Amicus Curiae Brief — People Not Politicians, et al., Applicants v. Robert Onder, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 23, 2026

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No. 26A388

In the Supreme Court of the United States

PEOPLE NOT POLITICIANS et al.,

Applicants,

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT “BOB” ONDER et al.,

Respondents,

and

STATE OF MISSOURI et al.,

Respondents.

BRIEF FOR MISSOURI VOTERS JAKE MAGGARD AND

GREGG LOMBARDI AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF APPLICANTS

Tori Schafer

P.O. Box 11424

Clayton, Missouri 63105

Kevin J. Hamilton

Counsel of Record

Matthew P. Gordon

Jonathan P. Hawley

ASHURST PERKINS COIE US LLP

1301 Second Avenue, Suite 4200

Seattle, Washington 98101

(206) 359-8000

Kevin.Hamilton@ashurstperkins.com

September 23, 2026

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................................................ 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 5

The Eighth Circuit’s decision, not the Missouri Supreme Court, threatens

the constitutional rights of Missouri voters. ...................................................... 5

II.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision fundamentally misunderstood the equities. ... 8

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens,

146 S. Ct. 418 (2025)...............................................................................................................10

Carson v. Simon,

978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2020) .......................................................................................... 10–11

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Pate,

950 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2020) .................................................................................................9–10

Klein v. United States,

176 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1949) ....................................................................................................6

Maggard v. State,

733 S.W.3d 411 (Mo. 2026) ..................................................................................................3, 9

Merrill v. Milligan,

142 S. Ct. 879 (2022)........................................................................................................... 4, 11

Missourians to Protect Initiative Process v. Blunt,

799 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1990) ......................................................................................................2

Mo. Gen. Assembly v. von Glahn,

No. 25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2025 WL 3514277 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2025) ....................................8

Moore v. Harper,

600 U.S. 1 (2023)............................................................................................................. 7–8, 11

Nat’l Insts. of Health v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n,

145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025)....................................................................................................... 11–12

Nichols v. Robinson,

211 S.W. 11 (Mo. 1919) ............................................................................................................7

No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft,

638 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. 2022) ..................................................................................................1–2

Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006)............................................................................................................. 4, 9–11

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

589 U.S. 423 (2020) ...................................................................................................................9

Riley v. Kennedy,

553 U.S. 406 (2008) .................................................................................................................11

State ex rel. Drain v. Becker,

240 S.W. 229 (Mo. 1922) ..........................................................................................................2

State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman,

250 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1952) ..................................................................................................1, 7

Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,

479 U.S. 208 (1986) ...................................................................................................................6

United States v. Classic,

313 U.S. 299 (1941) ...................................................................................................................6

Von Glahn v. Hoskins,

No. SC 101805, 2026 WL 2628846 (Mo. Sept. 3, 2026) ........................................... 3–4, 8–11

Wise v. Circosta,

978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) ...................................................................................11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b)....................................................................................................... 1, 9

Mo. Const. art. V, § 2 ...................................................................................................................11

Mo. Const. art. V, § 3 ...................................................................................................................11

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ............................................................................................................5–6

U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 .................................................................................................................5–6

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 .....................................................................................................................7

STATUTES

2 U.S.C. § 2a .................................................................................................................................10

RULES

Sup. Ct. R. 37.6...............................................................................................................................1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

David A. Lieb & Hannah Schoenbaum, Opponents of Trump-Backed

Redistricting in Missouri Submit a Petition to Force a Public Vote,

PBS News (Dec. 10, 2025), https://bit.ly/491AIKs ...............................................................2

iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

It’s déjà vu all over again.

Amici Curiae Jake Maggard and Gregg Lombardi (“Amici”) once again call on this

Court to vindicate not only their voting rights under the U.S. Constitution but their referendum right under the Missouri Constitution. Under Missouri law, a “measure referred to

the people shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not

otherwise.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b) (emphasis added). This is the essence of the people’s

referendum right: As the Missouri Supreme Court recognized a half-century ago, the

[p]urpose of referendum is to suspend or annul a law which has not gone into

effect and to provide the people a means of giving expression to a legislative

proposition, and require their approval before it become operative as a law;

and its purpose does not intend to invalidate a law already operative.

State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 250 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Mo. 1952) (emphasis added) (citation

modified).

Amici are qualified Missouri voters who signed the petition to refer House Bill 1

(“HB 1”), Missouri’s proposed new congressional map, to the people for approval or rejection. They therefore have a clear interest in the outcome of the pending emergency application and urge the Court to rule in Applicants’ favor. Under the Missouri Constitution, the

people “reserve[ ] a share of the legislative power for themselves …. to serve as a check on

the legislature.” No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft, 638 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Mo. 2022) (emphasis

added). Each Amici possesses a share of the legislative power and therefore has a personal

stake

safeguarding

the

right

cast

meaningful

vote

the

HB 1 referendum before the proposed map is used to elect members of Congress—and, for

that matter, in voting for a congressional delegation using a lawfully enacted map.

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, counsel for Amici Curiae Jake Maggard and

Gregg Lombardi (“Amici”) state that no party or counsel for a party, or any other person

other than Amici and their counsel, made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation

or submission of this brief.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

“The voters of Missouri first adopted a constitutional amendment establishing the

right of referendum more than 100 years ago,” “reserv[ing] a share of the legislative power

for themselves” and “ensur[ing] that ‘those who have no access to or influence with elected

representatives may take their cause directly to the people.’ ” No Bans, 638 S.W.3d at 486,

489 (quoting Missourians to Protect Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 827

(Mo. 1990)). For over a century, the Missouri Supreme Court—having recognized that “an

erroneous interpretation of powers conferred always ends in trouble,” State ex rel. Drain

v. Becker, 240 S.W. 229, 233 (Mo. 1922)—has zealously defended the boundaries of the referendum right against procedural chicanery and mischief. The court long ago acknowledged the “prudence” of the people reserving “the right to correct any evils which may

result from unwise legislation” and decided that this “absolute power” is “immune from

obstructive interference from any source until the purpose for which it is exercised has

been consummated.” Id. at 231–32 (emphasis added).

Nearly three weeks ago, the Missouri Supreme Court was required once again to

safeguard Missourians’ share of the legislative power, the latest leg of the “unseemly race

between the Governor, the Legislature, and the people” that has always accompanied the

referendum right. Becker, 240 S.W. at 233. The court’s intervention was sorely needed.

Since Secretary of State Denny Hoskins (the “Secretary”) received 691 boxes containing

nearly 50,000 pages of signed referendum petitions last December—far more than necessary to refer HB 1 for popular approval—he has done everything in his power to deny

Missouri voters their right to have their say before HB 1 goes into effect. The Secretary

did not hide his intentions or motivation: Within one day of submission, he told the Associated Press he was “going to do everything [he] can to protect” HB 1. 2

David A. Lieb & Hannah Schoenbaum, Opponents of Trump-Backed Redistricting

in Missouri Submit a Petition to Force a Public Vote, PBS News (Dec. 10, 2025), https://

bit.ly/491AIKs.

Delay was the Secretary’s chosen strategy, and he refused to make a final certification decision until just one hour before his statutory deadline on August 4, 2026—primary

day. This in turn postponed the inevitable suspension of HB 1, allowing the Secretary to

implement the new map in Missouri’s August primary even though, the Missouri Supreme

Court later explained, that map was never actually enacted. “[B]ecause a ‘legal, sufficient,

and timely’ referendum petition was filed on December 9—before HB 1 went into effect on

December 11—HB 1 did not take effect on December 11, HB 1 was ‘referred to the people’

as of December 9, and HB 1 ‘shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast

thereon, and not otherwise.’ ” Von Glahn v. Hoskins, No. SC 101805, 2026 WL 2628846, at

*5 (Mo. Sept. 3, 2026) (quoting Maggard v. State, 733 S.W.3d 411, 420 (Mo. 2026)). After

undertaking this straightforward application of Missouri law, the court had a pointed

response to the Secretary’s sudden concerns about “the confusion, expense, and practical

difficulties that may result from not utilizing the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the

November 2026 election”: “[T]hese arguments are particularly misplaced given the secretary’s delay created the confusion, expense, and practical difficulties of which he complains.” Id. at *6 n.8.

The Missouri Supreme Court was right on the law and on the equities. Any logistical

difficulties were a problem entirely of the Secretary’s own making, a byproduct (if not the

intended effect) of his promise to do “everything [he] can to protect” HB 1 by subverting

Missourians’ constitutional referendum right. And because HB 1 was properly referred to

the people, it cannot take effect—and cannot be implemented—until the people vote to

approve it. That should have been the end of this story.

Instead, the Eighth Circuit has injected new chaos and uncertainty on the eve of the

general election—indeed, after the election was already underway. As the Missouri

Supreme Court made clear on September 3, the day it handed down the von Glahn decision,

the one and only operative congressional map in Missouri is the map adopted by the General

Assembly in 2022. See 2026 WL 2628846, at *6 n.8 (“[T]he 2022 map is the only map in

effect.”). That was the status quo at the time the district court issued its temporary

restraining order (“TRO”), and it remains the state-law status quo today. And yet, in a

remarkable departure from comity and federal practice, the Eighth Circuit has prohibited

use of the only lawful congressional map Missouri currently has. More shocking still, the

Eighth Circuit premised its “final judgment on the merits,” App. 18a, on legal theories that

had already been considered and rejected by this Court—and in apparent defiance of this

Court’s September 10 order staying the district court’s TRO.

This Court’s immediate intervention is needed for at least two reasons.

First, the Eighth Circuit erroneously concluded “that, if the 2022 map is used in the

November 2026 general election, some Missouri voters will have more say than others on

who represents them in Congress.” App. 24a. Not so: No authority requires perfect symmetry between the electorates in primary and general elections or otherwise suggests that

use of Missouri’s 2022 congressional map (as required by the Missouri Supreme Court’s

injunction) would produce an unconstitutional result. Instead, it is the Eighth Circuit’s

decision that risks constitutional deprivation here, since use of the HB 1 map in the general

election would deny Missouri voters their right to referendum.

Second, this Court “has repeatedly stated that federal courts ordinarily should not

enjoin a state’s election laws in the period close to an election” and “in turn has often stayed

lower federal court injunctions that contravened that principle.” Merrill v. Milligan,

142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for stays). By

upending the state-law status quo—use of the 2022 congressional plan, Missouri’s only lawfully enacted map—on the eve of the general election, the Eighth Circuit (like the district

court before it) violated Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam), and disregarded

the compelling equitable concerns militating against emergency relief.

ARGUMENT

Following the Missouri Supreme Court’s clear directive that the 2022 congressional

map be used in the upcoming election and this Court’s stay of a TRO mandating otherwise,

the Eighth Circuit flouted any recognizable theory of federalism and enjoined Missouri

officials from using a congressional map other than HB 1, a map that, in a legal sense, does

not exist and has never existed. The premise underlying the Eighth Circuit’s decision—

that, since the Secretary intentionally violated state law by administering a primary election under an unlawful map (for concededly partisan purposes), Missouri must now conduct

a second election under the same unlawful map—is as stunning as it is baseless. Repeating

the Secretary’s error is inconsistent with federal and state law, and this Court should

immediately act to restore the status quo.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision, not the Missouri Supreme Court, threatens the

constitutional rights of Missouri voters.

The Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that “[c]hanging district lines between the primary

and general election prevents an affected voter from participating in either district’s complete procedure of choices,” App. 26a, does not bear scrutiny. Contrary to the Eighth Circuit’s decision, use of Missouri’s only lawfully enacted congressional map will not violate

Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution or the Equal Protection Clause.

Article I, Section 2. The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several

States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. But use of Missouri’s 2022 congressional map in the

general election will not prevent voters from “cho[osing]” the state’s congressional delegation to the House of Representatives as Article I, Section 2 requires. After all, the 2022 map

has been used in two prior elections—and there is certainly no argument that Missouri voters were denied their constitutional right to elect members of Congress in 2022 or 2024.

As for 2026, all that has changed since the Missouri Supreme Court decided von

Glahn is that some voters will find themselves in different congressional districts with

candidates other than those they voted for in the August primary. But the Eighth Circuit

cited no authority foreclosing this outcome, and no wonder: There is nothing inherently or

necessarily static about the composition of an electorate between a primary and general

election. After all, plenty of voters sit out primaries, but they are still perfectly able to cast

votes in general elections. Other voters move between districts after a primary but before

the general election—meaning they too find new candidates on their general-election ballots. What matters is that voters have the opportunity to vote in a primary and a general

election. Missourians were able to do so this year. That the district lines (and the voters

within them) might have changed between the elections is of no constitutional moment.

The cases the Eighth Circuit relied on underscore this point. See App. 23a. In United

States v. Classic, this Court held that, “[w]here the state law has made the primary an

integral part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls

the choice, the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary, is likewise

included in the right protected” by the U.S. Constitution. 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941) (emphasis

added). Here, no Missouri voter was denied that right—and thus Article I, Section 2 has

not been violated or even undermined. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479

U.S. 208 (1986), and Klein v. United States, 176 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1949), all stand for the

same principle: States cannot exclude voters from primaries. But that didn’t happen here.

And none of the cases cited by the Eighth Circuit held that deviations between primary and

general electorates run afoul of the U.S. Constitution.

Equal Protection Clause. The Eighth Circuit’s (brief) equal-protection analysis

fails for a simple reason: No Missourian’s vote for Congress will be worth more than any

other’s. Contra App. 27a. Each voter will be able to cast a single vote for a member of Congress. Again, all that has changed is that some voters will find themselves in different congressional districts, but the Eighth Circuit found no authority proscribing this outcome.

In short, no “Missouri voters will have more say than others on who represents them

in Congress” if the 2022 map is used, contra App. 24a, and no voter’s constitutional rights

will be violated. Instead, it is the Eighth Circuit’s decision that is now on the brink of producing an unconstitutional result. If the HB 1 map is used in the upcoming general election

before the people approve the map at the ballot box, then the Missouri Constitution’s referendum right will be effectively vitiated because the “[p]urpose of referendum is to suspend

or annul a law which has not gone into effect … and its purpose does not intend to invalidate

a law already operative.” Toberman, 250 S.W.2d at 706 (emphasis added) (citation modified). This purpose would be clearly and irreparably subverted if legislation like HB 1 could

take effect before voters approve it—just like the gubernatorial veto power would be

diminished if legislation could become effective before a governor has a chance to exercise

the veto. See Nichols v. Robinson, 211 S.W. 11, 13 (Mo. 1919) (explaining that “[t]he legislative authority in Missouri is not wholly with the General Assembly” because “[t]he Governor is a factor in legislation” and thus “[i]t would be far-fetched to say that the legislative

body meant that [a] law should become effective without the presentation to the Governor”).

The Eighth Circuit’s decision would force Amici and other Missourians to vote on

whether to approve or reject HB 1 at the very same time they elect members of Congress

from districts drawn by that legislation. The referendum right would lose any meaning or

value if voters rejected HB 1 in the general election and yet were still forced to live under

its map for the duration of the 120th Congress. That potential injury—dilution of the referendum right, which Missourians reserved to themselves as a check on the legislature—is

far more real and immediate than any of the manufactured constitutional injuries contained

in the Eighth Circuit’s decision. 3

Additionally, “[a] state legislature’s exercise of authority under the Elections

Clause” of the U.S. Constitution “must be in accordance with the method which the State

has prescribed for legislative enactments.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 24 (2023) (citation

It’s not just this map and this election that are at stake. If the Secretary’s gambit

succeeds, then the General Assembly could draw a new map every year, repeat the Secretary’s maximum-delay playbook, and thereby prevent Missourians from ever effectively

exercising their referendum right.

modified). Consistent with that admonition, “[t]here is only one valid congressional redistricting in effect—the congressional redistricting the General Assembly established in

2022.” Von Glahn, 2026 WL 2628846, at *6 n.8. No other map has been in effect since then.

Accordingly, requiring use of HB 1 would not just dilute the state constitutional referendum

right but also impair Missouri’s federal constitutional obligation to draw its congressional

maps pursuant to its legislative process, referendum included. Whatever else might be said

of such a result, it is hardly consistent with any constitution—federal or state.

II.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision fundamentally misunderstood the equities.

The equities do not favor the result ordered by the Eighth Circuit, as a matter of

either fairness or federalism.

First, the Eighth Circuit’s decision has the ultimate effect of rewarding the Secretary for his intentionally dilatory tactics and gamesmanship. His hands are decidedly unclean here, as the Missouri Supreme Court recognized: “In December 2025,” immediately

after the signed HB 1 referendum petitions were filed,

a federal district court advised the secretary and the state that, if the referendum petition is sufficient, “the new map will be frozen until after the referendum, which could significantly disrupt the 2026 elections.” At the same

time, the federal district court noted the secretary had the ability to declare

the petition insufficient based on his argument … that the Missouri Constitution does not permit a referendum as to congressional redistricting passed

by the General Assembly.

Von Glahn, 2026 WL 2628846, at *6 n.8 (citation omitted) (quoting Mo. Gen. Assembly v.

von Glahn, No. 25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2025 WL 3514277, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2025)).

“[T]here is no apparent reason,” the federal court earlier observed, “why [the Secretary]

would incur the significant cost of signature verification given his stated belief that the

petition is constitutionally deficient.” Mo. Gen. Assembly, 2025 WL 3514277, at *2 n.2. And

yet the Secretary “chose to delay his certification until the last possible day,” waiting until

4 p.m. on primary day, August 4—the certification deadline—to reject the HB 1

referendum on the same ground he raised in federal court nearly eight months earlier. Von

Glahn, 2026 WL 2628846, at *6 n.8.

Moreover, nearly three months before the certification deadline, the Missouri

Supreme Court put the Secretary on notice that a sufficiency determination would suspend

HB 1 and prevent its further use no matter when that determination was made: “If … the

December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient,” the court

made clear, then “HB 1 did not take effect on December 11, HB 1 was ‘referred to the

people’ as of December 9, and HB 1 ‘shall take effect when approved by a majority of the

votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.’ ” Maggard, 733 S.W.3d at 420 (quoting Mo. Const.

art. III, § 52(b)). And yet the Secretary still delayed until the last possible hour.

The result? HB 1 was used in the August primary, even though it was never properly

enacted. The Secretary’s tactics denied Missourians the opportunity to vote under a lawful

congressional map, and that injury should not be compounded in the general election. That

is exactly how the Eighth Circuit would have it: doubling down on use of an unlawful map

just because it was used in the primary election. See App.32a. Even setting aside the

absence of a colorable legal theory justifying the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the equities do

not favor rewarding the Secretary’s machinations and delay at the expense of Missourians’

constitutional referendum right—which is precisely what the decision accomplishes by

mandating use of the HB 1 map.

Second, apart from the Secretary’s gamesmanship, it is difficult to imagine a more

glaring violation of Purcell than the Eighth Circuit’s opinion. “This Court has repeatedly

emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the

eve of an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 424

(2020) (per curiam). The Purcell principle “is infused with federalism concerns, arising from

the notion that federal courts should show a degree of caution before they intervene in statecreated election procedures that could bollix up the management of an election by state

officials.” Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Pate, 950 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Iowa 2020)

(Appel, J., specially concurring); see, e.g., Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens,

146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025) (purpose of Purcell is to avoid “upsetting the delicate federal-state

balance in elections”).

Put plainly, the Eighth Circuit failed to exercise the restraint required by Purcell,

deciding instead to intrude on the Missouri Supreme Court’s injunction and issue a “conflicting order[ ]” that creates “voter confusion” and administrative chaos on the eve of voting. 549 U.S. at 4–5. Missouri now finds itself in an impossible situation: The HB 1 map

cannot be used (because the Missouri Supreme Court enjoined it, see von Glahn, 2026 WL

2628846, at *7), but nor can any other map (because the Eighth Circuit prohibited the Secretary “from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any

congressional district map other than the [HB 1] map for the November 3, 2026, general

election,” App. 34a–35a). In creating this catch-22, the Eighth Circuit failed to “weigh, in

addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases …. Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting

orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away

from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–

5. The Eighth Circuit’s decision has effectively left Missouri voters without a usable congressional map in contravention of well-settled equitable rules counseling restraint in the

leadup to elections—and in violation of federal law requiring that “a State [be] redistricted

in the manner provided by the law thereof.” 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c).

The Eighth Circuit went so far as to conclude that “Purcell supports, not prevents,

its decision” because “[t]he Missouri General Assembly set the status quo, the Missouri

Supreme Court upset it, and it is our duty, consistent with Purcell, to at least preserve the

possibility of restoring it.” App. 30a, 32a (citation modified). This reasoning misapprehends

the status quo in Missouri. Because “[t]he Purcell principle is a presumption against disturbing the status quo,” “[t]he question [ ] is who sets the status quo? The Constitution’s

answer is generally the state legislature,” Carson v. Simon, 978 F.3d 1051, 1062 (8th Cir.

2020), subject to the “requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the

enactment of laws”—including, where applicable, popular referenda, Moore, 600 U.S. at 23–

26 (citation modified). In other words, the starting point when applying Purcell is the status

quo as established by state law. See, e.g., Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2020)

(en banc) (“[I]t is the state’s action—not any intervening federal court decision—that

establishes the status quo.”).

Here, the Missouri Supreme Court—the “highest court in the state,” with “exclusive

appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the validity … of a statute or provision of the

constitution of ” Missouri, Mo. Const. art. V, §§ 2–3; see Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 425

(2008) (recognizing that “[a] State’s highest court is unquestionably the ultimate expositor

of state law” and that its “prerogative … to say what [state] law is merits respect in federal

forums” (citation modified))—established the state-law status quo when it ruled that “the

2022 map is the only map in effect,” von Glahn, 2026 WL 2628846, at *6 n.8. This “status

quo ([Missouri’s] duly-enacted election law) was disrupted by the [Missouri] Secretary of

State” when he conducted the August primary election using a map that was, ultimately,

never lawfully enacted. Carson, 978 F.3d at 1062. But the injury should go no further.

Under Purcell and the principles of federalism it embraces, the Eighth Circuit did not have

license to order for the November general election the same unlawful result orchestrated

by the Secretary for the August primary—and it certainly was not at liberty to upend the

status quo established by the Missouri Supreme Court. “It is one thing for a State on its

own to toy with its election laws close to a State’s elections. But it is quite another thing for

a federal court to swoop in and re-do a State’s election laws in the period close to an election.” Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for

stays).

Nor was the Eighth Circuit entitled to disregard this Court’s September 10 stay

order. “Lower court judges may sometimes disagree with this Court’s decisions, but they

are never free to defy them.” Nat’l Insts. of Health v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, 145 S. Ct.

2658, 2663 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

CONCLUSION

The stay application should be granted.