Respondents Brief — Cleveland Trust Co. v. Stoller

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IN THE f My

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term 1942

No. 988

Tue CLEVELAND Trust Company AND THE CENTRAL

NationaL Bank or CLEVELAND, OHIO,

Petitioners,

vs.

MicHakEL Grorce STouuer,

Respondent.

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT.

OPPOSING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT.

Eimer McCuarn, Lima, Ohio,

Counsel for Respondent,

Michacl George Stoller.

J. F. Cavanacu,

Paulding, Ohio

Of Counsel.

U. 8. Law Printing Company, 2817 N. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill.

SUBJECT MATTER

2. The Second Reason for the Disagreement:

The Hearing Conducted by the Special Mas-

ter

Page

Lskiohchsp diese dickedesavioashcbeba ad satobls pabiilectebdattden wieicaubis neaiiieadselilaissibs sented: 1

ee NIN, Dig SII Scions daisies nicl acascceabncasaeinabacnens 2

Wikia we i i 2

Answer of the Respondent to the Argument .................. 4

Restricted Range of Petitioners’ Objections ........ 4

The Statutory Definition of a Farmer Examined 5

Decisions of this Court -.....0000........ Se

Analyzing and Expanding the Definition of

a ‘‘Farmer’’ in Section 75 (r) ...0....0........... 5

Division I Occupation ..........0.00000.00........ 6

OUI Bn SINE iaionicteds oaicsdedcbede cates 6

Any of Seven Definitions Constitute a Farmer 7

The Application of the Statutory Definition to the

I sii eka a aiiscanneeabnataenstaeniesiniee 8

Conflicting Conclusions of the Courts Below........ 8

Reasons for These Conflicting Conclusions .......... 9

1. The First Reason for the Disagreement: The

District Judge Misconstrued the Statute...... 12

The Conclusions of the District Judge... 12

The Petitioners’ Motion and the Memo-

randum Opinion of the District Court

Analyzed and Compared ...................... 13

The Conclusions of the Special Master...... 14

eens _

ii

Page

3. The Third Reason for the Disagreement:

The Judge Did Not Have Access to All of

SII acd clielinciariisiaetnetrliinnsnsenannsienntiainintnne

An Examination of the Evidence ..................0...........--.---

Farming Operations

What the Testimony Shows About the oe

Operations of the Respondent

The Testimony Concerning the Respondent’s

Pr I ni ainsi...

The Farms He Operated in Recent Years ............

He Was ‘‘Personally Engaged in Farming Op-

IN tictlakenmeaaceidideaanechtinisacdsaiienisisainaonibianninoanse

The Special Master’s Summary on this

SERGI AE SIRES eis Se] RONEN ae

The Respondent’s Testimony ........................

Witness Doster, Farm Hand ..........................

Witness Leo DeLatt, Farm Owner ..............

Witness Gehau, Worker in seed store ..........

Witness Bidlock, Sugar Co. Manager ..........

Witness Jack DeLaet, Farm Hand ..............

The Evidence Conclusively Proves that the

Respondent is a Farmer ...................2.-0..----.

Income

The Losses in the Seed Business .......002000.000000000.....

The Decisions

The Decisions Cited by the District Judge ..............

i. First National Bank v. Beach (1937)), 301

U. S. 435

ii. Beamesderfer v. First National Bank,

(1937), 91 Fed. (2d) 491

iii. Baxter v. Savings Bank (1937), 92 Fed.

(2d) 404

ili

Page

iv. In re Day, (1935), 10 Fed. Supp. 229 ........ 44

The Other Decisions Relied Upon by the Peti-

EEN RN RM OM ODO RR ALY LOO 49

‘‘Fraudulent Conduct”? ............. eM Ne BOC a 51

RII Kstasetite dd ae eninessiaenstnccupbistede: dank sands Mhaae aes 52

Cases CITED.

Baxter v. Savings Bank (CCA 5), 92 Fed. (2d) 404... 41

Beamesderfer v. First National Bank (1937), (CCA 3),

ee Se EE crane ncdlaaciatibacenenntrccanctantianons 37, 51

In re Day (D. C. Ill.) (1935), 10 Fed. Supp. 229........ 44,51

In re Feil, 40 F. Supp. 948 ................ wa Ee

First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301 U. S. 435...

eaten ‘ .....o1, 32, 40, 47, 49, d1

Helliker, In re (1935), 9 Fed. Supp. 948 -.0.0000.0020..... 49

Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 at

DE sala sa tia pinsssaiacanion : . 40

Stoller v. Cleveland Trust Co., CCA 6 (1943), 133 Fed.

BE BRene ne yeh ee oo mem ene eho oe Nee

John Hancock v. Bartels, 308 U. S. 180 00. 42, 50

Knight, In re (1934), 9 Fed. Supp. 502 -....2.2.0.222.--....-. 49

Lindsay, In re (1941), 41 Fed. Supp. 948 52

Palma Brothers, In re (1934), 8 Fed. Supp. 920 .......... 50

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CRG ORO

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser TERM 1942

No. 988

BLESSES EARL LI EPI oe

Tue CLEVELAND Trust Company AND THE CENTRAL

NationaL Bank oF CLEVELAND, OHIO,

Petitioners,

vs.

MicHakEL Grorce STOLLER,

Respondent.

e,

ay

i

Fas

i

*

:

as

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT.

OPPOSING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT.

Note. All emphasis in this brief is supplied unless other-

wise stated.

MAP

There is inserted at the end of this brief a folded map

showing the farms operated by the respondent which are

referred to in the testimony or in the exhibits. By open-

2

ing out the map it will lie before the reader for reference

during the reading of this brief.

The Opinions, etc., Below

The opinion of the appellate court is reported as Stoller

v. Cleveland Trust Company, CCA 6 (1943), 133 Fed. (2d)

180. It is found at R. 242 to 247.

The memorandum opinion of the district court is not

reported. It appears at R. 190 and 191.

The report of the supervising conciliation commissioner

to whom the matter was referred as a special master is at

R. 24 to 84.

The transcript of evidence is at R. 85 to 189.

The petitioners’ motion to dismiss is at R. 22 to 23.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Having Reference to Pages 16 and 17 of the

Petitioners’ Brief.

The statement in the petitioners’ brief, at pages 16 and

17, that the respondent ‘‘rapidly gave up his farming super-

vision,’’ and restricted himself to ‘¢ Jandlord work’ ’’, is

answered at pages 17 to 28 of this brief.

Having Reference to Pages 17 and 18 of the

Petitioners’ Brief.

The assertion that respondent had a ‘‘special franking

privilege (R. 187)’’ from the Post office is not true. There

3

is no reference to a ‘‘franking privilege’’ at R. 87 or at any

other place in the record. There is in the special master’s

Findings of Fact at R. 25 (middle of the page) a statement

that he has a ‘‘postal permit for mailing of his advertising

matter’’. Such a postal permit may be obtained by anyone

who applies for it.

Having Reference to the Bottom of Page 18

of the Petitioners’ Brief.

The petitioners’ statement that in the seed business ‘‘he

employs a bookkeeper, also employs several other girls

and men—the girls working in the office in the preparation

of mailing lists and advertising the seed business,—the

men being employed in the warehouse and mill in the

handling, cleaning and processing of seed’’ is disproved by

their own references to the Record (‘‘R. 88, 116-118’) and

is further disproved by the references to the record at

pages 24 (Witness De Latt) and 25 (Witness Gehau), in

this brief.

Having Reference to Page 19 of the

Petitioners’ Brief.

(The quoted paragraph at the middle of the page)

The respondent occasionally worked at his seed records

at night because his farm work came first and he devoted

to the seed business the ‘‘tail ends’’ of his time. This is

shown from the record at page 25 (Witness Gehau) in

this brief.

Answer of the Respondent to the

ARGUMENT.

Set forth in the Petitioners’ Brief at pages 23 to 34.

Restricted Range of Petitioners’ Objections.

The petitioners’ petition and brief are grounded exclu-

sively upon that portion of the definition of a ‘‘farmer’’ in

Section 75(r), which relates to income. They ignore the

first, and principal part of the definition of a ‘‘farmer’’

which relates to the production of agricultural products.

The record demonstrates that, not only the ‘*principal

part’’ of his income, but his only income came from the

farm. The seed business, which grew out of his farming

occupation was a constant drain upon the farm profits and

finally brought him down. His farm debts were not press-

ing. His obligations growing out of his ill-starred seed

business caused him to borrow from the petitioners who

took judgment and levied on his farm chattels. When the

sheriff’s sale was advertised he filed his farmer debtor

petition. R. 186 to 188. R. 6.

When the facts are measured by either branch of the

statutory definition of a ‘‘farmer’’ in Section 75(r), (that

is whether by occupation or by income), the appellant is a

‘farmer’. He smacks of the soil and the roots of his occu-

pation and of his income go down into the soil.

The Statutory Definition of a Farmer Examined.

Decisions of This Court.

The original definition of a ‘‘farmer’’ in Section 75 (r),

Act of March 3, 1933, was not changed but merely amplified

and clarified by the amendment in the Act of May 15, 1935.

This Court said in First National Bank v. Beach, 301 U.S.

435 at page 438:

“The only effect of the 1935 amendments of the

statute, in so far as they have to do with the defi-

nition of a farmer, was to make it clear that farming

operations include dairy farming and the production

of poultry and livestock products in their unmanufac-

tured state as well as the cultivation of the products

of the soil. There had been decisions to the contrary.’’

This statutory definition of a ‘‘farmer”’ in Section 75 (r),

and no other, is controlling in a proceeding under Section

75. Benitez v. Bank, 313 U. 8S. 270.

Analyzing and Expanding the Definition

of a ‘‘Farmer’’ in Section 75 (r).

Upon analysis this definition of a farmer is seen to con-

tain two main divisions and seven separate definitions,

any one of which constitutes a “‘farmer’’.

The applicable portions of the definition are here ex-

panded:

a

Division I, OCCUPATION.

First Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes an

individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-

gaged in farm operations, that is, in producing prod-

ucts of the soil.

Second Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any

individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-

gaged in dairy farming.

Third Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any

individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-

gaged in the production of poultry.

Fourth Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any

individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-

gaged in the production of livestock.

Fifth Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any

individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-

gaged in the production of poultry products in their

unmanufactured state.

Sixth Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any

individual who is primarily bona fide personally en-

gaged in the production of livestock products in their

unmanufactured state.

Division II, INCOME

Seventh Definition: The term ‘‘farmer’’ includes any

individual, the principal part of whose income is de-

rived from farming operations, that is from any one or

more of the following operations:

(1) Producing products of the soil;

(2) Dairy Farming;

(3) The production of poultry;

(4) The production of livestock;

7

(5) The production of poultry products in their

unmanufactured state;

(6) The production of livestock products in their

unmanufactured state.

Any of Seven Definitions Constitute a Farmer.

It is to be noted that when either the activities or income

of a debtor bring him within any one of the foregoing

seven separate definitions, he is a ‘‘farmer’’ for the pur-

poses of Section 75.

The Supervising Conciliation Commissioner, as Special

Master, and also the appellate court, found that the re-

spondent qualifies as a farmer debtor under Section 75(r)

whether measured by either division of the statute, that is

whether by occupation, or by income.

Specifically the evidence proves that the respondent is

a ‘‘farmer’’ by each one of the following of the seven

statutory definitions:

iBy the first definition he is a ‘‘farmer’’ because he is

primarily bona fide personally engaged in farming oper-

ations, that is, in producing products of the soil.

By the fourth definition he is a ‘‘farmer’’ because he is

primarily bona fide personally engaged in the production

of livestock.

By the sixth definition he is a ‘‘farmer’’ because he is

primarily bona fide personally engaged in the production

of livestock products in their unmanufactured state.

By the seventh definition he is a ‘‘farmer’’ because the

principal part of his income is derived from farming oper-

tienen

Bw

ations, that is from one or more of the following oper:

tions:

8

Producing products of the soil.

The production of livestock.

The production of livestock products in their

unmanufactured state.

In fact, whether there is considered the last three years

as a whole or the last year alone, his only income has been

from the farm operations. The monetary tide ran the

other way in the seed business, absorbing not only the

farm income but the borrowed money represented by

the ninety day cognovit notes given to the petitioners and

by them reduced to judgment. It was these judgments

which precipitated the filing of the farmer debtor petition.

The Application of the Statutory Definition

to the Respondent.

Conflicting Conclusions of the Court Below.

The Special Master found, and the appellate court like-

wise found, that whether judged by occupation or by

income, the respondent was a ‘*farmer’’ and that the cause

of the debts was immaterial. R. 24, R. 244 bottom of

page to R. 246 bottom of page.

The special master’s findings of fact were:

‘‘He was in financial difficulty, not because of nor

through his farming operations but through his seed

business operations. His farming operations resulted

in a net profit and his seed business operations in &

net loss. It must be found that the principal part of

the debtor’s income was derived from producing

products of the soil and the production of livestock

9

and livestock products in their unmanufactured

state.’ Report of the Special Master, R. 957.

‘‘1, The debtor was primarily, bone fide, person-

ally engaged in producing products of the soil and in

the production of livestock and livestock products in

their unmanufactured state prior to filing his petition

in this case.

2. The principal part of the income of the debtor

for the year preceding the filing of his petition herein

was derived from the products of the soil and the live-

stock and livestock products in their unmanufactured

state, produced by him.’’ Report of the Special Mas-

ter, R. 57.

The Special Master’s Conclusion of Law was: ‘‘The

debtor is entitled to the benefits of Section 75 of the Bank-

ruptey act as a farmer who comes fully within the defini-

tion contained in Section 75 (r).’’ Report of Special

Master, R. 57.

The District Judge overruled the Special Master and

held that by occupation and income the petitioner was not

a ‘“‘farmer’’ and also that the substantial portion of his

debts was incurred outside of farming. He said:

‘‘T have concluded that Michael Stoller was basic-

ally, fundamentally and primarily engaged in the

wholesale and retail seed business; that his interests

lay there; that his energies and attention were pri-

marily devoted there; and that instead of being per-

sonally engaged in the business of farming he was

personally engaged in the seed business. I am fur-

ther of the opinion from the record that the principal

income that accrued to Michael Stoller during a period

of years prior to the filing of his petition in bankruptcy

was derived from the seed business, and I am further

convinced that the substantial portion of his indebted-

ness that brought him to the bar of the bankruptcy

court was incurred in the operation of that seed busi-

ness. Beamesderfer v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,

10

(CCA 3d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 491.” Memorandum of

the Court, R. 190.

Particularly pertinent extracts from the opinion of the

appellate court:

“There is controversy concerning his customary

daily movements from his farm to the situs of his seed

business in Paulding, Ohio; but it appears that his

day began at the usual early hour for farmers, and

that he constantly performed some regular farm rou-

tine, gave instructions for farm operations, and pre-

pared and kept records of the same; more adequately,

indeed, than he kept the books of his seed business.

However varied his activities, it is apparent from the

record that the industrious appellant applied a most

substantial portion of his time to the work of a ‘dirt

farmer.’ He plowed, planted and husked corn; sowed

wheat and oats; drilled and harvested beets; mowed

alfalfa hay and clover; and ran a tractor and a com-

bine, threshing machine, binder and reaper. He did

most of the farm repair work and gave attention to

drainage and tiling problems. The usual custom of

appellant, after completing his most pressing farm

work and instructing the farm hands, was to proceed

to his seed house between eleven and twelve o’clock,

and to return around four or five o’clock in the after-

g noon for the resumption of his part of planting, plow-

‘ing, or whatever might be the order of the day upon

the farm.’’ R. 245, last paragraph, running over to

the top of R. 246.

‘On the record before this court, it is not possible

to determine accurately the source of appellant’s in-

come. Apparently, he kept his farm and his seed

business records as a unit. He testified that the in-

come statements which he prepared for the creditor

banks were based on his combined operations. His

testimony indicates that the major portion of his net

income was derived from farming operations, but this

11

testimony is neither established nor disproved by his

own records. His reports to the Department of Agri-

culture indicate that his farming operations were

profitable; and the fact that the preponderance of

his debts were weighted upon him from the seed busi-

ness is corroborative of his assertion that the prin-

cipal ‘part of his income was derived from farming.”’

R. 246, second full paragraph on the page.

The Reasons for These Conflicting Conclusions.

The reasons for these opposite conclusions of the Spe-

cial Master and the District Judge become apparent from

a study of the statute and of the testimony and exhibits.

The reasons will first be stated and then discussed.

The first reason for the disagreement: The miscon-

struction of the statute by the District Judge.

The second reason for the disagreement: The hearing

before the Special Master took five days. He personally

heard and often personally questioned the witnesses, and

he had before him all of the exhibits, some sixty-six in all.

The third reason for the disagreement: The District

Judge did not have access to all of the exhibits. In fact,

most of the papers were never transmitted to the clerk

or to the Judge of the court, but remained, by stipulation

of the parties because of their bulk, at the place of hear-

ing and were never removed to the office of the Judge.

These three reasons for the conflict of conclusions in

the District Court will now be examined.

12

1,

The First Reason for the Disagreement: The District

Judge Misconstrued the Statute.

The Conclusions of the District Judge.

The Judge read ‘‘and’’ into the statute in place of

‘‘or’?, He also held to be important the fact that the

debts which precipitated the farmer debtor proceeding

were incurred outside of the farming business. R. 190.

These conceptions of the requirements necessary to meet

the definition of a ‘‘farmer”’ in Section 75 (r) were first

suggested by the petitioners’ motion to dismiss as is

disclosed when the substantial parts of the motion and of

the court’s memorandum opinion are put side by side for

comparison.

Indeed a perusal of the motion at R. 22 and of the Memo-

randum of the District Court at R. 190 discloses how -

closely the memorandum opinion follows the form of the

motion. An analysis of the motion to dismiss, at R. 22, is

here made for comparison with an analysis of the memo-

randum opinion of the District Court at R. 190.

13

The Petitioners’ Motion and the Memorandum Opinion

of the District Court Analyzed and Compared.

The Petitioners’ Motion.

(R, 22)

The debtor is not primar-

ily bona fide engaged in

farming and his principal

income is not derived from

farming.

The debtor is not a farmer

under Section 75 (s) [The

case had not progressed into

bankruptey under Section

75(s)].

The debtor is primarily

engaged in the seed business

and his gross income is de-

rived from it and not from

farming.

The Memorandum of the

District Court (R. 190).

The conclusion of the Spe-

cial Master that the farmer

debtor was primarily bona

fide personally a farmer and

his principal income was

therefrom should be over-

ruled.

Each ease involving the

question of whether a debtor

in bankruptcy is a farmer

should stand on its own bot-

tom. [The case had not pro-

gressed into bankruptcy. By

statute and by General Or-

der 5 (5) of the Supreme

Court, the appellant re-

mained a ‘‘debtor’’.]

He is basically fundamen-

tally and primarily engaged

in the seed business. His

principal income prior to fil-

ing his petition in bank-

ruptey was from the seed

business.

14

The debtor is not person-

ally and primarily engaged

in farming but devotes all

his time and attention to the

seed business.

Except for a farm mort-

gage and a chattel mortgage

all of his debts were in-

curred in the seed business.

The operation of the farms

was by other persons and

such operation was not pro-

ducing products of the soil

‘‘but the feeding out of

livestock,’’ [sic] and the se-

cured debts grew out of

feeding livestock.

Instead of being personal-

ly engaged in the business of

farming he was personally

engaged in the seed business.

The substantial part of

his debts that brought him

into bankruptcy was in-

curred in the seed business.

The farmer debtor super-

vised the farm operations by

giving directions to his fore-

men and workmen on the

farm in the mornings before

going to the seed store. Very

little in the record to show

he was personally engaged

in farming.

The Conclusions of the Special Master.

The Supervising Conciliation Commissioner, acting as

Special Master, by a minute and extensive discussion of the

evidence,

the law and the court decisions, and a copious

digest of the evidence, occupying sixty pages of the record

extending from R. 24 to 84, came to the following separate

and distinct conclusions.

See R. 57. Any one of these

conclusions made the respondent a ‘‘farmer’’ as defined

in Section 75 (r).

These conclusions were:

a a ——

15

1. The respondent was primarily in good faith person-

ally engaged in farming, and he was primarily and person-

ally in good faith producing products of the soil.

2. He was primarily in good faith personally engaged

in producing livestock.

3. The principal part of his income was derived from

farming operations, in fact, he had no other income except

that from the farm crops and livestock.

The seed business was run at a loss. As stated by the

movants in their motion (R. 22) and in the Memorandum of

the Court (R. 190) the debts which precipitated the farmer

debtor proceeding arose out of the ill fated seed business

venture which gobbled up the farm income faster than :t

could be produced from several hundreds of acres. The

Judge, the Special Master, the Movants and the Debtor all

agree upon this point.

In his discussion of the law and facts the Special Mas-

ter showed that any one of the proved elements was suf-

ficient to entitle the respondent to the benefits of the farmer

debtor statute.

The Special Master had all of the exhibits before him,

those that remained at the place of hearing and those trans-

mitted to the office of the District Court. The Judge had

only those sent to the office of the District Court. This ex-

plains the opposite factual and consequent opposite legal

conclusions reached by the Special Master and by the Judge.

The proof of these statements will now be discussed.

ph PRATT TRE AP DRESS A Se FRY TERT TERY ERS TR IR INT SMA OSE HS AL

16

The Second Reason for the Disagreement: The Hearing

Conducted by the Special Master.

The hearing before the Special Master required five

days in all.

The following quotations are from the Special Master’s

R. 24: . . . ‘Shearing was commenced . . . on

December 14, 1940.”’

R. 24: ‘‘Hearing .. . was continued until December

16, 1940, ... In the afternoon of such day, the hear-

R. 24: ‘*. . . continuances were had and further

hearing held on December 20, 23, and 27, 1940, at the

office of the debtor.”’

The Third Reason for the Disagreement: The Judge Did

Not Have Access to All of the Exhibits.

Only part of the exhibits were transmitted to the District

Judge with the report of the Special Master. The Report

states that by stipulation of counsel ‘‘such exhibits, all

of which are bulky, remain in the office of the debtor in

Paulding, Ohio, subject to the order of the court.”’ R. 58.

R. 111. The district judge did not call for the exhibits

which were left at the place of hearing and they were

never seen by the judge.

17

These three reasons explain the divergent conclusions

of the Special Master and the District Judge.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE.

Farming Operations.

What the Testimony Shows About the Farming

Operations of the Respondent.

It is when we turn to the testimony in the record that

we see the precise and abundant evidence which led the

Supervising Conciliation Commissioner as Special Master

to the inevitable conclusion that the respondent is a

‘‘farmer’’ as defined in Section 75 (r).

The Testimony Concerning the Respondent’s

Farming Operations.

The Special Master summarized the evidence thus:

‘He lived on the big farm with his father (the same

one now in his name), until he was 22 years old. He

thereafter lived for 1 year on a farm in Latty Town-

ship, of 160 acres and from there to Paulding Town-

ship, where he lived for 19 years. He moved to the big

farm on March 4th, 1940. He began to operate as an

independent farmer when he was 22 years old. He

farmed 160 acres and exchanged work with his fa-

ther.’’ R. 69.

The respondent himself testified that he is 42 years old.

Lived in Paulding County ‘‘twenty-nine year.’’ Came to

the community with his family when fifteen years old. R.

131. Lived on farms and farmed since five years old.

18

R. 131. Moved upon a 160 acre farm for a year after leav-

ing home. He then moved to the Huber Farm of 160 acres

where he lived nineteen years. During the last year he

moved to the ‘‘Home Farm”’ of 435 acres where he now

lives. He is one of the leading farmers in the community :

‘‘Brady Brothers were and Mike Stoller.’’ Related by

Burdick, a witness for the petitioner. R. 105. R. 131 and

132.

The Farms He Operated in Recent Years.

In 1936 he farmed 1785 acres, comprised of the ‘*Home

Farm,”’ Dittenhaver Farm, Sugar Company Farm, Huber

Farm, Ferrell Farm, Northwestern Mutual Farm, Section

15, farm of 240 acres, Latty Township Farm, Barnes Farm,

Graham Farm, Mikels Farm. R. 132, R. 133.

In 1937 he farmed the same acreage, 1785 acres. He

owned the same land and had the same Barnes farm under

contract. R. 134.

In 1938 he farmed the ‘‘Home Farm,’’ the Huber Farm,

the Sugar Company Farm, the Latty Township Farm, and

he looked after a rented Latty Township Farm, total 1095

acres. R. 134.

In 1939 he farmed the same acreage as in 1938, 855 acres.

R. 134.

In 1940 he farmed 515 acres.

The Special Master summarized the evidence on this

subject as follows:

‘‘In that year [1936] he farmer 135 acres in Jack-

son Township, Section 31; 130 acres from D. L. Ditten-

hauer estate in Jackson Township; 180 acres for the

Paulding Sugar Company in Section 13; 160 acres Car-

ey Huger farm, Sec. 23, Paulding Township, 40 acres;

19

Oliver Ferral farm, Sec. 23, Paulding Township; 120

acres for Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Com-

pany, Sec. 15, Paulding Township, 240 acres; Sec. 17,

Latty Township, 80 acres in Sec. 15, Latty Township.

During that time he owned 555 acres. He also had a

land contract on 200 acres which he improved and tiled

and later on turned over to one H. G. Barnes. He also

farmed 240 acres in Sections 22 and 26, Oren Graham

farm, and 160 acres E. E. Michel’s farm, Sections 22

and 25 in Paulding Township.’”’ R. 69.

‘*In 1937 he farmed the 435 acres called the home

farm, the 160 acres, the Huber farm, and the 180 acres

the Sugar Company farm, and the 80 acres, the Latty

Township farm, and looked after the other 240 acres

in Latty Township, rented it.

‘*In 1939 he farmed the same acreage as in 1938,

815 acres.

‘*In 1940, he farmed 515 acres.’’ R. 70.

The records and exhibits show that Mr. Stoller has farmed

the following tracts which are indicated on the map at the

end of this brief:

3 Stoller owned (435, 80 and 40 acres) ............ 555 acres

1 Barnes or Laukhoff Farm (Land Contract) 200 acres

2 Deleat Farms (329 and 20 — puemennededning 349 acres

1 Dittenhaver Farm 129 acres

Fh FE IID sacipirienthcitapsncionstticcinntin 40 acres

1 Franklin or North Western Mutual Farm.... 120 acres

4 Graham Farms (160, 80, 40 and 20 acres).... 300 acres

1 Huber Farm 160 acres

2 Mikels Farm (160 and 66 acres) ~.................. 226 acres

1 Rocky Farm 160 acres

1 Sugar Company Farm 180 acres

1 Carr Farm 160 acres

Total Farms—19 oe

Total acres farmed.......... 2579 acres

The fact that his farming operations, much of them as a

tenant, were confined to the same community indicated that

he must have achieved a good reputation as a farmer. Only

“|

a ‘first hand’’ dirt farmer whose primary interest is farm-

ing can produce profits as a tenant. A ‘‘second hand’’

absentee farm tenant whose chief industry is applied at

something other than farming can not be a good farmer.

20

He Was ‘‘Personally Engaged in Farming Operations.”’

The Special Master’s Summary on This Subject.

‘‘He also operates threshing and combining rigs and

does some custom seed cleaning.”’ R. 26.

‘“The debtor’s farm duties, as he testified concerning

them, were the looking after tiling and draining prob-

lems and ‘most other landlord work’. It included the

erection and repair of buildings and the repairing of

tractors.’’ R. 26.

‘‘He generally helps with the chores in the morning

during the time he is at home. He spends approxi-

mately an hour at that task. He has also plowed and

planted on occasion and has given instructions to the

men working for him. He maintained and fed 160

steers. Likewise on occasion, he personally fed such

steers, shocked some corn, hauled sugar beets and did

other work about the farms.”’ R. 26.

‘‘He has no foreman, he instructs his men himself

every morning, and looks after them and works with

them.’’ R. 71.

‘He also bought and fed steers, fed and sold them

between November 1, 1939, and November 1, 1940.

The 8692 bushels of corn, and 96 tons of clover hay

fed the steers was raised on his farm. 50 tons of

molasses was purchased. The mixed feed for hogs

was obtained in exchange for soy beans which were

raised on the farm. 4112 bushels of corn was partly

raised on the farm and partly purchased.

‘‘He bought some hogs (10) and raised the others.’’

R. 72.

‘‘He bought 100 head of steers on September 25,

1939. On October 3, 1939, he bought 72 more.’’ R. 77.

: —

21

He is a member and officer of the Farm Bureau, of the

Equity Elevator Exchange, and of the Rehabilitation

Board, also of the Delegation Committee of the Sugar

Company. R. 71.

The Respondent’s Testimony:

‘‘Who did the farming?’’ ‘‘I did it all with my own help

and extra help it required.’’ ‘‘I did tiling and other work

during the winter months.’’ R. 133.

‘‘Tell the Court what’”’ . . . ‘‘work you did in the cul-

tivation of the crops? Any and every job, usually started

every bit of corn planting, and the beet drilling and plow-

ing and the repairing of tractors, run a threshing engine

and did all the repair work on them; I did the repairing

during the slack time, and during the summer took care

of all the heavy work on the big machinery and all that

work.’’ ‘Pertaining to the cultivation what work did

you do? Always extra man to run the tractors, took fuel

to the men, and many a time went out and helped them,

and put on a shift and again in the evening went out at

four o’clock from here and would plant ten acres of beets,

corn, or what it might be, before dark.’’ ‘‘Plowed corn,

planted corn, planted sugar beets, made hay, run the com-

bine and did all other farm work.’’ R. 134. Sowed wheat,

laid tile, covered tile, inoculated and sowed seed, run

binder, plowed corn, mowed hay, husked corn, harvested

beets, dug beets, drove tractor and team. R. 133 to R. 135.

‘‘T have no foreman, look after that myself. I always

contact the men myself.’’ ‘‘Don’t make a speech.’’ ‘‘Court:

I asked him, if he understood it as a symbol for foremen

and he stated he don’t have any.’’ ‘‘Mr. Stoller: Don’t

have a foreman, I instruct my men myself every morning

and look after them and work with them.’’ R. 137.

22

During the seed season he said he ‘‘spent most of my

time here, and during the off time spent most of my time

on the farm, but during the seed season, go around on the

farms every morning and check up what the men are doing

and what condition the crops and livestock are in.’’ R. 144.

‘In the summer we all worked on the farm including

myself.’? Examination by the Supervising Conciliation

Commissioner. R. 113, 114.

He worked at the seed house and on the farm in the

winter. R. 88. There is little seed business in the sum-

mer, it is seasonable. R. 89. Sometimes he locks up the

seed business in summer. R. 94.

He helps his hired men, ‘‘the first thing I do is to take

time to farm.’’ R. 94.

He works at the seed store at nights, and during spare

time. R. 110. R. 116.

He threshes and hulls clover seed. R. 90.

So ran the findings of the Supervising Conciliation Com-

missioner as special master and the testimony of the re-

spondent himself.

We proceed to an examination of the testimony of the

other witnesses.

Witness Doster, Farm Hand.

R. 153, R. 154, R. 159, R. 160.

Age 51. Lives on his own farm. Has worked for Mr.

Stoller as a farm hand for 17 years.

23

Year 1939-1940:

Mr. Stoller was on the farm the biggest part of the time

and did chores, planted corn, sowed oats, drove the tractor.

He left the farms ‘‘usually noon or after; sometimes did

not come out till evening, out with us most of the time.’’

R. 154.

‘*Mr. Stoller helped chore on the home farm most of

the time.’’

‘‘He always got up around five o’clock—around in there

somewhere. What did he do from then until he came to

the Stoller Seed House? Helped around choring and out

on the place.’’ R. 154.

‘‘Mike [Mr. Stoller] comes out every morning to do the

chores’’ till they are done. It takes an hour every morn-

ing. Sometimes he is out in the evenings, ‘‘half the time,

anyhow.’’ Cross Examination: R. 156 and 157.

‘‘Did you get your instructions from John [the brother]

about planting and things to do? No, sir. Tell you any-

thing to do about the farm at all? No, got our instruc-

tions from Mike.’’ Cross examination: R. 157.

sé

. . - During the period of time from 1938 until now

did you observe any particular months in the year when

Mr. Stoller was on the farm more than in the Seed Store?

Not on the farm all the time. Was he at the seed store all

the time? No, Mike wasn’t. You say he was on the farm

all the time? The whole summer. How about the winter?

Up till quite a bit, and out there half and half. Half and

half you say? Yes. Wasn’t he at the seed store in the

summer? Not to speak of.’’ R. 157 and 158.

‘*Mike helped plant a lot of corn and oats both.’’ ‘“When

you say he helped, do you mean he was out planting corn

when you was helping, or’John? No, he [we] wasn’t all

24

helping plant corn. When we [he] was planting we was out

harrowing. You don’t mean you and Mr. Stoller were

planting corn together? No, one or the other planted.’’

Cross examination, R. 158-159.

‘You and John helped plant oats and say Mike helped

with that? Yes. Did you see him plant oats? Yes. Sure

of it? Yes. Do you know if he did a good job or not?

Sure.’’ Cross examination, R. 159.

“Tell what he [Stoller] did? Well, he milked and he

helped feed the horses and cows and hogs and everything.”’

Direct examination, R. 159.

In 1939 he kept 22 head of steers on the Huber farm. Di-

rect examination, R. 160.

Witness Leo De Latt, Farm Owner.

R. 161, R. 163, R. 165.

Has known Stoller over 25 years. The witness owns

his farm located near the Stoller ‘‘Home Farm’’. Has

seen him work on the farm, principally in the spring and

through harvest. Direct examination, R. 161 and 162.

He has gone to the seed house on various occasions and

Mr. Stoller was not there. ‘‘Well, generally didn’t find

him . . . I called the farm and found him there.”’ Talked

to him there by phone. ‘‘Well, I called him a lot of times

[at the seed house] and nobody was there, suppose, could

not get an answer.’’ ‘‘Tell the court if you usually came

to the seed house and found no one here? I have.’ si |

was on business.’’ Direct examination, R. 163.

Since January the witness has been at the seed house

three or four times and three or four times back in 1939.

‘‘Well, I would say he [Stoller] spent most of his time

on the farm during the day, have arranged to meet him

25

here in the evening.’’ Cross examination, R. 163 and 164.

‘*You haven’t seen him working on the farm? Yes, I

have.’’ ‘‘How many times? Went there three times, was

driving horses on the hay rack.’’ ‘‘Think that was in July,

went to see him about threshing.’’ ‘‘Another time he was

feeding cattle.’’ in October. ‘‘Once, in the Spring, don’t

know when, that was about sowing time.’’ Cross examina-

tion, R. 164.

‘‘Done business at the store at night? Yes. Done busi-

ness at the store in day time? Not with him.’’ Cross ex-

unination, R. 165.

When the witness came to the seed house it was ‘‘gen-

»rally bad days.’’ He picked those particular days ‘‘be-

eause I had the time and figured Mike had it.’’ ‘‘Tell the

court whether those days were fit to work on the farm?

Not on the ground.’’ Direct examination, R. 166.

Witness Gehau. Worker in seed store.

R. 169, R. 170.

State of Mr. Stoller was present every day in the Stoller

Seed House? ‘‘No, about half the time, maybe not half.’’

When Mr. Stoller was located by the witness, it was

usually ‘‘At the farm.”’

‘‘T was supposed to work from 8:30 to 5 and had to wait

until Mike got here at 10:30 to open up, sometimes in the

afternoon, whenever he got here, and when he finished his

work at the farm or got pretty well finished with it.’’ ‘‘As

I said before sometimes 10:30, just whatever time he would

run up here, and he would open up and then he would leave

and go back and finish his work, and then he would come

back.’’ Direct examination, R. 169, R. 170.

26

‘‘Mr. Stoller worked some of those nights? We worked

at nights because he could not be all day.’’ Cross exam-

ination, R. 170.

Witness Bidlock, Sugar Company Manager.

R. 172, R. 174, R. 177.

Saw Mr. Stoller doing farm work on the various farms

several times when on inspection trips as company man-

ager to the Stoller farms or part them.

In 1939 ‘‘he farmed the farm belonging to the Sugar

Company and the Huber Farm and the home farm and the

other two farms in Latty Township.”’ In 1938 farmed the

same land and also the Dittenhaver farm of over 200 acres.

‘‘Referring particularly to this Michael G. Stoller farm

I ask you if any of the hand labor was performed by the

children of Michael G. Stoller? There has been a part of

it performed by his family.”’ Direct examination, R. 172.

Witness Jack DeLaet, Farm Hand.

R. 178, BR. 179.

In 1939 ‘‘I fed, he had 160 head of steers, I fed those,

and shocked corn and hauled beets and everything there

was to do on the farm.’’

Mr. Stoller ‘‘done the work in the morning and helped

load beets when I hauled them, and put up a new building

and helped put the building up.”’ Mr. Stoller did not spend

all his time there. ‘‘No, he did not spend it all there,

but gave me orders what to do.’? He would leave the farm

‘around eleven o’clock, generally in the morning, and

sometimes would come back in the afternoon.’’

27

‘‘What time did Mr. Stoller usually get up in the morn-

ing? I always got there around 5:30 or 6 o’clock and he

was up then. What was he doing? In the barn doing

chores.’’ Direct examination, R. 178, R. 179.

The Evidence Conclusively Proves that the

Respondent Is a Farmer.

The special master in his report in summing up the evi-

ence on this subject said:

‘It is apparent from these facts that the debtor was

‘bona fide personally engaged in producing products

of the soil’ and ‘the producing of . . . livestock prod-

ucts in their unmanufactured state.’

The remaining question under this portion of the

definition is whether or not the debtor was ‘‘primar-

ily’ so engaged.

Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edi-

tion, defines the word as follows: ‘Primarily: In the

first place, originally; pre-eminently; fundamentally ;

as, an action primarily based on policy.’

The debtor resided on the largest of his farms with

his family. Regular operations about the farms were

his first concern in the mornings. He did not go to

his seed business until he had performed some farm

work and had arranged for and given instructions as

to the farm work to be done thereafter. The employees

of his seed business were required to await his arrival.

They were unable to enter the office until he did arrive.

It must be found that his first or primary interest

was in his farms and the farming operations. That

being so, he falls within the group included within

the first portion of Section 75 (r).’’

By every test applied to the evidence the respondent is

a farmer. He gives his farming first place in his time

and in his attention. He is a skillful farmer. By the first

=n

EU Bini itt OPA LATIN 8 Rte OY

yaar ag —

Se Eg ai eee ae ee

28

part of the statutory definition he is a farmer because he

is primarily bona fide personally engaged in producing

products of the soil and in the production of livestock.

Income.

The farming operations of the respondent were finan-

cially remunerative. His seed business was a failure and

was a constant drain on the farm profits. No farm cred-

itor pressed him but the seed business brought him down.

The Special Master’s conclusion on the cause of Mr.

Stoller’s financial difficulties were that:

‘He was in financial difficulty, not because of nor

through his farming operations but through his seed

business operations. His farming operations resulted

in a net profit and his seed business operations in a

net loss. It must be found that the principal part of

the debtor’s income was derived from producing prod-

ucts of the soil and the production of livestock and

livestock products in their unmanufactured state.”’

R. 57.

The witnesses for the banks testified that the loans were

necessary on account of the seed business. Carlton, R. 94.

Burdick, R. 106, R. 218.

The bankers called for a financial statement of the seed

business. Carlton, R. 95. They do not make farm loans.

R. 97. They did not loan on the land but on the seed busi-

ness. F. 99. Burdick, R. 109. They sent bank men down

to look at only the seed business. R. 99. Burdick, R.

101, R. 102, R. 103.

Witness Burdick, vice president for one of the peti-

tioners, the Cleveland Trust Company, testified: ‘‘We

29

knew he was a farmer, knew he lived on a farm’’.. .

R. 102. Report of special master, R. 602, middle of page.

This bank official knew that he was recognized to be one

of the leading farmers in the community, ‘‘Brady Broth-

ers and Mike Stoller.’’ R. 105. The bankers were taken

to the farms. R. 92, middle of page. R. 104, bottom of

page.

Declines in seed prices precipitated the loans from

he banks.

The Losses in the Seed Business.

Debtor’s Exhibit D-1 Market Quotation November 16,

1939, R. 149 to 152.

Debtor’s Exhibit D-2 Market Quotation November 1,

1940, R. 149 to R. 152.

The loss for the year 1939-1940 was $13,725.97 and was

due to seed market declines. R. 149 to R. 152.

Examples of declines: alfalfa, declined 5¢ per pound;

alsac, 9c; blue grass, 9c; red clover, 7c; sweet clover, 2c.

The finding of the Special Master on the subject of in-

come from the seed business in 1940 is as follows:

“It is not possible to determine accurate figures for

the income or less resulting from the seed business

operations for the same period of time ending Novem-

ber 1, 1940. The figures compiled by the debtor and

set forth in movants’ exhibit 25, admittedly are not

complete. The bankrupt testified that they are as ac-

curate as he could make them. Such figures disclose

a net loss of $13,725.97.

30

There is no testimony nor evidence in the record

which would tend to show that any profit or net income

was realized from the seed business operations.’’ R.

55.

He lost money in the total farm and seed business, about

$15,000 in 1938, and made some money in 1939. The loss

was in the seed business. R. 94. And not from the farm

operations. R. 95. According to values in 1939 he made

about $16,000 in 1939 from farms and seeds. The farm

income that year about $28,000. R. 91.

The two years of 1938-1939 combined were a loss. R.

95.

The farm operation net profits in 1940 were over $8,000.

R. 143. This was in addition to $327.04 on the 80 acre

farm and $246.64 on the 40 acre farm. R. 145 and 146. Thus

the total net profit from the three farms was $8614.89 in

1940.

The conclusion of the Special Master as to the net farm

profits for 1940 is summarized thus:

“The details of the debtor’s farm income for the

year of 1940, shown in Exhibit 15, appear to be reason-

ably adequate for the purpose. Movants’ witness,

Clifford E. Leitner, a certified public accountant, tes-

tified as to certain inadequacies therein such as the

allocation of items of farm labor to the farms and to

the seed business. Nevertheless, on the basis of fig-

ures found and to a great extent undisputed, the 1940

net income of the debtor from his farms was in the

approximate amount of $6,000.00. The figures for

the grain produced. were fixed as of the dates of har-

vest or entry. The testimony was to the effect that

the prices of grains had risen thereafter but no attempt

was made to include such price gains in the income.”’

—7

31

The losses in the seed business for 1940 are summarized

by the Special Master at R. 29 and R. 59.

It is equally clear that the respondent’s operations as

a farmer were financially successful while as a seedsman

he operated it at a loss. That is, his ‘‘principal income”’

came from farming—in fact his only income came from it.

The Decisions.

The supervising conciliation commissioner in his special

naster’s report cited and discussed thirty-one decisions

n all, some of them he considered more than once in their

different aspects. R. 31 to 54. The district judge cited

and discussed four cases. R. 190. They all were fully

inalyzed and discussed in the briefs and arguments be-

fore the appellate court. As was said by this court in

First National Bank v. Beach, 1937, 301 U. 8. 435, at page

441: when ‘‘read with due relation to the facts’’ the most

of them are seen to be consistent with the conclusion of

the special master and of the appellate court. The ap-

pellate court arrived at the same result, saying: ‘«The

authorities cited by the district court present facts far

afield from those recorded in the instant case’’ and took

the pains to show why. R. 243 and 244.

The decisions relied upon by the district judge and by

the petitioners are here discussed in the order in which

each first appears in their brief.

The Decisions Cited by the District Judge Found in the

Petitioners’ Brief at Page 9, Also in the Record

at pages 190 and 191.

So that the different viewpoints of these opinions which

were relied upon by the District Judge may be readily

32

compared the discussion in the ‘‘Memorandum of the

Court’? (R. 190) is first set forth followed by the discus-

sion by the Special Master (R. 24 to 54) and then by the

discussion of it by the appellate court (R. 242 to 247).

Finally the case is discussed on behalf of the respondent.

i. First National Bank v. Beach (1937)

301 U.S. 435.

From the Memorandum of the District Court:

R. 190: ‘‘Each case involving the question of

whether a debtor in bankruptcy was engaged in farm-

ing, so as to entitle him to the benefits that accrue to

a farmer under the provisions of Sec. 75 of the Bank-

ruptey Act, should stand on its own bottom and be

determined from the facts and from the record. First

Nat. Bank v. Beach, 301 U. S. 485.”

From the Special Master’s Report:

R. 31: ‘‘The leading case on the question of who

is a ‘farmer’’ appears to be First National Bank v.

Beach, 301 U. S. 485; decided May 17, 1937.

In that matter, the debtor owned a farm with 5

houses and a barn thereon. He had lived on such

farm since his birth, occupying one of the houses with

his family. Debtor had been engaged in business

prior to 1930, but had suffered financial losses. At

that time he began working the farms again. He had

harvested fruit from an orchard and some isolated

trees and cultivated a large garden of about one acre,

raising vegetables thereon. He raised hay and sold

it; repaired the houses, cleaned out a well, laid sev-

eral miles of stone walls and built 2 miles of barbed

wire fence; he also had a few animals and a miscel- ©

laneous assortment of farm tools. He raised a con-

siderable amount of poultry and eggs.

=—_

33

His total income per annum from 1930 to 1935, was

$4,000, of which amount $2200.00° was derived from

renting three-quarters of the farm to various persons

for grazing and cultivation.

Rentals from other real estate, not claimed to be

farm property, amounting to $1500.00 made up the

principal part of the remainder of his income.

The District Court held that the debtor was not a

farmer within the meaning of Section 75 (r), and the

Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

The Supreme Court stated the question to be simply:

‘Was respondent a farmer because ‘‘nersonally bona

fide engaged primarily in farming operations’’ or be-

cause ‘‘the principal part of his income was derived

from farming operations’’ ’?

It is stated in the opinion:

‘We do not try to fix the meaning of either of

the two branches of this definition, considered in

the abstract. The two are not equivalents. They

were used by way of contrast. Occasions must

have been in view when the receipt of income de-

rived from farming operations would make a

farmer out of some one who personally or pri-

marily was engaged in different activities. A

catalogue of such occasions might err for excess

or for defect if made up in advance. . . . The

words ‘“‘primarily engaged’’, as we find them in

the first branch of the definition, do not constitute

a term of art. The words ‘‘income derived from

farming operations’? do not constitute such a

term. In every case the totality of the facts is

to be considered and appraised. We pass to that

appraisal here.’

: . The farming and the leasing must be

viewed in combination if we are to gain a true

perspective, the two tied together as principal

and incident. A single tract of land belonging

to the debtor has been worked by him in part,

and in part worked by others to whom a section

34

of the tract as been let for cultivation. Far

from stepping into another business, he has been

faithful to the old one in thus dividing up the

tillage. To get a living out of the land in one

way or another is the thread of common purpose

that binds the labor and the leases, and enables

us to find in them the tokens of the same vocation.

In brief the man is seen to be a farmer by every

test of common speech, though his income has

been garnered in rents as well as products. We

emphasize the fact afresh that the words of the

statute to which meaning is to be given are not

phrases of art with a changeless connotation.

They have a color and a content that may vary

with the setting. . . . In the setting of this enter-

prise, the totality of its circumstances, the roots

of the respondent’s income go down into the

soil.’ ’’

From the opinion of the appellate court:

R. 247: ‘“‘The Supreme Court, in First National

Bank v. Beach, 301 U. S. 435, 438, 439, has declared

that, in determining in every case of this character

whether the petitioner is a farmer because ‘person-

ally bona fide engaged primarily in farming opera-

tions’ or because ‘the principal part of his income was

derived from farming operations,’ the totality of the

facts must be considered and appraised. The Supreme

Court would not attempt to fix the meaning of either

of the two branches of the definition considered in the

abstract, saying that the two are not equivalents but

are used by way of contrast. The words ‘primarily

engaged’ in the first branch of the definition, and the

words ‘income derived from farming operations’ in

the second, were said not to constitute terms of art.

Mr. Justice Cordozo wrote: ‘A farmer remains a

farmer, just as a lawyer remains a lawyer, though

the returns on his investments, while not enough to

35

keep him going, are larger, none the less, than the

profits of his labor. . . . We emphasize the fact afresh

that the words of the statute to which meaning is to

be given are not phrases of art with a changeless con-

notation. They have a color and a content that may

vary with the setting. (Citing cases.) In the setting

of this enterprise, the totality of its circumstances,

the roots of respondent’s income go down into the

soil.’

So, in the setting of the case here for decision and

the totality of its circumstances, the roots of appel-

lant’s income would seem to go down into the soil.

He is, therefore, entitled in full measure to the relief

provided by the Act of Congress of May 15, 1935, C.

114, Sec. 3, 49 Stat. 246, 11 U.S.C.A., See. 203(r).”’

Discussion :

With the statement in the Memorandum of the District

Court there is full agreement. The significance of the

decision in the Beach case in its application to the question

in this appeal, lies elsewhere. The Special Master aptly

develops two other points.

(1) The debtor Beach had been a merchant for many

years and in that occupation he acquired a total debt of

$100,000 and retired to do the best that he could on his

farm homestead. His debts arose entirely out of his busi-

ness venture. This fact which the opinion of the Supreme

Court specially noticed was ignored in its discussion of

the sole question to be decided, namely, was Beach a

‘‘farmer’’?

In contrast the Memorandum of the District Court in this

Stoller case lays special stress upon the similar fact in

this respondent’s case, with which fact all agree. The

Memorandum of the Court says:

F

_. . “I am further convinced that the substantial

portion of his indebtedness that brought him to the

bar of the bankruptcy court was incurred in the oper-

ation of that seed business.’’

(2) As pointed out by the Special Master in the quota-

tion from R. 52, the petitioners argued that in so far

as the appellant laid and repaired tile ditches, repaired

farm buildings and fences, and built new buildings, he was

not farming. In the same vein it was argued that in

cleaning out a well, laying stone walls, building fence

and hauling stone, Mr. Beach was not farming. But this

Court concluded that he was.

36

Likewise Mr. Stoller’s activities ‘‘smacked of the soil,

and made him not less, but more a farmer.’’ He was bred

a farmer. He has farmed all his life. Arising at five o’clock

in the morning, milking cows, feeding steers, doing chores,

until eleven before going to the seed store—on those days

when he went at all—he undoubtedly smacked loudly of

the soil when he arrived. ‘‘The roots of his income go

down into the soil.’? He went broke in the seed business

and had to borrow solely on account of the seed business.

At every turn of the evidence covering many years we see

profitable farming operations. The farm profits kept the

seed business afloat until it carried all down with it.

Tiling, repairing fences, building a cattle barn, repair-

ing tractors and other farm machinery, hauling fuel and

oil to the fields, feeding cattle, threshing, combining,

hulling clover, cleaning seed—all are ‘‘farming,’’ all are

producing products of the soil equally with planting,

hoeing, cutting and husking and cribbing corn.

Likewise just as Mr. Beach raised chickens and kept a

garden, so Mr. Stoller raised hogs and cattle, milked cows,

fed cattle, made hay, sowed wheat, laid tile, covered tile,

37

inoculated, cleaned and sowed seed, ran the binder, ran

a threshing machine, plowed corn, mowed hay, husked corn,

harvested beets, dug beets, drove the tractor and team,

planted corn, planted sugar beets, and ran the combine.

Clearly Mr. Stoller ‘‘smacks of the soil’’ and the ‘‘roots

of his income go down into the soil.’’

ii. Beamesderfer v. First National Bank (1937)

(CCA 3), 91 Fed. (2d) 491.

From the Memorandum of the Court:

R. 190: ‘‘I have concluded that Michael Stoller was

basically, fundamentally and primarily engaged in the

wholesale and retail seed business; that his interests

lay there; that his energies and attention were pri-

marily devoted there; and that instead of being per-

sonally engaged in the business of farming he was

personally engaged in the seed business. I am fur-

ther of the opinion from the record that the principal

income that accrued to Michael Stoller during a pe-

riod of years prior to the filing of his petition in bank-

ruptcy was derived from the seed business, and I am

further convinced that the substantial portion of his

indebtedness that brought him to the bar of the bank-

ruptecy court was incurred in the operation of that

seed business. Beamesderfer v. First Nat. Bank &

Trust Co., (CCA 3d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 491.”’

From the Special Master’s Report:

R. 34: ‘‘The case of Beamesderfer v. First Nat.

Bank & Trust Co. of Mount Joy, 91 F. (2d) 491, was

decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 3rd Cir. on

July 13, 1937.

The Court recited therein the following facts. From

38

1912 until the date of the filing of the petition on Jan-

uary 7, 1935, the debtor and his wife lived in Mount

Joy, Pa. They had a farm in another county. The

debtor was not a farmer; had not cultivated the farm,

but had rented it to a tenant. During the 5 years

prior to the decision, the farm had not been cultivated

by anybody but had been used for pasture and during

part of that time by another than the debtor. He also

owned a tobacco ware house and was engaged in buy-

ing and selling leaf tobacco over a period of 15 years

prior to the filing of the petition. He borrowed large

sums of money for use in the tobacce business and his

indebtedness arose out of his tobacco operations.

Practically all of his income was derived from the to-

bacco business.’’

In its discussion of this decision the appellate court

said:

R. 243. ‘‘The authorities cited by the district court

present facts far afield from those recorded in the

instant case. Beamesderfer v. First National Bank

dé Trust Co., supra, disclosed a situation where the

petitioner did not live on his farm but had rented it

out. The farm had not been cultivated for five years,

but had been used only for pasture. The petitioner

owned a tobacco warehouse in the town of his resi-

dence, and his occupation for fifteen years had been

buying and selling leaf tobacco. Practically all of

his income had been derived from the tobacco busi-

ness. He was properly adjudged not to be a farmer

entitled to the benefit of the Agricultural Composi-

tion and Extension Act.’’ :

Discussion :

The last paragraph of the Beamesderfer opinion reads

thus:

39

‘“‘The uncontradicted testimony established that

from 1912 until the date of filing the petition in this

case, January 7, 1935, Beamesderfer and his wife lived

in Mount Joy, Lancaster County, Pa., but that they had

a farm in Londonderry Township in Dauphin Coun-

ty, Pa.; that he was not a farmer, had not cultivated

the farm but had rented it to a tenant; and that dur-

ing the last five years it had not been cultivated by

anybody but had been used for pasture, and during

part of that time by another than Beamesderfer, one

Nicholas B. Garver. The testimony further shows

that Beamesderfer owned a tobacco warehouse in the

borough of Mount Joy and was engaged in buying and

selling leaf tobacco over a period of fifteen years prior

to filing the petition in this case; that he borrowed

large sums of money for use in his tobacco business

and that his indebtedness arises out of his tobacco

operations; that practically all of his income was de-

rived from the tobacco business. Under these cireum-

stances the conciliation commissioner found that

neither Beamesderfer nor his wife, the appellant, was

primarily bona fide engaged in producing products of

the soil and that the principal part of their income

was not derived from farming operations. Under these

circumstances, the District Court did not err in re-

fusing to refer the case back to the conciliation com-

missioner and in dismissing the petition.’’

The facts which separate the Beamesderfer case from

this Stoller case are:

1. Beamesderfers did not live on the farm. For 13

years they had lived in another county. Mr. Stoller has

lived on a farm all his life, since 5 years old.

2. Beamesderfers did not farm their land but rented

it to a tenant. Mr. Stoller has always farmed with his

own hands.

3. The Beamesderfers had not cultivated any land at

40

all for the preceding five years. Mr. Stoller has cultivated

land every year.

4. At his residence in a county distant from the farm,

Mr. Beamesderfer had been in.the business of buying and

selling tobacco for the past fifteen years. Mr. Stoller has

always lived on a farm and conducted his seed business

in the village.

5. Practically all of the Beamesderfer income came from

the tobacco business. All of the Stoller income came from

farming. The seed business took it all in and demanded

more, thus dragging the farm operations into the farmer

debtor proceeding.

6. The single element which is common to the two cases

is that the debts arose out of the businesses. This is im-

material as we have seen in First National Bank v. Beach,

301 U. S. 435, where the indebtedness of $100,000 arose out

of mercantile business. The sources of the debts are im-

material. The statute reads: ‘‘A petition may be filed

by any farmer, stating that the farmer is insolvent or

unable to meet his debts as they mature.’’ Sec. 75 (c).

It is the possibility of the farmer debtor losing his land

because he can not pay his debts, any debts, as they mature

that gives the court jurisdiction of a farmer debtor’s case.

The rock bottom purpose in Section 75 is to prevent the

creation of an European peasantry in our country. Farm

ownership by farmers is essential to a strong democracy.

As this Court said in Home Building and Loan v. Blais-

dell, 290 U. S. 398, at page 445:

‘«Algo important is the fact that mortgagees, as is

shown by official reports of which we may take notice,

are predominantly corporations, such as insurance

companies, banks, and investment and mortgage com-

panies. These, and such individual mortgagees as are

41

small investors, are not seeking homes or the oppor-

tunity to engage in farming.”’

The interest of the nation requires that farmers be kept

on the farm as farm owners.

iii. Baxter v. Savings Bank, (1937)

(CCA 5) 92 Fed. (2d) 404.

From the Memorandum of the Court:

R. 190: ‘‘It is apparent from the record that the

farmer debtor exercised supervision over the farm

operations in that he was in the habit of giving direc-

tions to his foreman and workman on the farm, espe-

cially in the mornings before proceeding to the con-

duct of his seed business. But supervision or prop-

erty management is not sufficient to entitle one to the

benefits of this section. Baaxter v. Savings Bank of

Utica (CCA 5th, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 404.”’

From the Special Master’s Report:

R. 33: ‘‘In the case of Bavter v. Savings Bank of

Utica, N. Y., 92 F. (2d) 404 (CCA 5th Cir.) decided

on October 18, 1937, adjudication was set aside for

the reason that the debtor was not a ‘farmer’ within

the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act relating to agri-

cultural compositions.

The bankrupt had resided in Utica, N. Y. and had

practiced law for a number of years prior to Feb-

ruary, 1935, when he moved to Georgia. In October of

that year, he filed a petition under Section 75. It was

found that farm property constituted only a small

part of his estate, and potential income from his farm-

ing operations was very small as compared with that

of his other property.

a ed Re AS ARG RANI PBA NG tre hk 0 ian .

42

The evidence disclosed that the debtor gave up his

law practice because of his health and he had already

acquired the farm property. Thereafter, he devoted his

entire time to the management thereof which in-

cluded the superintendence of the farming operations.

The court said on page 406:

‘While it is true that appellant may have per-

formed some of the functions of a farmer, his

occupation may be more accurately described as

property management. The evidence amply sus-

tained the conclusion of the court that appellant

was not a farmer within the meaning of the act

(section 75 (r), as amended 11 U.S.C.A. See.

aus (ft). "

The appellate court said:

R. 244: ‘Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, N. Y.,

supra is of doubtful authority, in the light of the opin-

ion of the Supreme Court in John Hancock Mutual

Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels, 308 U. S. 180; but, how-

ever this may be, its factual situation bears no rele-

vant resemblance to the instant justiciable contro-

versy. The petitioner, Baxter, who was denied the

benefits of a farmer debtor status, was a Utica, New

York, lawyer, who, eight months before filing his

petition, had given up his law practice and, because

of ill health, moved to Georgia, to a farm which he

had previously acquired there. During residence

on his farm, he merely superintended farming opera-

tions. The Court of Appeals probably took judicial

notice that the new arrival, as a farmer, was a good

lawyer.”’

Discussion :

By certiorari to the Fifth Cireuit (which decided the

Baxter case) the case of John Hancock v. Bartels, 308

U. S. 180 came to this court. At page 181 this Court said:

3b ae iaeh aa ne

RR Sa a ae EAE TE A Me RURAL DE SR EN AT NE EEE A ROSE TIE LIEGE SO PAE AA

43

‘Because of conflict in the rulings of the Court of Appeals

of the Fifth Circuit, due to the differing views of the judges

composing the court in the cases cited, and because of the

importance of the question, we granted certiorari.”

Among the ‘‘cases cited’’ was this case of Baxter v. Sav-

ings Bank, CCA 5, 92 Fed. (2d) 404, and this Court over-

ruled it.

This repudiated Baxter decision will not stand examina-

tion. The Fifth Cireuit Court there held three things:

1. The petitioner was not a farmer. 2. He had not shown

good faith. 3. The bankruptey court could make him an

involuntary farmer bankrupt by adjudication under Section

22 of the regular Bankruptey Act.

1. The entire evidence on the question of whether the

petitioner was a ‘‘farmer’’ the Fifth Circuit Court summed

up as follows:

‘‘The evidence discloses that appellant gave up his

law practice just prior to moving to Georgia on ae-

count of his health; that he had already acquired the

property involved; and that thereafter he devoted his

entire time to the management thereof, which in-

cluded the superintendence of the farming operations.

While it is true that appellant may have performed

some of the functions of a farmer, his occupation may

be more accurately described as property manage-

ment. The evidence amply sustained the conclusion

of the court that appellant was not a farmer within

the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, Section 75 (r),

11 U.S.C.A., Section 203 (r). Cf. In re Day, (D. C.,

Ill.), 10 F. Supp. 229.”’

Whether the mere management of farm operations would

debar a farmer debtor petitioner from being a ‘‘farmer’’

by occupation, which is extremely doubtful (since even a

corporation—which can not dig in the soil except vicari-

ously by ‘‘management’’ may by statute, 75 (s) 4, be a

”

Cee ies Oe Ot Core ae eee

44

‘‘farmer’’) that subject is not in this Stoller case. Mr.

Stoller was not a mere farm superintendent, he worked

every day with his hands.

2. On the point in issue here the Baxter decision is but

a puff of air, a side issue. The soul and center of the Bax-

ter decision was that a farmer debtor proceeding may

be dismissed, or transferred to regular bankruptcy, for

alleged lack of ‘good faith.’? This Court held in the

Bartels case that good faith has nothing to do with filing

a farmer debtor petition or making a proposal under it.

3. The holding that after dismissing a farmer debtor

petition under Section 75 the court could transfer the pro-

ceeding into regular bankruptcy is a direct violation of

the statutory prohibition against an involuntary bank-

ruptey adjudication of a farmer. The petitioner Baxter

never subjected himself to any jurisdiction in bankruptcy

except under Section 79 and he was not a petitioner for

voluntary adjudication in bankruptcy. No involuntary

petition had been filed.

The Baxter decision warrants no further discussion.

It is inherently a nullity as a precedent.

iv. In re Day (D. C. Ill), (1935)

10 Fed. Supp. 229.

From the Memorandum of the Court:

R. 191: ‘It is also apparent that in the off season

when his time and attention was not wholly concerned

with the seed business he devoted more time to his

farm, but there is very little in the record to indicate

that he was personally engaged in farming or that

he was basically and fundamentally a farmer and

CSPERDE APL ELUATE A 3 — ~

oe EL WO ps PEI told!

ss ‘i 8s PHAN NEY ah IEE TONE TI id iba

that this industry was his primary vocation. In re

Day, (D. C. Ill. 1935), 10 F. Supp. 229.”’

From the Special Master’s Report:

R. 41 and 42: ‘‘In re Day, et al., In re Day’s Estate,

10 F. Supp. 229, decided by the District Court, E. D.

Illinois, on March 8, 1935, set forth that the debtor

from 1920 to the date of his death in October 1932,

was superintendent of highways and county surveyor.

He was a civil engineer by profession, maintained a

civil engineering office, and in addition to his public

work, did engineering work. He owned 320 acres

of farm land but did not live thereon. He lived in a

village where he had an engineering office. His farm

from 1929 until his death, was occupied by a tenant

on a crop rental arrangement. The court concluded

that the income from the farm and from the engineer-

ing profession earnings were approximately the same.

The court said therein:

‘. . . Surely in that situation it cannot be said

that he was personally primarily engaged in farm-

ing. Primarily means basically or in such man-

ner as to be of first importance. Here the con-

nection with farming as such was incidental to

looking after an investment and did not have to

do with his basic employment.

Nor was he within the second definition of the

act, one ‘‘the principal part of whose income is

derived from farming operations.’’ Principal

means main, chief, of first importance. The show-

ing made in this respect falls far short of sus-

taining the allegation bringing him within such

language.’ ”’

In its opinion the appellate court said of this decision:

R. 244: ‘‘In re Day, supra, was a case where the

petitioner held not to be a farmer was a practicing

civil engineer, and also superintendent and county

aT rar ene ee

46

surveyor, who owned but did not live upon a farm

which he rented to a tenant who occupied and culti-

vated it. The civil engineer devoted his time almost

exclusively to the practice of his profession, and de-

rived his income about equally from his profession

and his farm.”’

Discussion :

There can be no quarrel with the decision of Judge

Lindley upon the facts as stated in his Day opinion. They

were:

‘The deceased from the year 1920, until the time

of his death in October, 1932, was superintendent of

highways and county surveyor for the county of Piatt.

He was a civil engineer by profession, maintained a

civil engineering office, and, in addition to his public

employment as superintendent of the highways and

county surveyor, was engaged during substantially

all the remainder of his time in performing for com-

pensation services as a civil engineer for drainage dis-

tricts and private parties. He owned 320 acres of

land, subject to mortgage indebtedness. He did not

live upon the farm, but lived in the village of Be-

ment, and divided his time between his office there

and the courthouse at Monticello, the county seat of

Piatt county. The farm, from 1929 until his death,

was occupied by a tenant, who paid crop rental to the

deceased.

‘“‘The court has labored with the books of the ac-

count, examined the same, drawn his own conclusions,

and observed carefully the calculations submitted by

the respective parties. My conclusion is that the in-

come from the farm and from the engineering profes-

sion earnings were approximately the same.

‘‘His time was given almost exclusively to the prac-

tice of his profession, out of which he had a substan-

tial income, probably at least one-half of his total

income. He did not live upon the farm. At the most,

_ er

47

he only conversed and consulted with the tenant as to

crops, harvests, repairs, and sales. Surely in that

situation it cannot be said that he was personally

primarily engaged in farming. Primarily means

basically or in such a manner as to be of first impor-

tance. Here the connection with farming was such

as was incidental to looking after an investment and

did not have to do with his basic employment.

Nor was he within the second definition of the act,

one ‘the principal part of whose income is derived

from farming operations.’ Principal means main,

chief, of first importance. The showing made in this

respect falls far short of sustaining an allegation

bringing him within such language.’’

Although some expressions in Judge Lindley’s opin-

ion may not accord with the opinion of this Court two

years later in First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301

U. S. 435, it would seem that by the Beach decision, the

facts in the Day case would not satisfy the definition in

Section 75 (r).

When the facts in the Day case and in this Stoller case

are compared, however, they lie far apart:

1. Mr. Day was a civil engineer by profession; he was ©

state superintendent of highways and also county sur-

veyor; he was civil engineer for drainage districts and

for other clients. Mr. Stoller was from boyhood a farmer

and his seed business grew out of his farm operations

of tillage and harvesting; his first daily work beginning

at the early hour of five was on his farms and the seed

store remained closed until he appeared on the scene as

late as eleven, or not at all; he often returned to his farm

work before the day was over; he worked on the farm in

the evenings.

2. Mr. Day did not live on his farm but in town where

48

he had his office, and he had another office in the county

seat. Mr. Stoller has always resided on a farm.

3. Mr. Day’s farm was occupied by a tenant who farmed

it on shares. Mr. Stoller not only farmed all the land

he owned (except 40 acres rented to Mr. Laukhuff, R.

167), but he rented large acreages which he farmed in ad-

dition to his own land.

4. Mr. Day’s income came equally from his profession

and from his share of the crops. Mr. Stoller’s entire in-

come came from his farming; his seed business went into

the hole and drew his farm income in with it. To keep

his farming operations going he was compelled to stop

the sheriff’s sale which followed the execution issued out

of the cognovit judgment on the appellee’s unsecured note

given to keep the seed business going. No judgment or

foreclosure was sought by any debt growing out of farm

operations.

5. When well enough to do it Mr. Day advised with his

farm tenant. Mr. Stoller habitually worked on the farms

with his hands and he directed his employees every day

about the farm work.

Judge Lindley had some difficulty reaching the conclu-

sion that Mr. Day was not a ‘‘farmer.”’ It was not easy

to determine whether farming or profession produced the

most income. The question of employment was easy to

decide. The facts in the Stoller record make the conclu-

sion inevitable that both his occupation and the source of

his income make him a ‘‘farmer.’’

49

The Other Decisions Relied Upon by the Petitioners.

Page 24 of the Petitioners’ Brief.

In re Knight (1934), 9 Fed. Supp. 502.

This old ‘‘horse and buggy’’ decision of a District Court

of Connecticut was rendered in 1934 before the import of

Section 75 was understood, and before it had been ex-

panded by the Act of May 15, 1935. It was overruled by

this Court in First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301

U. S. 435, at 439, where the opinion says that:

“‘The seantiness of the yield may have turned him

into a bankrupt, but it did not change his occupation.

One does not cease to be a farmer because draught or

wind or pest may have rendered the farm barren.’’

The Connecticut District Court opinion disregards that

part of Section 75 (r) which makes one a ‘‘farmer’’ who

is engaged in farming or producing livestock or dairy

products, even though he should have no income what-

soever or should have a greater income from a nonagri-

cultural source.

Page 24 of the Petitioners’ Brief.

In re Hilliker (1935), 9 Fed. Supp. 948.

This is another early decision on the definition of a

farmer in Section 75 (r) which was rendered before that

definition was expanded by the Act of May 15, 1935. It

was based, in part, upon the decision in the case of In re

Palma Brothers (1934), 8 F. Supp. 920, which adverse

decision this court noted was one of the reasons why the

nalts gemeeadD . . . "

SOE Re RE AN ph REALE Ie 68 FASB AR Tn BAA I PN RAS AL TS Ne A IC IEA SAM it FRE MID

50

Congress expanded the definition in Section 75 (r). See

First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301 U. 8. 435, at

the top of page 438. This Hilliker opinion was also

grounded upon the then prevalent theory that a farmer

debtor proceeding could be dismissed for lack of ‘‘good

faith’’. It observed that:

‘‘The proposal on its face bordered on the pre-

posterous and it may well be that the debtor had no

‘dea when he made the offer that any creditor would

think for a moment of giving acceptance to it. It

hardly need be stated that the proposition was re-

jected.’’

That theory was advanced and repudiated by this court in

John Hancock v. Bartels, (1939), 308 U. S. 180.

On the subject of the definition of a ‘¢farmer’’ in See-

tion 75 (r) the district court in the Hilliker case found

that:

‘<The debtor has never personally lived on the ranch

property, but has lived on a town lot in a suburban

city. He is a professional man by occupation, regularly

following the business of a dentist. The cultivation |

of the forty-acre ranch is and has been without doubt —

a mere incident with other business ventures of the

bankrupt, to the following of his professional calling.

The mere fact that the gross amount of income from

the ranch property during the past three years happens

to be a few hundred dollars in excess of the income of

the debtor from other sources, does not, to my mind,

determine the question at all. A man under the defi-

nition must be primarily a farmer. Here he is pri-

marily a dentist, regularly working at a regularly

kept office, in that profession.”’

Thus we see that instead of holding ‘‘that the word

‘income’ means the gross income”’ as suggested by the peti-

tioners in their brief at page 24, the district court in the

Hilliker case expressly declined to follow such a rule.

51

Pages 25 to 30 of Petitioners’ Brief

First National Bank v. Beach (1937), 301 U. S.

435;

Beamesderfer v. First National Bank and Trust

Company (1937), 91 Fed. (2d) 491;

In re Day (1935), 10 Fed. Supp. 229.

These three decisions have been discussed in this brief

at pages 32, 37 and 44 respectively.

This concludes the discussion of all the decisions relied

upon by the petitioners. It would seem that the statement

of the appellate court that they ‘‘present facts far afield

from those recorded in the instant case’’ is applicable to

each of them.

‘*Fraudulent Conduct’’

On page 32 of the petitioners’ brief the following ques-

tion is posed:

‘‘May the conduct of a farmer debtor in respect to

representing himself to be primarily engaged in busi-

ness enterprise and fraudulently soliciting and ob-

taining credit upon such conduct and misrepresenta-

tions be such as to estop him from claiming the

benefits of the Act?’’

This implied imputation of fraudulent conduct or mis-

representation has been repeatedly put forth below begin-

ning with the inception of the petitioners’ motion +o dis-

52

miss. It was disregarded by the supervising conciliation

commissioner as special master, by the district judge, and

by the appellate court. It was so disregarded because

there is nothing in the record to support it. If there were,

the subject has been fully discussed and determined

against the contentions of the petitioners in In re Feil

(1942), 40 F. Supp. 108, by Judge Schwellenbach, a for-

mer U. S. Senator who was a member of the Congresses

which considered at different times the enactment or

amendment of various portions of Section 75. It was also

considered and the same conclusion was reached by Judge

Allred in In re Lindsay (1941), 41 Fed. Supp. 948. This

case is cited by the petitioners in their petition but not

mentioned or discussed elsewhere.

CONCLUSION.

There is no reason for disturbing the conclusion of the

appellate court that the respondent is a ‘‘farmer’’ as

defined in Section 75 (r). Under either branch of the

statutory definition the record impells the conclusion that

he is a ‘‘farmer’’. No case has been cited which would

suggest a different result.

It is therefore submitted that the petition presents no

ground which would justify the exercise by this court of

its power to grant a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Lima, Ohio

May 18, 1943 Eimer McCrary, Lima, Ohio,

Counsel for Respondent,

Michael George Stoller.

J. F. Cavanacu,

Paulding, Ohio

Of Counsel.

sme

| . MAP

IN THE MATTER OF

MICHAEL GEORGE STOLLER, FARMER DEBTOR

CASE NO. 16315, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION .TOLEDO

CASE NO. 9180, UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SHOWING THE LOCATION OF FARMS OPERATED BY STOLLER :

FORMER RESIDENCE

TENANCY

Q

JACKSON TWP ‘

r.) q 10

NAA\ 7)

¢ ACRES

7 16 1S

A

x3

20 2! ze

ES

Senet | “saber

1329 ERES & ZOAGRE

Aes 26 25

NE CIES 30 29 27

160 ACRES BOACRES

40 ACRES &ZOACRES

MIKELS

6 6 ACRES 3! NICK a

—a— 32 3 34

34 35 36 HOME FARM 4355 ACRE

| PRESENT $TOLLER RE S)DENCE

L J

= ‘or as a . =

|

3 4 | é 5 4 |

| ROCKY

| 160 ACRES

ro ace ae eae {_____| 4 _fi_,

TT Twe

BLUE cntex Twp ~ LA

10 i 12 < 7 8 9 10

| | OWNED BY STOLL > BOACRE

| (ALBRIGHY © ARM)

! eX inci Ye es

apyct aimee stress g ES OF LAUKHUF FARI Z2OOACRE

D BY OLLER

| is

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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