Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Vinay Saini, Petitioner v. Hospital Care Consultants

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

36)-S’?

JUN 1 ? 2026

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

31 n We

Supreme Court of tlje Wniteb States

VINAY SAINI,

Petitioner,

v.

HOSPITAL CARE CONSULTANTS, INC.,

Respondent.

.....................

...... 4

.t.i?....

On 'Petition For Writ'r0f‘Certiorar.i

T6i»The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Tenth Circuit

PETITION EORWRTT OF CERTIORARI

—.................................................... ♦ ----............... -•?—-----------------

VINAY SAINI, Pro Se

3865 Estates Ct., Troy, MI 48084

T: (646) 717-4207

vny.saini@gmail.com

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Should accrual of the limitations period for a claim under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be subject to the

federal fraud-based discovery rule when a plaintiff does not

realize that he has been treated differently than other

employees because the employer misrepresented relevant

facts to cloak disparate treatment?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Vinay Saini, the Appellant-Plaintiff below.

Respondent is Hospital Care Consultants, Inc., AppelleeDefendant below.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner is a natural individual.

RELATED CASES

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, No. 242162, Saini v. Hospital Care Consultants, Inc. (April 6,

2026).

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico,

No. 24-113 MV/GBW, Saini v. Hospital Care Consultants,

Inc. (September 30, 2024).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED.......................................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................ v

OPINIONS BELOW...................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION............................................................................. 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS...................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................................... 2

I.

The Underlying Events.......................................................... 2

II. The District Court Proceedings........................................... 2

III. The Appellate Proceedings................................................... 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT................................ 3

I. The Question presented is important and recurring

with important impheations for Title VII litigants................ 3

A. A narrow interpretation of Ricks undermines the

remedial purpose of Title VII.................................................. 4

B. Fraud-based discovery rule is a presumption read

into every statute including Title VII...................................5

C. The fraud-based discovery rule and equitable tolling

are not synonymous................................................................. 6

II. This Case is an appropriate vehicle for resolving the

question presented......................................................................... 9

III. The court of appeals decision is incorrect and conflicts

with this Court’s decisions......................................................... 10

CONCLUSION............................................................................. 11

iv

APPENDIX............................................................................. 12

Appendix A: Order Denying Rehearing and Order and

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit (April 6, 2026)................................ App. l-12a

Appendix B: Opinion and Final Judgment of the District

Judge in the United States District Court for the District

of New Mexico (September 30, 2024)................App. 13-23a

Appendix C: Proposed Findings and Recommended

Disposition by the Magistrate Judge in the United States

District Court for the District of New Mexico (July 30,

2024)..................................................................... App. 24-54a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Amy v. City of Watertown,

130 U.S. 320 (1889)............................................................. 6

Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino,

501 U.S. 104 (1991)..............................................................6

Bailey v. Glover,

21 Wall. 342 (1875)..................................................... 3, 5, 10

California Pub. Emps. ’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Securities, Inc.,

137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017)........................................................8

Delaware State College v. Ricks,

449 U.S. 250 (1980).............................................................. 3

Dring v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,

58 F.3d 1323 (8th Cir.1995).................................................4

Gabelli v. SEC,

568 U.S. 442 (2013).............................................................. 8

Glass v. Petro-Tex Chemical Corp.,

757 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1985).............................................. 7

Green v. Brennan,

578 U.S. 547 (2016)..............................................................11

Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank,

928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990)..................................................4

Holmberg v. Armbrecht,

327 U. S. 392 (1946).......................................................... 3, 5

Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc.,

43 F.3d 555 (10th Cir.1994).................................................4

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,

501 U.S. 350 (1991).............................................................. 8

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

550 U.S. 618 (2007),............................................................. 9

Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,

490 U.S. 900 (1989).............................................................. 4

Love v. Pullman Co.,

404 U.S. 522 (1972).............................................................. 4

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,

427 U.S. 273 (1976)

...................................

10

Merck & Co. v. Reynolds,

559 U.S. 633 (2010)............................................................ 6

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

601 U.S. 346 (2024).............................................................10

Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101 (2002)...................................................... 3, 7, 9

Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,

38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994).................................................. 7

Rotkiske v. Klemm,

589 U.S. 8(2019).............................................................. 6, 7

Sherwood v. Sutton,

21 F. Cas. 1303 (C.C.D.N.H. 1828).....................................5

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,

431 U.S. 553 (1977).............................................................. 11

Urie v. Thompson,

337 U.S. 163 (1949)................................................................ 5

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)........................................................... 10

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l)............................................................. 1

Other Authorities

2 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment

Discrimination Law 1349 (3d ed. 1996)............................ 9

4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. &

Proc. § 1056 (4th ed. Apr. 2019).......................................... 7

7 Emp. Coord. Employment Practices § 84:63......................... 5

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

TENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner (Appellant-Plaintiff), Vinay Saini respectfully

petitions this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit.

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♦

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order and Judgement of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was issued on April 6, 2026

and is reproduced in the Petition Appendix at App. l-12a.

The September 30, 2024 Order and Judgement of the

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico

adopting the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation is

reproduced in the Appendix at App. 13-23a.

The July 30, 2024 Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Finding and

Recommended Disposition is reproduced in the Appendix at

App. 24-54a.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). A

petition for rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit on April 6, 2026. The Petition for Writ

of Certiorari was timely filed on June 16, 2026.

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-.........................

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) states: “A charge under this

section shall be filed [within 180 or 300 days] after the

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”

2

—......................... ............... ♦...............................................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

The Underlying Events

Petitioner, Vinay Saini, was employed by the Respondent

Hospital Care Consultants (“HCC”) as a medical doctor

under the H-1B provisions of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”). HCC terminated his employment

for an alleged breach of the employment agreement in

October 2018. Around July 2019, he filed a complaint with

the Department of Labor (“DOL”) alleging various

violations of the INA by HCC. Four years later, in October

2022, in course of hearing proceedings arising from the

DOL investigation, he for the first time discovered that

HCC claimed to have terminated his employment for

patient care issues. Challenging this reason as false and

discriminatory, he timely filed an EEOC Charge which

subsequently issued a Right to Sue letter. App. 25-26a.

II. The District Court Proceedings

In February 2024, Dr. Saini initiated proceedings in the

Federal District Court of New Mexico alleging, inter alia,

violations of Title VII. HCC moved under F.R.C.P. Rule

12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims on statute of limitations

grounds. The Court acknowledged that the October 2018

reason for Dr. Saini’s discharge was “vague,” his allegations

plausibly satisfied the “misrepresentation element,” and he

had no “reason or ability” to discover the subsequently

challenged October 2022 statement earlier. App. 31a, 45a,

48a n6. Nonetheless, the District Court rejected timeliness

arguments invoking the federal fraud-based discovery rule

and equitable tolling doctrines.

3

III. The Appellate Proceedings

Dr. Saini timely appealed the judgement of the District

Court to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate

panel found that the discrimination claims accrued in

October 2018 because a plaintiff “need not be aware of the

unlawful discriminatory intent behind that act for the

limitations clock to start ticking,” declined to extend

equitable relief because HCC’s statement in October 2022

was an “adequate basis” to support its purported reason for

his discharge in October 2018, and declined to construe his

Title VII claim as premised upon disparate discipline

because it could not be an “adverse action” under Title VII.

App. 5-6a.

♦

............................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

The Question presented is important and

recurring with important implications for Title

VII litigants.

Under Title VII, “a timely charge [of discrimination] is a

prerequisite to having an actionable claim.” Nat'l R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120 (2002). The

issue here involves the question of two methods for

calculating the accrual of limitations period in Title VII

cases. Under the first, the “notice rule” expounded in

Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the

limitations period begins to run on the date the

employment decision “[is] made and communicated to [the

employee].” Id. at 258. Under the second, the federal “fraud

discovery rule” when a plaintiff is “injured by fraud . . . the

bar of the statute [of limitations] does not begin to run until

the fraud is discovered.” Holmberg u. Armbrecht, 327 U. S.

392, 397 (1946) (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348

(1875)).

4

The applicability of the fraud-based discovery rule to the

accrual of Title VII claims and the interpretation of this

Court’s precedents to this question presents an issue of

fundamental national importance. A technical reading,

which rewards employers for wrongful concealment, would

be “particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in

which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the

process.” Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972).

Because EEOC does not investigate untimely charges, the

consequence for failure to timely file a Title VII charge of

discrimination is severe especially when the true nature of

plaintiffs injury is wrongfully concealed by the employer.

A.

A narrow interpretation of Ricks

undermines the remedial purpose of Title

VII.

The majority of federal courts have interpreted Ricks to

mean that where discrete acts of disparate treatment are

alleged the injured employee need not have notice of the

employer’s discriminatory intent and its subsequent

discovery is of no moment to the inquiry into the timeliness

of the charge. See e.g. Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928

F.2d 86 (4th Cir.1990); Dring v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,

58 F.3d 1323 (8th Cir.1995); Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc., 43 F.3d

555 (10th Cir.1994). However, Ricks had cautioned the

commencement of the time period "should not run so soon

that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the

protections of a civil rights statute," Id. at 262 n.16.

Employers, rarely if ever, admit to the discriminatory

intent behind their decisions, and an inflexible

interpretation of Ricks creates a perverse incentive for

employers to be evasive, or worse to provide pretextual

reasons, for an employment decision adversely affecting the

employee. “Requiring employees to sue anticipatorily or

forever hold their peace,” Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,

Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 914 (1989) (Justice Marshall dissenting),

would open the floodgates on Title VII litigation because in

majority of such “anticipatory” suits, the plaintiff would be

5

filing on a mere speculation that he or she might have been

a victim of unlawful discrimination.

This Court has long recognized that it would be unfair to

charge "a plaintiff with knowledge of facts which are

unknown and inherently unknowable." Urie v. Thompson,

337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949). “Notice or knowledge of a

personnel decision is really only one part of the equation for

determining when an alleged discriminatory act has

occurred. The other part is the victim's belief that the

employer's decision is discriminatory. A claim will not be

defeated where the complainant had no reason to suspect

discrimination until after the charge filing period has

passed.” 7 Emp. Coord. Employment Practices § 84:63.

An approach more consistent with the remedial purpose

of Title VII, should require the adoption of discovery rule

where the employee does not realize that he has been

treated differently from other employees or whether such

different treatment was discriminatory.

B.

i

Fraud-based discovery rule is a

presumption read into every statute

including Title VII.

Justice Story’s exploration of the origins of the fraud­

based discovery rule has a long history in law. Sherwood v.

Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303 (C.C.D.N.H. 1828). The thrust of

the rule is that wrongdoers should not benefit from their

own wrongs because “every statute is to be expounded

reasonably, so as to suppress, and not to extend, the

mischiefs, which it was designed to cure.” Id. at 1307. “To

hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in

a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the

party committing the fraud could plead the statute of

limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was

designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made

successful and secure.” Bailey at 349. This doctrine was

later expanded as a discovery rule to be “read into every

federal statute of limitation.” Holmberg at 397; Merck & Co.

v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 645 (2010) (“state and federal

courts have applied forms of the ‘discovery rule’ to claims

other than fraud”).

While the expansion of the general discovery rule, in

some contexts, has been denounced by this Court as “bad

wine of recent vintage,” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 14

(2019) (citation omitted), no member of the Court has ever

doubted the traditional rule delaying the start of the

limitations period in cases of fraud where the victim’s

injury is not reasonably discoverable. True, Congress did

not expressly include a discovery rule when it enacted Title

VII, but it also did not intend to abrogate the common law

presumption of fraud-based discovery rule. See Astoria Fed.

Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)

(“Congress is understood to legislate against a background

of common-law adjudicatory principles.”).

Where a discharged employee does not know that his

Title VII rights have been violated because the reason for

his discharge is deliberately misrepresented and he has no

reason or ability to discover the misrepresentation until

years later, he cannot be expected pursue his rights

diligently, or indeed at all, because he did not realize that

he had been injured. A victim who is unaware of his injury

“cannot take any steps to obtain redress.” Amy v. City of

Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 325 (1889).

A strict interpretation of the Ricks’ “notice rule,” without

any consideration of the background presumption of the

fraud-based discovery rule, especially when the

misrepresentation is central to the manner in which the

claim is presented, undermines the remedial goals of Title

VII.

C.

The fraud-based discovery rule and

equitable tolling are not synonymous.

The importance and value of statutorily based

limitations periods is not questioned. However, where time

limitations for satisfying the statutory perquisites are

7

notoriously short, as in 180/300 day EEOC time filing

window, courts must maintain some flexibility in

adjudicating such claims. This Court has emphasized that

“a just result” must be considered when applying Title VU's

time filing requirements. Morgan at 121.

The doctrine of equitable tolling grants courts power to

give a party additional time to file a claim where fairness

dictates that result. However, the use of equitable tolling is

highly fact-driven. On the other hand, the “fraud discovery

rule” has a “a thrust different from equitable tolling.”

Rotkiske at 18 (2019) (Justice Ginsburg dissenting).

‘“[E]quitable tolling’ describes a doctrine that pauses, or

‘tolls,’ a statutory limitations period after it has commenced

.... By contrast, the fraud-based discovery rule sets the time

at which a claim accrues, i.e., the time when the statute of

limitations commences to run.” Id. Accordingly, where

alleged facts “[fall] comfortably within the fraud­

based discovery rule's scope” and “fraud infects the manner

in which the claim is presented,” Id. at 21, the inquiry into

the accrual of the claim should begin with the date of the

discovery of the fraud.

While federal courts have occasionally exercised

discretion to permit untimely Title VII claims to proceed

when employers have made misrepresentations concerning

the reason for an employee’s discharge, it has been

varyingly described as invoking an equitable tolling

doctrine or a discovery rule. See e.g., Oshiver v. Levin,

Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1389 (3d Cir.

1994) (“[W]here the plaintiff has been actively misled

regarding the reason for his or her discharge, the equitable

tolling doctrine provides the plaintiff with the full statutory

limitations period, starting from the date the facts

supporting the plaintiffs cause of action either become

apparent to the plaintiff or should have become apparent to

a person in the plaintiffs position with a reasonably

prudent regard for his or her rights.”); Glass v. Petro-Tex

Chemical Corp., 757 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1985) (victim must

have enough information by which a "reasonably prudent

8

person similarly situated" could have realized that he was

the victim of discrimination).

A leading treatise recognizes “the often confusing

distinction between accrual and tolling of statutes of

limitations” which has been “characterized as performing

both functions.” 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1056 (4th ed. Apr. 2019). Even this

Court has, at times, has used the two terms loosely. See

California Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Securities, Inc., 137

S. Ct. 2042, 2055 (2017) (“Tolling may be of great value to

allow injured persons to recover for injuries that, through

no fault of their own, they did not discover.”); Lampf, Pleva,

Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363

(1991) (referring to the “venerable principle” of “equitable

tolling” but describing the discovery rule).

Title VII plaintiffs should not have to rely on a court’s

discretionary equity powers which are used sparingly.

Rather, where wrongful concealment of facts underlying the

discrimination claim is plausibly alleged, the lack of key

facts that would support a claim of unlawful discrimination

is an issue that goes to whether a cause of action has

accrued, and not tolling. After all, “[m]ost of us do not live

in a state of constant investigation; absent any reason to

think we have been injured, we do not typically spend our

days looking for evidence that we were lied to or

defrauded.” Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 450-51 (2013).

Employers’ often have a perverse incentive to lie to

individuals they discriminated against to run the fairly

short 180/300 day limitations clock for filing a charge of

discrimination. In instances where wrongful concealment of

key facts is alleged, the courts must give plaintiffs a fair

opportunity to develop evidence to support the applicability

of the fraud-based discovery doctrine to their claims.

9

II. This Case is an appropriate vehicle for resolving

the question presented.

This Court has previously “declined to address whether

Title VII suits are amenable to a discovery rule.” Ledbetter

v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642 n.10

(2007), overturned due to legislative action (Jan. 29, 2009)

(citing Morgan). Morgan noted, in dicta, “[t]here may be

circumstances where it will be difficult to determine when

the time period [for filing a Title VII charge] should begin to

run. One issue that may arise in such circumstances is

whether the time begins to run when the injury occurs as

opposed to when the injury reasonably should have been

discovered.” Id. at 115 n.7. “Although [Supreme Court

precedents] seem to establish a relatively simple ‘notice’

rule as to when discrimination ‘occurs’ (so as to start the

running of the charge-filing period), courts continue to

disagree on what the notice must be of.”ld. at 123 (Justice

O’Connor concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing

2 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment

Discrimination Law 1349 (3d ed. 1996) (emphasis in

original)).

The question of how the general discovery rule fits in

with the narrower Ricks’ “notice rule” for determining the

accrual date of Title VII claims has not been addressed by

this Court. The lower courts can, and do, routinely dismiss

credible claims of discrimination on limitations grounds

because they parsimoniously apply the equity doctrines and

confuse them with statutory presumptions, like the

doctrines of general “discovery rule” and “fraud discovery

rule.”

Employers should not be allowed to run out the clock on

credible Tile VII claims through their own misconduct. The

facts of this case are emblematic of how this legal issue

frequently arises and present a good occasion for this Court

to provide clarity and uniformity on the limits of discovery

rule, general or fraud-based, and its applicability to the

Ricks’ “notice rule” in the context of Title VII.

10

III. The court of appeals decision is incorrect and

conflicts with this Court’s decisions.

The decision below was incorrect by narrowly construing

the Ricks’ “notice rule” and rejecting application of the

fraud-based discovery rule when the misrepresentation

element was plausibly pled. In the procedural context of

this case, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the court should have

accepted the factual allegations as true, not applied the post

hoc “adequate basis” test to the two differing alleged

reasons for the plaintiffs discharge, and modified the

accrual date of the claims—either under an equitable

tolhng or discovery rule doctrine—consistent with this

Court’s decisions in Bailey, Holmberg, and their subsequent

progeny.

The District Court acknowledged that if the October

2022 false statement triggered the limitations period, the

EEOC Charge would be timely. App. 30a nl. However, the

Court of Appeals rejected characterizing the discrimination

allegations, premised in discovery of the discriminatory

application of disciplinary criteria, as independently

actionable under Title VII. App. 5a nl; Cf. 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2(a)(2) (“classifying employees in any way which

would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of

employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his

status as an employee for discriminatory reasons” violates

Title VII); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427

U.S. 273, 284 (1976) (The basis for discharge “does not

diminish the illogic in retaining guilty employees of one

color while discharging those of another color.”). Further, in

denying the timely retaliation claim because it failed to

allege a materially adverse action, the decision below

overlooked this Court’s directive that a retaliatory harm

need not exceed any heightened bar. Muldrow v. City of St.

Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024).

Even accepting that Ricks requires the claim accrual to

run from the from the time when the discrete act of

discrimination occurred, the “critical question” in assessing

11

the timeliness of the Title VII charge is “whether any

present violation exists.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,

431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977). Where ongoing retaliatory

harassment is alleged, the “notice rule” has no applicability

because such a claim “includes every act composing that

claim, whether those acts are independently actionable or

not.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 557 (2016). Where an

employee does not, and could not, perceive discrimination

until a series of post-termination acts occur, e.g. an

employer’s continued harassment in retaliation of a

protected activity (here the DOL complaint), the overly

rigid and inflexible application of limitations period is

unjust.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, a Writ of Certiorari should

be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Vinay Saini

VINAY SAINI

3865 Estates Ct, Troy, MI 48084

T: (646) 717-4207

vny.saini@gmail.com

June 16, 2026