Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Zvi Kriple, Petitioner v. Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 24, 2026
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FILED: July
23,2026
united states COURT of appeals
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 26-1392
ZVI KRIPLE,
Petitioner.
v.
HORSERACING INTEGRITY AND SAFETY AUTHORITY; FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
ORDER
In 2025, the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the “Authority”)
found that racehorse trainer Zvi Kriple had violated an Authority rule regarding
home welfare, resulting in the suffering and death of a racehorse at an Ohio
racetrack, and imposed a two-year suspension of Kriple’s registration with the
Authority. Kriple sought review of this decision before a Federal Trade
(FTC) administrative law judge (“AU”), who affirmed the Authmhg|g|g|
Kriple filed a petition for review of the administrative law
court.
App. 1
le’s petition for lack
CTC and die Authority have moved to dismiss Kripi
, h
*
j‘ r-tlv review
fiction, noting that there is no statutory basis for this court to
the challenged agency action. Although Kriple cites
m his p
this provision does not provide an avenue for direct judicial review by this
only addresses the FTC’s authority to review an Authority determinati
flings opposing .he motions .o dismiss, Kripie aiso does no. proffer a vaiid basis for
fle’cburt’sjunsdictidnaSd’asl.si^ltefnativSyi tHaf tiie court transfer his case to an
appropriate venue.
As a threshold matter, we grant Kriple’s motions for leave to file a
supplemental response to the motions to dismiss and to file a supplemental statement
and attachments in support of his petition. However, upon consideration of Kriple’ s
various filings and the other materials before this court, we discern no basis for this
court’s jurisdiction to review the relevant order. Accordingly, we grant the motions
to dismiss and dismiss Kriple’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. We further deny
Kriple’s request for transfer, as no other court of appeals would have jurisdiction
over this action.
Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Wynn, Judge Harris, and Senior
Judge Floyd.
For the Court
Zs/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk
. f-
App. 2
APPENDIX B
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
ON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
MARCH 4, 2026
PUBLIC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
In the Matter of
Zvi Kriple,
Appellant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Docket No. 9446
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
ON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
PUBLIC
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................
I.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
II.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE.
A. Facts
i
1
........................
......................... 2
3
B.
The Racetrack Safety Program Rule Violation Charged
8
C.
The Decisions of the IAP member and the Board of the Authority
10
III.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
13
IV.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
13
V.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
...............................
14
A. The Authority Proved the Violation Charged. ..........................................14
B.
Mr. Kriple’s Procedural Due Process Rights Were Not Violated
C.
Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable
D.
Mr. Kriple Cannot Evade His Responsibility to Royal Honey by
Complaining about Veterinary Staffing at Belterra Park. ....................20
16
........................................19
VI.
SANCTIONS
21
VII.
CONCLUSION
26
i
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In the wee hours of a late summer morning in 2025, a thoroughbred
racehorse, Royal Honey, died a painful and lonely death in a stable at Belterra Park
racetrack in Ohio. This case concerns whether or not Royal Honey’s trainer, Zvi
Kriple, has responsibility for her death under rules that enforce the federal
Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act (“HISA”).11 hold that he does.
I.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK.
Congress enacted HISA in 2020 to provide national oversight and uniformity
to safety and substance control in the nation’s thoroughbred racing industry. Among
other things, HISA authorized the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the
“Authority”), a private, independent, self-regulatory, nonprofit corporation to
“develop D and implementD ... a racetrack safety program” throughout the United
States.2 The Authority issued regulatory rules that include the statutorily-required
Racetrack Safety Program (“RSP”), which the Federal Trade Commission
approved.3 HISA and the RSP rules, applicable to Covered Persons and Covered
Horses that HISA regulates, address, in summary: (1) the persons and racetracks
subject to the Program’s requirements! (2) training and racing standards related to
jockey safety and equine welfare! (3) the conduct constituting violations and
1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051-60.
2 Id. § 3052(a).
3 Id. §§ 3053, 3056, 3057.
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corresponding sanctions; and (4) investigation and enforcement in furtherance of
the statute.4
The Authority prosecutes RSP violations through its enforcement counsel. As
relevant here, RSP violations may be adjudicated by members of the Authority’s
Internal Adjudication Panel (“IAP”), an Arbitral Body, or racetrack stewards.5 Here,
in particular, an IAP heard the case. The FTC has authority to review decisions
imposing final civil sanctions arising from enforcement proceedings.6 Further
review is available under the Administrative Procedures Act.7
IL
SUMMARY OF THE CASE.
Mr. Kriple has litigated this case without an attorney. He did not submit a
witness statement and testified only briefly, while offering no other witnesses and
virtually no other evidence as part of his defense. Consequently, the facts are not as
developed as they might otherwise have been. This much, however, is clear.8
4 See generallyRSV Rule 2010 (Definitions); Racetrack Safety Program Rule Series 2000; 87 Fed.
Reg. 435 (Jan. 5, 2022) (FTC Notice of HISA Proposed Rule and Request for Public Comment); Order
Approving the Racetrack Safety Rule Proposed by HISA (March 3, 2022) (https://www.ftc.gov/system
Zfiles/ftc_gov/pdf/order_re_racetrack_safety_2022-3- 3_for_publication.pdf); 89 Fed. Reg. 24574 (Apr.
8, 2024) (FTC Notice of HISA Proposed Rule Modification and Request for Public Comment; Order
Approving the Racetrack Safety Rule Proposed Modification (June 7, 2024) (httpsV/www.ftc.gov/
system/files/ftc_gov/pdf7P222100CommOrderHISARacetrackSafetyRule20240607.pdf). Capitalized
terms used, but not defined in this Decision, are those defined in RSP Rule 2010.
5 See generally'RSP Rule Series 2000 and Rule 8320 (“Adjudication of Violations in the Rule 2200
Series”).
6 15 U.S.C. § 3058; 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.145-.148. See 87 Fed. Reg. 60077 (Oct. 4, 2022) (Final Rule).
7 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.
8 The record provided by the Authority includes memos that Dr. Sutherland, an expert witness that
enforcement counsel called, prepared of interviews he conducted. Appeal Book (“AB”) 9‘11. Although
Dr. Sutherland’s reliance on the interviews in forming his opinion is not objectionable, the record
2
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A.
Facts.
Royal Honey began “colicing”—exhibiting abdominal pain—on Saturday,
August 23, 2025.9 Saturday was a racing day at Belterra Park. There were two or
three veterinarians at the track.10 But there is no evidence Mr. Kriple contacted any
of them, and, therefore, Royal Honey was not examined. Mr. Kriple claimed to have
been unable to find any track veterinarian during the day that Saturday.11
However, he telephoned Dr. Tamara Widenhouse, one of Belterra Park’s regulatory
veterinarians, that night. Dr. Widenhouse “told him she was a couple hours away at
home” and advised Mr. Kriple “to take the horse to the clinic. . . .”12 Mr. Kriple did
not do so.
Around 12:30 p.m. the next day, Sunday August 24, 2025, Mr. Kriple
telephoned another Belterra Park veterinarian, Dr. Timothy Renn. Mr. Kriple told
him Royal Honey “had been colicing since the previous afternoon and evening, and
he wanted it seen . . . .”13 Dr. Renn was then 100 miles away at his home. He told
Mr. Kriple that “the horse definitely needed to be seen, or it was probably going to
die. I told him to call Park Equine or other trainers to find a vet locally.”14
does not establish whether or not his interview memos were admitted as evidence before the TAP
hearing. Therefore, I have not drawn on the memos for any facts forming the basis for this Decision.
9 AB 21 & 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.), 46 (Renn), 64 (Kriple), 122, 125 (Kriple App. to Bd.).
19 Id. 40, 42 (Pate), 56-60 (Renn).
11 Id. 64 (Kriple).
12 Id. 35 (Pate).
13 Id. 46 (Renn), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).
14 Id. 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.). See also id. 46 (Renn).
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Mr. Kriple “was basically . . . noncommittal about having the horse seen . . . .”15
During the day on Sunday, Mr. Kriple gave Royal Honey banamine, a pain killer,
and acepromazine, a sedative, plus milk of magnesia, “which really wasn’t going to
help this horse at all.”16
Dr. Renn next heard from Mr. Kriple around 8:30 p.m. on Sunday evening.17
Another trainer, Pearl Chain, was with Mr. Kriple and also spoke to Dr. Renn.18
Dr. Renn learned that Royal Honey “was getting tremendously worse and that no
care had been sought before that. . . .”19 On the call, Dr. Renn heard “distressed”
sounds—“[n]aying, whinning”—from Royal Honey in the background.20 Ms. Chain
“indicated in her opinion, the horse was going to die if it did not get any kind of
veterinary care.”21 Dr. Renn agreed, telling Mr. Kriple “the horse is going to die
unless it’s seen and it might just need to be euthanized, this might be too far
gone.”22 As Dr. Renn further testified:
Q [Enforcement counsel]: At that point in time, would you say that the horse
was in serious distress and pain based on what you were told Sunday night?
15 Id. 46 (Renn).
16 Id. 49 (Renn).
17 Id. 46 (Renn), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).
18 Id. 46, 48 (Renn), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).
19 Id. 46 (Renn).
20 Id. 47-48 (Renn).
21 Id. 49 (Renn).
™ Id.
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A-... . Yeah, . . . absolutely my recommendation. It had to be seen or it was
either going to die or it would need to be euthanized due to a[n] extremely
low chance of a positive outcome.23
Dr. Renn also learned from Ms. Chain that racetrack trainers had found a
veterinarian about 20 minutes away in Kentucky, Dr. Tony Wolfe, who agreed to
see Royal Honey.24 Ms. Chain, and two other trainers had “volunteered” to
transport Royal Honey for free to Dr. Wolfe’s facility.25
Mr. Kriple took no steps to secure veterinary care for Royal Honey. He
testified that, by late Sunday night, Royal Honey seemed better, more relaxed. He
stayed with the horse until about LOO a.m. Monday, but then left to sleep.26
Dr. Renn heard nothing further until early Monday morning, when he
arrived at Belterra Park for his pre-race rounds. He learned that Royal Honey had
“died somewhere like 3^00 or LOO in the morning . . . .”27 Later that day, Dr. Renn
spoke with Mr. Kriple, who told him Royal Honey had not been seen by any
veterinarian, despite Dr. Renn’s urgings.28 The necropsy performed the University
of Kentucky laboratory concluded that death resulted from a “ruptured volvulus”—a
23 Id. 50 (Renn).
24 Id. 46 (Renn). See also id. 35 (Pate).
25 Id. 46, 50, 52 (Renn). See also id. 35 (Pate), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).
26 Id. 65 (Kriple).
27 Id. 50 (Renn).
28 Id. 51 (Renn).
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twisting of the intestine, which blocks food passage, causing a build-up in pressure
that ruptures the digestive tract.29
Based on his conversations with Mr. Kriple and Ms. Chain, and his
experience as a veterinarian, Dr. Renn testified:
Q [Enforcement counsel]: . . . [I]n this particular case, if Mr. Kriple were to
report that the horse began colicing Saturday and continued colicing until
Monday morning at 3:30 AM, this horse would have been in pretty serious
pain and distress.
A: Absolutely.30
Dr. Renn testified further that Royal Honey needed veterinary care on Saturday or
Sunday: “if the surgery was declined, there would have been euthanasia
recommended, which would have prevented the horse from going through however
many hours of agony at the end of its life that it went through.”31
Dr. Bart Sutherland, a long-time veterinarian whose experience includes
investigating equine welfare, also testified.32 Dr. Sutherland investigated Royal
Honey’s death and described the horse’s condition: “a large colon embolus [sic
volvulus] is one of the most painful types of colic in the horse—very aggressive, very
acute, very dangerous if left untreated.”33 Recommended veterinary care was either
“surgery or euthanasia,” the latter “to avoid prolonged pain and suffering and
29 Id. 51'52 (Renn), 73 (University of Kentucky diagnostic report), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).
30 Id. 51 (Renn).
Id.
32 Id. 26'27 (Sutherland).
33 Id. 30 (Sutherland).
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distress . . . .”34 He agreed with Dr. Renn that, if Royal Honey had been examined
on Sunday, “it is my opinion that a veterinarian would have realized the
seriousness or grave condition of the horse.”35 Based on his investigation,
Dr. Sutherland believed that Mr. Kriple “caused needless suffering by unnecessarily
delaying or avoiding pursuing treatment for the uncontrollable pain of the horse
Royal Honey.”36
Mr. Kriple asked Dr. Sutherland no questions, stating that “I accepted the
description and I agree with the consequences.”37
David Pate, a steward at Belterra Park, recounted the basis for the racetrack
stewards’ action after the death of Royal Honey. The Belterra Park stall application
includes a provision requiring trainers to care for their horses “to the best of their
ability and ... do everything in their power to treat their horses right, . . . get them
the care they need . . . ”38 Royal Honey’s death called for the stewards to “figure out
if [Mr. Kriple] did, in fact, do everything he could for that horse or if there was any
neglect in the matter on his part.”39
After a stewards’ hearing, Mr. Kriple agreed to give up his Ohio license, and
the stewards themselves decided to “rescind[ ] it with prejudice and [to]
™ Id.
35 Id. 71 (assessment report).
™ Id.
37 Id. 32 (Kriple).
38 Id. 35 (Pate).
33 Id.
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recommendD to the Racing Commission not to license him again.”40 The Ohio State
Racing Commission put Mr. Kriple “on a stop list,” “preventing him from any future
license in this state.”41 According to Mr. Pate, “[t]his is the second (2nd) time
[Mr. Kriple] has been found to have neglected animals in his care, and I would
rather not find out if it will happen a third (3rd) time.”42
During his brief testimony, Mr. Kriple denied failing to care for Royal Honey.
However, his testimony included the following:
[T]o take the horse to a hospital. . . it’s going to cost you $6,000.00 .... I
couldn’t do that. I can’t afford taking the horse to hospital. So I was in a bad
situation and I completely agreed to this situation. I’m not denying it, I’m not
denying it. But I [was] left with no help, with no hope .... I’m terribly,
terribly sorry for the situation, but it’s not for lack of care. It’s lack of [a]
veterinarian to help me. That’s what the situation [was].43
B.
The Racetrack Safety Program Rule Violation Charged.
Mr. Kriple, a trainer, is a Covered Person under HISA and the RSP Rules.
Royal Honey was a Covered Horse. As a Covered Person, Mr. Kriple is required to
register with the Authority.44 By registering, Mr. Kriple “agree[s] to be subject to
40 Id. 37 (Pate).
41 Id. 37 (Pate), 80 (Pate Wit. Stmt.).
42 Id. 80 (Pate Wit. Stmt.).
43 Id. 65 (Kriple) (emphasis added).
44 Rule 2010 (Definitions), 9000(a) (registration of Covered Persons). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051(4)
& (6), 3054(d) (registration obligation).
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and comply with the rules, standards, and procedures of the Authority developed
and approved under 15 U.S.C. 3054(c).”45
RSP Rule 2215(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
No Covered Person . . . shall compromise the welfare of a Covered Horse for
competitive or commercial reasons or subject or permit any Covered Horse
under their control, custody, or supervision to be subjected to or incur the
following:
★ ★★
(4) Deprivation of necessary care, sustenance, shelter, or veterinary care.
In September 2025, the Authority’s enforcement counsel served Mr. Kriple
with a notice, alleging that Mr. Kriple violated Rule 2215(a)(4) by “depriv[ing] the
Covered Horse, Royal Honey of necessary veterinary care when she was
experiencing an emergency medical condition on or about August 24, 2025. The
Covered Horse, Royal Honey, died on Monday, August 25, 2025,”46 Enforcement
counsel further advised Mr. Kriple that if liability for the violation were proven,
“HISA may seek to impose one or more of the sanctions outlined in Rule 8200 as
deemed appropriate by HISA in keeping with the seriousness of the violation and
the facts of the case, and that is consistent with the safety, welfare, and integrity of
Covered Horses, Covered Persons and Covered Horseraces.”47
45 Rule 9000(g).
46 AB 14 (Notice of violation). See Rule 8200(d) (providing for notice of violation).
47 AB 14 (Notice of violation).
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Rule 8200(b) provides that after a hearing is held and a Rule violation
proven, the Authority “may impose one or more” of a variety of sanctions “in
proportion to the nature, chronicity, and severity of the violation . . .
As relevant
here, the Authority may “suspend the registration of a Covered Person for a definite
period . . . .”48
An IAP, consisting of a single member, heard enforcement counsel’s alleged
violation of RSP Rule 2215(a)(4), where enforcement counsel had the burden of
proving its charge by a preponderance of the evidence.49
C.
The Decisions of the LAP member and the Board of the Authority.
After receiving the witness testimony and documentary evidence at the
hearing, the IAP member found the following, in summary:
Royal Honey “began to show symptoms of colic” during Saturday afternoon,
August 23, 2025. On Sunday, August 24, Mr. Kriple spoke to Dr. Renn, who
“suggested several alternative veterinarians” and who “stressed the importance of
having the horse seen to.”50 If Royal Honey’s condition were “left untreated, ”
Dr. Renn told Mr. Kriple, that “could lead to a very painful death . . . .”51 When
48 Rule 8200(b)(3).
49 See Rules 7020(b), 8310, and 8340(f). The Rule-based steps by which this Rule 2215(a)(4) case
came to be referred to an IAP and heard under Rule 8000 Series procedures is unclear. Insofar as the
IAP’s jurisdiction might be questioned, Mr. Kriple failed to make a timely objection and participated
in the IAP hearing. Thus, he forfeited any jurisdictional objection. See generally Matter of Galvin,
No. 9445, 2026 FTC Lexis 3, at *6-15 (ALJ Jan. 7, 2026).
50 AB 93 (Amended IAP Ruling).
™Id.
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Mr. Kriple contacted Dr. Renn again on Sunday evening, Dr. Renn learned “the
horse still had not been treated by a veterinarian,” despite the offer of other trainers
“to ship the horse to a nearby vet clinic free of charge . . . .”52
Mr. Kriple left Royal Honey “unattended at L30 AM” on Monday morning,
after which, at 3^30 AM the horse died “a very painful death,” later determined to
have been caused by “a rupture” of Royal Honey’s “digestive tract.”53
The IAP member described Mr. Kriple’s testimony, which was offered
“withoutany other testimony to corroborate his evidence^ It is the Covered Person’s
testimony that, despite his best and repeated efforts over the periods of August 23rd
and 24th, 2025 he was unable to find any veterinarian that would either come to the
racetrack to treat the horse or receive the horse at a clinic where it could be seen
and treated.”54
The IAP member held that enforcement counsel proved Mr. Kriple violated
Rule 2215(a)(4) and awarded the following sanctions'■
1. Suspension of Mr. Kriple’s registration with the Authority for a period of
two years, commencing on October 28, 2025, and continuing through October
27, 2027.
2. Public disclosure of the sanctions.55
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. (emphasis added).
55 Id. 92-94 (Amended IAP Ruling).
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On Mr. Kriple’s appeal from the IAP member’s decision, the Authority’s
Board affirmed the IAP member’s decision.56 It rejected his argument that he did
not neglect caring for Royal Honey. Dr. Renn, the Board noted, provided Mr. Kriple
with an equine facility for treatment services and told him Royal Honey “would
likely die if she did not receive immediate treatment.”57 Further, Mr. Kriple
“refused” other trainers’ offers to transport Royal Honey for treatment, free of
charge.58 In consequence, “Royal Honey sufferted] a painful death . . . .”59
In addition, the Board rejected Mr. Kriple’s argument that the hearing
process was unfair, as Mr. Kriple had never objected to either the hearing date or to
disclosure deadlines.60 Thus, finding the IAP member’s decision “not clearly
erroneous” and “supported by evidence and applicable law,” the Board “affirmted]
the IAP Decision in full.”61
*
★
*
As provided for in HISA, Mr. Kriple seeks review of the Authority’s decision
upholding his two-year suspension.62 Although Mr. Kriple asserts several alleged
errors in the prior proceedings, his arguments are without merit. This is not a close
56 See Rule 8350.
57 AB 148 (Board Decision).
58 Id.
59 Id. 149 (Board Decision).
60 Id. 148 (Board Decision).
61 Id. 149 (Board Decision).
62 15 U.S.C. § 3058.
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case. Mr. Kriple deprived Royal Honey of necessary veterinary care. For the reasons
set out below, his two-year suspension is affirmed.
III.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
As framed by the parties, the following issues must be resolved:
A. Is the evidence presented by enforcement counsel sufficient to prove the
charge against Mr. Kriple?
B. Did the hearing before the IAP violate Mr. Kriple’s procedural due process
rights?
C. Does collateral estoppel bar enforcement under the RSP Rules?
D. Does the availability of veterinary staff at Belterra Park during the period
Royal Honey Suffered excuse or mitigate Mr. Kriple’s violation of RSP
Rule 2215(a)(4)?
IV.
SCOPE OF REVIEW.
HISA civil sanctions, imposed for Rule violations, are reviewable by an FTC
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upon application of the person aggrieved and
thereafter by the Commission itself on a discretionary basis.63 The ALJ reviews:
“whether—
(i) a person has engaged in such acts or practices, or has omitted such acts or
practices, as the Authority has found the person to have engaged in or
omitted;
(ii) such acts, practices, or omissions are in violation of this [chapter] or the
anti-doping and medication control or racetrack safety rules approved by the
Commission,’ or
63 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)-(c); FTC Rules 1.146-.147.
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(iii) the final civil sanction of the Authority was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”64
The ALJ’s review of the Arbitrator’s decision is de novo— “as if it had not
been heard before, and as if no decision previously had been entered.”65 Thus, the
ALJ must determine the merits of the charged violation, and whether the sanctions
the Authority imposed were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”66 In exercising their review authority, the
ALJ may “affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or remand for further proceedings, in
whole or in part” and “make any finding or conclusion that, in [their] judgment. . .
is proper and based on the record.”67
V.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES.
A.
The Authority Proved the Violation Charged.
On Saturday, August 23, 2025, Mr. Kriple suspected Royal Honey was
suffering from colic, and recognized the abdominal pain the horse was experiencing
64 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A). See also FTC Rule 1.146(b)(l)-(3).
65 Shane v. Albertson’s Inc., *504 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc.,
457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Harris v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co., 42 F.4th 1292,
1295 (11th Cir. 2022) (“De novo means ... a fresh, independent determination of ‘the matter’”)
(quoting with approval Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); Reyes-Colon v.
United States, 974 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2020) (“review ... de novo ... is a legalistic way of saying we
critique the judge’s decision without giving any deference to his views”); Amparan v. Lake Powell
Car Rental Cos., 882 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court’s grant of summary judgment
[is reviewed] de novo,” and “[i]n so doing, we need not defer to factual findings rendered by the
district court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Aquarius Marine Co. v. Pena, 64 F.3d 82, 87 (2d
Cir. 1995) (on de novo review, the appellate court “give[s] no deference to the lower court”).
66 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A); FTC Rule 1.146(b)(l)-(3).
67 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(3)(A)(ii-iii); FTC Rule 1.146(d)(3).
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required veterinary care.68 That Saturday and the next day, Sunday, all those
informed of, or able to observe, Royal Honey’s condition—Dr. Widenhouse,
Dr. Renn, Ms. Chain, and other Belterra Park trainers—drove home to Mr. Kriple
the seriousness of the situation. Royal Honey needed not only examination, but
possibly emergency surgery or, indeed, euthanasia. Several Belterra Park trainers,
a group likely to have an informed sense of the horse’s distress, identified a nearby
veterinarian and offered Mr. Kriple free transportation to the facility. Yet,
Mr. Kriple never obtained veterinary care. Early Monday morning, August 25,
2025, Royal Honey died, alone, after experiencing “prolonged pain and suffering and
distress . . . ,”69
These facts are undisputed. The Authority proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Kriple “[d]epriv[ed]” Royal Honey of “necessary . . . veterinary
care” in violation of Rule 2215(a)(4).70 Two veterinary experts, Dr. Bart Sutherland
and Dr. Timothy Renn, as well as steward David Pate, gave sworn testimony that
was credible and consistent. Dr. Renn testified not only to telephone calls with
Mr. Kriple, but also to one with trainer Chain. Royal Honey was in distress and
track trainers offered to transport Royal Honey to an available veterinarian for free.
Steward Pate corroborated Dr. Renn’s testimony.71
68 AB 64 (Kriple).
69 Id. 30 (Sutherland).
70 Rule 8340(f) provides that “t]he burden of proof shall be on the party alleging the violation to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Covered Person has violated or failed to comply
with, or is responsible for a violation of, a provision of the Authority’s rules.”
71 AB 35-36 (Pate), 46, 50, 52 (Renn).
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In contrast, apart from his own brief testimony, Mr. Kriple’s only other
evidence is a text message, allegedly from trainer Steve Sandy to Mr. Kriple,
stating: “no [veterinarian] would come 2 the track that night!”72 “[T]hat night,”
Kriple explained, referred to “Sunday night.”73 Even accepting, for argument’s sake,
the authenticity of the text, the message does not rebut enforcement counsel’s proof.
Kriple himself stated that, on Saturday, he could not find a track veterinarian to
see Royal Honey. By Sunday night, he had spoken by telephone with
Drs. Widenhouse and Renn, as well as trainer Chain and others, all of whom had
implored him to get Royal Honey urgently needed veterinarian care. Mr. Kriple
ignored advice. Trainer Sandy’s brief remark about his own Sunday night effort is,
at best, cumulative. In all events, it does not excuse Mr. Kriple’s neglect.
Mr. Kriple’s conclusory claim that the Authority relied on fabricated or
speculative evidence, is unsupported. It does not cast any doubt on enforcement
counsel’s proof. The rest of Mr. Kriple’s asserted errors on this review are equally
meritless.
B.
Mr. Kriple’s Procedural Due Process Rights Were Not Violated.
At a September 22, 2025 status conference, the IAP member set October 20
as the date for the hearing.74 Mr. Kriple argues that the hearing schedule denied
him due process because “Respondent objected by email to the hearing date due to
72 Id. 131 (Kriple text message with Steve Sandy); id. 63’64 (Kriple).
73 Id. 63 (Kriple).
74 Id. 17 (Authority’s Prehearing Stmt.).
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insufficient time to prepare . . . [but] [t]hat objection was not disclosed or
acknowledged in subsequent representations.”75 This objection implicates
§ 3057(c)(3), which requires that Rules implementing the statute “shall provide for
adequate due process . . . commensurate with the seriousness of the alleged safety,
performance, or anti-doping and medication control rule violation and the possible
civil sanctions for such violation.”76
Mr. Kriple never asserted any due process objection at the IAP hearing itself,
first adding this objection only on his appeal to the Board.77 Even then, Mr. Kriple
did not describe any additional proof he would have offered if the IAP hearing date
had been extended. The Board rejected Mr. Kriple’s objection, noting that he “never
objected to the hearing date . . . .”78
However, in a September 25, 2025 email to enforcement counsel, sent just
days after the IAP member set the hearing date, Mr. Kriple wrote: “I am in the
process of collecting witness list as well as information from the Ohio commission.
That might take some time so please let’s not commit to dates yet.”79 Although the
Board did not have the benefit of the continuing email thread, I do, and it bears
directly on Mr. Kriple’s argument on this review.
75 Kriple’s Proposed Findings of Fact
34-35.
76 15 U.S.C. § 3057(c)(3). See FTC Rule 1.146(c)(l)(ii).
77 AB 127 (Kriple appeal).
78 Id. 148 (Board decision).
79 Id. 134 (Kriple Ex. 1 to appeal to Board).
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In its reply here, the Authority has included as “Attachment 1” the full email
thread. Besides including Mr. Kriple’s “let’s not commit” email, it also contains
enforcement counsel response to Mr. Kriple, copied to the IAP member: “You will
need to take up your request to modify the dates and deadlines with Mr. Abbott [the
IAP member].”80 The IAP Member himself then emailed Mr. Kriple: “[t]he dates . . .
are committed. If you need extra time, please apply to me directly with an
explanation of your difficulties and proposed deadline.”81 Mr. Kriple never asked the
IAP member to modify the hearing date and did not renew his protest regarding
schedule at the IAP hearing itself, but instead participated in the proceeding.
In Matter ofArbitration Between Trans Chemical Ltd. and China National
Machinery Import and Export Corp.,82 the respondent objected to the arbitration
hearing date, but thereafter “proceeded to arbitrate . . . without further comment.”
The respondent opposed the prevailing party’s petition to confirm the award,
arguing that failure to reschedule the hearing date denied it a fair hearing. The
Court rejected the argument, noting that the respondent “failed to identify what
additional discovery or preparation it would have undertaken, and it is idle
speculation to assume that the result would have been different had [the
respondent] been given additional time.”83
80 Authority’s Reply Brief, Attachment 1.
Id.
82 978 F. Supp. 266, 307 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (cleaned up).
88 Id.
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Likewise here, taking account of not only Mr. Kriple’s failure to apply to re
set the hearing date, but also the entirety of the record, Mr. Kriple’s argument fails.
By not presenting his argument to the IAP member, Mr. Kriple forfeited his
objection to the hearing date.84 Nor has he shown he was prejudiced in his ability to
defend against enforcement counsel’s charged violation.85
As part of his due process objection, Mr. Kriple also contends that “HISA had
access to pro bono counsel resources for pro se respondents but did. not offer [him]
such assistance.”86 The objection is hollow.
Mr. Kriple never presented the argument to the Board, so it is not properly
subject to review, absent Mr. Kriple showing “good cause” that excuses the
omission.87 Kriple has made no such showing here. He has not offered evidence that
he took any steps to secure legal representation from any source, either on a pro
bono basis or as a paying client.
Accordingly, Mr. Kriple’s conclusory due process argument is without merit.
C.
Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable.
84 See generally, e.g., Ganton Techs., Inc. v. UAW, 358 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The failure to
pose an available argument to the arbitrator waives that argument in collateral proceedings to
enforce or vacate the arbitration award.”); Howard Univ. v. Metropolitan Campus Police Officer’s
Union, 512 F.3d 716, 719-21 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
85 See Laws v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 452 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2006) (the arbitrator’s
refusal to postpone the arbitration hearing did not deny the objecting party a fair hearing where the
party offered only a “conclusory motion”). Enforcement counsel’s submission of Attachment 1 as part
of its reply was, of course, irregular and in an appropriate case, might result in striking such a
submission or other relief. Mr. Kriple, however, has not filed any reply papers on this review, much
less objected to enforcement counsel’s attachment.
86 Kriple’s Proposed Findings of Fact
38.
87 FTC Rule 1.146(a)(1) (“Except for good cause shown, no assignment of error by the aggrieved party
may rely on any question of fact or law not presented to the Authority.”).
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As noted, prior to the IAP hearing, the Belterra Park stewards held a hearing
to decide, in substance, whether Mr. Kriple had provided adequate care for Royal
Honey. The stewards determined he had not; therefore, that proceeding, too,
resulted in sanctions against Mr. Kriple. On this review, Mr. Kriple maintains that
collateral estoppel arises from the Belterra Park stewards’ proceeding and bars
enforcement counsel’s case under RSP Rule 2215(a)(4).
But collateral estoppel has no application. The doctrine “cannot apply when
the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted”—here, the Authority—“did
not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case.”88 The
Authority was not a party to the Belterra Park stewards’ proceeding and, therefore,
had no opportunity at all to litigate anything against Mr. Kriple. The IAP member
rejected Mr. Kriple’s collateral estoppel objection during the hearing, recognizing
that Mr. Kriple was “under the jurisdiction of the [Authority] and . . . they have the
right to adjudicate this matter.”89 I agree and similarly reject his argument.
D.
Mr. Kriple Cannot Evade His Responsibility to Royal Honey by
Complaining about Veterinary Staffing at Belterra Park.
Finally, Mr. Kriple attempts to shift the blame for Royal Honey’s death on
Belterra Park’s supposed lack of an on-track veterinarian on Saturday. This is
88 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (cleaned up). See also United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart
Solution, P.C., 923 F.3d 308, 317 (3d Cir. 2019) (a non-party to the first case “did not have any
opportunity, much less a full and fair opportunity to litigate any issue involved in this appeal.”)
(cleaned up).
88 AB 25.
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another red herring. As a Covered Person for Royal Honey, under RSP Rule
2215(a)(4), Mr. Kriple was responsible for the welfare of Royal Honey, regardless of
racetrack staffing. Belterra Park had no obligation to provide Mr. Kriple with
attending veterinary care. Moreover, on Saturday, Mr. Kriple in fact reached a
Belterra Park veterinarian—Dr. Widenhouse—by phone when Royal Honey was
colicing. Yet, he simply ignored her advice to take Royal Honey to a clinic. And
Mr. Kriple himself told us why: “[I]t’s going to cost you $6,000.00 .... I couldn’t do
that. I can’t afford taking the horse to hospital.”90
If Mr. Kriple cannot meet his basic obligations as a trainer to provide
necessary veterinary care to Covered Horses under his care, then Mr. Kriple has no
business being in the horseracing business to begin with—a conclusion the Belterra
Park stewards themselves seemingly reached. Mr. Kriple’s. effort to evade his
responsibility is, once again, without merit.
VI.
SANCTIONS.
The LAP member, and thereafter the Authority’s Board, adopted the request
of enforcement counsel at the hearing that Mr. Kriple’s registration with HISA be
suspended for two years.91 Neither enforcement counsel, the IAP member, nor the
Board offered any basis for the two-year period thus imposed. Although I affirm
that sanction, I do so with misgivings.
90 Id. 65 (Kriple).
91 Id. 24 (Enforcement counsel’s opening statement), 67 (Enforcement counsel’s closing statement),
93 (Amended IAP Ruling), 149 (Board Final Decision).
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Over at least a two-day period, Mr. Kriple deprived Royal Honey of the
veterinary care that she desperately needed. He ignored the advice he received,
disregarding what was obvious to those observed or were informed of her condition.
The Belterra Park stewards directed rescission of Mr. Kriple’s track license “with
prejudice” and a recommendation—promptly followed by the Ohio Racing
Commission—to put Mr. Kriple on the “stop list,” essentially declaring him unfit to
own or train thoroughbred racehorses in that State. Indeed, steward David Pate
stated that, in his “opinion . . . Mr. Kriple should never be granted a racing license,
of any kind, ever again. This is the second (2nd) time he has been found to have
neglected animals in his care, and I would rather not find out if it will happen a
third (3rd) time.”92
If anything, Mr. Kriple’s two-year suspension of his HISA registration seems
overly lenient. Yet, I also recognize that the HISA regime is relatively new, and that
reported decisions arising from equine deaths due to deprivation or abuse generally
are highly fact-specific.
By way of illustration, Castlebar Contraband?3 was a case against an
endurance rider, Sh. Abdul Aziz Bin Faisal Al Qasimi, whose horse, Castlebar,
suffered a fracture during an event and had to be euthanized.94 Post-mortem blood
sample analysis detected xylazine, “used as a sedative, analgesic and muscle
92 Id. 80 (Pate Wit. Stmt.).
93 No. 2018/HAO2 (FEI June 3, 2020).
94 Id. HU 1.1, 1.2.
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relaxant,” which FEI classified as a Controlled Medication Substance.95 Although
Sh. Abdul argued the xylazine was administered in preparation for the euthanasia,
the Tribunal rejected that contention.96 The Tribunal imposed two years
ineligibility for the medication violation.97
But the abuse charge went beyond that and was based on “repeated and
multiple nerve blocking injections” of Castlebar—including ones before and during
the event itself—which “favoured the occurrence of the fracture.”98 The during-event
injections “abnormally desensitisted] Castlebar’s limbs” and “caused or likely caused
pain and unnecessary discomfort to Castlebar.”99 The Tribunal issued a “lengthy
suspension”—18 years—“as a stern warning to others that the Tribunal will not
tolerate cases of horse abuse . . . .”100
On the other hand, in FEI v. Thornton,191 Thornton, an experienced
international rider, “undoubtedly whipped the Horse repeatedly to force him to keep
a full gallop on the race track .... [A]ccording to the six (6) eye witnesses who
observed the event along the racetrack, the whipping [was] quasi-constant, violent
and excessive. . . . [T]he Tribunal also concludes that the whipping was
95 Id. If 1.5.
96 Id. T1TI 10.8-.9.
97 Id. If 10.12.
98 Id. mJ 10.18, 10.22 (italics in original; quotation marks omitted).
99 Id. U 10.18.
.
100 Id. mi 10.24, 12.2(4). See afeoUSEF Release (May 21, 2025) (Trainer Shannon Eckel expelled
from membership in the USEF after her horse, Cobain, went untreated after “show[ing] signs of
colic” and subsequently died), https://files.usef.org/assets/D9jBCtpoPco/eckel-shannon-cobain-51425hj.pdf.
101 Decision of the FEI Tribunal (June 6, 2017).
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administered with anger.”102 And when the race ended, the horse collapsed and
died.103 Although the FEI requested a two-year suspension, the Tribunal decided on
four months.104 However, the Tribunal also stated that “it was not requested and is
not deciding on the potential responsibility of Mr. Thornton’s for the tragic death of
the Horse. . . . Moreover, neither do the scientific reports (Autopsy and Histologic
Reports) provide any conclusion on the cause of the death.”105
The decision was met with significant criticism. Thornton was Charged
criminally in France, and after being tried in absentia, received a suspended
sentence of one year imprisonment, along with a five-year ban on racing in France,
and a prohibition against owning an animal again.106
The Authority has offered no decisions against which to benchmark the two-
year suspension here. Lacking guidance, I defer in this case to enforcement
counsel’s recommendation, adopted by the TAP member and the Board. However, I
urge the Authority to keep in mind that, since Rule 8200(b) itself provides no
102 Id. H 9.18, 9.22, 9.25.
103 Id. UU 1.2, 3.3
104 Id. H 3.16, 9.30(2).
105 Id. TJ 9.9. See, e.g., id. U 3.13 (“it was not possible to establish the cause of death from the histology
analysis”).
106 Cavallo Magazine, He kills the horse to teach it a lesson. And now he’s going to prison. (Nov. 29,
2020), https7/www.cavallomagazine.it/en/cronaca/ammazza-il-cavallo-per-dargli-una-lezione-e-orava-in-prigione?fbclid=IwARlBAthuPxgpKqABk6D7Es_z9CgkJJe_gCttSlId-oJgm2dR0ugDUhrfXWM ;
Courthouse News Service, Irish Rider Sentenced in France for “Disgraceful” Abuse of Horse (Nov. 27,
2020), https7/www.courthousenews.com/irish-rider-sentenced-in-france-for-disgraceful-abuse-ofhorse/J Epoch Times, Alpes-Maritimes: A rider sentenced for causing the death of his horse while
trying to “teach it a lesson” (Nov. 26, 2020) (translated), https7/www.epochtimes.fr/alpes-maritimesun-cavalier-condamne-pour-avoir-provoque-la-mort-de-sorrcheval-en-voulant-lui-donner-une-lecon1603043.html; Horse and Hound, Top rider vilified online aims to help others in similar situations
(Dec. 20, 2018), https7/www.horseandhound.co.uk/news/kevin-thornton-vilified-online-aims-to-helpothers-in-similar-situations-673916.
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guideposts for the sanctions detailed, decision-making at all levels will be betterserved if both grounds for exercising the Authority’s discretion and supporting
authority are provided.
Additionally, in affirming the IAP member’s suspension award, the Board of
the Authority specified that:
During the period of suspension, Mr. Kriple shall be prohibited from
participating in any capacity in any activity involving Covered Horses,
or in any other activity taking place at a Racetrack or Training Facility
and shall also be prohibited from permitting anyone to participate in
any capacity on his behalf in any such activities during the suspension
period.107
This description of the prohibition arising from Mr. Kriple’s suspension was not
part of the IAP member’s award, and the Racetrack Safety Program Rules do not
expressly define the effects that arise from a suspension of registration. However,
the Board’s explanatory addition seems reasonably implicit in the Authority’s
regulatory authority generally and in its discretion under Rule 8200(b).
The Board, acting for the Authority, should be able to provide practical
guidance along the lines expressed in the registration suspension imposed on
Mr. Kriple. The language here finds support in the Authority’s Anti-Doping and
Controlled Medication Program and in agreed-on orders in others HISA cases, as
well as in variations found in the WADA Code and equine competition decisions
generally.108 At the same time, the particular language here should not be regarded
107 AB 149 (Board Decision).
108 See Rules 3229(a) and 3329(a) (providing, in relevant part, that “[w]hile serving a period of
Ineligibility for an Anti-Doping Rule Violation ... (2) a Covered Person may not participate in any
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as “etehed in stone.” Depending on case-specific facts, variations may be
appropriate.
VII.
CONCLUSION.
At the IAP hearing, enforcement counsel met their burden of proving
Mr. Kriple violated Rule 2215(a)(4) by a preponderance of the evidence. Under Rule
8350(f), the Board must uphold the IAP member’s decision “unless it is clearly
erroneous or not supported by the evidence or applicable law.” In affirming, the
Board correctly upheld the IAP member’s decision.
I have considered all the matters raised by Mr. Kriple on this review and,
I
regardless of whether detailed specifically above, find them unpersuasive. The
Board’s Final Decision and the sanctions imposed are AFFIRMED.
ORDERED:
fay A.
Jay L. Himes
Administrative Law Judge
Date: March 4, 2026
capacity in any activity involving Covered Horses, or in any other activity . . . taking place at a
Racetrack or Training Facility! nor shall he or she permit anyone to participate in any capacity on
his or her behalf in any such activities . . . .”); Matter of Wales, No. 2025-01944, at If D (HISA Dec.
23, 2025) and Matter ofBonnell, 2025-0351, at 2-3 (HISA May 7, 2025) (Agreed Orders). See also
World Anti-Doping Code § 10.14.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2027); FEI v. Schelkens, C22-0020, at If 98(2) (Aug. 10,
2022); FEI v. Kocher, C20-0060, at XIV(i) (June 10, 2021).
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.