Amicus Curiae Brief — Alaska Policy Forum, Petitioner v. Alaska Public Offices Commission, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 20, 2026

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 26-88

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

ALASKA POLICY FORUM,

Petitioner,

ALASKA PUBLIC OFFICES COMMISSION;

YES ON 2 FOR BETTER ELECTIONS; AND

PROTECT MY BALLOT,

Respondents.

————

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Alaska Supreme Court

————

BRIEF OF AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE

EXCHANGE COUNCIL AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

————

SHAWN T. SHEEHY

Counsel of Record

FISHERBROYLES, LLP

1200 G Street NW

Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 258-0741

shawn.sheehy@fisherbroyles.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

August 20, 2026

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .....................

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................

ARGUMENT ........................................................

ALASKA’S TWO-TIERED DISCLOSURE REGIME FAILS CLOSELY

DRAWN SCRUTINY ................................

A. Alaska Cannot Justify Its Two-Tiered

Disclosure Regime Demanding Public

Disclosure Of All APF’s Donors And A

Second Public Disclosure Of The TopThree Donors On The Communication

Itself .....................................................

i. Alaska’s Justification for its TopThree Donor Disclosure Requirement Amounts to Administrative

Convenience Which is Insufficient

to Justify Infringements on Free

Speech .............................................

ii. Alaska’s Justification That on

Communication Disclosure Provides Immediate Assistance to the

Listener to Evaluate the Speaker’s

Speech is Foreign to the First

Amendment ....................................

B. Alaska’s Two-Tiered Disclosure Regime

Unnecessarily Abridges Speech and is

Therefore not Narrowly Tailored .........

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

C. Alaska’s

Two-Tiered

Disclosure

Regime Does not Reflect the Burden

on a Speaker’s First Amendment

Rights ...................................................

CONCLUSION ....................................................

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

AFL-CIO v. FEC,

333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ...................

Alaska Policy Foundation v. Alaska Public

Offices Commission,

583 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2026) ......................

6, 7

Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta,

594 U.S. 595 (2021) .................. 2, 7, 8, 11-13, 17

Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep.

Redistricting Comm'n,

576 U.S. 787 (2015) ...................................

Brock v. Local 375, Plumbers Int'l Union,

860 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1988) .....................

Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found.,

525 U.S. 182 (1999) ............................ 2, 6, 11-13

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976) .......................................

Citizens United v. FEC,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) ..................... 4, 8, 13, 14, 18

Davis v. FEC,

554 U.S. 724 (2008) ...................................

Doe v. Reed,

561 U.S. 186 (2010) ...................................

First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti,

435 U.S. 765 (1978) ...................................

Lynch v. Donnelly,

465 U.S. 668 (1984) ...................................

McConnell v. FEC,

540 U.S. 93 (2003) .....................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

McCullen v. Coakley,

573 U.S. 464 (2014) ...................................

McCutcheon v. FEC,

572 U.S. 185 (2014) .................... 2, 3, 5-7, 13, 16

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,

514 U.S. 334 (1995) .................................. 2, 8-10

NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson,

357 U.S. 449 (1958) ................................... 17, 20

Shelton v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479 (1960) ...................................

South Carolina v. United States,

199 U.S. 437 (1905) ...................................

8-9

Van Hollen v. FEC,

811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ......... 3, 12, 15, 16

Virginia v. Hicks,

539 U.S. 113 (2003) ................................... 3, 20

Watkins v. United States,

354 U.S. 178 (1957) ...................................

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. amend. I ......... 2, 3, 7, 8, 10-12, 17, 20

STATUTES

26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) ........................................ 1, 14

2 Alaska Admin. Code § 50.270(e) ...............

2 Alaska Admin. Code § 50.270(e)(2) ...........

Alaska Stat. § 15.13.040(d) ..........................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Alaska Stat. § 15.13.040(h) ..........................

Alaska Stat. § 15.13.040(e) ..........................

Alaska Stat. § 15.13.050...............................

Alaska Stat. § 15.13.090(a)(2) ......................

COURT FILINGS

Br. for ALEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting

Petitioner, Americans for Prosperity

Found. v. Bonta, Nos. 19-251 & 19-255

(U.S. Mar. 1, 2021), available at

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketP

DF/19/19-251/170380/202103011223542

39_19-251%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf (last

visited Aug. 16, 2026) ...............................

Br. for ALEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting

Petitioner,

First

Choice

Women’s

Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin, No. 24781 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2025), available at

https://alec.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/

09/ALEC-Amicus-Brief-FirstChoiceWom

ens-v-Platkin.pdf (last visited Aug. 16,

2026) ..........................................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Bradley A. Smith, Doxing Trump Donors Is

Just The Beginning, National Review

(Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nationalrevi

ew.com/2019/08/doxxingtrump-donors-isjust-the-beginning (last accessed Aug. 16,

2026)..................................................................

Bradley A. Smith, In Defense of Political

Anonymity, City Journal (Winter 2010)...

David M. Primo, Full Disclosure: How

Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Fail

To Inform Voters and Stifle Public Debate

(2011) .........................................................

Electronic Filing of APOC Documents,

available at https://apoc.doa.alaska.gov/

filer-resources/electronic-filing-of-apocdocuments/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2026) ...

Katherine T. Bennett, Testimony in Ohio:

Ranked Choice Voting (Feb. 18, 2026)

avail-able at Testimony in Ohio:

Ranked Choice Voting (last visited Aug.

16, 2026) ....................................................

Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil,

70 Yale L.J. 1084 (1961) ...........................

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

University of Maryland, School of Public

Policy, Program for Public Consultation,

Six-In-Ten Favor Ranked Choice Voting

In Federal Elections (April 20, 2022)

available at https://publicconsultation.

org/united-states/six-in-ten-favor-rankedchoice-voting-in-federal-elections/ (last

visited Aug. 16, 2026) ...............................

William Shakespeare, Hamlet (Norton ed.

1997) ..........................................................

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Like Petitioner, Alaska Policy Forum (“APF”), the

American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) is a

nonprofit and nonpartisan corporation organized

under 501(c)(3) of the Tax Code.1 ALEC and its

members are dedicated to educating the people of

the United States about the principles of limited

government, free markets, and federalism.

ALEC proudly serves as America’s largest nonprofit,

nonpartisan voluntary membership organization of

state legislators. With a membership base of hundreds

of private sector organizations and with legislatormembers in all 50 States, ALEC’s state legislative

membership amounts to nearly one-quarter of the

state legislators in the United States.

ALEC submits this amicus brief because if ALEC

speaks about an issue in Alaska, regardless of the

amount spent on disseminating ALEC’s speech,

Alaska may interpret such speech as election related

under an amorphous test. This interpretation could

trigger disclosure of all ALEC’s donors. In addition to

disclosing ALEC’s donors in filings with the Alaska

Public Offices Commission, ALEC must, on the

communication itself, disclose for a second time the

names and state of residence of ALEC’s top three

donors in the past 12 months. This would impose a

substantial chill on ALEC’s speech, especially given

No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part. Additionally, no counsel for a party or any person for a party,

made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief. In fact, no person, other than ALEC,

funded the preparation and submission of this brief. See Sup. Ct.

R. 37.6. Additionally, on July 28, 2026, ALEC’s counsel notified all

parties in this case of ALEC’s intent to file this amicus brief. Sup.

Ct. R. 37.2.

the history of harassment against ALEC and its members. Accordingly, Alaska’s disclosure and disclaimer

requirements violate the First Amendment.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Alaska’s two-tiered disclosure regime fails exacting

scrutiny and therefore violates the First Amendment.

First, because APF’s speech involves a ballot

initiative, the only interest Alaska has in disclosure is

in an informed electorate. Buckley v. Am. Const. Law

Found., 525 U.S. 182, 203 (1999).

Next, Alaska must adduce separate justifications for

each of its two-tiers of disclosure. Its donor disclosure

requirement that is filed with the Commission is to

inform the electorate. Alaska must have a separate

justification for its on-communication disclosure requirement. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 210 (2014).

Second, Alaska’s on-communication disclosure

requirement does not satisfy the sufficiently important

interest prong. Alaska justifies this requirement as a

means to provide the listener with a heuristic to

evaluate the speech. But this justification amounts to

convenience, which is not sufficient to infringe First

Amendment rights. See, e.g., Ams. for Prosperity

Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615 (2021). Additionally,

the Framers of the First Amendment would have

found this justification foreign to the First

Amendment and violative of the speaker’s right to

speak under a pseudonym. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections

Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342-43 (1995).

Third, Alaska’s two-tiered disclosure requirement is

not narrowly tailored. As for the base donor disclosure

requirement, there are less intrusive means to inform

the electorate. For example, Alaska could impose a

threshold reporting requirement or an earmarking

requirement. An earmarking requirement would

inform the electorate as to exactly who supports the

speech and not inundate the listener with misinformation. Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 497-98 (D.C.

Cir. 2016).

Fourth, the on-communication disclosure requirement is also not narrowly tailored because that

information is already available on disclosure reports.

These disclosure reports are available almost immediately upon filing. The second disclosure of APF’s topthree donors does not advance Alaska’s interest in any

meaningful way. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 210.

Fifth, Alaska’s two-tiered disclosure regime imposes

an intolerably high burden on First Amendment

rights. The internet’s ability to compile names and

addresses quickly permits abuse. Examples of abuse

are pervasive, especially to groups like ALEC. If

Alaska’s two-tiered disclosure regime is upheld, then

it will chill the speech of organizations like ALEC,

injuring both speakers and society. Virginia v. Hicks,

539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).

ARGUMENT

I. ALASKA’S TWO-TIERED DISCLOSURE

REGIME

FAILS

CLOSELY

DRAWN

SCRUTINY.

Alaska requires that organizations register with the

Alaska Public Offices Commission (“the Commission”)

before the organization spends money on a ballot

proposition campaign. Alaska Stat. § 15.13.050.

Additionally, Alaska generally requires reporting to

the Commission all expenditures made to influence an

election—including a ballot proposition—even when

the expenditure is $1. Id. § 15.13.040(d) and (h).

The report must disclose all donors who donated to

the entity regardless of the amount donated “for the

purpose of influencing the outcome of the election.” Id.

§ 15.13.040(e). Although the statute seems to contain

a limiting principle, seemingly requiring disclosure of

only those donations made with the purpose of

influencing the election, to quote Hamlet: “I know not

seems.” William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 2,

Line 76 (Norton ed. 1997). As the Commission’s

regulations make clear, if an organization’s general

funds are used, all the organization’s donors who

donated must be disclosed. See 2 Alaska Admin. Code

§ 50.270(e)(2). Instead, if an organization wants to

limit disclosure of its donors to only those who donated

with the purpose of influencing the election, the

organization must first complete some prerequisites.

First the organization must establish a separate bank

account; then the organization must solicit

contributions expressly for the purpose of supporting

the particular speech, allowing the contributor to

indicate that they want to influence the election; lastly,

the organization must then place the contributions

received into that account. See id. § 50.270(e). All of

this must be done prior to speaking. See Citizens

United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337-38 (2010).

In addition to these disclosures filed with the

Commission, the organization must make a disclosure

on the communication itself when an organization

makes a communication related to a ballot proposition.

This disclosure must identify the organization’s top

three donors within the past 12 months and provide

their names and states of residence. Alaska Stat.

§ 15.13.090(a)(2).

Alaska’s disclosure and disclaimer requirements are

unconstitutional for a few reasons.

First, Alaska needs to separately justify both of its

disclosure requirements. Because this case involves a

ballot proposition, the Supreme Court has made clear

that the government’s interest in preventing actual or

apparent corruption is not at issue. Thus, the only

interest Alaska has in disclosure is to provide

information to the electorate.

Thus, Alaska must justify its base disclosure

requirement in that it demands organizations like

APF to disclose all donors who donated, even those

who gave only $1. Then, Alaska must also justify why

it needs a second disclosure layered on top of the base

disclosure, especially when the second disclosure, the

on-communication disclosure, is also intended to

promote an informed electorate. Alaska fails to do this.

Second, even if Alaska could provide separate

justifications for each of its disclosure regimes, those

justifications are not properly tailored to the means

used. Accordingly, Alaska’s disclosure regime fails

closely drawn scrutiny.

A. Alaska Cannot Justify Its Two-Tiered

Disclosure Regime Demanding Public

Disclosure Of All APF’s Donors And A

Second Public Disclosure Of The TopThree Donors On The Communication

Itself.

In McCutcheon, this Court declared unconstitutional Congress’s aggregate contribution limits. This

Court found that the aggregate contribution limits—

in addition to the base contribution limits—did little if

anything to prevent actual or apparent corruption.

572 U.S. at 191. This is because when a contributor

contributes the maximum permitted under the base

limits to ten candidates, on the eleventh candidate, the

aggregate contribution limits suddenly prevent the

contributor from contributing even a dime. This is

because with the aggregate limits, Congress considered that dime corrupting. Id. at 210. Here, the

Supreme Court emphasized that in the context of

campaign finance laws, fit matters. Id. at 218. The

aggregate contribution limits at issue in McCutcheon

were not closely drawn to avoid “the unnecessary

abridgment of associational freedoms.” Id.

In the disclosure context, disclosure also serves to

prevent actual or apparent corruption. Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976). Disclosure of large

contributions allows the public to more easily detect

post-election quid pro quo corruption. Id. Additionally,

disclosure prevents actual or apparent corruption due

to reporting and record keeping requirements,

allowing the government to detect and pursue actual

or apparent corruption. Id. Lastly, disclosure provides

the electorate with information allowing the electorate

to evaluate the candidates and to know to which

interests the candidate will be most responsive. Id. at

66. Because this case involves a ballot initiative, the

first two government interests are simply not present.

Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. at 203. The only

interest that Alaska may advance with these

disclosure statutes is an informed electorate.

The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that its two-tiered

disclosure regime served the informational interests of

Alaska’s voters. Alaska Policy Foundation v. Alaska

Public Offices Commission, 583 P.3d 701, 735 (Alaska

2026). Concerning the base disclosure requirements,

the court ruled that Alaska has an interest in an

informed electorate. Id. at 730. Next, the Alaska

Supreme Court contends that the top-three donor

disclosure requirement better effectuates the

government’s interest in an informed electorate than

publicly available disclosure reports. Id. at 737. This is

so because on communication disclosure “provides an

instantaneous heuristic by which to evaluate generic

or uninformative speaker names...” Id.

Alaska fails to justify its double disclosure regime.

Closely drawn scrutiny requires that Alaska demonstrate that its top-three donor disclosure requirement

targets the informational interest in a meaningful way

and uses means that are narrowly tailored. Ams. for

Prosperity Found., 594 U.S. at 608. Accordingly, Alaska

cannot use means that unnecessarily abridge First

Amendment rights. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199.

i. Alaska’s Justification for its TopThree Donor Disclosure Requirement Amounts to Administrative

Convenience Which is Insufficient to

Justify Infringements on Free Speech.

At the outset, Alaska’s justification for its top-three

donor disclosure requirement is merely an argument

for administrative convenience. Alaska justifies the

requirement because it provides an “instantaneous

heuristic” to the listener and thus is more effective at

serving the government’s interest of an informed

electorate. Alaska Policy Foundation, 583 P.3d at 737.

Importantly, however, within the context of a ballot

petition, Alaska’s individual voters are exercising

legislative power. Id. at 709; cf. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz.

Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 793 (2015).

Thus, Alaska compels speakers to provide a second

layer of disclosure as a matter of convenience to those

acting with legislative power. The First Amendment

does not countenance government efficiency as a

sufficiently important interest to justify infringement

of First Amendment rights. Ams. for Prosperity Found.,

594 U.S. at 615; McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464,

495 (2014); see Pet. at 36. Alaska cannot use

administrative convenience to justify disclosure.

ii. Alaska’s Justification That on

Communication Disclosure Provides

Immediate Assistance to the Listener

to Evaluate the Speaker’s Speech is

Foreign to the First Amendment.

Premised on a mistrust of governmental power, the

First Amendment declares in no uncertain terms that

Congress “shall make no law…abridging the freedom

of speech…”. U.S. Const. amend. I; Citizens United,

558 U.S. at 340. The major purpose of the First

Amendment is to “protect the free discussion of

governmental affairs.” First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435

U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978).

Importantly, “the inherent worth of the speech in

terms of its capacity for informing the public does not

depend upon” the speaker’s identity. Id. at 777. Thus, a

state’s interest in providing voters with relevant

information is insufficient to abridge the right to

anonymous speech. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 276

(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in

judgment in part, and dissenting in part); see also

McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348 (holding that the

government’s informational interest is insufficient to

compel a speaker to disclose their identity).

When interpreting the meaning of the Free Speech

Clause, this Court looks to the meaning of the words

when it was adopted, and what the contemporaneous

understanding was concerning the Clause’s protections. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J.,

concurring) (citing South Carolina v. United States,

199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465

U.S. 668, 673 (1984)).

The Framers of the Constitution engaged in political

advocacy under pseudonyms, most famously “Publius”

of the Federalist Papers. Id. at 360. In 1779,

Dr. Benjamin Rush wrote under the pseudonym

“Leonidas” and argued that Congress had caused

inflation. Id. In 1784, the Governor of New Jersey,

William Livingston wrote under the pseudonym

“Scipio” arguing that the New Jersey legislature failed

to lower taxes. Id. at 362-63. Those who opposed the

writings of Publius signed their writings under

pseudonyms such as Cato, Centinel, Brutus, and The

Federal Farmer. Id. at 343 n.6. Benjamin Franklin also

“employed numerous different pseudonyms” in his

writings. Id. at 341 n.4. Chief Justice Marshall also

wrote under the penname “a friend to the Republic” to

defend some of the Supreme Court’s decisions. See

Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free

Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 Yale L.J. 1084,

1085 (1961). Accordingly, from 1789 to 1809, “no fewer

than six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty

senators, and thirty-four congressmen published political writings either unsigned or under pen names.” Id.

Political advocacy through the use of pseudonyms

was therefore common. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 369

(Thomas, J., concurring). In fact, Abraham Lincoln

himself engaged in political advocacy through the use

of pseudonyms. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 373 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). The Framers, therefore, established a

“respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of

political causes” and an “honorable tradition of

advocacy and dissent” because anonymity provides a

“shield from the tyranny of the majority.” McIntyre,

514 U.S. at 343, 357.

Speaking through a pseudonym, however, had

another salutary purpose. Clinton Rossiter, one of the

most respected historians of The Federalist Papers,

states that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and

John Jay chose to speak pseudonymously because they

wanted “their arguments debated on the merits, rather

than through personal attacks.” See Bradley A. Smith,

In Defense of Political Anonymity, City Journal at 9

(Winter 2010). The Supreme Court too has recognized

that speaking through a pseudonym requires the

listener to judge the speech not the speaker. McIntyre,

514 U.S. at 342.

The idea, therefore, that the government has a

sufficiently important interest in compelling disclosure on

the communication itself to provide the listener with

an “instantaneous heuristic” is foreign to the Free

Speech Clause. In fact, just the opposite: the Framers

wanted the listener to engage the speech disseminated

in the message, not attack the identity of the speaker.

Providing the listener with “instantaneous heuristic”

is a concept the Framers of the First Amendment

would have rejected. In fact, the Framers did reject

attempts both in Congress and the courts to compel

the disclosure of a speaker’s identity. McIntyre, 514

U.S. at 361-62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing

both the court case of John Peter Zenger, a printer who

refused to identify the author of pamphlets attacking

the royal governor of New York; and the case of

“Leonidas” where Elbridge Gerry moved Congress to

compel the printer of a newspaper to testify before

Congress on the identity of “Leonidas;” his motion failed).

B. Alaska’s Two-Tiered Disclosure Regime

Unnecessarily Abridges Speech and is

Therefore not Narrowly Tailored.

Alaska’s two-tiered disclosure regime is not

narrowly tailored for it unnecessarily abridges the

First Amendment rights of speakers. Alaska is “not

free to enforce any disclosure regime that furthers its

interests. It must instead demonstrate its need for [its

two-tiered disclosure regime] in light of any less

intrusive alternatives.” Ams. for Prosperity Found.,

594 U.S. at 613.

First, there are less intrusive alternatives that

Alaska can choose that would achieve its interest in an

informed electorate.

This Court has previously declared unconstitutional

disclosure statutes in the context of ballot petitions.

Specifically, this Court declared unconstitutional

Colorado’s requirement that petition circulators wear

badges that displayed their names and Colorado’s

requirement that disclosure reports identify the

names and addresses of each paid circulator. See

Buckley, 525 U.S. 182. Evidence demonstrated that the

badge requirement caused fewer people to serve as

petition circulators. Id. at 198. This is especially true

because when the circulator begins speaking with a

potential signatory, it is in that moment that

retaliation may occur, especially if the ballot issue is

volatile. Id. Colorado, for its part, insisted that the

badge requirement was necessary for law enforcement

purposes. Id.

The Court concluded that there were less intrusive

alternatives available to Colorado, such as the

affidavit requirement which demands the circulator

sign his name and provide his address behind each

page bearing a voter’s signature. Id. Importantly too,

the affidavit is separate from when the circulator

speaks, separating the speaker from the “heat of the

moment.” Id. at 198-99. The affidavit was therefore

sufficient to meet the law enforcement requirement.

Next, the Court declared unconstitutional Colorado’s

requirement the names and addresses of each paid

circulator be disclosed on disclosure reports. Id. at 20102. The Court declared this disclosure requirement

unconstitutional because Colorado also required the

disclosure of “who has proposed [the] measure and who

has provided funds for its circulation.” Id. at 203.

Colorado failed to prove that it needed the names and

addresses of the paid circulators themselves to have

an informed electorate. See id. As it was, Colorado had

means available to it that less infringed on First

Amendment rights, such as voiding those signature

pages if the petition circulator violated the laws

governing petition circulation. Id. at 205.

1. Alaska requires that APF disclose all donors who

donated to it regardless of amount. Alaska does not,

however, demonstrate that such broad disclosure is

necessary to have an informed electorate. Ams. for

Prosperity Found., 594 U.S. at 614. In fact, there is no

evidence that Alaska considered less intrusive alternatives. See Ams. for Prosperity Found., 594 U.S. at 618

(holding that California failed to carry its burden for

mandating disclosure of all 990s because California

failed to consider any less intrusive alternative).

Instead, an earmarking requirement would provide

the electorate with knowledge of exactly who supported the speech. Van Hollen, 811 F.3d at 497.

Additionally, Alaska has not shown why an informed

electorate requires the disclosure of each and every

donor to an organization that spent less than $700 to

support a ballot initiative. See Ams. for Prosperity

Found., 594 U.S. at 613-14.

2. Alaska’s second layer of disclosure, the top-three

donor disclosure requirement, is also not narrowly

tailored. The top-three donor names are already

disclosed on campaign finance reports. This is similar

to Colorado where the petition circulators’ names were

also already disclosed on the affidavit, making the ID

badge requirement unnecessary. Am. Const. Law

Found., 525 U.S. at 198. Also, like Colorado, disclosure

in campaign finance reports separates the speaker

from its message, allowing the listener to at least

initially, in the heat of the moment, to evaluate the

message itself. Then, if the listener wants to know, the

listener can pull the disclosure reports. Requiring that

APF disclose its top-three donors twice is not closely

drawn.

Additionally, because Alaska requires disclosure

reports, voters already have all of the donors

information, including the names and addresses of the

top three donors. The added on-communication

information does not advance the voter’s knowledge

but instead provides an incomplete picture in the heat

of the moment when the speech is heard. The voter

still has the information about who donates to the

organization long before casting a vote at the polls. The

on-communication disclosure does not advance the

government’s interest in an informed electorate in any

meaningful way. See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 210.

This is especially true when campaign finance

reports are publicly available as soon as the reports

are filed. This Court recognized that the internet

allows for “prompt” dissemination of disclosure

reports. This permits voters to rapidly react and hold

elected officials accountable. See Citizens United, 558

U.S. at 370-71. The Commission’s website provides

searchable campaign finance reports, including 24hour reports. When a filer certifies the report, “it is

immediately available for the public to view.”2

That Alaska allows organizations like APF and

ALEC to establish a separate segregated fund and to

fundraise for that purpose is of no import. It is well

known that people begin to focus on the election close

in time to the election. The decision to speak in

elections happens quickly and often in the heat of the

campaigns in the weeks leading up to the election.

Accordingly, the window within which to speak is often

short. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 334. For organizations like APF and ALEC that do not and cannot

electioneer, 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), requiring them to

establish a separate fund, create separate solicitations

where the contributor would then indicate express

support for the message, is simply impractical. See

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 334, 337-38 (discussing the

burdensome PAC requirements imposed on corporations); see also 2 Alaska Admin. Code § 50.270(e). APF

must comply with all of these requirements if it wishes

to spend less than $700 on a ballot initiative and

maintain the privacy of its donors.

Second, such broad disclosure would supply the

electorate with misinformation. For example, ALEC

serves as a nationwide forum for the study, education,

and vigorous debate of issues concerning individual

rights and free market policies. ALEC has legislative

members in all 50 states and collaborates with nonprofit think tanks and corporations. All three groups

Electronic Filing of APOC Documents, available at

https://apoc.doa.alaska.gov/filer-resources/electronic-filing-ofapoc-documents/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2026).

participate in these debates to formulate policy

proposals. ALEC’s corporate members employ more

than 30 million people and ALEC has sometimes

partnered with ideological opponents, such as the

ACLU, on issues like criminal justice reform.

Thus, individuals, nonprofits, and corporations all

participate with ALEC for various reasons and its

members do not agree with all ALEC’s activities.

Accordingly, ALEC’s donors donate for many reasons.

ALEC educates the public on many issues. If ALEC

were to run a communication in Alaska opposing

ranked choice voting, it is unlikely that its donors

would know about the communication and it is further

unknown how many donors would support ALEC’s

message.

In Van Hollen v. FEC, the D.C. Circuit analyzed

whether the FEC’s purpose requirement in its

electioneering communications disclosure regulations

survived an APA challenge. 811 F.3d 486, 488 (D.C. Cir.

2016). Although the statute’s disclosure provision did

not contain as a pre-requisite to disclosure that the

donor donate for the purpose of influencing the electioneering communication, the FEC’s regulations

adopted a purpose provision. In defending that

decision, the FEC contended that contributions to the

general treasury of a corporation “would mislead

voters as to who really supports the communications.”

Id. at 497.

In agreeing with the FEC, the D.C. Circuit provided

an example: a Republican donates $5,000 to the

American Cancer Society (“ACS”) because the

Republican wants to provide funding for cancer

research. Then, the ACS runs targeted advertisements

against Republican congressional members because

these Republicans sought to end federal funding to

ACS. Compelling disclosure of the Republican donor to

ACS would convey misinformation to the electorate

about “who supported the advertisements.” Id.

Consider the following hypothetical with ALEC. A

donor donates a substantial sum of money making the

donor one of ALEC’s top-three donors. This donor

makes the donation because he supports ALEC’s

educational efforts in supporting conservative and free

market principles.

Like some conservative voters, however, this

hypothetical donor supports ranked choice voting.3

ALEC, by contrast, opposes ranked choice voting.4

Imagine if ALEC ran a communication like Petitioners

and ALEC were required to disclose all its donors,

including the top-three donors on the communication

itself, because it posted on its website analysis of why

ranked choice voting is concerning. Alaska would

require the disclosure of the hypothetical donor which

would convey misinformation to the public. Van

Hollen, 811 F.3d at 497. Thus, Alaska’s broad and twotiered disclosure regime does not serve the interests of

an informed electorate in any meaningful way.

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 210.

Accordingly, Alaska’s two-tiered disclosure regime is

not closely drawn.

University of Maryland, School of Public Policy, Program for

Public Consultation, Six-In-Ten Favor Ranked Choice Voting In

Federal

Elections

(April

20,

2022)

available

https://publicconsultation.org/united-states/six-in-ten-favorranked-choice-voting-in-federal-elections/ (last visited Aug. 16,

2026).

Katherine T. Bennett, Testimony in Ohio: Ranked Choice

Voting (Feb. 18, 2026) available at Testimony in Ohio: Ranked

Choice Voting (last visited Aug. 16, 2026).

C. Alaska’s Two-Tiered Disclosure Regime

Does not Reflect the Burden on a

Speaker’s First Amendment Rights.

When evaluating the constitutionality of a disclosure regime, part of the exacting scrutiny analysis is

evaluating the strength of the governmental interest

against the actual burden on First Amendment rights.

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008).

The risks of disclosure make Alaska’s on-communication disclosure regime unnecessarily abridge Free

Speech rights. Donors may cease giving to organizations if their names and addresses are at risk of

disclosure, especially if it’s an issue they may or may

not support.

People have misused disclosure laws for purposes of

harassment for decades. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.

479, 486 n.7 (1960) (observing that a local association

had dedicated itself to obtaining the names of teachers

who belonged to controversial organizations “with a

view to eliminating from the school system persons

who supported organizations unpopular with the

group, including the ACLU.”); see also NAACP v. Ala.

ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465-66 (1958) (declaring

unconstitutional Alabama’s demand that the NAACP

produce its Alabama membership list as part of

Alabama’s purported effort to compel compliance with

the state’s incorporation laws).

The advent of the internet, however, has made

disclosure abuse more widespread and concerning. As

this Court recently recognized “anyone with access to

a computer [can] compile a wealth of information

about anyone else, including such sensitive details as

a person’s home address or the school attended by his

children.” Ams. for Prosperity Found., 594 U.S. at 617

(quoting in part Doe v. Reed, 561 U. S. 186, 208 (2010)

(Alito, J., concurring)).

For example, with California’s Proposition 8, opponents of Proposition 8 created websites that compiled

address information of Proposition 8 supporters.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 481 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Supporters received threats like: “Consider

yourself lucky. If I had a gun I would have gunned you

down along with your friends.” Id. Other supporters

were compelled to resign from jobs. Id. at 482. Other

people and organizations have abused campaign

finance disclosure reports as a means to threaten

potential donors to Republican candidates. Id. One

particular organization sent warning letters to

potential donors warning them that if they contributed

to Republican candidates, the donor could expect,

“legal trouble, public exposure, and watchdog groups

digging through their lives.” Id. at 482-83. The head of

this organization described this tactic as “going for the

jugular.” Id. at 482.

Websites, such as The Huffington Post, use Google

Maps “so viewers can see who in their neighborhood

has made political contributions.” David M. Primo,

Full Disclosure: How Campaign Finance Disclosure

Laws Fail To Inform Voters and Stifle Public Debate at

6 (2011). The internet continues to provide

opportunities for people to abuse publicly available

campaign finance disclosure reports. Bradley A. Smith,

Doxing Trump Donors Is Just The Beginning, National

Review (Aug. 9, 2019) available at https://www.nationa

lreview.com/2019/08/doxxingtrump-donors-is-just-thebeginning (last accessed Aug. 16, 2026) (discussing

Congressman Joaquin Castro posting campaign finance

reports on Twitter in 2019 disclosing San Antonio

residents who contributed the maximum amount to

President Trump’s reelection campaign and subsequent

harassment and threats those donors endured).

ALEC itself has endured a consistent barrage of

attacks where ideological opponents have sought the

complete list of ALEC’s members and donors. Br.

for ALEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,

Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, Nos. 19-251

& 19-255, at 3 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2021).5 Then, beginning in

2013, U.S. Senator Dick Durban of Illinois also

harassed organizations he thought might be members

of ALEC. In letters echoing the disgraced Senator

Joseph McCarthy, Durbin demanded to know if these

organizations are now or ever have been members of

or donors to ALEC. Id. at 4-5. More recently, in 2021,

ideological opponents filed complaints in 15 states

alleging that ALEC’s activities triggered those state’s

reporting and disclosure statutes. Br. for ALEC as

Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, First Choice

Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin, No. 24-781,

at 6 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2025).6

These harassing tactics had their intended effect.

Within the decade of 2011 to 2021, ALEC’s ideological

opponents caused ALEC’s funding to decrease by $2

million. Id. at 7. It took ALEC five years to rebuild the

organization’s support. Id. Additionally, between 2011

and 2013, ALEC lost approximately 25% of its private

sector members and 400 state legislative members,

including members who are Democrats. Id. at 7-8.

Available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/

19/19-251/170380/20210301122354239_19-251%20Amicus%20

Brief.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2026).

Available at https://alec.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/

09/ALEC-Amicus-Brief-FirstChoiceWomens-v-Platkin.pdf (last

visited Aug. 16, 2026).

Government action that leads to membership withdrawal and a loss of donations harms both free speech

and free associational rights. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 46263 (observing that a withdrawal of membership is a

First Amendment harm); Brock v. Local 375, Plumbers

Int’l Union, 860 F.2d 346, 350 (9th Cir. 1988) (same);

AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 176, 178 (D.C. Cir.

2003) (same).

Accordingly, the burden of Alaska’s disclosure

regime risks chilling the speech of organizations like

APF and ALEC. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,

197-98 (1957) (observing that compelling a congressional witness to publicly testify about their beliefs

and associations could cause the witness to experience

terrible reactions from the public that are disastrous

for the witness and for those persons whom the

witness discloses; additionally, those who adhere to the

same beliefs will refrain from speaking to avoid a

similar fate). Rather than speak, and risk disclosure of

their supporters, subjecting them to potential

harassment, some organizations might rather avoid

the public square altogether. This chilling of speech not

only harms organizations like APF and ALEC, but also

harms society. See Virginia, 539 U.S. at 119 (chilled

speech harms society because it is “deprived of an

uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

SHAWN T. SHEEHY

Counsel of Record

FISHERBROYLES, LLP

1200 G Street NW

Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 258-0741

shawn.sheehy@fisherbroyles.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

August 20, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.