Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Howard National Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan

: Office - Supreme Osurt, U.

APR 30 1943

PETITION AND BRIEF

CHARLES ELMORE CBOPLEY

: Supreme Court of the United States

: OCTOBER TERM, 1942

No. 9¢8

HOWARD NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,

PETITIONER

Us.

EMILY TENNEY MORGAN, MARIAN BAYLEY

BUCHANAN, RICHARD MORGAN, Et AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF VERMONT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PETITION l

SUMMARY STATEMENT 2

ASSERTED BASIS OF JURESDICTION cicccsecccssscossesssonn 7

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 10

REASONS RELIED ON : 11

PRAYER 13

BRIEF

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BRIEF 14-15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 16-19

TEXT OF BRIEF 1-30

APPENDIX 31

i

_—_

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1942

No.

IN THE MATTER OF THE

ESTATE OF

HARRIS R. WATKINS,

Deceased,

HOWARD NATIONAL BANK

AND TRUST COMPANY,

Petitioner.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF VERMONT

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSO-

CIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES.

Howard National Bank and Trust Company of Burlington,

Vermont, a corporation created and existing under the laws of the

United States and having its principal office at Burlington in the

State of Vermont, brings this.its petition for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Ver-

niont entered in the above entitled cause, affirming the judgment

of the Probate Court of the State of Vermont for the District of

Chittenden and remanding the cause to said Probate Court.

The opinion, review of which is sought has not been printed

in the official reports of the Supreme Court of Vermont but is

printed in 30 Atlantic (2d) 305.

1

ER "i SIRE PENI RISE OST CM MOEN ISIS SRI TR RA

2

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MATTER INVOLVED

This cause arose upon the petition of the beneficiaries of a testa-

mentary trust provided by the will of Harris R. Watkins, late of |

Burlington, in said Probate District of Chittenden in the State of

Vermont, for the appointment of an administrator d. b. n. c. ta

The will was duly probated March 18, 1930, and letters testa-

mentary were issued to City Trust Company (Op. par. 6-7, Rec.

51-52), then a banking corporation created and existing under the

laws of the State of Vermont, with its principal office in Burling-

ton, Vermont, which was named executor in said will and had

qualified April 17, 1930. (F. 10, Rec. 26.) City Trust Company

occupied the same banking rooms and had the same officers as

Howard National Bank (F. 12, Rec. 26; Op. par. 9, Rec. 52), and

on the 12th day of March, 1931, while acting as executor as afore-

said, was consolidated with said Howard National Bank by virtue

of the Act of Congress of November 7, 1918, as amended Febru-

ary 25, 1927,c. 191, sec. 1. (F. 15, Rec. 27, Op. par. 9, Rec. 52-

53.) The consolidated corporation took the name Howard Na-

tional Bank and Trust Company. The consolidation was ap-

proved and certified by the Comptroller of the Currency, March

12, 1931. (J/b.) No annual corporation license tax for City

Trust Company was paid to the state of Vermont for the succeed-

ing year. And on April 1, of that year (1932) a revocation of

the state charter of City Trust Company for non-payment of the

annual license tax was recorded by the Secretary of State. (F. 4

Rec. 24-25, Op. par. 9, Rec. 52-53.) The petition by which

this proceeding was instituted, alleged the provision of the will, that

the petitioners were the persons in interest, that the will was allowed

and City Trust Company qualified as executor, that the'debts, the

funeral expenses and special legacies had been satisfied, that the

consolidation and charter revocation above stated had \occurred,

that the consolidated national bank had never been appointed exect

tor or administrator and had taken over the assets of the estate

without right, “that there is not now, there never has been since

on or about March 12, 1931 (the date of consolidation) any legal

——

executor or administrator... ."’ Wherefore petitioners pray for

the appointment of an administrator (Rec. 4-7). A copy of the

will was annexed. (Rec. 8-9.)

Howard National Bank and Trust Company made answer as-

serting among other things the following :

“(a) On the 12th day of March, 1931, City Trust Com-

pany a Vermont corporation theretofore named, qualified

and acting as executor of the will of Harris R. Watkins

was consolidated with Howard National Bank, a corporate

instrumentality of the United States, into a corporation of

the United States under the name and style of Howard

National Bank and Trust Company of Burlington having

the same officers and directors as City Trust Company and

by virtue of the laws of the United States, then and since

in harmony with the laws of the State of Vermont in this

regard, the powers, property, rights, obligations and duties

of fiduciary relationship of City Trust Company, including

the executorship of said will of Harris R. Watkins, de-

volved upon said consolidated corporation, and from said

day hitherto have been exercised by it agreeably to the laws

of the United States of which said consolidated corporation

became and continued a corporate instrumentality and

agreeably to the laws of Vermont.

“(b) Since March 12, 1931, City Trust Company has con-

tinued its existence as a constituent part of Howard Na-

tional Bank and Trust Company continued in life by and

subject to the laws of the United States of America and

said City Trust Company as a constituent part of said

Howard National Bank and Trust Company has continued

to be and is an instrumentality of the United States; and

the state of Vermont since said March 12, 1931, hitherto

has been without power to regulate, control or terminate

the corporate existence of said City Trust Company as a

constituent part of said consolidated corporation or to im-

pair its utility.”

And that from the date of consolidation the consolidated bank

“has been the true and qualified executor acting under bond as pro-

vided by law.’ (Rec. 13-14.)

PRE ata poe ee

4

After finding the facts the Probate Court entered a judgment

order that :

“City Trust Company upon the forfeiture of its charter,

ceased to exist as a corporate entity of the State of Ver-

mont, for the purposes of this case.

“It is further, adjudged that a vacancy was created in the

office of the Executor of the Estate of Harris R. Watkins

as of that time.” (Rec. 2.)

This judgment, thus fixing the termination of the executorship

upon the date of the supposed forfeiture of the charter of City

Trust Company rather than at the time of consolidation, as asserted

by the petitioners, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Vermont.

That court recognized the claim of the consolidated national bank

made in its answer as above stated and, pursuant to claims made

in the brief for the consolidated bank, held:

(1) “.... in the absence of any statutory interdict we are un-

able to discern a public policy of this State, that would

operate to prevent a consolidation of State and National

banks under the Acts of Congress. Specific statutory

authorization was not necessary. Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S.

673, 24 L. ed. 168, 169; Petition of Worcester County Nat.

Bank, supra, 162 N. E. at page 220. We hold that the

consolidation of the City Trust Company and the Howard

National Bank was not in contravention of our law, or of

our public policy.” (Op. par. 12, Rec. 54.)

(2) That there was no Vermont statute which declared the

charter void upon consolidation (Op. par. 14, Rec. 55) and it fol-

lowed precedents which it cited to the effect that :

“|. the corporate identity of the trust company is not

destroyed and its charter is not dissolved by the consoli-

dation.” (Op. par. 14, Rec. 55.)

(3) That the appointment of an executor is not in Vermont

the result of judicial proceedings but:

__

“In our law an executor is a person, or corporation em-

powered to discharge the duties of a fiduciary, appointed as

such by the testator in his will. The Probate Court has no

power of choice, for the office is held by virtue of the testa-

tor’s selection.” (Op. par. 16, Rec. 50.)

But the Vermont court contrary to the claim of the consoli-

dated bank held that the petitionee did not become the legal execu-

tor as the result of the consolidation, asserting :

“Our law does not recognize any right to succession to the

office of an executor by a person or corporation not desig-

nated by the testator in his will.” (Op. par. 17, Rec. 57.)

(4) The court then ruled that the state might after the consoli-

dation regulate, tax and destroy the state corporation and thereby

extinguish its authority as executor and create a vacancy to be

filled by the probate court. The court said:

“As we have seen, the petitionee asserts that since the date

of the consolidation the State of Vermont has been without

power to regulate, control or terminate its corporate exist-

ence. We do not adopt this view. The ‘franchise’ of the

state bank, the transfer of which is provided for in the Act

of Congress (12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 34a), cannot mean its

right to be a corporation. The right to transfer franchise

powers of a corporation organized under the laws of one

sovereignty to a corporation organized under the laws of a

different sovereignty is extraordinary. It can not be im-

plied in the absence of explicit statutory enactment to that

end.” (Op. par. 19, Rec. 57.)

In support of this proposition the court cited Massachusetts

and Pennsylvania cases and failed to accept or apply the rule of

immunity of national banks from state control, as enunciated by

this court in Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 at 283,

cited and quoted in the brief for the consolidated bank and the rule

recognized by the Vermont court in State v. Clement National

Bank, 84 Vt. 167 (cited and quoted in the brief for the consoli-

dated bank ), that there can be no state taxation of a national bank

6

without the consent of Congress, citing Mercantile, etc., Bank y.

City of New York, 121 U.S. 138, Owensboro National Bank y,

Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 and other cases.

The Vermont Supreme Court impliedly held that, after the con-

solidation, City Trust Company was taxable under Section 1035

of the General Laws of Vermont which is as follows:

“Every foreign corporation doing business in this state,

and every association or joint stock company doing busi-

ness in this state issuing shares of stock or dividing its cor-

porate rights or property into shares, and every domestic

corporation, shall, except as hereinafter provided, pay an

annual license tax to the state.”

The court after holding that the corporate franchise was not

transferred by consolidation, continued :

“It follows that the State of Vermont had the power to

terminate the corporate existence of the City Trust Com-

pany, in accordance with G. L. 1046 (now P. L. 1000),

providing that: ‘Every corporation shall, by virtue of this

section, except as otherwise provided, cease to exist as such

corporation on the first day of April in any year during

which such corporation has not, on or before such day,

filed its annual license tax returns for the fiscal year be-

ginning with the first day of the preceding Febuary, and

has not, on or before the first day of April in such year,

paid to the state the annual license tax for such fiscal

year. ...’ Although the certificate of revocation was dated

June 1, 1932, the City Trust Company, not having paid its

annual license tax, ceased to exist as a corporation upon

April 1, of that year. Its authority as executor was there-

upon extinguished and it devolved upon the Probate Court

to grant administration to a suitable person, as required by

G. L. 3240, now P. L. 2784, which is, undobtedly, the

exercise of a judicial function.” (Op. par. 20, Rec. 58.)

The court further said:

“The court might, after the dissolution of the City Trust

Company’s charter, have appointed the petitionee adminis-

trator with the will annexed, for a national bank may serve

in this capacity.” (Op. par. 24, Rec. 60.)

ee

The court further recognized that prior to consolidation the

constituent banks, City Trust Company and Howard National

Bank, occupied the same banking rooms and had the same officers

(Op. par. 9, Ree. 52); and that at the time of consolidation the

consolidated bank took possession and control of the assets of the

estate and thereafter

“the directors of the City Trust Company never took

action as a board and the affairs previously conducted by

the company were directed and controlled by the directors

and officers of the petitionee.” (Op. par. 10, Rec. 53.)

Thus the Supreme Court of Vermont held that although the

iederal statute with respect to consolidation of state and national

banks could operate in Vermont because not in contravention of

Vermont law, it could not operate upon the franchise to be a cor-

poration because the state had not given affirmative consent ; and it

could not operate upon the testator’s designation of an executor

because the consolidated corporation was not the same corporation

named by the testator. That the state corporation continued in

life and continued to hold the executorship, although it was under

the management and all its assets, including the estate assets, were

in the custody of the consolidated bank. But that the state cor-

poration, after consolidation, remained subject to the control and

taxation of the state and that for failure to pay a corporation

license tax assessed by the state of Vermont, the state could destroy

that corporate entity and vacate the executorship.

ASSERTED BASIS OF JURISDICTION TO REVIEW

Petitioner contends that the Supreme Court of the United

States should review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the

State of Vermont because the Supreme Court of the State of Ver-

mont has decided federal questions of substance,

(a) Which heretofore had not been expressly determined by

this Court ; and

ELLE LOLI OSE TES DE LY LEE BEA GE NM ¢ DALY SELL EOE IGE ECT, SION rot ROBE EL, BTM TTT

8

(b) Has decided such substantial federal questions in a way

probably not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Court

with respect to the controlling elements of the questions here pre-

sented.

The questions are federal because the ruling of the State Court

frustrates the full accomplishment of the expressed purposes of

the national legislation as to consolidation of state banks into

national banks, when not in contravention of state law.

In particular the questions involve the decision of a state cour:

which :

(1) Makes the full operation of the federal statute as to the

consolidation of state and national bank depend upon the expressed

consent of the state rather than upon the absence of contravening

law.

(2) Sanctions taxation burdening a national bank (through a

constituent state bank) in a manner not within the permission of

Congress.

(3) Without the consent of Congress, imposes upon the con-

stituent state bank, after consolidation, control by the state to the

extent of destruction of that constituent to the detriment of the

co.solidated national bank.

The questions are substantial because (1) they are the neces:

sary foundation of a decision which deprives petitioner of the right

to act as executor and makes it an intermeddler in a large

estate ; and (2) because the answers given by the Vermont court to

those questions, assert as the necessary basis of the decision, a rule

so important and far reaching that it would subject many national

banks throughout the United States to the payment of unlawful

and burdensome tax levies by the states, or alternatively te impait-

ment of their operations.

The sum of the answers to these federal questions raises an

issue of federal law which has never been presented to this court

for a composite ruling. But the component rules which make up

mi , s SERA s PP Se SURES Ks cop opentets NE EME Nhs

_ ——_!

9

the decision of the state court are in conflict with the decisions of

this court, 772. :

(1) The ruling that affirmative consent of the state is neces-

sary to a complete consolidation of a state bank into a national

hank, though there be no contravening state law, is in conflict with

the decision of this Court in Ex parte Worcester County National

Bank, 279 U.S. 347 and with other cases cited in the accompany-

ing brief.

(2) The ruling that a state may burden a consolidated national

bank by a license tax upon the constituent state bank is in conflict

with

Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664,

19S. Ct. 537, 43 L. ed. 850.

Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Bedford, 310 U. S.

41 at 52, 60 S. Ct. 800 at 805, 84 L. ed. 1067.

Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 16 S. Ct.

502, 40 L. ed . 700, as well as other cases cited in the

accompanying brief.

(3) The rule that after consolidation into a national bank

under federal law not in contravention of state law, the state re-

tains a degree of control of a constituent state bank such that it

may destroy the state corporate entity and thereby terminate an

executorship held by the state bank after consolidation to the

benefit and under the management of the consolidated bank, is in

conflict with Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, supra, and other cases

cited in the brief, and

(4) The ruling that a consolidated national bank may not

hold in its own name an executorship held by a constituent bank at

the time of consolidation, although the state bank’s entity is not

destroyed by consolidation, because the consolidated bank is not

the bank name as executor in the will, which (rather than judicial

appointment) creates the executorship,—this ruling is in conflict

with the implied ruling of this Court in Ex parte Worcester County

National Bank, supra, although the question has not been expressly

decided by this court.

EE SOE BES EIG R TPE BTID FEISS LANE DI RNA OBEN ER DENI LAO SE STAN LO SAE REDE OAM OEN IS eT Mg

Sie PRD EAE ENGL TALC AN D8 RENE RB 89 cH bie Sigh 98.

10

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioner asserts that upon the record the decision of the State

Supreme Court raises questions which this petition presents for re-

view as follows:

1. If a state has no law or public policy in contravention of

consolidation of state banks into national banks under the federal

statutes (Act of November 7, 1918, c. 209, sec. 3, as amended by

Act of February 5, 1927, c. 191, sec. 1),

2. And if a bank of its creation, while holding under its law

the office of executor by virtue of testamentary appointment rather

than judicial order, has been lawfully consolidated into a national

bank without loss of corporate existence or of its office as executor,

In those circumstances, may the state, after consolidation,

deny the right of the consolidated bank to be executor for the

reason that it was not named in the will and impose a corporate

license tax upon the constituent state corporation and, if the tax

is not paid, destroy the constituent state corporation and terminate

its executorship because the laws of the state did not give affirma-

tive consent to the merger of the state corporate identity into the

national corporation? This question is divisible, thus:

In the circumstances above stated

(a) May the state deny the effectiveness of the federal statute

to transfer out of state control and vest in the consolidated bank

the franchise of the state bank to be a corporation, unless the state

gives affirmative consent to such a transfer?

(b) May the state refuse to recognize the consolidated bank

as the legal executor in the right of the continuing state entity?

(c) May the state continue to regulate and control the consti-

tuent state bank ?

(d) May the state after the consolidation continue to impose

license taxes with respect to the constituent state bank in a form

not within the permission of Congress as to taxation of national

banks?

si ESE EOE EMG NY TERE ES TARE SAME TaN NRT OTS te wi

11

(e) May the state destroy the constituent state entity because

those taxes are not paid, and thereby terminate the executorship

to the injury of the consolidated national bank ?

Petitioner asserts that these questions require answers in the

negative ; and when so answered require the reversal of the decision

of the state courts.

REASONS RELIED ON

The reasons upon which petitioner relies are set forth in an ac-

companying brief. The decision of the Vermont Supreme Court

asserts that that State may regulate, control, tax and destroy the

corporate existence of a constituent state bank after completion of

its consolidation with a national banking association under the Act

of Congress, although that control, taxation and destruction

operates to the detriment of the national bank. But this decision

of the State Supreme Court is in conflict with established law of

this court that state law may not operate in conflict with the laws

of the United States as to national banks. It impairs the efficiency

of national banks to exercise the powers and discharge the duties

conferred and imposed by the laws of the United States, (Davis v.

Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, McClellan v. Chipman,

164 U. S. 347; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173

U.S. 664; First National Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 258 U. S.

362, and other cases cited in the accompanying brief.) The rule is

applicable whether the taxation or interference is direct or indirect,

(Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton 738; Federal

Land Bank v. Crossland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 S. Ct. 385, 67 L. ed.

703; Pittman v. H. O. L. C., 308 U.S. 21, 60 S. Ct. 15, 84 L. ed.

11; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct.

451,72 L. ed. 857.)

The Supreme Court of the State of Vermont asserted that that

tion of the constituent state bank after consolidation because, al-

7 Se eh ee eee ee ee ee SURI ASIII OEE tte

State might exercise the regulation, control, taxation and destruc-

si ———

12

though there was no law or public policy of Vermont in contra-

vention of consolidation, the State of Vermont had not given

affirmative statutory consent to the transfer of the corporate fran-

chise of the constituent state bank. But such affirmative consent

is not required by the statute to an effective consolidation, by which

the consolidated national bank shall acquire all the franchises, in-

terests and fiduciary offices of the constituent state bank, unless

there are contravening state laws; and the operation of the statute

according to its terms is within the federal power (/:x parte

Worcester County National Bank, 279 U. S. 347; Cannon v.

Dixon (C. C. A. 4, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 913; and see Metropolitan

National Bank v. Claggett, 141 U. S. 520; Michigan Insurance

Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293, 12 S. Ct. 450, 36 L. ed. 162;

Guardian Depositors’ Crop. v. Currie (1940), 292 Mich. 549, 297

N. W. 2; Central United National Bank v. Abbott (1939), 125

Ohio St. 37, 18 N. E. (2d) 981 and other cases cited in the brief.)

The denial by the state court of effective operation of the

statute, so as to preserve the complete identity of the constituent

state bank within the corporate structure of the consolidated na-

tional bank, resulted in the denial to the consolidated natoinal bank

of the right of executorship given it by the federal statute (Adams

v. Atlantic National Bank (1934), 115 Fla. 399, 155 S. 648),

although the state treated the executorship of the state bank as

continuing.

The rules of law thus asserted by the Vermont state court may

be applied to the injury of a great number of consolidated national

banks throughout the United States because they are based upon

general theories of federal power and federal statutes and are not

limited to the peculiar statutory provisions of a particular state

13

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari may

issue out of, and under the seal of, this Honorable Court directed

to the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont commanding that

Court to certify and to send to this Court for its review and de-

termination a transcript of the record and proceedings in the afore-

said cause and that the judgment of said Supreme Court of said

State of Vermont affirming the judgment of the Probate Court

for the District of Chittenden in the State of Vermont be reversed

by this Honorable Court ; and that if need be to effectuate a proper

presentation of the record in the aforesaid cause a writ of certiorari

be issued out of and under the seal of this Honorable Court directed

to said Probate Court for the District of Chittenden in the State

of Vermont, commanding that Court to certify and send to this

Court for its review and determination all or so much as may be

appropriate of the record in the above entitled cause ; and that your

petitioner have such other and further relief in the premises as to

this Honorable Court may seem meet and just.

?

JoserpH T. STEARNS, Guy M. Pace,

G. J. MurpHy, 172 College Street,

Both 172 College Street, Burlington, Vt.

Burlington, Vt. Joun J. DESCHENEs,

Of Counsel. 158 Bank Street,

Burlington, Vt.

Attorneys for Petitioner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OF

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Page

of

Brief

I. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the consolidation

involved was not in contravention of the law or public policy

of Vermont, did not require specific statutory authority from

the state, was validly effected, did not destroy the corporate

identity of the state bank or terminate its executorship, al-

though all the assets of the estate were in the possession of,

and were managed by, the consolidated bank l

II. Vermont Supreme Court held that the corporate franchise

of constituent state bank was not vested in consolidated

national bank for want of affirmative consent by the state and

that the state corporation remained subject to state regulations

control, taxation and destruction after consolidation...» 3

III. United States has power, in the absence of contravening

state statutes, to effect complete consolidation without affirma-

tive consent of the state

IV. That power was exercised by COmgress....ceccccmencnnmnuenennnns Il

V. No state may burden and impair the efficiency of a na-

tional bank by control or taxation except as permitted by na-

nD ae Ses SEAS 5 tee EO l

A. A state may not share in the COMtTrO]....csseenennenennnn l

B. A state may not tax a national bank directly or in-

directly except within the permission granted by the

Teatal Sea accesses cect 18

tae tse

14

_—

15

VI. The taxation and destruction of the constituent state

bank, after consolidation was an unauthorized burden on the

consolidated national bank

A. The tax by the state was in effect upon the consolidated

national bank, because

1. The situation precluded payment except by the

national bank

2. The corporate franchise taxed was either merged

in or owned by the consolidated national bank........

B. The destruction of the charter of the constituent state

bank (resulting from the tax) impaired the perform-

ance of the functions of the consolidated national bank

C. The tax by Vermont was not within the permission of

the United States because (1) the state otherwise

taxes national banks

And the tax was in an arbitrary AMOUNE ......ccssssseeenn

D. The tax occasioned an unauthorized burden upon the

exercise of national privileges

VIl. The Vermont Courts wrongfully denied the executor-

ship to the consolidated bank

The only reason for denial was that the consolidated bank was

not named in the will

But the effect of national law continuing the existence of the

state entity within the consolidated bank, made it the corpora-

tion named in the will, as a matter Of national 1AW o.com

VIII. Widespread injury to national banks would result from

establishment of the rule of decision announced by the Vermont

Court

20

26

27

28

VEL TANG UE

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Page

Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U.S. 765, 51S. Ct. 252, 75

L. ed. 690 Brief 26

Adams v. Atlantic National Bank, 115 Fla. 399, 155 S. 648

Brief 9, 29

Pet. 12

Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U.S.

209, 56S. Ct. 417 Brief 12

Bank of California v. Richardson, 248 U. S. 476, 39 S. Ct.

165, 63 L. ed. 372 Brief 19, 22, 26

In re Barreiro’s Estate, 125 Cal. App. 153, 13 P. (2d) 1017

Brief 12

Bransford, Ex parte, 310 U.S. 354: GOS. Ct. DAT entncnn Brief 16

Cannon v. Dixon (C.C. A. 4, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 913

Brief 13, 14, 28

Pet. 12

Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. G73. 24: L.. e€h. 16S cic Brief 8, 10

Pet. 4

Central United National Bank v. Abbott, 135 Ohio St. 37, 18

N. E. (2d) 981 Brief 8, 9, 12, 15, 28

Pet. 12

Clement National Bank v. State of Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 34

S. Ct. 31, 58 L. ed. 147 Brief 25

Coffey v. The National Bank of the State of Missouri, 46 Mo.

140, 2 Am. Rep. 488 Brief 12

Cook County National Bank v. United States, 107 U. S. 445,

2S. Ct. 561, 27 L. ed. 537 ......... Brief 17 |

17

Page

Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41

at 52, 60 S. Ct. 800 Brief 19

re. 9

Commonwealth v. First National Bank and Trust Company,

303 Pa. 241, 154 A. 379 Brief 5,6,8

Commonwealth v. Merchants National Bank, 323 Pa. 145, 185

A. 823 Brief 5,7,8

Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 16S. Ct. 502, 40

L. ed. 700 Brief 6, 16, 18, Appendix

Pet. 5,9, 11

Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190, 194, 60 S. Ct. 480........ Brief 17

Easton v. lowa, 188 U. S. 220, 23 S. Ct. 288, 47 L. ed. 452

Brief 18

Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102,

62 S. Ct. 1 Brief 19

Federal Land Bank v. Crossland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 S. Ct. 385

Brief 19, 26

Pet. 11

First National Bank v. Chapman (1929), 160 Tenn. 72, 22

S. W. (2d) 245 Brief 9

First National Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 258 U. S. 363, 42

S. Ct. 323, 66 L. ed. 661 Brief 18

Pet. 11

First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson, 269 U. S.

341, 46 S. Ct. 135, 70 L. ed. 295 Brief 19

Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Currie, 292 Mich. 549, 291

N. W. 2 Brief 12, 28

Pet. 12

Hawley v. Hurd, 72 Vt. 122, 47 Atl. 401, 52 L. R. A. 195, 82

Am. St. Rep. 922 Brief Appendix

“

Page

18

Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Cleary, 2%

U.S. 315, 56 S. Ct. 235, 80 L. ed. 251, 100 A. L. R.

1403 Brief 8,9, 10

International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 265, 49 S.

Ct. 108, 73 L. ed. 318 ox Brief 17

International Text Book Company v. Lynch, 81 Vt. 101, 69

481, 54 L. ed. 678 ... Brief 25

International Text Bokk Companyg v. Lynch, 81 Vt. 101, 69

Atl. 541, reversed 218 U. S. 664, 54 L. ed. 1201, 31S. Ct.

225 Brief 25

. Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U. S. 245, 249, 57 S. Ct. 449 ........ Brief 14

Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 48S.

Ct. 423, 72 L. ed. 770 Brief 26

Maricopa County v. Valley National Bank, No. 449, Decided

March 1, 1943, 63 S. Ct. 587 Brief 19

McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347, 17S. Ct. 85, 41 L. ed.

461 Brief 16

Pet. 11

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 4 L. ed. 579..Brief 18, 19

Mercantile National Bank v. City of New York, 121 U.S. 138,

30 L. ed. 895, 7 S. Ct. 826 Brief Appendix

Pet. 6

Metropolitan National Bank v. Claggett, 141 U. S. 520, 12S.

Ct. 60, 35 L. ed. 841 ; Brief 7, 12, 28

Pet. 12

Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293, 12 S. Ct.

450, 36 L. ed. 162 Brief 7, 12,28

Pet. 12

Osborn v. Bank of U. S.,9 Wheaton 738, 6 L. ed. 204....... Brief 18

Pet. 11

19

Page

Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 43

Bs i: OU, FF i SR Be ts eteetitbestreneniss Brief 18, Appendix

Pet. 6,9, 11

Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 48S. Ct. 451,

72 L. ed. 857 Pet. 11

Pittman v. H. O. L. C., 308 U.S. 21, 60 S. Ct. 15........ Brief 19, 26

Pet. 11

Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41 S.

Ct. 243, 65 L. ed. 577 Brief 16

State v. Bradford Savings Bank & Trust Co., 71 Vt. 234, 44

A. 349 Brief Appendix

State v. Clement National Bank, 84 Vt. 167, 78 A. 944, Ann.

Cas. 1912D, 22 (affirmed 231 U.S. 120, 34S. Ct. 31, 58

L. ed. 147) Brief Appendix

Pa. 5

Stahman v. Vidal, 305 U. S. 61, 59'S. Ct. 41, 83 L. ed. 41

Brief 19

Thomas v. National Bank, 187 Wash. 521, 60 P. (2d) 264

Brief 29

Ex parte Worcester County National Bank, 279 U. S. 347, 49

S. Ct. 368, 73 L. ed. 733, 61 A. L. R. 987

Brief 4, 5, 6, 9, 23, 26, 28, 29, Appendix

Pet. 9, 12

Petition of Worcester County National Bank, 263 Mass. 444,

Ge PE: 247, BIE FOU, 3. GAF ciennes Brief 5,7, 8, 21

Pet. 4, 5,9

NOMA PEAROMY, EATS NURS SFL ENS ISP PLAGE NS PPA PRYD ne ESN EBT SS TIC AASBR GR, Re TENNENT EON

CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES

i age

Amendment VI, cl. 2 Brief 16

STATUTES

UNITED STATES

Bank consolidation statute:

(Act Nov. 17, 1918, c. 309 § 3; Feb. 25, 1927, c. 191

$ 1; 44 Stat. 1225 la U.S.C. A. 34a) quoted Op.

Dat FT FR OG sient Brief 4, 11, 13, 15, 16, 28

Act of June 16, 1933, c. 89 § 24, 48 Stat. 100........... Brief 13

Permission for State Taxation of National Banks:

R. S. Sec. 5219 as amended March 4, 1923, c. 267,

1499, and March 25, 1936, c. 88, 44 Stat. 223, subd.

(a) U. S.C. A., Sec. 548, subd. (a) quoted Ap-

pendix I] Brief 32

Brief 12, 18-19, 24

VERMONT

Corpration License Tax, G. L. 1035 (now P. L. 989),

quoted Petition &

Brief 15, 24

Forfeiture of Charter for Nonpayment of License Tax,

G. L. 1046 (now P. L. 1000), quoted (Op. par. 20,

Rec. 58) Brief 4

; Brief 15-24

Taxation of Income from National Bank Stock, subd. Il

of Sec. 3, of Part I, read with Sec. 8 of Part II of No.

17 of the Acts of 1931. Quoted Appendix III.....Brief 33

Brief 24

20

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