Amicus Curiae Brief — People Not Politicians, et al., Applicants v. Robert Onder, et al.

No. 26A-388

In the Supreme Court of the United States

PEOPLE NOT POLITICIANS, ET AL.,

Applicants,

v.

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT “BOB” ONDER, ET AL.,

Respondents.s

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE FLORIDA, TEXAS, AND 20 OTHER

STATES IN OPPOSITION TO APPLICANT’S EMERGENCY

MOTION TO CLARIFY AND APPLICATION FOR STAY

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General of Florida

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST

Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

WILLIAM R. PETERSON

Solicitor General

WILLIAM F. COLE

Principal Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Texas Attorney General

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

September 23, 2026

JASON J. MUEHLHOFF

Chief Deputy Solicitor General

VINCENT H. LI

Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General

PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee,

FL 32399-1050

(850) 414-3300

david.dewhirst@myfloridalegal.com

jenna.hodges@myfloridalegal.com

Counsel for Amici States

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................... ii

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................ 1

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 3

I.

The equities overwhelmingly disfavor a stay. .............................................. 3

A. The Purcell principle disfavors a stay........................................................... 4

B. General equitable principles further disfavor a stay. .................................. 6

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 8

ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES.................................................................................... 10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens,

146 S. Ct. 418 (2025) .................................................................................................. 4

Allen v. Milligan,

146 S. Ct. 1377 (2026) ................................................................................................ 5

Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections,

607 U.S. 71 (2026) ...................................................................................................... 2

Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc.,

525 U.S. 182 (1999) .................................................................................................... 1

Burson v. Freeman,

504 U.S. 191 (1992) .................................................................................................... 1

Clingman v. Beaver,

544 U.S. 581 (2005) .................................................................................................... 8

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature,

592 U.S. 1039 (2020) .................................................................................................. 5

Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm.,

489 U.S. 214 (1989) .................................................................................................... 1

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,

435 U.S. 765 (1978) .................................................................................................... 8

Gray v. Sanders,

372 U.S. 368 (1963) .................................................................................................... 2

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183 (2010) .................................................................................................... 3

Malliotakis v. Williams,

146 S. Ct. 809 (2026) .............................................................................................. 5, 6

Merrill v. Milligan,

142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) .................................................................................. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6

Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006) .................................................................................................... 2, 4

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

589 U.S. 423 (2020) .................................................................................................... 5

Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. City of Vicksburg,

185 U.S. 65 (1902) ...................................................................................................... 7

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Statutes

52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20311 .............................................................................................. 2

Other Authorities

Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law,

130 Yale L. J. 1050 (2021) .......................................................................................... 7

iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, the Attorneys General of Florida and

Texas, on behalf of the State of Florida, the State of Texas, and 20 other States,

respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in support of the Respondents.

Amici States “indisputably ha[ve] a compelling interest in preserving the

integrity of [their] election process[es].” Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic

Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).

That compelling interest includes

“protecting voters from confusion and undue influence.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.

191, 199 (1992). That compelling interest naturally creates a corresponding duty:

“States, of course, must regulate their elections to ensure that they are conducted in

a fair and orderly fashion.” Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S.

182, 206 (1999) (emphasis added).

Our republican system depends on orderly,

administrable, and trustworthy elections. But when a court—here, the Missouri

Supreme Court—orders sweeping, last-minute changes to the election process, chaos

and confusion follow.

Amici therefore have an interest in ensuring this Court

preserves the States’ ability to administer predictable and stable elections.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

“Running elections state-wide is extraordinarily complicated and difficult.”

Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of

stays).

Yet this already difficult task becomes impossible when courts impose

sweeping changes to a state’s election landscape at the eleventh hour.

That is

precisely what the Missouri Supreme Court did—requiring Missouri to use a different

election map for the general election than it used for the primary election. The result:

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candidates running in different areas than those where they primaried, voters voting

for candidates they took no part in nominating, and state officials scrambling to

administer a different election in November than what they did in August.

Inevitably, “even heroic efforts likely [will] not be enough to avoid chaos and

confusion.” Id.

Not only that, but the Missouri Supreme Court’s order ignored the manifold

federal constitutional and statutory problems that would arise from substituting a

new map at this late date—ranging from basic equal protection violations for

Missouri’s voters, see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963), to the state’s inability

to comply with the September 19, 2026, the presumptive deadline for the Uniformed

and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, see 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20311.

Fortunately, well-developed equitable principles exist to remedy the potential

violations of federal rights. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), and its progeny

caution against “[s]uch late-breaking, court-ordered rule changes.” Bost v. Illinois

State Bd. of Elections, 607 U.S. 71, 80 (2026). And if there were ever a time to invoke

these principles, it is when a court orders a change to the election landscape so radical

that the lower court determined it would be “impossible” to implement at this late

juncture.

The district court properly recognized as such when it held that without a

temporary restraining order, “the public would suffer,” as “many Missouri voters

would have to cast their general-election votes for candidates whom they had no role

in nominating.” App. 61a–62a. Applicants did not agree, filing emergency motions in

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the Eighth Circuit.

The Eighth Circuit unanimously rejected Applicants’ bid.

Applicants then sought a stay before this Court, which was granted. After briefing

on the merits, the Eighth Circuit unanimously held that the Missouri Supreme

Court’s command “to use the [earlier] map in the November 2026 general election

violates the Constitution,” affirmed the district court, and remanded for entry of a

permanent injunction. 1 App. 3a. The Eighth Circuit explained that reverting to the

previous map would force millions of Missouri voters to choose between candidates

selected by different Missouri voters. App. 24a. That violated Article I, Section 2 of

the Constitution. App. 27a. The panel stayed the permanent injunction to ensure

that this Court would have an opportunity to review the merits. App. 35a.

The Court should deny the Applicants’ emergency application and allow

Missouri’s voters, candidates, and election officials to administer the election for

which they prepared for nearly a year.

ARGUMENT

I.

The equities overwhelmingly disfavor a stay.

When considering an application for a stay, this Court will look to, among other

things, the “likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay.”

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010). “In deciding whether to grant a

stay pending appeal or certiorari, the Court also considers the equities (including the

1 Judge Stras agreed that reverting to the earlier map would violate Article I, Section 2 of

the Constitution but would have dismissed the appeal on standing grounds. App. 36a.

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likely harm to both parties) and the public interest.” Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 880

(Kavanaugh J., concurring in grant of stays).

Those equities are lopsided here and overwhelmingly disfavor a stay. Whether

viewed through the Purcell principle governing elections specifically or through

general principles of equity, the result remains the same—the Eighth Circuit’s ruling

should be affirmed.

A. The Purcell principle disfavors a stay.

It is a “bedrock tenet of election law” that “[w]hen an election is close at hand,

the rules of the road must be clear and settled.” Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 880–81

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of stays). Conversely, “[c]ourt orders affecting

elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and

consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5. This

“risk will increase” as “an election draws closer.” Id. That is why “[c]hanges that

require complex or disruptive implementation must be ordered earlier than changes

that are easy to implement.”

Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 881 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in grant of stays).

Wittingly or not, the Missouri Supreme Court has steamrolled each and every

one of these considerations. It issued a bare-bones injunction requiring the use of a

different electoral map without addressing the inevitable chaos that will follow. The

court “improperly inserted itself into an active” election and thereby “caus[ed] much

confusion.” Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025).

Affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision, on the other hand, “not only prevents voter

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confusion but also prevents election administrator confusion—and thereby protects

the State’s interest in running an orderly, efficient election and in giving citizens

(including the losing candidates and their supporters) confidence in the fairness of

the election.” Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 592 U.S. 1039,

1044 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of vacatur of stay).

In light of these concerns, this Court has previously found a state makes “a

strong showing of irreparable harm and that the equities and public interest favor”

it when courts “‘alter the election rules on the eve of an election.’” Allen v. Milligan,

146 S. Ct. 1377, 1381 (2026) (per curiam) (quoting Republican Nat’l Comm. v.

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020)).

These general principles apply with full force to an improper order from a state

court. While Purcell has most often been applied to the orders of “federal courts” that

“alter the election rules on the eve of an election,” Republican Nat’l Comm., 589 U.S.

at 424, its animating principles—preventing voter confusion and loss of election

integrity—apply equally to state court rulings. It is no surprise then that this Court

has already stayed state court rulings in this context.

See, e.g., Malliotakis v.

Williams, 146 S. Ct. 809 (2026) (staying a state court order requiring new

congressional maps).

None of this changes with the unique procedural posture of this case. As the

Eighth Circuit noted, the status quo is the 2025 map set by the Missouri General

Assembly. App. 30a. Relying on that map, “[m]ore than 60 congressional candidates

filed,” “[c]andidates and their supporters invested countless hours and millions of

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dollars implement primary and general election strategies,” and “[m]ore than 1.2

million Missourians voted.” Id. The alternative map that the Missouri Supreme

Court imposed would “upset” the status quo. Id.

The Court should deny Applicants’ attempt to stay the restraint on the

Missouri Supreme Court’s eleventh-hour overhaul of the Missouri maps on the

Purcell principle alone. See Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh J., concurring in

grant of stays) (noting the “traditional test for a stay does not apply (at least not in

the same way) in election cases when a lower court has issued an injunction of a

state’s election law in the period close to an election”).

B. General equitable principles further disfavor a stay.

Applicants’ stay request should be denied pursuant to Purcell and the electionspecific caselaw from this Court. But general principles of equity also counsel in favor

of denying the stay. Members of this Court have repeatedly grounded Purcell’s

principle within the general equitable framework. See, e.g., Malliotakis, 146 S. Ct. at

811 (Alito, J., concurring in grant of stay) (“An injunction is an equitable remedy, and

such relief may be inequitable if it is issued shortly before an election, when

candidates, election officials, and voters have relied on the rules in place at that

time.”); Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of stays) (“As

I see it, however, the Purcell principle is probably best understood as a sensible

refinement of ordinary stay principles for the election context . . . .”).

General equitable principles further support denying Applicants’ stay. The

Missouri Supreme Court’s order comes only after (1) Missouri legally codified the new

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map, (2) Missouri defended the map’s legality against numerous lawsuits, and (3)

Missouri used the map in the primary election. App. 6a. Despite all this, Applicants

leveraged the preliminary stages of a statewide referendum—before any statewide

vote has been cast—to invalidate the congressional map. Equity, however, “has

always had a special role in combatting opportunism.” Henry E. Smith, Equity as

Meta-Law, 130 Yale L. J. 1050, 1076 (2021).

And most fundamentally, “it is one of the most valuable features of equity

jurisdiction, to anticipate and prevent a threatened injury, where the damages would

be insufficient or irreparable.” Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. City of Vicksburg, 185

U.S. 65, 82 (1902). The lower federal court found that Respondents were likely to

succeed on the merits its claim that reverting to the earlier map would violate Article

I, Section 2 by “disenfranchis[ing] voters of their votes in the primary election,”

“effectively nullifying their votes,” as well as violate the Equal Protection Clause by

divesting candidates and voters who did not happen to remain in same district in

both maps of “their fundamental electoral rights” by “foisting new candidates on

[Missouri voters] on the eve of the election.” App. 66a–67a. That same court found

that absent a temporary restraining order, “many Missouri voters would have to cast

their general-election votes for candidates whom they had no role in nominating,” and

that “the public would suffer.” App. 61a–62a. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the

grounds that a reversion to the earlier map would violate Article I, Section 2. 2 App.

2 The panel did not reach the Equal Protection Clause issue despite finding the district

court’s analysis “compelling.” App. 28a.

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27a. The panel also held that restraining the use of the earlier map “will lead to the

least amount of confusion for voters subject to a string of changes this month,”

because for “approximately one year, Missouri operated under the 2025 map,” during

which “Missourians filed to run for Congress, met candidates, watched campaign

advertisements, received campaign mail, and voted.” App. 32a. A hectic and likely

flawed election would undermine “the citizen’s confidence in government,” which is

an “interest[] of the highest importance.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435

U.S. 765, 787, 789 (1978). And “the denial of the right to vote cannot be cured by the

ability to participate in a subsequent or different election.” Clingman v. Beaver, 544

U.S. 581, 611 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Only the continued restraint of the

Missouri Supreme Court’s ill-conceived order can ensure that voters, candidates, and

the State of Missouri can conduct a proper and lawful election.

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny Applicants’ application.

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Dated: September 23, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General of Florida

DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney General Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM R. PETERSON

JASON J. MUEHLHOFF

Chief Deputy Solicitor General

Solicitor General

WILLIAM F. COLE

Principal Deputy Solicitor

General

VINCENT H. LI

Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Texas Attorney

General

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Office of the Attorney General PL-01, The Capitol

Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050

(850) 414-3300

david.dewhirst@myfloridalegal.com

jason.muehlhoff@myfloridalegal.com

jenna.hodges@myfloridalegal.com

Counsel for Amici States

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ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General

State of Alabama

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

CORI MILLS

Acting Attorney General

State of Alaska

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General

State of Montana

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

DREW WRIGLEY

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

RAÚL R. LABRADOR

Attorney General

State of Idaho

ANDY WILSON

Attorney General

State of Ohio

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General

State of Indiana

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

MARTY JACKLEY

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

KRIS KOBACH

Attorney General

State of Kansas

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General

State of Tennessee

RUSSELL COLEMAN

Attorney General

State of Kentucky

DEREK BROWN

Attorney General

State of Utah

LIZ MURRILL

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

JOHN MCCUSKEY

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

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