Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Zvi Kriple, Petitioner v. Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 24, 2026

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FILED: July

23,2026

united states COURT of appeals

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 26-1392

ZVI KRIPLE,

Petitioner.

v.

HORSERACING INTEGRITY AND SAFETY AUTHORITY; FEDERAL

TRADE COMMISSION,

Respondents.

ORDER

In 2025, the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the “Authority”)

found that racehorse trainer Zvi Kriple had violated an Authority rule regarding

home welfare, resulting in the suffering and death of a racehorse at an Ohio

racetrack, and imposed a two-year suspension of Kriple’s registration with the

Authority. Kriple sought review of this decision before a Federal Trade

(FTC) administrative law judge (“AU”), who affirmed the Authmhg|g|g|

Kriple filed a petition for review of the administrative law

court.

App. 1

le’s petition for lack

CTC and die Authority have moved to dismiss Kripi

, h

*

j‘ r-tlv review

fiction, noting that there is no statutory basis for this court to

the challenged agency action. Although Kriple cites

m his p

this provision does not provide an avenue for direct judicial review by this

only addresses the FTC’s authority to review an Authority determinati

flings opposing .he motions .o dismiss, Kripie aiso does no. proffer a vaiid basis for

fle’cburt’sjunsdictidnaSd’asl.si^ltefnativSyi tHaf tiie court transfer his case to an

appropriate venue.

As a threshold matter, we grant Kriple’s motions for leave to file a

supplemental response to the motions to dismiss and to file a supplemental statement

and attachments in support of his petition. However, upon consideration of Kriple’ s

various filings and the other materials before this court, we discern no basis for this

court’s jurisdiction to review the relevant order. Accordingly, we grant the motions

to dismiss and dismiss Kriple’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. We further deny

Kriple’s request for transfer, as no other court of appeals would have jurisdiction

over this action.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Wynn, Judge Harris, and Senior

Judge Floyd.

For the Court

Zs/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

. f-

App. 2

APPENDIX B

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

MARCH 4, 2026

PUBLIC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

In the Matter of

Zvi Kriple,

Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 9446

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

PUBLIC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................

I.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

II.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE.

A. Facts

i

1

........................

......................... 2

3

B.

The Racetrack Safety Program Rule Violation Charged

8

C.

The Decisions of the IAP member and the Board of the Authority

10

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

13

IV.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

13

V.

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

...............................

14

A. The Authority Proved the Violation Charged. ..........................................14

B.

Mr. Kriple’s Procedural Due Process Rights Were Not Violated

C.

Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable

D.

Mr. Kriple Cannot Evade His Responsibility to Royal Honey by

Complaining about Veterinary Staffing at Belterra Park. ....................20

16

........................................19

VI.

SANCTIONS

21

VII.

CONCLUSION

26

i

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In the wee hours of a late summer morning in 2025, a thoroughbred

racehorse, Royal Honey, died a painful and lonely death in a stable at Belterra Park

racetrack in Ohio. This case concerns whether or not Royal Honey’s trainer, Zvi

Kriple, has responsibility for her death under rules that enforce the federal

Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act (“HISA”).11 hold that he does.

I.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK.

Congress enacted HISA in 2020 to provide national oversight and uniformity

to safety and substance control in the nation’s thoroughbred racing industry. Among

other things, HISA authorized the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the

“Authority”), a private, independent, self-regulatory, nonprofit corporation to

“develop D and implementD ... a racetrack safety program” throughout the United

States.2 The Authority issued regulatory rules that include the statutorily-required

Racetrack Safety Program (“RSP”), which the Federal Trade Commission

approved.3 HISA and the RSP rules, applicable to Covered Persons and Covered

Horses that HISA regulates, address, in summary: (1) the persons and racetracks

subject to the Program’s requirements! (2) training and racing standards related to

jockey safety and equine welfare! (3) the conduct constituting violations and

1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051-60.

2 Id. § 3052(a).

3 Id. §§ 3053, 3056, 3057.

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corresponding sanctions; and (4) investigation and enforcement in furtherance of

the statute.4

The Authority prosecutes RSP violations through its enforcement counsel. As

relevant here, RSP violations may be adjudicated by members of the Authority’s

Internal Adjudication Panel (“IAP”), an Arbitral Body, or racetrack stewards.5 Here,

in particular, an IAP heard the case. The FTC has authority to review decisions

imposing final civil sanctions arising from enforcement proceedings.6 Further

review is available under the Administrative Procedures Act.7

IL

SUMMARY OF THE CASE.

Mr. Kriple has litigated this case without an attorney. He did not submit a

witness statement and testified only briefly, while offering no other witnesses and

virtually no other evidence as part of his defense. Consequently, the facts are not as

developed as they might otherwise have been. This much, however, is clear.8

4 See generallyRSV Rule 2010 (Definitions); Racetrack Safety Program Rule Series 2000; 87 Fed.

Reg. 435 (Jan. 5, 2022) (FTC Notice of HISA Proposed Rule and Request for Public Comment); Order

Approving the Racetrack Safety Rule Proposed by HISA (March 3, 2022) (https://www.ftc.gov/system

Zfiles/ftc_gov/pdf/order_re_racetrack_safety_2022-3- 3_for_publication.pdf); 89 Fed. Reg. 24574 (Apr.

8, 2024) (FTC Notice of HISA Proposed Rule Modification and Request for Public Comment; Order

Approving the Racetrack Safety Rule Proposed Modification (June 7, 2024) (httpsV/www.ftc.gov/

system/files/ftc_gov/pdf7P222100CommOrderHISARacetrackSafetyRule20240607.pdf). Capitalized

terms used, but not defined in this Decision, are those defined in RSP Rule 2010.

5 See generally'RSP Rule Series 2000 and Rule 8320 (“Adjudication of Violations in the Rule 2200

Series”).

6 15 U.S.C. § 3058; 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.145-.148. See 87 Fed. Reg. 60077 (Oct. 4, 2022) (Final Rule).

7 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.

8 The record provided by the Authority includes memos that Dr. Sutherland, an expert witness that

enforcement counsel called, prepared of interviews he conducted. Appeal Book (“AB”) 9‘11. Although

Dr. Sutherland’s reliance on the interviews in forming his opinion is not objectionable, the record

2

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A.

Facts.

Royal Honey began “colicing”—exhibiting abdominal pain—on Saturday,

August 23, 2025.9 Saturday was a racing day at Belterra Park. There were two or

three veterinarians at the track.10 But there is no evidence Mr. Kriple contacted any

of them, and, therefore, Royal Honey was not examined. Mr. Kriple claimed to have

been unable to find any track veterinarian during the day that Saturday.11

However, he telephoned Dr. Tamara Widenhouse, one of Belterra Park’s regulatory

veterinarians, that night. Dr. Widenhouse “told him she was a couple hours away at

home” and advised Mr. Kriple “to take the horse to the clinic. . . .”12 Mr. Kriple did

not do so.

Around 12:30 p.m. the next day, Sunday August 24, 2025, Mr. Kriple

telephoned another Belterra Park veterinarian, Dr. Timothy Renn. Mr. Kriple told

him Royal Honey “had been colicing since the previous afternoon and evening, and

he wanted it seen . . . .”13 Dr. Renn was then 100 miles away at his home. He told

Mr. Kriple that “the horse definitely needed to be seen, or it was probably going to

die. I told him to call Park Equine or other trainers to find a vet locally.”14

does not establish whether or not his interview memos were admitted as evidence before the TAP

hearing. Therefore, I have not drawn on the memos for any facts forming the basis for this Decision.

9 AB 21 & 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.), 46 (Renn), 64 (Kriple), 122, 125 (Kriple App. to Bd.).

19 Id. 40, 42 (Pate), 56-60 (Renn).

11 Id. 64 (Kriple).

12 Id. 35 (Pate).

13 Id. 46 (Renn), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).

14 Id. 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.). See also id. 46 (Renn).

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Mr. Kriple “was basically . . . noncommittal about having the horse seen . . . .”15

During the day on Sunday, Mr. Kriple gave Royal Honey banamine, a pain killer,

and acepromazine, a sedative, plus milk of magnesia, “which really wasn’t going to

help this horse at all.”16

Dr. Renn next heard from Mr. Kriple around 8:30 p.m. on Sunday evening.17

Another trainer, Pearl Chain, was with Mr. Kriple and also spoke to Dr. Renn.18

Dr. Renn learned that Royal Honey “was getting tremendously worse and that no

care had been sought before that. . . .”19 On the call, Dr. Renn heard “distressed”

sounds—“[n]aying, whinning”—from Royal Honey in the background.20 Ms. Chain

“indicated in her opinion, the horse was going to die if it did not get any kind of

veterinary care.”21 Dr. Renn agreed, telling Mr. Kriple “the horse is going to die

unless it’s seen and it might just need to be euthanized, this might be too far

gone.”22 As Dr. Renn further testified:

Q [Enforcement counsel]: At that point in time, would you say that the horse

was in serious distress and pain based on what you were told Sunday night?

15 Id. 46 (Renn).

16 Id. 49 (Renn).

17 Id. 46 (Renn), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).

18 Id. 46, 48 (Renn), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).

19 Id. 46 (Renn).

20 Id. 47-48 (Renn).

21 Id. 49 (Renn).

™ Id.

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A-... . Yeah, . . . absolutely my recommendation. It had to be seen or it was

either going to die or it would need to be euthanized due to a[n] extremely

low chance of a positive outcome.23

Dr. Renn also learned from Ms. Chain that racetrack trainers had found a

veterinarian about 20 minutes away in Kentucky, Dr. Tony Wolfe, who agreed to

see Royal Honey.24 Ms. Chain, and two other trainers had “volunteered” to

transport Royal Honey for free to Dr. Wolfe’s facility.25

Mr. Kriple took no steps to secure veterinary care for Royal Honey. He

testified that, by late Sunday night, Royal Honey seemed better, more relaxed. He

stayed with the horse until about LOO a.m. Monday, but then left to sleep.26

Dr. Renn heard nothing further until early Monday morning, when he

arrived at Belterra Park for his pre-race rounds. He learned that Royal Honey had

“died somewhere like 3^00 or LOO in the morning . . . .”27 Later that day, Dr. Renn

spoke with Mr. Kriple, who told him Royal Honey had not been seen by any

veterinarian, despite Dr. Renn’s urgings.28 The necropsy performed the University

of Kentucky laboratory concluded that death resulted from a “ruptured volvulus”—a

23 Id. 50 (Renn).

24 Id. 46 (Renn). See also id. 35 (Pate).

25 Id. 46, 50, 52 (Renn). See also id. 35 (Pate), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).

26 Id. 65 (Kriple).

27 Id. 50 (Renn).

28 Id. 51 (Renn).

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twisting of the intestine, which blocks food passage, causing a build-up in pressure

that ruptures the digestive tract.29

Based on his conversations with Mr. Kriple and Ms. Chain, and his

experience as a veterinarian, Dr. Renn testified:

Q [Enforcement counsel]: . . . [I]n this particular case, if Mr. Kriple were to

report that the horse began colicing Saturday and continued colicing until

Monday morning at 3:30 AM, this horse would have been in pretty serious

pain and distress.

A: Absolutely.30

Dr. Renn testified further that Royal Honey needed veterinary care on Saturday or

Sunday: “if the surgery was declined, there would have been euthanasia

recommended, which would have prevented the horse from going through however

many hours of agony at the end of its life that it went through.”31

Dr. Bart Sutherland, a long-time veterinarian whose experience includes

investigating equine welfare, also testified.32 Dr. Sutherland investigated Royal

Honey’s death and described the horse’s condition: “a large colon embolus [sic

volvulus] is one of the most painful types of colic in the horse—very aggressive, very

acute, very dangerous if left untreated.”33 Recommended veterinary care was either

“surgery or euthanasia,” the latter “to avoid prolonged pain and suffering and

29 Id. 51'52 (Renn), 73 (University of Kentucky diagnostic report), 78 (Renn Wit. Stmt.).

30 Id. 51 (Renn).

Id.

32 Id. 26'27 (Sutherland).

33 Id. 30 (Sutherland).

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distress . . . .”34 He agreed with Dr. Renn that, if Royal Honey had been examined

on Sunday, “it is my opinion that a veterinarian would have realized the

seriousness or grave condition of the horse.”35 Based on his investigation,

Dr. Sutherland believed that Mr. Kriple “caused needless suffering by unnecessarily

delaying or avoiding pursuing treatment for the uncontrollable pain of the horse

Royal Honey.”36

Mr. Kriple asked Dr. Sutherland no questions, stating that “I accepted the

description and I agree with the consequences.”37

David Pate, a steward at Belterra Park, recounted the basis for the racetrack

stewards’ action after the death of Royal Honey. The Belterra Park stall application

includes a provision requiring trainers to care for their horses “to the best of their

ability and ... do everything in their power to treat their horses right, . . . get them

the care they need . . . ”38 Royal Honey’s death called for the stewards to “figure out

if [Mr. Kriple] did, in fact, do everything he could for that horse or if there was any

neglect in the matter on his part.”39

After a stewards’ hearing, Mr. Kriple agreed to give up his Ohio license, and

the stewards themselves decided to “rescind[ ] it with prejudice and [to]

™ Id.

35 Id. 71 (assessment report).

™ Id.

37 Id. 32 (Kriple).

38 Id. 35 (Pate).

33 Id.

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recommendD to the Racing Commission not to license him again.”40 The Ohio State

Racing Commission put Mr. Kriple “on a stop list,” “preventing him from any future

license in this state.”41 According to Mr. Pate, “[t]his is the second (2nd) time

[Mr. Kriple] has been found to have neglected animals in his care, and I would

rather not find out if it will happen a third (3rd) time.”42

During his brief testimony, Mr. Kriple denied failing to care for Royal Honey.

However, his testimony included the following:

[T]o take the horse to a hospital. . . it’s going to cost you $6,000.00 .... I

couldn’t do that. I can’t afford taking the horse to hospital. So I was in a bad

situation and I completely agreed to this situation. I’m not denying it, I’m not

denying it. But I [was] left with no help, with no hope .... I’m terribly,

terribly sorry for the situation, but it’s not for lack of care. It’s lack of [a]

veterinarian to help me. That’s what the situation [was].43

B.

The Racetrack Safety Program Rule Violation Charged.

Mr. Kriple, a trainer, is a Covered Person under HISA and the RSP Rules.

Royal Honey was a Covered Horse. As a Covered Person, Mr. Kriple is required to

register with the Authority.44 By registering, Mr. Kriple “agree[s] to be subject to

40 Id. 37 (Pate).

41 Id. 37 (Pate), 80 (Pate Wit. Stmt.).

42 Id. 80 (Pate Wit. Stmt.).

43 Id. 65 (Kriple) (emphasis added).

44 Rule 2010 (Definitions), 9000(a) (registration of Covered Persons). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051(4)

& (6), 3054(d) (registration obligation).

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and comply with the rules, standards, and procedures of the Authority developed

and approved under 15 U.S.C. 3054(c).”45

RSP Rule 2215(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:

No Covered Person . . . shall compromise the welfare of a Covered Horse for

competitive or commercial reasons or subject or permit any Covered Horse

under their control, custody, or supervision to be subjected to or incur the

following:

★ ★★

(4) Deprivation of necessary care, sustenance, shelter, or veterinary care.

In September 2025, the Authority’s enforcement counsel served Mr. Kriple

with a notice, alleging that Mr. Kriple violated Rule 2215(a)(4) by “depriv[ing] the

Covered Horse, Royal Honey of necessary veterinary care when she was

experiencing an emergency medical condition on or about August 24, 2025. The

Covered Horse, Royal Honey, died on Monday, August 25, 2025,”46 Enforcement

counsel further advised Mr. Kriple that if liability for the violation were proven,

“HISA may seek to impose one or more of the sanctions outlined in Rule 8200 as

deemed appropriate by HISA in keeping with the seriousness of the violation and

the facts of the case, and that is consistent with the safety, welfare, and integrity of

Covered Horses, Covered Persons and Covered Horseraces.”47

45 Rule 9000(g).

46 AB 14 (Notice of violation). See Rule 8200(d) (providing for notice of violation).

47 AB 14 (Notice of violation).

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Rule 8200(b) provides that after a hearing is held and a Rule violation

proven, the Authority “may impose one or more” of a variety of sanctions “in

proportion to the nature, chronicity, and severity of the violation . . .

As relevant

here, the Authority may “suspend the registration of a Covered Person for a definite

period . . . .”48

An IAP, consisting of a single member, heard enforcement counsel’s alleged

violation of RSP Rule 2215(a)(4), where enforcement counsel had the burden of

proving its charge by a preponderance of the evidence.49

C.

The Decisions of the LAP member and the Board of the Authority.

After receiving the witness testimony and documentary evidence at the

hearing, the IAP member found the following, in summary:

Royal Honey “began to show symptoms of colic” during Saturday afternoon,

August 23, 2025. On Sunday, August 24, Mr. Kriple spoke to Dr. Renn, who

“suggested several alternative veterinarians” and who “stressed the importance of

having the horse seen to.”50 If Royal Honey’s condition were “left untreated, ”

Dr. Renn told Mr. Kriple, that “could lead to a very painful death . . . .”51 When

48 Rule 8200(b)(3).

49 See Rules 7020(b), 8310, and 8340(f). The Rule-based steps by which this Rule 2215(a)(4) case

came to be referred to an IAP and heard under Rule 8000 Series procedures is unclear. Insofar as the

IAP’s jurisdiction might be questioned, Mr. Kriple failed to make a timely objection and participated

in the IAP hearing. Thus, he forfeited any jurisdictional objection. See generally Matter of Galvin,

No. 9445, 2026 FTC Lexis 3, at *6-15 (ALJ Jan. 7, 2026).

50 AB 93 (Amended IAP Ruling).

™Id.

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Mr. Kriple contacted Dr. Renn again on Sunday evening, Dr. Renn learned “the

horse still had not been treated by a veterinarian,” despite the offer of other trainers

“to ship the horse to a nearby vet clinic free of charge . . . .”52

Mr. Kriple left Royal Honey “unattended at L30 AM” on Monday morning,

after which, at 3^30 AM the horse died “a very painful death,” later determined to

have been caused by “a rupture” of Royal Honey’s “digestive tract.”53

The IAP member described Mr. Kriple’s testimony, which was offered

“withoutany other testimony to corroborate his evidence^ It is the Covered Person’s

testimony that, despite his best and repeated efforts over the periods of August 23rd

and 24th, 2025 he was unable to find any veterinarian that would either come to the

racetrack to treat the horse or receive the horse at a clinic where it could be seen

and treated.”54

The IAP member held that enforcement counsel proved Mr. Kriple violated

Rule 2215(a)(4) and awarded the following sanctions'■

1. Suspension of Mr. Kriple’s registration with the Authority for a period of

two years, commencing on October 28, 2025, and continuing through October

27, 2027.

2. Public disclosure of the sanctions.55

52 Id.

53 Id.

54 Id. (emphasis added).

55 Id. 92-94 (Amended IAP Ruling).

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On Mr. Kriple’s appeal from the IAP member’s decision, the Authority’s

Board affirmed the IAP member’s decision.56 It rejected his argument that he did

not neglect caring for Royal Honey. Dr. Renn, the Board noted, provided Mr. Kriple

with an equine facility for treatment services and told him Royal Honey “would

likely die if she did not receive immediate treatment.”57 Further, Mr. Kriple

“refused” other trainers’ offers to transport Royal Honey for treatment, free of

charge.58 In consequence, “Royal Honey sufferted] a painful death . . . .”59

In addition, the Board rejected Mr. Kriple’s argument that the hearing

process was unfair, as Mr. Kriple had never objected to either the hearing date or to

disclosure deadlines.60 Thus, finding the IAP member’s decision “not clearly

erroneous” and “supported by evidence and applicable law,” the Board “affirmted]

the IAP Decision in full.”61

*

★

*

As provided for in HISA, Mr. Kriple seeks review of the Authority’s decision

upholding his two-year suspension.62 Although Mr. Kriple asserts several alleged

errors in the prior proceedings, his arguments are without merit. This is not a close

56 See Rule 8350.

57 AB 148 (Board Decision).

58 Id.

59 Id. 149 (Board Decision).

60 Id. 148 (Board Decision).

61 Id. 149 (Board Decision).

62 15 U.S.C. § 3058.

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case. Mr. Kriple deprived Royal Honey of necessary veterinary care. For the reasons

set out below, his two-year suspension is affirmed.

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

As framed by the parties, the following issues must be resolved:

A. Is the evidence presented by enforcement counsel sufficient to prove the

charge against Mr. Kriple?

B. Did the hearing before the IAP violate Mr. Kriple’s procedural due process

rights?

C. Does collateral estoppel bar enforcement under the RSP Rules?

D. Does the availability of veterinary staff at Belterra Park during the period

Royal Honey Suffered excuse or mitigate Mr. Kriple’s violation of RSP

Rule 2215(a)(4)?

IV.

SCOPE OF REVIEW.

HISA civil sanctions, imposed for Rule violations, are reviewable by an FTC

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upon application of the person aggrieved and

thereafter by the Commission itself on a discretionary basis.63 The ALJ reviews:

“whether—

(i) a person has engaged in such acts or practices, or has omitted such acts or

practices, as the Authority has found the person to have engaged in or

omitted;

(ii) such acts, practices, or omissions are in violation of this [chapter] or the

anti-doping and medication control or racetrack safety rules approved by the

Commission,’ or

63 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)-(c); FTC Rules 1.146-.147.

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(iii) the final civil sanction of the Authority was arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”64

The ALJ’s review of the Arbitrator’s decision is de novo— “as if it had not

been heard before, and as if no decision previously had been entered.”65 Thus, the

ALJ must determine the merits of the charged violation, and whether the sanctions

the Authority imposed were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.”66 In exercising their review authority, the

ALJ may “affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or remand for further proceedings, in

whole or in part” and “make any finding or conclusion that, in [their] judgment. . .

is proper and based on the record.”67

V.

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES.

A.

The Authority Proved the Violation Charged.

On Saturday, August 23, 2025, Mr. Kriple suspected Royal Honey was

suffering from colic, and recognized the abdominal pain the horse was experiencing

64 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A). See also FTC Rule 1.146(b)(l)-(3).

65 Shane v. Albertson’s Inc., *504 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc.,

457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Harris v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co., 42 F.4th 1292,

1295 (11th Cir. 2022) (“De novo means ... a fresh, independent determination of ‘the matter’”)

(quoting with approval Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); Reyes-Colon v.

United States, 974 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2020) (“review ... de novo ... is a legalistic way of saying we

critique the judge’s decision without giving any deference to his views”); Amparan v. Lake Powell

Car Rental Cos., 882 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court’s grant of summary judgment

[is reviewed] de novo,” and “[i]n so doing, we need not defer to factual findings rendered by the

district court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Aquarius Marine Co. v. Pena, 64 F.3d 82, 87 (2d

Cir. 1995) (on de novo review, the appellate court “give[s] no deference to the lower court”).

66 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A); FTC Rule 1.146(b)(l)-(3).

67 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(3)(A)(ii-iii); FTC Rule 1.146(d)(3).

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required veterinary care.68 That Saturday and the next day, Sunday, all those

informed of, or able to observe, Royal Honey’s condition—Dr. Widenhouse,

Dr. Renn, Ms. Chain, and other Belterra Park trainers—drove home to Mr. Kriple

the seriousness of the situation. Royal Honey needed not only examination, but

possibly emergency surgery or, indeed, euthanasia. Several Belterra Park trainers,

a group likely to have an informed sense of the horse’s distress, identified a nearby

veterinarian and offered Mr. Kriple free transportation to the facility. Yet,

Mr. Kriple never obtained veterinary care. Early Monday morning, August 25,

2025, Royal Honey died, alone, after experiencing “prolonged pain and suffering and

distress . . . ,”69

These facts are undisputed. The Authority proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that Mr. Kriple “[d]epriv[ed]” Royal Honey of “necessary . . . veterinary

care” in violation of Rule 2215(a)(4).70 Two veterinary experts, Dr. Bart Sutherland

and Dr. Timothy Renn, as well as steward David Pate, gave sworn testimony that

was credible and consistent. Dr. Renn testified not only to telephone calls with

Mr. Kriple, but also to one with trainer Chain. Royal Honey was in distress and

track trainers offered to transport Royal Honey to an available veterinarian for free.

Steward Pate corroborated Dr. Renn’s testimony.71

68 AB 64 (Kriple).

69 Id. 30 (Sutherland).

70 Rule 8340(f) provides that “t]he burden of proof shall be on the party alleging the violation to

show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Covered Person has violated or failed to comply

with, or is responsible for a violation of, a provision of the Authority’s rules.”

71 AB 35-36 (Pate), 46, 50, 52 (Renn).

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In contrast, apart from his own brief testimony, Mr. Kriple’s only other

evidence is a text message, allegedly from trainer Steve Sandy to Mr. Kriple,

stating: “no [veterinarian] would come 2 the track that night!”72 “[T]hat night,”

Kriple explained, referred to “Sunday night.”73 Even accepting, for argument’s sake,

the authenticity of the text, the message does not rebut enforcement counsel’s proof.

Kriple himself stated that, on Saturday, he could not find a track veterinarian to

see Royal Honey. By Sunday night, he had spoken by telephone with

Drs. Widenhouse and Renn, as well as trainer Chain and others, all of whom had

implored him to get Royal Honey urgently needed veterinarian care. Mr. Kriple

ignored advice. Trainer Sandy’s brief remark about his own Sunday night effort is,

at best, cumulative. In all events, it does not excuse Mr. Kriple’s neglect.

Mr. Kriple’s conclusory claim that the Authority relied on fabricated or

speculative evidence, is unsupported. It does not cast any doubt on enforcement

counsel’s proof. The rest of Mr. Kriple’s asserted errors on this review are equally

meritless.

B.

Mr. Kriple’s Procedural Due Process Rights Were Not Violated.

At a September 22, 2025 status conference, the IAP member set October 20

as the date for the hearing.74 Mr. Kriple argues that the hearing schedule denied

him due process because “Respondent objected by email to the hearing date due to

72 Id. 131 (Kriple text message with Steve Sandy); id. 63’64 (Kriple).

73 Id. 63 (Kriple).

74 Id. 17 (Authority’s Prehearing Stmt.).

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insufficient time to prepare . . . [but] [t]hat objection was not disclosed or

acknowledged in subsequent representations.”75 This objection implicates

§ 3057(c)(3), which requires that Rules implementing the statute “shall provide for

adequate due process . . . commensurate with the seriousness of the alleged safety,

performance, or anti-doping and medication control rule violation and the possible

civil sanctions for such violation.”76

Mr. Kriple never asserted any due process objection at the IAP hearing itself,

first adding this objection only on his appeal to the Board.77 Even then, Mr. Kriple

did not describe any additional proof he would have offered if the IAP hearing date

had been extended. The Board rejected Mr. Kriple’s objection, noting that he “never

objected to the hearing date . . . .”78

However, in a September 25, 2025 email to enforcement counsel, sent just

days after the IAP member set the hearing date, Mr. Kriple wrote: “I am in the

process of collecting witness list as well as information from the Ohio commission.

That might take some time so please let’s not commit to dates yet.”79 Although the

Board did not have the benefit of the continuing email thread, I do, and it bears

directly on Mr. Kriple’s argument on this review.

75 Kriple’s Proposed Findings of Fact

34-35.

76 15 U.S.C. § 3057(c)(3). See FTC Rule 1.146(c)(l)(ii).

77 AB 127 (Kriple appeal).

78 Id. 148 (Board decision).

79 Id. 134 (Kriple Ex. 1 to appeal to Board).

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In its reply here, the Authority has included as “Attachment 1” the full email

thread. Besides including Mr. Kriple’s “let’s not commit” email, it also contains

enforcement counsel response to Mr. Kriple, copied to the IAP member: “You will

need to take up your request to modify the dates and deadlines with Mr. Abbott [the

IAP member].”80 The IAP Member himself then emailed Mr. Kriple: “[t]he dates . . .

are committed. If you need extra time, please apply to me directly with an

explanation of your difficulties and proposed deadline.”81 Mr. Kriple never asked the

IAP member to modify the hearing date and did not renew his protest regarding

schedule at the IAP hearing itself, but instead participated in the proceeding.

In Matter ofArbitration Between Trans Chemical Ltd. and China National

Machinery Import and Export Corp.,82 the respondent objected to the arbitration

hearing date, but thereafter “proceeded to arbitrate . . . without further comment.”

The respondent opposed the prevailing party’s petition to confirm the award,

arguing that failure to reschedule the hearing date denied it a fair hearing. The

Court rejected the argument, noting that the respondent “failed to identify what

additional discovery or preparation it would have undertaken, and it is idle

speculation to assume that the result would have been different had [the

respondent] been given additional time.”83

80 Authority’s Reply Brief, Attachment 1.

Id.

82 978 F. Supp. 266, 307 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (cleaned up).

88 Id.

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Likewise here, taking account of not only Mr. Kriple’s failure to apply to re­

set the hearing date, but also the entirety of the record, Mr. Kriple’s argument fails.

By not presenting his argument to the IAP member, Mr. Kriple forfeited his

objection to the hearing date.84 Nor has he shown he was prejudiced in his ability to

defend against enforcement counsel’s charged violation.85

As part of his due process objection, Mr. Kriple also contends that “HISA had

access to pro bono counsel resources for pro se respondents but did. not offer [him]

such assistance.”86 The objection is hollow.

Mr. Kriple never presented the argument to the Board, so it is not properly

subject to review, absent Mr. Kriple showing “good cause” that excuses the

omission.87 Kriple has made no such showing here. He has not offered evidence that

he took any steps to secure legal representation from any source, either on a pro

bono basis or as a paying client.

Accordingly, Mr. Kriple’s conclusory due process argument is without merit.

C.

Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable.

84 See generally, e.g., Ganton Techs., Inc. v. UAW, 358 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The failure to

pose an available argument to the arbitrator waives that argument in collateral proceedings to

enforce or vacate the arbitration award.”); Howard Univ. v. Metropolitan Campus Police Officer’s

Union, 512 F.3d 716, 719-21 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

85 See Laws v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 452 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2006) (the arbitrator’s

refusal to postpone the arbitration hearing did not deny the objecting party a fair hearing where the

party offered only a “conclusory motion”). Enforcement counsel’s submission of Attachment 1 as part

of its reply was, of course, irregular and in an appropriate case, might result in striking such a

submission or other relief. Mr. Kriple, however, has not filed any reply papers on this review, much

less objected to enforcement counsel’s attachment.

86 Kriple’s Proposed Findings of Fact

38.

87 FTC Rule 1.146(a)(1) (“Except for good cause shown, no assignment of error by the aggrieved party

may rely on any question of fact or law not presented to the Authority.”).

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As noted, prior to the IAP hearing, the Belterra Park stewards held a hearing

to decide, in substance, whether Mr. Kriple had provided adequate care for Royal

Honey. The stewards determined he had not; therefore, that proceeding, too,

resulted in sanctions against Mr. Kriple. On this review, Mr. Kriple maintains that

collateral estoppel arises from the Belterra Park stewards’ proceeding and bars

enforcement counsel’s case under RSP Rule 2215(a)(4).

But collateral estoppel has no application. The doctrine “cannot apply when

the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted”—here, the Authority—“did

not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case.”88 The

Authority was not a party to the Belterra Park stewards’ proceeding and, therefore,

had no opportunity at all to litigate anything against Mr. Kriple. The IAP member

rejected Mr. Kriple’s collateral estoppel objection during the hearing, recognizing

that Mr. Kriple was “under the jurisdiction of the [Authority] and . . . they have the

right to adjudicate this matter.”89 I agree and similarly reject his argument.

D.

Mr. Kriple Cannot Evade His Responsibility to Royal Honey by

Complaining about Veterinary Staffing at Belterra Park.

Finally, Mr. Kriple attempts to shift the blame for Royal Honey’s death on

Belterra Park’s supposed lack of an on-track veterinarian on Saturday. This is

88 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (cleaned up). See also United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart

Solution, P.C., 923 F.3d 308, 317 (3d Cir. 2019) (a non-party to the first case “did not have any

opportunity, much less a full and fair opportunity to litigate any issue involved in this appeal.”)

(cleaned up).

88 AB 25.

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another red herring. As a Covered Person for Royal Honey, under RSP Rule

2215(a)(4), Mr. Kriple was responsible for the welfare of Royal Honey, regardless of

racetrack staffing. Belterra Park had no obligation to provide Mr. Kriple with

attending veterinary care. Moreover, on Saturday, Mr. Kriple in fact reached a

Belterra Park veterinarian—Dr. Widenhouse—by phone when Royal Honey was

colicing. Yet, he simply ignored her advice to take Royal Honey to a clinic. And

Mr. Kriple himself told us why: “[I]t’s going to cost you $6,000.00 .... I couldn’t do

that. I can’t afford taking the horse to hospital.”90

If Mr. Kriple cannot meet his basic obligations as a trainer to provide

necessary veterinary care to Covered Horses under his care, then Mr. Kriple has no

business being in the horseracing business to begin with—a conclusion the Belterra

Park stewards themselves seemingly reached. Mr. Kriple’s. effort to evade his

responsibility is, once again, without merit.

VI.

SANCTIONS.

The LAP member, and thereafter the Authority’s Board, adopted the request

of enforcement counsel at the hearing that Mr. Kriple’s registration with HISA be

suspended for two years.91 Neither enforcement counsel, the IAP member, nor the

Board offered any basis for the two-year period thus imposed. Although I affirm

that sanction, I do so with misgivings.

90 Id. 65 (Kriple).

91 Id. 24 (Enforcement counsel’s opening statement), 67 (Enforcement counsel’s closing statement),

93 (Amended IAP Ruling), 149 (Board Final Decision).

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Over at least a two-day period, Mr. Kriple deprived Royal Honey of the

veterinary care that she desperately needed. He ignored the advice he received,

disregarding what was obvious to those observed or were informed of her condition.

The Belterra Park stewards directed rescission of Mr. Kriple’s track license “with

prejudice” and a recommendation—promptly followed by the Ohio Racing

Commission—to put Mr. Kriple on the “stop list,” essentially declaring him unfit to

own or train thoroughbred racehorses in that State. Indeed, steward David Pate

stated that, in his “opinion . . . Mr. Kriple should never be granted a racing license,

of any kind, ever again. This is the second (2nd) time he has been found to have

neglected animals in his care, and I would rather not find out if it will happen a

third (3rd) time.”92

If anything, Mr. Kriple’s two-year suspension of his HISA registration seems

overly lenient. Yet, I also recognize that the HISA regime is relatively new, and that

reported decisions arising from equine deaths due to deprivation or abuse generally

are highly fact-specific.

By way of illustration, Castlebar Contraband?3 was a case against an

endurance rider, Sh. Abdul Aziz Bin Faisal Al Qasimi, whose horse, Castlebar,

suffered a fracture during an event and had to be euthanized.94 Post-mortem blood

sample analysis detected xylazine, “used as a sedative, analgesic and muscle

92 Id. 80 (Pate Wit. Stmt.).

93 No. 2018/HAO2 (FEI June 3, 2020).

94 Id. HU 1.1, 1.2.

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relaxant,” which FEI classified as a Controlled Medication Substance.95 Although

Sh. Abdul argued the xylazine was administered in preparation for the euthanasia,

the Tribunal rejected that contention.96 The Tribunal imposed two years

ineligibility for the medication violation.97

But the abuse charge went beyond that and was based on “repeated and

multiple nerve blocking injections” of Castlebar—including ones before and during

the event itself—which “favoured the occurrence of the fracture.”98 The during-event

injections “abnormally desensitisted] Castlebar’s limbs” and “caused or likely caused

pain and unnecessary discomfort to Castlebar.”99 The Tribunal issued a “lengthy

suspension”—18 years—“as a stern warning to others that the Tribunal will not

tolerate cases of horse abuse . . . .”100

On the other hand, in FEI v. Thornton,191 Thornton, an experienced

international rider, “undoubtedly whipped the Horse repeatedly to force him to keep

a full gallop on the race track .... [A]ccording to the six (6) eye witnesses who

observed the event along the racetrack, the whipping [was] quasi-constant, violent

and excessive. . . . [T]he Tribunal also concludes that the whipping was

95 Id. If 1.5.

96 Id. T1TI 10.8-.9.

97 Id. If 10.12.

98 Id. mJ 10.18, 10.22 (italics in original; quotation marks omitted).

99 Id. U 10.18.

.

100 Id. mi 10.24, 12.2(4). See afeoUSEF Release (May 21, 2025) (Trainer Shannon Eckel expelled

from membership in the USEF after her horse, Cobain, went untreated after “show[ing] signs of

colic” and subsequently died), https://files.usef.org/assets/D9jBCtpoPco/eckel-shannon-cobain-51425hj.pdf.

101 Decision of the FEI Tribunal (June 6, 2017).

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administered with anger.”102 And when the race ended, the horse collapsed and

died.103 Although the FEI requested a two-year suspension, the Tribunal decided on

four months.104 However, the Tribunal also stated that “it was not requested and is

not deciding on the potential responsibility of Mr. Thornton’s for the tragic death of

the Horse. . . . Moreover, neither do the scientific reports (Autopsy and Histologic

Reports) provide any conclusion on the cause of the death.”105

The decision was met with significant criticism. Thornton was Charged

criminally in France, and after being tried in absentia, received a suspended

sentence of one year imprisonment, along with a five-year ban on racing in France,

and a prohibition against owning an animal again.106

The Authority has offered no decisions against which to benchmark the two-

year suspension here. Lacking guidance, I defer in this case to enforcement

counsel’s recommendation, adopted by the TAP member and the Board. However, I

urge the Authority to keep in mind that, since Rule 8200(b) itself provides no

102 Id. H 9.18, 9.22, 9.25.

103 Id. UU 1.2, 3.3

104 Id. H 3.16, 9.30(2).

105 Id. TJ 9.9. See, e.g., id. U 3.13 (“it was not possible to establish the cause of death from the histology

analysis”).

106 Cavallo Magazine, He kills the horse to teach it a lesson. And now he’s going to prison. (Nov. 29,

2020), https7/www.cavallomagazine.it/en/cronaca/ammazza-il-cavallo-per-dargli-una-lezione-e-orava-in-prigione?fbclid=IwARlBAthuPxgpKqABk6D7Es_z9CgkJJe_gCttSlId-oJgm2dR0ugDUhrfXWM ;

Courthouse News Service, Irish Rider Sentenced in France for “Disgraceful” Abuse of Horse (Nov. 27,

2020), https7/www.courthousenews.com/irish-rider-sentenced-in-france-for-disgraceful-abuse-ofhorse/J Epoch Times, Alpes-Maritimes: A rider sentenced for causing the death of his horse while

trying to “teach it a lesson” (Nov. 26, 2020) (translated), https7/www.epochtimes.fr/alpes-maritimesun-cavalier-condamne-pour-avoir-provoque-la-mort-de-sorrcheval-en-voulant-lui-donner-une-lecon1603043.html; Horse and Hound, Top rider vilified online aims to help others in similar situations

(Dec. 20, 2018), https7/www.horseandhound.co.uk/news/kevin-thornton-vilified-online-aims-to-helpothers-in-similar-situations-673916.

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guideposts for the sanctions detailed, decision-making at all levels will be betterserved if both grounds for exercising the Authority’s discretion and supporting

authority are provided.

Additionally, in affirming the IAP member’s suspension award, the Board of

the Authority specified that:

During the period of suspension, Mr. Kriple shall be prohibited from

participating in any capacity in any activity involving Covered Horses,

or in any other activity taking place at a Racetrack or Training Facility

and shall also be prohibited from permitting anyone to participate in

any capacity on his behalf in any such activities during the suspension

period.107

This description of the prohibition arising from Mr. Kriple’s suspension was not

part of the IAP member’s award, and the Racetrack Safety Program Rules do not

expressly define the effects that arise from a suspension of registration. However,

the Board’s explanatory addition seems reasonably implicit in the Authority’s

regulatory authority generally and in its discretion under Rule 8200(b).

The Board, acting for the Authority, should be able to provide practical

guidance along the lines expressed in the registration suspension imposed on

Mr. Kriple. The language here finds support in the Authority’s Anti-Doping and

Controlled Medication Program and in agreed-on orders in others HISA cases, as

well as in variations found in the WADA Code and equine competition decisions

generally.108 At the same time, the particular language here should not be regarded

107 AB 149 (Board Decision).

108 See Rules 3229(a) and 3329(a) (providing, in relevant part, that “[w]hile serving a period of

Ineligibility for an Anti-Doping Rule Violation ... (2) a Covered Person may not participate in any

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as “etehed in stone.” Depending on case-specific facts, variations may be

appropriate.

VII.

CONCLUSION.

At the IAP hearing, enforcement counsel met their burden of proving

Mr. Kriple violated Rule 2215(a)(4) by a preponderance of the evidence. Under Rule

8350(f), the Board must uphold the IAP member’s decision “unless it is clearly

erroneous or not supported by the evidence or applicable law.” In affirming, the

Board correctly upheld the IAP member’s decision.

I have considered all the matters raised by Mr. Kriple on this review and,

I

regardless of whether detailed specifically above, find them unpersuasive. The

Board’s Final Decision and the sanctions imposed are AFFIRMED.

ORDERED:

fay A.

Jay L. Himes

Administrative Law Judge

Date: March 4, 2026

capacity in any activity involving Covered Horses, or in any other activity . . . taking place at a

Racetrack or Training Facility! nor shall he or she permit anyone to participate in any capacity on

his or her behalf in any such activities . . . .”); Matter of Wales, No. 2025-01944, at If D (HISA Dec.

23, 2025) and Matter ofBonnell, 2025-0351, at 2-3 (HISA May 7, 2025) (Agreed Orders). See also

World Anti-Doping Code § 10.14.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2027); FEI v. Schelkens, C22-0020, at If 98(2) (Aug. 10,

2022); FEI v. Kocher, C20-0060, at XIV(i) (June 10, 2021).

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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