Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Arthur Lopez, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefMay 4, 2026

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APPENDIX A

NOTE: This order is

nonprecedential.

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL

CIRCUIT

ARTHUR LOPEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

2025-2047

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Appeal from the United States

Court of Federal Claimsin No. l:25-cv-00145-RTH,

Judge Ryan T. Holte.

ON MOTION

PER CURIAM. ORDER

Arthur Lopez appeals from the judgment of the

United States Court of Federal Claims

dismissing his case and moves for leave to proceed

informa pauperis. ECF No. 14.

The United States moves to summarily affirm.

Mr. Lopez opposes. We grant summary

affirmance.Case: 25-2047

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Document: 15 Page: 2 Filed:

12/10/2025 2 LOPEZ v. USA After unsuccessfully

pursuing litigation over a private loan gone bad

that resulted in foreclosure on his residence,!

Mr. Lopez brought this action in the Court of

Federal Claims asserting he was entitled

to $5 million in damages based on the government’s

“interference,” “obstruction[|,” and “derailing” of

that litigation. ECF No. 3 at 21. Specifically, Mr.

Lopez’s complaint alleged the government had

take[n] everything from his possession,” including

his “children and Family,” his social security

benefits, his “property,” and his “assets.” Id. at

15-17. He further as-serted “U.S. Congress-staff’

had taken his property by omitting Civil Cause of

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Action under Theft of Trade Secrets statute.” Id. at

14. On August 20, 2025, the Court of

Federal Claims dismissed the complaint and

certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that

any appeal would not be in good faith. Mr. Lopez

nevertheless filed this appeal. Summary affirmance

is warranted here. We have explained to Mr. Lopez

that the Court of Federal Claims lacks

jurisdiction over claims for social security benefits,

criminal actions and suits, tort claims

based on interferencewith prior litigation, and

claims that he is entitled to compensation under

the Fifth Amendment for the taking of his

children and family. See Lopez v.United States, No.

2024-1860, 2025 WL 685917, at *l-2(Fed. Cir. Mar.

4, 2025); Lopez v. United States, No.2025-1499

(Fed. Cir. July 16, 2025). The Court of Federal

Claims was likewise clearly correct that Mr. Lopez

failed to raise a cognizable takings

claim based on his allegation that Congress omitted

a civil cause of action from the federal

Defend Trade Secrets Act at least because

“[t]akings liability must be premised onaffirmative

government acts,” St.Bernard Par. Gov’t v.

United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir.

2018). 1 See Lopez v. MUFG Holding

Corp., No. G061254, 2023 WL 4941972, at *1 (Cal.

Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2023).Case: 25-2047

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Document: 15 Page: 3 Filed:

12/10/2025

LOPEZ v. US 3

We have considered Mr. Lopez’s

arguments in opposition to summary affirmance

and find them unpersuasive.

In particular, Mr. Lopez reiterates

his argument that the trial judge should have

recused because, when an attorney

in private practice, he had “transacted business

dealingswith the . . . United States” in

matters unrelated to Mr. Lopez’s claims. ECF No.

10-1 at 2—3. As previously explained to Mr. Lopez,

to show “that judicial bias during the proceedings

deprived him of due process [he] must show a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible,” and he has

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clearly failed to do so here in this case. Lopez, 2025

WL 685917, at *2. The court notes that Mr. Lopez

has filed numerous cases with the Court of Federal

Claims, and related appeals with this court, each of

which have been similarly re-jected. See, e.g.,

Lopez, 2025 WL 685917; Lopez, No. 2025-1499,

ECF No. 15; Lopez v. United States, No. 2023-1522,

ECF No. 26 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2023); Lopez v.

United States, No. 2022-2244, ECF No.

13 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2022); Lopez v. United States,

No.2022-1426, ECF No. 20 (Fed.

Cir. Dec. 14, 2022). Mr. Lopez is now specifically

warned that if he continues to file appeals

with this court that are wholly meritless, the court

may impose monetary and/or

non-monetary sanctions. Cf. In re

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Amend, to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13 (1991) (“It is

vital that the right to file in formapauperis not be

encumbered by those who would abuse the

integrity of our process by frivolous filings[.]”).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis

is denied.

(2) The United States’s motion is granted.

The judgment of the United

States Court of Federal Claims is

summarily affirmed.4

LOPEZ v. US(3) Each party shall bear its own

costs.

FOR THE COURT

JARRETT B. PERLOW December 10, 2025

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APPENDIX B

Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH

Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 1 of 16

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 25-145 (Filed: 20 August 2025)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

******************************

ARTHUR LOPEZ, Plaintiff, **

v. *

THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. **

******************************

Arthur Lopez, pro se, of Newport Beach, CA.

Tate N. Walker, Trial Attorney,

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil

Division, with whom were Claudia Burke, Deputy

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Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Yaakov

M. Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC.

ORDER

HOLTE, Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Arthur Lopez brings

this action seeking $500 million for

an alleged Fifth Amendment taking of his property

and family. The Court suspected it

lacked jurisdiction overplaintiffs claims and

ordered plaintiff to show cause demonstrating

why the Court should not dismiss the case for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff and the

government responded outlining his jurisdictional

theory or lack thereof. Separately, plaintiff moved

to disqualify and recuse the undersigned. For the

reasons discussed below, the Court denies

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plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge and for

Recusal, and dismisses sua sponte plaintiff s

Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. Factual Background and

Procedural History

On 27 January 2025, pro se plaintiff

Arthur Lopez filed this action,

alleging governmentagents engaged in stalking,

harassment, prostitution, denial of social security

benefits, theft of trade secrets, theft of his children,

taking of his residence and business, conspiracy to

deprive him of judicial relief, negligence, false

imprisonment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and

mail tampering. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.

The same day, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Mot. for

Leave to Proceed IFP (“First IFP Appl.”), ECF

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No. 2.Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH

Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 2 of 16

On 30 January 2025, the Court

denied plaintiffs IFP application for

incompleteness andordered “plaintiff to show cause

as

to: (1) why this case should not be

dismissed for being nearly

identical to plaintiff s other pending

action in the Court of Federal Claims

before Judge Smith, No. 23-1742; and (2) why this

case is not against private individuals or

seek[s] injunctive relief.” O.S.C. at 3, ECF No. 5.1

As the Court explained, “[u]nder Rule 12(h)(3) of

the Rules of the United States Court of Federal

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Claims (“RCFC”), ‘ [i]f the court determines at any

time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

court must dismiss the action.’” Id. 2

On 18 February 2025, plaintiff filed a

motion for extension of time to

respond to theShow Cause Order, see Pl.’s Mot. for

Extension of Time, ECF No. 8, which

was granted the next day. On 25 February 2025,

plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify and

recuse the undersigned. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify

Judge and for Recusal, ECF No. 9. On 5 March

2025, the government responded. See Gov’t’s Resp.

to Mot. to Disqualify and for Recusal, ECF

No. 10. On 17 March 2025, plaintiff responded to

the Court’s Show Cause Order, see Pl.’s Resp. to

O.S.C., ECF No. 12, and refiled a second motion for

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leave to proceed IFP, see Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to

Proceed IFP (“Second IFP Appl ”), ECF No. 12. On

4 April 2025, the government responded to

plaintiff sResponse to the Show Cause Order. See

Gov’t’s Resp. to O.S.C., ECF No. 13.

II. Plaintiff s Extensive Litigation

History

Plaintiff has filed several cases in the

Court of Federal Claims—all were dismissed and

all dismissals were affirmed per curiam by the

Federal Circuit: (1) Lopez v. United States, No.

21-1166 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 21, 2022) (Meyers, J.)

(dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

and failure to state a claim), affd, No. 22-1426

(Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2022) (per curiam); (2) Lopez v.

United States, No. 22-259 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 30, 2023)

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(Williams, J.) (dismissed for lack of subjectmatter

jurisdiction), aff d, No. 23-1522, 2023 WL 7096921

(Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2023) (per curiam); (3) Lopez v.

United States, No. 22-330 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 23, 2022)

(Schwartz, J.) 1 The case before Judge Smith was

later dismissed because plaintiff “apparently

believes that federal agency officials, local law

enforcement, and private companies conspired to

take his housing’ and assets in a scheme

involving torts, criminal actions, and an

‘unlawful’ denial of social security

disability benefits,” and “the Court does

not have subject-matter jurisdiction over

claims that sound in tort . . . [or] over

criminal claims and social security

benefits claims.” 28 Feb. 2025 Order at 2,

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Lopez v. United States, No. 23-1742, ECF

No. 26. 2 The Federal Circuit recently affirmed

this court’s practice in a pair of orders

affirming dismissals after the Courtordered two

plaintiffs to “show cause as to why [the] case[s]

should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3).”

Hernandez v. United States, No. 25-1248,

2025 WL 2304600, at *1 (Fed.

Cir. Aug. 11, 2025); see Hout v. United

States, No. 25-1247, 2025 WL 2305100

(Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). Both

plaintiffs thereafter filed a plethora of

unresponsive documents without any

meaningful attempt to address the

Court’s Show Cause Order. When the

Court again ordered the plaintiffs to

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respond, plaintiffs failed to file anything

at all. See 23 September 2024 Order, ECF

No. 13, Hernandez, No. 24-1034; 23

September 2024 Order, ECF No.

19, Hout, No. 24-1032. Thus, the Court

had “no choice but to dismiss plaintiffs’

complaint [s] for failure to

prosecute.” 24 October 2024 Order at 2,

ECF No. 14, Hernandez, No. 24-1034; 24

October 2024 Order at 2, ECFNo. 14, Hout, No.

24-1032. The Federal

l

Circuit held there was “no abuse of

discretion by the [Court of Federal

Claims]” in dismissing each case for

failure to prosecute because “the show

cause order [s] w[ere] unambiguous and

clear” and the failure to respond “is

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dispositive.” Hernandez, No. 25-1248,

2025 WL 2304600, at *1; see Hout, No.

25-1248, 2025 WL 2305100. As such,

when a plaintiff fails to respond to a show

cause order, that failure is dispositive and the

Court can dismiss the case. See Hernandez, No.

25-1248, 2025 WL 2304600, at *1; see Hout,

No. 25-1247, 2025 WL 2305100. - 2 -Case 1:25cv-00145-RTH

Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 3 of 16

(dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and failure to state a

claim), affd, No. 22-2244,2022 WL 17972176 (Fed.

Cir. Dec.

28, 2022) (per curiam); (4) Lopez v.

United States, No. 23-

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620 (Fed. Cl. May 7, 2024)

(Schwartz, J.) (dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and

failure to state a claim), aff d, No.

24-1860, 2025 WL 685917 (Fed. Cir.

Mar. 4, 2025) (per

curiam); and (5) Lopez v. UnitedStates, No. 23-1742

(Fed. Cl. Feb.28, 2025) (Smith, J.)

(dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction), aff d, No. 25-1499,

2025 WL 1949865 (Fed.

Cir. July 16, 2025) (per curiam).

Furthermore, plaintiff has an

extensive filing history in the United

States District Court

for the Central District of California,

all of which have been dismissed,

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inter alia, for failure to prosecute, failure to comply

with court orders, frivolousness, failure to

state a claim, lack of jurisdiction, res judicata,

untimeliness, and summary judgment

granted in favor of the opposing party. See, e.g.,

Lopez v. Corona Police Dept, 2019 WL 9656443

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019),

aff d, 816 F. App’x 113 (9th Cir.

2020), cert, denied, 141 S. Ct. 2600

(May 3, 2021). The Central District of California

also sanctioned plaintiff pursuant to Rule

11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

forging and falsifying documents. See id. at *2.

The same court, in a different case, declared

plaintiff a vexatious litigant and barred him

from bringing claims againstpublic employees and

entities, or claims alleging discrimination

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against him or his family. SeeLopez v. HSBC Bank,

2020 WL 7416930, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 10,

2020), cert, denied, 142 S. Ct. 1366 (2022).

Similarly, the Southern District of Florida found

plaintiff s claims frivolous, denied his IFP petition,

and certified any appeal would not be taken in

good faith. See Lopez v. Actualidad Radio LLC, No.

23-22692, 2023 WL 5951833, at *1(S.D. Fla. Aug.

17, 2023).

III. Plaintiff s Arguments

As an initial matter, the Court will

review the plaintiff s arguments in its

outstanding motions and responses. In doing so,

the Court begins by considering plaintiff s motion

forrecusal and the government’s response thereto.

Then, the Court reviews plaintiff s response to

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the Court’s Show Cause Order and the

government’s response thereto.

A. Plaintiff s Motion for Recusal

In his Motion to Disqualify Judge

and for Recusal, plaintiff alleges the

undersigned’s “impartiality might reasonably be

questioned” because the undersigned was general

counsel for a technology company which contracts

with the U.S. Military, and as a part

of this role, co-invented a patent involving signal

jamming. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify

Judge and for Recusal at 2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

455). Plaintiff argues this gives the

undersigned “a financialinterest in the subject

matter in controversy,” because the Army and

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the “USA” are organizations conspiring against

plaintiff. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455). Plaintiff

claims the “military operations and schemes by

which the Takings [were] accomplished . . . also

involve signal jamming technology,” implying a

ruling against the government might

hurt the undersigned financially, because the

patent was for “signal jamming technology.” Id.

at 11-12. Citing the undersigned’s involvement in

legal associations, plaintiff alleges the undersigned

has bias sufficient to be disqualified. See id. at

8-10.- 3 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH

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Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 4 of 16

In response, the government argues

plaintiff failed to provide an

objective basis for

disqualification. See Gov’t’s Resp. to

Mot. to Disqualify and for Recusal.

Specifically, the

government argues involvement in

legal associations is insufficient on

their own to show bias.

See id. at 2 (citing Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994)).

B. Plaintiffs Show Cause

Responses

In response to the Court’s Show

Cause Order, plaintiff raises four

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arguments. First,

plaintiff reiterated his takings claim:

“branches of the U.S. Military, U.S.

Civilian Staff,Pentagon, and other divisions/

departments of the United States such

as the U.S. Postal Service [have] taken without just

compensation . . . damages due to

plaintiff for taking of his residence

. . . and his business, Auto Finance

Liberty Credit Corporation . . . solely

owned by plaintiff, and taking of plaintiffs family

including 4 (four) children.” Pl.’s Resp. to

O.S.C. at 2 (cleaned up). Plaintiff asserts, without

citation, the Supreme Court of California has held

children to be property. See id. at 3. Second,

plaintiff clarified the “case involves solely the

United States as a [defendant and their ‘Takings’

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violations as causes of action regardless of the fact

otherviolations may be concurrently committed.”

See id. at 3. Whether or not they break other laws,

or meet the elements of tort, plaintiff urges the

same underlying facts may be takings violations.

See id. at 3 (citing Taylor v. United States, 959 F.3d

1081 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). Third, plaintiff argues the

claims are not against private individuals—instead,

“the sole defendant [is] the United

States, . . . [and] the names referred

to in the initial complaint serve only

to provide clarity.” See Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 7—8.

To help establish jurisdiction, plaintiff names

several agencies inaddition to those cited in the

complaint—“U.S. HomelandSecurity-USDOJ-FBI-

assoc.” as wellas “U.S. Department of Homeland

Security-U.S. Air Force-Defense Coordinator, U.S.

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Marshals-Court Staff-Security Contractors, etc.”—

I

which plaintiff alleges participated in the

takings violation. See id. at 3, 7. Finally, in

response to the Court’s concern plaintiffs claims

are identical to those dismissed under plaintiff s

other claim, he insists “the Takings Violations

are for separate property/assets,

” without elaborating. See id. at 6; see also Lopez v.

United States, No. 23-1742, ECF No. 26.

The government advances five arguments in

response. First, the government argues

plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Fifth

Amendment property interest,” and has failed to

establish jurisdiction over the claim under the

Constitution. See Gov’t’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 7—8.

Second, even if plaintiff had established those two

elements, the government argues “the complaint

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still fails because he has not alleged that the taking

was legal.” Id. at 9 (citing Wagstaff v. United

States, 105 Fed. Cl. 99, 110 (2012)). Third, the

government avers plaintiff s claims are against

private parties, not the United States. See id. at 6—

7. Given “the Court does not possess jurisdiction to

entertain any suits—takings or other—against

private parties,” the government argues the Court

should dismiss the claim for lack of subject­

matter jurisdiction. Id.at 9 (citing Brown v. United

States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

Fourth, the government asserts plaintiff “simply

realleges the same facts and baseless allegations in

this case as he did inhis five other complaints and

subsequent appeals before the Federal Circuit.” Id.

at 6-7. Finally, the government argues plaintiffs

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claims are “really about criminal or tort matters

like the ‘theft of trade secrets’ and mail delivery,”

over which the Court has no jurisdiction. Id. at 7.

IV. Applicable Law

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Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 5 of 16

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under

RCFC12(b)(l)

“Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue

that must be determined at the outset of a case.”

King v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 766, 768 (2008)

(citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523

U.S. 83, 94—95 (1998)). Plaintiffs “bear the burden

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of establishing the court’s jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Acevedo v. United

States, 824 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing

Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659

F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). If a motion to

dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1) challenges

jurisdictional facts alleged in the

/

complaint, “the court may consider

relevant evidence to resolve the factual dispute.”

Schultz v. United States, No. 08—889T, 2009

WL 3416453, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 21, 2009) (citing

Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846

F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “In determining

jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all

undisputed facts asserted in plaintiff s complaint

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

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plaintiff.” Acevedo, 824 F.3d at 1368 (quoting

Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1163). The

Court, however, may “consider . . . evidentiary

matters outside the pleadings” when deciding

a RCFC 12(b)(1) motion. Indium

Corp, of Am. v. Semi- Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 884

(Fed. Cir. 1985).The Court of Federal Claims “is a

court of limited jurisdiction.” Jentoft v.UnitedStates

,450 F.3d 1342, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted). Under the Tucker

Act: The United States Court of Federal

Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment

upon any claim against the United

t

States founded either upon the

Constitution, or anyAct of Congress or any

regulation of an executive department, or upon any

express or implied contract with the United

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States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in

cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

“ [Although the Tucker Act waives the sovereign

immunity of thefederal government, it does not

itself provide any substantive rights or any

right of action to obtain monetary relief for wrongs.

Accordingly, to invoke [Court of Federal Claims]

jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act, ‘a

plaintiff must identify a right to money damages

found in the Constitution, a statute or government

regulation, or a contract.’” McCormick v. United

States, No. 2023-2314, 2024 WL 1005563,

at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2024) (quoting Folden v.

UnitedStates, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354-55 (Fed.

Cir. 2004)). “A plaintiff. . . must [also] show that

the identified source of law ‘can fairly be

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interpreted as mandating compensation by the

[f]ederal[government for the damages

sustained.’” Id. (citations omitted). Additionally,

the Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to claims

against state officials, local officials, or private

individuals. See United States v. Sherwood, 312

U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (“[I]f the relief

sought is against others than the United States [,]

the suit as to them . . . [is] beyond the jurisdiction

of th [is] court.”). “If the court determines at any

time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,

the court must dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3).

B. Pro Se Litigants

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Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 6 of 16Pro se litigants are granted greater

leeway than parties represented by

counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520—

21 (1972) (holding pro se complaints

should be held to “less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).

Despite such leeway, the Court has long recognized

“the leniency afforded to a pro se litigant

with respect to mere formalities does not relieve

the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.”

Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253

(2007)(citing Kelley v. Secy, U.S. Dept of Lab., 812

F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Biddulphv. United

States, 74 Fed. Cl. 765(2006)). A pro se plaintiff—

like any other plaintiff—must bear”the burden of

establishing the Court’s jurisdiction by a

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preponderance of the evidence.” Riles v. United

States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing

Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed.

Cir. 2002)). If a plaintiff acts pro se, this

“may explain . . . ambiguities [in filings], but it does

not excuse [any] failures [in the plaintiff s

pleadings], if such there be.” Henkev. United States,

60 F.3d 795, 799(Fed. Cir. 1995).

V. Plaintiff s IFP Application

On 27 January 2025, plaintiff filed a

motion for leave to proceed IFP. See Pl.’s First IFP

Appl. On 30 January 2025, the Court struck

plaintiff s IFP, because “plaintiff did not complete

the form; specifically, plaintiff did not answer

question 2(b) and theanswers to portion ofquestion

3 are not complete and/or legible, rendering the IFP

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incomplete.” O.S.C. at 1, ECF No. 5. On 17 March

2025, plaintiff filed a second motion for leave to

proceed IFP. See Pl.’s Second IFP Appl. Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), “any court of the United

States may authorize the commencement... of any

suit, action or proceeding . . . without prepayment

of fees or security therefor, by a person

who submits an affidavit that includes a

statement. . . that the person is unable to pay such

fees or give security therefor.” In plaintiff s second

IFPapplication, plaintiff claims he has been

unemployed since 2010 and has $0 in cash or in a

checking, savings, or inmate account. See Pl.’s

Second IFP Appl. at 2. Under these circumstances,

the Court concludes paying such fees would

constitute a serious hardship on plaintiff and

grants plaintiff s Motion to Proceed IFP.

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3 See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de

Nemours &Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (“We

think an affidavit is sufficient which

states that one cannot

because of his poverty ‘pay or give

security for the costs . . . and still be

able to provide’ himself

and dependents ‘with the necessities

of life.’” (alteration in original)); see

also 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(a)(1).

VI. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify-and

Recuse the Undersigned

The Court addresses plaintiffs Motion toDisqualify

Judge and for Recusal as a threshold matter. First,

plaintiff argues the undersigned’s “impartiality

might reasonably be questioned” because the

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undersigned was general counsel for a military

contractor, with whom he coinvented a patent for

signal jamming technology. See Pl.’s Mot. to

Disqualify Judge and for Recusal at 11—12.

Specifically, plaintiff argues this gives a financial

interest in the proceeding, because the “military

operations and schemes by which the Takings

[were] accomplished . . . involve signals The Court

notes the Court is being lenient to plaintiff given

his extensive litigation history in this Court and in

federal courts around thecountry, where he has

received sanctions and his similar IFP requests

have been denied. See supra Section IL- 6 -Case

l:25-cv-00145-RTH

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Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 7 of 16

jamming technology.” Id. A federal

judge shall “disqualify himself... [if

he] has a financial

interest in the subject matter in

controversy or in a party to the

proceeding, or any other interest

that could be substantially affected

by the outcome of the proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).

An objective standard is used to

determine a judge’s impartiality. See

Hewlett-Packard Co. v.Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882«

F.2d 1556, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“In enacting

section 455(a), Congress created an objective

standard under which to question the

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judge’s impartiality.”). Plaintiff has failed to clarify

what “military operations and schemes”

were implicated in his claims that would provide

sufficient objective ground for recusal, let

alone how his claims “involve” signal jamming

technology. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify Judge and

For Recusal at 11-12. Even if they did “involve”

such technology—which they do not—it is

unclear how past work as counsel for a signal

jamming startup, or owning a patent for signal

jamming, would give the undersigned a financial

interest in any of plaintiffs claims. See id.

Plaintiff fails to identify what the undersigned

would stand to lose in granting plaintiff s plea for

$500 million or stand to gain in denying it—nor

does plaintiff provide a reason for “an objective

B-32

observer to question [the undersigned’s]

impartiality.” Hewlett-Packard, 882 F.2d at 1568

(quoting Liljeberg v. Health

Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.

847, 865 (1988)). As the government

notes: In his motion, Mr. Lopez cites to the

currently assigned judge’s past employment

history, membership or affiliation with certain

groups, and prior filings for patentsfor military

equipment. See generally ECF No. 9. None of these

cited reasons provide a legitimate, objective basis

for disqualification. Opinions a judge forms

outside their employment as a judge

are not sufficient, on their own, to show bias

or prejudice. Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994). Nor is the judge’s view of

the law or legal theories sufficient to show the need

B-33

for a recusal. Id. Mr. Lopez has not alleged how

any of these cited reasons for disqualification

have personally affected the Court’s rulings or

actions in this matter. Accordingly, Mr. Lopez’s

allegations of prejudice fall short of justifying

hisrequest for disqualification for which

he bears a heavy burden. Gov’t’s Resp. to Mot. to

Disqualify and for Recusal at 2. Plaintiff has

failed to state facts orinferences which might lead a

reasonable person to question the undersigned’s

impartiality, and therefore the Motion should be

denied. See Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu

Enterprise Corp, 78 F.3d 550, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

(“[Appellants’ assertion of a financial conflict of

interest in this matter borders on the frivolous.

Appellants’ brief utterly omits any discussion of the

B-34

key facts and key legal provision concerning this

issue.”). Second, plaintiff insists the undersigned’s

involvement in voluntary associations causesbias,

“at best giving the appearance of impropriety and

diminishing public confidence.” Pl.’s Mot. to

Disqualify Judge and for Recusal at 8. Plaintiff

made similar accusations against two other judges

in this Court—Judges Schwartz and Smith—both

of which were rejected by the Federal Circuit. See

Lopez v. United States, No. 2025-1499, 2025 WL

1949865, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2025

(nonprecedentialy, Lopez v. United States,

No.2024-1860, 2025 WL 685917, *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar.

4, 2025) (nonprecedential). In accusing Judge

Schwartz of bias, plaintiff “express[ed] concern that

his complaint was dismissed because [Judge

Schwartz] was biasedagainst him.” Lopez, 2025 WL

B-35

685917, at *2. In rejecting plaintiffs “purely

speculative accusation, the Federal Circuit held

plaintiff “ha[d] not satisfied th[e] requirement. . .

to identify

*

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Page 8 of 16

any statement or action by the trial

court judge during the handling of his

case that demonstrates

bias.” See id. In accusing Judge

Smith of bias, plaintiff allegedly

“uncovered very significant

conflict of interest Standard

Operating Procedures [sic] within the

B-36

Trial Court that includes the

repeated occurrence of assigning bias

judicial officers to his cases, and

alleges that the trialjudge’s denial of his request to

recuse was an apparent retaliatory act also

negated his request for leave to amend complaint to

possibly add legal theories, facts, claims.”

Lopez, 2025 WL 1949865, at *2 (cleaned up). The

Federal Circuit rejected this baseless

accusation because “[to show] judicial bias during

the proceedings deprived him of due

process[,] [plaintiff] must show a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair

judgment impossible.” Id. (citing

Lopez, 2025 WL 685917, at *2). The Court reasoned

“[a]s with his prior similar attempts, here again, he

‘has not satisfied this requirement,’ as ‘[h]is

B-37

accusations are purely speculative.’” Id.A federal

judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might be reasonably

questioned. ” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see Shell Oil

Co. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283,

1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Pursuant to Section 455, the

Supreme Court requires a showing of a

1

“deep-seated . . . antagonism or an extrajudicial

source of bias: information gained from outside

of a judge’s participation in the proceedings.”

Flowers v. United States, 321 F. App’x 928, 935

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Liteky, 510

U.S. at 555). Plaintiffs bear a “heavy burden ... to

substantiate their recusal cXeavn” Baldwin, 78

F.3dat 557 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at555). Plaintiff,

however, has not met that “heavy burden’ to

B-38

show a reasonable person would question the

undersigned’s impartiality here. Compare

Baldwin, 78 F.3d at 557 (emphasis

added), with PL’s Mot. to Disqualify

Judge and for Recusal at 8—10. Plaintiff also has

not shown how being involved in non-political,

legal associations or Intellectual Property Practice

Group committees would create objective

indications of bias. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify

Judge and for Recusal at 9, 7. Failing to

acknowledge the high bar required for recusal, see

Baldwin, 78 F.3d at 557 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at

555), plaintiff claimslegal associations and the

entire federal government have conspired

against him, see Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify Judge and

for Recusal at 7—10. Such conspiracy theories are

insufficient to serve as objective grounds for recusal

B-39

or disqualification. See Baldwin, 78 F.3d at 557

(citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). As discussed above,

this is not the first time plaintiff has baselessly

accused this court of bias, and the Federal Circuit

previously rejected plaintiff s “purely speculative”

accusations of bias in prior cases. See Lopez, 2025

WL 1949865, at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2025) (“As

this court previously explained to plaintiff, to show

that judicial bias during the proceedingsdeprived

him of due process he must show a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair

judgment impossible. As with his prior similar

attempts, here again, he has not satisfied this

requirement, as his accusations are purely

speculative.” (cleaned up)). As plaintiff

has failed to demonstrate a “deep- seated . . .

antagonism” or “ favoritism,” or alleged a plausible

B-40

bias against him held by the aforementioned

organizations, the Court denies plaintiffs Motion to

Disqualify and for Recusal. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at

555 (1994) (“[O]pinions formed by the judge

on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring

in the course of the current proceedings, or ofprior

proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or

partiality motion unless they display a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible.”); Baldwin, 78

F.3d at 557 (“We conclude that appellants have not

carried the heavy burden necessary to

substantiate their recusal claim under

Liteky.”); see also Lopez, 2025 WL

1949865, at *2. VII. Whether Plaintiff s

Criminal and Tort Claims Fall Under the

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Page 9 of 16

As plaintiff s Complaint makes

allegations of crimes and torts, the

Court begins byaddressing whether it has

jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims sounding in

tort and criminal law. See, e.g., Compl. at 6—11;

Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 2—3. First, plaintiff makes

criminal allegations of: (1) mail tampering,

see Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 2 (“Moreover, the United

States Postal Service interfered with

timely Mail Delivery to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit causing

dismissal of plaintiff case to also bar plaintiff from

obtaining relief.”); (2) prostitution, see Compl.

B-42

at 3 (“U.S. Marine and U.S. Air Force and

associates’ schemes . . . led to barring plaintiff s

18 yr. old daughter frombeing introduced as a co­

plaintiff [against MUFG] . . . specifically,

U.S. Air Force agent. . . who is involved in

prostitution sponsoring.”); (3) economic

espionage, see Compl. at 9 (“(Defendant

. . . omitted a Civil Cause of Action

from theft of trade secrets statute

U.S. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1831 and § 1832 precluding

plaintifffrom relief-just compensation from

cohort Japanese bank the conglomerate MUFG

Union Bank, NA for their violations-theft of

trade secrets.”); and (4) stalking and harassment,

see Compl. at 7 (“It should also be noted that

defendant U.S. has taken adequate food, housing­

medical- dental care through these years of

B-43

takings violation schemes allthe while stalking-

spying-harassing and depriving quality of life in

peace for over a decade as a foundation to execute

these recent takings violations.”). The Court lacks

jurisdiction over claims alleging criminal conduct.

See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378,

379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The Court [of federal claims]

has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims

whatsoever under the federal criminal code.”). In

Joshua,plaintiff claimed “two officers of the

court acted in various ways by ‘scheme and design’

to deprive plaintiff of a finding under

the Declaratory Judgment Act, . . . allegedly

violating] several provisions of Title 18, the

criminal code, and . . .Constitutional rights...... The

criminal acts complained of includeconspiracy,

fraud, perjury, and malfeasance in office.” Id. at

B-44

379. In affirming the Court of Federal Claims, the

Federal Circuit held the Court “has no

jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever

under the federal criminal code.” Id. Like plaintiff

inJoshua, plaintiff alleges various crimes—e.g.,

prostitution, mail tampering, theft of trade secrets,

and stalking—which deprived plaintiff of judicial

relief; and like the Court in Joshua, “[t]he

[C]ourt has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims

whatsoever under the federal criminal code,” and

must dismiss. 17 F.3d at 379; see, e.g., Compl.at 3

(“U.S. Marine and U.S. Air Force and associates’

schemes . . . led to barring plaintiffs 18 yr. old

daughter from being introduced as a co-plaintiff . . .

specifically, U.S. Air Force agent. . .who is involved

in prostitution sponsoring.); Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at

B-45

2 (“[T]he United States Postal Service interfered

with timely mail delivery to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit causing

dismissal of plaintiff’s] case to also bar plaintiff

from obtaining relief . . .[T]he United States

*

Pentagon targeted plaintiff to also bar relief

through other judicial processes.”).Second, plaintiff

makes variousclaims sounding in tort: (1) false

imprisonment and intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“TIED”), see Compl. at 11

(“Plaintiff has been subjected to false imprisonment

by these defendant schemes all of which have

caused enormous emotional distress along with

physical harm.”); (2) fraudulent misrepresentation,

see id. at 11

B-46

(“U.S. Navy affiliates, who also remain parishioners

at Our Lady Queen of Angels Catholic

Church, et al., also participated in schemes to harm

plaintiff through deceit and trickery all leading to

loss of family, social standing, quality of life,

business, home, assets, etc.”); and (3)- 9 -Case 1:25-

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negligence, see id. at 6 (“U.S. Marine

Corps has a business office . . . where

plaintiff suffered a

traumatic fall. . . and the security

camera, directly above the location of

the fall, video recording

B-47

was destroyed by the defendant.”).

The Court lacks jurisdiction over

claims sounding in tort.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The

United States Court of Federal

Claims shall have jurisdiction

. . . for liquidated or unliquidated

damages in cases not sounding in

tort.”); see also Upshaw v.

United States, 673 F. App’x 985, 987

(Fed. Cir. 2016); Brown, 105 F.3d at

623—24; Lopez v.United States, No. 24-1860, 2025

WL 685917, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4,

2025). In Brown, plaintiff alleged ‘“Fourth

Amendment fraudulent taking’claims” for tax

penalties, and • demanded monetary damages to

compensate for the wages the IRS

B-48

had ‘seized’ without warrants.” 105 F.3d at 622.

There, the court held, given “[plaintiffs]

complaints for ‘fraudulent assessment[s]’ are

grounded upon fraud, which is a tort, the court

lacks jurisdiction over those claims.” Id. at 623.

Like in Brown, the Court lacks jurisdiction here

because plaintiff s claims of false imprisonment,

TIED, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligence

all sound in tort. SeeCompl. at 11 (“[F]alse

imprisonment. . . which [has] caused enormous

emotional distress along with physical harm”); id.

at 11 (“[D]eceit and trickery”); id. at 6 (“[P]laintiff

suffered a traumatic fall. . . [and] video recording

was destroyed by the defendant.”); see Brown, 103

F.3d at 623—624 (“Because [plaintiffs]

complaints . . . are grounded upon fraud, which is a

B-49

tort, the court lacks jurisdiction over those

claims . . [and] the trial judge properly dismissed

their cases.”); Upshaw, 673 F. App’x at 987 (“With

regard to Mr. Upshaw’s tort claims: the Tucker Act

excludes tort claims . . . [and] we affirm the trial

court’s decision to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter

jurisdiction.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1);

RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time

that it lacks subject- matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.”).

VIII. Whether Plaintiff States

Takings Claims Within the Court’s

Jurisdiction

In his Complaint, plaintiff further

alleged tortious and criminal claims

outside of the

B-50

Court’s jurisdiction. See supra

Section VII. In response to the

Court’s Show Cause Order,

plaintiff weaved a web of

unintelligible conspiracy, in which

the “highest authorities” of

government conspired to take his

property through agencies such as

“U.S. Homeland Security-USDOJ-FBI-assoc.,” “U.S.

Department of Homeland Security -

U.S. Air Force-Defense

Coordinator, U.S. Marshals-Court

Staff-Security Contractors, etc.” and

their “agents.” Pl.’s

Resp. to O.S.C. at 3, 6-7. Plaintiff

contrives four sets of allegedly taken

B-51

property: (1) Social

Security benefits, see Compl. at 6;

(2) children, see id. at 2; (3) trade

secrets, see id. at 2; and (4)

a residence and business, see id. at 2.

As the four sets are legally distinct,

the Court analyzes

each in turn below.

A. Whether the Court Has

Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs

Takings Claim for His

Social Security BenefitsPlaintiff s Complaint

alleges

“ [defendant [United States] (Social

Security Division)

ha[s] also Taken Plaintiffs Disability

Benefits for several years so as to

B-52

prevent [p]laintiff from

hiring competent legal representation

to obtain Relief sooner and as such

adding another layer of

Takings Violations by the defendant

against [p]laintiff.” Compl. at 6. The

Court of Federal

Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims

for social security benefits. See

Marcus v. United States,

909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1990)

(“[W]e hold that the [Court of

Federal Claims] has no

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988), over

claims to social security- 10 -Case l:25-cv-00145-

RTH

B-53

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Page 11 of 16

benefits.”); Arunga v. United States,

465 F. App’x 966, 967-68 (Fed. Cir.

2012) (“[T]he statute

makes clear that the Court of Federal

Claims lacks jurisdiction because

claims for social security

benefits must be filed in a federal

district court.”); see also 42 U.S.C. §

405(g)—(h). Plaintiff s

factual claim is similar to Marcus v.

United States, where the Court

denied plaintiff s plea for “a

reversal of the decision by the

Commissioner of Social Security

denying an award of social

B-54

security disability benefits,” as “the

[Court of Federal Claims] has no

jurisdiction under theTucker Act. . . over claims to

social

security benefits, even considering

appellant’s assertions

that he is entitled to relief under the

Constitution.” 909 F.2d at 1471; see

Compl. at 6 (“[The

Social Security Administration has]

taken plaintiffs disability benefits for

several years.”).

Here, plaintiff alleges the Social

Security Administration (“SSA”) has

“Taken Plaintiffs

Disability Benefits for several years,”

B-55

Compl. at 6, but this claim must “be

brought in the district

court of the United States for the

judicial district in which the plaintiff

resides.

” 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 405

does not give this court jurisdiction

over the SSA’s decisions.See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (“No

findings

of fact or decision of the Commission

of Social Security

shall be reviewed by any person,

tribunal, or governmental agency

except as [provided by the

Social Security Act.]”). As plaintiff

alleges Social Security benefits

B-56

claims outside the Court’s

jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss.

See Marcus, 909 F.2d at 1471 (“[T]he

[Court of Federal

Claims] has no jurisdiction under the

Tucker Act. . . over claims to social

security benefits, even

considering appellant’s assertions

that he is entitled to relief under the

Constitution.”); Arunga,

465 F. App’x at 967—68 (“Challenges

relating to social security benefits

shall be brought in thedistrict court of the United

States for

the judicial district in which the

plaintiff resides.”) (citation

omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. §

B-57

f

405(g)—(h).

B. Whether the Court Has

Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs

Takings Claim for His

Children

Plaintiff further alleges the

government has taken “Plaintiff s

Property-Family including

4 (four) children.” Pl.’s Resp. to

O.S.C. at 2. Plaintiff claims unnamed

precedent establishes

“ [parents’ children are deemed their

property.” Id. at 3. For an actionable

Fifth Amendment

takings claim, plaintiff must have a

legally cognizable property interest.

B-58

' See American PelagicFishing Co., L.P. v. United

States, 379

F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It

is axiomatic that

only persons with a valid property

interest at the time of the taking are

entitled to compensation.”

(citations omitted)). People are not

property. See U.S. CONST, amend. XIII,

§ 1. Plaintiff has

previously claimed his children to be

property, but as the Federal Circuit

reasoned, “there is no

case law or statute which establishes

a property right in children.” Lopez,

2025 WL 685917, at

*1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 2025). Plaintiff

B-59

therefore cannot demonstrate a

legally cognizable property

interest in his children, and has not

identified a taking within the Court’s

jurisdiction. See Lopez,2025 WL 685917, at *1 (Fed.

Cir.

Mar. 4, 2025); American Pelagic,

379 F.3d at 1372 (“If the

claimant fails to demonstrate the

existence of a legally cognizable

property interest, the court’s

task is at an end.”); Fishermen s

Finest, Inc. v. United States, 59 F.4th

1269, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir.

2023) (“[T]he [Court of Federal

Claims] did not err in dismissing

B-60

[plaintiff s] takings claim for

lack of a cognizable property

interest.”). To the extent plaintiffs

claim is for family separation,

the Court lacks jurisdiction over state

law matters such as those involving

domestic relations.

See, e.g., Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv.

Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (“Claimsfounded on state law are also outside

the scope of the limited jurisdiction

of the Court of Federal

Claims.”); Gordon v. United States,

No, 23-2035, 2024 WL 3634306

(Fed. Cl. 2024) (“[T]he

- 11 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH

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Page 12 of 16

court is powerless to review the

decisions of state courts.”); Johnson

v. United States, No. 20831, 2020 WL 5645180, at *1-2

(Fed. Cl. 2020) (“The remaining

‘grievances’ appear to be

associated with decisions by the

Oklahoma courts in family law

matters [;] . . . [tjhis court,

however, lacks jurisdiction over

claims founded on state law.”).

Consequently, even if plaintiffcould demonstrate

the government

took his children, this would not be

an actionable Fifth

B-62

Amendment takings claim. See

American Pelagic, 379 F.3d 1363.

The Court must therefore

dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. See Lopez v. United

States, 2025 WL 685917, at

*1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 2025);

American Pelagic, 379 F.3d at 1372

(“If the claimant fails to

demonstrate the existence of a legally

cognizable property interest, the

court’s task is at an

end.”); Fishermen s Finest, 59 F.4th

at 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[T]he

[Court of Federal

1

Claims] did not err in dismissing

[plaintiff s] takings claim for lack of

B-63

a cognizable propertyinterest.”); see also Souders,

497 F.3d

at 1307.

C. Whether the Court Has

Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs

Takings Claim for his

Trade Secrets

Plaintiff alleges “U.S. Congress­

staff’ omitted a civil cause of action

for theft of trade

secrets, effecting a taking of relief

plaintiff alleges he would be owed

from third parties. See

Compl. at 3, 9 (“Just the same in this

case brought by plaintiff I property

owner Arthur Lopez,

the defendant. . . omitted a Civil

B-64

Cause of Action from theft of trade

secrets statute U.S. Title 18

U.S.C. § 1831 and § 1832 precluding

plaintiff from relief-just

compensation from cohortJapanese bank the

conglomerate

MUFG Union Bank, NA for their

violations-theft of trade

secrets.”); Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 2

(“[T]he United States Congress

omitted a Civil Cause of

Action under Title 18 U.S.C.

1831/1832 (Economic Espionage

Act) to prevent recovery of

damages from theft of trade

secrets.”). A takings claim must be

premised on affirmative

B-65

government action. See St. Bernard

Parish Government v. United States,

887 F.3d 1354, 1362

(Fed. Cir. 2018). Plaintiff argues

Congress effected a taking of his

property, by not enacting

regulation which would give him a

civil cause of action for its theft. See

Compl. at 9. A takingmust be an affirmative act,

and given

plaintiff has not stated a takings

claim under the Fifth

Amendment, the Court must dismiss.

See Compl. at 9; St. Bernard Parish

Government, 887

F.3d at 1362 (“Plaintiffs point to no

case where the government incurred

B-66

takings liability based on inaction. Takings liability

must be premised on affirmative government

acts.”); Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“If the court’s conclusion is that

the source as alleged and pleaded is not money­

mandating, the court shall so declare

and shall dismiss the cause for lack of

jurisdiction.”). In fact, plaintiffs claims here seem

identical to the claimsplaintiff alleged in MUFG

Union Bank, N.A. against a private party.

Compare MUFG, 2016 WL 9686990, at *1

(“[P]laintiff sued [MUFG Union Bank] . . .

alleging] . . . theft of trade secrets”);

with Compl. at 9 (“[Congress] omitted a Civil Cause

of Action from Theft of Trade Secrets . .precluding

Plaintiff from Relief — just compensation from

B-67

cohort Japanese banking conglomerate, MUFG

Union Bank.”)- As plaintiffs claims here

are against a private party, and not the federal

government, the Court lacks jurisdiction and must

t

dismiss. See Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Souders v.

S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1308

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Bydefinition, a claim for just

compensation under the [T]akings [C]lause of the

Fifth Amendment must be against the United

States since it applies only to the federal

government”) (emphasis added)); Casa de Cambio

Comdiv S.A., de C.V. v. United States, 291

F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Because the

government did not direct [the third party] to take

action against [plaintiff],

- 12 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH

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Page 13 of 16

and because [the third party] did not

act as the alter ego or agent of the

government, [plaintiff]

has not stated a claim for relief under

the Takings Clause.”) D« Whether the Court Has

Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs

Takings Claim for

His Residence and Business

Plaintiff s claims all seem to stem

from one set of facts—bankruptcy of

plaintiff1 s

business and foreclosure of plaintiff s

residence. See MUFG, 2016 WL

9686990, at *1

(plaintiffs original federal action);

B-69

see also Lopez v. MUFG Holding

Corporation, 2023 WL

4941972, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 3,

2023) (detailing plaintiff s litigation

history). Around

2007, plaintiff met with “an

employee and agent of MUFG Union

Bank to discuss developing an

auto finance company.” Id. MUFG

Bank employees promised additional

credit if Lopezwithdrew his home equity line of

credit, so “Lopez withdrew the

remainder of his home equity

line of credit to finance Liberty, . . .

[but] despite Lopez’s repeated

requests, Chung and other

Union Bank agents declined to

B-70

provide the promised funding.” Id.

Lopez first sued in Orange

Country Superior Court in May of

2012—he lost. Id. Since then, he has

embarked on creating a

saga of litigation in federal courts

across the country under the same

factual premise—“[MUFG

Union Bank’s] misconduct caused

[plaintiff] to lose his business [and]

home.” MUFG, 2016

WL 9686990, at *2; see supra

Section II.Plaintiff alleges his “property­

residence . . . [and] auto finance

Liberty Credit

Corporation” were taken by the

government “stem[ming] from

B-71

damages due to plaintiff’ for the

residence and corporation being

taken. See Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 2.

Plaintiff s “case follows

the defendants’ persistent

aggressions, interference,

obstructions to harm Plaintiff by

derailing

his litigation attempts for relief

against MUFG Union Bank.” Compl.

at 10 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff argues “it must be judicially

noted that the defendant through its

clandestine operations

by its web of undercover operative in

the Marine Corp — U.S. Airforce, etc.

constantly createdestructions online, private

B-72

businesses, Catholic Church as part

of an ongoing restricting of

Plaintiffs Rights program ‘signature

reduction’ to impede and derail

efforts for Relief through

the State and Federal Courts as part

of these Takings schemes.” Compl. at

7—8 (emphasis

omitted). Plaintiff alleges such

“clandestine operations” include: (1)

“U.S. Marine and U.S. Air

Force and associates’ schemes . . . led

to barring plaintiffs 18 yr. old

daughter from being

introduced as a co-plaintiff. . .

specifically, U.S. Air Force agent. . .

B-73

who is involved in

prostitution sponsoring,” Compl. at

3; (2) the “taking of the $53,000 note

by U.S. Attorneythrough a bankruptcy

proceeding . . .

precluding plaintiff from removing/

preventing taking of

property located @ 11540 Hoxie

Dr.,” Compl. at 9; (3) “the United

States Postal Service

interferfing] with timely mail

delivery to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

causing dismissal of plaintiff[’s] case

to also bar plaintiff from obtaining

relief,” Pl.’s Resp. to

O.S.C. at 2; and (4) “the United

B-74

States Pentagon targeting] plaintiff

to also bar relief through other judicial processes,”

id.', see also Compl., Ex. 1, App. A (a Newsweek

article from 2021 describing and decrying “the

Military’s Secret Undercover Army”); Compl. at 7

(“[T]he U.S.nonmilitary branches involved are

several - U.S. Homeland Security- USDOJ-FBIassoc.,” Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 3, and “U.S.

Department of Homeland Security- U.S. Air Force-

Defense Coordinator, U.S. Marshals-Court

Staff-Security Contractors, etc.”)(emphasis added).

- 13 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH

Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

B-75

Page 14 of 16

The Court has no jurisdiction over

claims against parties other than the

United States, and

if a third party takes something, it

must have been directed by the

federal government. See

Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Souders

v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d

1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir.2007) (“By definition, a claim

for

just compensation under the

[T]akings [C]lause of the Fifth

Amendment must be against the

United States since it applies only to

the federal government”)

(emphasis added)); Casa de Cambio

B-76

Comdiv S.A., de C. V. v. United States,

291 F.3d 1356, 1363

(Fed. Cir. 2002). In Casa de Cambio,

plaintiff cashed a stolen Treasury

check at a third-party

bank, the Treasury recouped its

losses by debiting the bank, and the

third-party bank recouped its

losses by debiting plaintiff. See 291

F.3d at 1361. The Federal Circuit

held the Court of Federal

Claims properly dismissed: “Because

the government did not direct [the

third party] to takeaction against [plaintiff], and

because

[the third party] did not act as the

alter ego or agent of the

B-77

government, [plaintiff] has not stated

a claim for relief under the Takings

Clause.” Id. at 1363.

The Court of Federal Claims does not

have jurisdiction to review the

decisions of federal district

courts or bankruptcy courts. See

Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d

1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir.

2001) (“To permit collateral attacks

on bankruptcy court judgments

would seriously undercut the

orderly process of the law. The

proper forum for appellants’

challenges to the bankruptcy

trustees’ actions therefore lies in the

[Federal Appeals Courts], not the

B-78

Court of Federal

Claims.”) (quotation omitted)).To the extent

plaintiff alleges his

business and residence were taken,

he contends they

were taken through “[MUFG Bank’s]

promising future consideration of a

business loan” but

“reneging,” which led to “plaintiff

filing for bankruptcy,” and

“plaintiffs financing requests to

[MUFG Bank], home equity line of

credit, and the subsequent foreclosure

of plaintiff s home.

MUFG, 2023 WL 4941972, at *1

(cleaned up). Like Casa de Cambio,

B-79

where a third-party bank

took money from plaintiff, the

actions of MUFG Union Bank cannot

be imputed to the federal

government. Compare 291 F.3d at

1361 (“[Plaintiff] urges that [the

Bank’s] debiting of[plaintiff s] account as a result of

the

government’s action against [the

Bank] amounted to a

taking of [plaintiff s] property by the

government.”), with Compl. at 10

(“[Plaintiffs] case

follows the defendants’ persistent

aggressions, interference,

obstructions to harm Plaintiff by

B-80

derailing his litigation attempts for

relief against MUFG Union Bank.”),

and id. at 7—8 (“the

defendant through its clandestine

operations . . . derailed] efforts for

Relief through the State

and Federal Courts.”), and Pl.’s Resp.

to O.S.C. at 2 (“the United States

Pentagon target[ing]

plaintiff to also bar relief through

other judicial processes”). MUFG

Bank is not the federalgovernment, and plaintiff

has not

alleged MUFG’s activities were

directed by the federal

government. See generally CompL;

Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. As plaintiffs

B-81

company and residence

were not taken by the federal

government, and the third-party

alleged to have taken them was not

directed by the federal government,

the Court lacks jurisdiction. See

Lopez, 2023 WL 4941972,

at *1 (“[All of] plaintiffs claims

arose from the same factual

predicate: plaintiffs financing

requests to defendants, home equity

line of credit, and the subsequent

foreclosure of plaintiff s

home.”); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588

(“[I]f the relief sought is against

others than the UnitedStates the suit as to them

must be

B-82

ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of

the [Court of Federal

Claims], or if its maintenance against

private parties is prerequisite to

prosecution of the suit

against the United States the suit

must be dismissed.” (citations

omitted)); Souders, 497 F.3d at

1308 (“By definition, a claim for just

compensation under the [T]akings

[C]lause of the Fifth

Amendment must be against the

United States since it applies only to

the federal government.”)(emphasis added)); Casa

de Cambio, 291 F.3d at 1363 (“Because the

government did not direct -

14 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH

B-83

Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 15 of 16[the third party] to take action against

[plaintiff], and because [the third

party] did not act as the

alter ego or agent of the government,

[plaintiff] has not stated a claim for

relief under the

Takings Clause.”).

Plaintiff s other claims are against

the judiciary and related

organizations, as plaintiff has

not prevailed despite litigating

relentlessly. See supra Section II; see

also Compl. at 7—8

(“clandestine operations . . .

derailing] efforts for Relief through

the . . . Courts”); id. at 3

B-84

(“schemes . . . barring plaintiffs ...

daughter from being introduced as a

co-plaintiff’); id. at 9

(“taking . . . by U.S. Attorney . . .

precluding plaintiff from . . . taking

of property located @11540 Hoxie Dr.”); id. at 7, 3

(alleging schemes perpetrated by

“USDOJ” and “U.S. Marshals-

Court Staff’); Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at

2 (“[I]nterfer[ing] with timely mail

delivery to the United

States Court of Appeals”); id.

(“Pentagon target[ing] plaintiff to

also bar relief through other

judicial processes”); id. (“Taking of

Property Residence . . . and derailing-

B-85

taking of Business of

Auto Finance Liberty Credit

Corporation.”). Plaintiff effectively

asks the Court to reverse the

decisions of other courts over which

the Court has no authority, and the

Court must dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. See Joshua, 17

F.3d at 380 (“[T]he Court of Federal

Claims does not havejurisdiction to review the

decisions of

district courts.”); Allustiarte, 256

F.3d at 1352 (quoting

Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S.

300, 313 (1995)) (“If a party is

‘dissatisfied with the

Bankruptcy Court’s ultimate decision,

B-86

[it] can appeal to the district court for

the judicial district

in which the bankruptcy judge is

serving, and then to the Court of

Appeals.’”); see also RCFC

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at

any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.”).

To summarize, plaintiff argues the

Court has jurisdiction over the taking

of his residence

and business under the Fifth

Amendment. See Pl.’s Resp. to

O.S.C. at 2. As discussed supraSections VII—VIII,

plaintiff s

arguments for the Court’s jurisdiction

B-87

are unclear, incomplete, and

insufficient. Plaintiff does not

provide any facts, causation, or

circumstances implicating the

government that give rise to a cause

of action under this court’s

jurisdiction. See supra Sections

VII-VIII. Jurisdiction is a threshold

issue. See King, 81 Fed. Cl. at 768

(citing Steel, 523 U.S. at

94-95). It is clear plaintiff

misunderstands the Court’s

jurisdiction, especially given the

large

number of cases that have been

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by

this court and other federal

B-88

courts. See supra Section II. As

plaintiff has failed to show

jurisdiction, the Court has no choicebut to dismiss

plaintiffs Complaint.

See Knick, 588 U.S. at 185; Fisher,

402 F.3d at 1173 (“If

the court’s conclusion is that the

source as alleged and pleaded is not

money-mandating, the

court shall so declare and shall

dismiss the cause for lack of

jurisdiction.”); see also RCFC

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at

any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.”).

IX. Conclusion

B-89

The Court has reviewed all of

plaintiff s arguments, and to the

extent any arguments are

not discussed herein specifically, they

are unclear, meritless, and

unpersuasive. Accordingly, theCourt: (1) DENIES

plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge and for

Recusal, ECF No. 9; (2)

GRANTS plaintiff s Motion for

Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis,

ECF No. 11; and (3)

- 15 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH

B-90

Document 14 Filed 08/20/25

Page 16 of 16

DISMISSES plaintiff s Complaint

sua sponte,

4 ECF No. 1. The Court DIRECTS

the Clerk’s

Office to enter judgment accordingly.

The Court further CERTIFIES,

under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), any appeal from this

order would not be taken in good

faith because plaintiff s

claims as alleged are clearly outside

the jurisdiction of the Court and

considering plaintiff sextensive litigation history in

this

court and other federal courts.

B-91

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Ryan T. Holte

RYANT. HOLTE

Judge

4 The Court notes this is the same process

recently affirmed by the Federal Circuit in

Hernandez v. United States and

Hout v. United States, where the Federal

Circuit held:

Although Mr. Hout is proceeding pro se,

the show cause order was unambiguous

and clearly

directed him to file a response explaining

the jurisdictional basis for his case by the

stated

deadline

We hold that the Claims

Court did not abuse its discretion in

B-92

determining that Mr.Hout failed to timely file a

response to the

show cause order. Because that failure is

dispositive,

we affirm.

Hout, No. 25-1247, 2025 WL 2305100, at

*2 (citations omitted); see also

Hernandez, No. 25-1248, 2025

WL 2304600, at *2.

B-93

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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