Brief for the CIO as Amicus Curiae — Peters v. Hobby
Supreme Court brief1954
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Office -Suorer-2 Court, U. S.
FiiLBD
JAN 171955
HAROLD B. WILLEY, Clerk
LIBRARY |
SUPREME COURT. U.S.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
| OcToBer Term, 1954
No. 376
Joun P. Perers, Petitioner,
v.
Oveta Cup Hossy, et al.
| BRIEF FOR THE
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
AS AMICUS CURIAE —
Artruur J. GoipBerc
General Counsel
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
Tuomas E. Harris
Associate General Counsel
718 Jackson Place, N. W..
Washington 6, D. C.
Joszeru L. Raun, Jr.
Washington Counsel, UAW-CIO
1631 K Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
>.
INDEX
PACE
The Interest of the Congress of Industrial Organizations |
Argument 3
I]. Federal Loyalty-Security Programs | 6
A. The Current “Employees” Security Program” for Civil-
ian Employees of ‘The Federal Government 8
1. Genesis of the Present Program ‘
a. The Truman administration loyalty program 8
b. Summary dismissal statutes and “security” 10
c. Merger of the Truman administration loyalty and
summary dismissal (security) programs ok ee
2. Establishment of the“Employees’ Security Program” 12
3. The Finding of Guilt Under the Present Program... 13
4. The Distinction between Applicants and Employees 17
B. Security Programs for Military Personnel seacdacitan ts: ee
C. Defense Contractors’ Personnel Clearance . ies ee
D. Proposed Extensions of Loyalty-Security Programs to
Other Industrial Facilities - sacle ekosan 21
E. Atomic Energy Commission. _ Saasemaee a
F. one "st pee Te. OD
G. International Organizations Employees’ Loyalty Pro-
gram 27
II. State and Local Action 30
Conclusion LER piace eaet col PME anaes 39
Appendix—Personnel Security Programs of the Federal Gov-
ernment .
CITATIONS
PAGE
Cases:
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 32
— Communications Association v. Doud, 339 U.S. 382 oe
Bailey vy. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 —.. _— 5,7
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 38
Fitzgerald vy. City of Philadelphia No. 6212, September Term
1952, Pennsylvania Pleas Court 38
Garner v. Board of Public Workers of Los duasles, 341 U S. 716 31
Gerende vy. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56... 31
Parker vy. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433, 443-444 (N.D. Calif., 1953) 23
United States v. Gray, 207 F, 2d 237, 241-242 (C.A. 9th, 1953) 23
United States v. Marcus Singer, Criminal No. 1150-54, United
States District Court for the District of Columbia... ss 33
Vane mele y, are, 296 we fC
Wieman v. Undegraff, 344 U.S. 183... ; ..3, 14, 20, 21
Statutes:
(Federal!)
Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 1053... sasees 1
Act of August 26, 1950—64 Stat. 476, 5 U SC. $22. . 10, 11, 12
Civil Service Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403 .. 9
Hatch Act—53 Stat. 1148, 5 U.S.C. $113), 1939 ‘Amendment,
i cag EE REI AES ORE AE ALS RA TE ARG NRE 8, 9, 10
Internal Security Act a 1950, Title I, 64 Stat. 987. nema = ean eee 23
ne
50 U.S.C. $782(7) Scealins tacnahnesenanniasacinscadniertSepnchwhanmiguia >. ee
dE a
Magnuson Act —.....- ieotadatecapiaasnteidcceneecadendiiddaestnnioe * Oe
R. S. $1753, § U.S.C. $631 NRE EAL AN NS SOE * |
| SEES ST
United States Code Annotated:
a I ccs siteccneecencmnncivensnenpecscinciiiinpaicsscens OM
(State)
Alabama: Code of Alabama, T.52, s. 433 (6a) — wien 35
California: Deering’s California Code, Government T., para.
1028, 1953 - eae : —
Connecticut: Rule 17, Rules ‘and Regulations ‘and ‘Related
Statutes for State Classified Service... nesses cia
Florida: Florida Statutes Annotated, Ch. 876. jleieaaai ae
Georgia: Georgia Code Annotated, Ch. 89, ss. 311- 316. ideas Oe
Indiana: Burns Indiana Statutes 10-5202...
PAGE
Louisiana: Louisiana Revised Statutes, Ch. 14, ss. 358-365 32
Maryland: Flack’s Annotated Code of Maryland, 1951, Article
85A, (Ober Law of Mary!and) - 31
Mississippi: Mississippi Code Annotated, ss 4064- 01 et seq... 32
New Hampshire: New Hampshire Laws, Ch. 180 1953 _ 32
New York: New York Laws 1949, C. 360, (Feinberg Law) 32
65 McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York $§1101-1108
(1954 Cum, Supp.) - aocanccncoe ae
Ohio: Anderson’s Ohio Revised Code, ss. -143- 272 ae
Pennsylvania: Purdon’s Pennsylvania Loyalty Oath. Statute . =
Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, T.65, Ch. 11 822
Texas: Vernon’s Annotated Statutes, Article 6252, 5.7... 35
Article 4542a, s.9_. ses. 37
Washington: Washington Revieed Code, Ch. 981 on) ae
Miscellaneous:
Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program, Cornell Press,
1953 - waES nis , 9. 3G, it, {2
Brown and Fassett, tele Tests tee ddeiisson to the Bar, 20
University of Chicago Law Review. ell 37
Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania ley alty Act, 101 U niversity
of Pennsylvania Law Review 480, 1953. Sem as 35, 36
gE SS EE ROE ONT
Congressional Record:
100 Cong. Rec. 14116 ~ btilienbaata darshan aeaiomasinaichas: <a
100 Cong. Rec. 14118 - ae ei dieesatnces Hae
Daily Labor Report, Jan. 10, 1955, | p. ». AS. ; 21
Defense Facilities Protection Act, $s. 3428, HJ. Res. 527, 83rd
Congress, 2nd Session —..... ae ntl, ao
Department of Defense Regulations, “May 4, 1953. cadicabaeesnal. ae
Department of State Publication 3655, February, 19: ae
Executive Order 9835, March 21, 1947, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 25, 27, 28, 30, 33
Executive Order 10241, April 28, 1951, 16 Fed. Reg. 369... 9, 11
Executive Order 106422, January 9, 1953.00.00... 27, 28
Executive Order 10450, April 27, 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489
7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 28, 30
Executive Order 10459, June 4, 1953_. 28, 29
Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty and Science, Cornell Press, 1950 23, 24
New York Times —. -. ee 15, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38
Pamphlet, “Faceless informers and our - Schools”, Denver Post 3
ill
PAGE
Report of Committee on Academic Freedom, February 1, 1951,
Northern Section of University of California... ........ 36
Report No. 1818, United States Senate, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. . 23
Resignation letter of Pierce J. Gerety, Chairman of the Interna-
tional Organizations Employees Loyalty Board, December 10,
1954, released on December 17, 1954 by U.S. Civil Service
Commission —___. adh 28, 30
Resolution by Rekimore School Bossd, Morytand, “State Gov-
ernment”, Publication ef Council of State Governments, Feb-
ruary, 1954 paon tata oe
Teachers’ Oath and Related State Rewsiemens. ‘Pebiication of
National Education Association, June 1949.0 34, 35, 36
Co tg SO ES
I ic hac ins ctacadiomcarsheeigtaeccalorciemigtnbeiadeensiiarniinadsunaee:. ae
iv
IN THE
Supreme Court of the GAnited States
Ocroper Term, 1954
No. 376
Joun P. Peters, Petitioner,
v.
Oveta Cup Hospsy, et al.
BRIEF FOR THE
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
AS AMICUS CURIAE
THE INTEREST OF THE CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) is a
federation of labor unions, whose combined membership
approximates six million. It is dedicated to the defeat of
Communism through democratic processes.
A substantial portion of these members hold jobs that
are covered by one or another of the government loyalty
or security programs. Some are civilian employees of de-
partments and agencies of the federal government. and are
subject to the “Employees’ Security Program,” which is
the Eisenhower Administration successor to the Truman
Administration “loyalty” program involved in this case. A
somewhat larger number of CIO members, running into
the tens of thousands, are subject to the “Port Security
Program” administered by the United States Coast Guard.
2
Still other tens of thousands, employed by private firms
under contract with the Atomic Energy Commission, are
subject to the personnel security clearance program of that
agency.
An even larger number of CIO members, totaling some
hundreds of thousands, are employed by private firms
doing defense work under government contracts, and are
subject to the security clearance program for such em-
ployees operated by the three defense departments of the
federal government. Further, Attorney General Brownell
has asked Congress to authorize the extension of this or a
similar program to private industrial facilities which are
important to national defense, but do not have direct
contractual relations with the government. These facili-
ties would, in the discretion of the Secretary of Defense,
include not only utilities, such as telephones, railroads, and
power plants, but also mines, mills and factories. If the
Administration secures this requested legislation, virtually
all CIO members—and the major portion of the industrial
workers of the country-—could be brought under some gov-
ernment loyalty-security pregram.
Finally, a small number of CIO members are subject to
the loyalty-security programs of States or municipalities,
or to these for military personnel administered by the
military departments.
(Loyalty-security programs run by private industry
without governmental intervention or participation are be-
conung more and more widespread, but we have ignored
them in this Brief as presenting different legal issues from
those raised by government loyalty-security programs. )
The CIO, as a labor organization, is directly concerned
that the jobs and job opportunities of the members of its
affliated unions be not placed at hazard through pro-
cedures which are not consonant with the guarantees of
the United States Constitution. Beyond that, we believe
that these government loyalty-security programs, relying
3
as they do upon the statements of informers whose iden-
tity is kept secret from the accused and often from the
adjudicating boards, pose a major threat to the constit»-
tional liberties of all Americans, and to the very existence
of our democratic system of government.
ARGUMENT
The CIO believes that no one can constitutionally be
deprived of employment, pursuant to governmental ac-
tion, where the deprivation of employment carries with it
the stigma of disloyalty or of characterization as a security
risk, except after a fair opportunity to rebut the adverse
loyalty-security charges at a hearing. Where these charges
are based on statements to an intelligence agency by secret
informers unavailable for cross-examination, and whose
identity is often not disclosed even to the board members,
there is no such fair opportunity and the purported hearing
is a travesty on our democratic processes.”
It is not our purpose to intrude upon the Court’s time
with legal arguments already made by petitioner and
1 We believe this to be an a fortiori case after Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183. There this Court unanimously struck down the
action of the State of Oklahoma in requiring school teachers to swear
that they were not, and had not within the past five years been,
members of any organization on the Attorney General’s “subversive”
list. The Court based its decision on the principle that “indiscrimi-
nate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an
assertion of arbitrary power” and “offends due process” (at p. 191).
Far worse than classifying the innocent with the knowing is finding
the innocent to be guilty on the basis of a sham hearing. We refer
this Court to a pamphlet recently issued by the Denver Post, entitled
“Faceless Informers And Our Schools,” setting forth a number of
cases in which school teachers were discharged on the basis of FBI
reports to school officials based on statements of secret informants
unknown to the teachers in question who steadfastly maintained their
innocence. These teachers, unlike those in the Wieman case, were
actually held guilty and discharged, not just placed in the same
classification with guilty persons. We have supplied the Supreme
Court Library with a copy of this pamphlet in case it should be
requested by any of the members of the Court.
4
amici curiae. We do, however, believe that the Court
should have available information as to the tremendous
growth of loyalty-security programs and their ever-increas-
ing spread to all parts of the country and virtually all
walks of life.
We recognize, of course, that this Court will adjudicate
in the present case only the actual controversy before it,
which arises under the old Truman “loyalty” program.
We believe, however, that for two reasons this Court
should have before it, when it decides that controversy,
adequate information as to the general nature and scope
of the various government loyalty-security programs now
in operation in this country.
In the first place, the Court’s decision and, not less, its
opinion, will inevitably carry implications as to the consti-
tutionality of these other loyalty-security programs.
In the second place, and far more significantly, the scope
of the loyalty-security programs throughout the nation
bears directly upon the basic question presented in the
case at bar. In the final analysis, what this Court is being
called upon to do in this case is to balance two great na-
tional interests. On the one hand is the interest in the
protection of government (federal, state and local), de-
fense plants, port facilities, armed forces and international
organizations against disloyal persons and security risks.
On the other hand is the interest in the protection of the
individual against loss of employment and reputation on
the basis of statements of secret informers whom he never
knows and never confronts. Certainly the extent of these
loyalty-security programs and the injustices done in indi-
vidual cases is relevant to this question of balancing great
national interests.”
2 It had been our intention to set forth a portion of the great many
cases that have come to our attention showing the injustices occurring
through secret information given by unknown persons unavailable for
cross-examination. In view of the excellent presentation of the Amer-
5
The Government itself presented this point to the Court
in Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918. At page 76 of the
brief filed by the Solicitor General, the Governiuent stated:
“The harm to the individual must be weighed
against the harm to the public. The problem is one
of ‘balancing the conflicting individual and aational
interests involved.’ American Communications Assn.
v. Douds, supra, p. 410. . . . disloyalty in the Gov-
ernment service under present circumstances is a
matter of great public concern. And it was the in-
formed judgment of the President and those charged
by him with administering the loyalty program that in
many instances disclosure of the identity of inform-
ants, and of investigative techniques and sources of
information, would be strongly against the public in-
terest.”
We share the Government’s belief that the issue in the
Bailey case, as it is here, was one of weighing the harm to
the individual against the harm to the public, of balancing
individual liberty and national security. If only a few
persons in highly sensitive positions were being subjected
to the revages of secret informants, one might conclude
that the balance of national interest lay with the Presi-
dent’s judgment that the security of the nation required
the protection of these secret informants.* Now, how-
ever, that these loyalty-security programs with their secret
informants, have spread to many millions of persons most
of whose employment has no relation whatever to our
ican Civil Liberties Union on this point, however, and our desire not
to duplicate other material before the Court, we are limiting this
brief to the general nature and scope of the various loyalty-security
programs without reference to the individual cases .here injustices
have occurred.
3 Of course, even here, the distinction night well be drawn between
different categories of secret informants. An undercover agent of
the FBI, for example, might be protected under many circumstances
when the landlord, the school associate or village gossip ought not
be protected.
6
national security, the balance of interest may and, in our
opinion does, lie with the individual’s right to an oppor-
tunity to rebut the charges against him before losing his
employment and his reputation.
Therefore, in the discussion which follows, we under-
take to supply the Court with a description of the gen-
eral nature and scope of the various governmental loyalty-
security programs in operation throughout the country.
The loyalty programs fal! into -wo categories: those op-
erated by the federal government and those operated by
States or localities. We discuss them in that order.
I—FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAMS
As already indicated, supra, pp. 1-3, there are currently
in operation five different federal loyalty programs, which
apply to different groups of federal employees or to per-
sons in private employment. The Fund for the Republic,
Inc., has recently had prepared a survey of these programs,
by Sandra Weinstein under the direction of Professor
Ralph S. Brown, Jr., of the Yale Law School. With the
permission of The Fund for the Republic, Inc., we have
printed this study, entitled “Personnel Security Program
of the Federal Government,” as an Appendix to this Brief.
It includes 2 description of the appropriate statutes, ex-
ecutive orders, aid regulations.
While the five different federal loyalty-security pro-
grams differ in many respects, the most striking and rele-
vant similarity among their procedures is the use by all of
the ditferent boards of investigative agency files containing
statements by secret informers. These files are not shown
to the accused and the identity of the informers is not dis-
closed to them. Usually, the identity of the informers is
not known even to the members of the various boards. In
the investigative files furnished to these boards the in-
formers are identified only by symbol, such as T-1, T-2.
This practice of utilizing the unsworn statements of
secret informers was permitted by the original Executive
7
Order 9835, creating the Truman loyalty program, which
provided that
\
“the investigative agency may refuse to disclose the
names of confidential informants” (Part IV, sec-
tion 2). 7
This decision was apparently taken because of the position
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that \
“practically none of the evidential sources available
will continue to be available to the Bureau if secrecy
and confidence cannot at all times be maintained with
respect to the original source of information * * *”
(See statement of the Chairman of the Loyalty Re-
view Board, quoted in the Government’s brief in the
Bailey case at pp. 107, 108).
In view of the position taken by the Bureau and pre-
sumably by the other investigative agencies, the other
loyalty-security programs have followed the provisions and
practices under the original Truman loyalty program.
Thus the Sample Regulations attached to Executive Order
10450 setting up the Eisenhower security program pro-
vide, inter alia, that
“the Board shall reach its conclusions and\ base its
determination on the transcript of the hearing, to-
eether with such confidential information as it may
have in its possession.” |
\
,. In the case at bar, arising under the original Truman
loyalty program, the pleadings make clear, and indeed the
government in its answer alleges,
“that the identity of confidential informants whb had
given information with respect to the charges against
plaintiff was not disclosed to the plaintiff; that the
identity of one or more such informants, but not of
all such informants, was known to the Board; and
that the information given by such confidential in-
formants was not disclosed under oath” (R. 20)
We respectfully refer the Court to the Fund study
8
printed in the Appendix (hereafter designated as App.)
for a detailed description of each of the five different fed-
eral loyalty-security programs. This Brief will be re-
stricted to pointing out certain features of each of these
programs which, we believe, will be of assistance to the
Court in understanding their general significance and
scope.
A. The Current “Employees’ Security Program” for Civilian
Employees of the Federal Government
The program which is now in operation for civilian em-
ployees of departments and agencies of the federal gov-
ernment is called the “Employee’s Security Program.” It
was instituted by Executive Order 10450, of April 27,
1953, and applies to civilian employees of all of the depart-
ments and agencies of the federa! government, including
the military departments. In 1953 the civilian employees
of the federal government totaled 2,302,932 (App. 29).
1. Genesis of the Present Program
The “Employees’ Security Program” is an outgrowth of
various earlier programs, including the loyalty program
established by Executive Order 9835, of March 21, 1947,
which is involved in this particular case. It is believed
that a brief relation of this history will throw light on the
nature of both of these programs. The history and opera-
tion of the various federal loyalty and security programs,
up until 1952, is fully detailed in Bontecou, The Federal
Loyalty-Security Program (Cornell, 1953), and the fol-
lowing summary is largely derived from that source.
a. The Truman administration loyalty program. In
1939 the Hatch Act was amended to forbid any federal
employee
“to have membership in any political party or organi-
zation which advocates the overthrow of our constitu-
tional form of government in the United States.” (52
Stat. 1148, 5 U.S.C. § 118})
9
Sporadic attempts at enforcing this provision were made
during the next few years by the Civil Service Commission,
by the FBI, and by various of the employing agencies.
See Bontccou, pp. 14-21. The Civil Service Commission,
in particular, developed regular procedures for hearings
and appeals within the Commission. (Bontecou, pp. 14-15.)
The first formal, over-ali, systematic program for scruti-
nizing and adjudicating the loyalty of federal employees
was, however, established by Executive Order 9835, 12
Fed. Reg. 1935. The details of this program are set forth
in the Petitioner’s Brief, and, in greater detail, in Miss
Bontecou’s book.
We call particular attention to the following features of
this program:
(1) The Fxecutive Order cited, as authority for its is-
suance, the Civil Service Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403, as
amended (without referring to any particular provision
thereof) ; Section 9A of the Hatch Act (viz., the 1939
Amendment) ; and the authority vested in the President
by the Constitution.
(2) The Order, as originally issued, provided that “the
standard” for removal from employment
“ * * * on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that,
on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for be-
lief that the person involved is disloyal to the Govern-
ment of the United States.” (Bontecou, p. 280.)
Subsequently, by Executive Order 10241, 16 Fed. Reg.
369, issued April 28, 1951 (Bontecou, pp. 281-2), the final
clause of this provision was amended to read
“there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the
person involved to the Government of the United
States.”
The present case arose after this amendment.
The Order then went on to list six categories of “activi-
ties and associations * * * which may be considered in
connection with the determination of disloyalty * * *.”
10
These categories were not changed with the amendment of
the “standard.”
(3) The Order itself set forth certain “loyalty deter-
mination procedures,” which “shall be considered as pro-
viding minimum requirements.” In addition it directed
the head of each department to “prescribe regulations for
the conduct of the proceedings before such [loyalty]
boards.”
b. Summary dismissal statutes and “security.” Begin-
ning in 1940, the year after the Hatch Act Amendment
which eventually supplied the principal legal basis for
Executive Order 9835, the military departments secured
the enactment of statutes permitting the summary dis-
missal of their employees, in the interest of national secur-
ity. See Bontecou, pp. 12-13. Typical of these statutes
was the 1942 Act, 56 Stat. 1053 (quoted in Bontecou, pp.
289-290), which authorized the immediate removal of any
employees of the War or Navy Departments or of the Coast
Guard
“whose immediate removal is, in the opinion of the
Secretary concerned, warranted by the demands of
national security * * *.”
Whatever may have been the intention of Congress, the
War Department did not interpret these statutes as accord-
ing the employee the right to a hearing of any sort.
Bontecou, pp. 13-14.
These earlier summary dismissal statutes were super-
seded by the Act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476, 5 U.S.C.
§ 22-1 (set out in Bontecou, pp. 290-292). This statute
authorizes the head of each of certain designated agencies‘
to dismiss civilian employees “in his absolute discretion
*The Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, and Treasury
(with respect to the Coast Guard), the Defense Department and its
component parts (Army, Navy and Air Force), the Atomic Energy
Commission, the National Security Resources Board, and the Na-
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
11
and when deemed necessary in the interests of national
security.” The statute provides that the President may
extend it to departments other than the ones named in it
if he deems it necessary in the interest of national security.
This statute further provides that permanent employees,
or those holding indefinite appointments who have com-
pleted their trial period, and who are citizens, and whose
employment is suspended under the Act, shall, after the
suspension but before employment is terminated, be ac-
corded certain procedural rights, as follows: (1) a written
statement “of the charges against him” within 30 days
after the suspension “which shall be stated as specifically
as security considerations permit”; (2) an opportunity to
answer the charges and to submit affidavits; (3) “a hear-
ing, at the employee’s request, by a duly constituted
agency authority for this purpose”; (4) a review of the
case by the agency head, or his designee, before any final
decision adverse to the employee; and (5) “a written
statement of the decision of the agency head.”
c. Merger of the Truman administration loyalty and
summary dismissal (security) programs. It will be noted
that the procedures prescribed by the Act of August 26,
1950, are approximately the same as the loyalty program
procedures established by Executive Order 9835.° The
removal standard set out in the August 26, 1950, Act, viz.,
“in the interest of national security,” does however differ
somewhat from those successively promulgated for the loy-
alty program in Executive Orders 9835 and 10241.
Executive Order 9835 provided, in Part VI, paragraph 3,
that it was not applicable to persons removed under the
summary removal statutes. Nevertheless, the various de-
partments having special statutory powers of summary
dismissal tended, even before the Act of August 26, 1950,
to merge their summary dismissal procedures with their
5For a detailed description of the procedures under Executive
Order 9835, see Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 15-18; Bontecou, pp. 35-73.
12
loyalty program, or, more accurately, to incorporate the
former in the latter. With the passage of the 1950 Act,
explicitly giving employees the right to a hearing, the last
department operating under a summary dismissal statute,
the Department of the Army, capitulated and agreed to
process its cases under the loyalty program.*
2. Establishment of the “Employees’ Security Program”
The “Employees’ Security Program,” now in effect for
civilian employees of the federal government, was insti-
tuted by Executive Order 10450, of April 27, 1953, 18 Fed.
Reg. 2489. Full details with regard to this program are
set forth in App. 5-29.
In general the present program strongly resembles the
Truman administration loyalty program established by
Executive Order 9835. Thus:
1. Executive Order 10450 cites the same authority for
its issuance as that set forth in Executive Order 9835, plus
two additional statutes, viz. (1) R. S. § 1753, 5 U.S.C.
§ 631, which authorizes the President to “establish regu-
lations for the conduct of persons who may receive ap-
pointments in the civil service,” and (2) the Act of Au-
gust 26, 1950, that is, the summary dismissal statute just
discussed.” a
2. Unlike Executive Order 9835, the present Order does
not itself prescribe the procedures to be followed. Instead,
it provides for termination of employment “in accordance
with the said Act of August 26, 1950.” As we have shown,
however, (supra, p. 11), that Act prescribes procedures
closely paralleling those of Executive Order 9835. The
principal difference is that there is now no appeal to a
* This merger of the summary dismissal procedures into the loyalty
program operating under Executive Order 9835 is summarized in
Bontecou, pp. 36-37.
*'To justify this invocation of the latter statute, Executive Order
10450 provides that the provisions of that Act shall apply, in addi-
tion to the departments and agencies specified in it, “to all other de-
partments and agencies of the Government”. See supra, p. 11.
13
central loyalty review board, and the head of each agency
and department is given the final power of decision. In
addition, Sample Regulations were attached to the E-:xecu-
tive Order and, as under Executive Order 9835, each de-
partment and agency has issued regulations detailing its
procedures (App. 17).
3. The current Order sets forth as its “standard”
“whether the employment or retention in employment
in the federal service of the person being investigated
is clearly consistent with the interest of national se-
curity.”
The Order then goes on to state that investigations pur-
suant to it sha!l develop information which “shall relate,
but shall not be limited, to the following:”. There then
follows a lengthy list of activities or associations of various
sorts. Some of these relate to loyalty, and are similar to,
or identical with, those set out in Executive Order 9835.
Others are, however, considerably broader, and relate not
to loyalty but to personal suitability and even to suscep-
tibility to pressure. Thus, this portion of the Order reads
in part:
“‘(1) Depending on the relation of the Government
employment to the national security:
“(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which
tend to show that the individual is not reliable or
trustworthy.
* * *
“(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral,
or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of in-
toxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual per-
version.”
3. The Finding of Guilt Under the Present Program
The thesis of Petitioner’s Brief is that if the government
establishes a procedure which has the appearance of a
trial on the merits, and looks to the discharge of an em-
ployee on the basis of a determination of guilt “which
ruins the reputation and career of the accused,” then
14
due process requires that the hearing be a fair one in the
accepted sense, and the determination may not be made
arbitrarily. (Petitioner’s Brief, p. 10.)
Petitioner’s Brief relies primarily on Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183, in which this Court said (p. 190-191) :
“There can be no dispute about the consequences
visited upon a person excluded from pubiic employ-
ment on disloyalty grounds. Jn the view of the com-
munity, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has be-
come a badge of infamy. FE specially is this so in time
of cold war and hot emotions when ‘each man begins
to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy.’ ”
And the Court concluded:
“Tt is sufficient to say that constitutional protection
does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pur-
suant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discrimina-
tory.” (344US. at 192.)
In the light of the language of the Court, and of the
Petitioner’s line of argument, it is worth noting that the
current “Employees’ Security Program,” like the Truman
loyalty program, does involve a system for discharging
employees, after a hearing which has the appearance of a
trial on the merits, on the basis of an adverse determina-
tion which ruins the reputation of the accused.
As regards the standard for discharge, it is more vague,
but, we believe, an adverse finding under it is equally dis-
astrous to the reputation, equally “a badge of infamy.”
The entire history of the transition from the Truman loy-
alty program to the Eisenhower security program indi-
cates that the latter was simply an effort to “tighten up”
the former. The finding which the Order requires for
discharge, that retention is “not clearly consistent with
the interest of national security,” is itself highly deroga-
tory. Further, the acts and associations which the Order
lists as justifying an adverse finding are of types which are
at worst infamous and at best injurious to the future
career of the accused.
15
Finally, high government officials have repeatedly la-
beled employees discharged under the present program as
“Communists” or “subversives” or as disloyal. Repeat-
edly they have made it clear that they consider discharge
under the present program “a badge of infamy.” Here are
some typical statements (Italics have been supplied) :
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
President Eisenhower: “I repeat my previously
expressed conviction that fear of Communists
actively undermining our Government will not
be an issue in the 1954 elections. Long before
then, this administration will have made such
progress in rooting them out under the security
program developed by Attorney General Brown-
ell that this can no longer be considered a seri-
ous menace. As you already know, about 1,500
persons who were security risks already have
been removed.” (President Eisenhower Press
cos. statement 12-2-53: New York Times
12-3-53.
Attorney General Brownell: “Fourteen hundred
fifty-six persons have been ejected from Govern-
ment service because they were found to be secur-
ity risks ... We are going to have no more Com-
munist infiltration in the Government and we
steadily are getting rid of those who are security
risks.” (Attorney General Herbert Brownell at
Chicago, 11-6-53: New York Times 11-7-53.)
White House Counsel Bernard Shanley: “. . . 1,-
456 subversives have been kicked out of Govern-
ment jobs since the President assumed office .. .”
(Bernard M. Shanley, counsel to the President,
in a speech to Advertising Club of New Jersey,
11-6-53: New York Times 11-7-53).
Senator McCarthy: “. . . the new Administra-
tion has already rid itself of 1,456 security risks
inherited from the Democratic Administration—
practically all of whom were removed because of
Communist activities or connections or perver-
sion.” (Senator McCarthy on nationwide televi-
sion program, 11-24-54.)
*. . Senator McCarthy . . . said flatly that ‘90
16
percent [of government employees] were re-
moved because of Communist connections and
activities.’ ””—(Marquis Childs in the Washing-
ton Post, 2-3-54.)
(5) Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby: “. . . [Mrs. Hobby]
said that when she took office she found ‘little
or no security program’ except in the public
health service. She recalled that the Eisenhower
administration has fired 1,456 persons who were
regarded as security risks in all departments ...
‘All cases handled under the previous loyalty
program are being reexamined .. . We are de-
termined that every member of the department
must be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct
and character, and completely loyal to the U.S.’”
(Chicago Tribune, 2-24-53.)
(6) Postmaster General Summerfield: “Almost 2,-
200 people who were security risks are no longer
using your tax money. I am here to tell you
we are not hiring any new ones. Somehow, I do
not fee! too amiably inclined toward people who
make treason a preoccupation.” (Postmaster
General Summerfield, quoted in Post Office De-
partment Press Release on Speech to New York
City Industrial Conference Board, 1-21-54.)
(7) Senator (then Representative) George Bender
(Ohio): “. .. we have eliminated more than two
thousand Communists and fellow travelers from
important positions in the government of the
United States. Every one of these jobs was ob-
tained under the Democratic Administration.”
aaa Bender (R., Ohio), press release, 1-
15-54.
In view of these statements of high government officials,
it would hardly be open to the government to contend that
discharge under the “Employees’ Security Program” in-
volves no invidious finding of guilt. In this respect, this
program seems to stand on precisely the same footing as
the Truman loyalty program which preceded it.
17
4. The Distinction Between Applicants and Employees
Both Executive Order 9835 and its successor F-xecutive
Order 10450 provide for security or loyalty screening of
job applicants, as well as of employees. The screening of
applicants may, however, involve simply an investigatio.1,
upon the basis of which the employing agency decides
whether to hire. There is no required procedure of
charges, hearing, appeal, and adjudication: indeed an ap-
plicant who is rejected on security grounds may never
know that that was the reason for his rejection (App. 18).
B. Security Programs for Military Personnel
Civilian employees of the military departments are
subject, like those of the other departments, to the “Em-
ployees’ Security Program” just discussed. Military per-
sonnel, both officer and enlisted, are subject to other sep-
arate, though similar, programs.
These military personnel security programs do not have
statutory authorization, but are governed by regulations
promulgated by the Defense departments. A rather de-
tailed description of these programs appears in the Ap-
pendix, pp. 41-50. In general, they resemble the “Em-
ployees’ Security Program”, both as to standards and cri-
teria and as to procedures.
These military personnel programs do, however, have
certain variations as regards draftees, which arise out of
the fact that their service is involuntary. Thus, under
these programs, volunteers are treated just as applicants
for employment are under the “FE mployees’ Security Pro-
gram”. ‘That is, there is an investigation and if it results
unfavorably they simply are not accepted (App. 43-4) ;
there is no procedure of charges, hearing, appeal, and ad-
judication. The military departments apparently feared,
however, that draftees might pretend to be subversive in
order to avoid service. Accordingly they are treated like
employees, rather than applicants, but with two variations
from the “FE mployees’ Security Program”.
18
The first of these is that the burden of proof is reversed.
Whereas the “Employees’ Security Program” provides for
retention only if “clearly consistent with the interests of
national security”, draftees are retained unless there is suf-
ficient derogatory information to require discharge (App.
44).
The other difference is that if there is some derogatory
information against a draftee, but not enough to warrant
discharge, he may be retained in the service under con-
trolled conditions (App. 45-6). Since all officers, both
commissioned and non-commissioned, are deemed to hold
sensitive positions, draftees in this twilight category have
no possibility of promotion (App. 46).
There are at present something over 3,000,000 persons
in the Armed Forces, all of whom are subject to these se-
curity programs. In addition, turnover in the Armed
Forces, necessitates the induction of some tens of thou-
sands of new persons each month, all of whom are covered
by the programs. Thus, during the course of a few years
these programs have application to may millions of per-
sons.
C. Defense Contractors’ Personnel Clearance
Probably the most important of all! of the loyalty pro-
grams, from the standpoint of the number of persons af-
fected, is that applicable to employees of defense con-
tractors. This program, which is operated by the military
departments, covers defense contractors’ employees who
use Classified information, or have access to areas where
classified production is carried on.*
Since 1950 about half a million employees have been
cleared for top secret, secret, and confidential information,
and an additional two million have been cleared for area
access (App. 50). During the same period some 700
workers have been denied clearance. Currently about four
*No distinction is made in this program between “employees”
and “applicants for employment” (App. 51).
19
thousand employees are being screened monthly under
this program.
This program is operated without statutory authority:
each defense contractor agrees, as part of his contract, to
abide by it. The current version of the program is em-
bodied in Department of Defense Regulations, issued
May 4, 1953.
The details of this program are set out in the Fund
study (App. 50-53). In a number of respects it deviates
considerably from the “Employees’ Security Program”.
One such divergence, and one of major importance to
unions, is that the initial screening of employees who re-
quire only the lowest level of clearance, that is, who have
access only to “confidential” material, is undertaken by
the plant management. On the basis of its own beliefs or
information, or of data supplied by the military, plant
management determines whether there is “derogatory in-
formation” against the employee in question. The Fund
study recited that, to handle this initial screening,
“Many facilities have therefore had to establish
large investigative staffs of their own or utilize de-
tectives and credit agencies. FBI information is not
available directly but it may come through the mili-
tary department.” (App. 51.)
If the management determines that there is “derogatory
information” against an employee, the further handling
of his case is turned over to the military department having
security cognizance of the facility. In the case of em-
ployees requiring a higher degree of clearance, viz., access
to top secret or secret information, clearance is handled
by the military at the outset.
If the security office of the military department having
responsibility for the facility thinks clearance should be
denied, the case is forwarded to the appropriate Industrial
Personnel Security Board. There are three of these Boards,
each with a geographical jurisdiction. The eastern Board
is administered by the Army, the central by the Air Force,
20
and the western »y the Navy. This means, of course, that
a loyalty-security case initiated by one of the military de-
partments may go before a Board administered by an-
other of the departments.
When a case reaches a Board, it goes first before a
Screening Division of three members. * If the three mem-
bers unanimously favor clearance, it is granted and that
is the end of the case. If they do not, a notice of denial
of clearance, and of the reasons therefor, are forwarded to
the employee. This notice parallels the “statement of
charges” used in the “Employees’ Security Program”.
The employee may file an answer and, if not then cleared
by unanimous vote of the Screening Division, may appeal
to the Appeals Division of the Board. At this point he
has the right to an administrative hearing, of the sort usual
in the loyalty-security programs. These hearings are con-
ducted like those under the “Employees’ Security Pro-
gram” and the same criteria are used as are used by the
military departments under that program (App. 53).
There is no provision for any appeal from the decision of
the Appeals Division. Apparently, however, the Secre-
tary of the department concerned can intervene if he
sees fit (App. 53).
A second major respect in which this program differs
from that for government employees is that denial of se-
curity clearance need not mean dismissal for the em-
ployee, if the employer is willing, or can be induced by
the union, to transfer the employee to work not requiring
security clearance. It has been the experience of CIO
unions, however, that employers lean to automatic dis-
missal.
This program, and the “Port Security Program” dis-
cussed infra pp. 25-27, may present a-different constitu-
tional issue than do the loyalty-security programs for gov-
ernment employees. Up at least until this Court’s decision
in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 the government
21
defended the constitutionality of the loyalty programs for
federal employees upon the “facile generalization that
there is no constitutionally protected right to public em-
ployment” (344 U. S. at 191). It is not perceived how
this generalization was ever thought to apply, however, to
employment in private industry.
D. Proposed Extensions of Loyalty-Security Programs to Other
Industrial Facilities
As stated supra p. 17, the loyalty-security program
operated by the military departments for certain em-
ployees of defense contractors—viz., those having access
to classified information—does not rest on statutory au-
thority, but on contract.
The McCarthy Investigations Subcommittee (of the
Senate Government Operations Committee) in its final
Report, just released, calls on the Defense Department to
use its contracting authority to extend its lovalty-security
program to all employees of government contractors do-
ing defense work, whether or not the particular employees
have access to classified information (DAILY LABOR
REPORT, January 10, 1955, p. A-6).
This same Report likewise calls for the enactment of
the “Defense Facilities Protection Act” which passed the
Senate last year during the final week of the regular ses-
sion (100 Cony. Rec. 14118), but did not come to a vote
in the House. This bill (S. 3428, H. J. Res. 527, 83rd Con-
gress, 2nd Session), drafted by Attorney General Brownell,
authorizes the President to
“institute such measures and issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to bar from access
to any defense facility or facilities individuals as to
whom there is reasonable ground to believe they
may engage in sabotage, espionage, or other subver-
sive acts”.
It further provides that any individual barred from access
shall be notified in writing of the charges against him, and
22
be given “an adequate opportunity to defend himself * * *
including. if he so requests, a hearing * * *”. But the bill
further provides that
“Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to
require any investigatory organization of the United
States Government to disclose its informants or other
information which in its judgment wou! | endanger
its investigatory activity: Provided, hot ver, That
in the event that such information is um — disclosed
the individual charged shal! be furnished with a fair
summary of the information in support of the charges
against him.”
Thus, this loyalty-security program, too, lil.e those al-
ready in operation, would rely on secret witne ses, whose
identity woulc .emain unknown either to the accused or
to his judges. Senator Ferguson, who introd1 ed the bill,
made that perfectly clear to the Senate. He said (100
Cong. Rec. 14116) :
“However, no hearings under the act will require
that any Government investigative organization dis-
close its informants or other information if in its judg-
ment disclosure would endanger its investigatory ac-
tivity.
“Mr. President, that is not an unusual provision.
lf it were necessary to give the names of informants
or agents of the United States Government, and if
the disclosure of those names or that information
would endanger our investigatory activities in this
field, naturally they would not have to be given. But
the law does require that charges be specific enough
to enable a defense to be made, despite the provision
for protection of security information. In other words,
if the Government does not wish to give the names
or information which would lead to disclosure of the
names, it must nevertheless give information specific
enough so that the accused may be given an oppor-
tunity to answer. It would appear, on the basis of
recent decisions involving the Magnuson Act, which
23 |
was taken to the upper court, that this would meet
the requirements of due process.
“TI cite the cases of United States v. Gray (207 F.
(2d) 237, 241-242 (C.A. 9th, 1953)) ; Parker v. Lester
(112 F. Supp. 433, 443-444 (N. D. Calif. 1953));
see also United States v. Nugent (346 U.S. 1), involv-
ing hearing procedures under the Selective Service
Act.”
To the same effect, see the Senate Committee Report (Re-
port No. 1818), pp. 3-4.
The bill defines the term “defense facility” as having
the same meaning as in Title I of the Internal Security
Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. § 781 ff., except that
it is not to include vessels, piers, or waterfront facilities.
Under the Internal Security Act of 1950 a “defense facil-
ity” is any facility designated as such under that Act by
the Secretary of Defense (50 U.S.C. § 784 (6)), and he
is authorized to so designate (50 U.S.C. § 782 (7)):
“any plant, factory or other manufacturing, produc-
ing or service establishment, airport, airport facility,
* * * mine ,railroad, public utility, laboratory, station,
or other establishment or facility, or any part, division
or department of any of the foregoing.”
Thus, the Defense Facilities Protection Act will, if it
becomes law, authorize the application of a loyalty-security
program to the great bulk of the nation’s workers. And it
will be a program of the type that is already so familiar:
a derogatory adjudication upon the basis of a police file
by judges who are not themselves trusted to know the
names of the police informers.
E. Atomic Energy Commission
The Atomic Energy Commission operates a loyalty-
security program applicable to, probably, several hundred
thousand persons.® Some of these are employees of the
®Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty and Science (Cornell, 1950), p. 82,
states:
24
Commission itself, but most of them are employees of pri-
vate companies who are constructing or operating insialla-
tions under contract with the Commission. The same
loyalty-security program applies to Comi.:‘ssion personnel
and to that of its contractors.
The AEC loyalty-security program rests on direct statu-
tory authority (App. 53). The program is described in
the Fund study (App. 53-58), and in more detail in Ge’ -
horn, Security, Loyalty and Science (Cornell, 1950).
The AFC program differs from the “Employees’ Secur-
ity Program” in the following respects :
(1) The “standard” is phrased in terms of the danger
to the common defense or security. It provides that the
determination shall be one “which balances the cost to the
program of not having his services against any possible
risks involved.” (Gellhorn, p. 86.)
(2) Since 1950 applicants as well as incumbents have
been granted hearings under the program, in contrast with
the normal practice as to government personnel (App. 57).
(3) The employee is given the right to challenge for
cause the members of the Personnel Security Board which
is to hear his case (App. 58).
(4) While only one hearing is provided, there are rather
more layers of appeal. Thus the findings and statement
of reasons of the Personnel Security Board are submitted
to the Manager. The Manager then makes a determina-
tion and findings, which are given to the employee. The
employee may then appeal to the Personnel Security Re-
view Board, and submit briefs. That Board reviews the
case and makes a recommendation to the General Man-
“T'rom January 1, 1947, to April 30, 1949, a total of 141,469
individuals were evaluated by the Atomic Energy Commission.
During 1949 there arose a total of 37,561 new personne! clear-
ance cases, and this number may sharply increase as new instal-
lations come into being.”
We do not have any more recent data on the numbers of persons
covered by this program.
25
ager. The decision of the General Manager is normally
final, but the Commission itself sometimes considers im-
poricnt cases, such as that of Dr. Oppenheimer. It may
be questioned whether this multiplicity of paper appeals
is of any real benefit to the employee.
F. The “Port Security Program”
The Port Security Program is a loyalty-security pro-
gram applicable to merchant seamen and shoreside per-
sonnel with access to waterfront facilities.” it is operated
by the Coast Guard, with the cooperation and the par-
ticipation of the maritime labor unions (CIO-AFL) and
management. (Certain other unions, expelled from the
CIO in 1949 as Communist-dominated, do not participate
in the administration of the program or cooperate with
it.) The Fund study estimates that this program af-
fects more than half a million people (App. 58-59).
The present program is based on a statute enacted in
1950 after the outbreak of the Korean War (App. 59).
This statutory program superseded a voluntary plan in-
stituted by maritime labor (CIO-AFL) and management
through the Department of Labor, and the Coast Guard
(App. 59).
Every merchant seaman on deep sea ships is required
by stz'uie to have a federal certificate or license. Under
the Port Security Program seamen who receive clearance
are issued a new certificate or license, known as a val-
idated document.
Clearance is denied if the presence of the worker “‘aboard
vessels of the United States would be inimical to the se-
curity of the United States”. The criteria (App. 59-61)
are essentially the same as those of Executive Order 9835.
Since the program applies to all employment on ships
1° No distinction is made between “applicants” and “employees.”
In view of the sporadic nature of these types of employment, such
a distinction would hardly be possible.
26
carrying the United States flag, a deniui of clearance means
that the worker is completely forbidden to work at his
normal trade or calling. He does not have even the theo-
retical option of working at his trade in some private em-
ployment not covered by the program. And, his reputa-
tion destroyed by the denial of clearance, the possibilities
of employment in another trade become more and more
illusory. :
In addition, the program applies to persons seeking ac-
cess to designated waterfront facilities, which now includes
all major port areas. Longshoremen and other workers
covered by this part of the program, who do not have sea-
men’s papers, are issued a “Port Security Card”.
The initial determination of whether to grant clearance
is made by a Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office, upon
the basis of the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) files. If clearance is denied, the worker is notified
in writing and may then have recourse to the hearing pro-
cedures provided in the program.
As the result of union cooperation in the administration
of this program, its procedures are substantially less unfair
to the workers covered by it than are the procedures of any
of the other loyalty-security programs. Thus:
(1) The initial hearing is before an Appeal Board,
which is convened at one of the ports. The Board, unlike
any of the other heaving boards, is tripartite in its com-
position. The chairman represents the Coast Guard, while
one member is from management and one from labor. The
management and labor representatives are chosen from
panels supplied by the Secretary of Labor, and the labor
member is normally from the same union as the worker
(App. 62).
(2) The worker is informed in advance who the mem-
bers of the Board will be, and what their business or union
affiliations are. He may challenge any member of the
Board for cause, and in addition he is given two peremp-
27
tory challenges, one as to the management representa-
tive and one as to labor. Further the worker may decide
whether the replacement for the challenged member will
be from management or labor, as appropriate, or from
the public members of the panel (App. 62).
(3) The worker is supplied, in advance of the hearing,
with a bill of particulars (App. 62).
(4) The worker may decide if the hearings are to be
open or closed (App. 62). (Closed hearings are the rule
under the other programs.)
(5) On the hearing record, and on the FBI and ONI
files (undisclosed to the worker), the Board makes a
recommendation, together with a statement of reasons,
to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. If the Com-
mandant’s decision is adverse, the worker may appeal to,
and have a hearing before, the “National Appeal Board”
which sits in Washington. This Board also is tripartite,
and the worker has the same rights before it as before the
Appeal Board, including the same right to challenge.
(6) The National Appeal Board also sends its recom-
mendation, -together with its reasons, to the Command-
ant of the Coast Guard, who nominally still makes the
final decision. In actual practice, however, the Com-
inandant accepts the decision of the National Appeal
Board.
G. International Organizations Employees Loyalty Program
Late in 1952 the Administration decided to apply the
Federal Employees Loyalty Program to all United States
citizens employed by, or being considered for employ-
ment by, public international organizations of which the
United States was a member. To this end, President Tru-
man, on January 9, 1953, issued Executive Order 10422
making the provisions, procedures and standards of Ex-
ecutive Order 9835 applicable in these cases.
The International Organizations Employees Loyalty
Program created by Executive Order 10422 applies to
28
United States citizens employed in or being considered
for employment in sixty-six (66) international organiza-
tions in which the United States participates." These
range all the way from such well-known international
agencies as the United Nations, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Mon-
etary Fund, the World Health Organization, the Inter-
national Labor Organization and the United Nations Ed-
ucational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations, to such
relatively unknown organizations as the Inter-Parliamen-
tary Union For The Promotion of International Arbitra-
tion, the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, the In-
ternational Whaling Commission and the International
Commission of the Cape Spartel Light.
As of December 10, 1954, 3,939 employees and persons
seeking employment with over 40 international organiza-
tions had been processed under this program and there
were 158 cases pending.’* ‘These proceedings were con-
ducted by the International Organizations Employees Loy-
alty Board, which carried on investigations and held hear-
ings not only in the United States but also in Rome and
in Paris. The Board also scheduled hearings in Geneva,
but they were called off when the Swiss Government re-
fused the members of the Board permission to enter Swit-
zerland.
Executive Order 10422 was modeled on Executive Or-
der 9835. After Executive Order 9835 had been super-
seded by Executive Order 10450, Executive Order 10459,
instituting the present international organization em-
ployees loyalty program, was issued on June 4, 1953. It
provides that there shall be an International Organizations
11 Publication 3655 of Department of State, released February
1950.
12 Resignation letter of Pierce J. Gerety, Chairman of the Inter-
national Organizations Employees Loyalty Board, dated Decembe:
10, 1954, and released on December 17, 1954, by the U. S. Civil
Service Commission,
29
Employees Loyalty Board of not less than three impartial
persons. The Board is charged with the responsibility of
inquiring into the loyalty to the Government of the United
States of United States citizens employed, or considered
for employment, by international organizations of which
the United States is a member, and of making advisory
determinations in such cases for transmission by the Sec-
retary of State to the executive heads of the international
organizations. The Board is directed to supply a written
statement of the alleged derogatory information to the
individuals concerned, to provide the individuals with an
opportunity to answer or comment upon the statement
of alleged derogatory information, to afford opportunity
for hearing before the Board or a panel thereof, and to
make its determinations upon all the evidence.
Executive Order 10459 provides that the employee is
only to receive notice of such derogatory information “as
security considerations permit,” that the employee is given
the right to cross-examine only those “witnesses offered
in support of the derogatory information”, that the Board
is to base its decision upon all the evidence “including
such confidential information” as the Board may have in
its possession, and that the Board is to conduct its hear-
ing in such a manner “as to protect from disclosure in-
formation affecting the national security.”
The invest’ -ation of all American applicants created
“a serious bottleneck in the recruitment of United States
citizens by international organizations, particularly in the
technical and professional fields.” The international agen-
cies turned to non-Americans since Americans were not
immediately available for employment because of time-
consuming investigations, and “delay in security clear-
ances was sometimes unfairly misunderstood as a reflec-
tion upon the individual concerned.” **
13 Resignation letter of Pierce |. Gerety, Chairman of the Inter-
national Organizations Employees Loyalty Board, dated December
30
II—STATE AND LOCAL ACTION
The past half dozen years have seen state and local gov-
ernments following in the footsteps of, and at times even
outdoing, the Federal Government in their loyalty-security
programs. Many States and municipalities have adopted
an all-embracing concept of security and have applied
their loyalty-security programs to individuals whose work
is even more remote from the national security than that
of appellant in the case at bar.
The loyalty-security prairie fire which the Federal Gov-
ernment sparked has caught on in different communities
in different ways. Whatever the method followed, it is to-
day very difficult to find a State which still requires no
more than the traditional oath of allegiance to the Federal
and State Constitutions, and which does not, in some
form and to some degree, inquire into the past and present
affiliations of present and would-be jobholders. Such loy-
alty-security inquirics fall into three broad categories:
1. Programs analogous to that applied to federal em-
ployees under Executive Order 9835 and its successor, E-x-
ecutive Order 10450.
2. Public employees’ loyalty oaths without specific pro-
grams of implementation.
3. Loyalty-security inquiries as an adjunct to state
licensing and taxing power.
1. State and Local Programs Analogous to that Applied to
Federal Employees '*
Among the States and cities with loyalty-security stat-
utes which may be considered as spiritual relatives of the
10, 1954, and released on December 17, 1954, by the U. S. Civil
Service Commission.
1# Much of the following material has been adapted from a manu-
script, thus far unpublished, written by Professor Ralph S. Brown,
Tr., of the Yale Law School.
31
Federal program are the following: California, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsy]-
vania and Texas; Baltimore and New York City.
The Ober Law in Maryland (Flack’s Annotated Code of
Maryland (1951) Art. 85 A), the oath provision of which
was interpreted and upheld by this Court in Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56,”° set the pattern sub-
sequently followed by many other States. Under the Ober
Law, ail of the many state agencies are required to screen
all applicants for state jobs to determine whether they are
subversive; incumbents are to be similarly screened and
‘are to be discharged wherever “reasonable grounds” exist
for belief that they are subversive; an Assistant Attorney
General is provided to enforce the Act; and private ed-
ucational institutions which receive state aid must set up
similar machinery for discovering subversives and dis-
charging them from their staffs.
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington have all
adopted the basic provisions of the Ober Law, establish-
ing procedures for screening applicants and employees,
and for discharging and denying employment to individ-
13In this per curiam decision, the onlv issue before the Court
was the denial to appellant of a place on the ballot for a municipal
election on the ground of her refusal to file the loyalty affidavit re-
quired by the Ober law. The Court held that the affidavit require-
ment would be fulfilled by an oath that the affiant is not a person
who is engaged “in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow
the government by force or violence” (Emphasis is the Court’s). As
so interpreted, the Court held the requirement lawful. The Court
did not have before it in the Gerende case, nor also in Garner v.
Board of Public Workers of Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716, any issue
involving secret informers, non-ccnfrontation, or any other aspect of
due process in arriving at administrative determinations of loyalty
or security.
32
uals as to whom there are “reasonable grounds” to believe
them subversive.”®
Under the California statute (Deering’s Calif. Code
(1953 Pocket Supp.), Government T. 1, par. 1028) all
public employees are liable to dismissal for refusal to an-
swer questions about past as well as present subversive
affiliations. The investigating responsibility rests with
the employing agency, but the administrative procedures
are not spelled out in the law.
New York adopted the first out-and-out state “security
risk” statute (65 McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New
York, §§ 1101-1108 (1954 Cum. Supp.)). This law is
administered by the State Civil Service Commission, which
has the authority to transfer, suspend, or discharge em-
nloyees in sensitive positions, and which is authorized to
make use of the list of subversive organizations issued by
the Attorney General of the United States. In addition,
New York has the Feinberg Law (N. Y. Laws 1949, C.
360) upheld by this Court in Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485, which authorizes the Board of Regents to use
the Attorney General’s List in determining the loyalty of
New York teachers and which makes a teachers’ member-
ship in a listed organization a presumption of disloyalty."
Connecticut provides that “. .. membership in subver-
sive organizations as defined by the United States Depart-
ment of Justice shall constitute cause for dismissal unless
16 Florida Statutes Anno. Ch. 876; Georgia Code Anno. Ch. 89, ss.
311-316; Louisiana Revised Siatutes, Ch. 14, ss. 358-365; Missis-
sippi Code Anno. ss. 4064-01 2t seq.; New Hampshire Laws, ch.
180 (1953); Anderson’s Ohio Revised Code, ss. 143-272; Purdon’s
Pennsylvania Stats. Anno. T. 65, Ch. 11; Washington Revised Code,
Ch. 9.81.
The Adler case is readily distinguishable from the case at bar
in that full hearings were to be accorded both the organizations
listed and the individuals charged. No issue was presented to the
Court of secret informers or non-confrontation and for all that ap-
peared to the Court in that case, the full hearing required by statute
barred secret informers and provided for confrontation.
33
promptly disavowed by the employee.” (Rule 17, Rules
and Regulations and Related Statutes for State Classified
Service). As in the case of California, the administrative
procedures are not spelled out.
Indiana declares its public policy to be “to exterminate
Communism and Communists and any and all teachings
of the same” (Burns Indiana Statutes 10-5202), but gives
no indication as to how this policy is to be effectuated.
Employees and applicants for employment with the
District of Columbia Government are subjected to loyalty-
security investigations and procedures which, in their es-
sentials, are similar to those applicable to federal em-
ployees, although these procedures are not embodied in
any formal document or order.’* No doubt other jurisdic-
tions have, by informal action, similarly put into effect
loyalty-security programs analogous to the federal pro-
gram.
Among the cities, in 1948 the School Board of Balti-
more adopted a Resolution applying to school employees
a loyalty program modeled after Executive Order 9835
(“State Government,” February, 1954—publication cf
Council of State Governments). And in New York City
the Mayor has authorized the Commissioner of Investi-
gations to conduct a security clearance of all city em-
ployees (New York Times, March 26, 1954).
2. Public Employees’ Loyalty Oaths
Among the States, territories and cities which now re-
quire their employees to swear that they are not sub-
versives or members of subversive organizations are the fol-
lowing: Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
18 Affidavit in support of Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in
United States v. Marcus Singer, Criminal No. 1150-54, United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.
34
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, Alaska, Hawaii, Annapolis
(Maryland), Detroit (Michigan), Los Angeles (Cali-
fornia), and Wyandotte (Michigan). While there is no
specific means provided for policing many of these oaths,
there are nonetheless three effective penalties available:
denial of employment to any person who, for whatever
reason, refused to take such an oath; dismissal if admin-
istrative procedures indicate doubts as to the underlying
facts; and a perjury indictment if any employee wilfully
falsified his oath.
The language of these oaths varies. Some, like Texas
and Detroit, make specific reference to the list of sub-
versive organizations put out by the Attorney General of
the United States. Some, as in Texas and California,
make reference to past as well as present afhliations. Sev-
eral, such as Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, Oregon and West Virginia, are patterned after the
oath required of Civil Defense Workers by the Federal
Government.”
Education has become the special beneficiary of loyalty
oath requirements. Thus, in Rhode Island, a special oath
is required of teachers, part of which states that:
“T affirm, in recognition of my official obligation,
that though as a citizen I have the right of personal
opinion, as a teacher of the public’s children I have
no right, either in school hours, or in the presence
of my pupils out of school hours, to express opinions
19 The pertinent part of this oath is as follows: “.... And I do
further swear (affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member
or an affiliate of any organization, group, or combination of persons
that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States
by force or violence; and that during such time that I am a member
of the (name of civil defense organization), I will not advocate nor
become a member or an affiliate of any organization, group, or com-
bination of persons that advocates the ov throw of the Government
of the United States (or of this state) by force or violence. 50 USCA
App. 2255(b).
35
that conflict with honor to country, loyalty to Ameri-
can ideals and obedience to and respect for the laws
of Nation and State” (Page 11, Teachers’ Oaths and
Related State Requirements, publication of National
Education Association, June, 1949).
Georgia, in prescribing its loyalty oath, forbids its teach-
ers from “teaching any theory of government or economics
or of social relations which is inconsistent with the funda-
mental principles of patriotism and high ideals of Amer-
icanism.” (Page 10, Teachers’ Oath and Related State
Requirements). As we have pointed out in the previous
section, it is Indiana’s public policy to exterminate all
teaching of Communism.
The State of Alabama has adopted a law which forbids
the use by any state school of any textbook :
“which does not contain a statement by the pub-
lisher or author thereof indicating clearly and with
particularity that the author of the book or other writ-
ing and the author of any book or writings cited
therein as parallel or additional reading, is or is not a
known advocate of communism or Marxist socialism,
is Or is not a member or ex-member of the Communist
Party, and is or is not a member or ex-member of a
Communist-front organization as designated by the
U. S. Congress or any Committee thereof or the At-
torney General of the United States” (Code of Ala-
bama, T. 52, s. 433 (6a)).
A similar law is in effect in Texas (Vernon’s Anno. Stat-
utes, Art. 6252, s. 7).
Apparently without the benefit of a specific law, the
Town of Shaftsbury, Vermont, has seen fit to ban books
from its school library in cases where writers have been
listed by the Attorney General of the United States as be-
longing to subve.sive organizations. (New York Times
November 14th, 1953).
What has been the effect of these public employees’ and
teachers’ oath requirements? In Pennsylvania employees
of unguestioned loyalty who refused to take the oath
36
solely as a matter of conscience have been discharged from
publicemployment. (Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania
Loyalty Act, 101 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
480 (1953).)
In California over 60 members of the faculty of the
University of California either resigned or were dismissed
because of refusal to take a loyalty oath, despite the fact
that there was no evidence that any of this group were
Communists. (Committee on Academic Freedom, North-
ern Section of University of Calif., Report of February 1,
1951.)
The National Education Association’s Chairman of its
Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom quotes
President (then General) Eisenhower as saying: “Ignor-
ance of Communism, Fascism or any cther police state
philosophy is far more dangerous than ignorance of the
most virulent disease. Who can doubt the choice of future
Americans between statism and freedom if the truth con-
cerning each be held before their eyes?”, but questions
whether any teacher would dare discuss such controversial
issues at the risk of being called disloyal and dismissed
from his position. (Foreword to Teachers’ Oaths and Re-
lated State Requirements).
3. Loyalty Inquiries as an Adjunct to State Licensing and
Taxing Powers
The “logic” which has dictated the federal loyalty-se-
curity programs and which has been followed with respect
to state and local public employees, has been applied as
well to employment dependent on licensing by the State
—-as consistency would seem to require. Examples of such
government-imposed restrictions are the following:
In the Federal Government, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission indicated its plan to require non-Com-
munist affidavits from every applicant for a commercial or
amateur radio license. (New York Times, June 13, 1954.)
In Indiana professional boxers and wrestlers are re-
37
quired by the State Athletic Association to take a non-
Communist oath. (New York Times, Oct. 22, 1954.)
In New York, the State Commerce Department refuses
to list in its directory of summer camps any camp whose
owner will not swear that his camp does not advocate sub-
versive activities nor employ anyone wio is a member
of an organization on the lis: of subversive organizations
put out by the Attorney General of the United States or
by the Board of Regents of the State of New York (New
York Times, Aug. 27, 1954).
In California, churches must take a loyalty oath if
their property is to remain tax exempt. (New York
Times, April 11th, 1954).
Texas has a loyalty oath for pharmacists (Vernon's
Anno. Statutes, Art. 4542 a., s. 9).
The District of Columbia has held up licenses to a piano
dealer and a liquor salesman on the basis of allegations
relating to their loyalty (Washington Daily News, De-
cember 8 and 9, 1954).
A detailed study of the various loyalty tests for iawyers
(Brown and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the
Bar, 20 University of Chicago Law Review, 480 (1953) )
reveals that Alaska, Colorado, Kentucky, Oklahoma and
Washington have all prescribed loyalty oaths as pre-requi-
sites to admission to the bar. Indeed, in Alaska, Colorado
and Kentucky the applicant must say that he not only is
not, but also that he never has been, an advocate of over-
throw of the Government bv force or violence. Several
additional States have loyalty questions in application
forms which must be filled out to demonstrate that the
potential attorneys are of good moral character. An ex-
treme example is Hawaii, where applicants are asked:
“If you were to be listed as a ‘Communist’ in the
records of any federal investigative agency, what past
actions or organizational afhliations of yours not al-
ready listed by you might be used by such investiga-
38
tive ageucy to support its conclusions? In answering
this question, assume that all of your past actions
and organizational affiliations are known to such in-
vestigative agency.”
Nor has the medical profession been altogether immune
from loyalty inauiries. In New York two doctors who
had been convicted of contempt for failure to produce the
books of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee to
Congressional Committees, were suspended by the Board
of Regents from the right to practice medicine. See Bar-
sky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442.
An example of what has been happening in local com-
munities is the requirement of the Harrison, New York,
Board of Education that oificers of any community or-
ganization wishing to use school facilities, as well as any
guest speakers appearing in the school, must take a loyalty
oath. (New York Times, August 30th, 1953.)
What began as a federal employees’ loyalty program has
thus found its way into all types of employment through-
out the land, and continues to spread day by day to areas
even more remote from security considerations than is
told in the case at bar. We call the Court’s attention in
this connection to the opinion of the Pennsylvania Com-
mon Pleas Court in Fitzgerald v. City of Philadelphia
No. 6212, September Term, 1952. Speaking for the Court,
Judge Bok upheld the Pennsylvania Loyalty Oath statute,
but made it clear that he was doing so reluctantly and
only because the Supreme Court of the United States had
upheld similar statutes. In the words of Judge Bok:
“The loyalty or disloyalty of a ditchdigger or leaf
raker would be so irrelevant to the safety of the state
as to render the entire loyalty system not vuly absurd
but oppressive... America was built on dissent and
provocation and her answer to Communism lies in the
effort of her citizens to achieve her moral purpose.”
(New York Times, May 5, 1953).
39
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the ‘rief for Petitioners and in
the briefs amici curiae, it is submitted that the decision of
the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
ArTHUR J. GoLpBERG
General Counsel
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
Tuomas E. Harris
Associate General Counsel
718 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
Josern L. Raun, Jr.
Washington Counsel, UAW-CIO
1631 K Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
January 1955
APPENDIX
PRELIMINARY STUDY
(Revised)
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A Description of Statutes, Executive Orders, and Reguiations
by
Sandra Weinstein, LL.B.
under the direction of
Professor Ralph S. Brown, Jr.
Yale Law School
Copyright, 1954,
by
The Fund for the Repubiic, Inc.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. CIVILIAN AGENCIES... Te TT
Public Law 733 and Executive Order 10450... ae
Criteria of Executive Order 10450... is 2
The Attorney General’s List of Subversive
EET AEDT RS iiseaalaeaie 9
Comment on the Criteria... PMS eS
Relation to Suitability Procedures... a
Investigations—Pre- and Post-Appointment AAP ase 13
Investigations—National Agency Checks... .................._ 14
Full Field Investigations................ . BD
Security Office Evaluation of Investigative Reports. 17
Suspension .. as tt SERS
Disposition Without Hearing... PRAM ES
Charges Preceding a Hearing. A Raa NSTRRUY NAS moe a
Hearing Boards ... ree eee
Conduct of the Hearing. SE iso VER I ALON eet 25
Sa I i —eseanjietinnaninpnitemmveniie 27
Eligibility for Reappointment... 2B
Criteria a DAISIES A
Categories of Sensitive Positions... pe . a
EE 33
Disposition of Applicants... _ 34
Evaluation of Reports—Army ....... 35
Evaluation—Air Force.............. 35
Evaluation—-Navy ............ 36
Disposition Without Hearing _ 37
Hearings; Boards. 37
Conduct of Hearings. _ 39
Decision, Review and Appeal 49
MILITARY PERSONNEL... 41
Criteria 41
Volunteers . 43
Conscripts _. 44
Types of Discharge: Retention in ‘Controlled Duties 45
Investigation and Evaluation ... &
Charges and Hearings 48
Decision and Review 48
VIL.
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS’ PERSONNEL
IEE REECE RA Ne ee Se ee Pe oA
RSIS Ta ARE SERS Te Pe a SCI inlet el
an ERR AOR AR Se Pec RE
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION...
aA ea Sale, SEAT AS AR PT MO GRE
THE PORT SECURITY PROGRAM...
Criteria ... Cts OCIS Lidl cP ARAN aS a eS
CIVIL SERVICE SEPARATION PROCEDURES IN
NON-SECURITY CASES...
Removal for Cause...
Veterans’ Preference . AER
Fair Employment, Hatch Act. .
Reduction in Force. __
Departmental Appeals.
Summary Comparison of ‘Security and Other
Procedures .
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
SELECTED REFERENCES
Statutes .
Executive Orders
Hearings |
Civilian Employees Security Regulations
Security Regulations—Military Personnel
Other Regulations
Other Forms
+)
The United States government operates five distinct security
programs.' They represent decisions that government em-
ployment, military service, defense production, atomic energy
development, and shipping are vital security areas and that
the employment of certain defined security risks in these fields
must be barred. What follows is a description of those pro-
prams. It indicates the authority and standards under which
they operate, the steps in the procedure and the chief similari-
ties and differences to be found.
I. CIVILIAN AGENCIES
In the last years of the Truman administration, the majority
of government employees were subject to both a loyalty and a
security program. The loyalty program was established by
Presidential Executive Order 9835, March 21, 1947, based on
his powers under the Civil Service Act and section 9a of the
Hatch Act. This section makes it unlawful for any person
employed by the Federal government and drawing compensa-
tion under an Act of Congress to be a member of any political
party or organization advocating the overthrow of the gov-
ernment by force or violence.? All employees of the execu-
tive branch were covered by this Order. The Security pro-
gram derived its existence from Public Law 733, passed in
1950. This Act, which replaced World War II legislation
applicable only to the military departments, permitted the
1The government may also require a loyalty oath as a prerequisite
to certain grants. Fellowships awarded by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission are made subject to investigation even though the area of re-
search is not classified. Recipients of National Science Foundation fel-
lowships must execute a loyalty oath.
The program for investigation and clearance of the employees of the
United Nations and its specialized agencies is beyond the scope of this
memorandum. The United States governmerit, by Executive Order
10422, Jan. 1953, as amended FE. O. 10459, June 1953 established an
International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board in the Civil
Service. This is»ard transmits recommendations as to the employe. ;’
loyalty to the Secretary-General.
“A standard rider of every Appropriation Act since 1941 has been a
prohibition of the use of money appropriated by the Act t pay persons
who advocated or belonged to organizations that ad. ocated the over-
throw of the Government by force or viclence. It is a felony for any
such person to accept wages or salaries paid under the Act
6
heads of certain designated agencies? to suspend summarily
and to dismiss employees when national security warranted
the action.
In 1951, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Secu-
rity and the Civil Service Commission surveyed these programs
at the President’s request. They reported in 1952 that a gov-
ernment employee might be separated involuntarily under
three standards, loyalty, security, and suitability. In practice,
it was difficult to separate the three; some departments were
already administering combined loyalty-security programs. A
recommendation was made to create an integrated procedure
covering all dismissal for cause. In view of the election results,
nothing further was done.
Public Law 733 and Executive Order 10450
A new security program was promised in President Eisen-
hower’s first State of the Union Message and established in
Executive Order 10450, of April 27, 1953. The Order extended
the operation of Public Law 733 to all executive agencies and
departments. The Loyalty program was abolished, the Loy-
alty Review Board given 120 days to finish its work. The head
of each agency and department was made responsible for his
unit’s program; central review was discarded. The Civil Serv-
ice Commission is a record keeper and a surveyor, but is ac-
corded no control.
The Order set out investigative requirements for govern-
ment employees. It established a new set of criteria by which
the results of such investigation were to be measured. These
criteria combine indicia of disloyalty, pressure risk, other se-
curity risks, and personality suitability problems. The stand-
ard to which these criteria were to be applied is that the em-
ployment of the individual must be clearly consistent with the
national security. National security is defined to include the
“military, economic and productive strength of the United
3‘The Depart:nents of State, Commerce, Justice, and Treasury (with
respect to the Coast Guard), The Defense Department and its com-
ronent parts (Army, Navy and Air Force) the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, the National Security Resources Board, and the National Ad-
visory Committee for Aeronautics. The Office of Defense Mob lization
absorbed the National Security Resources Board.
&
7
States.” The definition appears in the Regulations, not in the
Executive Order.
The procedural minimum is prescribed by Public Law 733.
The Executive Order was silent on this point. The Sample
Regulations recommended by the Department of Justice com-
bined the standards and investigative requirements of the
Order with an elaboration of the procedure required by Public
Law 733. The Act and the Executive Order are, of course,
binding on all agencies, but the sample regulations are tr. t.
They were, however, adopted, with some changes, by the
civilian agencies of the government.
Public Law 733 allows the head of the agency “in his abso-
lute discretion and when deemed necessary in the interest of
national security’ to suspend without pay any employee of
the agency. The employee must then be notified of the reasons
for his suspension, with whatever degree of specificity that
security, in the opinion of the agency head, permits. He may
show cause, in written statements and affidavits, why he should
not be removed from his position. Employees who are citi-
zens, with permanent or indefinite appointments past the trial
or probationary period‘ are given, within thirty days of sus-
pension, a statement of charges, a right to answer these
charges in writing, and a further right to request a hearing
by the agency.
Public Law 733 can, by its own terms, be extended to other
departments than the ones enumerated if the President deems
it necessary in the best interests of national security. Execu-
tive Order 16450 is based on this provision.
Every agency and department of the executive issued regu-
lations pursuant to the Executive Order. This section of the
memorandum reviews nine sets of regulations in addition to
4 These qualifications are obviously derived from Civil Service Acts
The citizen, past probation, in permanent or indefinite appointment may,
in a separation for cause, answer charges. The parallels will be de-
veloped in a subsequent section.
5 The legality of the extension has been questioned. Cvie v. Young,
125 F. Supp. 284 (D. C. 1954). The agencies listed in the Act were
for the most part highly sensitive. In the Cole case, it was held in
effect, that Executive Order 10450 is a finding that ail government em-
ployment is sensitive. The President, when he extends the act to new
agencies, is required to report to the Committee on the Armed Services
8
the Sample Regulations of the Justice Department. Six
civilian agencies have been sampled: the Post Office, the Vet-
erans Administration, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, and the Treasury, Justice and State Depart-
ments. The Post Office and the Veterans Administration ac-
count for 59 percent of federal employment outside the military
departments. The regulations of the three military depart-
ments will be studied separately; while similar to the civilian
agencies, they present unique problems and solutions. Almost
50 percent of all Federal civilian employees are in these three
departments.
Criteria of Executive Order 10450
The Executive Order established these criteria as indicative
of the existence of a security risk:
“1. Depending on the relation of the Government em-
ployment to the national security:
(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which
tend to show that the individual is not reliable or
trustworthy.
(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications,
or omissions of material facts.
(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or
notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of
intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual
perversion.
(iv) An adjudication of insanity, or treatment for
serious mental or neurological disorder without
satisfactory evidence of cure.
(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the
individual may be subjected to cvercion, influence,
or pressure which may cause him to act contrary
to the best interests of the national security.
“2. Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, trea-
son, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation there-
for, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to
commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espion-
age, treason, or sedition.
“3. Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association
with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or
revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or
representative of a foreign nation, or any representative
of a foreign natien whose interests may be inimical to the
interests of the United States, or with any person who ad-
9
vocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the gov-
ernment of the United States or the alteration of the form
of government of the United States by unconstitutional
means.
“4. Advocacy cf use of force or violence to overthrow
the government of the United States, or of the alteration
of the form of government of the United States by uncon-
stitutional means.
“5. Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic associa
tion with, any foreign or domestic organization, associa-
tion, movement, group, or combination of persons which
is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist or subversive, or which
has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approv-
ing the commission of acts of force or violence to deny
other persons their rights under the Constitution of the
United States, or which seeks to alter the form of govern-
ment of the United States by unconstitutional means.
“6. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of
security information, or of other information disclosure of
which is prohibited by Jaw, or willful violation or disre-
gard of security regulations.
“7. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or
otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another
government in preference to the interests of the United
States.” (Executive Order 10450, sec. 8.)
(1) (iv) was amended August 4, 1954, by Executive Order
10548 to read:
“Any illness, including any mental condition of a nature
which in the opinion of competent medical authority may
cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of
the employee, with due regard to the transient or continu-
ing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such
cases.”
An eightii criterion, refusal to testify before a Congressional
committee about alleged disloyalty or other misconduct, under
the protection of the fifth amendment, was added October 13,
1953, by Executive Order 10491.
Information raising security questions “shall relate but
shall not be limited” to, the criteria of the Executive Order.
The milita:y agencies in their regulations have considerably
elaborated upon these criteria, but the net effect is the same.
The Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations
The Executive Order does not define “totalitarian, Fascist,
Communist or subversive,”” nor does it refer to ai... other source
10
for definition. The agencies are not limited in these cases to
the Attorney General’s list. The Attorney General is to advise
on the program under the Order and the list has been con-
tinued under the new procedure. Nonetheless, the employing
agencies are free to make use of other lists or citations.®
The Attorney General’s list originated under Executive Or-
der 9835, which called for tiie Attorney General to designate
those organizations membership in which would be an indica-
tion of disloyalty. Tie Department relied on the data then in
its files and on any further investigation it thought necessary.
Organizations were not informed that they were being con-
sidered for listing and no hearings were given to allow inter-
ested parties to contest the designation. The list was divided
into those groups of Fascist, Totalitarian, Communist, and
Subversive organizations which advocate force and violence to
deny others their rights under the Constitution, and those
which seek to alter the government by unconstitutional means.
The criteria for listing were never made public. The list was
not limited to presently functioning associations.
In the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee case, 341 U. S.
123, the Supreme Court examined the listing procedure and
four Justices found it wanting in due process. The Department
of Justice has issued new rules on the composition of the list.
In an attempt to comply with the minimum prescribed by the
case, an organization is given a notice of proposed listing. The
organization may file a notice of contest of this proposal. If
it does, it is then sent a statement of grounds for the listing
and interrogatories to complete. No case has proceeded be-
yond this second notice stage thus far.”
* Under the old Loyalty program, mere affiliation with an organiza-
tion not on the Attorney General's list could not be considered. The
security programs were not bound by this limitation.
A frequent source of names of organizations for use in these cases
is the file of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Another
is the lists compiled by the California Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, the Tenney committee.
7'fhe Attorney General's list has both active and disbanded organ-
izations in it.
The Attorney General, when re-issuing the list for use in the Security
program, warned that membership in a group was only one factor that
should be considered in a case. 18 Federal Register 2741, May 12,
1953.
1l
Whether the employee is charged with being a member of a
group on the Attorney General’s list or of some other “sub-
versive”’’ organization he may as a matter of defense show he
was innocent of the nature of the group. He may attempt to
rehabilitate the organization, but his chance of success is small
if it is on the Attorney General’s list. He may, however,
attempt to show that the group had a different character when
he was a member.
Comment on the Criteria
Criteria (2) to (8) were in substance part of the previous
loyalty and security program. They include acts illegal in
themselves or indicative of a philosophy which, it is thought,
would encourage acts against the good of the nation. They
range from indications of imminent security risks to politica!
risks, to varying affiliations and associations with security
and the political risks, etc.
Of these criteria it is believed that the fifth has been most
frequently encountered in security hearings. Some of its terms
lack legal definition, though they may draw meaning from
administrative practice. The terms used: membership, affilia-
tion, sympathetic association—indicate that more than casual
or intermittent patronage is meant; but the extent of partici-
pation which is suspect is not to be determined from the word-
ing alone.
Paragraph (1) is the major change wrought by the Eisen-
hower program. It deals not with disloyal, traitorous or sub-
versive activity, but with various reasons why an otherwise
patriotic person may not be trusted ~ serve ‘*e nation. This
criterion includes the blabber-mouths, the drunkards, the crim-
inals—the unreliable. It also includes the individual who may
be subject to blackmail, through a close relative in enemy
hands, through hi- past or his habits.
There are few legal precedents for defining some of the com-
ponent parts of this category. Perversion, unreliability, etc.,
import a variable moral standard. It would be difficult to
have a uniform standard: excessive drinking to a teetotaller is
no. excessive t2 one who drinks. Subdivision (ii) (deliberate
12
misrepresentation) raises questions of materiality. Is this
section limited to misrepresentation o. facts otherwise relevant
to security? Or is it disqualifying if a woman employee falsi-
fies her date of birth? Subdivision (v) (pressure or coercion)
pertains partly to matters outside the control of the employee.
Does it make allowance for the ability of the individual to
resist external pressure? These and many other ambiguities
in the reliability criteria may be mitigated by the direction to
consider the position the employee holds, and the effect his
position could have on the national security. A drunken gar-
dener, unlike a drunken State Department executive, need not
be a security risk. All of the “loyalty” criteria, however, are
treated as grounds for dismissal, whatever the actual security
risk involved. Only when the facts raise no loyalty question
is a strict “security” standard applied—that is, one which bal-
ances the sensitivity of the employment against the gravity of
the charges.
Relation to Suitability Procedures
There is a recognized possibility that a security program
which includes factors going to suitability might become a way
to circumvent customary civil service procedures, especially
when the character of the proof of unsuitability is not so sub-
stantial as civil service practice might require. The military
departments warn, in the regulations covering civilian person-
nel and in the servicemen’s security programs, that these pro-
grams are not a substitute for other administrative methods.
The Sample Regulation lacks this provision, but a similar
warning is found in the regulations of most civilian agencies.
The warnings vary in emphasis, however. The Post Office
states that Civil Service procedures are to be used to the maxi-
mum; the Department of Health, Education and Welfare says
tnat cases remote from security will be processed normally
under routine procedure; the Treasury says that security regu-
lations are not to be used to the exclusion of normal proce-
dure; the Veterans Administration provides only that nothing
in the new regulations supersedes existing regulations. The
Justice Department regulations make no reference to this
problem.
13
Investigations: Pre- and Post-Appointment
An investigation is required for a!l new employees. In-
cumbents are investigated when “derogatory information,”
that is, information relating to the criteria, arises.*
The Executive Order divides all government positions into
sensitive and non-sensitive, and the extent of the initial inves-
tigation of an appointee is determined by the classification of
the position he is to fill. The Executive Order defines sensitive
as a position “the occupant of which could bring 7 out, by
virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect
on the national security.” The head of the department or
agency, or one to whom he delegates this authority, desig-
nates which jobs are sensitive. The Sample Regulations add
that such positions include those wherein there is access to
classified information and an opportunity to commit acts affect-
ing national security. The civilian agencies, other than the
Justice Department itself, include this addition in their defini-
tion. Indeed, the Treasury, which originally omitted it,
amended its regulations to conform. The addition adds noth-
ing which is not in the origina! definition but does iliustrate it.
The State Department has included all its employees in the
sensitive category except any excluded by the ’. !:ninistrator,
Bureau of Security and Insular Affairs.
The Executive Order says that the scope of investigation
will be determined by the degree of adverse effect the holder
of the position could have on the national security and pro-
ceeds to set as a minimum a national agency check and writ-
ten inquiries. In practice, initial .1vestigation seems to consist
either of this minimum, or to involve a full field investigation.
There is no middle ground.
Investigations for non-sensitive positions are usually made
after the employee enters on duty. The Civil Service Commis-
sion will make an investigation of all employees entering the
competitive classified service. The Commission will make the
investigation of non-competitive employees for an agency with-
*“Derogatory information” is a term developed under the old loyalty
program. The Executive Order does not employ it but the Sample
Regulations brought it back into the Security program.
14
out investigative facilities or for one with which it has an
agreement to that effect.®
Investigations—National Agency Checks
These investigations consist of a national agency check and
inquiry. The agency check is a search of Civil Service rec-
ords, reports of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and of the investigative records of the Armed Forces where
appropriate. Written inquiries are sent to law enforcement
agencies in areas where the employee has lived or worked, to
former employers and supervisors, to the references given,
and to the schools attended. The addresses are drawn from
the personal history statement which al’ government appli-
cants must complete. The Justice Department requires a full
field investigation even for its non-sensitive positions and the
State Department makes the same requirement for any posi-
tion it might designate as non-sensitive. Unlike the full field
investigations conducted for sensitive positions, these are made
after the employee enters on duty.
An applicant for Federal employment is required to complete
Form 57. He lists the places at which he has been employed
and the schools he has attended. He gives character refer-
ences. Further, he must report on any foreign travel and the
reasons for it. The applicant is asked about any arrests and
any discharge from a job for misconduct. He is further asked
if he is now or has ever been a member of a subversive organi-
zation and for exp!anat:un if the answer is affirmative. No list
of organizaticns is give.1 with the Form nor (until very re-
cently) was there any reference to the Attorney General’s list.
For sensitive positions, further forms are completed. These
will cover all past addresses, all schools, all groups of any
kind to which the applicant has belonged.
Under the authorization of the Executive Order, the Civil
Service Commission allows a lesser degree of investigation for
® The military departments, State, Justice, Treasury, Agriculture and
Post Office departments conduct their own field investigation.
15
per diem, temporary, or seasonal workers or for aliens em-
ployed outside the United States.’°
Should this agency check and the inquiry develop any de-
rogatory information, the Order requires a full field investi-
gation or any lesser investigation which can allow a determina-
tion to be made. For a non-sensitive employee in competitive
service or in an agency without investigative facilities, the
Commission will make further investigation, limited to cover-
ing by personal investigation the adverse information devel-
oped. Seriously derogatory material is referred to the FBI.
The Commission will furnish a report of the agency check,
the replies to written inquiries, and the report of any investi-
gations made to the officer designated to receive them in the
agency. If the written inquiries brought no response, the
Commission will make no further attempts to obtain this in-
forination. If the Commission did the initial investigation for
an agency which has its own facilities, the results of the na-
tional agency check ard the inquiries are given to the agency,
which may then develop any adverse report.
Full Field Investigations
If the position is sensitive, full field inquiry is normally made
before the employee enters office. The Civil Service Coramis-
sion will investigate competitive jobs unless the department
head assumes the responsibility by law or agreement. If the
position is not competitive, the employing agency investigates
if it has the facilities; if it does not, the Commission does it
on a reimbursable basis. If the employee has previously
worked for the government and been the subject of a full field
investigation, and if there has been no break in service over
a year, the employing agency will determine the extent of the
new investigation it desires.
In an emergency, so determined by the head of the depart-
ment, a sensitive position may be filled for a limited period by
10The Department of Health, Education and Welfare provides that
no temporary appointment which has been made without investigation
may be extended or renewed without the written approval of the Per-
sonne] Security Officer.
16
an employee on whom an investigation has not been conducted.
The State Department sets a limit of ninety days. A national
agency check may be made but this is not required. The in-
cumbent of any position at the time it is designated sensitive
may continue to hold it, pending completion favorably of in-
vestigation.
Executive Order 10450 requires that the file of anyone who
underwent a full field investigation under the previous loyalty
and security programs be reviewed and all cases readjudicated
under the present standard if the former standard was less
rigorous. Such a review may necessitate a new investigation.
If, in the course of any of these investigations, or by any
other method, there is developed information pertaining to
paragraphs (2) to (8) of the security criteria, or information
that the person has been subjected to pressure to commit dis-
loyal acts, the case is referred to the FBI for full field investi-
gation. The FBI does not take cases involving only suitability
factors. Further investigation of other kinds of derogatory
information will be conducted by the Commission for agencies
without facilities on a reimbursable basis."!
FBI files are checked in all investigations, agency or full-
field. They are likely to produce derogatory information
if any exists. The FBI scans the Worker and other pub-
licaticas it considers Communist or as having Communist
leanings. It files the names of those mentioned as speaker,
signer, or contributor in activities which it regards as Com-
munist or subversive. It receives information from its own
agents, from other law enforcement groups, from letters,
anonymous and otherwise. It files the hearings and re-
ports of the House Committee on Un-American activities.
All this, and much more, goes into the file.
The full field investigation, whether conducted by FBI,
Commission or military, is a comparatively complete study
of the person, within the practical limits of time and money.
11 Much legislation creating agencies dealing with foreign aid or with
national defense specifically required investigations to be made by
the FBI. The Justice Department was swamped and requested a
change in the law. Since 1952, the Civil Service Commission has con-
ducted most routine investigations and only derogatory information is
sent to the FBI for development.
17
In addition to the sources covered in agency and inquiries,
it may cover credit agencies, minor party affiliations, other
records. The investigator goes into the community and in-
terviews the references, friends, neighbors, business acquaint-
ances of the employee. They (the usual practice is to have
a two-man team) will inquire into his habits, his opinions, his
reputation. There is no precise definition of derogatory in-
formation at this stage. The investigating agency will collect
and report to the employing agency almost anything which
could reflect adversely on the employees, without comment or
evaluation. Such a report contains largely derogatory infor-
mation; the government is looking for danger spots. The FBI
makes a summary report; its raw files, which include informa-
tion on confidential advisors and methods of inquiry, are not
available to the employing agency.'? To protect an informant
it considers confidential, the FBI will conceal his name and
any data which might lead to his identification. It will eval-
uate his reliability to the extent of indicating whether he has
given information which has been shown correct to the FBI’s
satisfaction in the past.
There are many delays in the investigative process. An
FBI field check takes from four weeks up. A serious back-
log may develop. In the State Department, there were at
the end of 1953 over 5,500 cases waiting to be processed. Funds
have since been reallocated to add investigators.
Security Office Evaluation of Investigative Reports
Each department or agency has a security office, which
plays many roles in the clearance procedure. In most Cepart-
ments, the office is part of the administrative services; none-
theless, in its functioning, it tends to be almost autonomous.
The office is usually staffed by career employees, with person-
nel or investigative experience. The Department of Health,
Education and Welfare and the State Department have head-
12 Attorney General Brownell, in an interview, gave as reasons: the
jeopardy to security of disclosure of sources or of investigative tech-
niques, the harm to the innocent, the danger of educating the sub-
versive in ways of evasion, and the fear of drying up sources. Newsweek,
April 6, 1953, p. 24.
18
ing their security forces ex-members of the FBI, Mr. Schmidt
in Health and Mr. McLeod in the State Department.'*
The investigative reports go to the Security Office for pre-
liminary analysis. All such reports go for evaluation in the
Veterans Administration, the Post Office, Health and Justice
departments. The sample regulations were not clear on this
point; one section routed all reports to the Security office for
evaluation, another required this only for information under
criteria (2) to (8). The Treasury sends all full field reports
and any other investigations with unfavorable information
of any kind to the Security Office. Presumably, someone down
the line must decide what information is unfavorable; but this
initially is a mechanical determination. The State Depart-
ment routes all reports through the Security Office but sends
only those with derogatory information to the Administrator,
who is responsible for the actual evaluation and recommenda-
tion.
The standards to be used by the Personnel Security Offic> in
this evaluation are never discussed in the regulations. Presum-
ably they are similar to the standards prescribed for the de-
cision to suspend.
The civilian agencies make no further provision for the ap-
plicant about whom there is derogatory information; he is
not processed under the regulations. Presumably the Security
Office evaluation of an applicant is given to the employing of-
fice, with a recommendation. There is no requirement that
the applicant ever be informed why he was turned down. Non-
sensitive appointments are made subject to subsequent in-
vestigation; hence, the applicant will usually have become an
employee before the investigation is made. He is thus af-
forded the procedural rights granted to an employee in his
probational period. The applicant for a sensitive position will
in all likelihood still be an applicant when investigation is com-
pleted.
13 The security officer in the State Department, known as the Admin-
istrator, holds 1 peculiar position. The Bureau of Security and Consular
Affairs was created by Congress. Responsibility for personnel was later
added to this Bureau. The personnel office was recently removed from
the Bureau, but Mr. McLeod remains in control of security, of the Pass-
port Division and of other offices.
19
The State Department specifies that the Office of Security
may conduct or request further investigation, or may develop
the information in hand by interview or written interroga-
tories. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
has similar provisiéns for inquiry. The regulations of the
other agencies are silent on this point and the frequency of use
of these pre-hearing devices has not been ascertained. Po-
tentially, interview or interrogatory at this stage can do away
with a need for further processing of a simple case and save
both the government and the employee expense, effort and
embarrassment. Potentially, too, it can be a form of threat,
an indication to the employee that charges are forthcoming
and that quick resignation would be in order. The value of
the device depenus not on its intrinsic merits but on the atti-
tude of the department which utilizes it.
The Personnel Officer, under the Sample Regulations, for-
wards his evaluation and the file to whatever official the agency
head has delegated his authority under the Act to suspend
employees.
Suspension
The decision to suspend is the responsibility of a high ad-
ministrative officer, not a security official. It is a rare admin-
istrator who would have the time for complete review of all
files; the recommendation of the Personnel Security Officer
must carry great weight. The Post Office and the Treasury
departments ailow some scope for decision to be made formally,
as well as informally, by the Security office. The Post Office
regulations require the Personnel Security Officer to forward
the report and evaluation “if he deems suspension advisable”
which by negative inference means he may close the case if he
feels suspension unnecessary. This implication is further sup-
ported by a later section which specificaily says that in his
decision he is to be guided by the same standards which the
suspending authority uses.
The Treasury Department explicitly puts the power to order
suspension jointly in a Security Officer and a Legal! Officer, who
evaluate the reports. They decide what action, if any, shall be
taken. If they consider suspension or reassignment appropri-
20
ate, they notify the head of the bureau who must follow their
decision.’ If they wish, they may call the bureau chief into
consultation and abide by the majority decision.
In the Justice, Post Office and Treasury departments, sus-
pension is formally ordered by the heads of component bu-
reaus. The State and Health departments and the Veterans’
Administration restrict this power to the head of the agency.
If the officer decides it is not necessary to suspend the em-
ployee, a written determination to that effect must be placed
in the files.5 The Sample regulations state that if there are
“ameliorating circumstances” which are neither defined nor
illustrated, and if the Security Officer approves, the employee
may be transferred temporarily to a position where his pres-
ence would be consistent with national security. The regula-
tions of the Veterans Administration adopt this provision in
the words of the Sample. The Post Office, Justice and Health
departments have no equivalent sections. The State Depart-
ment includes, in a general warning against using the security
program to the exclusion of other procedures, a statement
that “interim action’? should be used to “the fullest possible
extent.” This could authorize temporary change of position
though there is no other mention of it. Since all positions in
State are considered sensitive, the practicability of such a
transfer can be doubted.
The Treasury treats reassignment as an interim measure
open to the Personnel Security Officer and the Legal Officer.
An employee who has been reassigned will then receive the
14The Treasury regulations state that one of four actions may be
taken, to
1. Retain the employee in his present position.
2. Suspend.
3. Transfer temporarily.
4. To find that continued employment is not clearly consistent
with national security.
The fourth item is not a true alternative. If it is found that con-
tinued employment is not clearly consistent with national security, a
further decision to suspend or transfer temporarily must be made. It
is possible that if this fourth item is found, further investigation will be
made before the second or third alternative is followed.
15 This requirement may put pressure on the official to suspend. He
may fear that he would be criticized if a future investigation should
unearth his failure to suspend.
In the Post Office, whatever the decision, the file is returned to the
custody of the Personne] Security Officer.
21
same notice which an employee of his status would receive if
suspended. He may answer in writing and in affidavits. If,
considering these documents, the Security Officer and the Legal
Officer agree that the case may be closed favorably to the em-
ployee, they make this recommendation to the Secretary. If
a favorable decision is not made, the Security Officer wil! order
the head of the bureau to suspend the employee. The case is
then treated like any other suspension case.
In deciding whether suspension is necessary in the inter-
ests of secur ty, the officer should consider, among other things,
the seriousness of the information received, the possible access
to classified materia! which the individual might have in his
position, and the opportunity to do harm which that position
affoi js. The regulations make no attempt to prescribe respec-
tive weight to these elements or to indicate what other con-
siderations might enter the decision.
Disposition Without Hearing
All employees do not have the same rights under Public
Law 733. The United States citizen, serving under a per-
manent or indefinite appointment and past the period of pro-
bation, is entitled to an agency hearing; other employees
are not.
The probational employee, the alien, the employee hired for
a limited period, will be given, within ‘‘a reasonable time”
after suspension, notice in writing of the suspension. Such
notice is generally given in the name of the administrative
officer having power to suspend, but some agencies have the
Security Officer or some lesser official send it.
The notice is accompanied by a list of reasons for the suspen-
sion.1® The regulations state these shall be as complete as
security considerations, including protection of confidential
sources, permit. This proviso has been broadly interpreted by
the various agencies so that not only the names of informants
but the details of the incidents involved may be concealed if it
is thought such information might allow identification.
Within thirty days, the employee may submit such state-
16 These are prepared in most units by the Security Office. In the
Treasury Department, they are the joint product of the Legal Officer
and the Security Officer.
22
ments in writing, affidavits or documents, as he wishes, to
refute or explain the reasons given him with the notice. These
papers are submitted to a Legal Officer, who may be specializ-
ing in Security work. The Post Office and the Veterans Ad-
. ministration route the reply through the Security Officer.
The Legal Officer or the Security Officer (both of them in
the Veterans Administration) consider the answer for “suf-
ficiency.” This term is not defined. The Treasury adds that
if the papers are deficient, the Legal Officer may allow cor-
rection.
The Personnel Security Officer and the Legal Officer review
the file and the reply, if any was made.’7 They make a joint
recommendation to the head of the department or agency, or
individual recommendations if they are not in agreement.
There is no provision in the regulations of civilian agencies
for further investigation cr inquiry at this stage.
The head of the agency is responsible for reviewing the file
and the recommendations made. The extent of the review
may vary with the size of the operation supervised, the nature
of its security problem, and the personalities of the officials
involved. Again, there is no mention of any independent ques-
tioning. The officer may make one of three decisions. If he
finds that the continued employment of the individual is
“clearly consistent’’ with the national security, he will reinstate
the employee and compensate him for loss of earnings during
this period. There is no provision for compensation for the
expenses of defense.!*
If he finds that continued employment in the present posi-
tion is inadvisable, but that another position exists which the
employee could fill without danger to security, he may trans-
fer him to this job. This is to be distinguished from the tem-
17 The Justice Department requires the Deputy Attorney General, the
legal officer in security cases, to consider also the employee’s personnel
file. This, coupled with the lack of any reference in the Justice regula-
tions to other civil] service procedures, might indicate that suitability
cases are processed under security regulations.
18 The costs of defense may be high. The employee should have an
attorney. He may have to get copies of various records and documents.
He may take depositions and get affidavits. All this may be expensive,
and especially burdensome to a man who is suspended without pay.
Many employees, it is said, resign rather than fight charges, for financial
reasons.
23
porary reassignment pending administrative action which ‘s in
lieu of suspensicn. Permanent reassignment is at least a the-
oretical possibility in all agencies. The regulations emphasize
that reassignment, rather than removal, should be used when-
ever possible. There is little evidence of any widespread use.
If there is no position available, or if for any other reason
continued employment is not consistent with the security
standard, the employee is separated from the department. He
receives written notice of this decision from the administrative
officer or the Security Officer. There is no appeal. Civil Serv-
ice regulations for appeal of dismissal exc'!ude security cases.
Charges Preceding a Hearing
The employee entitled to a hearing receives, within thirty
days after suspension (as distinguished from “a reasonable
time”) a written “statement of charges.” These, like the
“reasons” which other employees get, are required to be as
detailed as security allows.
The employee may answer in writing, in refutation of the
charges. His documents are sent to the Legal Officer or the
Personnel Security Officer, both of whom again consider them
for “sufficiency.’”’'® The Post Office adds that if the Security
Officer and the Legal Officer are agreed on a favorable recom-
mendation, a hearing may be by-passed and the recommenda-
tion to close the case made to the Postmaster General. The
Justice Department makes a similar provision.
The Post Office, State, Treasury and Justice departments
state that the employee must request a hearing. Other agen-
cies make no mention of this. They say, following the Sample,
that a hearing ‘‘shall be given” but presumably one must ask
before it will be given.
Hearing Boards
Hearing boards are composed of government employees,
picked from a panel to hear a particular case. Agencies nom-
inate their own employees to a roster compiled by the Civil
Service Commission and draw from that roster employees of
other units when a board is needed. This procedure is a prod-
19 The Veterans Administration omits any reference to “sufficiency”
at this stage.
24
uct of the regulations; neither the statute nor the Executive
Order mention it.
In the Sample Regulations, nominations to the roster in the
Washington area are made by the agency’s Security Officer.
Health and the Veterans Administration reserve this function
to the head of the agency. The chief of a field office outside
Washington nominates to regional rosters, according to the
Sample. Many regulations are silent on this. The Post Office
gives still another power to the Security Officer; he makes
these field nominations also. The Treasury has the field heads
submit nominations at the request of the Personnel Security
Officer, who makes the final choice.
Nominees are required to be men of responsibility, ‘““unques-
tioned integrity” and sound judgment. They have had full
field investigations and no unresolved derogatory information
exists against them. The Treasury adds that no nominee may
be a security officer or an investigator. All nominations rust
be found to be “clearly consistent” with national security.
At least three members are chosen from this panel. None is
employed in the agency conducting the hearing.2° None may
be acquainted with the employee. The military selection dif-
fers, as will be shown. Sample Regulations call for the head
of the agency to make the selections frum the panel. The State
Department gives this task to the Administrator, Bureau of
Security and Consular Affairs. The Treasury places the au-
thority in the Legal Officer.
Of the agencies sampled, only the Treasury gives the em-
dloyee the right to challenge a member of the board. The
employee has one peremptory challenge and an unlimited num-
ber of challenges for cause. Rulings on chailenge are made by
the Legal Office which, of course, chooses the board in the first
place.
A cautionary note should be sounded at this point. The
regulations speak of “The Security Officer” or “The Legal
Officer” or “The Head of the Agency” performing a function.
2°It was hoped that this arrangement would eliminate personal
prejudice and cut down fear of reprisal from the Security Officer. In
defense of the older system in which each agency had its own board,
it is argued that outside boards may have little knowledge of the prob-
lems of the agency where they are sitting, and that security decisions
should consider the position of the employee.
25
This memorandum follows the terminology of the regulations.
It is impossible to ascertain from the regulations the degree
of delegation of authority that prevails. It is equally impos-
sible to determine the extent to which an individual Security
Officer or Legal Officer follows through the successive steps in
a given case.
Conduct of the Hearing
The Security Officer usually prepares the case against the
employee. The regulations call for the presence of a Legai
Officer at the hearing but what he does and whom he repre-
sents there vary among the agencies. The Sample Regulations
make him the representative of the head of the department.
He aids the board in procedure and legal matters and advises
the employee of his rights—but only on the request of the lat-
ter. This last duty is not his in the Justice Department. The
Treasury gives him the responsibility of assuring that both
sides are fully protected. He is repeatedly warned that he is
not a prosecutor and is not to act like one. Equally often it is
stated that the hearing is a fact-finding procedure and not a
trial.
The hearing is opened by reading the charges and the an-
swer, if any was made. The regulations instruct the Board to
insure the employee full and fair consideration. Before or
after the charges are read, varying with the agency, the Board
informs the employee of his right to participate in the hear-
ing, to have counsel, to offer witnesses or other evidence, to
cross-examine any adversary witnesses who may appear at the
hearing, and generally anything else the Board thinks he may
need to know.
The general order of the hearing is controlled by the Board.
The employee is allowed to control the sequence of presenta-
tion of his evidence. Generally, the agency presents its case
first; this is mandatory under Justice rules and customary in
other agencies. The department case is presented by the Per-
sonnel Security Officer.
The agency need never present a case; in practice, it rarely
does. The hearing board has access to the case file and must
consider it in reaching its decision. The Board may hear ex
parte testimony of witnesses of whose existence the employee
26
may be unaware. It may consider any documentary evidence
in the case—petitions bearing the employee’s signature, books,
articles and treatises he has written, previous testimony, etc.
A staternent that such evidence has been considered is included
in the transcript, out the evidence itself is not. The agency
may rest on the case it has built in the files; the hearing will
be treated as an opportunity for the employee to defend him-
self and for the Board to examine and judge him.
After the agency has made its presentation, if any is
made, the employee presents his case. He may call witnesses.
He may present documents. He may testify in his own be-
half. He gives his case in the sequence he thinks will be most
effective.
~ All witnesses who 2ppear at the hearing testify under oath.
However, statements in the file need not be under oath and
the board may hear testimony in executive session with or
without oath. The Board may call witnesses, but it is not
bound by their testimony and may cross-examine them. Even
if the agency has subpoena power, it is seldom used.” There
is no provision for witnesses’ expenses.
Technical rules of evidence are not binding; the Board de-
cides what it considers relevant to the issue. Study of tran-
scripts of hearings will show that questioning often goes to
political and economic beliefs, and that anything the Board
feels has a bearing on the ultimate issue may be brought up
whether or not it was contained in the charges.
The hearings are held in closed sessions. The Board is re-
sponsible for seeing that the hearing is conducted so that no
confidentia! information is disclosed to unauthorized persons.
Such information includes not only classified matter but
sources of information or methods of investigation. In Justice
Department hearings, the Security Officer confronts the em-
ployee only with evidence which in his discretion will not be
inconsistent with ‘or in any way compromise” security. The
Board is bound by his advice in all security matters in the
hearing. He may preclude pursuing a line of questioning if it
might divulge information to the employee.
—s
2: Most exceptionally, a few witnesses called by the A.E.C. in the
Oppenheimer case were under subpoena.
27
A verbatim report is made of the hearing. he transcript
contains the preliminary papers and the testimony given at the
hearing. The Sample Regulations stated that a copy vu. the
transcript could be had by the employee at “a reasonable cost”
but this provision was followed only by the Veterans Adminis-
tration and the Post Office. Generally, the employee gets a
copy free.
Decision and Review
The Board makes its decision on the basis of the fliie and
the hearing.??. Certain guides; are given for considering the
evidence. The Board is to take into account any handicap the
employee may have had through inability to meet charges of
which he was not told or to cross-examine or cast doubt on the
credibility of witnesses whose names were not disclosed. The
Board is also told that if a witness, not a “confidential in-
formant,” is called and does not appear, this can be considered;
so may the fact that there can be no payment for expenses.**
The State Department regulations, as a genera! guide for all
security decisions, establish two presumptions: a former course
of behavior is presumed to continue until the opposite is clearly
shown, and any doubts are to be resolved against the employee.
The decision is accompanied by a statement of reasons. Both
are submitted to the head of tne department or agency. They
are advisory only.
The Sample Regulations provided that the employee receive
a copy of the board decision (though not of the reasons). The
regulations of the Health Department omit this provision;
the regulations of the Post Office, Treasury and Justice Depart-
ments specifically provide against it. The State Department
does give the worker a notice of the decision. The Vet-
erans Administration gives the employee a statement of the
decision and further (within security restrictions) a state-
ment of the basic reasons for the decision. The Veterans Ad-
22The Justice Department provides that if the emplovee fails to
appear at the scheduled hearing, the Board will consider the case on
the record.
23 “Confidential informant” is never defined. It is not limited to FBI
undercover agents or similarly situated persons but may include anyone
who does not wish to be identified to the employee.
28
ministration does not elaborate on what this statement in-
cludes and how far beyond a general conclusion it would go.
The entire file, including the hearing record and the opin-
ion of the Board, is forwarded to the head of the agency. (The
Treasury Department sends the file though to the Security Of-
ficer and the Legal Officer for another review and recom-
mendation) ; he is supposed to review the entire case. There is
no provision for appeal by the employee nor for further in-
vestigation at this stage. A written decision is then made, to
reinstate, to transfer or to remove, and the employee is noti-
fied of this decision. The regulations do not indicate whether
th- ~gency head in fact delegates his review.**
There is no central review board, as there was under the
Loyaity Program. The Civil Service Commission is required
under the Executive Order to make a continuing study of the
manner in which the program is being operated, to look for
deficiencies in security protection and any tendency to deny
employees their rights. It is to report at least semi-annually
to the National Security Council, with recommendations for
revision or legislation. It also furnishes information about
any department deficiencies to the head of the department im-
mediately, for such correction as he might make. A small
unit in the Commission has been established for this function.
A central security investigations index is also maintained by
the Civil Service Commission.
In accordance with a presidential directive of 1948, all rec-
ords and files are to be kept fully confidential to preserve in-
formational sources and t» protect the employee. A subpoena
or other demand from a source other than the executive
branch is to be “respectfully declined” and referred to the
office of the President. Access to FBI raw files is given neither
to other executive agencies nor to the legislature.
Eligibility for Reappointment
Public Law 733 said that termination “shall not affect the
right . . . to seek or accept employment in any other depart-
ment or agcuncy of the government” provided that the Civil
Service Commission determine that the employee was eligible.
24 The Veterans Administration provides that the Administrator give,
with the notice, the basic reasons for the conclusion reached.
29
Since the law originally covered only selected agencies, such
reappointment was more of a possibility than it is now. The
Executive Order shifted the emphasis and added a require-
ment. The employee will not be appointed in the same or an-
other agency unless the Civii Service determines eligibility
and unless the head of the appointing agency finds that such
employment is consistent with the national security.
Il. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
The military departments of the government operate three
security programs, one for civilian personnel, one for military
personnel and one fer industrial facilities and their personnel.
These programs are not based on the same authority. They
do not cover the same areas nor deal with the same problems.
Yet, they are alike in spirit, in standards and in procedure.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
The program for civilian personnel operates under Public
Law 733 and Executive Orde: 10450. In 1953, the Defense
departments employed 1,148,745 out of a total Federal Gov-
ernment employment of 2,302,932.744
The Defense Department issued a genera! directive and the
constituent departments issued regulations governing their
own forces. The regulations are highly detailed. They pre-
scribe administrative steps far more elaborately than civilian
agency regulatious do. Military channels are carefully pre-
served. Nonetheiess, the programs are basically the same as
those under which civilian agencies operate and only the dif-
ferences need be emphasized.
Criteria
The Defense Directive criteria include all those of Executive
Order 10450 but add these refinements:
“8. Participation in the activities of an organization es-
tablished as a front for an organization referred to
in subparagraph 5 above [subversive organizations |
when his personal views were sympathetic to the
subversive purposes of such organization.
“9. Participation in the activities of an organization with
24a The Defense Department includes the departments of the Army,
Navy and Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
10.
“Eee
“12.
13.
“14,
15.
“16
wy |
30
knowledge that it had been infiltrated by members of
subversive groups under circumstances indicating
that the individual was a part of or sympathetic to
the infiltrating element or sympathetic to its pur-
poses.
Participation in the activities of an organization, re-
ferred to in subparagraph 5 above, in a capacity
where he should reasonably have had knowledge of
the subversive aims or purposes of the organization.
Sympathetic interest in totalitarian, Fascist, Com-
munist, or similar subversive movements.
Sympathetic association with a member or members
of an organization referred to in subparagraph 5
above.
(Ordinarily this will not include chance or occasional
meetings, nor contacts limited to normal business or
official relations. )
Currently maintaining a close continuing association
with a person who has engaged in activities or asso-
ciation; of the type referred to in subparagraphs 2
through 11 above. A close continuing association
may be deemed to exist if the individual lives at the
same premises as, frequently visits, or frequently
communicates with such person.
Close continuing association of the type described in
subparagraph 13 above, even though later separated
by distance, if the circumstances indicate that re-
newal of the association is probable.
The presence of a spouse, parent, brother, sister or
offspring in a nation whose interests may be inimical
to the interests of the United States or in satellites
or occupied areas of such a nation, under circum-
stances permitting coercion or pressure to be brought
on the individual through such relatives.
Willful violation or disregard of security regulations.
Acts of a reckless, irresponsible or wanton nature
which indicates such poor judgment and instability
as to suggest that the individual might disclose se-
curity information to unauthorized persons or other-
wise assist such persons, whether deliberately or
inadvertently, in activities inimical to the security
of the United States.”
Items (8) to (14) may be considered as an elaboration of
paragraph (5) of Executive Order 10450, sec. 8, or perhaps
they create independent grounds for rvjection. (15) is the
31
classic example of 1(v), the pressure risk. Making it a sepa-
rate category may divorce it from the limitation of (1) that it
be weighed according to the position of the employee. (17) can
be encompassed in i(i), but the separate expansion may in-
dicate some special import to the Defense Department. (16)
merely makes a separate class of what was a phrase of (6)
in the Executive Order.
The directive recognizes that because of this enumeration
and elaboration on the basic criteria, all the classes are not of
the same “seriousness.” The regulations of the military de-
partments do not follow these criteria precisely, but the varia-
tions are unimportant.
The departments do not limit subversive groups to those on
the Attorney General’s list. That list is set forth in the loyalty
certificate for military personnel and the similar certificate of
non-affiliation for civilian personnel; but the employee is ap-
parently expected to disclose any subversive affiliation, whether
or not the organization is on the list. Failure to disclose mem-
bership is itself grounds for charges. The list is posted con-
spicuously at all military establishments.
The regulations, furthermore, specifically indicate that non-
listed organizations may be considered, though the Air Force
notes that the Attorney General has advised that “mere”
membership, affiliation or association with an organization
not designated by him should not be considered relevant un-
less the department obtains and makes available to the adjudi-
sator the Attorney General’s views on the organization. There
S no indication, however, that other departments follow this
idvice. The Navy permits the citing of organizations men-
jioned by other government agencies if there is information
ivailable sufficient to evaluate it.
The military regulations all refer to the Attorney General’s
itatement that membership in an organization is only one
actor to be considered. The Navy and the Air Force counsel
he adjudicator to consider the employee’s reasons for join-
ng the group and his knowledge of its purposes.
The Defense directive quite clearly states that these regu-
ations should be limited to true security cases. Maximum use
5 to be made of normal civil service removal when security is
32
not a consideration and the procedure is adequate and appro-
priate. This is repeated by the constituent units. However,
both the Army and the Navy indicate the reverse implications
of this provision. If the information is not of a status to sus-
tain civil service action, it will be processed under security
regulations. The Navy adds that action may be taken through
suitability procedures even if the security decision was favor-
able.
Categories of Sensitive Positions.
The Defense directive distinguishes three types of position,
two sensitive and one non-sensitive. The definition of “sensi-
tive” is not changed. However, a separate category is estab-
lished, consisting of those responsible for war plans and pol-
icies, for over-all defense programs, and certain other censi-
tive positions. The Army calls this top sensitive classifica-
tion “‘sensitive-critical’’ and includes in addition to those men-
tioned all having access to Top Secret classified matter, all
grades above GS-14, and all members of screening and appeals
boards. The Navy includes in top sensitive all having access
to any classified matter. The bottom sensitive group consists
of all other positions which are designated sensitive.
The Air Force has three sensitive levels—the war plan level,
a second level including those with access to Top Secret,
cryptographic or security clearance material, and a third level
which includes those having access to Secret or Confidential
matter, those training personnel, and those in public relations.
Included also in this lowest level are those working in areas
which contain classified matter (but who are without author-
ized access to it), and who have a real opportunity to commit
sabotage or espionage.
It was brought out in hearings of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, July 15, 1954, that some incumbent em-
ployees and all applicants for Army employment are now re-
quired to execute a certificate of non-affiliation with certain
organizations. Incumbents in sensitive positions must sign. If
they refuse or invoke the Fifth Amendment, they are deemed
a security risk. Applicants for any position not exempted from
investigation must fill out this form. If they refuse or invoke
33
the Fifth Amendment, they are denied employment. If they
complete the forms and the information given raises a security
question, appointment will not be made prior to a national
agency check.
Investigations
Investigation in the military departments, as in civilian ones,
starts from the personnel forms and varies in intensity with
the sensitivity of the position filled and the nature of the in-
formation developed. Non-sensitive appointments are, as in
civil agencies, made subject to agency check and written in-
quiry. The Army excepts appointments under six months and
aliens employed overseas. The Air Force regulations require
only a check of employees references and local agencies for
temporary or seasonal employees under three months. If
derogatory information is developed in any of these cases, the
investigation is extended.
The top sensitive appointments are made only after the
completion of what the defense departments call a “back-
ground” investigation, which is approximately the equivalent
of a full-field investigation.» An emergency appointment may
be made but at least a satisfactory national agency check
must first be completed. A national agency check is required
before appointment to other sensitive jobs and the appointment
is subject to the satisfactory completion of the background in-
vestigation. In emergency, the position may be filled by one
on whom no check has been made. The Air Force regulations
are substantially similar but a lot more intricate.
Incumbents of sensitive positions are subject to full field in-
vestigation but may continue to occupy their positions pend-
ing completion. The Air Force requires only a national agency
check for the lowest sensitive group of incumbents. The Army
allows past investigation to suffice for present clearance if it
meets the present requirements. Of course, under the Ex-
ecutive Order, cases previously investigated are re-adjudicated
by the present standard. The Defense departments operated
——_
25 A neighborhood investigation is not generally made except to prove
or disprove derogatory information developed in other ways.
A great emphasis is placed in background investigation on citizenship
Status and on foreign travel and connections.
34
both loyalty and security programs during the Truman admin-
istration so that this provision should have little practical
effect.
The Directive is silent on procedure; it refers the depart-
ments to Public Law 733. As the regulations were developed,
each department uses three levels of boards, a security screen-
ing board at a pre-charge stage, a hearing board, as required
by the statute, and a review board, which affords the employee
an appeal after hearing, a development peculiar to the military
departments.
Disposition of Applicants
The civilian agencies, it will be remembered, have no formai-
ized procedure by which an applicant can appeal. The situa-
tion under the armed forces regulations is more difficult to
ascertain and the practice is not uniform.
The Army is silent on this point. There are detailed direc-
tions for handling the files after a determination has been
made, but no hint of what happens before. The Navy provides
that all cases in which an FBI full field investigative report is
received are referred to the activity Screening Board. This
would include all cases in which derogatory information deal-
ing with subversion was developed. A Screening Board may
request furthe.’ investigation, an interview, etc. These pow-
ers are given to the Board in all cases; hence, they are avail-
able when the Board handles an application. The Board
makes a recommendation to the head of the activity who makes
the final decision. There is no appeal from this decision.
The Air Force states that the appropriate military Com-
mand on receiving the investigative report may decide that
the applicant should not be appointed. If, notwithstanding
the presence of derogatory information, he feels the appoint-
ment should be made, he may do so if it is to a non-sensitive
position. If the position is sensitive, the case must be proc-
essed. Whatever the determination, all reports of derogatory
information are forwarded to the Central Security Board, with
a statement of the action taken. The Security Board reviews
all cases, may issue interrogatories, have investigation made,
etc. It may in its discretion grant a hearing to the applicant.
35
Evaluation of Reports—Army
Derogatory reports come to the installation or command of
the Army. A decision is made whether to continue employ-
ment. Additional investigation may be made. Suspension
occurs at this point only if security warrants it. The file is
forwarded to major command headquarters, within three days
if the employee has been suspended. The major command
makes a determination and a recommendation and forwards
to the command echelon or G-2, depending on the position of
the command. The head of the service of the Army having
command will review, make recommendations, and forward
to G-2.%6
G-2 will then review. It may make further investigation,
issue interrogatories, return the case to the major command
for an interview with the employee, or recommend suspension
or revocation of clearance, if this has not already been accom-
plished. If the decision is to end employment, the case is sent
to the Screening Board which is in the Office of the Secretary
of the Army. A recommendation and rationale accompany
the file and if the recommendation is adverse, a suggested list
of charges is included. The Board reviews the case and makes
a recommendation to the Secretary. It, too, may prepare inter-
rogatories, direct an interview or further investigate. If the
recommendation is favorable, G-2 may concur. If it dissents
a detailed rationale for non-concurrence is required. If the
recommendation is unfavorable and approved by the Secretary,
the Board draws up the charges.
Evaluation—Air Force
The Air Force procedure is similar. Reports are transmitted
to the Commander through the Director of Special Investiga-
tions, who also forwards a copy to the Central Security Board.
He may recommend to the latter that the employee be sus-
pended before sending the file to the installation.
The Commander makes his determination. If it is to retain,
he so states with reasons. He may suspend. However, interim
action, such as a change or a restriction of duty, is preferred.
26 At any time before a letter of charges is issued, the commander
may end suspension. Only the Secretary of the Army may authorize
payments for the suspension period.
36
Before suspending, “to avoid unwarranted or premature sus-
pensions” and to “ensure the orderly processing of cases’’ the
Commander must contact the Executive Secretary, Civilian
Personnel Security Program, at Headquarters in Washington.
If the employee is suspended, he receives a copy of the regu-
lations and is told he will get charges or instructions from the
Board. At the time he is suspended, the Executive Secretary
must be notified, a description of the position occupied for-
warded, and a statement made why interim action is not suffi-
cient to safeguard security. Whatever action is taken, the
file is forwarded, with the recommendation, to Special Investi-
gations at Washington. It must contain information as to
whether it is practicable to reassign the worker to another,
non-sensitive position on a permanent basis.
The Director submits this file with his recommendations to
the Central Security Board, with a summary of facts.27 The
Board reviews the case, making investigation or interrogation
as needed. It may recommend favorable finding, further in-
vestigation, processing to removal or other administrative
proceedings.
The Board may direct suspension or it may restore a sus-
pended employee to duty. It is required to take into considera-
tion not only the usual security needs but “the fact that an
unwarranted or premature suspension may result in needless
effort or embarrassment on the part of the employee or the
Air Force.” If it decides adversely to the worker, it will pre-
pare charges and a notice informing him of his rights. Nor-
mally, suspension occurs at this time.
Evaluation—Navy
The Army and Air Force have central screening boards
which act as a check over the Commander’s decision. The
Navy puts greater power in the hands of the Commander. A
screening board is appointed by the head of each activity and
handles only the cases of that activity.2* In small activities
the Commander may dispense with the board.
27 This Board has at least three members. One is from the Inspector
General's office, one from Personnel, and one from Judge Advocate or
the General Counsel's office.
28 This is composed of three employees of the activity. Preferably,
two should be civilians.
37
The board, if one exists, reviews all cases in which a full
fieid report is received and 2ll cases formerly adjudicated
under 9835. It may direct further investigation. It may re-
quest advice on the reliability of confidential informants from
the FBI. To clarify minor points prior to recommendation,
the employee, if he so desires, may be given written interroga-
tories. These are not to be used to confront the individual
with seriously derogatory information. The Board may inter-
view any local personnel, including the employee. It makes
a recommendation to the activity head but he makes the deci-
sion. However, if he disagrees with the board, he must in-
clude his rationale in the file.
Disposition Without Hearing
The Navy states that an appointee, defined as an employee
who has not completed twelve months of government service,
may be separated administratively. Administrative separa-
tion is not defined; it would presumably have to meet the re-
quirements of Public Law 733, however. An “incumbent” who
is an employee past probation period is furnished with charges.
The Army gives in a six-line paragraph the procedure ap-
plicable to the employee not entitled to a hearing. Cases of
appointments of under a year are not ordinarily processed
through security regulations. Their contracts are simply not
renewed and no reference is made to security in the termina-
tion. The undefined status of the Navy appointee has been
indicated.
The Air Force is as brief as the Army on these cases. How-
ever, it allows all employees and even applicants hearings at
the discretion of the Central Security Board. The regulations
suggest that a hearing should normally be granted.
Hearings; Boards
If a hearing is requested, a board is convened. The Army
provides that the Executive Secretary of the hearing board
will schedule a hearing even if no request is made and the
employee will be notified of the time and place. The Navy
provides that if no reply is made, the head of the activity will
38
consider the case, no presumption being made against the em
ployee for failure to respond. This would seem a formal step
the Commander has just decided to suspend and no new in
formation has arisen. If there is a reply, but nu hearing i
requested, the head will consider the case. He may, in his dis
cretion, schedule a hearing, again with no presumptions draw
if the employee fails to appear. The Air Force forwards th
file, with or without answer, through the Review Board if n
hearing is requested.
If an Army employee requests a hearing, the Executiv:
Secretary of the hearing board will review the file. If hi
opinion is favorable, an advisory panel of the Board will b
named. If it concurs, it may meet formally in executive ses
sion and submit a recommendation to the Office of the Secre
tary, Administrative Assistant. The employee will be give
no notice of this nearing unless he should happen to inquire
By an agreement approved by the Department of Justice
the military departments supply each other with hearing boar
personnel. In the Washington area, an official roster is kep
by the Defense Department. In continental United State:
and the territories, the boards are also drawn from the othe:
military departments. Overseas, and in isolated areas any
where, boards are taken from the employees of the installatior
and may therefore be composed of members of the same de
partment as the employee being heard. Board members are
chosen from the highest ranking personnel available.
The boards are composed of military and civilian personnel
A majority must be civilian. The Army and Navy provide fo.
an Executive Secretary of the Hearing Board who is in charge
of all administrative details of the hearing. The Executive
Secretary is a civilian
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.