Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michael H. Hunt, Petitioner v. Florida

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A, Corrected Opinion of the

Supreme Court of Florida, December 18,

2025 ..................................................................... 1a

Appendix B, Order of the Supreme Court of

Florida, denying motion for rehearing,

March 5, 2026 .................................................... 31a

Appendix C, Florida Statutes, Title XLVII,

Section 921.141: Sentence of death or life

imprisonment for capital felonies; further

proceedings to determine sentence................... 32a

1a

APPENDIX A

Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC2024-0096

____________

MICHAEL H. HUNT,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

December 18, 2025

CORRECTED OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Michael Harrison Hunt appeals his first-degree

murder conviction and death sentence, raising six

issues for our review. We have jurisdiction. See art.

V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

I.

A. Factual Background

The State’s evidence at trial established the

following facts. On April 4, 2019, Alexandra Elise

Peck (Lexie) was at home with her family in Panama

City. Lexie lived with her mother Jenna, her

stepfather Danny, and her brother Gabe. Gabe’s

girlfriend, P.O., and two friends, Brentley and Izac,

were also living at the home. Around 10:30 p.m., a

2a

man knocked on the door claiming to have a pizza

delivery. Danny answered the door and told the man

that no one in the home had ordered a pizza. When

Danny tried to shut the door, the man pushed it in,

nearly knocking him over. The man entered the

home, pulling a gun from his waistband and holding

it up to Danny’s chin. When the man did so, his face

covering slipped back and Danny recognized him as

Michael Hunt. He also then recognized Hunt’s “very

distinctive” voice.

Once Danny saw the gun, he yelled “run” to the

home’s other occupants. Hunt snatched Danny’s cell

phone from his hand and shot him in the neck. After

Danny fell to the floor, he heard a second, “totally

different” voice, which was later presumed to be the

voice of Hunt’s accomplice.1 He heard several more

gun shots coming from the home’s back bedroom. He

also heard Lexie say “Dad, help me” and “Please don’t

kill me” before several more shots. Knowing that

Hunt would likely shoot him again, Danny crawled to

the neighbor’s house, where his neighbor called the

police.

Meanwhile, Lexie had heard Danny’s warning

and ran into the home’s back bedroom, where

Brentley and Izac were staying. Hunt’s accomplice

followed her into the bedroom, where he shot Izac in

the back before shooting Lexie in the back of the

head. The accomplice shot Lexie and Izac again

before shooting Brentley and running out of the

room.

At the time of trial, there had been no arrest for Hunt’s

accomplice. There were suspects, and it was still an ongoing

investigation.

1

3a

Danny, Brentley, and Izac survived with serious

injuries. Lexie died at the scene. Although they were

home, Gabe and P.O. were hiding on the other side of

the house and were uninjured. Jenna was at work

and was also uninjured. When the police arrived at

the home, both Hunt and his accomplice had fled the

scene.

The Panama City Police Department suspected

that this murder was no random burglary and

immediately identified Hunt as a suspect. The

Panama City Police Department recovered shell

casings and fired projectiles from the scene, which

revealed that Danny was shot with a .380 caliber

handgun. Lexie, Brentley, and Izac were shot with a

.45 caliber handgun. Hunt was known to own both

types of weapons. About nine months after the

murder, a .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol was

recovered in a neighbor’s bushes, and the police

determined it was the weapon used to shoot Danny.

At the scene, Danny told both his neighbor and

several police officers that Hunt had shot him.

During the shooting, Gabe was in the home’s

bathroom and heard Hunt’s voice. But beyond the

physical

evidence

and

visual

and

voice

identifications, the Panama City Police Department

was already aware of the risk that Hunt posed to the

family because of their connection through Gabe’s

girlfriend, P.O.

About a year and a half before the murder,

sixteen-year-old P.O. met Hunt and began seeing him

and his girlfriend, Kaitlyn West, on a regular basis.

P.O. learned that Hunt owned a “dance studio” called

“Polecats,” which was advertised as an event space

that people could rent out and throw parties. At some

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point in their relationship, Hunt took pictures of

Kaitlyn and put them on a website without her

consent to prostitute her. She did not say anything or

leave him because Hunt beat her, and she was scared

that he would do something to her or her family.

Several months later, P.O.’s mother kicked her

out of the house, and P.O. began living with Hunt

and Kaitlyn. One night after Hunt sent Kaitlyn out,

P.O. was at the house alone with Hunt. She asked for

ibuprofen for a headache, but Hunt gave her Xanax

instead. Hunt covered the living room cameras and

raped P.O. She did not report the incident to the

police out of fear. Soon after, Hunt asked P.O. if she

wanted to receive money in exchange for having sex

with others. P.O. originally said no, but she “gave in”

out of both “peer pressure” and fear. She knew that

Hunt was doing the same with Kaitlyn. Hunt took

P.O. and Kaitlyn “wherever” to sell them. P.O.

testified that on one occasion, she was at Polecats

with Hunt when he came up behind her and put a

knife to her throat and said that if she ever told

anyone, he would kill her. Much of the prostitution

took place at Polecats. P.O. testified that she was

trafficked for about a year and a half.

Eventually P.O. started dating Gabe, and after

Hurricane Michael damaged Hunt and Kaitlyn’s

home, Hunt, Kaitlyn, P.O., and Gabe evacuated to

Biloxi, Mississippi, and stayed there for about a

month and a half. Sometime in the early months of

2019, the group made their way back to Panama

City. When they returned, Gabe stayed with Hunt,

Kaitlyn, and P.O. for a short period. Almost daily,

Hunt made multiple threats to him and P.O. about

how he would “end” them if they told anyone about

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what was going on. Gabe had seen Hunt with

firearms. Gabe eventually moved back in with his

mother Jenna, his stepfather Danny, and his sister

Lexie. At some point, Gabe’s friends, Brentley and

Izac, who had lost their homes in Hurricane Michael,

also began living at the house. Hunt and Kaitlyn got

to know the family during this period, as they often

dropped P.O. off at the house so that she could spend

time with Gabe.

Sometime in mid-February 2019, P.O., Kaitlyn,

and Hunt went to their rented storage unit to

retrieve their belongings. At the storage unit, Hunt

and Kaitlyn got into a serious argument, and they

demanded that P.O. choose between them. P.O.

decided that she wanted to live with Gabe and his

family, and Hunt did not object.

Shortly after she moved in with Gabe’s family,

P.O.’s acquaintance informed the Panama City Police

Department that she knew of a “runaway juvenile”

who was living with an adult. This information

prompted a Department of Children and Families

investigation. Around the same time, P.O. confided in

Gabe’s mother Jenna about the sex crimes.2 Up until

this point, P.O. had not confided in anyone else,

including Gabe. Corporal Corinne Clark of the

Panama City Police Department met with P.O. at the

home. Though not forthcoming at first, P.O.

ultimately signed criminal complaints against Hunt.

After speaking with P.O., Clark developed a

criminal case against Hunt and applied for an arrest

The term “sex crimes” refers to Hunt’s alleged sexual

battery of P.O. and the prostitution of P.O. and Kaitlyn.

2

6a

warrant. She learned that Hunt had an upcoming

court date for two unrelated criminal cases. The plan

was to serve Hunt with the warrant for the sex

crimes against P.O. and arrest him at the courthouse.

When Hunt’s cases were called, the assistant state

attorney informed the trial judge that there was a

new active arrest warrant against Hunt. Hunt also

learned of the warrant against him at this time. The

judge directed Hunt to wait while the court sorted

out the warrant, and then took a recess because of

unrelated noise in the gallery. When Hunt’s case was

recalled for service of the warrant, he was not

present in the courtroom.

That afternoon, Hunt met up with Kaitlyn, and

they went to Atlanta. It was during this trip that

Hunt began preparations to murder P.O. Rather than

taking Hunt’s black Ford Explorer, the couple

borrowed a family friend’s Ford Escape. The couple

first stopped in Dothan, Alabama, where they spent

the night. There, Hunt purchased window tint and

tinted the Ford Escape. Over the next two days, Hunt

also purchased two untraceable phones, black

sweatpants, and a black hoodie. On the way to

Atlanta, Kaitlyn learned that P.O. had filed criminal

charges against Hunt. Hunt told her twice that he

would “do what he ha[d] to do,” and “no witness, no

case.”

Meanwhile, while Hunt and Kaitlyn were in

Atlanta, Clark learned that the police were not

successful in arresting Hunt at the courthouse. The

Panama City Police Department immediately began

looking for him at all his known addresses and his

acquaintances’ addresses. They put out a “be on the

lookout for” him. Danny and Jenna requested extra

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patrols at their home, which police were already

conducting. Clark was also working with the

Department of Children and Families to get P.O. into

a safer place, but she did not want to leave Gabe.

Then, as detailed above, Hunt returned from

Atlanta and went to P.O.’s home with an accomplice

where they forced their way in, murdered Lexie, and

attempted to murder Danny, Brentley, and Izac.

They then fled to Atlanta. The day after the murder,

the United States Marshals Service apprehended

Hunt, who was wearing a woman’s wig and the black

hoodie, driving the Ford Escape toward Panama City.

B. Pretrial Proceedings

Prior to trial, the State filed a notice under

section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, of its intent to

introduce evidence of Hunt’s alleged sexual battery

and prostitution of P.O. At the hearing for the notice,

the State explained that the evidence was relevant to

establish motive, identity, intent, and premeditation.

Defense counsel objected to the use of the evidence as

similar fact evidence but conceded that it was likely

admissible because it was “inextricably intertwined”3

with the allegation in this case. Defense counsel

requested that any evidence deemed admissible be

“sanitized” so that it did not become a feature of the

trial and was not unduly prejudicial to Hunt. The

State agreed that the evidence was likely better

classified as “inextricably intertwined” and explained

“[E]vidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable

from the crime charged, or evidence which is inextricably

intertwined with the crime charged . . . is admissible under

section 90.402 . . . .” Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla.

1994).

3

8a

that it filed the notice “out of an abundance of

caution.”

Ultimately, the parties agreed that this evidence

was not Williams4 rule evidence. The trial court

determined that this evidence instead constituted

“dissimilar fact evidence” under section 90.402,

Florida Statutes. The trial court ruled that it would

not allow the evidence to become a feature of the trial

and cautioned the parties against any unnecessary or

in-depth discussion.

Also at this hearing, the trial court heard motions

made by the defense about Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme. Hunt had moved to declare

multiple sections of Florida’s capital sentencing

scheme unconstitutional. In part, Hunt alleged that

Florida’s scheme violated the Sixth and Eighth

Amendments. The trial court denied the motions.

Before trial, the Governor signed into law Senate

Bill 450 (SB 450), which amended Florida’s death

penalty statutes. Ch. 2023-23, Laws of Fla. (effective

Apr. 20, 2023; codified at § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (2023)).

SB 450 removed the requirement for a jury to be

unanimous in recommending a death sentence. See

ch. 2023-23, § 1, Laws of Fla. Under the new

sentencing scheme, a jury must recommend a

sentence of death to the court if at least eight jurors

(i.e., a supermajority) determine a defendant should

be sentenced to death. Id. If fewer than eight jurors

make that determination, the jury’s recommendation

must be a life sentence. Id. Prior to trial, the State

moved to utilize the amended version of the statute.

4

Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).

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Hunt

objected,

arguing

that

allowing

a

nonunanimous jury recommendation was both

unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92

(2016), and an ex post facto change of the law.

Following a separate hearing, the trial court rejected

those objections and granted the State’s motion.

C. Guilt Phase

The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial. The

State presented the testimony of twenty-nine

witnesses, while the defense presented one witness.

The State’s evidence at trial established the facts as

explained above. The defense focused on (1) the

undisputed fact that a second, unidentified man

killed Lexie; (2) attacking Danny and Gabe’s visual

and voice identifications; and (3) highlighting the

lack of forensic evidence.

Relevant to the issues on appeal, the defense

objected several times to testimony about the sex

crimes. Six of the State’s twenty-nine witnesses

testified about the sex crimes, some more briefly than

others. During P.O.’s testimony, when the State

asked her whether the prostitution took place in the

shared hotel room in Biloxi, defense counsel objected,

stating that this testimony was unnecessary to

proving motive. The State responded that the

purpose of P.O.’s testimony about Mississippi was to

corroborate Gabe’s testimony. The trial court stated

that it would allow P.O. to answer the question but

requested that the State then move on to the murder.

Also, prior to Kaitlyn’s testimony, defense counsel

objected to any testimony by her that did not relate to

the trip to Atlanta and back. The trial court

reiterated that her testimony about the sex crimes

10a

was relevant “for the limited purpose of [Hunt’s]

motive and to corroborate the testimony of [P.O.]”

At the preliminary charge conference, the State

requested a transferred intent instruction for the

first-degree murder charge. The defense objected,

arguing that the facts did not support the instruction.

The trial court ultimately approved the transferred

intent instruction, and the jury convicted Hunt on all

counts.

D. Penalty Phase

The penalty phase began after trial with the

same jury. The State presented victim impact

evidence but otherwise relied on evidence from the

trial. Defense counsel intended to call two expert

witnesses as mitigating evidence, but Hunt requested

that neither expert testify. Hunt’s older sister,

Wanda, who was his legal guardian during his

teenage years, testified about his childhood and their

“close knit” family. Hunt’s father ran a nightclub and

had eleven children with multiple women. Hunt did

not interact much with his father; the only thing they

enjoyed together was fishing. Wanda testified that

the family tried to “make up for what [Hunt] lost”

when his father died during his childhood. She also

testified that Hunt did well in school and was raised

to know right from wrong. Wanda explained how

after their father died, their mother worked during

the day as a teacher and ran the nightclub at night,

leaving one of Hunt’s older sisters to run the

household.

About five years after Hunt’s father’s death, the

nightclub and the family’s home were destroyed in

fires on the same night. Three years after the fires,

11a

when Hunt was fourteen years old, his mother died of

stomach cancer. At that time, Hunt went to live with

Wanda and her husband. Wanda testified that her

husband ran a recreation center and was a “strong

force” in Hunt’s life. Once he graduated high school,

Hunt joined the United States Army, from which he

eventually received a dishonorable discharge. After

Hunt left the military, he pursued a career in

rapping, and Wanda maintained infrequent contact

with him. Hunt’s niece testified about his community

involvement and a rap that he performed on behalf of

a recreation center.

The State sought to prove five aggravators.5 The

jury unanimously found that the State had proven all

five aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt,

considered the mitigating circumstances,6 and

The five aggravators were (1) there was a

contemporaneous conviction of attempted first-degree murder;

(2) the murder was committed while engaged or an accomplice

in the commission of a burglary; (3) the murder was committed

to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental

function or enforcement of laws; (4) the murder was especially

heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (5) the murder was committed

in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner with no pretense

of moral or legal justification.

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6

There was no mitigation presented based on the specific

circumstances delineated in section 921.141(7)(a)-(g), Florida

Statutes. Rather, Hunt’s mitigation evidence was entirely

premised on section 921.141(7)(h), which allows mitigation

based on “[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant’s

background that would mitigate against imposition of the death

penalty.” § 921.141(7)(h), Fla. Stat. The trial court found the

following factors in Hunt’s background to be mitigation: (1) his

family dynamic; (2) his childhood trauma; and (3) his mental

health. The trial court afforded Hunt’s childhood trauma some

weight and his family dynamic and mental health little weight.

12a

weighed them with the aggravators. The jury then

concluded by a vote of 10-2 that Hunt should be

sentenced to death.

The

trial

judge

followed

the

jury’s

recommendation and sentenced Hunt to death for his

first-degree murder conviction. This direct appeal

follows.

II.

A. Guilt Phase

On appeal, Hunt raises two issues related to the

guilt phase of his trial.

1.

First, Hunt argues that the trial court erred in

admitting evidence that P.O. and Kaitlyn were

prostituted as “inextricably intertwined” with the

charged acts. Hunt concedes that the evidence was

relevant but argues that it exceeded the scope of

what was necessary to provide an adequate

description of the charged offenses. The nature of the

evidence, he argues, ensured that it would be a

feature of the trial. We review this claim for abuse of

discretion. Kirkman v. State, 233 So. 3d 456, 467

(Fla. 2018) (citing McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777,

786 (Fla. 2010)).

In addition to the mitigation discussed in open court, the trial

court’s written order considered but afforded no weight to the

following mitigating evidence: Hunt’s childhood and adult

achievements; his military career, including numerous

commendations and other recognition; his physical health; his

conduct while awaiting trial; and his potential for rehabilitation.

13a

We have long held that evidence of “inextricably

intertwined acts” is relevant and admissible at trial.

Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1994).

Collateral

crimes

evidence

is

“inextricably

intertwined” if it is “necessary to (1) adequately

describe the deed; (2) provide an intelligent account

of the crime(s) charged; (3) establish the entire

context out of which the charged crime(s) arose; or (4)

adequately describe the events leading up to the

charged crime(s).” Ballard v. State, 66 So. 3d 912, 918

(Fla. 2011) (citing Dorsett v. State, 944 So. 2d 1207

(Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). Even when evidence is

inextricably intertwined, it cannot become a feature

of the trial. Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 293 (Fla.

2009) (citing Morrow v. State, 931 So. 2d 1021, 1022

(Fla. 3d DCA 2006)); see also Bryan v. State, 533 So.

2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1988). Relevant evidence of

collateral crimes becomes a feature of the trial when

it “ ‘transcend[s] the bounds of relevancy to the

charge being tried’ and the prosecution ‘devolves from

development of facts pertinent to the main issue of

guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of

the defendant.’ ” Peterson v. State, 2 So. 3d 146, 155

(Fla. 2009) (alternation in original) (quoting Conde v.

State, 860 So. 2d 930, 945 (Fla. 2003)).

Our evaluation of whether the trial court abused

its discretion is a case-specific one. See Pitts v. State,

263 So. 3d 834, 840-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)

(explaining that whether evidence becomes a feature

of the trial is a fact-dependent determination, made

on a case-by-case basis). In doing so, we have

considered factors such as the number of references

made to the evidence, whether the evidence was a

focus of the State’s closing argument, and how the

14a

jury was instructed on the collateral crimes evidence.

Id. (first citing Wright, 19 So. 3d at 293-94; and then

citing Peterson, 2 So. 3d at 156).

Based on a complete review of the record, we find

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of

evidence. The trial court was vigilant in ensuring

that the collateral crimes evidence did not become a

feature of the trial. Only six of the State’s twentynine witnesses testified about the sex crimes. Most of

those witnesses only mentioned the crimes as they

related to the criminal investigation. P.O. and

Kaitlyn both testified that they were prostituted but

did not dwell on the topic. During closing argument,

the State only briefly mentioned that P.O. “hid

behind the door . . . because she was worried [that]

she was going to be raped and killed by men that

were there for her.” The State did not mention the

sexual battery or prostitution. Throughout trial, the

trial court continuously limited the scope of the

evidence to ensure that it only served its necessary

purpose.

Overall, the record supports a conclusion that the

State referenced the collateral crimes for the

purposes of (1) establishing that Hunt was criminally

charged and there were pending arrest warrants

when the murder took place and (2) establishing

Hunt’s identity, motive, intent, and premeditation to

murder P.O., resulting in Lexie’s death and the

attempted murder of three others. See Wright, 19 So.

3d at 292 (concluding that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of a

separate burglary because it “(1) linked [the

defendant] to one of the murder weapons and

explained his possession of this weapon; (2) provided

15a

a geographical nexus for each event; and (3)

established the context of [the defendant’s] three-day

crime spree”). Although the State mentioned these

crimes during trial to establish the necessary context

for the murders, the State was limited to introducing

relevant evidence that did not transcend the bounds

of the charges being tried. See Cannon v. State, 51

So. 3d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that

evidence of a collateral crime became a feature of the

trial when it was discussed for approximately half of

the opening and closing statements, two-thirds of the

witnesses testified about it, and video of the crime

was shown to the jury twice); Ballard, 66 So. 3d at

918 (explaining that collateral crimes evidence is

“inextricably intertwined” and therefore relevant

when it establishes context for the charged crimes).

P.O. and Kaitlyn’s testimony, for instance, provided

context for the jury to understand Hunt’s motive for

wanting to murder P.O. The sex crimes evidence here

appropriately “paint[ed] an accurate picture of the

events surrounding the crimes charged” and provided

context for the criminal conduct. Campbell v. State,

271 So. 3d 914, 932 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Truehill v.

State, 211 So. 3d 930, 945 (Fla. 2017)); see also

Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 753 (Fla. 1996). Thus,

we conclude that the trial court did not allow the

evidence to become a feature of the trial and did not

abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.

2.

Next, Hunt argues that the trial court erred by

instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred

intent. Hunt argues that the trial court erred because

the doctrine of transferred intent typically applies

when a defendant shoots at his intended target, but

16a

instead misses and kills someone else. Hunt posits

that because his accomplice shot his intended target,

but was mistaken about the identity of the victim, a

transferred intent instruction does not apply. We

review this issue for abuse of discretion. Armstrong v.

State, 73 So. 3d 155, 173 (Fla. 2011) (citing Green v.

State, 907 So. 2d 489, 498 (Fla. 2005); Fla. R. Crim.

P. 3.410).

We disagree with Hunt because his view of when

a transferred intent instruction applies is too narrow.

To be sure, we have said that “[t]he usual case

involving the doctrine of transferred intent is when a

defendant aims and shoots at A intending to kill him

but instead misses and kills B.” Provenzano v. State,

497 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. 1986) (citing Pressley v.

State, 395 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)). But

we have also noted that transferred intent is not

limited to this specific factual scenario. Id. at 118081; see also Coston v. State, 190 So. 520, 522 (Fla.

1939). In addition, we have long held that the

doctrine of transferred intent applies to cases where

a person is killed through “mistaken identity or

accident.” Lee v. State, 141 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla.

1962) (citing Hall v. State, 69 So. 692, 693 (Fla.

1915); Pinder v. State, 8 So. 837, 841 (Fla. 1891);

McCray v. State, 102 So. 2d 831, 831 (Fla. 1925)).

Here, the evidence at trial showed that Hunt and

his accomplice went to the house with the intent to

kill P.O. Although Hunt’s “intricate design to

effectuate death went awry” and P.O. survived, his

accomplice still murdered Lexie. Provenzano, 497 So.

2d at 1181. In fact, the State’s evidence showed that

Hunt’s accomplice thought that he was shooting P.O.

because of Lexie’s red hair. See id. at 1180 (holding

17a

that even though Provenzano knew that he was

shooting the bailiffs instead of his intended victims,

transferred intent was still an appropriate

instruction). Because the factual scenario here

supports the doctrine of transferred intent, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the

instruction. Lee, 141 So. 2d at 259; see also Yates v.

Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 409 (1991); Coston, 190 So. at

522 (“The law, as well as reason, prevents plaintiff in

error from taking advantage of his own wrong doing,

or excusing himself when this unlawful act, if

committed by plaintiff in error, strikes down an

unintended victim.”).7

B. Penalty Phase

Hunt next raises several constitutional claims

related to the penalty phase and his death sentence,

which are arguments we review de novo. Jackson v.

State, 191 So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 2016) (citing Crist v.

Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010)).

1.

First, Hunt argues that the trial court denied

Hunt due process of law by failing to determine

beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating

factors were sufficient to justify the death penalty.

Hunt acknowledges his argument is foreclosed by

precedent. See State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 505

(Fla. 2020) (reiterating that our prior holding

We also reject Hunt’s argument that the transferred

intent instruction had the potential to confuse the jury about

whose intent was transferred and how, because of the

concurrent instruction on the law of principals and the fact that

Hunt denied any involvement in the murder.

7

18a

requiring the reasonable doubt standard “was based

on a mistaken view”); McKenzie v. State, 333 So. 3d

1098, 1105 (Fla. 2022) (declining to revisit the issue);

Orme v. State, 361 So. 3d 842, 845-46 (Fla. 2023)

(same). Even so, he raises it now to preserve the issue

for federal review. However, he does not offer a

substantive reason for us to retreat from our

precedent. We therefore decline to revisit this issue.

See Bevel v. State, 376 So. 3d 587, 597 (Fla. 2023)

(rejecting the same claim when it was raised solely to

preserve for federal review); Wells v. State, 364 So.

3d 1005, 1014 (Fla. 2023) (rejecting this claim when

the defendant provided “no substantial reason” for us

to revisit our prior holdings).

2.

Next, Hunt asserts that Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme is constitutionally deficient for

several reasons. We focus our analysis on just one of

his arguments.8 Specifically, Hunt argues that

Hunt makes two other arguments. First, he argues that

by eliminating proportionality review, this Court has removed a

necessary safeguard against arbitrary and inconsistent

sentencing. Second, he argues that Florida has significantly

expanded the number of offenses eligible for a death sentence

since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and the scheme

no longer serves the constitutional mandate of narrowing the

class of people subject to a death sentence. This Court has

repeatedly considered and rejected these arguments. See Loyd

v. State, 379 So. 3d 1080, 1097-98 (Fla. 2023) (“[W]e have

‘repeatedly rejected the argument that the death-penalty

statute violates the Eighth Amendment because it fails to

sufficiently narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death

penalty.’ [Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015.] Eliminating

proportionality review did not change that analysis.” (citing

Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015)). We do so again here.

8

19a

although we have previously determined that the

Sixth Amendment does not require a unanimous jury

to recommend a death sentence, see Poole, 297 So. 3d

at 504, we should reevaluate our precedent in light of

the United States Supreme Court holding in Ramos

v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020). In Ramos, the

Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to a

jury requires a unanimous verdict. Id. at 92.

We reject Hunt’s argument. The holding in

Ramos does not apply to a jury’s recommendation of

death in a capital case because a jury’s

recommendation is not equivalent to a verdict. Poole,

297 So. 3d at 504. Instead, it is a capital jury’s

finding of an aggravating factor that is equivalent to

a verdict. Id. at 503. It is that finding that must be

found by the jury. McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U.S.

139, 145 (2020). And as amended, Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme requires aggravating factors to be

found by a unanimous jury. See § 921.141(2)(a)-(b),

Fla. Stat.

As for Hunt’s claim that eliminating the

unanimous jury recommendation violates the Eighth

Amendment, it also fails. For a capital sentencing

scheme to pass constitutional muster, there must be

an aggravating circumstance to narrow the class of

persons eligible for the death penalty. Zant v.

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). In imposing a

death sentence, the trial court must be permitted to

consider the defendant’s individual circumstances,

background, and crime. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.

447, 460 (1984) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,

604-05 (1978)). There must also be safeguards in

place to ensure that there are no “wholly arbitrary,

capricious, or freakish sentences.” Pulley v. Harris,

20a

465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984). We hold that Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme meets those requirements and

does not violate the Eighth Amendment.9

Together, Florida’s death penalty provisions10

establish the constitutionally required safeguards to

To the extent that Hunt contends that Ramos supports

this argument, that case involved the Sixth Amendment rightto-a-jury-trial provision and did not invoke the Eighth

Amendment. 590 U.S. at 88-89.

9

Unless the defendant has waived his or her right to such,

there must be a full-length penalty phase hearing before a death

sentence may be imposed. § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat.; see also Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.780. The jury must then deliberate and determine

if the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, the

existence of an aggravating factor. § 921.141(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

The jury must then “return findings identifying each

aggravating factor found to exist.” § 921.141(2)(b), Fla. Stat. “A

finding that an aggravating factor exists must be unanimous.”

Id. For a defendant to be eligible for a sentence of death, the

jury must unanimously find at least one aggravating factor. §

921.141(2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. If it makes such a finding, the jury

must make a recommendation to the court as to whether the

defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole or to death. § 921.141(2)(b)2., Fla. Stat. In

making that recommendation, the jury must weigh “[w]hether

sufficient aggravating factors exist” and “[w]hether aggravating

factors exist which outweigh the mitigating circumstances found

to exist.” § 921.141(2)(b)2.a.-b., Fla. Stat. Section 921.141

establishes the relevant aggravating factors and mitigating

circumstances. § 921.141(6), (7), Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Crim.

P. 3.202. Based on those considerations, the jury recommends to

the court “whether the defendant should be sentenced to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole or to death. §

921.141(2)(b)2.c., Fla. Stat. “If at least eight jurors determine

that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s

recommendation to the court must be a sentence of death.” §

921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. And “[i]f fewer than eight jurors

determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the

10

21a

ensure that there are no “arbitrary, capricious, or

freakish” death sentences. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45

(holding that a capital sentencing scheme with

“bifurcated proceedings, [a] limited number of capital

crimes, [a] requirement that at least one aggravating

circumstance be present, and the consideration of

mitigating circumstances minimized the risk of

wholly arbitrary, capricious, or freakish sentences”);

Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 466 (holding that Florida’s

capital sentencing scheme, which contained many of

the same provisions it still has today, did not violate

the Eighth Amendment). Thus, there is no support

for the argument that the Eighth Amendment

requires a unanimous jury recommendation.

3.

Finally, Hunt argues that application of section

921.141 as amended in 2023 violates the ex post facto

clauses of the United States and Florida

Constitutions because it increases the criminal

jury’s recommendation to the court must be a sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Id. If the jury

opts for a life sentence, the court is bound by that

recommendation and cannot impose death. § 921.141(3)(a)1.,

Fla. Stat. But if the jury recommends death, the court must

consider “each aggravating factor found by the jury and all

mitigating circumstances” and may then either impose a

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or

a sentence of death. § 921.141(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. The trial court

“may consider only an aggravating factor that was unanimously

found to exist by the jury.” § 921.141(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. The trial

court must also enter a written order in support of the imposed

sentence. § 921.141(4), Fla. Stat. Finally, judgments of

conviction and sentences of death are subject to automatic

review by this Court. § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat.; see also art. V,

§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

22a

punishment Hunt is exposed to by making it more

likely the death penalty will be imposed. For several

reasons, we disagree.

Article I, section 10 of the United States

Constitution prohibits a state from passing any ex

post facto law. Art. I, § 9, U.S. Const.11 To be ex post

facto, a law must either alter the definition of

criminal conduct or increase the criminal

punishment. Victorino v. State, 241 So. 3d 48, 50

(Fla. 2018) (citing Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441

(1997)); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)

(defining an ex post facto law). Additionally, the

statute in question must apply to events that

occurred before its enactment and disadvantage the

affected defendant. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S.

37, 41 (1990) (statutes must disadvantage the

affected defendant (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390-92));

Victorino, 241 So. 3d at 50 (statute must be

retrospective (citing Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441)).

Importantly, however, the Ex Post Facto Clause does

not give the defendant the “right to be tried . . . by

the law in force when the crime charged was

committed.” Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293

(1977) (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565,

590 (1896)).

Hunt argues that the amended statute violates

the ex post facto clauses because by decreasing

The Florida Constitution also contains a prohibition on ex

post facto laws. Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. (“No bill of attainder, ex

post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall

be passed.”). Although Hunt cites both provisions, he does not

make a distinct argument related to the state constitution and

instead primarily relies on federal precedent.

11

23a

unanimity requirements for penalty phase juries, the

chance that the death penalty will be imposed

increases. The State, on the other hand, argues that

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Dobbert demonstrates Hunt’s argument is without

merit. We agree with the State.

In Dobbert, a defendant was convicted of

murdering his two children and was sentenced to

death. Id. at 284-85, 287. At the time of the murders,

state law provided that a defendant convicted of a

capital felony was to receive a death sentence unless

a majority of the jury recommended life. Id. at 288.

Later that year, based on the United States Supreme

Court’s holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238

(1972), the Florida Legislature amended its death

penalty statute. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288-92. The

changes included new requirements for a full penalty

phase hearing, an advisory death recommendation by

a majority of the jury, the weighing of aggravating

and mitigating circumstances, and an automatic

review by this Court. Id. at 290-92. Because his

penalty phase occurred after these changes, Dobbert

was sentenced to death under the parameters of the

amended statute. Id. at 287.

Dobbert argued that sentencing him under

Florida’s amended statute violated the Ex Post Facto

Clause. Id. at 292. But the Court concluded that

these changes merely altered the methods used to

determine the applicability of a death sentence

rather than the “quantum of punishment” attached to

the crime. Id. at 293-94. Therefore, the Court held,

these changes were “clearly procedural” and did not

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.

24a

We agree with the State that Dobbert guides our

analysis here. As Judge Nardella explained in State

v. Lobato, 394 So. 3d 1219, 1224 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024),

applying the United States Supreme Court’s

analytical framework in Dobbert to the amended

statute compels the conclusion that the amended

statute too contains merely procedural changes that

do not alter the quantum of punishment. As a result,

the statute does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause

protections. See id.

Hunt argues that any procedure versus substance

distinction that Dobbert established has since been

undermined by the Collins decision, when the United

States Supreme Court admonished that “by simply

labeling a law ‘procedural,’ a legislature does not

thereby immunize it from scrutiny under the Ex Post

Facto Clause.” Collins, 497 U.S. at 46 (citing Gibson,

162 U.S. at 590). Hunt further argues that as a result

of Collins, the only remaining aspect of Dobbert’s

rationale is that the statute at issue in Dobbert was

not an ex post facto law because it was ameliorative.

However, as Judge Nardella also explained in

Lobato, Collins does not undermine our conclusion.

See Lobato, 394 So. 3d at 1224-25. Collins overruled

portions of Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).

In Thompson, the defendant committed a capital

crime when state law guaranteed him a jury of

twelve people. Id. at 344. By the time of his trial, the

legislature had modified the law to only require a

jury of eight people for conviction. Id. at 344-45. The

Court held in Thompson that this change in law

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 352-53. But

the Court overruled that holding in Collins,

reasoning that the right to a jury trial is based on the

25a

Sixth Amendment and has nothing “to do with the

definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments, which

is the concern of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” 497 U.S.

at 51. In other words, the Court held that even

reducing the number of jurors needed to convict a

defendant does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Id. Thus, as Judge Nardella put it, “surely reducing

the number of votes needed to provide a

‘recommendation’ of death also fails.” Lobato, 394 So.

3d at 1225.

Finally, Hunt argues that even considering

Dobbert, Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013),

which applied a risk analysis, should control our

analysis. In Peugh, the United States Supreme Court

explained that to determine whether there is an ex

post facto violation, the relevant inquiry is “whether

a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of

increasing the measure of punishment attached to

the covered crimes.’ ” 569 U.S. at 539 (quoting Garner

v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000)); see also Miller v.

Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 424-25 (1987) (addressing an

ex post facto claim pertaining to sentencing guideline

changes in Florida). The Court applied that test to a

claim related to changes in federal sentencing

guidelines and parole. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 533-34.

Hunt argues that eliminating the unanimity

requirement makes it more likely that a death

sentence will be imposed, thereby violating the Ex

Post Facto Clause under Peugh. But we are again

persuaded by the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s

reasoning on this issue. See Lobato, 394 So. 3d at

1225-26. The Sixth District explained that in Peugh,

the “detrimental change in the guidelines virtually

guarantee[d] an increase in the measure of

26a

punishment the defendant [would] face.” Id. at 1226.

The change to the statute here does not have a

similar guarantee. Id. As the Sixth District

explained, the legislature maintained the “essential

framework” of the three-phase death penalty scheme

in requiring a supermajority to offer a recommended

sentence. Id. at 1227. It remains that a unanimous

jury must find a statutory aggravating factor for a

defendant to be eligible for the death penalty. Id.

(citing Poole, 297 So. 3d at 503). Further, even if a

jury recommends death, the trial judge may opt for a

life sentence. See Miller, 482 U.S. at 435 (finding an

ex post facto violation where the judge did not have

the discretion to opt for a more lenient sentence).

These changes did not alter or increase the

punishment. Lobato, 394 So. 3d at 1227 (citing

Peugh, 569 U.S. at 530-31). The penalty remains

death regardless of how many jurors are required to

make the recommendation. See id. (“The two

procedural changes . . . concern the question of

mercy, which works only to abrogate, not to augment

the punishment which can be imposed.”).12

Overall, we apply the well-settled test and

conclude that the recent changes to the death penalty

scheme do not alter the definition of criminal conduct

or increase the penalty by which the crime of firstdegree murder is punishable. Victorino, 241 So. 3d at

Hunt also argues that this law violates ex post facto

because unlike the statute in Dobbert, the change here was not

“ameliorative.” But the Supreme Court has been clear that a

procedural change need not be “ameliorative” to not violate the

Ex Post Facto Clause. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292 n.6 (citing

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925)).

12

27a

50 (citing Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441). Thus, the statute

does not constitute an ex post facto law.

III.

Finally, we turn to our independent obligation to

review the sufficiency of the evidence. See Colley v.

State, 310 So. 3d 2, 19 (Fla. 2020) (“[E]ven where the

defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence, this Court has a mandatory obligation in

death penalty cases to determine whether competent,

substantial evidence supports a murder conviction.”

(citing Kirkman, 233 So. 3d at 469; Fla. R. App. P.

9.142(a)(5))). “In conducting this review, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State to

determine whether a rational trier of fact could have

found the existence of the elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rodgers v. State, 948 So.

2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006) (citing Bradley v. State, 787

So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)). Hunt was convicted

based on theories of both premeditated and felony

murder. His conviction can be upheld if the evidence

is sufficient to support either theory. Colley, 310 So.

3d at 19 (citing Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891

(Fla. 2019)).

We conclude that competent, substantial evidence

supports Hunt’s first-degree murder conviction. The

evidence at trial showed that Hunt was set to be

arrested for the human trafficking and sexual battery

of P.O. Upon learning of his pending arrest warrant

at a separate court hearing, Hunt defied the trial

judge’s instruction to remain at the courthouse and

fled to another state with Kaitlyn. Tracking on

Hunt’s primary cellphone, as well as license plate

readers, confirmed this trip. There, he formed the

28a

premeditated intent and plan to kill P.O. He

borrowed an unrecognizable vehicle and tinted the

vehicle’s windows. He purchased two nontraceable

phones, black sweatpants, and a black hoodie. During

the trip, Hunt told Kaitlyn about the criminal

charges against him and that he would “do what he

had to do” and “no witness, no case.” Once Hunt

made his preparations, he returned to Panama City,

where he was observed in the vehicle on business

security camera recordings near the victim’s home

immediately before the murder.

Hunt then forcibly entered the victim’s home,

using a pizza delivery ruse, with an accomplice.

Danny, the victim’s stepfather, identified Hunt

visually and through his “very distinctive” voice.

After he was shot, Danny informed both police and

his neighbor that Hunt was the perpetrator. Gabe,

who was hiding during the murder, also identified

Hunt’s voice. Although there was no DNA or latent

fingerprint evidence linking Hunt to the scene, a

spent casing from a .380 caliber pistol was recovered

from the home’s living room. Hunt owned this type of

weapon. A .380 caliber semi-automatic was later

found in a neighbor’s bushes, and the recovered

casing was matched to that weapon. When law

enforcement apprehended Hunt, he was driving the

vehicle and wearing the same black sweatshirt

purchased with Kaitlyn and observed on the night of

the murder. He also attempted to disguise his

identity by wearing a woman’s wig.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State,

there is competent, substantial evidence to support

Hunt’s first-degree murder conviction.

29a

IV.

We affirm Hunt’s first-degree murder conviction

and death sentence, as well as his convictions for

attempted murder and armed burglary of a dwelling.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ,

C.J.,

and

CANADY,

COURIEL,

GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE

REHEARING

MOTION

AND,

IF

FILED,

DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

Today’s decisions in Hunt v. State, No. SC20240096 (Fla. Dec. 18, 2025), and Jackson v. State, No.

SC2023-1298 (Fla. Dec. 18, 2025), reject various

challenges to the 2023 statutory amendment that

requires only eight members of a twelve-person

capital jury to vote to recommend the death penalty. I

concur in the result to the extent that these decisions

are consistent with what this Court has held since

State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020).

However, as I explain in my concurring in result

opinion in Jackson, the statutory amendment

requiring only an 8-4 jury vote to recommend that a

defendant be sentenced to death renders Florida’s

requirement the least demanding nationally and

establishes Florida as the state with the least

rigorous requirement among states that impose the

death penalty.

I believe that the use of the death penalty in

Florida and the integrity of the process benefit from

30a

safeguards such as the requirement of jury

unanimity, and I believe that such safeguards are

constitutionally permissible. I also continue to adhere

to the views expressed in my dissent in Lawrence v.

State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding from the

decades-long practice of conducting proportionality

review in direct appeals of sentences of death).

For these reasons, I can only concur in the result.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay

County,

Shonna Young Gay, Judge

Case No. 032019CF002281XXAXMX

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J.

Busharis, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial

Circuit of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Charmaine M.

Millsaps, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and

Benjamin L. Hoffman, Senior Assistant Attorney

General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

31a

APPENDIX B

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2026

Michael H. Hunt,

Appellant(s)

SC2024-0096

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

032019CF002281XXAXMX

v.

State of Florida

Appellee(s)

Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is hereby

denied.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL,

GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.

A True Copy

Test:

SC2024-0096 3/5/2026

John A. Tomasino

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court

SC2024-0096 3/5/2026

KC

Served:

CHARMAINE MILLSAPS

BARBARA J. BUSHARIS

MARK EDWARD GRAHAM

HON. SHONNA YOUNG GAY

PETER CHARLES OVERSTREET

CAPAPPEALS TLH ATTORNEY GENERAL

BAY CLERK

BENJAMIN HOFFMAN

32a

APPENDIX C

2025 FLORIDA STATUTES

___________________

Title XLVII

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS

Chapter 921

SENTENCE

921.141 Sentence of death or life imprisonment for

capital felonies; further proceedings to determine

sentence.—

(1) SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS ON ISSUE OF

PENALTY.—Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt

of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall

conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to

determine whether the defendant should be

sentenced to death or life imprisonment as

authorized by s. 775.082. The proceeding shall be

conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as

soon as practicable. If, through impossibility or

inability, the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a

hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined

the guilt of the accused, the trial judge may summon

a special juror or jurors as provided in chapter 913 to

determine the issue of the imposition of the penalty.

If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant

pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be

conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose,

unless waived by the defendant. In the proceeding,

evidence may be presented as to any matter that the

court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and

the character of the defendant and shall include

matters relating to any of the aggravating factors

33a

enumerated in subsection (6) and for which notice

has been provided pursuant to s. 782.04(1)(b) or

mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsection

(7). Any such evidence that the court deems to have

probative value may be received, regardless of its

admissibility under the exclusionary rules of

evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair

opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements.

However, this subsection shall not be construed to

authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in

violation of the Constitution of the United States or

the Constitution of the State of Florida. The state

and the defendant or the defendant’s counsel shall be

permitted to present argument for or against

sentence of death.

(2) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED SENTENCE

BY THE JURY.—This subsection applies only if the

defendant has not waived his or her right to a

sentencing proceeding by a jury.

(a) After hearing all of the evidence presented

regarding aggravating factors and mitigating

circumstances, the jury shall deliberate and

determine if the state has proven, beyond a

reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one

aggravating factor set forth in subsection (6).

(b) The jury shall return findings identifying each

aggravating factor found to exist. A finding that an

aggravating factor exists must be unanimous. If

the jury:

1. Does not unanimously find at least one

aggravating factor, the defendant is ineligible for

a sentence of death.

34a

2. Unanimously finds at least one aggravating

factor, the defendant is eligible for a sentence of

death and the jury shall make a recommendation

to the court as to whether the defendant shall be

sentenced to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole or to death. The

recommendation shall be based on a weighing of

all of the following:

a. Whether sufficient aggravating factors exist.

b. Whether aggravating factors exist which

outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to

exist.

c. Based on the considerations in subsubparagraphs a. and b., whether the defendant

should be sentenced to life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole or to death.

(c) If at least eight jurors determine that the

defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s

recommendation to the court must be a sentence of

death. If fewer than eight jurors determine that

the defendant should be sentenced to death, the

jury’s recommendation to the court must be a

sentence of life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole.

(3) IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE

IMPRISONMENT OR DEATH.—

OF

LIFE

(a) If the jury has recommended a sentence of:

1. Life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole, the court shall impose the recommended

sentence of life.

2. Death, and at least eight jurors recommend a

sentence of death, the court, after considering

35a

each aggravating factor found by the jury and all

mitigating circumstances, may impose a sentence

of life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole or a sentence of death. The court may

consider only an aggravating factor that was

unanimously found to exist by the jury. The court

may impose a sentence of death only if the jury

unanimously finds at least one aggravating factor

beyond a reasonable doubt.

(b) If the defendant waived his or her right to a

sentencing proceeding by a jury, the court, after

considering all aggravating factors and mitigating

circumstances, may impose a sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole or a

sentence of death. The court may impose a

sentence of death only if the court finds that at

least one aggravating factor has been proven to

exist beyond a reasonable doubt.

(4) ORDER OF THE COURT IN SUPPORT OF

SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT OR

DEATH.—In each case in which the court imposes a

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility

of parole or death, the court shall, considering the

records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings,

enter a written order addressing the aggravating

factors set forth in subsection (6) found to exist, the

mitigating circumstances in subsection (7) reasonably

established by the evidence, whether there are

sufficient aggravating factors to warrant the death

penalty, and whether the aggravating factors

outweigh the mitigating circumstances reasonably

established by the evidence. The court must include

in its written order the reasons for not accepting the

jury’s recommended sentence, if applicable. If the

36a

court does not issue its order requiring the death

sentence within 30 days after the rendition of the

judgment and sentence, the court shall impose a

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility

of parole in accordance with s. 775.082.

*

*

*