Respondents Brief — Cleveland Trust Co. v. Stoller
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IN THE f My
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser Term 1942
No. 988
Tue CLEVELAND Trust Company AND THE CENTRAL
NationaL Bank or CLEVELAND, OHIO,
Petitioners,
vs.
MicHakEL Grorce STouuer,
Respondent.
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT.
OPPOSING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT.
Eimer McCuarn, Lima, Ohio,
Counsel for Respondent,
Michacl George Stoller.
J. F. Cavanacu,
Paulding, Ohio
Of Counsel.
U. 8. Law Printing Company, 2817 N. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill.
SUBJECT MATTER
2. The Second Reason for the Disagreement:
The Hearing Conducted by the Special Mas-
ter
Page
Lskiohchsp diese dickedesavioashcbeba ad satobls pabiilectebdattden wieicaubis neaiiieadselilaissibs sented: 1
ee NIN, Dig SII Scions daisies nicl acascceabncasaeinabacnens 2
Wikia we i i 2
Answer of the Respondent to the Argument .................. 4
Restricted Range of Petitioners’ Objections ........ 4
The Statutory Definition of a Farmer Examined 5
Decisions of this Court -.....0000........ Se
Analyzing and Expanding the Definition of
a ‘‘Farmer’’ in Section 75 (r) ...0....0........... 5
Division I Occupation ..........0.00000.00........ 6
OUI Bn SINE iaionicteds oaicsdedcbede cates 6
Any of Seven Definitions Constitute a Farmer 7
The Application of the Statutory Definition to the
I sii eka a aiiscanneeabnataenstaeniesiniee 8
Conflicting Conclusions of the Courts Below........ 8
Reasons for These Conflicting Conclusions .......... 9
1. The First Reason for the Disagreement: The
District Judge Misconstrued the Statute...... 12
The Conclusions of the District Judge... 12
The Petitioners’ Motion and the Memo-
randum Opinion of the District Court
Analyzed and Compared ...................... 13
The Conclusions of the Special Master...... 14
eens _
ii
Page
3. The Third Reason for the Disagreement:
The Judge Did Not Have Access to All of
SII acd clielinciariisiaetnetrliinnsnsenannsienntiainintnne
An Examination of the Evidence ..................0...........--.---
Farming Operations
What the Testimony Shows About the oe
Operations of the Respondent
The Testimony Concerning the Respondent’s
Pr I ni ainsi...
The Farms He Operated in Recent Years ............
He Was ‘‘Personally Engaged in Farming Op-
IN tictlakenmeaaceidideaanechtinisacdsaiienisisainaonibianninoanse
The Special Master’s Summary on this
SERGI AE SIRES eis Se] RONEN ae
The Respondent’s Testimony ........................
Witness Doster, Farm Hand ..........................
Witness Leo DeLatt, Farm Owner ..............
Witness Gehau, Worker in seed store ..........
Witness Bidlock, Sugar Co. Manager ..........
Witness Jack DeLaet, Farm Hand ..............
The Evidence Conclusively Proves that the
Respondent is a Farmer ...................2.-0..----.
Income
The Losses in the Seed Business .......002000.000000000.....
The Decisions
The Decisions Cited by the District Judge ..............
i. First National Bank v. Beach (1937)), 301
U. S. 435
ii. Beamesderfer v. First National Bank,
(1937), 91 Fed. (2d) 491
iii. Baxter v. Savings Bank (1937), 92 Fed.
(2d) 404
ili
Page
iv. In re Day, (1935), 10 Fed. Supp. 229 ........ 44
The Other Decisions Relied Upon by the Peti-
EEN RN RM OM ODO RR ALY LOO 49
‘‘Fraudulent Conduct”? ............. eM Ne BOC a 51
RII Kstasetite dd ae eninessiaenstnccupbistede: dank sands Mhaae aes 52
Cases CITED.
Baxter v. Savings Bank (CCA 5), 92 Fed. (2d) 404... 41
Beamesderfer v. First National Bank (1937), (CCA 3),
ee Se EE crane ncdlaaciatibacenenntrccanctantianons 37, 51
In re Day (D. C. Ill.) (1935), 10 Fed. Supp. 229........ 44,51
In re Feil, 40 F. Supp. 948 ................ wa Ee
First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301 U. S. 435...
eaten ‘ .....o1, 32, 40, 47, 49, d1
Helliker, In re (1935), 9 Fed. Supp. 948 -.0.0000.0020..... 49
Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 at
DE sala sa tia pinsssaiacanion : . 40
Stoller v. Cleveland Trust Co., CCA 6 (1943), 133 Fed.
BE BRene ne yeh ee oo mem ene eho oe Nee
John Hancock v. Bartels, 308 U. S. 180 00. 42, 50
Knight, In re (1934), 9 Fed. Supp. 502 -....2.2.0.222.--....-. 49
Lindsay, In re (1941), 41 Fed. Supp. 948 52
Palma Brothers, In re (1934), 8 Fed. Supp. 920 .......... 50
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CRG ORO
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser TERM 1942
No. 988
BLESSES EARL LI EPI oe
Tue CLEVELAND Trust Company AND THE CENTRAL
NationaL Bank oF CLEVELAND, OHIO,
Petitioners,
vs.
MicHakEL Grorce STOLLER,
Respondent.
e,
ay
i
Fas
i
*
:
as
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT.
OPPOSING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT.
Note. All emphasis in this brief is supplied unless other-
wise stated.
MAP
There is inserted at the end of this brief a folded map
showing the farms operated by the respondent which are
referred to in the testimony or in the exhibits. By open-
2
ing out the map it will lie before the reader for reference
during the reading of this brief.
The Opinions, etc., Below
The opinion of the appellate court is reported as Stoller
v. Cleveland Trust Company, CCA 6 (1943), 133 Fed. (2d)
180. It is found at R. 242 to 247.
The memorandum opinion of the district court is not
reported. It appears at R. 190 and 191.
The report of the supervising conciliation commissioner
to whom the matter was referred as a special master is at
R. 24 to 84.
The transcript of evidence is at R. 85 to 189.
The petitioners’ motion to dismiss is at R. 22 to 23.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Having Reference to Pages 16 and 17 of the
Petitioners’ Brief.
The statement in the petitioners’ brief, at pages 16 and
17, that the respondent ‘‘rapidly gave up his farming super-
vision,’’ and restricted himself to ‘¢ Jandlord work’ ’’, is
answered at pages 17 to 28 of this brief.
Having Reference to Pages 17 and 18 of the
Petitioners’ Brief.
The assertion that respondent had a ‘‘special franking
privilege (R. 187)’’ from the Post office is not true. There
3
is no reference to a ‘‘franking privilege’’ at R. 87 or at any
other place in the record. There is in the special master’s
Findings of Fact at R. 25 (middle of the page) a statement
that he has a ‘‘postal permit for mailing of his advertising
matter’’. Such a postal permit may be obtained by anyone
who applies for it.
Having Reference to the Bottom of Page 18
of the Petitioners’ Brief.
The petitioners’ statement that in the seed business ‘‘he
employs a bookkeeper, also employs several other girls
and men—the girls working in the office in the preparation
of mailing lists and advertising the seed business,—the
men being employed in the warehouse and mill in the
handling, cleaning and processing of seed’’ is disproved by
their own references to the Record (‘‘R. 88, 116-118’) and
is further disproved by the references to the record at
pages 24 (Witness De Latt) and 25 (Witness Gehau), in
this brief.
Having Reference to Page 19 of the
Petitioners’ Brief.
(The quoted paragraph at the middle of the page)
The respondent occasionally worked at his seed records
at night because his farm work came first and he devoted
to the seed business the ‘‘tail ends’’ of his time. This is
shown from the record at page 25 (Witness Gehau) in
this brief.
Answer of the Respondent to the
ARGUMENT.
Set forth in the Petitioners’ Brief at pages 23 to 34.
Restricted Range of Petitioners’ Objections.
The petitioners’ petition and brief are grounded exclu-
sively upon that portion of the definition of a ‘‘farmer’’ in
Section 75(r), which relates to income. They ignore the
first, and principal part of the definition of a ‘‘farmer’’
which relates to the production of agricultural products.
The record demonstrates that, not only the ‘*principal
part’’ of his income, but his only income came from the
farm. The seed business, which grew out of his farming
occupation was a constant drain upon the farm profits and
finally brought him down. His farm debts were not press-
ing. His obligations growing out of his ill-starred seed
business caused him to borrow from the petitioners who
took judgment and levied on his farm chattels. When the
sheriff’s sale was advertised he filed his farmer debtor
petition. R. 186 to 188. R. 6.
When the facts are measured by either branch of the
statutory definition of a ‘‘farmer’’ in Section 75(r), (that
is whether by occupation or by income), the appellant is a
‘farmer’. He smacks of the soil and the roots of his occu-
pation and of his income go down into the soil.
The Statutory Definition of a Farmer Examined.
Decisions of This Court.
The original definition of a ‘‘farmer’’ in Section 75 (r),
Act of March 3, 1933, was not changed but merely amplified
and clarified by the amendment in the Act of May 15, 1935.
This Court said in First National Bank v. Beach, 301 U.S.
435 at page 438:
“The only effect of the 1935 amendments of the
statute, in so far as they have to do with the defi-
nition of a farmer, was to make it clear that farming
operations include dairy farming and the production
of poultry and livestock products in their unmanufac-
tured state as well as the cultivation of the products
of the soil. There had been decisions to the contrary.’’
This statutory definition of a ‘‘farmer”’ in Section 75 (r),
and no other, is controlling in a proceeding under Section
75. Benitez v. Bank, 313 U. 8S. 270.
Analyzing and Expanding the Definition
of a ‘‘Farmer’’ in Section 75 (r).
Upon analysis this definition of a farmer is seen to con-
tain two main divisions and seven separate definitions,
any one of which constitutes a “‘farmer’’.
The applicable portions of the definition are here ex-
panded:
a
Division I, OCCUPATION.
First Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes an
individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-
gaged in farm operations, that is, in producing prod-
ucts of the soil.
Second Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any
individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-
gaged in dairy farming.
Third Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any
individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-
gaged in the production of poultry.
Fourth Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any
individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-
gaged in the production of livestock.
Fifth Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any
individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-
gaged in the production of poultry products in their
unmanufactured state.
Sixth Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any
individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-
gaged in the production of livestock products in their
unmanufactured state.
Division II, INCOME
Seventh Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any
individual, the principal part of whose income is de-
rived from farming operations, that is from any one or
more of the following operations:
(1) Producing products of the soil;
(2) Dairy Farming;
(3) The production of poultry;
(4) The production of livestock;
7
(5) The production of poultry products in their
unmanufactured state;
(6) The production of livestock products in their
unmanufactured state.
Any of Seven Definitions Constitute a Farmer.
It is to be noted that when either the activities or income
of a debtor bring him within any one of the foregoing
seven separate definitions, he is a ‘‘farmer’’ for the pur-
poses of Section 75.
The Supervising Conciliation Commissioner, as Special
Master, and also the appellate court, found that the re-
spondent qualifies as a farmer debtor under Section 75(r)
whether measured by either division of the statute, that is
whether by occupation, or by income.
Specifically the evidence proves that the respondent is
a ‘‘farmer’’ by each one of the following of the seven
statutory definitions:
iBy the first definition he is a ‘‘farmer’’ because he is
primarily bona fide personally engaged in farming oper-
ations, that is, in producing products of the soil.
By the fourth definition he is a ‘‘farmer’’ because he is
primarily bona fide personally engaged in the production
of livestock.
By the sixth definition he is a ‘‘farmer’’ because he is
primarily bona fide personally engaged in the production
of livestock products in their unmanufactured state.
By the seventh definition he is a ‘‘farmer’’ because the
principal part of his income is derived from farming oper-
tienen
Bw
ations, that is from one or more of the following oper:
tions:
8
Producing products of the soil.
The production of livestock.
The production of livestock products in their
unmanufactured state.
In fact, whether there is considered the last three years
as a whole or the last year alone, his only income has been
from the farm operations. The monetary tide ran the
other way in the seed business, absorbing not only the
farm income but the borrowed money represented by
the ninety day cognovit notes given to the petitioners and
by them reduced to judgment. It was these judgments
which precipitated the filing of the farmer debtor petition.
The Application of the Statutory Definition
to the Respondent.
Conflicting Conclusions of the Court Below.
The Special Master found, and the appellate court like-
wise found, that whether judged by occupation or by
income, the respondent was a ‘*farmer’’ and that the cause
of the debts was immaterial. R. 24, R. 244 bottom of
page to R. 246 bottom of page.
The special master’s findings of fact were:
‘‘He was in financial difficulty, not because of nor
through his farming operations but through his seed
business operations. His farming operations resulted
in a net profit and his seed business operations in &
net loss. It must be found that the principal part of
the debtor’s income was derived from producing
products of the soil and the production of livestock
9
and livestock products in their unmanufactured
state.’ Report of the Special Master, R. 957.
‘‘1, The debtor was primarily, bone fide, person-
ally engaged in producing products of the soil and in
the production of livestock and livestock products in
their unmanufactured state prior to filing his petition
in this case.
2. The principal part of the income of the debtor
for the year preceding the filing of his petition herein
was derived from the products of the soil and the live-
stock and livestock products in their unmanufactured
state, produced by him.’’ Report of the Special Mas-
ter, R. 57.
The Special Master’s Conclusion of Law was: ‘‘The
debtor is entitled to the benefits of Section 75 of the Bank-
ruptey act as a farmer who comes fully within the defini-
tion contained in Section 75 (r).’’ Report of Special
Master, R. 57.
The District Judge overruled the Special Master and
held that by occupation and income the petitioner was not
a ‘“‘farmer’’ and also that the substantial portion of his
debts was incurred outside of farming. He said:
‘‘T have concluded that Michael Stoller was basic-
ally, fundamentally and primarily engaged in the
wholesale and retail seed business; that his interests
lay there; that his energies and attention were pri-
marily devoted there; and that instead of being per-
sonally engaged in the business of farming he was
personally engaged in the seed business. I am fur-
ther of the opinion from the record that the principal
income that accrued to Michael Stoller during a period
of years prior to the filing of his petition in bankruptcy
was derived from the seed business, and I am further
convinced that the substantial portion of his indebted-
ness that brought him to the bar of the bankruptcy
court was incurred in the operation of that seed busi-
ness. Beamesderfer v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,
10
(CCA 3d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 491.” Memorandum of
the Court, R. 190.
Particularly pertinent extracts from the opinion of the
appellate court:
“There is controversy concerning his customary
daily movements from his farm to the situs of his seed
business in Paulding, Ohio; but it appears that his
day began at the usual early hour for farmers, and
that he constantly performed some regular farm rou-
tine, gave instructions for farm operations, and pre-
pared and kept records of the same; more adequately,
indeed, than he kept the books of his seed business.
However varied his activities, it is apparent from the
record that the industrious appellant applied a most
substantial portion of his time to the work of a ‘dirt
farmer.’ He plowed, planted and husked corn; sowed
wheat and oats; drilled and harvested beets; mowed
alfalfa hay and clover; and ran a tractor and a com-
bine, threshing machine, binder and reaper. He did
most of the farm repair work and gave attention to
drainage and tiling problems. The usual custom of
appellant, after completing his most pressing farm
work and instructing the farm hands, was to proceed
to his seed house between eleven and twelve o’clock,
and to return around four or five o’clock in the after-
g noon for the resumption of his part of planting, plow-
‘ing, or whatever might be the order of the day upon
the farm.’’ R. 245, last paragraph, running over to
the top of R. 246.
‘On the record before this court, it is not possible
to determine accurately the source of appellant’s in-
come. Apparently, he kept his farm and his seed
business records as a unit. He testified that the in-
come statements which he prepared for the creditor
banks were based on his combined operations. His
testimony indicates that the major portion of his net
income was derived from farming operations, but this
11
testimony is neither established nor disproved by his
own records. His reports to the Department of Agri-
culture indicate that his farming operations were
profitable; and the fact that the preponderance of
his debts were weighted upon him from the seed busi-
ness is corroborative of his assertion that the prin-
cipal ‘part of his income was derived from farming.”’
R. 246, second full paragraph on the page.
The Reasons for These Conflicting Conclusions.
The reasons for these opposite conclusions of the Spe-
cial Master and the District Judge become apparent from
a study of the statute and of the testimony and exhibits.
The reasons will first be stated and then discussed.
The first reason for the disagreement: The miscon-
struction of the statute by the District Judge.
The second reason for the disagreement: The hearing
before the Special Master took five days. He personally
heard and often personally questioned the witnesses, and
he had before him all of the exhibits, some sixty-six in all.
The third reason for the disagreement: The District
Judge did not have access to all of the exhibits. In fact,
most of the papers were never transmitted to the clerk
or to the Judge of the court, but remained, by stipulation
of the parties because of their bulk, at the place of hear-
ing and were never removed to the office of the Judge.
These three reasons for the conflict of conclusions in
the District Court will now be examined.
12
1,
The First Reason for the Disagreement: The District
Judge Misconstrued the Statute.
The Conclusions of the District Judge.
The Judge read ‘‘and’’ into the statute in place of
‘‘or’?, He also held to be important the fact that the
debts which precipitated the farmer debtor proceeding
were incurred outside of the farming business. R. 190.
These conceptions of the requirements necessary to meet
the definition of a ‘‘farmer”’ in Section 75 (r) were first
suggested by the petitioners’ motion to dismiss as is
disclosed when the substantial parts of the motion and of
the court’s memorandum opinion are put side by side for
comparison.
Indeed a perusal of the motion at R. 22 and of the Memo-
randum of the District Court at R. 190 discloses how -
closely the memorandum opinion follows the form of the
motion. An analysis of the motion to dismiss, at R. 22, is
here made for comparison with an analysis of the memo-
randum opinion of the District Court at R. 190.
13
The Petitioners’ Motion and the Memorandum Opinion
of the District Court Analyzed and Compared.
The Petitioners’ Motion.
(R, 22)
The debtor is not primar-
ily bona fide engaged in
farming and his principal
income is not derived from
farming.
The debtor is not a farmer
under Section 75 (s) [The
case had not progressed into
bankruptey under Section
75(s)].
The debtor is primarily
engaged in the seed business
and his gross income is de-
rived from it and not from
farming.
The Memorandum of the
District Court (R. 190).
The conclusion of the Spe-
cial Master that the farmer
debtor was primarily bona
fide personally a farmer and
his principal income was
therefrom should be over-
ruled.
Each ease involving the
question of whether a debtor
in bankruptcy is a farmer
should stand on its own bot-
tom. [The case had not pro-
gressed into bankruptcy. By
statute and by General Or-
der 5 (5) of the Supreme
Court, the appellant re-
mained a ‘‘debtor’’.]
He is basically fundamen-
tally and primarily engaged
in the seed business. His
principal income prior to fil-
ing his petition in bank-
ruptey was from the seed
business.
14
The debtor is not person-
ally and primarily engaged
in farming but devotes all
his time and attention to the
seed business.
Except for a farm mort-
gage and a chattel mortgage
all of his debts were in-
curred in the seed business.
The operation of the farms
was by other persons and
such operation was not pro-
ducing products of the soil
‘‘but the feeding out of
livestock,’’ [sic] and the se-
cured debts grew out of
feeding livestock.
Instead of being personal-
ly engaged in the business of
farming he was personally
engaged in the seed business.
The substantial part of
his debts that brought him
into bankruptcy was in-
curred in the seed business.
The farmer debtor super-
vised the farm operations by
giving directions to his fore-
men and workmen on the
farm in the mornings before
going to the seed store. Very
little in the record to show
he was personally engaged
in farming.
The Conclusions of the Special Master.
The Supervising Conciliation Commissioner, acting as
Special Master, by a minute and extensive discussion of the
evidence,
the law and the court decisions, and a copious
digest of the evidence, occupying sixty pages of the record
extending from R. 24 to 84, came to the following separate
and distinct conclusions.
See R. 57. Any one of these
conclusions made the respondent a ‘‘farmer’’ as defined
in Section 75 (r).
These conclusions were:
a a ——
15
1. The respondent was primarily in good faith person-
ally engaged in farming, and he was primarily and person-
ally in good faith producing products of the soil.
2. He was primarily in good faith personally engaged
in producing livestock.
3. The principal part of his income was derived from
farming operations, in fact, he had no other income except
that from the farm crops and livestock.
The seed business was run at a loss. As stated by the
movants in their motion (R. 22) and in the Memorandum of
the Court (R. 190) the debts which precipitated the farmer
debtor proceeding arose out of the ill fated seed business
venture which gobbled up the farm income faster than :t
could be produced from several hundreds of acres. The
Judge, the Special Master, the Movants and the Debtor all
agree upon this point.
In his discussion of the law and facts the Special Mas-
ter showed that any one of the proved elements was suf-
ficient to entitle the respondent to the benefits of the farmer
debtor statute.
The Special Master had all of the exhibits before him,
those that remained at the place of hearing and those trans-
mitted to the office of the District Court. The Judge had
only those sent to the office of the District Court. This ex-
plains the opposite factual and consequent opposite legal
conclusions reached by the Special Master and by the Judge.
The proof of these statements will now be discussed.
ph PRATT TRE AP DRESS A Se FRY TERT TERY ERS TR IR INT SMA OSE HS AL
16
The Second Reason for the Disagreement: The Hearing
Conducted by the Special Master.
The hearing before the Special Master required five
days in all.
The following quotations are from the Special Master’s
R. 24: . . . ‘Shearing was commenced . . . on
December 14, 1940.”’
R. 24: ‘‘Hearing .. . was continued until December
16, 1940, ... In the afternoon of such day, the hear-
R. 24: ‘*. . . continuances were had and further
hearing held on December 20, 23, and 27, 1940, at the
office of the debtor.”’
The Third Reason for the Disagreement: The Judge Did
Not Have Access to All of the Exhibits.
Only part of the exhibits were transmitted to the District
Judge with the report of the Special Master. The Report
states that by stipulation of counsel ‘‘such exhibits, all
of which are bulky, remain in the office of the debtor in
Paulding, Ohio, subject to the order of the court.”’ R. 58.
R. 111. The district judge did not call for the exhibits
which were left at the place of hearing and they were
never seen by the judge.
17
These three reasons explain the divergent conclusions
of the Special Master and the District Judge.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE.
Farming Operations.
What the Testimony Shows About the Farming
Operations of the Respondent.
It is when we turn to the testimony in the record that
we see the precise and abundant evidence which led the
Supervising Conciliation Commissioner as Special Master
to the inevitable conclusion that the respondent is a
‘‘farmer’’ as defined in Section 75 (r).
The Testimony Concerning the Respondent’s
Farming Operations.
The Special Master summarized the evidence thus:
‘He lived on the big farm with his father (the same
one now in his name), until he was 22 years old. He
thereafter lived for 1 year on a farm in Latty Town-
ship, of 160 acres and from there to Paulding Town-
ship, where he lived for 19 years. He moved to the big
farm on March 4th, 1940. He began to operate as an
independent farmer when he was 22 years old. He
farmed 160 acres and exchanged work with his fa-
ther.’’ R. 69.
The respondent himself testified that he is 42 years old.
Lived in Paulding County ‘‘twenty-nine year.’’ Came to
the community with his family when fifteen years old. R.
131. Lived on farms and farmed since five years old.
18
R. 131. Moved upon a 160 acre farm for a year after leav-
ing home. He then moved to the Huber Farm of 160 acres
where he lived nineteen years. During the last year he
moved to the ‘‘Home Farm”’ of 435 acres where he now
lives. He is one of the leading farmers in the community :
‘‘Brady Brothers were and Mike Stoller.’’ Related by
Burdick, a witness for the petitioner. R. 105. R. 131 and
132.
The Farms He Operated in Recent Years.
In 1936 he farmed 1785 acres, comprised of the ‘*Home
Farm,”’ Dittenhaver Farm, Sugar Company Farm, Huber
Farm, Ferrell Farm, Northwestern Mutual Farm, Section
15, farm of 240 acres, Latty Township Farm, Barnes Farm,
Graham Farm, Mikels Farm. R. 132, R. 133.
In 1937 he farmed the same acreage, 1785 acres. He
owned the same land and had the same Barnes farm under
contract. R. 134.
In 1938 he farmed the ‘‘Home Farm,’’ the Huber Farm,
the Sugar Company Farm, the Latty Township Farm, and
he looked after a rented Latty Township Farm, total 1095
acres. R. 134.
In 1939 he farmed the same acreage as in 1938, 855 acres.
R. 134.
In 1940 he farmed 515 acres.
The Special Master summarized the evidence on this
subject as follows:
‘‘In that year [1936] he farmer 135 acres in Jack-
son Township, Section 31; 130 acres from D. L. Ditten-
hauer estate in Jackson Township; 180 acres for the
Paulding Sugar Company in Section 13; 160 acres Car-
ey Huger farm, Sec. 23, Paulding Township, 40 acres;
19
Oliver Ferral farm, Sec. 23, Paulding Township; 120
acres for Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany, Sec. 15, Paulding Township, 240 acres; Sec. 17,
Latty Township, 80 acres in Sec. 15, Latty Township.
During that time he owned 555 acres. He also had a
land contract on 200 acres which he improved and tiled
and later on turned over to one H. G. Barnes. He also
farmed 240 acres in Sections 22 and 26, Oren Graham
farm, and 160 acres E. E. Michel’s farm, Sections 22
and 25 in Paulding Township.’”’ R. 69.
‘*In 1937 he farmed the 435 acres called the home
farm, the 160 acres, the Huber farm, and the 180 acres
the Sugar Company farm, and the 80 acres, the Latty
Township farm, and looked after the other 240 acres
in Latty Township, rented it.
‘*In 1939 he farmed the same acreage as in 1938,
815 acres.
‘*In 1940, he farmed 515 acres.’’ R. 70.
The records and exhibits show that Mr. Stoller has farmed
the following tracts which are indicated on the map at the
end of this brief:
3 Stoller owned (435, 80 and 40 acres) ............ 555 acres
1 Barnes or Laukhoff Farm (Land Contract) 200 acres
2 Deleat Farms (329 and 20 — puemennededning 349 acres
1 Dittenhaver Farm 129 acres
Fh FE IID sacipirienthcitapsncionstticcinntin 40 acres
1 Franklin or North Western Mutual Farm.... 120 acres
4 Graham Farms (160, 80, 40 and 20 acres).... 300 acres
1 Huber Farm 160 acres
2 Mikels Farm (160 and 66 acres) ~.................. 226 acres
1 Rocky Farm 160 acres
1 Sugar Company Farm 180 acres
1 Carr Farm 160 acres
Total Farms—19 oe
Total acres farmed.......... 2579 acres
The fact that his farming operations, much of them as a
tenant, were confined to the same community indicated that
he must have achieved a good reputation as a farmer. Only
“|
a ‘first hand’’ dirt farmer whose primary interest is farm-
ing can produce profits as a tenant. A ‘‘second hand’’
absentee farm tenant whose chief industry is applied at
something other than farming can not be a good farmer.
20
He Was ‘‘Personally Engaged in Farming Operations.”’
The Special Master’s Summary on This Subject.
‘‘He also operates threshing and combining rigs and
does some custom seed cleaning.”’ R. 26.
‘“The debtor’s farm duties, as he testified concerning
them, were the looking after tiling and draining prob-
lems and ‘most other landlord work’. It included the
erection and repair of buildings and the repairing of
tractors.’’ R. 26.
‘‘He generally helps with the chores in the morning
during the time he is at home. He spends approxi-
mately an hour at that task. He has also plowed and
planted on occasion and has given instructions to the
men working for him. He maintained and fed 160
steers. Likewise on occasion, he personally fed such
steers, shocked some corn, hauled sugar beets and did
other work about the farms.”’ R. 26.
‘‘He has no foreman, he instructs his men himself
every morning, and looks after them and works with
them.’’ R. 71.
‘He also bought and fed steers, fed and sold them
between November 1, 1939, and November 1, 1940.
The 8692 bushels of corn, and 96 tons of clover hay
fed the steers was raised on his farm. 50 tons of
molasses was purchased. The mixed feed for hogs
was obtained in exchange for soy beans which were
raised on the farm. 4112 bushels of corn was partly
raised on the farm and partly purchased.
‘‘He bought some hogs (10) and raised the others.’’
R. 72.
‘‘He bought 100 head of steers on September 25,
1939. On October 3, 1939, he bought 72 more.’’ R. 77.
: —
21
He is a member and officer of the Farm Bureau, of the
Equity Elevator Exchange, and of the Rehabilitation
Board, also of the Delegation Committee of the Sugar
Company. R. 71.
The Respondent’s Testimony:
‘‘Who did the farming?’’ ‘‘I did it all with my own help
and extra help it required.’’ ‘‘I did tiling and other work
during the winter months.’’ R. 133.
‘‘Tell the Court what’”’ . . . ‘‘work you did in the cul-
tivation of the crops? Any and every job, usually started
every bit of corn planting, and the beet drilling and plow-
ing and the repairing of tractors, run a threshing engine
and did all the repair work on them; I did the repairing
during the slack time, and during the summer took care
of all the heavy work on the big machinery and all that
work.’’ ‘Pertaining to the cultivation what work did
you do? Always extra man to run the tractors, took fuel
to the men, and many a time went out and helped them,
and put on a shift and again in the evening went out at
four o’clock from here and would plant ten acres of beets,
corn, or what it might be, before dark.’’ ‘‘Plowed corn,
planted corn, planted sugar beets, made hay, run the com-
bine and did all other farm work.’’ R. 134. Sowed wheat,
laid tile, covered tile, inoculated and sowed seed, run
binder, plowed corn, mowed hay, husked corn, harvested
beets, dug beets, drove tractor and team. R. 133 to R. 135.
‘‘T have no foreman, look after that myself. I always
contact the men myself.’’ ‘‘Don’t make a speech.’’ ‘‘Court:
I asked him, if he understood it as a symbol for foremen
and he stated he don’t have any.’’ ‘‘Mr. Stoller: Don’t
have a foreman, I instruct my men myself every morning
and look after them and work with them.’’ R. 137.
22
During the seed season he said he ‘‘spent most of my
time here, and during the off time spent most of my time
on the farm, but during the seed season, go around on the
farms every morning and check up what the men are doing
and what condition the crops and livestock are in.’’ R. 144.
‘In the summer we all worked on the farm including
myself.’? Examination by the Supervising Conciliation
Commissioner. R. 113, 114.
He worked at the seed house and on the farm in the
winter. R. 88. There is little seed business in the sum-
mer, it is seasonable. R. 89. Sometimes he locks up the
seed business in summer. R. 94.
He helps his hired men, ‘‘the first thing I do is to take
time to farm.’’ R. 94.
He works at the seed store at nights, and during spare
time. R. 110. R. 116.
He threshes and hulls clover seed. R. 90.
So ran the findings of the Supervising Conciliation Com-
missioner as special master and the testimony of the re-
spondent himself.
We proceed to an examination of the testimony of the
other witnesses.
Witness Doster, Farm Hand.
R. 153, R. 154, R. 159, R. 160.
Age 51. Lives on his own farm. Has worked for Mr.
Stoller as a farm hand for 17 years.
23
Year 1939-1940:
Mr. Stoller was on the farm the biggest part of the time
and did chores, planted corn, sowed oats, drove the tractor.
He left the farms ‘‘usually noon or after; sometimes did
not come out till evening, out with us most of the time.’’
R. 154.
‘*Mr. Stoller helped chore on the home farm most of
the time.’’
‘‘He always got up around five o’clock—around in there
somewhere. What did he do from then until he came to
the Stoller Seed House? Helped around choring and out
on the place.’’ R. 154.
‘‘Mike [Mr. Stoller] comes out every morning to do the
chores’’ till they are done. It takes an hour every morn-
ing. Sometimes he is out in the evenings, ‘‘half the time,
anyhow.’’ Cross Examination: R. 156 and 157.
‘‘Did you get your instructions from John [the brother]
about planting and things to do? No, sir. Tell you any-
thing to do about the farm at all? No, got our instruc-
tions from Mike.’’ Cross examination: R. 157.
sé
. . - During the period of time from 1938 until now
did you observe any particular months in the year when
Mr. Stoller was on the farm more than in the Seed Store?
Not on the farm all the time. Was he at the seed store all
the time? No, Mike wasn’t. You say he was on the farm
all the time? The whole summer. How about the winter?
Up till quite a bit, and out there half and half. Half and
half you say? Yes. Wasn’t he at the seed store in the
summer? Not to speak of.’’ R. 157 and 158.
‘*Mike helped plant a lot of corn and oats both.’’ ‘“When
you say he helped, do you mean he was out planting corn
when you was helping, or’John? No, he [we] wasn’t all
24
helping plant corn. When we [he] was planting we was out
harrowing. You don’t mean you and Mr. Stoller were
planting corn together? No, one or the other planted.’’
Cross examination, R. 158-159.
‘You and John helped plant oats and say Mike helped
with that? Yes. Did you see him plant oats? Yes. Sure
of it? Yes. Do you know if he did a good job or not?
Sure.’’ Cross examination, R. 159.
“Tell what he [Stoller] did? Well, he milked and he
helped feed the horses and cows and hogs and everything.”’
Direct examination, R. 159.
In 1939 he kept 22 head of steers on the Huber farm. Di-
rect examination, R. 160.
Witness Leo De Latt, Farm Owner.
R. 161, R. 163, R. 165.
Has known Stoller over 25 years. The witness owns
his farm located near the Stoller ‘‘Home Farm’’. Has
seen him work on the farm, principally in the spring and
through harvest. Direct examination, R. 161 and 162.
He has gone to the seed house on various occasions and
Mr. Stoller was not there. ‘‘Well, generally didn’t find
him . . . I called the farm and found him there.”’ Talked
to him there by phone. ‘‘Well, I called him a lot of times
[at the seed house] and nobody was there, suppose, could
not get an answer.’’ ‘‘Tell the court if you usually came
to the seed house and found no one here? I have.’ si |
was on business.’’ Direct examination, R. 163.
Since January the witness has been at the seed house
three or four times and three or four times back in 1939.
‘‘Well, I would say he [Stoller] spent most of his time
on the farm during the day, have arranged to meet him
25
here in the evening.’’ Cross examination, R. 163 and 164.
‘*You haven’t seen him working on the farm? Yes, I
have.’’ ‘‘How many times? Went there three times, was
driving horses on the hay rack.’’ ‘‘Think that was in July,
went to see him about threshing.’’ ‘‘Another time he was
feeding cattle.’’ in October. ‘‘Once, in the Spring, don’t
know when, that was about sowing time.’’ Cross examina-
tion, R. 164.
‘‘Done business at the store at night? Yes. Done busi-
ness at the store in day time? Not with him.’’ Cross ex-
unination, R. 165.
When the witness came to the seed house it was ‘‘gen-
»rally bad days.’’ He picked those particular days ‘‘be-
eause I had the time and figured Mike had it.’’ ‘‘Tell the
court whether those days were fit to work on the farm?
Not on the ground.’’ Direct examination, R. 166.
Witness Gehau. Worker in seed store.
R. 169, R. 170.
State of Mr. Stoller was present every day in the Stoller
Seed House? ‘‘No, about half the time, maybe not half.’’
When Mr. Stoller was located by the witness, it was
usually ‘‘At the farm.”’
‘‘T was supposed to work from 8:30 to 5 and had to wait
until Mike got here at 10:30 to open up, sometimes in the
afternoon, whenever he got here, and when he finished his
work at the farm or got pretty well finished with it.’’ ‘‘As
I said before sometimes 10:30, just whatever time he would
run up here, and he would open up and then he would leave
and go back and finish his work, and then he would come
back.’’ Direct examination, R. 169, R. 170.
26
‘‘Mr. Stoller worked some of those nights? We worked
at nights because he could not be all day.’’ Cross exam-
ination, R. 170.
Witness Bidlock, Sugar Company Manager.
R. 172, R. 174, R. 177.
Saw Mr. Stoller doing farm work on the various farms
several times when on inspection trips as company man-
ager to the Stoller farms or part them.
In 1939 ‘‘he farmed the farm belonging to the Sugar
Company and the Huber Farm and the home farm and the
other two farms in Latty Township.”’ In 1938 farmed the
same land and also the Dittenhaver farm of over 200 acres.
‘‘Referring particularly to this Michael G. Stoller farm
I ask you if any of the hand labor was performed by the
children of Michael G. Stoller? There has been a part of
it performed by his family.”’ Direct examination, R. 172.
Witness Jack DeLaet, Farm Hand.
R. 178, BR. 179.
In 1939 ‘‘I fed, he had 160 head of steers, I fed those,
and shocked corn and hauled beets and everything there
was to do on the farm.’’
Mr. Stoller ‘‘done the work in the morning and helped
load beets when I hauled them, and put up a new building
and helped put the building up.”’ Mr. Stoller did not spend
all his time there. ‘‘No, he did not spend it all there,
but gave me orders what to do.’? He would leave the farm
‘around eleven o’clock, generally in the morning, and
sometimes would come back in the afternoon.’’
27
‘‘What time did Mr. Stoller usually get up in the morn-
ing? I always got there around 5:30 or 6 o’clock and he
was up then. What was he doing? In the barn doing
chores.’’ Direct examination, R. 178, R. 179.
The Evidence Conclusively Proves that the
Respondent Is a Farmer.
The special master in his report in summing up the evi-
ence on this subject said:
‘It is apparent from these facts that the debtor was
‘bona fide personally engaged in producing products
of the soil’ and ‘the producing of . . . livestock prod-
ucts in their unmanufactured state.’
The remaining question under this portion of the
definition is whether or not the debtor was ‘‘primar-
ily’ so engaged.
Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edi-
tion, defines the word as follows: ‘Primarily: In the
first place, originally; pre-eminently; fundamentally ;
as, an action primarily based on policy.’
The debtor resided on the largest of his farms with
his family. Regular operations about the farms were
his first concern in the mornings. He did not go to
his seed business until he had performed some farm
work and had arranged for and given instructions as
to the farm work to be done thereafter. The employees
of his seed business were required to await his arrival.
They were unable to enter the office until he did arrive.
It must be found that his first or primary interest
was in his farms and the farming operations. That
being so, he falls within the group included within
the first portion of Section 75 (r).’’
By every test applied to the evidence the respondent is
a farmer. He gives his farming first place in his time
and in his attention. He is a skillful farmer. By the first
=n
EU Bini itt OPA LATIN 8 Rte OY
yaar ag —
Se Eg ai eee ae ee
28
part of the statutory definition he is a farmer because he
is primarily bona fide personally engaged in producing
products of the soil and in the production of livestock.
Income.
The farming operations of the respondent were finan-
cially remunerative. His seed business was a failure and
was a constant drain on the farm profits. No farm cred-
itor pressed him but the seed business brought him down.
The Special Master’s conclusion on the cause of Mr.
Stoller’s financial difficulties were that:
‘He was in financial difficulty, not because of nor
through his farming operations but through his seed
business operations. His farming operations resulted
in a net profit and his seed business operations in a
net loss. It must be found that the principal part of
the debtor’s income was derived from producing prod-
ucts of the soil and the production of livestock and
livestock products in their unmanufactured state.”’
R. 57.
The witnesses for the banks testified that the loans were
necessary on account of the seed business. Carlton, R. 94.
Burdick, R. 106, R. 218.
The bankers called for a financial statement of the seed
business. Carlton, R. 95. They do not make farm loans.
R. 97. They did not loan on the land but on the seed busi-
ness. F. 99. Burdick, R. 109. They sent bank men down
to look at only the seed business. R. 99. Burdick, R.
101, R. 102, R. 103.
Witness Burdick, vice president for one of the peti-
tioners, the Cleveland Trust Company, testified: ‘‘We
29
knew he was a farmer, knew he lived on a farm’’.. .
R. 102. Report of special master, R. 602, middle of page.
This bank official knew that he was recognized to be one
of the leading farmers in the community, ‘‘Brady Broth-
ers and Mike Stoller.’’ R. 105. The bankers were taken
to the farms. R. 92, middle of page. R. 104, bottom of
page.
Declines in seed prices precipitated the loans from
he banks.
The Losses in the Seed Business.
Debtor’s Exhibit D-1 Market Quotation November 16,
1939, R. 149 to 152.
Debtor’s Exhibit D-2 Market Quotation November 1,
1940, R. 149 to R. 152.
The loss for the year 1939-1940 was $13,725.97 and was
due to seed market declines. R. 149 to R. 152.
Examples of declines: alfalfa, declined 5¢ per pound;
alsac, 9c; blue grass, 9c; red clover, 7c; sweet clover, 2c.
The finding of the Special Master on the subject of in-
come from the seed business in 1940 is as follows:
“It is not possible to determine accurate figures for
the income or less resulting from the seed business
operations for the same period of time ending Novem-
ber 1, 1940. The figures compiled by the debtor and
set forth in movants’ exhibit 25, admittedly are not
complete. The bankrupt testified that they are as ac-
curate as he could make them. Such figures disclose
a net loss of $13,725.97.
30
There is no testimony nor evidence in the record
which would tend to show that any profit or net income
was realized from the seed business operations.’’ R.
55.
He lost money in the total farm and seed business, about
$15,000 in 1938, and made some money in 1939. The loss
was in the seed business. R. 94. And not from the farm
operations. R. 95. According to values in 1939 he made
about $16,000 in 1939 from farms and seeds. The farm
income that year about $28,000. R. 91.
The two years of 1938-1939 combined were a loss. R.
95.
The farm operation net profits in 1940 were over $8,000.
R. 143. This was in addition to $327.04 on the 80 acre
farm and $246.64 on the 40 acre farm. R. 145 and 146. Thus
the total net profit from the three farms was $8614.89 in
1940.
The conclusion of the Special Master as to the net farm
profits for 1940 is summarized thus:
“The details of the debtor’s farm income for the
year of 1940, shown in Exhibit 15, appear to be reason-
ably adequate for the purpose. Movants’ witness,
Clifford E. Leitner, a certified public accountant, tes-
tified as to certain inadequacies therein such as the
allocation of items of farm labor to the farms and to
the seed business. Nevertheless, on the basis of fig-
ures found and to a great extent undisputed, the 1940
net income of the debtor from his farms was in the
approximate amount of $6,000.00. The figures for
the grain produced. were fixed as of the dates of har-
vest or entry. The testimony was to the effect that
the prices of grains had risen thereafter but no attempt
was made to include such price gains in the income.”’
—7
31
The losses in the seed business for 1940 are summarized
by the Special Master at R. 29 and R. 59.
It is equally clear that the respondent’s operations as
a farmer were financially successful while as a seedsman
he operated it at a loss. That is, his ‘‘principal income”’
came from farming—in fact his only income came from it.
The Decisions.
The supervising conciliation commissioner in his special
naster’s report cited and discussed thirty-one decisions
n all, some of them he considered more than once in their
different aspects. R. 31 to 54. The district judge cited
and discussed four cases. R. 190. They all were fully
inalyzed and discussed in the briefs and arguments be-
fore the appellate court. As was said by this court in
First National Bank v. Beach, 1937, 301 U. 8. 435, at page
441: when ‘‘read with due relation to the facts’’ the most
of them are seen to be consistent with the conclusion of
the special master and of the appellate court. The ap-
pellate court arrived at the same result, saying: ‘«The
authorities cited by the district court present facts far
afield from those recorded in the instant case’’ and took
the pains to show why. R. 243 and 244.
The decisions relied upon by the district judge and by
the petitioners are here discussed in the order in which
each first appears in their brief.
The Decisions Cited by the District Judge Found in the
Petitioners’ Brief at Page 9, Also in the Record
at pages 190 and 191.
So that the different viewpoints of these opinions which
were relied upon by the District Judge may be readily
32
compared the discussion in the ‘‘Memorandum of the
Court’? (R. 190) is first set forth followed by the discus-
sion by the Special Master (R. 24 to 54) and then by the
discussion of it by the appellate court (R. 242 to 247).
Finally the case is discussed on behalf of the respondent.
i. First National Bank v. Beach (1937)
301 U.S. 435.
From the Memorandum of the District Court:
R. 190: ‘‘Each case involving the question of
whether a debtor in bankruptcy was engaged in farm-
ing, so as to entitle him to the benefits that accrue to
a farmer under the provisions of Sec. 75 of the Bank-
ruptey Act, should stand on its own bottom and be
determined from the facts and from the record. First
Nat. Bank v. Beach, 301 U. S. 485.”
From the Special Master’s Report:
R. 31: ‘‘The leading case on the question of who
is a ‘farmer’’ appears to be First National Bank v.
Beach, 301 U. S. 485; decided May 17, 1937.
In that matter, the debtor owned a farm with 5
houses and a barn thereon. He had lived on such
farm since his birth, occupying one of the houses with
his family. Debtor had been engaged in business
prior to 1930, but had suffered financial losses. At
that time he began working the farms again. He had
harvested fruit from an orchard and some isolated
trees and cultivated a large garden of about one acre,
raising vegetables thereon. He raised hay and sold
it; repaired the houses, cleaned out a well, laid sev-
eral miles of stone walls and built 2 miles of barbed
wire fence; he also had a few animals and a miscel- ©
laneous assortment of farm tools. He raised a con-
siderable amount of poultry and eggs.
=—_
33
His total income per annum from 1930 to 1935, was
$4,000, of which amount $2200.00° was derived from
renting three-quarters of the farm to various persons
for grazing and cultivation.
Rentals from other real estate, not claimed to be
farm property, amounting to $1500.00 made up the
principal part of the remainder of his income.
The District Court held that the debtor was not a
farmer within the meaning of Section 75 (r), and the
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
The Supreme Court stated the question to be simply:
‘Was respondent a farmer because ‘‘nersonally bona
fide engaged primarily in farming operations’’ or be-
cause ‘‘the principal part of his income was derived
from farming operations’’ ’?
It is stated in the opinion:
‘We do not try to fix the meaning of either of
the two branches of this definition, considered in
the abstract. The two are not equivalents. They
were used by way of contrast. Occasions must
have been in view when the receipt of income de-
rived from farming operations would make a
farmer out of some one who personally or pri-
marily was engaged in different activities. A
catalogue of such occasions might err for excess
or for defect if made up in advance. . . . The
words ‘“‘primarily engaged’’, as we find them in
the first branch of the definition, do not constitute
a term of art. The words ‘‘income derived from
farming operations’? do not constitute such a
term. In every case the totality of the facts is
to be considered and appraised. We pass to that
appraisal here.’
: . The farming and the leasing must be
viewed in combination if we are to gain a true
perspective, the two tied together as principal
and incident. A single tract of land belonging
to the debtor has been worked by him in part,
and in part worked by others to whom a section
34
of the tract as been let for cultivation. Far
from stepping into another business, he has been
faithful to the old one in thus dividing up the
tillage. To get a living out of the land in one
way or another is the thread of common purpose
that binds the labor and the leases, and enables
us to find in them the tokens of the same vocation.
In brief the man is seen to be a farmer by every
test of common speech, though his income has
been garnered in rents as well as products. We
emphasize the fact afresh that the words of the
statute to which meaning is to be given are not
phrases of art with a changeless connotation.
They have a color and a content that may vary
with the setting. . . . In the setting of this enter-
prise, the totality of its circumstances, the roots
of the respondent’s income go down into the
soil.’ ’’
From the opinion of the appellate court:
R. 247: ‘“‘The Supreme Court, in First National
Bank v. Beach, 301 U. S. 435, 438, 439, has declared
that, in determining in every case of this character
whether the petitioner is a farmer because ‘person-
ally bona fide engaged primarily in farming opera-
tions’ or because ‘the principal part of his income was
derived from farming operations,’ the totality of the
facts must be considered and appraised. The Supreme
Court would not attempt to fix the meaning of either
of the two branches of the definition considered in the
abstract, saying that the two are not equivalents but
are used by way of contrast. The words ‘primarily
engaged’ in the first branch of the definition, and the
words ‘income derived from farming operations’ in
the second, were said not to constitute terms of art.
Mr. Justice Cordozo wrote: ‘A farmer remains a
farmer, just as a lawyer remains a lawyer, though
the returns on his investments, while not enough to
35
keep him going, are larger, none the less, than the
profits of his labor. . . . We emphasize the fact afresh
that the words of the statute to which meaning is to
be given are not phrases of art with a changeless con-
notation. They have a color and a content that may
vary with the setting. (Citing cases.) In the setting
of this enterprise, the totality of its circumstances,
the roots of respondent’s income go down into the
soil.’
So, in the setting of the case here for decision and
the totality of its circumstances, the roots of appel-
lant’s income would seem to go down into the soil.
He is, therefore, entitled in full measure to the relief
provided by the Act of Congress of May 15, 1935, C.
114, Sec. 3, 49 Stat. 246, 11 U.S.C.A., See. 203(r).”’
Discussion :
With the statement in the Memorandum of the District
Court there is full agreement. The significance of the
decision in the Beach case in its application to the question
in this appeal, lies elsewhere. The Special Master aptly
develops two other points.
(1) The debtor Beach had been a merchant for many
years and in that occupation he acquired a total debt of
$100,000 and retired to do the best that he could on his
farm homestead. His debts arose entirely out of his busi-
ness venture. This fact which the opinion of the Supreme
Court specially noticed was ignored in its discussion of
the sole question to be decided, namely, was Beach a
‘‘farmer’’?
In contrast the Memorandum of the District Court in this
Stoller case lays special stress upon the similar fact in
this respondent’s case, with which fact all agree. The
Memorandum of the Court says:
F
_. . “I am further convinced that the substantial
portion of his indebtedness that brought him to the
bar of the bankruptcy court was incurred in the oper-
ation of that seed business.’’
(2) As pointed out by the Special Master in the quota-
tion from R. 52, the petitioners argued that in so far
as the appellant laid and repaired tile ditches, repaired
farm buildings and fences, and built new buildings, he was
not farming. In the same vein it was argued that in
cleaning out a well, laying stone walls, building fence
and hauling stone, Mr. Beach was not farming. But this
Court concluded that he was.
36
Likewise Mr. Stoller’s activities ‘‘smacked of the soil,
and made him not less, but more a farmer.’’ He was bred
a farmer. He has farmed all his life. Arising at five o’clock
in the morning, milking cows, feeding steers, doing chores,
until eleven before going to the seed store—on those days
when he went at all—he undoubtedly smacked loudly of
the soil when he arrived. ‘‘The roots of his income go
down into the soil.’? He went broke in the seed business
and had to borrow solely on account of the seed business.
At every turn of the evidence covering many years we see
profitable farming operations. The farm profits kept the
seed business afloat until it carried all down with it.
Tiling, repairing fences, building a cattle barn, repair-
ing tractors and other farm machinery, hauling fuel and
oil to the fields, feeding cattle, threshing, combining,
hulling clover, cleaning seed—all are ‘‘farming,’’ all are
producing products of the soil equally with planting,
hoeing, cutting and husking and cribbing corn.
Likewise just as Mr. Beach raised chickens and kept a
garden, so Mr. Stoller raised hogs and cattle, milked cows,
fed cattle, made hay, sowed wheat, laid tile, covered tile,
37
inoculated, cleaned and sowed seed, ran the binder, ran
a threshing machine, plowed corn, mowed hay, husked corn,
harvested beets, dug beets, drove the tractor and team,
planted corn, planted sugar beets, and ran the combine.
Clearly Mr. Stoller ‘‘smacks of the soil’’ and the ‘‘roots
of his income go down into the soil.’’
ii. Beamesderfer v. First National Bank (1937)
(CCA 3), 91 Fed. (2d) 491.
From the Memorandum of the Court:
R. 190: ‘‘I have concluded that Michael Stoller was
basically, fundamentally and primarily engaged in the
wholesale and retail seed business; that his interests
lay there; that his energies and attention were pri-
marily devoted there; and that instead of being per-
sonally engaged in the business of farming he was
personally engaged in the seed business. I am fur-
ther of the opinion from the record that the principal
income that accrued to Michael Stoller during a pe-
riod of years prior to the filing of his petition in bank-
ruptcy was derived from the seed business, and I am
further convinced that the substantial portion of his
indebtedness that brought him to the bar of the bank-
ruptecy court was incurred in the operation of that
seed business. Beamesderfer v. First Nat. Bank &
Trust Co., (CCA 3d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 491.”’
From the Special Master’s Report:
R. 34: ‘‘The case of Beamesderfer v. First Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. of Mount Joy, 91 F. (2d) 491, was
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 3rd Cir. on
July 13, 1937.
The Court recited therein the following facts. From
38
1912 until the date of the filing of the petition on Jan-
uary 7, 1935, the debtor and his wife lived in Mount
Joy, Pa. They had a farm in another county. The
debtor was not a farmer; had not cultivated the farm,
but had rented it to a tenant. During the 5 years
prior to the decision, the farm had not been cultivated
by anybody but had been used for pasture and during
part of that time by another than the debtor. He also
owned a tobacco ware house and was engaged in buy-
ing and selling leaf tobacco over a period of 15 years
prior to the filing of the petition. He borrowed large
sums of money for use in the tobacce business and his
indebtedness arose out of his tobacco operations.
Practically all of his income was derived from the to-
bacco business.’’
In its discussion of this decision the appellate court
said:
R. 243. ‘‘The authorities cited by the district court
present facts far afield from those recorded in the
instant case. Beamesderfer v. First National Bank
dé Trust Co., supra, disclosed a situation where the
petitioner did not live on his farm but had rented it
out. The farm had not been cultivated for five years,
but had been used only for pasture. The petitioner
owned a tobacco warehouse in the town of his resi-
dence, and his occupation for fifteen years had been
buying and selling leaf tobacco. Practically all of
his income had been derived from the tobacco busi-
ness. He was properly adjudged not to be a farmer
entitled to the benefit of the Agricultural Composi-
tion and Extension Act.’’ :
Discussion :
The last paragraph of the Beamesderfer opinion reads
thus:
39
‘“‘The uncontradicted testimony established that
from 1912 until the date of filing the petition in this
case, January 7, 1935, Beamesderfer and his wife lived
in Mount Joy, Lancaster County, Pa., but that they had
a farm in Londonderry Township in Dauphin Coun-
ty, Pa.; that he was not a farmer, had not cultivated
the farm but had rented it to a tenant; and that dur-
ing the last five years it had not been cultivated by
anybody but had been used for pasture, and during
part of that time by another than Beamesderfer, one
Nicholas B. Garver. The testimony further shows
that Beamesderfer owned a tobacco warehouse in the
borough of Mount Joy and was engaged in buying and
selling leaf tobacco over a period of fifteen years prior
to filing the petition in this case; that he borrowed
large sums of money for use in his tobacco business
and that his indebtedness arises out of his tobacco
operations; that practically all of his income was de-
rived from the tobacco business. Under these cireum-
stances the conciliation commissioner found that
neither Beamesderfer nor his wife, the appellant, was
primarily bona fide engaged in producing products of
the soil and that the principal part of their income
was not derived from farming operations. Under these
circumstances, the District Court did not err in re-
fusing to refer the case back to the conciliation com-
missioner and in dismissing the petition.’’
The facts which separate the Beamesderfer case from
this Stoller case are:
1. Beamesderfers did not live on the farm. For 13
years they had lived in another county. Mr. Stoller has
lived on a farm all his life, since 5 years old.
2. Beamesderfers did not farm their land but rented
it to a tenant. Mr. Stoller has always farmed with his
own hands.
3. The Beamesderfers had not cultivated any land at
40
all for the preceding five years. Mr. Stoller has cultivated
land every year.
4. At his residence in a county distant from the farm,
Mr. Beamesderfer had been in.the business of buying and
selling tobacco for the past fifteen years. Mr. Stoller has
always lived on a farm and conducted his seed business
in the village.
5. Practically all of the Beamesderfer income came from
the tobacco business. All of the Stoller income came from
farming. The seed business took it all in and demanded
more, thus dragging the farm operations into the farmer
debtor proceeding.
6. The single element which is common to the two cases
is that the debts arose out of the businesses. This is im-
material as we have seen in First National Bank v. Beach,
301 U. S. 435, where the indebtedness of $100,000 arose out
of mercantile business. The sources of the debts are im-
material. The statute reads: ‘‘A petition may be filed
by any farmer, stating that the farmer is insolvent or
unable to meet his debts as they mature.’’ Sec. 75 (c).
It is the possibility of the farmer debtor losing his land
because he can not pay his debts, any debts, as they mature
that gives the court jurisdiction of a farmer debtor’s case.
The rock bottom purpose in Section 75 is to prevent the
creation of an European peasantry in our country. Farm
ownership by farmers is essential to a strong democracy.
As this Court said in Home Building and Loan v. Blais-
dell, 290 U. S. 398, at page 445:
‘«Algo important is the fact that mortgagees, as is
shown by official reports of which we may take notice,
are predominantly corporations, such as insurance
companies, banks, and investment and mortgage com-
panies. These, and such individual mortgagees as are
41
small investors, are not seeking homes or the oppor-
tunity to engage in farming.”’
The interest of the nation requires that farmers be kept
on the farm as farm owners.
iii. Baxter v. Savings Bank, (1937)
(CCA 5) 92 Fed. (2d) 404.
From the Memorandum of the Court:
R. 190: ‘‘It is apparent from the record that the
farmer debtor exercised supervision over the farm
operations in that he was in the habit of giving direc-
tions to his foreman and workman on the farm, espe-
cially in the mornings before proceeding to the con-
duct of his seed business. But supervision or prop-
erty management is not sufficient to entitle one to the
benefits of this section. Baaxter v. Savings Bank of
Utica (CCA 5th, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 404.”’
From the Special Master’s Report:
R. 33: ‘‘In the case of Bavter v. Savings Bank of
Utica, N. Y., 92 F. (2d) 404 (CCA 5th Cir.) decided
on October 18, 1937, adjudication was set aside for
the reason that the debtor was not a ‘farmer’ within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act relating to agri-
cultural compositions.
The bankrupt had resided in Utica, N. Y. and had
practiced law for a number of years prior to Feb-
ruary, 1935, when he moved to Georgia. In October of
that year, he filed a petition under Section 75. It was
found that farm property constituted only a small
part of his estate, and potential income from his farm-
ing operations was very small as compared with that
of his other property.
a ed Re AS ARG RANI PBA NG tre hk 0 ian .
42
The evidence disclosed that the debtor gave up his
law practice because of his health and he had already
acquired the farm property. Thereafter, he devoted his
entire time to the management thereof which in-
cluded the superintendence of the farming operations.
The court said on page 406:
‘While it is true that appellant may have per-
formed some of the functions of a farmer, his
occupation may be more accurately described as
property management. The evidence amply sus-
tained the conclusion of the court that appellant
was not a farmer within the meaning of the act
(section 75 (r), as amended 11 U.S.C.A. See.
aus (ft). "
The appellate court said:
R. 244: ‘Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, N. Y.,
supra is of doubtful authority, in the light of the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court in John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels, 308 U. S. 180; but, how-
ever this may be, its factual situation bears no rele-
vant resemblance to the instant justiciable contro-
versy. The petitioner, Baxter, who was denied the
benefits of a farmer debtor status, was a Utica, New
York, lawyer, who, eight months before filing his
petition, had given up his law practice and, because
of ill health, moved to Georgia, to a farm which he
had previously acquired there. During residence
on his farm, he merely superintended farming opera-
tions. The Court of Appeals probably took judicial
notice that the new arrival, as a farmer, was a good
lawyer.”’
Discussion :
By certiorari to the Fifth Cireuit (which decided the
Baxter case) the case of John Hancock v. Bartels, 308
U. S. 180 came to this court. At page 181 this Court said:
3b ae iaeh aa ne
RR Sa a ae EAE TE A Me RURAL DE SR EN AT NE EEE A ROSE TIE LIEGE SO PAE AA
43
‘Because of conflict in the rulings of the Court of Appeals
of the Fifth Circuit, due to the differing views of the judges
composing the court in the cases cited, and because of the
importance of the question, we granted certiorari.”
Among the ‘‘cases cited’’ was this case of Baxter v. Sav-
ings Bank, CCA 5, 92 Fed. (2d) 404, and this Court over-
ruled it.
This repudiated Baxter decision will not stand examina-
tion. The Fifth Cireuit Court there held three things:
1. The petitioner was not a farmer. 2. He had not shown
good faith. 3. The bankruptey court could make him an
involuntary farmer bankrupt by adjudication under Section
22 of the regular Bankruptey Act.
1. The entire evidence on the question of whether the
petitioner was a ‘‘farmer’’ the Fifth Circuit Court summed
up as follows:
‘‘The evidence discloses that appellant gave up his
law practice just prior to moving to Georgia on ae-
count of his health; that he had already acquired the
property involved; and that thereafter he devoted his
entire time to the management thereof, which in-
cluded the superintendence of the farming operations.
While it is true that appellant may have performed
some of the functions of a farmer, his occupation may
be more accurately described as property manage-
ment. The evidence amply sustained the conclusion
of the court that appellant was not a farmer within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, Section 75 (r),
11 U.S.C.A., Section 203 (r). Cf. In re Day, (D. C.,
Ill.), 10 F. Supp. 229.”’
Whether the mere management of farm operations would
debar a farmer debtor petitioner from being a ‘‘farmer’’
by occupation, which is extremely doubtful (since even a
corporation—which can not dig in the soil except vicari-
ously by ‘‘management’’ may by statute, 75 (s) 4, be a
”
Cee ies Oe Ot Core ae eee
44
‘‘farmer’’) that subject is not in this Stoller case. Mr.
Stoller was not a mere farm superintendent, he worked
every day with his hands.
2. On the point in issue here the Baxter decision is but
a puff of air, a side issue. The soul and center of the Bax-
ter decision was that a farmer debtor proceeding may
be dismissed, or transferred to regular bankruptcy, for
alleged lack of ‘good faith.’? This Court held in the
Bartels case that good faith has nothing to do with filing
a farmer debtor petition or making a proposal under it.
3. The holding that after dismissing a farmer debtor
petition under Section 75 the court could transfer the pro-
ceeding into regular bankruptcy is a direct violation of
the statutory prohibition against an involuntary bank-
ruptey adjudication of a farmer. The petitioner Baxter
never subjected himself to any jurisdiction in bankruptcy
except under Section 79 and he was not a petitioner for
voluntary adjudication in bankruptcy. No involuntary
petition had been filed.
The Baxter decision warrants no further discussion.
It is inherently a nullity as a precedent.
iv. In re Day (D. C. Ill), (1935)
10 Fed. Supp. 229.
From the Memorandum of the Court:
R. 191: ‘It is also apparent that in the off season
when his time and attention was not wholly concerned
with the seed business he devoted more time to his
farm, but there is very little in the record to indicate
that he was personally engaged in farming or that
he was basically and fundamentally a farmer and
CSPERDE APL ELUATE A 3 — ~
oe EL WO ps PEI told!
ss ‘i 8s PHAN NEY ah IEE TONE TI id iba
that this industry was his primary vocation. In re
Day, (D. C. Ill. 1935), 10 F. Supp. 229.”’
From the Special Master’s Report:
R. 41 and 42: ‘‘In re Day, et al., In re Day’s Estate,
10 F. Supp. 229, decided by the District Court, E. D.
Illinois, on March 8, 1935, set forth that the debtor
from 1920 to the date of his death in October 1932,
was superintendent of highways and county surveyor.
He was a civil engineer by profession, maintained a
civil engineering office, and in addition to his public
work, did engineering work. He owned 320 acres
of farm land but did not live thereon. He lived in a
village where he had an engineering office. His farm
from 1929 until his death, was occupied by a tenant
on a crop rental arrangement. The court concluded
that the income from the farm and from the engineer-
ing profession earnings were approximately the same.
The court said therein:
‘. . . Surely in that situation it cannot be said
that he was personally primarily engaged in farm-
ing. Primarily means basically or in such man-
ner as to be of first importance. Here the con-
nection with farming as such was incidental to
looking after an investment and did not have to
do with his basic employment.
Nor was he within the second definition of the
act, one ‘‘the principal part of whose income is
derived from farming operations.’’ Principal
means main, chief, of first importance. The show-
ing made in this respect falls far short of sus-
taining the allegation bringing him within such
language.’ ”’
In its opinion the appellate court said of this decision:
R. 244: ‘‘In re Day, supra, was a case where the
petitioner held not to be a farmer was a practicing
civil engineer, and also superintendent and county
aT rar ene ee
46
surveyor, who owned but did not live upon a farm
which he rented to a tenant who occupied and culti-
vated it. The civil engineer devoted his time almost
exclusively to the practice of his profession, and de-
rived his income about equally from his profession
and his farm.”’
Discussion :
There can be no quarrel with the decision of Judge
Lindley upon the facts as stated in his Day opinion. They
were:
‘The deceased from the year 1920, until the time
of his death in October, 1932, was superintendent of
highways and county surveyor for the county of Piatt.
He was a civil engineer by profession, maintained a
civil engineering office, and, in addition to his public
employment as superintendent of the highways and
county surveyor, was engaged during substantially
all the remainder of his time in performing for com-
pensation services as a civil engineer for drainage dis-
tricts and private parties. He owned 320 acres of
land, subject to mortgage indebtedness. He did not
live upon the farm, but lived in the village of Be-
ment, and divided his time between his office there
and the courthouse at Monticello, the county seat of
Piatt county. The farm, from 1929 until his death,
was occupied by a tenant, who paid crop rental to the
deceased.
‘“‘The court has labored with the books of the ac-
count, examined the same, drawn his own conclusions,
and observed carefully the calculations submitted by
the respective parties. My conclusion is that the in-
come from the farm and from the engineering profes-
sion earnings were approximately the same.
‘‘His time was given almost exclusively to the prac-
tice of his profession, out of which he had a substan-
tial income, probably at least one-half of his total
income. He did not live upon the farm. At the most,
_ er
47
he only conversed and consulted with the tenant as to
crops, harvests, repairs, and sales. Surely in that
situation it cannot be said that he was personally
primarily engaged in farming. Primarily means
basically or in such a manner as to be of first impor-
tance. Here the connection with farming was such
as was incidental to looking after an investment and
did not have to do with his basic employment.
Nor was he within the second definition of the act,
one ‘the principal part of whose income is derived
from farming operations.’ Principal means main,
chief, of first importance. The showing made in this
respect falls far short of sustaining an allegation
bringing him within such language.’’
Although some expressions in Judge Lindley’s opin-
ion may not accord with the opinion of this Court two
years later in First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301
U. S. 435, it would seem that by the Beach decision, the
facts in the Day case would not satisfy the definition in
Section 75 (r).
When the facts in the Day case and in this Stoller case
are compared, however, they lie far apart:
1. Mr. Day was a civil engineer by profession; he was ©
state superintendent of highways and also county sur-
veyor; he was civil engineer for drainage districts and
for other clients. Mr. Stoller was from boyhood a farmer
and his seed business grew out of his farm operations
of tillage and harvesting; his first daily work beginning
at the early hour of five was on his farms and the seed
store remained closed until he appeared on the scene as
late as eleven, or not at all; he often returned to his farm
work before the day was over; he worked on the farm in
the evenings.
2. Mr. Day did not live on his farm but in town where
48
he had his office, and he had another office in the county
seat. Mr. Stoller has always resided on a farm.
3. Mr. Day’s farm was occupied by a tenant who farmed
it on shares. Mr. Stoller not only farmed all the land
he owned (except 40 acres rented to Mr. Laukhuff, R.
167), but he rented large acreages which he farmed in ad-
dition to his own land.
4. Mr. Day’s income came equally from his profession
and from his share of the crops. Mr. Stoller’s entire in-
come came from his farming; his seed business went into
the hole and drew his farm income in with it. To keep
his farming operations going he was compelled to stop
the sheriff’s sale which followed the execution issued out
of the cognovit judgment on the appellee’s unsecured note
given to keep the seed business going. No judgment or
foreclosure was sought by any debt growing out of farm
operations.
5. When well enough to do it Mr. Day advised with his
farm tenant. Mr. Stoller habitually worked on the farms
with his hands and he directed his employees every day
about the farm work.
Judge Lindley had some difficulty reaching the conclu-
sion that Mr. Day was not a ‘‘farmer.”’ It was not easy
to determine whether farming or profession produced the
most income. The question of employment was easy to
decide. The facts in the Stoller record make the conclu-
sion inevitable that both his occupation and the source of
his income make him a ‘‘farmer.’’
49
The Other Decisions Relied Upon by the Petitioners.
Page 24 of the Petitioners’ Brief.
In re Knight (1934), 9 Fed. Supp. 502.
This old ‘‘horse and buggy’’ decision of a District Court
of Connecticut was rendered in 1934 before the import of
Section 75 was understood, and before it had been ex-
panded by the Act of May 15, 1935. It was overruled by
this Court in First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301
U. S. 435, at 439, where the opinion says that:
“‘The seantiness of the yield may have turned him
into a bankrupt, but it did not change his occupation.
One does not cease to be a farmer because draught or
wind or pest may have rendered the farm barren.’’
The Connecticut District Court opinion disregards that
part of Section 75 (r) which makes one a ‘‘farmer’’ who
is engaged in farming or producing livestock or dairy
products, even though he should have no income what-
soever or should have a greater income from a nonagri-
cultural source.
Page 24 of the Petitioners’ Brief.
In re Hilliker (1935), 9 Fed. Supp. 948.
This is another early decision on the definition of a
farmer in Section 75 (r) which was rendered before that
definition was expanded by the Act of May 15, 1935. It
was based, in part, upon the decision in the case of In re
Palma Brothers (1934), 8 F. Supp. 920, which adverse
decision this court noted was one of the reasons why the
nalts gemeeadD . . . "
SOE Re RE AN ph REALE Ie 68 FASB AR Tn BAA I PN RAS AL TS Ne A IC IEA SAM it FRE MID
50
Congress expanded the definition in Section 75 (r). See
First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301 U. 8. 435, at
the top of page 438. This Hilliker opinion was also
grounded upon the then prevalent theory that a farmer
debtor proceeding could be dismissed for lack of ‘‘good
faith’’. It observed that:
‘‘The proposal on its face bordered on the pre-
posterous and it may well be that the debtor had no
‘dea when he made the offer that any creditor would
think for a moment of giving acceptance to it. It
hardly need be stated that the proposition was re-
jected.’’
That theory was advanced and repudiated by this court in
John Hancock v. Bartels, (1939), 308 U. S. 180.
On the subject of the definition of a ‘¢farmer’’ in See-
tion 75 (r) the district court in the Hilliker case found
that:
‘<The debtor has never personally lived on the ranch
property, but has lived on a town lot in a suburban
city. He is a professional man by occupation, regularly
following the business of a dentist. The cultivation |
of the forty-acre ranch is and has been without doubt —
a mere incident with other business ventures of the
bankrupt, to the following of his professional calling.
The mere fact that the gross amount of income from
the ranch property during the past three years happens
to be a few hundred dollars in excess of the income of
the debtor from other sources, does not, to my mind,
determine the question at all. A man under the defi-
nition must be primarily a farmer. Here he is pri-
marily a dentist, regularly working at a regularly
kept office, in that profession.”’
Thus we see that instead of holding ‘‘that the word
‘income’ means the gross income”’ as suggested by the peti-
tioners in their brief at page 24, the district court in the
Hilliker case expressly declined to follow such a rule.
51
Pages 25 to 30 of Petitioners’ Brief
First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301 U. S.
435;
Beamesderfer v. First National Bank and Trust
Company (1937), 91 Fed. (2d) 491;
In re Day (1935), 10 Fed. Supp. 229.
These three decisions have been discussed in this brief
at pages 32, 37 and 44 respectively.
This concludes the discussion of all the decisions relied
upon by the petitioners. It would seem that the statement
of the appellate court that they ‘‘present facts far afield
from those recorded in the instant case’’ is applicable to
each of them.
‘*Fraudulent Conduct’’
On page 32 of the petitioners’ brief the following ques-
tion is posed:
‘‘May the conduct of a farmer debtor in respect to
representing himself to be primarily engaged in busi-
ness enterprise and fraudulently soliciting and ob-
taining credit upon such conduct and misrepresenta-
tions be such as to estop him from claiming the
benefits of the Act?’’
This implied imputation of fraudulent conduct or mis-
representation has been repeatedly put forth below begin-
ning with the inception of the petitioners’ motion +o dis-
52
miss. It was disregarded by the supervising conciliation
commissioner as special master, by the district judge, and
by the appellate court. It was so disregarded because
there is nothing in the record to support it. If there were,
the subject has been fully discussed and determined
against the contentions of the petitioners in In re Feil
(1942), 40 F. Supp. 108, by Judge Schwellenbach, a for-
mer U. S. Senator who was a member of the Congresses
which considered at different times the enactment or
amendment of various portions of Section 75. It was also
considered and the same conclusion was reached by Judge
Allred in In re Lindsay (1941), 41 Fed. Supp. 948. This
case is cited by the petitioners in their petition but not
mentioned or discussed elsewhere.
CONCLUSION.
There is no reason for disturbing the conclusion of the
appellate court that the respondent is a ‘‘farmer’’ as
defined in Section 75 (r). Under either branch of the
statutory definition the record impells the conclusion that
he is a ‘‘farmer’’. No case has been cited which would
suggest a different result.
It is therefore submitted that the petition presents no
ground which would justify the exercise by this court of
its power to grant a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Lima, Ohio
May 18, 1943 Eimer McCrary, Lima, Ohio,
Counsel for Respondent,
Michael George Stoller.
J. F. Cavanacu,
Paulding, Ohio
Of Counsel.
sme
| . MAP
IN THE MATTER OF
MICHAEL GEORGE STOLLER, FARMER DEBTOR
CASE NO. 16315, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION .TOLEDO
CASE NO. 9180, UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
SHOWING THE LOCATION OF FARMS OPERATED BY STOLLER :
FORMER RESIDENCE
TENANCY
Q
JACKSON TWP ‘
r.) q 10
NAA\ 7)
¢ ACRES
7 16 1S
A
x3
20 2! ze
ES
Senet | “saber
1329 ERES & ZOAGRE
Aes 26 25
NE CIES 30 29 27
160 ACRES BOACRES
40 ACRES &ZOACRES
MIKELS
6 6 ACRES 3! NICK a
—a— 32 3 34
34 35 36 HOME FARM 4355 ACRE
| PRESENT $TOLLER RE S)DENCE
L J
= ‘or as a . =
|
3 4 | é 5 4 |
| ROCKY
| 160 ACRES
ro ace ae eae {_____| 4 _fi_,
TT Twe
BLUE cntex Twp ~ LA
10 i 12 < 7 8 9 10
| | OWNED BY STOLL > BOACRE
| (ALBRIGHY © ARM)
! eX inci Ye es
apyct aimee stress g ES OF LAUKHUF FARI Z2OOACRE
D BY OLLER
| is
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.