Amicus Curiae Brief — Denny Hoskins, Secretary of State of Missouri, Applicant v. Richard Von Glahn, et al.

No. 26A-304

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DENNY HOSKINS, in his official capacity

as Missouri Secretary of State,

Applicant,

v.

RICHARD VON GLAHN,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE FLORIDA, TEXAS, AND 18 OTHER

STATES IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT’S EMERGENCY

APPLICATION FOR STAY

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General of Florida

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST

Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney General

JASON J. MUEHLHOFF

Chief Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General

PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee,

FL 32399-1050

(850) 414-3300

david.dewhirst@myfloridalegal.com

jenna.hodges@myfloridalegal.com

WILLIAM R. PETERSON

Solicitor General

WILLIAM F. COLE

Principal Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Texas Attorney General

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

September 7, 2026

Counsel for Amici States

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................... ii

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................ 1

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 3

I.

The equities overwhelmingly favor a stay. ................................................... 3

A. The Purcell principle warrants a stay. ......................................................... 3

B. General equitable principles further favor a stay. ....................................... 5

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 6

ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES...................................................................................... 8

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens,

146 S. Ct. 418 (2025) .................................................................................................. 5

Allen v. Milligan,

146 S. Ct. 1377 (2026) ................................................................................................ 5

Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections,

607 U.S. 71 (2026) ...................................................................................................... 3

Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc.,

525 U.S. 182 (1999) .................................................................................................... 1

Burson v. Freeman,

504 U.S. 191 (1992) .................................................................................................... 1

Clingman v. Beaver,

544 U.S. 581 (2005) .................................................................................................... 8

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature,

592 U.S. 1039 (2020) .................................................................................................. 5

Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm.,

489 U.S. 214 (1989) .................................................................................................... 1

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,

435 U.S. 765 (1978) .................................................................................................... 8

Gray v. Sanders,

372 U.S. 368 (1963) .................................................................................................... 2

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183 (2010) .................................................................................................... 3

Malliotakis v. Williams,

146 S. Ct. 809 (2026) .............................................................................................. 6, 7

Merrill v. Milligan,

142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) ...................................................................................... 2, 4, 6, 7

Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006) .................................................................................................... 3, 4

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

589 U.S. 423 (2020) ................................................................................................ 5, 6

Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. City of Vicksburg,

185 U.S. 65 (1902) ...................................................................................................... 8

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Statutes

52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20311 .............................................................................................. 3

Other Authorities

Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law,

130 Yale L. J. 1050 (2021) .......................................................................................... 8

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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, the Attorneys General of Florida and

Texas, on behalf of the State of Florida, the State of Texas, and 18 other States,

respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in support of the applicant, Secretary

Hoskins.

Amici States “indisputably ha[ve] a compelling interest in preserving the

integrity of [their] election process[es].” Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic

Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).

That compelling interest includes

“protecting voters from confusion and undue influence.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.

191, 199 (1992). That compelling interest naturally creates a corresponding duty:

“States, of course, must regulate their elections to ensure that they are conducted in

a fair and orderly fashion.” Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S.

182, 206 (1999) (emphasis added).

Our republican system depends on orderly,

administrable, and trustworthy elections.

But when, like here, a court orders

sweeping, last-minute changes to the election process, chaos and confusion follow.

Amici therefore has an interest in ensuring this Court preserves the States’ ability to

administer predictable and stable elections.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

“Running elections state-wide is extraordinarily complicated and difficult.”

Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of

stays).

Yet this already difficult task becomes impossible when courts impose

sweeping changes to a state’s election landscape at the eleventh hour.

That is

precisely what the Missouri Supreme Court just did—requiring Missouri to use a

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different election map for the general election than it used for the primary election.

The result: candidates running in different areas than those where they primaried,

voters voting for candidates they took no part in nominating, and state officials

scrambling to administer a different election in November than what they did in

August. Inevitably, “even heroic efforts likely [will] not be enough to avoid chaos and

confusion.” Id.

Not only that, but the Missouri Supreme Court’s order ignored the manifold

federal constitutional and statutory problems that would arise from substituting a

new map at this late date—ranging from basic equal protection violations for

Missouri’s voters, see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963), to the state’s inability

to comply with the September 19, 2026, deadline for the Uniformed and Overseas

Citizens Absentee Voting Act, see 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20311.

Fortunately, well-developed equitable principles exist to remedy the potential

violations of federal rights. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), and its progeny

caution against “[s]uch late-breaking, court-ordered rule changes.” Bost v. Illinois

State Bd. of Elections, 607 U.S. 71, 80 (2026). And if there were ever a time to invoke

these principles, it is when a court orders a change to the election landscape so radical

that the lower court determined it would be “impossible” to implement at this late

juncture. App. 52a. The Court should grant the Secretary’s emergency application

and allow Missouri’s voters, candidates, and election officials to administer the

election for which they prepared.

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ARGUMENT

I.

The equities overwhelmingly favor a stay.

When seeking a stay pending a petition for a writ of certiorari, this Court will

look to, among other things, the “likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the

denial of a stay.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010). “In deciding

whether to grant a stay pending appeal or certiorari, the Court also considers the

equities (including the likely harm to both parties) and the public interest.” Milligan,

142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh J., concurring in grant of stays).

Those equities are lopsided here and overwhelmingly favor a stay. Whether

viewed through the Purcell principle governing elections specifically or through

general principles of equity, the result remains the same—the Missouri Supreme

Court’s reckless order requiring an impossible election change must not stand.

A. The Purcell principle warrants a stay.

It is a “bedrock tenet of election law” that “[w]hen an election is close at hand,

the rules of the road must be clear and settled.” Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 880–81

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of stays). Conversely, “[c]ourt orders affecting

elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and

consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5. This

“risk will increase” as “an election draws closer.” Id. That is why “[c]hanges that

require complex or disruptive implementation must be ordered earlier than changes

that are easy to implement.”

Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 881 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in grant of stays).

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Wittingly or not, the Missouri Supreme Court has steamrolled each and every

one of these considerations. It issued a bare-bones injunction requiring the use of a

different electoral map without addressing the inevitable chaos that will follow. The

court “improperly inserted itself into an active” election and thereby “caus[ed] much

confusion.” Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025).

Staying this sweeping ruling “not only prevents voter confusion but also prevents

election administrator confusion—and thereby protects the State’s interest in

running an orderly, efficient election and in giving citizens (including the losing

candidates and their supporters) confidence in the fairness of the election.”

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 592 U.S. 1039, 1044 (2020)

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of vacatur of stay).

No surprise, then, that this Court has previously found a state makes “a strong

showing of irreparable harm and that the equities and public interest favor” it when

courts “‘alter the election rules on the eve of an election.’” Allen v. Milligan, 146 S.

Ct. 1377, 1381 (2026) (per curiam) (quoting Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic

Nat’l Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020)).

Those familiar principles govern here. The Court should grant Missouri’s stay

on the Purcell principle alone.

See Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh J.,

concurring in grant of stays) (noting the “traditional test for a stay does not apply (at

least not in the same way) in election cases when a lower court has issued an

injunction of a state’s election law in the period close to an election”).

And as relevant here, these general principles apply with full force to an

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improper order from a state court. While Purcell has most often been applied to the

orders of “federal courts” that “alter the election rules on the eve of an election,”

Republican Nat’l Comm., 589 U.S. at 424, its animating principles—preventing voter

confusion and loss of election integrity—apply equally to state court rulings. It is no

surprise then that this Court has already stayed state court rulings in this context.

See, e.g., Malliotakis v. Williams, 146 S. Ct. 809 (2026) (staying a state court order

requiring new congressional maps).

B. General equitable principles further favor a stay.

Missouri’s stay request is warranted under Purcell and the election-specific

caselaw from this Court. So too is a stay warranted under general principles of

equity. Members of this Court have repeatedly grounded Purcell’s principle within

the general equitable framework. See, e.g., Malliotakis, 146 S. Ct. at 811 (Alito, J.,

concurring in grant of stay) (“An injunction is an equitable remedy, and such relief

may be inequitable if it is issued shortly before an election, when candidates, election

officials, and voters have relied on the rules in place at that time.”); Milligan, 142 S.

Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of stays) (“As I see it, however, the

Purcell principle is probably best understood as a sensible refinement of ordinary stay

principles for the election context . . . .”).

General equitable principles further support Missouri’s petition. The Missouri

Supreme Court’s order comes only after (1) Missouri legally codified the new map,

(2) Missouri defended the map’s legality against numerous lawsuits, and (3) Missouri

used the map in the primary election. See Stay Pet. at 9–12. Despite all this,

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respondent leveraged the preliminary stages of a statewide referendum—before any

statewide vote has been cast—to invalidate the congressional map. Equity, however,

“has always had a special role in combatting opportunism.” Henry E. Smith, Equity

as Meta-Law, 130 Yale L. J. 1050, 1076 (2021).

And most fundamentally, “it is one of the most valuable features of equity

jurisdiction, to anticipate and prevent a threatened injury, where the damages would

be insufficient or irreparable.” Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. City of Vicksburg, 185

U.S. 65, 82 (1902). Here, both the state and the lower court found that requiring a

new map would be impossible to implement in time for the general election. See App.

52a. A hectic and likely flawed election would undermine “the citizen’s confidence in

government,” which is an “interest[] of the highest importance.” First Nat’l Bank of

Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787, 789 (1978). And “the denial of the right to vote

cannot be cured by the ability to participate in a subsequent or different election.”

Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 611 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Only a stay

of the Missouri Supreme Court’s ill-conceived order can ensure that voters,

candidates, and the State of Missouri can conduct a proper and lawful election.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Missouri’s application to stay.

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Dated: September 7, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES UTHMEIER

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

Attorney General of Florida

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM R. PETERSON

Solicitor General

JASON J. MUEHLHOFF

Chief Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General PL-01,

The Capitol

Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050

(850) 414-3300

david.dewhirst@myfloridalegal.com

jason.muehlhoff@myfloridalegal.com

jenna.hodges@myfloridalegal.com

Counsel for Amici States

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WILLIAM F. COLE

Principal Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Texas Attorney General

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General

State of Alabama

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

CORI MILLS

Acting Attorney General

State of Alaska

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

DREW WRIGLEY

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

ANDY WILSON

Attorney General

State of Ohio

RAÚL R. LABRADOR

Attorney General

State of Idaho

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General

State of Indiana

MARTY JACKLEY

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General

State of Tennessee

RUSSELL COLEMAN

Attorney General

State of Kentucky

DEREK BROWN

Attorney General

State of Utah

LIZ MURRILL

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

JOHN MCCUSKEY

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

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