Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Arthur Lopez, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefMay 4, 2026
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APPENDIX A
NOTE: This order is
nonprecedential.
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
ARTHUR LOPEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
2025-2047
A-l
Appeal from the United States
Court of Federal Claimsin No. l:25-cv-00145-RTH,
Judge Ryan T. Holte.
ON MOTION
PER CURIAM. ORDER
Arthur Lopez appeals from the judgment of the
United States Court of Federal Claims
dismissing his case and moves for leave to proceed
informa pauperis. ECF No. 14.
The United States moves to summarily affirm.
Mr. Lopez opposes. We grant summary
affirmance.Case: 25-2047
A-2
Document: 15 Page: 2 Filed:
12/10/2025 2 LOPEZ v. USA After unsuccessfully
pursuing litigation over a private loan gone bad
that resulted in foreclosure on his residence,!
Mr. Lopez brought this action in the Court of
Federal Claims asserting he was entitled
to $5 million in damages based on the government’s
“interference,” “obstruction[|,” and “derailing” of
that litigation. ECF No. 3 at 21. Specifically, Mr.
Lopez’s complaint alleged the government had
take[n] everything from his possession,” including
his “children and Family,” his social security
benefits, his “property,” and his “assets.” Id. at
15-17. He further as-serted “U.S. Congress-staff’
had taken his property by omitting Civil Cause of
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Action under Theft of Trade Secrets statute.” Id. at
14. On August 20, 2025, the Court of
Federal Claims dismissed the complaint and
certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that
any appeal would not be in good faith. Mr. Lopez
nevertheless filed this appeal. Summary affirmance
is warranted here. We have explained to Mr. Lopez
that the Court of Federal Claims lacks
jurisdiction over claims for social security benefits,
criminal actions and suits, tort claims
based on interferencewith prior litigation, and
claims that he is entitled to compensation under
the Fifth Amendment for the taking of his
children and family. See Lopez v.United States, No.
2024-1860, 2025 WL 685917, at *l-2(Fed. Cir. Mar.
4, 2025); Lopez v. United States, No.2025-1499
(Fed. Cir. July 16, 2025). The Court of Federal
Claims was likewise clearly correct that Mr. Lopez
failed to raise a cognizable takings
claim based on his allegation that Congress omitted
a civil cause of action from the federal
Defend Trade Secrets Act at least because
“[t]akings liability must be premised onaffirmative
government acts,” St.Bernard Par. Gov’t v.
United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2018). 1 See Lopez v. MUFG Holding
Corp., No. G061254, 2023 WL 4941972, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2023).Case: 25-2047
A-5
Document: 15 Page: 3 Filed:
12/10/2025
LOPEZ v. US 3
We have considered Mr. Lopez’s
arguments in opposition to summary affirmance
and find them unpersuasive.
In particular, Mr. Lopez reiterates
his argument that the trial judge should have
recused because, when an attorney
in private practice, he had “transacted business
dealingswith the . . . United States” in
matters unrelated to Mr. Lopez’s claims. ECF No.
10-1 at 2—3. As previously explained to Mr. Lopez,
to show “that judicial bias during the proceedings
deprived him of due process [he] must show a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgment impossible,” and he has
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clearly failed to do so here in this case. Lopez, 2025
WL 685917, at *2. The court notes that Mr. Lopez
has filed numerous cases with the Court of Federal
Claims, and related appeals with this court, each of
which have been similarly re-jected. See, e.g.,
Lopez, 2025 WL 685917; Lopez, No. 2025-1499,
ECF No. 15; Lopez v. United States, No. 2023-1522,
ECF No. 26 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2023); Lopez v.
United States, No. 2022-2244, ECF No.
13 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2022); Lopez v. United States,
No.2022-1426, ECF No. 20 (Fed.
Cir. Dec. 14, 2022). Mr. Lopez is now specifically
warned that if he continues to file appeals
with this court that are wholly meritless, the court
may impose monetary and/or
non-monetary sanctions. Cf. In re
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Amend, to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13 (1991) (“It is
vital that the right to file in formapauperis not be
encumbered by those who would abuse the
integrity of our process by frivolous filings[.]”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis
is denied.
(2) The United States’s motion is granted.
The judgment of the United
States Court of Federal Claims is
summarily affirmed.4
LOPEZ v. US(3) Each party shall bear its own
costs.
FOR THE COURT
JARRETT B. PERLOW December 10, 2025
A-8
APPENDIX B
Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH
Document 14 Filed 08/20/25
Page 1 of 16
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-145 (Filed: 20 August 2025)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
******************************
ARTHUR LOPEZ, Plaintiff, **
v. *
THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. **
******************************
Arthur Lopez, pro se, of Newport Beach, CA.
Tate N. Walker, Trial Attorney,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, with whom were Claudia Burke, Deputy
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Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Yaakov
M. Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC.
ORDER
HOLTE, Judge.
Pro se plaintiff Arthur Lopez brings
this action seeking $500 million for
an alleged Fifth Amendment taking of his property
and family. The Court suspected it
lacked jurisdiction overplaintiffs claims and
ordered plaintiff to show cause demonstrating
why the Court should not dismiss the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff and the
government responded outlining his jurisdictional
theory or lack thereof. Separately, plaintiff moved
to disqualify and recuse the undersigned. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court denies
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plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge and for
Recusal, and dismisses sua sponte plaintiff s
Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I. Factual Background and
Procedural History
On 27 January 2025, pro se plaintiff
Arthur Lopez filed this action,
alleging governmentagents engaged in stalking,
harassment, prostitution, denial of social security
benefits, theft of trade secrets, theft of his children,
taking of his residence and business, conspiracy to
deprive him of judicial relief, negligence, false
imprisonment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
mail tampering. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.
The same day, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Mot. for
Leave to Proceed IFP (“First IFP Appl.”), ECF
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No. 2.Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH
Document 14 Filed 08/20/25
Page 2 of 16
On 30 January 2025, the Court
denied plaintiffs IFP application for
incompleteness andordered “plaintiff to show cause
as
to: (1) why this case should not be
dismissed for being nearly
identical to plaintiff s other pending
action in the Court of Federal Claims
before Judge Smith, No. 23-1742; and (2) why this
case is not against private individuals or
seek[s] injunctive relief.” O.S.C. at 3, ECF No. 5.1
As the Court explained, “[u]nder Rule 12(h)(3) of
the Rules of the United States Court of Federal
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Claims (“RCFC”), ‘ [i]f the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.’” Id. 2
On 18 February 2025, plaintiff filed a
motion for extension of time to
respond to theShow Cause Order, see Pl.’s Mot. for
Extension of Time, ECF No. 8, which
was granted the next day. On 25 February 2025,
plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify and
recuse the undersigned. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify
Judge and for Recusal, ECF No. 9. On 5 March
2025, the government responded. See Gov’t’s Resp.
to Mot. to Disqualify and for Recusal, ECF
No. 10. On 17 March 2025, plaintiff responded to
the Court’s Show Cause Order, see Pl.’s Resp. to
O.S.C., ECF No. 12, and refiled a second motion for
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leave to proceed IFP, see Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to
Proceed IFP (“Second IFP Appl ”), ECF No. 12. On
4 April 2025, the government responded to
plaintiff sResponse to the Show Cause Order. See
Gov’t’s Resp. to O.S.C., ECF No. 13.
II. Plaintiff s Extensive Litigation
History
Plaintiff has filed several cases in the
Court of Federal Claims—all were dismissed and
all dismissals were affirmed per curiam by the
Federal Circuit: (1) Lopez v. United States, No.
21-1166 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 21, 2022) (Meyers, J.)
(dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim), affd, No. 22-1426
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2022) (per curiam); (2) Lopez v.
United States, No. 22-259 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 30, 2023)
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(Williams, J.) (dismissed for lack of subjectmatter
jurisdiction), aff d, No. 23-1522, 2023 WL 7096921
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2023) (per curiam); (3) Lopez v.
United States, No. 22-330 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 23, 2022)
(Schwartz, J.) 1 The case before Judge Smith was
later dismissed because plaintiff “apparently
believes that federal agency officials, local law
enforcement, and private companies conspired to
take his housing’ and assets in a scheme
involving torts, criminal actions, and an
‘unlawful’ denial of social security
disability benefits,” and “the Court does
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
claims that sound in tort . . . [or] over
criminal claims and social security
benefits claims.” 28 Feb. 2025 Order at 2,
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Lopez v. United States, No. 23-1742, ECF
No. 26. 2 The Federal Circuit recently affirmed
this court’s practice in a pair of orders
affirming dismissals after the Courtordered two
plaintiffs to “show cause as to why [the] case[s]
should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3).”
Hernandez v. United States, No. 25-1248,
2025 WL 2304600, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 11, 2025); see Hout v. United
States, No. 25-1247, 2025 WL 2305100
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). Both
plaintiffs thereafter filed a plethora of
unresponsive documents without any
meaningful attempt to address the
Court’s Show Cause Order. When the
Court again ordered the plaintiffs to
B-8
respond, plaintiffs failed to file anything
at all. See 23 September 2024 Order, ECF
No. 13, Hernandez, No. 24-1034; 23
September 2024 Order, ECF No.
19, Hout, No. 24-1032. Thus, the Court
had “no choice but to dismiss plaintiffs’
complaint [s] for failure to
prosecute.” 24 October 2024 Order at 2,
ECF No. 14, Hernandez, No. 24-1034; 24
October 2024 Order at 2, ECFNo. 14, Hout, No.
24-1032. The Federal
l
Circuit held there was “no abuse of
discretion by the [Court of Federal
Claims]” in dismissing each case for
failure to prosecute because “the show
cause order [s] w[ere] unambiguous and
clear” and the failure to respond “is
B-9
dispositive.” Hernandez, No. 25-1248,
2025 WL 2304600, at *1; see Hout, No.
25-1248, 2025 WL 2305100. As such,
when a plaintiff fails to respond to a show
cause order, that failure is dispositive and the
Court can dismiss the case. See Hernandez, No.
25-1248, 2025 WL 2304600, at *1; see Hout,
No. 25-1247, 2025 WL 2305100. - 2 -Case 1:25cv-00145-RTH
Document 14 Filed 08/20/25
Page 3 of 16
(dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim), affd, No. 22-2244,2022 WL 17972176 (Fed.
Cir. Dec.
28, 2022) (per curiam); (4) Lopez v.
United States, No. 23-
B-10
620 (Fed. Cl. May 7, 2024)
(Schwartz, J.) (dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim), aff d, No.
24-1860, 2025 WL 685917 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 4, 2025) (per
curiam); and (5) Lopez v. UnitedStates, No. 23-1742
(Fed. Cl. Feb.28, 2025) (Smith, J.)
(dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction), aff d, No. 25-1499,
2025 WL 1949865 (Fed.
Cir. July 16, 2025) (per curiam).
Furthermore, plaintiff has an
extensive filing history in the United
States District Court
for the Central District of California,
all of which have been dismissed,
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inter alia, for failure to prosecute, failure to comply
with court orders, frivolousness, failure to
state a claim, lack of jurisdiction, res judicata,
untimeliness, and summary judgment
granted in favor of the opposing party. See, e.g.,
Lopez v. Corona Police Dept, 2019 WL 9656443
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019),
aff d, 816 F. App’x 113 (9th Cir.
2020), cert, denied, 141 S. Ct. 2600
(May 3, 2021). The Central District of California
also sanctioned plaintiff pursuant to Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
forging and falsifying documents. See id. at *2.
The same court, in a different case, declared
plaintiff a vexatious litigant and barred him
from bringing claims againstpublic employees and
entities, or claims alleging discrimination
B-12
against him or his family. SeeLopez v. HSBC Bank,
2020 WL 7416930, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 10,
2020), cert, denied, 142 S. Ct. 1366 (2022).
Similarly, the Southern District of Florida found
plaintiff s claims frivolous, denied his IFP petition,
and certified any appeal would not be taken in
good faith. See Lopez v. Actualidad Radio LLC, No.
23-22692, 2023 WL 5951833, at *1(S.D. Fla. Aug.
17, 2023).
III. Plaintiff s Arguments
As an initial matter, the Court will
review the plaintiff s arguments in its
outstanding motions and responses. In doing so,
the Court begins by considering plaintiff s motion
forrecusal and the government’s response thereto.
Then, the Court reviews plaintiff s response to
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the Court’s Show Cause Order and the
government’s response thereto.
A. Plaintiff s Motion for Recusal
In his Motion to Disqualify Judge
and for Recusal, plaintiff alleges the
undersigned’s “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned” because the undersigned was general
counsel for a technology company which contracts
with the U.S. Military, and as a part
of this role, co-invented a patent involving signal
jamming. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify
Judge and for Recusal at 2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
455). Plaintiff argues this gives the
undersigned “a financialinterest in the subject
matter in controversy,” because the Army and
B-14
the “USA” are organizations conspiring against
plaintiff. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455). Plaintiff
claims the “military operations and schemes by
which the Takings [were] accomplished . . . also
involve signal jamming technology,” implying a
ruling against the government might
hurt the undersigned financially, because the
patent was for “signal jamming technology.” Id.
at 11-12. Citing the undersigned’s involvement in
legal associations, plaintiff alleges the undersigned
has bias sufficient to be disqualified. See id. at
8-10.- 3 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH
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I
Document 14 Filed 08/20/25
Page 4 of 16
In response, the government argues
plaintiff failed to provide an
objective basis for
disqualification. See Gov’t’s Resp. to
Mot. to Disqualify and for Recusal.
Specifically, the
government argues involvement in
legal associations is insufficient on
their own to show bias.
See id. at 2 (citing Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994)).
B. Plaintiffs Show Cause
Responses
In response to the Court’s Show
Cause Order, plaintiff raises four
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arguments. First,
plaintiff reiterated his takings claim:
“branches of the U.S. Military, U.S.
Civilian Staff,Pentagon, and other divisions/
departments of the United States such
as the U.S. Postal Service [have] taken without just
compensation . . . damages due to
plaintiff for taking of his residence
. . . and his business, Auto Finance
Liberty Credit Corporation . . . solely
owned by plaintiff, and taking of plaintiffs family
including 4 (four) children.” Pl.’s Resp. to
O.S.C. at 2 (cleaned up). Plaintiff asserts, without
citation, the Supreme Court of California has held
children to be property. See id. at 3. Second,
plaintiff clarified the “case involves solely the
United States as a [defendant and their ‘Takings’
B-17
violations as causes of action regardless of the fact
otherviolations may be concurrently committed.”
See id. at 3. Whether or not they break other laws,
or meet the elements of tort, plaintiff urges the
same underlying facts may be takings violations.
See id. at 3 (citing Taylor v. United States, 959 F.3d
1081 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). Third, plaintiff argues the
claims are not against private individuals—instead,
“the sole defendant [is] the United
States, . . . [and] the names referred
to in the initial complaint serve only
to provide clarity.” See Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 7—8.
To help establish jurisdiction, plaintiff names
several agencies inaddition to those cited in the
complaint—“U.S. HomelandSecurity-USDOJ-FBI-
assoc.” as wellas “U.S. Department of Homeland
Security-U.S. Air Force-Defense Coordinator, U.S.
B-18
Marshals-Court Staff-Security Contractors, etc.”—
I
which plaintiff alleges participated in the
takings violation. See id. at 3, 7. Finally, in
response to the Court’s concern plaintiffs claims
are identical to those dismissed under plaintiff s
other claim, he insists “the Takings Violations
are for separate property/assets,
” without elaborating. See id. at 6; see also Lopez v.
United States, No. 23-1742, ECF No. 26.
The government advances five arguments in
response. First, the government argues
plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Fifth
Amendment property interest,” and has failed to
establish jurisdiction over the claim under the
Constitution. See Gov’t’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 7—8.
Second, even if plaintiff had established those two
elements, the government argues “the complaint
B-19
still fails because he has not alleged that the taking
was legal.” Id. at 9 (citing Wagstaff v. United
States, 105 Fed. Cl. 99, 110 (2012)). Third, the
government avers plaintiff s claims are against
private parties, not the United States. See id. at 6—
7. Given “the Court does not possess jurisdiction to
entertain any suits—takings or other—against
private parties,” the government argues the Court
should dismiss the claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.at 9 (citing Brown v. United
States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Fourth, the government asserts plaintiff “simply
realleges the same facts and baseless allegations in
this case as he did inhis five other complaints and
subsequent appeals before the Federal Circuit.” Id.
at 6-7. Finally, the government argues plaintiffs
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claims are “really about criminal or tort matters
like the ‘theft of trade secrets’ and mail delivery,”
over which the Court has no jurisdiction. Id. at 7.
IV. Applicable Law
- 4 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH
Document 14 Filed 08/20/25
Page 5 of 16
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under
RCFC12(b)(l)
“Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue
that must be determined at the outset of a case.”
King v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 766, 768 (2008)
(citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523
U.S. 83, 94—95 (1998)). Plaintiffs “bear the burden
B-21
of establishing the court’s jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Acevedo v. United
States, 824 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing
Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659
F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). If a motion to
dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1) challenges
jurisdictional facts alleged in the
/
complaint, “the court may consider
relevant evidence to resolve the factual dispute.”
Schultz v. United States, No. 08—889T, 2009
WL 3416453, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 21, 2009) (citing
Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846
F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “In determining
jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all
undisputed facts asserted in plaintiff s complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
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plaintiff.” Acevedo, 824 F.3d at 1368 (quoting
Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1163). The
Court, however, may “consider . . . evidentiary
matters outside the pleadings” when deciding
a RCFC 12(b)(1) motion. Indium
Corp, of Am. v. Semi- Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 884
(Fed. Cir. 1985).The Court of Federal Claims “is a
court of limited jurisdiction.” Jentoft v.UnitedStates
,450 F.3d 1342, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). Under the Tucker
Act: The United States Court of Federal
Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim against the United
t
States founded either upon the
Constitution, or anyAct of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United
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States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
“ [Although the Tucker Act waives the sovereign
immunity of thefederal government, it does not
itself provide any substantive rights or any
right of action to obtain monetary relief for wrongs.
Accordingly, to invoke [Court of Federal Claims]
jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act, ‘a
plaintiff must identify a right to money damages
found in the Constitution, a statute or government
regulation, or a contract.’” McCormick v. United
States, No. 2023-2314, 2024 WL 1005563,
at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2024) (quoting Folden v.
UnitedStates, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354-55 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)). “A plaintiff. . . must [also] show that
the identified source of law ‘can fairly be
B-24
interpreted as mandating compensation by the
[f]ederal[government for the damages
sustained.’” Id. (citations omitted). Additionally,
the Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to claims
against state officials, local officials, or private
individuals. See United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (“[I]f the relief
sought is against others than the United States [,]
the suit as to them . . . [is] beyond the jurisdiction
of th [is] court.”). “If the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3).
B. Pro Se Litigants
- 5 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH
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Document 14 Filed 08/20/25
Page 6 of 16Pro se litigants are granted greater
leeway than parties represented by
counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520—
21 (1972) (holding pro se complaints
should be held to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).
Despite such leeway, the Court has long recognized
“the leniency afforded to a pro se litigant
with respect to mere formalities does not relieve
the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.”
Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253
(2007)(citing Kelley v. Secy, U.S. Dept of Lab., 812
F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Biddulphv. United
States, 74 Fed. Cl. 765(2006)). A pro se plaintiff—
like any other plaintiff—must bear”the burden of
establishing the Court’s jurisdiction by a
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preponderance of the evidence.” Riles v. United
States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing
Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)). If a plaintiff acts pro se, this
“may explain . . . ambiguities [in filings], but it does
not excuse [any] failures [in the plaintiff s
pleadings], if such there be.” Henkev. United States,
60 F.3d 795, 799(Fed. Cir. 1995).
V. Plaintiff s IFP Application
On 27 January 2025, plaintiff filed a
motion for leave to proceed IFP. See Pl.’s First IFP
Appl. On 30 January 2025, the Court struck
plaintiff s IFP, because “plaintiff did not complete
the form; specifically, plaintiff did not answer
question 2(b) and theanswers to portion ofquestion
3 are not complete and/or legible, rendering the IFP
B-27
incomplete.” O.S.C. at 1, ECF No. 5. On 17 March
2025, plaintiff filed a second motion for leave to
proceed IFP. See Pl.’s Second IFP Appl. Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), “any court of the United
States may authorize the commencement... of any
suit, action or proceeding . . . without prepayment
of fees or security therefor, by a person
who submits an affidavit that includes a
statement. . . that the person is unable to pay such
fees or give security therefor.” In plaintiff s second
IFPapplication, plaintiff claims he has been
unemployed since 2010 and has $0 in cash or in a
checking, savings, or inmate account. See Pl.’s
Second IFP Appl. at 2. Under these circumstances,
the Court concludes paying such fees would
constitute a serious hardship on plaintiff and
grants plaintiff s Motion to Proceed IFP.
B-28
3 See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours &Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (“We
think an affidavit is sufficient which
states that one cannot
because of his poverty ‘pay or give
security for the costs . . . and still be
able to provide’ himself
and dependents ‘with the necessities
of life.’” (alteration in original)); see
also 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(a)(1).
VI. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify-and
Recuse the Undersigned
The Court addresses plaintiffs Motion toDisqualify
Judge and for Recusal as a threshold matter. First,
plaintiff argues the undersigned’s “impartiality
might reasonably be questioned” because the
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undersigned was general counsel for a military
contractor, with whom he coinvented a patent for
signal jamming technology. See Pl.’s Mot. to
Disqualify Judge and for Recusal at 11—12.
Specifically, plaintiff argues this gives a financial
interest in the proceeding, because the “military
operations and schemes by which the Takings
[were] accomplished . . . involve signals The Court
notes the Court is being lenient to plaintiff given
his extensive litigation history in this Court and in
federal courts around thecountry, where he has
received sanctions and his similar IFP requests
have been denied. See supra Section IL- 6 -Case
l:25-cv-00145-RTH
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Document 14 Filed 08/20/25
Page 7 of 16
jamming technology.” Id. A federal
judge shall “disqualify himself... [if
he] has a financial
interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest
that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
An objective standard is used to
determine a judge’s impartiality. See
Hewlett-Packard Co. v.Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882«
F.2d 1556, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“In enacting
section 455(a), Congress created an objective
standard under which to question the
B-31
judge’s impartiality.”). Plaintiff has failed to clarify
what “military operations and schemes”
were implicated in his claims that would provide
sufficient objective ground for recusal, let
alone how his claims “involve” signal jamming
technology. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify Judge and
For Recusal at 11-12. Even if they did “involve”
such technology—which they do not—it is
unclear how past work as counsel for a signal
jamming startup, or owning a patent for signal
jamming, would give the undersigned a financial
interest in any of plaintiffs claims. See id.
Plaintiff fails to identify what the undersigned
would stand to lose in granting plaintiff s plea for
$500 million or stand to gain in denying it—nor
does plaintiff provide a reason for “an objective
B-32
observer to question [the undersigned’s]
impartiality.” Hewlett-Packard, 882 F.2d at 1568
(quoting Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 865 (1988)). As the government
notes: In his motion, Mr. Lopez cites to the
currently assigned judge’s past employment
history, membership or affiliation with certain
groups, and prior filings for patentsfor military
equipment. See generally ECF No. 9. None of these
cited reasons provide a legitimate, objective basis
for disqualification. Opinions a judge forms
outside their employment as a judge
are not sufficient, on their own, to show bias
or prejudice. Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994). Nor is the judge’s view of
the law or legal theories sufficient to show the need
B-33
for a recusal. Id. Mr. Lopez has not alleged how
any of these cited reasons for disqualification
have personally affected the Court’s rulings or
actions in this matter. Accordingly, Mr. Lopez’s
allegations of prejudice fall short of justifying
hisrequest for disqualification for which
he bears a heavy burden. Gov’t’s Resp. to Mot. to
Disqualify and for Recusal at 2. Plaintiff has
failed to state facts orinferences which might lead a
reasonable person to question the undersigned’s
impartiality, and therefore the Motion should be
denied. See Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu
Enterprise Corp, 78 F.3d 550, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“[Appellants’ assertion of a financial conflict of
interest in this matter borders on the frivolous.
Appellants’ brief utterly omits any discussion of the
B-34
key facts and key legal provision concerning this
issue.”). Second, plaintiff insists the undersigned’s
involvement in voluntary associations causesbias,
“at best giving the appearance of impropriety and
diminishing public confidence.” Pl.’s Mot. to
Disqualify Judge and for Recusal at 8. Plaintiff
made similar accusations against two other judges
in this Court—Judges Schwartz and Smith—both
of which were rejected by the Federal Circuit. See
Lopez v. United States, No. 2025-1499, 2025 WL
1949865, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2025
(nonprecedentialy, Lopez v. United States,
No.2024-1860, 2025 WL 685917, *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar.
4, 2025) (nonprecedential). In accusing Judge
Schwartz of bias, plaintiff “express[ed] concern that
his complaint was dismissed because [Judge
Schwartz] was biasedagainst him.” Lopez, 2025 WL
B-35
685917, at *2. In rejecting plaintiffs “purely
speculative accusation, the Federal Circuit held
plaintiff “ha[d] not satisfied th[e] requirement. . .
to identify
*
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Page 8 of 16
any statement or action by the trial
court judge during the handling of his
case that demonstrates
bias.” See id. In accusing Judge
Smith of bias, plaintiff allegedly
“uncovered very significant
conflict of interest Standard
Operating Procedures [sic] within the
B-36
Trial Court that includes the
repeated occurrence of assigning bias
judicial officers to his cases, and
alleges that the trialjudge’s denial of his request to
recuse was an apparent retaliatory act also
negated his request for leave to amend complaint to
possibly add legal theories, facts, claims.”
Lopez, 2025 WL 1949865, at *2 (cleaned up). The
Federal Circuit rejected this baseless
accusation because “[to show] judicial bias during
the proceedings deprived him of due
process[,] [plaintiff] must show a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible.” Id. (citing
Lopez, 2025 WL 685917, at *2). The Court reasoned
“[a]s with his prior similar attempts, here again, he
‘has not satisfied this requirement,’ as ‘[h]is
B-37
accusations are purely speculative.’” Id.A federal
judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might be reasonably
questioned. ” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see Shell Oil
Co. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283,
1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Pursuant to Section 455, the
Supreme Court requires a showing of a
1
“deep-seated . . . antagonism or an extrajudicial
source of bias: information gained from outside
of a judge’s participation in the proceedings.”
Flowers v. United States, 321 F. App’x 928, 935
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Liteky, 510
U.S. at 555). Plaintiffs bear a “heavy burden ... to
substantiate their recusal cXeavn” Baldwin, 78
F.3dat 557 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at555). Plaintiff,
however, has not met that “heavy burden’ to
B-38
show a reasonable person would question the
undersigned’s impartiality here. Compare
Baldwin, 78 F.3d at 557 (emphasis
added), with PL’s Mot. to Disqualify
Judge and for Recusal at 8—10. Plaintiff also has
not shown how being involved in non-political,
legal associations or Intellectual Property Practice
Group committees would create objective
indications of bias. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify
Judge and for Recusal at 9, 7. Failing to
acknowledge the high bar required for recusal, see
Baldwin, 78 F.3d at 557 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at
555), plaintiff claimslegal associations and the
entire federal government have conspired
against him, see Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify Judge and
for Recusal at 7—10. Such conspiracy theories are
insufficient to serve as objective grounds for recusal
B-39
or disqualification. See Baldwin, 78 F.3d at 557
(citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). As discussed above,
this is not the first time plaintiff has baselessly
accused this court of bias, and the Federal Circuit
previously rejected plaintiff s “purely speculative”
accusations of bias in prior cases. See Lopez, 2025
WL 1949865, at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2025) (“As
this court previously explained to plaintiff, to show
that judicial bias during the proceedingsdeprived
him of due process he must show a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible. As with his prior similar
attempts, here again, he has not satisfied this
requirement, as his accusations are purely
speculative.” (cleaned up)). As plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate a “deep- seated . . .
antagonism” or “ favoritism,” or alleged a plausible
B-40
bias against him held by the aforementioned
organizations, the Court denies plaintiffs Motion to
Disqualify and for Recusal. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at
555 (1994) (“[O]pinions formed by the judge
on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring
in the course of the current proceedings, or ofprior
proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgment impossible.”); Baldwin, 78
F.3d at 557 (“We conclude that appellants have not
carried the heavy burden necessary to
substantiate their recusal claim under
Liteky.”); see also Lopez, 2025 WL
1949865, at *2. VII. Whether Plaintiff s
Criminal and Tort Claims Fall Under the
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Page 9 of 16
As plaintiff s Complaint makes
allegations of crimes and torts, the
Court begins byaddressing whether it has
jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims sounding in
tort and criminal law. See, e.g., Compl. at 6—11;
Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 2—3. First, plaintiff makes
criminal allegations of: (1) mail tampering,
see Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 2 (“Moreover, the United
States Postal Service interfered with
timely Mail Delivery to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit causing
dismissal of plaintiff case to also bar plaintiff from
obtaining relief.”); (2) prostitution, see Compl.
B-42
at 3 (“U.S. Marine and U.S. Air Force and
associates’ schemes . . . led to barring plaintiff s
18 yr. old daughter frombeing introduced as a co
plaintiff [against MUFG] . . . specifically,
U.S. Air Force agent. . . who is involved in
prostitution sponsoring.”); (3) economic
espionage, see Compl. at 9 (“(Defendant
. . . omitted a Civil Cause of Action
from theft of trade secrets statute
U.S. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1831 and § 1832 precluding
plaintifffrom relief-just compensation from
cohort Japanese bank the conglomerate MUFG
Union Bank, NA for their violations-theft of
trade secrets.”); and (4) stalking and harassment,
see Compl. at 7 (“It should also be noted that
defendant U.S. has taken adequate food, housing
medical- dental care through these years of
B-43
takings violation schemes allthe while stalking-
spying-harassing and depriving quality of life in
peace for over a decade as a foundation to execute
these recent takings violations.”). The Court lacks
jurisdiction over claims alleging criminal conduct.
See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378,
379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The Court [of federal claims]
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims
whatsoever under the federal criminal code.”). In
Joshua,plaintiff claimed “two officers of the
court acted in various ways by ‘scheme and design’
to deprive plaintiff of a finding under
the Declaratory Judgment Act, . . . allegedly
violating] several provisions of Title 18, the
criminal code, and . . .Constitutional rights...... The
criminal acts complained of includeconspiracy,
fraud, perjury, and malfeasance in office.” Id. at
B-44
379. In affirming the Court of Federal Claims, the
Federal Circuit held the Court “has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever
under the federal criminal code.” Id. Like plaintiff
inJoshua, plaintiff alleges various crimes—e.g.,
prostitution, mail tampering, theft of trade secrets,
and stalking—which deprived plaintiff of judicial
relief; and like the Court in Joshua, “[t]he
[C]ourt has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims
whatsoever under the federal criminal code,” and
must dismiss. 17 F.3d at 379; see, e.g., Compl.at 3
(“U.S. Marine and U.S. Air Force and associates’
schemes . . . led to barring plaintiffs 18 yr. old
daughter from being introduced as a co-plaintiff . . .
specifically, U.S. Air Force agent. . .who is involved
in prostitution sponsoring.); Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at
B-45
2 (“[T]he United States Postal Service interfered
with timely mail delivery to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit causing
dismissal of plaintiff’s] case to also bar plaintiff
from obtaining relief . . .[T]he United States
*
Pentagon targeted plaintiff to also bar relief
through other judicial processes.”).Second, plaintiff
makes variousclaims sounding in tort: (1) false
imprisonment and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“TIED”), see Compl. at 11
(“Plaintiff has been subjected to false imprisonment
by these defendant schemes all of which have
caused enormous emotional distress along with
physical harm.”); (2) fraudulent misrepresentation,
see id. at 11
B-46
(“U.S. Navy affiliates, who also remain parishioners
at Our Lady Queen of Angels Catholic
Church, et al., also participated in schemes to harm
plaintiff through deceit and trickery all leading to
loss of family, social standing, quality of life,
business, home, assets, etc.”); and (3)- 9 -Case 1:25-
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negligence, see id. at 6 (“U.S. Marine
Corps has a business office . . . where
plaintiff suffered a
traumatic fall. . . and the security
camera, directly above the location of
the fall, video recording
B-47
was destroyed by the defendant.”).
The Court lacks jurisdiction over
claims sounding in tort.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The
United States Court of Federal
Claims shall have jurisdiction
. . . for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in
tort.”); see also Upshaw v.
United States, 673 F. App’x 985, 987
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Brown, 105 F.3d at
623—24; Lopez v.United States, No. 24-1860, 2025
WL 685917, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4,
2025). In Brown, plaintiff alleged ‘“Fourth
Amendment fraudulent taking’claims” for tax
penalties, and • demanded monetary damages to
compensate for the wages the IRS
B-48
had ‘seized’ without warrants.” 105 F.3d at 622.
There, the court held, given “[plaintiffs]
complaints for ‘fraudulent assessment[s]’ are
grounded upon fraud, which is a tort, the court
lacks jurisdiction over those claims.” Id. at 623.
Like in Brown, the Court lacks jurisdiction here
because plaintiff s claims of false imprisonment,
TIED, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligence
all sound in tort. SeeCompl. at 11 (“[F]alse
imprisonment. . . which [has] caused enormous
emotional distress along with physical harm”); id.
at 11 (“[D]eceit and trickery”); id. at 6 (“[P]laintiff
suffered a traumatic fall. . . [and] video recording
was destroyed by the defendant.”); see Brown, 103
F.3d at 623—624 (“Because [plaintiffs]
complaints . . . are grounded upon fraud, which is a
B-49
tort, the court lacks jurisdiction over those
claims . . [and] the trial judge properly dismissed
their cases.”); Upshaw, 673 F. App’x at 987 (“With
regard to Mr. Upshaw’s tort claims: the Tucker Act
excludes tort claims . . . [and] we affirm the trial
court’s decision to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter
jurisdiction.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1);
RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject- matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.”).
VIII. Whether Plaintiff States
Takings Claims Within the Court’s
Jurisdiction
In his Complaint, plaintiff further
alleged tortious and criminal claims
outside of the
B-50
Court’s jurisdiction. See supra
Section VII. In response to the
Court’s Show Cause Order,
plaintiff weaved a web of
unintelligible conspiracy, in which
the “highest authorities” of
government conspired to take his
property through agencies such as
“U.S. Homeland Security-USDOJ-FBI-assoc.,” “U.S.
Department of Homeland Security -
U.S. Air Force-Defense
Coordinator, U.S. Marshals-Court
Staff-Security Contractors, etc.” and
their “agents.” Pl.’s
Resp. to O.S.C. at 3, 6-7. Plaintiff
contrives four sets of allegedly taken
B-51
property: (1) Social
Security benefits, see Compl. at 6;
(2) children, see id. at 2; (3) trade
secrets, see id. at 2; and (4)
a residence and business, see id. at 2.
As the four sets are legally distinct,
the Court analyzes
each in turn below.
A. Whether the Court Has
Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
Takings Claim for His
Social Security BenefitsPlaintiff s Complaint
alleges
“ [defendant [United States] (Social
Security Division)
ha[s] also Taken Plaintiffs Disability
Benefits for several years so as to
B-52
prevent [p]laintiff from
hiring competent legal representation
to obtain Relief sooner and as such
adding another layer of
Takings Violations by the defendant
against [p]laintiff.” Compl. at 6. The
Court of Federal
Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims
for social security benefits. See
Marcus v. United States,
909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“[W]e hold that the [Court of
Federal Claims] has no
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988), over
claims to social security- 10 -Case l:25-cv-00145-
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B-53
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Page 11 of 16
benefits.”); Arunga v. United States,
465 F. App’x 966, 967-68 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“[T]he statute
makes clear that the Court of Federal
Claims lacks jurisdiction because
claims for social security
benefits must be filed in a federal
district court.”); see also 42 U.S.C. §
405(g)—(h). Plaintiff s
factual claim is similar to Marcus v.
United States, where the Court
denied plaintiff s plea for “a
reversal of the decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security
denying an award of social
B-54
security disability benefits,” as “the
[Court of Federal Claims] has no
jurisdiction under theTucker Act. . . over claims to
social
security benefits, even considering
appellant’s assertions
that he is entitled to relief under the
Constitution.” 909 F.2d at 1471; see
Compl. at 6 (“[The
Social Security Administration has]
taken plaintiffs disability benefits for
several years.”).
Here, plaintiff alleges the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) has
“Taken Plaintiffs
Disability Benefits for several years,”
B-55
Compl. at 6, but this claim must “be
brought in the district
court of the United States for the
judicial district in which the plaintiff
resides.
” 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 405
does not give this court jurisdiction
over the SSA’s decisions.See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (“No
findings
of fact or decision of the Commission
of Social Security
shall be reviewed by any person,
tribunal, or governmental agency
except as [provided by the
Social Security Act.]”). As plaintiff
alleges Social Security benefits
B-56
claims outside the Court’s
jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss.
See Marcus, 909 F.2d at 1471 (“[T]he
[Court of Federal
Claims] has no jurisdiction under the
Tucker Act. . . over claims to social
security benefits, even
considering appellant’s assertions
that he is entitled to relief under the
Constitution.”); Arunga,
465 F. App’x at 967—68 (“Challenges
relating to social security benefits
shall be brought in thedistrict court of the United
States for
the judicial district in which the
plaintiff resides.”) (citation
omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. §
B-57
f
405(g)—(h).
B. Whether the Court Has
Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
Takings Claim for His
Children
Plaintiff further alleges the
government has taken “Plaintiff s
Property-Family including
4 (four) children.” Pl.’s Resp. to
O.S.C. at 2. Plaintiff claims unnamed
precedent establishes
“ [parents’ children are deemed their
property.” Id. at 3. For an actionable
Fifth Amendment
takings claim, plaintiff must have a
legally cognizable property interest.
B-58
' See American PelagicFishing Co., L.P. v. United
States, 379
F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It
is axiomatic that
only persons with a valid property
interest at the time of the taking are
entitled to compensation.”
(citations omitted)). People are not
property. See U.S. CONST, amend. XIII,
§ 1. Plaintiff has
previously claimed his children to be
property, but as the Federal Circuit
reasoned, “there is no
case law or statute which establishes
a property right in children.” Lopez,
2025 WL 685917, at
*1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 2025). Plaintiff
B-59
therefore cannot demonstrate a
legally cognizable property
interest in his children, and has not
identified a taking within the Court’s
jurisdiction. See Lopez,2025 WL 685917, at *1 (Fed.
Cir.
Mar. 4, 2025); American Pelagic,
379 F.3d at 1372 (“If the
claimant fails to demonstrate the
existence of a legally cognizable
property interest, the court’s
task is at an end.”); Fishermen s
Finest, Inc. v. United States, 59 F.4th
1269, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir.
2023) (“[T]he [Court of Federal
Claims] did not err in dismissing
B-60
[plaintiff s] takings claim for
lack of a cognizable property
interest.”). To the extent plaintiffs
claim is for family separation,
the Court lacks jurisdiction over state
law matters such as those involving
domestic relations.
See, e.g., Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv.
Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“Claimsfounded on state law are also outside
the scope of the limited jurisdiction
of the Court of Federal
Claims.”); Gordon v. United States,
No, 23-2035, 2024 WL 3634306
(Fed. Cl. 2024) (“[T]he
- 11 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH
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Page 12 of 16
court is powerless to review the
decisions of state courts.”); Johnson
v. United States, No. 20831, 2020 WL 5645180, at *1-2
(Fed. Cl. 2020) (“The remaining
‘grievances’ appear to be
associated with decisions by the
Oklahoma courts in family law
matters [;] . . . [tjhis court,
however, lacks jurisdiction over
claims founded on state law.”).
Consequently, even if plaintiffcould demonstrate
the government
took his children, this would not be
an actionable Fifth
B-62
Amendment takings claim. See
American Pelagic, 379 F.3d 1363.
The Court must therefore
dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Lopez v. United
States, 2025 WL 685917, at
*1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 2025);
American Pelagic, 379 F.3d at 1372
(“If the claimant fails to
demonstrate the existence of a legally
cognizable property interest, the
court’s task is at an
end.”); Fishermen s Finest, 59 F.4th
at 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[T]he
[Court of Federal
1
Claims] did not err in dismissing
[plaintiff s] takings claim for lack of
B-63
a cognizable propertyinterest.”); see also Souders,
497 F.3d
at 1307.
C. Whether the Court Has
Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
Takings Claim for his
Trade Secrets
Plaintiff alleges “U.S. Congress
staff’ omitted a civil cause of action
for theft of trade
secrets, effecting a taking of relief
plaintiff alleges he would be owed
from third parties. See
Compl. at 3, 9 (“Just the same in this
case brought by plaintiff I property
owner Arthur Lopez,
the defendant. . . omitted a Civil
B-64
Cause of Action from theft of trade
secrets statute U.S. Title 18
U.S.C. § 1831 and § 1832 precluding
plaintiff from relief-just
compensation from cohortJapanese bank the
conglomerate
MUFG Union Bank, NA for their
violations-theft of trade
secrets.”); Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 2
(“[T]he United States Congress
omitted a Civil Cause of
Action under Title 18 U.S.C.
1831/1832 (Economic Espionage
Act) to prevent recovery of
damages from theft of trade
secrets.”). A takings claim must be
premised on affirmative
B-65
government action. See St. Bernard
Parish Government v. United States,
887 F.3d 1354, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2018). Plaintiff argues
Congress effected a taking of his
property, by not enacting
regulation which would give him a
civil cause of action for its theft. See
Compl. at 9. A takingmust be an affirmative act,
and given
plaintiff has not stated a takings
claim under the Fifth
Amendment, the Court must dismiss.
See Compl. at 9; St. Bernard Parish
Government, 887
F.3d at 1362 (“Plaintiffs point to no
case where the government incurred
B-66
takings liability based on inaction. Takings liability
must be premised on affirmative government
acts.”); Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“If the court’s conclusion is that
the source as alleged and pleaded is not money
mandating, the court shall so declare
and shall dismiss the cause for lack of
jurisdiction.”). In fact, plaintiffs claims here seem
identical to the claimsplaintiff alleged in MUFG
Union Bank, N.A. against a private party.
Compare MUFG, 2016 WL 9686990, at *1
(“[P]laintiff sued [MUFG Union Bank] . . .
alleging] . . . theft of trade secrets”);
with Compl. at 9 (“[Congress] omitted a Civil Cause
of Action from Theft of Trade Secrets . .precluding
Plaintiff from Relief — just compensation from
B-67
cohort Japanese banking conglomerate, MUFG
Union Bank.”)- As plaintiffs claims here
are against a private party, and not the federal
government, the Court lacks jurisdiction and must
t
dismiss. See Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Souders v.
S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Bydefinition, a claim for just
compensation under the [T]akings [C]lause of the
Fifth Amendment must be against the United
States since it applies only to the federal
government”) (emphasis added)); Casa de Cambio
Comdiv S.A., de C.V. v. United States, 291
F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Because the
government did not direct [the third party] to take
action against [plaintiff],
- 12 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH
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Page 13 of 16
and because [the third party] did not
act as the alter ego or agent of the
government, [plaintiff]
has not stated a claim for relief under
the Takings Clause.”) D« Whether the Court Has
Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
Takings Claim for
His Residence and Business
Plaintiff s claims all seem to stem
from one set of facts—bankruptcy of
plaintiff1 s
business and foreclosure of plaintiff s
residence. See MUFG, 2016 WL
9686990, at *1
(plaintiffs original federal action);
B-69
see also Lopez v. MUFG Holding
Corporation, 2023 WL
4941972, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 3,
2023) (detailing plaintiff s litigation
history). Around
2007, plaintiff met with “an
employee and agent of MUFG Union
Bank to discuss developing an
auto finance company.” Id. MUFG
Bank employees promised additional
credit if Lopezwithdrew his home equity line of
credit, so “Lopez withdrew the
remainder of his home equity
line of credit to finance Liberty, . . .
[but] despite Lopez’s repeated
requests, Chung and other
Union Bank agents declined to
B-70
provide the promised funding.” Id.
Lopez first sued in Orange
Country Superior Court in May of
2012—he lost. Id. Since then, he has
embarked on creating a
saga of litigation in federal courts
across the country under the same
factual premise—“[MUFG
Union Bank’s] misconduct caused
[plaintiff] to lose his business [and]
home.” MUFG, 2016
WL 9686990, at *2; see supra
Section II.Plaintiff alleges his “property
residence . . . [and] auto finance
Liberty Credit
Corporation” were taken by the
government “stem[ming] from
B-71
damages due to plaintiff’ for the
residence and corporation being
taken. See Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 2.
Plaintiff s “case follows
the defendants’ persistent
aggressions, interference,
obstructions to harm Plaintiff by
derailing
his litigation attempts for relief
against MUFG Union Bank.” Compl.
at 10 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues “it must be judicially
noted that the defendant through its
clandestine operations
by its web of undercover operative in
the Marine Corp — U.S. Airforce, etc.
constantly createdestructions online, private
B-72
businesses, Catholic Church as part
of an ongoing restricting of
Plaintiffs Rights program ‘signature
reduction’ to impede and derail
efforts for Relief through
the State and Federal Courts as part
of these Takings schemes.” Compl. at
7—8 (emphasis
omitted). Plaintiff alleges such
“clandestine operations” include: (1)
“U.S. Marine and U.S. Air
Force and associates’ schemes . . . led
to barring plaintiffs 18 yr. old
daughter from being
introduced as a co-plaintiff. . .
specifically, U.S. Air Force agent. . .
B-73
who is involved in
prostitution sponsoring,” Compl. at
3; (2) the “taking of the $53,000 note
by U.S. Attorneythrough a bankruptcy
proceeding . . .
precluding plaintiff from removing/
preventing taking of
property located @ 11540 Hoxie
Dr.,” Compl. at 9; (3) “the United
States Postal Service
interferfing] with timely mail
delivery to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
causing dismissal of plaintiff[’s] case
to also bar plaintiff from obtaining
relief,” Pl.’s Resp. to
O.S.C. at 2; and (4) “the United
B-74
States Pentagon targeting] plaintiff
to also bar relief through other judicial processes,”
id.', see also Compl., Ex. 1, App. A (a Newsweek
article from 2021 describing and decrying “the
Military’s Secret Undercover Army”); Compl. at 7
(“[T]he U.S.nonmilitary branches involved are
several - U.S. Homeland Security- USDOJ-FBIassoc.,” Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at 3, and “U.S.
Department of Homeland Security- U.S. Air Force-
Defense Coordinator, U.S. Marshals-Court
Staff-Security Contractors, etc.”)(emphasis added).
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Document 14 Filed 08/20/25
B-75
Page 14 of 16
The Court has no jurisdiction over
claims against parties other than the
United States, and
if a third party takes something, it
must have been directed by the
federal government. See
Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Souders
v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d
1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir.2007) (“By definition, a claim
for
just compensation under the
[T]akings [C]lause of the Fifth
Amendment must be against the
United States since it applies only to
the federal government”)
(emphasis added)); Casa de Cambio
B-76
Comdiv S.A., de C. V. v. United States,
291 F.3d 1356, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2002). In Casa de Cambio,
plaintiff cashed a stolen Treasury
check at a third-party
bank, the Treasury recouped its
losses by debiting the bank, and the
third-party bank recouped its
losses by debiting plaintiff. See 291
F.3d at 1361. The Federal Circuit
held the Court of Federal
Claims properly dismissed: “Because
the government did not direct [the
third party] to takeaction against [plaintiff], and
because
[the third party] did not act as the
alter ego or agent of the
B-77
government, [plaintiff] has not stated
a claim for relief under the Takings
Clause.” Id. at 1363.
The Court of Federal Claims does not
have jurisdiction to review the
decisions of federal district
courts or bankruptcy courts. See
Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d
1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“To permit collateral attacks
on bankruptcy court judgments
would seriously undercut the
orderly process of the law. The
proper forum for appellants’
challenges to the bankruptcy
trustees’ actions therefore lies in the
[Federal Appeals Courts], not the
B-78
Court of Federal
Claims.”) (quotation omitted)).To the extent
plaintiff alleges his
business and residence were taken,
he contends they
were taken through “[MUFG Bank’s]
promising future consideration of a
business loan” but
“reneging,” which led to “plaintiff
filing for bankruptcy,” and
“plaintiffs financing requests to
[MUFG Bank], home equity line of
credit, and the subsequent foreclosure
of plaintiff s home.
MUFG, 2023 WL 4941972, at *1
(cleaned up). Like Casa de Cambio,
B-79
where a third-party bank
took money from plaintiff, the
actions of MUFG Union Bank cannot
be imputed to the federal
government. Compare 291 F.3d at
1361 (“[Plaintiff] urges that [the
Bank’s] debiting of[plaintiff s] account as a result of
the
government’s action against [the
Bank] amounted to a
taking of [plaintiff s] property by the
government.”), with Compl. at 10
(“[Plaintiffs] case
follows the defendants’ persistent
aggressions, interference,
obstructions to harm Plaintiff by
B-80
derailing his litigation attempts for
relief against MUFG Union Bank.”),
and id. at 7—8 (“the
defendant through its clandestine
operations . . . derailed] efforts for
Relief through the State
and Federal Courts.”), and Pl.’s Resp.
to O.S.C. at 2 (“the United States
Pentagon target[ing]
plaintiff to also bar relief through
other judicial processes”). MUFG
Bank is not the federalgovernment, and plaintiff
has not
alleged MUFG’s activities were
directed by the federal
government. See generally CompL;
Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. As plaintiffs
B-81
company and residence
were not taken by the federal
government, and the third-party
alleged to have taken them was not
directed by the federal government,
the Court lacks jurisdiction. See
Lopez, 2023 WL 4941972,
at *1 (“[All of] plaintiffs claims
arose from the same factual
predicate: plaintiffs financing
requests to defendants, home equity
line of credit, and the subsequent
foreclosure of plaintiff s
home.”); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588
(“[I]f the relief sought is against
others than the UnitedStates the suit as to them
must be
B-82
ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of
the [Court of Federal
Claims], or if its maintenance against
private parties is prerequisite to
prosecution of the suit
against the United States the suit
must be dismissed.” (citations
omitted)); Souders, 497 F.3d at
1308 (“By definition, a claim for just
compensation under the [T]akings
[C]lause of the Fifth
Amendment must be against the
United States since it applies only to
the federal government.”)(emphasis added)); Casa
de Cambio, 291 F.3d at 1363 (“Because the
government did not direct -
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Page 15 of 16[the third party] to take action against
[plaintiff], and because [the third
party] did not act as the
alter ego or agent of the government,
[plaintiff] has not stated a claim for
relief under the
Takings Clause.”).
Plaintiff s other claims are against
the judiciary and related
organizations, as plaintiff has
not prevailed despite litigating
relentlessly. See supra Section II; see
also Compl. at 7—8
(“clandestine operations . . .
derailing] efforts for Relief through
the . . . Courts”); id. at 3
B-84
(“schemes . . . barring plaintiffs ...
daughter from being introduced as a
co-plaintiff’); id. at 9
(“taking . . . by U.S. Attorney . . .
precluding plaintiff from . . . taking
of property located @11540 Hoxie Dr.”); id. at 7, 3
(alleging schemes perpetrated by
“USDOJ” and “U.S. Marshals-
Court Staff’); Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. at
2 (“[I]nterfer[ing] with timely mail
delivery to the United
States Court of Appeals”); id.
(“Pentagon target[ing] plaintiff to
also bar relief through other
judicial processes”); id. (“Taking of
Property Residence . . . and derailing-
B-85
taking of Business of
Auto Finance Liberty Credit
Corporation.”). Plaintiff effectively
asks the Court to reverse the
decisions of other courts over which
the Court has no authority, and the
Court must dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. See Joshua, 17
F.3d at 380 (“[T]he Court of Federal
Claims does not havejurisdiction to review the
decisions of
district courts.”); Allustiarte, 256
F.3d at 1352 (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S.
300, 313 (1995)) (“If a party is
‘dissatisfied with the
Bankruptcy Court’s ultimate decision,
B-86
[it] can appeal to the district court for
the judicial district
in which the bankruptcy judge is
serving, and then to the Court of
Appeals.’”); see also RCFC
12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at
any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.”).
To summarize, plaintiff argues the
Court has jurisdiction over the taking
of his residence
and business under the Fifth
Amendment. See Pl.’s Resp. to
O.S.C. at 2. As discussed supraSections VII—VIII,
plaintiff s
arguments for the Court’s jurisdiction
B-87
are unclear, incomplete, and
insufficient. Plaintiff does not
provide any facts, causation, or
circumstances implicating the
government that give rise to a cause
of action under this court’s
jurisdiction. See supra Sections
VII-VIII. Jurisdiction is a threshold
issue. See King, 81 Fed. Cl. at 768
(citing Steel, 523 U.S. at
94-95). It is clear plaintiff
misunderstands the Court’s
jurisdiction, especially given the
large
number of cases that have been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
this court and other federal
B-88
courts. See supra Section II. As
plaintiff has failed to show
jurisdiction, the Court has no choicebut to dismiss
plaintiffs Complaint.
See Knick, 588 U.S. at 185; Fisher,
402 F.3d at 1173 (“If
the court’s conclusion is that the
source as alleged and pleaded is not
money-mandating, the
court shall so declare and shall
dismiss the cause for lack of
jurisdiction.”); see also RCFC
12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at
any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.”).
IX. Conclusion
B-89
The Court has reviewed all of
plaintiff s arguments, and to the
extent any arguments are
not discussed herein specifically, they
are unclear, meritless, and
unpersuasive. Accordingly, theCourt: (1) DENIES
plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge and for
Recusal, ECF No. 9; (2)
GRANTS plaintiff s Motion for
Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis,
ECF No. 11; and (3)
- 15 -Case l:25-cv-00145-RTH
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Page 16 of 16
DISMISSES plaintiff s Complaint
sua sponte,
4 ECF No. 1. The Court DIRECTS
the Clerk’s
Office to enter judgment accordingly.
The Court further CERTIFIES,
under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), any appeal from this
order would not be taken in good
faith because plaintiff s
claims as alleged are clearly outside
the jurisdiction of the Court and
considering plaintiff sextensive litigation history in
this
court and other federal courts.
B-91
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Ryan T. Holte
RYANT. HOLTE
Judge
4 The Court notes this is the same process
recently affirmed by the Federal Circuit in
Hernandez v. United States and
Hout v. United States, where the Federal
Circuit held:
Although Mr. Hout is proceeding pro se,
the show cause order was unambiguous
and clearly
directed him to file a response explaining
the jurisdictional basis for his case by the
stated
deadline
We hold that the Claims
Court did not abuse its discretion in
B-92
determining that Mr.Hout failed to timely file a
response to the
show cause order. Because that failure is
dispositive,
we affirm.
Hout, No. 25-1247, 2025 WL 2305100, at
*2 (citations omitted); see also
Hernandez, No. 25-1248, 2025
WL 2304600, at *2.
B-93
Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.