

contributes was physically too remote. Raymond y,

Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, 243

U. S. 48 (1917); New York Central Railroad Company y,

White, 243 U. S. 188, 192 (1917); Pedersen v. Delaware,

Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, 229 U. 8S. 146,

152 (1913) (dictum).

Just as injuries systained in the repair of fixed instru-

mentalities in use in interstate commerce came within the

scope of the Act, so likewise did injuries received by em-

ployees while repairing or working upon movable instru-

mentalities such as locomotives or cars used in interstate

commerce and not removed from service so long as to

eclipse their identification with such commerce. Walsh

v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R. R. Co., 223

U. S. 1, 5 (1912); North Carolina Railroad Company v.

Zachary, 232 U. 8S. 248 (1914). On the other hand, such

injuries were not compensable under the Act where the

engine or car being repaired, although it had been used

in interstate commerce just prior to the repairs and would

probably be so used subsequently, had been out of such

service for too long a period and was undergoing repairs

of too extensive a nature. To bring the employee within

the Act, it was necessary that the repairs be merely a

short interruption in an interstate haul. New York, New

Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v. Bezue, 284 U. S. 415,

420 (1932); Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company v.

Winters, 242 U. S. 358, 356 (1917); Baltimore d& Ohio

Railroad Company v. Branson, 242 U. 8S. 623 (1917, re-

versing 128 Md. 678, 98 Atl. 225, 230).

ele sf

taal

17

Most of the cases discussed above involved principally

the question of the relation between the activity of the

employee at the time of injury and the interstate com-

merce of the railroad in terms of time. In other words,

if the activity of the employee during which he was

injured took place too long before or after the interstate

commerce to which it contributed, the relationship was

too remote for the one to become a part of the latter.

Kven more pertinent and persuasive in the instant case

are those Federal Employers’ Liability cases in which

there was considered the physical relationship of the

injured employee’s activity to the interstate transportation

of the carrier in terms of the identity of that activity

with the transportation of the carrier. In other words,

the ultimate question to be answered in each ease was

whether the employee’s activity physically partook of the

nature of transportation (i. e., banking here), or was a

separate and distinct activity. As was pointed out above,

injuries sustained by an employee while directly repairing

cars or locomotives in use in interstate commerce were

compensable under the Act provided the ears or loco-

motives had not been out of service too long. But injuries

suffered by employees while repairing or caring for ma-

chinery or shops used in the repair of such cars or loco-

motives were not within the Act. The work he performed

in the railroad shop or roundhouse other than on the ears

or locomotives themselves ultimately contributed to the

interstate transportation but did not possess the inherent

character of interstate transportation. Shanks v. Dela-

ware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, 239

mm 2% 096, 559 (1916); Illinois Central Railroad Company

vy, Cousins, 241 U. S. 641 (1916, reversing 126 Minn. 172,

148 N. W. 58); Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v.

Bolle, 284 U. S. 74, 80 (1931). The principle upon which

the decisions in the foregoing cases were founded was

stated at page 559 of the Shanks case, as follows:

18

‘*Coming to apply the test to the case in hand, it

is plain that Shanks was not employed in interstate

transportation, or in repairing or keeping in usable

condition a roadbed, bridge, engine, car or other in-

strument then in use in such transportation. What

he was doing was altering the location of a fixture

in a machine shop. The connection between the fix.

ture and interstate transportation was remote at best,

for the only function of the fixture was to communi-

cate power to machinery used in Tepairing parts of

engines some of which were used in such transporta-

tion. This, we think, demonstrates that the work in

which Shanks was engaged, like that of the coal miner

in the Yurkonis case, was too remote from interstate

transportation to be practically a part of it, and there.

fore that he was not employed in interstate com-

merce within the meaning of the Employers’ Liability

Act.’’

Exactly the same was true with respect to employees

working with or upon supplies like coal or water for

interstate locomotives. The Act applied to them if they

were injured while directly coaling or watering such loco-

motives. North Carolina Railroad Company v. Zachary,

232 U. S. 248, 260 (1914); Armbruster v. Chicago, Rock

Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 166 Iowa 155, 147 N. W. 337,

346 (1914); Southern Ry. Co. v. Peters, 194 Ala. 64, 69

So. 611, 613 (1915). But if the injury occurred while

the employee was engaged in mining, preparing or trans-

porting the coal or other supplies for interstate locomo-

tives prior to the actual loading of such supplies on the

locomotives, the Act did not apply. Such activity of the

employee, like that of the employee repairing machinery

in the roundhouse, although it eventually contributed to

the interstate transportation of the locomotive, did not

partake of the nature of such transportation. Instead it

was mining, fueling, or servicing. Delaware, Lackawanna

& Western Railroad Company v. Yurkonis, 238 U. 8. 439,

444 (1915) ; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Com-

19

pany v. Harrington, 241 U. §. 177, 180 (1916); Lehigh

Valley Railroad Company v. Barlow, 244 U. 8. 183 (1917).

Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act the same

principles have been applied with like results to the situa-

tion which most nearly resembles that presented in the

instant case—namely, the injury to an employee while

caring for or repairing a building or station owned by

an interstate carrier and used by it in its interstate busi-

ness. Such an employee has been held to be engaged in an

activity of a type physically so different from interstate

transportation as not to be a part of it.

In Sullivan v. New York, New Haven € Hartford Rail-

road Uo., 134 Atl. 795, 800 (Conn. 1926) the Court, after

applying the ‘‘true test’’, held that a clerk in an interstate

railroad station who was killed by the electrie current

while turning off the station lights after his regular clerk-

ing activities were completed, was not engaged in inter-

state commerce and that hence the state Workmen’s Com-

pensation Act rather than the Federal Employers’ Liability

Act applied. The Court reached its conclusion by com-

paring the employee’s activity at the time of injury with

the work of a station janitor similar to that of the plaintiff

in the instant ease. It stated at page 800:

“If the decedent had been an employee of the de-

fendant whose sole duty was to do janitor’s duty at

the station after all movement of goods or persons in

commerce was over for the day, would he, while doing

such work, be deemed to be engaged in interstate

commerce, or in work so closely related to it as to

be practically part of it? If the conclusion that he

would not is correct as to such assumed employee, then

the work which the decedent was engaged in at the

time of the injury ought to be viewed from the same

standpoint, and with a like result.

“We are of the opinion that in so far as interstate

commerce was concerned the janitor’s work in which

Sullivan was engaged when injured was a matter of

indifference to interstate commerce; that, in fact, it

was work ‘out of commerce.’

EK ERIN EE ESS SED 0! MED ick OI TEINS, : . PR NRE NLA yy PWM ETE LINTON de at

20

‘‘In the instant case the current of electricity and

the electric light, when being turned off, were not

directly and immediately used in interstate transporta-

tion, and cannot reasonably be deemed a part of inter-

state commerce; the decedent, therefore, at the time

of turning out the electric light, was not engaged in

such commerce.’’

The New York courts are in accord with this view. In

Klochyn v. New York Central R. Co., 218 App. Div. 29%,

296, 297 (3rd Dept., 1926) a carpenter injured while re-

pairing a watchman’s shanty at an interstate grade cross-

ing in which the tools of a track repair gang were kept

was held not to be engaged in interstate commerce so as

to be subject to the provisions of the Act. The watchman

himself was engaged in interstate commerce; so likewise

was the track repair gang. But the carpenter’s repair

work on the shanty which housed both the watchman and

the tools possessed so little of the nature of transporta-

tion as not to be a part of it. This was clearly pointed

out by the Court as follows at page 296:

‘‘TIn the present case we think the claimant’s work

was too remote from interstate commerce. He was

repairing the shanty to make it fit for its purpose,

namely, to shelter the watchman and for the storage

of tools. To the watchman, considering his health and

welfare, the shanty was needful; to commerce, how-

ever, it was not directly essential; it was not so closely

related to commerce as to be practically a part of it,

a direct instrumentality of movement. Repairing the

shanty is a step further removed from commerce

movement than is the shanty itself and its use. As

the shanty is needful to the watchman for shelter, so

his clothing is needful to protect him while doing his

work; still it could hardly be claimed that a man or

woman who made necessary repairs to that clothing

was engaged in interstate commerce. The fact that

tools were kept in the shanty cannot affect the result.

While the tools were stored they were withdraw

from commerce and it could hardly be said that every

building in which track gangs kept their tools was

directly connected with interstate commerce.”’

21

And the Court at page 297, after drawing an analogy be-

tween the shanty and an office building housing the clerks

and officers of the railroad continued as follows:

* * * A carpenter repairing such an office build-

ing would not be held to be engaged in interstate com-

merce. ’’

Upon exactly the same grounds the Court of Appeals

in Vollmers v. New York Central R. Co., 223 N. Y. 571

(1918), reversed a ruling by the Appellate Division, Third

Department, to the effect that a plumber injured while

repairing the pipes in an interstate passenger station was

engaged in interstate commerce and came within the pro-

visions of the Act. The Court relied upon Shanks v. Dela-

ware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 239 U. S. 556

(1916), discussed supra, as its authority.

Upon the same grounds the United States Supreme

Court reversed a judgment of the Minnesota Supreme

Court granting the benefits of the Act to an employee en-

gaged in working upon an outhouse of an interstate pas-

senger station. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Com-

pany v. Nash, 242 U. S. 619 (1917), (reversing 131 Minn.

166, 154 N. W. 957).

The banking quarters, although essential to carrying

on the banking functions, cannot be regarded as an in-

strumentality of interstate commerce, as for instance, a

check, a draft or a note may be. The various documents of

title used by banks may be instrumentalities of commerce,

for they are employed in the actual transactions of com-

merce just as are railroad cars and tracks in transporta-

tion. But the banking quarters have no such particular

identification with commerce itself, other than that the

commerce must take place somewhere. They may more

appropriately be compared with the railroad stations and

buildings in the cases discussed above, in which without

exception employees engaged in working in or upon such

buildings were held not to be engaged in interstate com-

merce.

a

22

Moreover, the absurdity of comparing the relation be.

tween track workers on interstate railroads and the inter-

state transportation of such railroads with that between a

night porter cleaning in the banking quarters and the

bank’s interstate banking functions such as the negotia-

tion of bills, notes and checks need hardly be pointed out.

Track clearance is by nature closely identified with trans.

portation; but how can it reasonably be said that there is

any such affinity between cleaning, dusting and mopping

the banking quarters and, for example, the negotiation of

bills, notes and checks? It cannot be said that cleaning in

any way partakes of the nature of any of the usual inter.

state banking transactions. It is well-nigh impossible to

conceive of an activity more remotely connected with

interstate banking transactions than the cleaning activities

of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff worked only at night when no banking activ-

ities whatsoever were carried on (49). Sullivan v. New

York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 134 Atl. 79%

(Conn., 1926), swpra. Never did he participate direetly

or indirectly in any activity even faintly resembling a

banking function, not to speak of an interstate banking

transaction. Nor did he ever handle any of the doev-

ments or other articles used in interstate transactions.

His job, strikingly similar to that of the repairmen in the

interstate railroad terminals noted above, was to dust

tables, chairs, ete., and scrub floors and stairs in the

banking quarters and to mop and clean the public cor.

ridors and washrooms in the tenant space (49, 50). The

most that plaintiff can claim is that he worked in the same

quarters where alleged interstate commerce transactions

were carried on, and this, as was pointed out above, will

not suffice to establish the necessary relationship.

The case of Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Development

Co., certiorari denied April 19, 1943, 318 U. S. 790, ap

pears to be much in point. The petition for certiorari in

that case stated that the petitioners were ‘‘elevator opera

23

tors, maintenance men, porters and utility men employed

in and necessary to the operation of Texas Bank Building,

an office building owned and operated by the defendant,

the majority of which building is occupied by persons

engaged in commerce and in the distribution, sale, han-

dling, and other processes of goods produced in commerce

and for commerce, as alleged in their complaint.’’ The

petition also disclosed that the building located in Dallas,

Texas, was occupied principally by offices of companies

having their home offices outside of Texas and including

many nationally known concerns, such as Pillsbury Flour

Mills Company, Charles Scribner’s Sons, Western Elec-

trie Company, American Blower Company, General Food

Sales Co., Encyclopedia Britannica, and the manufacturers

of such famous products as Old Dutch Cleanser, Lipton

Tea, Jello, Maxwell House Coffee and Welch’s Grape

Juice. Other tenants were commission brokers, manufac-

turer’s agents representing textiles, foods and machinery,

and from these offices orders were solicited and instrue-

tions issued on which merchandise was shipped into the

Southwest from factories in the East. Other offices were

occupied by a selling subsidiary of oil well pumps manu-

factured outside Texas, a freight solicitor for an inter-

state railroad, the Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship

Clerks affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.

Ome of the offices was occupied by International News

Service, a news collecting and disseminating cooperative.

There were also advertising agencies, insurance companies,

general contractors and consulting engineers, agencies

soliciting national magazine subscriptions, an office en-

gaged in making insurance investigations and reports, an

office supply house and others. Six or seven of the peti-

tioners were porters whose duty it was to clean up offices,

empty cuspidors, clean waste baskets, keep the halls clean,

paint the walls and floors on the inside of the building and

clean both the private offices and also the halls and stair-

ways of the building commonly used by tenants. The peti-

tion for certiorari states:

ER aNptin ums

24

‘‘The work which the plaintiffs do is usual and

customary work done in buildings and necessary to

keep them clean in order to keep tenants in them

* * & 99

.

The United States District Court for the Northern

District of Texas dismissed the complaint and held that

the employees were not covered by the Fair Labor Stand-

ards Act. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Cireuit affirmed in 132 F. 2d 287, saying

inter alia:

‘*We do not think that Congress intended that the

Act with respect to those who are only ‘engaged in

commerce’ should be stretched and strained to cover

every person whose labor is of use or convenience or

labor which in some fashion contributes to the com-

fort or convenience of another who is so engaged.”

Among the reasons relied on for the allowance of the

writ, the petitioners in Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Devel-

opment Company, stated that the decision of the Fifth

Cireuit ‘‘conflicts with decisions by District Courts in

other circuits, appeals from which are now pending in

other Circuit Courts of Appeal and likewise conflicts with

decisions by various state courts, appeals from which are

pending and which are still subject to application to this

Court for certiorari * * *.’’

The petition then goes on to state that ‘‘In this con-

nection petitioners would show that the following cases

involving the identical question here in issue are pending

in various courts, and a decision herein would be deter-

minative of all of them.’’ The petition then cites the case

at bar in these words:

‘*(b) Stoike v. The First National Bank of the

City of New York, 38 N. Y. Supp. 2d 390, appeal

pending in Court of Appeals of New York.”’

RAN tN ERG a iS eR ga mn Soe tae bate

25

The petition in the Johnson case went on to recite:

‘“‘In well-reasoned opinions, one state court and

one federal court upon this precise point have held

that such maintenance employees and elevator opera-

tors in a building tenanted as was this one by persons

engaged in commerce were themselves in commerce

within the meaning of the Act. The Appellate Divi-

sion of the Supreme Court of New York so held in

Stoike v. First National Bank of the City of New

York, 36 N. Y. Supp. 2d 390, and so did the District

Court for the Northern District of California in

Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., 45 Fed. Supp. 128.”

It thus appears from the petition for certiorari in

Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Development Company that

the petitioners in that case felt that the issues in their case

were the same as those raised in the case at bar. In this

connection it is interesting to note that not only has the

Court of Appeals of the State of New York in the case at

bar held that the petitioner here is not within the coverage

of the Fair Labor Standards Act, but the Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Cireuit in an opinion dated August

17, 1943 has reversed the case of Lorencetti v. American

Trust Co. (45 Fed. Supp. 128) and in holding that the

petitioners, some of whom were porters who did mopping

and dusting and emptying of waste baskets, ete. in banks

and office buildines, said that:

‘*Since the submission of the cases, the Supreme

Court has decided McLeod v. Threlkeld, ...... Je Gee

The employers there were a partnership with a con-

tract to furnish meals to maintenance-of-way em-

ployees of an interstate carrier, the meals being

cooked and served in a railroad ear attached to a

particular gang of workmen and set on the railroad

track conveniently to the place of the gang’s activ-

ities. The employee concerned worked for the part-

nership as a cook in this car. He was held not within

the coverage of the Act, the court saying that ‘The

test under this present Act, to determine whether an

employee is engaged in commerce, is not whether the

j

$

se RE erga tan rE EOL

LEED LECT HEEL Aa IMEI IN EO, TRS RE YY LEST : men

6 ey LEQ LO LL IS OLLIE MOY 2 3

2 SRR ROY S FR ie Se eet Nae OS

ay

26

employee’s activities affect or indirectly relate to

interstate commerce but whether they are actually in

or so closely related to the movement of the com-

merce as to be a part of it’. It was thought that

employee activities outside of this movement, so far

as they are covered by the wage-hour regulation, are

governed by the phrase ‘production of goods for com-

merce’.

‘‘Here, as there, the employees concerned are not

in any sense engaged in production nor are their

activities integrated with the production of goods.

Cf. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517. The

sole argument made on their behalf is that they are

‘engaged in commerce’. We are compelled to dis-

agree. Their work appears to us even more remote

from the movement or stream of commerce than was

the work of the cook in McLeod v. Threlkeld, supra.

The holding in that case is controlling.

‘‘The judgments are accordingly reversed.’’

A proper interpretation of the decisions of this Court

on this issue is found in the language of Judge Lewis

speaking for the Court of Appeals of the State of New

York in the case at bar (290 N. Y. 195, 203) where it is

said:

‘‘In our endeavor to interpret the phrase ‘engaged

in commerce’ we adopt and apply to our present prob-

lem the ‘practical test’ suggested in Overstreet et al.

v. North Shore Corporation, 317 U.S. —/(decided

Feb. 1, 1943)—Was the plaintiff’s work of dusting

and cleaning the defendant’s banking quarters so

closely related to interstate commerce as to be ‘in

practice and in legal contemplation a part of it.’ (See

also Pedersen v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146,

151; Shanks v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556,

560.) By the application of that test we think that

one of those ‘areas’ which Congress chose not to

occupy when it fixed the scope of section 7 (a) was

employment such as the plaintiff’s. It is our con-

clusion that the cleaning operations which plaintiff was

27

required to perform in defendant’s banking quarters

were not so closely related to the many banking serv-

ices performed there that we can say as matter of law

that plaintiff’s cleaning was a part of such banking

services and therefore that he was ‘engaged in’ inter-

state commerce. The plaintiff’s work of cleaning and

dusting the quarters in which the functions of bank-

ing are performed, although it may contribute re-

motely to the comfort and convenience of those whose

services are vital to its business, is not a step in the

process of banking. Indeed, as we consider the ac-

tivities of those who conduct the vital functions by

which the business of the defendant bank is accom-

plished, the essential characteristics of that portion

of its banking service which is interstate commerce

are lost before we reach the position held by the

plaintiff. If, under the guise of construing section

7 (a), we extend its application beyond those em-

ployees who are ‘engaged in’ interstate commerce and

include that vast number of employees whose work,

like that of the plaintiff, only remotely affects com-

merece, we would extend the operation of the Act

beyond its intended scope.’’

POINT Ill

Petitioner was not engaged in production of goods

for interstate commerce.

The plaintiff in his petition for certiorari (p. 2) states:

‘‘Defendant also undertakes some production for

commerce in that it prepares cashier’s check and ecus-

tomer’s credit reports, which are used in and trans-

mitted in interstate commerce (p. 14, fols. 40-41).

Many of the other services performed by the bank

are actually production of goods under the definitions

given in the Act.’’

28

The petitioner then goes forward at pages 8 to 12 to

prove that banking is commerce, rather than production,

Again at page 12, the petitioner urges that banking is

production of goods for commerce and at page 13 says:

‘‘In a sense then a bank’s whole business is pro-

duction in commerce as that term is defined in the

Fair Labor Standards Act.’’

The petitioner goes on to say that:

‘‘The bank in furnishing credit information, trans-

mitting intelligence across State lines, financing the

sale and purchase of goods to and from other States,

sending out and receiving drafts with bills of lading

attached, ete., engage in activities involving the physi-

eal distribution of goods in interstate commerce and

therefore production in commerce.’’ (Emphasis ours.)

That this argument is an afterthought is attested by

the fact that in none of the briefs submitted by petitioner

in the two lower courts is there any assertion that bank-

ing is production of goods for commerce. True it is, as

set forth by petitioner herein, that the Administrator of

the Wage and Hour Division as amicus curiae in the two

lower courts submitted in its briefs a point entitled

‘*Plaintiff was engaged in commerce and/or the produe-

tion of goods for commerce within the meaning of the

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.’’ That the point of

production was labored in these briefs is apparent from

the very ‘‘and/or’’ entitlement of the point itself. The

fact remains that the Appellate Division of the Supreme

Court in its opinion specifically stated that:

‘‘This ease, therefore, involves solely a situation

where plaintiff’s employer is engaged in commeree,

but it is not a case where the employee was in any

wise engaged in the production of goods for commerce

* * * The question to be decided in this controversy

is whether the plaintiff in view of the nature of the

work which he performed is to be deemed engaged

: interstate commerce within the meaning of the

o.””

29

Moreover, the Court of Appeals in its opinion stated:

‘‘The defendant, for the purpose of the argument

only, concedes that at least a part of the banking

services performed in its banking quarters constitutes

interstate commerce. It contends, however, and the

Appellate Division has recognized that this—‘* * *

is not a case where the employee was in anywise en-

gaged in ihe production of goods for commerce’, (264

App. Div. 585, 586.) Accordingly the defendant’s

argument goes to the narrow question whether the

plaintiff, at the time of his overtime employment, was

‘engaged in’ interstate commerce within the intended

meaning of section 7 (subd. a) of the Aet.’’

These two statements by the Appeilate Division of the

Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of themselves

indicate definitely that the lower courts were of the

opinion that the question of production for interstate eom-

merce, as distinguished from interstate commerce, was not

before them for consideration, and emphasizes the fact

that production of goods for commerce is seriously raised

here for the first time.

The ‘‘Summary of Argument’’ in the brief filed by

this petitioner with the Court of Appeals states that:

‘*The plaintiff-respondent will argue:

‘‘A. That the defendant was engaged in Interstate

Commerce.

‘“*B. That the plaintiff’s activities were so close

to and so much a part of defendant’s interstate busi-

ness as to make such work a part of that interstate

business even under such precedented statutes as the

Federal Employers’ Liability Act.

“C, That the Fair Labor Standards Act was

meant to be and is broader in scope than the Federal

Kmployers’ Liability Act.

“TP, That as a consequence the plaintiff is covered

by the Fair Labor Standards Act * * *.’’

i,

30

The Court of Appeals therefore was accurate when in its

opinion it said: ‘‘* * * plaintiff does not claim we are

dealing with the problem of ‘production of goods for

commerce.’ ”’

The petitioner devotes a considerable portion of his

petition to the argument that banking is interstate com.

merce and then argues that because the bank is engaged in

interstate commerce it must also be engaged in produe-

tion of goods for commerce. The petitioner’s argument,

carried to its conclusion, is either one of two propositions,

His argument is either that because banking is necessary

to the production and sale of goods in modern complex

industrial society and allegedly petitioner’s work is neces.

sary to banking, therefore petitioner is engaged in.produe-

tion. Or else, it is that the drawing of a cashier’s cheek

is actual production of goods for interstate commerce.

Hither argument, it would seem, must end in the conclu.

sion that there no longer is such a thing as interstate com-

merce as it has been known through the generations, but

interstate commerce has given way in its entirety to pro-

duction of goods for interstate commerce. If because

banking is necessary to production, therefore banking is

production, then, since all business activities in moder

economic society are dependent and interdependent upon

one another, it must follow that all business activity,

whether removed once, twice or a dozen times, becomes

production of goods for interstate commerce. If the dravw-

% ing of a cashier’s check is the production of goods, then

by the same token the writing of a letter of credit, or

indeed the writing of any letter which evidences some

business obligation, is production and again in its final

analysis the petitioner’s argument means that every busi-

ness letter becomes production and there is no longer

commerce, but only production.

The argument completely loses sight of the realities

of the situation. The argument supposes that there are

no longer such things as instrumentalities of commeree,

31

but only production. It loses sight of the fact that the

debates in Congress specifically refer to both interstate

commerce and the production of goods for interstate

commerce. It loses sight of the fact that the definition

of the word ‘‘goods’’ in the Act obviously relates to

tangible manufactured products, and that the definition in

the Act of the word ‘‘produced’’ obviously relates to

tangible articles that are manufactured, mined or other-

wise produced. The petitioner cannot blow both hot and

wld. After spending a good portion of his petition to

argue that banking is commerce within the definition of

“eommerce’’, as found in the Act, which by definition

includes trade, commerce, transportation or communica-

tion among the several states, he then argues that banking

is not commerce but is production. If banking is either

one or the other, it obviously is commerce and not pro-

duction.

Again the facts in Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Devel-

opment Co. are in point. In that case, as noted above,

the building was occupied by branch offices of nationally

known companies engaged in production and distribution,

as Pillsbury Flour Mills Company, American Blower Com-

pany, Fuller Brush Company, Charles Scribner’s Sons,

Western Electric Company, the manufacturers of Old

Dutch Cleanser, Lipton’s Tea, Maxwell House Coffee

and Welch’s Grape Juice. One of the tenants was a

news collecting and disseminating agency. Other tenants

included insurance companies, general contractors and

engineers building and supervising construction outside of

Texas, a company engaged in making insurance investi-

gations and reports. The tenants in the case at bar, other

than the First National Bank itself, the owner of the

building, were dealers in securities, lawyers, coal mer-

chants, accountants, management engineers, members of

stock exchanges, etc. (10). If banking can possibly be

construed to be production then a fortiori the work per-

32

formed by the various tenants in the Johnson case is much

nearer a realistic concept of the production of goods of a

physical and tangible nature than banking.

Even assuming arguendo—by a long stretch of the

legal imagination—that banking is ‘‘producing’’ in the

sense of manufacturing, mining, etc., still the work of a

night porter is so far removed, it would seem, as to most

certainly fall within that outer fringe of the orbit de-

scribed by Mr. Justice Frankrurter in Kirschbaum Co,

v. Walling, where at page 525 he wrote:

‘*But because some employees may not be within

the Act even though their activities are in the ulti-

mate sense ‘necessary’ to the production of goods for

commerce, * * *’’

The debates of Congress indicate quite definitely that in

dealing with the term ‘‘production of goods for commerce”

and in dealing with the definitions of ‘‘goods’’ and

‘*producing’’, Congress was dealing with the manufacture

and the mining of tangible materials, and was not trying

to destroy the distinction between interstate commerce

and production of goods for interstate commerce.

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

LoweLL Wapmonp,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Ourver P. Scarre III,

Of Counsel.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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