Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Susan Braun, Petitioner v. Tracey Sager, et al.

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In the

AUG 2 2 2026

'OFFICE OF THE ci Fpi>

LsuPREME COI JRT. 11 AK

Supreme Court of the United States

Susan Braun, pro se,

Petitioner,

V.

Tracey Sager, et al,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

To the State of Florida District Court of Appeal,

Third District

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Respectfully submitted by,

Susan Braun, pro se

45 NW 44th Street

Miami, FL 33127

(305) 224-3098

SusanBraunl8@Gmail.com

August 27, 2026

-

!

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits a state court to

recharacterize a self-represented citizen’s case, and adjudicate to finality, without

informed notice and an opportunity to contest the recharacterization.

-1 -

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Susan Braun, Petitioner, was an interested person, respondent, and petitioner

below, and the appellant in the Supreme Court of Florida and Third District Court

of Appeal for the State of Florida.

Tracey Sager, Respondent, was a petitioner and respondent below, an appellee

in the Supreme Court of Florida and Third District Court of Appeal for the State of

Florida and, after the adversary proceeding started, was appointed personal

representative of the Estate of Arnold Z. Braun.

Jeff Braun, Respondent, was a respondent below, and an appellee in the

Supreme Court of Florida and the Third District Court of Appeal for the State of

Florida. Additionally, he is a trustee.

Beatriz Braun, was a respondent in the trial court but not in the appeals.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

No. SC26-0463, Supreme Court of Florida, Susan Braun v. Tracey Sager et al.

Jurisdiction declined May 29, 2026; No. 3D2024-1192, Florida’s Third District

Court of Appeal, Susan Braun v. Tracey Sager et al. Opinion entered December 3,

2026, Rehearing denied February 19, 2026. No. 3D2024-1708, Florida’s Third

District Court of Appeal, Susan Braun v. Tracey Sager et al. Dismissal entered

October xx, 2024; No. 3D2022-0410, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal;

Susan Braun v. Tracey Sager et al, Opinion entered July 5, 2023; Rehearing denied.

No. 3D2021-1875; Florida Third District Court of Appeal; Susan Braun v. Tracey

Sager et al, Opinion entered January 25, 2023, rehearing denied.

2019-5346-

CP-02, Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, Miami-Dade, Florida, Susan Braun v.

Tracey Sager et al.

Will admitted and proceeding concluded May 22, 2024. No.

2019-831-CP-02, Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, In re: Arnold Z. Braun, deceased.

- ii -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS.........................................................................

ii

TABLE OF APPENDICES...................................................

iv

.......................................................... vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

15

I.

The State Court’s Unannounced Recharacterization Violates

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and

Exposes a Gap between Federal Supervisory Authority and

State Constitutional Obligations

15

A. Castro v. United States requires notice before recharacterization

but its federal reach leaves state proceedings vulnerable

15

B. The state court misled by a ‘Pro Se Presumption’ substituted

recharacterization for neutral adjudication

17

II. The Case presents a clean vehicle to resolve a question of

great national importance

20

A. The federal question is cleanly presented, preserved and pressed

on an objective record without factual disputes

20

B. Public trust and self-represented citizens

21

CONCLUSION

22

- iii -

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX A - Opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, No.

3D24-1192 (December 3,2025)

la-2a

APPENDIX B - Post Hearing Order Granting Personal Representative's Petition to

Admit Will into Probate per Appellate Orders, No. 2019-005346-CP-02 (May 22,

2024)

3a

APPENDIX C - Transcript Excerpt Containing the Trial Court's Oral Ruling, Braun v.

Sager, No. 2019-005346-CP-02, Transcript Pages 51-55 (March 27, 2024)

4a-8a

APPENDIX D - Order of the Supreme Court of Florida Denying Discretionary

Review, No. SC2026-0463 (May 29, 2026)

9a-10a

APPENDIX E - Order of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District,

Denying Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, No. 3D24-1192 (February 19, 2026)

lla-12a

APPENDIX F - Caveat by Interested Person (filed November 20, 2018)

13a

APPENDIX G - Order Granting Susan Braun's Motion for Leave to File Amended

Response, Affirmative Defenses, and Crossclaims, No. 2019-000831-CP-02 (filed

October 31,2019)

14a

APPENDIX H - Notice of Hearing on Filed Caveat and Objection to Admission of the

Will, No. 2019-000831-CP-02 (November 6, 2019)

15a

APPENDIX I - Case Management Order Declaring Matter Adversary, No.

2019-000831-CP-02 (November 22, 2019)

16a

APPENDIX J - Declaration That Proceeding Is Adversary, Adversary Proceeding No.

2019-005346-CP-02 (filed December 3, 2019)

17a-18a

APPENDIX K - Docket Excerpt Identifying Petition for Adversary Proceedings, No.

2019-005346-CP-02 (December 3, 2019)

19a

APPENDIX L - Correspondence and Email Transmitting Respondents' Proposed

Order Admitting Will to Probate (March 11, 2022)

20a-24a

APPENDIX m _ Adversary Proceeding Docket Excerpt, No. 2019-005346-CP-02

25a

APPENDIX N - Formal Administration Docket Excerpt, No. 2019-000831-CP-02

26a

APPENDIX O - Amended Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, No.

2019-005346-CP-02 (September 8, 2021)

27a-28a

APPENDIX P - Table of Contents of Pro Se Appellant's Second Amended Initial

Brief, No. 3D21-1875 (June 1, 2022)

29a-30a

APPENDIX Q - Table of Contents of Appellees’ Joint Answer Brief, No. 3D21-1875

(July 25, 2022)

31a-33a

- iv -

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX R - Table of Contents of Pro Se Appellant's Amended Reply Brief, No.

3D21-1875 (September 27, 2022)

APPENDIX S - Opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, No.

3D21-1875 (January 25, 2023)

34a-36a

37a

APPENDIX T - Order on Personal Representatives' and Trustees' Amended Joint

Motion for Summary Judgment, No. 2019-005346-CP-02 (February 9, 2022)

38a-39a

APPENDIX U - Table of Contents of Pro Se Appellant's Amended Initial Brief, No.

3D22-0410 (October 24, 2022)

40a^41 a

APPENDIX V - Table of Contents of Appellees' Joint Answer Brief, No. 3022-0410

(December 22, 2022)

42a-43a

APPENDIX W - Table of Contents of Pro Se Appellant's Amended Reply Brief, No.

3D22-0410 (February 24, 2023)

44a-46a

APPENDIX X - Opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, No.

3D22-0410 (July 5, 2023)

47a^48a

APPENDIX Y - Mandate of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District,

No. 3D22-0410 (November 14, 2023)

49a

APPENDIX Z - Table of Contents of Pro Se Appellant's Initial Brief, No. 3D24-1192

(May 28, 2025)

50a-52a

APPENDIX AA - Table of Contents of Appellees' Joint Answer Brief, No.

3D24-1192 (July 17, 2025)

53a-54a

APPENDIX AB - Table of Contents of Pro Se Appellant's Reply Brief, No.

3D24-1192 (August 27, 2025)

55a-56a

APPENDIX AC - Order Granting Motion for Cases to Travel Together, Nos.

3D22-0410 and 3D21-1875 (August 11, 2022)

57a

APPENDIX AD - Order Vacating Order Granting Motion for Cases to Travel

Together, Nos. 3D21-1875 and 3D22-0410 (August 12, 2022)

58a

APPENDIX AE - Order Denying Motion to Accept Appendix and Striking Proposed

Appendices, No. 3D24-1192 (July 2,2025)

59a

APPENDIX AF - Order Denying Motion for Clarification Concerning Striking of

Initial Brief Appendix, No. 3D24-1192 (August 13, 2025)

60a

APPENDIX AG - Order Striking Suggestion of Noncompliance in the Answer Brief,

No. 3D24-1.192 (September 4, 2025)

61a

APPENDIX AH - Order Denying Motion for Authorization to File Suggestion of

Fraud on the Appellate Court, No. 3D24-1192 (October 9, 2025)

62a

-v-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)

........................ 21

Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969)

20

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003)

15-17, 21

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)

15

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

18

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)

21

Grooms v. Royce, 638 So. 2d 1019, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)

3

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)

18

Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)

18

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)

19

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980)

18

Rocca v. Boyansky, 80 So. 3d 377, 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)

3

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982)

15

United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)

17

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973)

18

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause)

14, 16, 18, 20, 21

Statutes and Rules

Fla. Stat. § 733.107(1)

6, 18

................................................ 6, 18

Fla. Stat. § 733.201

- vi -

OPINIONS BELOW

Braun v. Sager, 427 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2025), No. 24-1192; Braun v.

Sager, 373 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2025), No. 23-0410; Braun v. Sager, 358 So. 3d

1216 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2023), No. 23-1875, Decision without published opinion.

JURISDICTION

The order of the Florida Third District Court of Appeal denying Petitioner’s

timely motion for rehearing was entered on February 19, 2026. The Florida

Supreme Court declined discretionary jurisdiction on May 29, 2026.

Therefore, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal is the highest state court in

which a decision could be had. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a). This petition is timely filed within the 90-day statutory window

expiring on August 27, 2026.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in

relevant part:

"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.”

Page 1 of 22

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Introduction

Petitioner filed a caveat (App.l3a) as an interested person before administration

of her father’s estate began in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, Miami-Dade

County, Florida. (R.45—46.) Under Florida law, a caveat filed prior to a petition for

administration entitles the caveator to an adjudication of the will before probate

proceeds. (18-1069-CV-02) Following the petition for administration, Petitioner filed

an operative Amended Response, Affirmative Defenses, and Crossclaims,

anticipating the personal representative would take control. (R. 115-164.)

Before the will was admitted, the court ordered the self-represented Petitioner to

open an adversary case. (App. 16a) (R. 175-176.) The first docket entry described her

compliance as a petition for adversary proceedings, recharacterizing Petitioner from

an interested person awaiting an adjudication into a plaintiff initiating litigation.

(App. 19a) (Adv. D.E.l.) (R.175-176, 245-248; Adv. D.E.l.)

Petitioner, who is under a full disability, (RC.1620), filed five motions to be heard

on obtaining legal representation before any order admitting the will was entered;

all received no response or were denied without a hearing. (D.E. 77, 83, 182)

The recharacterization of the case as a revocation proceeding drove two summary

judgments and their respective appeals. (RS. 1686; R.1853; Adv. D.E. 191, 196, 278,

285-286.) None of the statutory methods Respondents pursued resulted in

admission of the will. (R. 182-183, 510, 512, 1039-1044, 1980; RS.2031.) A successor

judge ultimately admitted the will five and a half years after the caveat, “per

appellate court orders.” (App. 3a, 49a) (R.45, 984-998; Admin. D.E.234; Adv.

D.E.402.) The third appeal now under review affirmed on the revocation premise.

Throughout almost seven years of proceedings, no evidentiary hearing was held.

Page 2 of 22

I. The Case Petitioner Presented

The decedent died on December 29, 2017. (R.1114.) On November 20, 2018,

Petitioner filed a caveat as an interested person, preventing admission of the subject

will, appointment of personal representative, and issuance of letters of

administration until the court first determined validity.1 (18-1069-CV-02)(R.45.)

(App.l3a) Respondents petitioned for administration on February 24, 2019. (R.46.)

After an attorney agreed to represent Petitioner, he was dissuaded following a

conversation with counsel for Respondents. (R.462.) A hearing Petitioner set on

obtaining the withheld estate planning file was canceled. (R.113.) A footnote in the

cancelation order led to caselaw on permissible ex parte communication.2 (R.113,

427-429.) Counsel and the administrative and original presiding judge were

colleagues from shared service on the Florida Probate Rules Committee. (R.46, 422.)

Respondents provided the file. (R.113, 1805-1806),

On October 31, 2019, the probate court granted leave on Petitioner’s Amended

Response, Affirmative Defenses, and Crossclaims, submitted as an interested person

on the estate’s behalf. (App. 14a) (R. 115—164, 169.) This operative pleading opposed

admission; it did not seek revocation of a will that was not admitted. (R. 115-164.)

Petitioner alleged the decedent’s widow had procured the will without the

decedent’s knowledge, (R. 124-126), and raised crossclaims concerning estate

property and alleged harm to the decedent. (R. 133-143.) Among Petitioner’s

supporting materials was the decedent’s official state driver license record (DMV

11 “The trial court is required to rule on the challenge to the will before proceeding

to probate or naming the personal representative.” Grooms v. Royce, 638 So. 2d

1019, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). “The clear implication of...the Florida Probate

Code and Rules is that will contests and the rights of caveators must be determined

prior to letters of administration being issued.” Rocca v. Boyansky, 80 So. 3d 377,

381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

2 2 Nudel v. Flagstar Bank, FSB 52 So. 3d 692, n.l (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)

Page 3 of 22

evidence) paired with an inter-office memorandum from the attesting witness.

(R. 148-149.) The juxtaposition demonstrated inconsistent names on the license.

(R. 148-149.) The attesting witness’s memo had “Arnold Z. Braun” and the DMV had

“Arnold Zabusky Braun” with no name change, going back to 1971. The caveat and

crossclaims constituted the case Petitioner presented. (R.45, 115-164.) It was not

heard. (May 22, 2024 Tr. 20:18-21:12.)

II. The Proceedings Became the Case

A. The probate court ordered an adversary designation imposing litigation,

before an adjudication on the will.

On November 6, 2019, Petitioner noticed a hearing as per the caveat for

December 17 regarding the will’s admission and for sanctions against Respondents

for attempts to admit the will through means other than adjudication. (App. 15a)

(R.172.)

On November 22, 2019, the probate court entered a Case Management Order

Declaring Matter to be Adversary (App. 16a), ordering Petitioner to open an

adversary case under Florida Probate Rule 5.025, without further direction except

follow the rules of civil procedure and pay the fees. (App. 16a)(R.175-176; Admin.

D.E.70.) The will had not been admitted, and the hearing on admission was less

than one month away. (R.172, 175-176, 502-503; Admin. D.E.63, 70.) The order

relied on Petitioner’s superseded May 20, 2019 response, rather than the operative

Amended Response the state court had authorized three weeks earlier. (App. ) In

the outdated response’s title, Petitioner had used “revocation” according to its plain

meaning, erring with legal terminology. Nowhere in Amended Response nor in the

outdated response did Petitioner seek revocation of an admitted will. (R. 115-164,

316-317, 1691.)

Page 4 of 22

Petitioner complied. On December 3, 2019, she filed a formal notice along with a

clerk-provided Declaration that Proceeding is Adversary. (App. 17a-18a)(R.245-248;

Adv. D.E.l, 3-4.) The docket labeled the declaration a “Petition for Adv.

Proceedings,” and the record described it as “Pet. for Adversary Proceedings.” (App.

19a)(Adv. D.E.l.) From its first entry, the official history identified Petitioner as a

party who had initiated litigation, rather than as an interested person awaiting

adjudication on the subject will. (Adv. D.E.l.)

Petitioner did not then know how the declaration had been docketed. The probate

court did not provide her online access to the case files (R.787-788); she obtained that

access with assistance from the Florida Courts authority in late 2021. (D.E. 312)

B. The scheduled will hearing was canceled, and fiduciary authority issued

without admission of the will.

On December 12, 2019, Petitioner submitted a memorandum for the will

hearing. (R.687-713.) It included the conclusion of an investigation by the Notary

Section of the Executive Office of the Governor concerning the will’s self-proving

affidavit. (App. 66a)(R.51O, 687-713; RS.1796, 1799-1801.) The Executive Office of

the Governor determined that the notarization violated three Florida statutes: the

instrument was not signed in the notary’s presence, the signatory’s identity was not

confirmed, and there was a false or fraudulent acknowledgment that the decedent

signed. (R.510.) The notary was also the drafting attorney. (RS. 1796, 1799-1801.)

The next day, Respondents’ counsel informed Petitioner that the December 17

hearing had been canceled and that the judge wanted proposed orders uploaded.

(R.513.) The docket contains no entry recording the cancelation. (Admin. D.E.63-

74.) Petitioner submitted a petition for appointment of an impartial curator. (R.519.)

Instead, with the caveat pending, on December 17, the court appointed Respondent

Tracey Sager personal representative and issued letters of administration. (R.521;

Page 5 of 22

Admin. D.E.73-74.) Respondents relied on a June 2019 consent Petitioner had

provided under the incorrect understanding that assets needed marshaling and

Sager would remain neutral until an adjudication on the will. (R.516-517, 520,

1210-1213.) The December 17 appointment provided fiduciary authority and access

to estate funds. (R.357-360, 521.) No hearing on admission had been held, and no

order admitted the will. (R.513, 521, 1214; Admin. D.E.63-74.)

After the appointment, chambers filed the curator petition. (R. 1254-1263; Adv.

D.E.7.) The page on impartiality was omitted. (R. 1254-1263.) The last page, which

included the certificate of service, was from another document, keeping the

enumeration intact. (R.1254-1263.) Petitioner did not know of the alteration until

2022 and filed notice accordingly. (Adv. D.E. 300)

The DMV evidence and the Executive Office of the Governor’s determination

letter had been before the state court since late 2019.

C. Neither statutory form of proof resulted in admission of the will.

Florida law places on the will’s proponents the initial burden of establishing

formal execution and attestation. Fla. Stat. §§ 733.107(1), 733.201. Respondents

first relied on the self-proving affidavit. (R.510.) Upon seeing the Executive Office of

the Governor’s determination, Respondents contacted the attesting witness. (R.512.)

At a rescheduled caveat hearing on February 25, 2020, the court questioned

counsel for Respondents on the personal representative appointment without will

admission. Counsel responded that there was a “weird situation.” (R.809-811; Adv.

D. E. 10; Feb. 25, 2020 Tr. 16:18-25 [blank in the record on appeal].) The hearing was

adjourned without deciding admission. (Feb. 25, 2020 Tr. 24:24.) The judge, meeting

Petitioner for the first time, commented that Petitioner was “pleasant” for a self­

represented person. (Feb. 25, 2020 Tr. 24:17; R.657.)

Page 6 of 22

With the rebuttal of the self-proving affidavit by the Governor’s determination,

the only remaining statutory method available for Respondents to establish prima

facie validity was an Oath of Witness to Will. Obtaining that oath required a

commission. (Admin. D.E.85, 93-94.)

On February 6, 2020, Respondents had filed a sworn petition for appointment of

a commissioner to take the Oath. (R.179; RS. 1822-1830; Admin. D.E.85.) Probate

Rule 5.230(a) required the petition to state the place of execution, if known.

Although the law firm’s address was known, the petition stated execution occurred

“at Miami-Dade County, Florida.” (R.179; RS. 1822-1830.) The e-filing portal service

list did not include Petitioner. (R.179; RS. 1822-1830.)

Invoice records show that the day after the February 25 hearing, counsel’s

paralegal contacted the judicial assistant inquiring on the delay regarding the

Commission. (R.815.)

On March 5, 2020, the court issued the Commission directing that the executed

oath be returned “without delay.” (R.182-183; Admin. D.E.93-94) Petitioner objected

to the locally-based attesting witnesses not testifying in person. (R.186, 25) The

court did not respond. The oath was sworn on March 12, 2020, but not filed until

April 2, 2021 (RS.2031; Admin. D.E.174)—almost one year later and three days

before Respondents moved for summary judgment on April 5, 2021. (Adv. D.E. 94)

On April 27, 2021, Petitioner moved to strike the Oath for noncompliance with

probate rules. (R.345—350; Adv. D.E. 108) The state court did not respond. On July 9,

2021, Petitioner filed Alleged Revisions to Commission to Prove Will-documents. (RS

16.43, Adv. D.E. 163) The state court did not respond. Neither statutory method of

proof resulted in admission. (R.510, 182-183, 345-350; RS.2031); Admin. D.E.73-

Page 7 of 22

174; Adv. D.E.108) The official court record contains no ruling granting or denying

admission. (Admin. D.E.73-174) (R.315-344; Adv. D1E.94)

D. The first summary judgment converted the revocation premise

into a finding.

On April 5, 2021, Respondents filed a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Adv. DE. 94)) The motion cited Petitioner’s superseded May 22, 2019 response five

times, mentioned “revocation” repeatedly, and omitted the operative Amended

Response. It stated that the caveat had been filed after the petition for

administration, reversing the chronology by three months. (R.315-344, 449-450)

Under that reversed chronology, Petitioner appeared to be challenging a will already

admitted to probate.

The motion stated that Petitioner had not established recognized grounds to

“revoke consideration” of the will. (R.324, D.E. 94) In probate usage, “revoke” placed

the case within the framework of setting aside a will already treated as valid,

switching the burden of proof. Petitioner did not then recognize that the unresolved

question of admission had been recharacterized. Also recharacterized was

Petitioner’s will argument, which Respondent’s represented as undue influence. (Id.)

Starting on May 3, 2021, Petitioner repeatedly objected to the summary

judgment hearing based on incomplete discovery, lack of hearings, and the estate

paying Respondents' legal fees. (R.351-361; Adv. D.E. 115-118, 130) Petitioner also

objected on medical grounds. (R.361; RS. 1637; RC.1617) The court did not address

her requests until June 1. (R.858; Adv. D.E. 132) The court stated Petitioner could

argue immediately before the June 7 summary judgment hearing whether

incomplete discovery warranted a continuance. Petitioner submitted a response and

an evidence packet on June 4. (R.449—452; Adv. D.E. 136) The hearing was

continued. (Adv. D.E. 139)

Page 8 of 22

Court internal records showed that the summary judgment order was created

while the judge was presiding, (R. 1966; Adv. 418, [still redacting on the docket]) and

Florida Courts Authority records showed that Petitioner’s summary judgment

declaration remained in case management for nineteen days before docketed, after

the order was entered. (R.595, 601 [blank in the record on appeal], 759, 1264-1265)

E. The second summary judgment revised the recharacterization.

On September 8, 2021, the court entered an amended order on summary

judgment. (App. 27a - 28a) (RS.1686; Adv. D.E.191) The Executive Office of the

Governor’s determination led to a partial denial based on validity. (R.510; RS. 1686)

(App. 13a) However, the order stated that Respondents moved for judgment because

Petitioner “failed to present any genuine issue of fact which requires revocation of

the will.” (RS. 1686) The court granted partial summary judgment foreclosing fraud

and undue influence. (RS. 1686) The motion had discussed fraud only within the

context of undue influence. (R.315-344, 325) Undue influence is one of Petitioner’s

arguments on the estate’s property. (Adv. D.E. 87) Petitioner appealed.(R.375; Adv.

D.E.196)

In the summary judgment order, the state court applied the former summary

judgment standard rather than the amended rule in effect. (RS.1686; Adv. D.E.191)

This allowed Respondents, on September 10, 2021, to file an amended summary

judgment motion. (RS. 1670, 1700; Adv. D.E. 195) In the motion, Respondents

recharacterized Petitioner’s argument as the “impostor’s ruse”) (Id.)

Petitioner filed documents objecting to the lack of being heard. (R.418-541, 549,

606, 612, 620, 658, 729) Five court orders were issued stating a hearing took place.

(R.869-879) Other findings included Petitioner’s overall abuse of process or lack of

comprehension. (R. 1346-1366; Adv. 238, 263) Petitioner filed a motion to correct the

Page 9 of 22

record and four supplements through March 2022. (R.549, 606, 612, 658, 729;

Admin. D.E.196; Adv. D.E.245, 253, 254, 299) On the day before the summary

judgment hearing, Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify. (Adv. D.E. 273)

On February 8, 2022, the second hearing on summary judgment was held. (Adv.

D.E.267, 269) Petitioner did not arrange for a court reporter or file a response.

(R.627-639; RS. 1835) No witness testified. (Adv. DE. 283) Respondents relied on

amended affidavits from the attesting witnesses. (RS.1714-1725; R.1853; Adv.

D.E.278) One affidavit again identified the name Arnold Z. Braun, which did not

match the DMV record, and both referred to an attached photograph that was not

attached. (R.148-149, 1716; RS.1714-1725) The judicial order on summary

judgment was created that day and issued the following morning. (App. 38a-39a)

(R.1853, 1974; Adv. D.E.278) The court’s order recharacterized Petitioner as per the

amended summary judgment motion as the “imposter’s ruse.” (Id.) Petitioner’s

motion for a rehearing received no response. (D.E.283)

Five hundred days retroactively, the court-filed Exhibits for Identification

omitted both the DMV official driving record and the Governor’s determination.

(R.148-149, 510, 1847-1852; Adv. D.E.275-277, 352 [Filed under February 8, 2022])

The Oath of Witness had not been raised since 2021. (R.345-350; Adv. D.E.108)

Neither of the two statutory methods admitted the will.

On March 11, 2022, Respondents submitted a proposed Order Admitting Will.

(App.20a - 24a)(R. 1039—1044) Counsel submitted correspondence stating the order

accorded with the ruling. (R. 1039-1044) The court rejected the proposed order,

which remained unsigned. (App.20a - 24a) (R. 1039-1044, 1980) The rejection

appears only in the court’s internal records and was not filed in the official court

record or disclosed in the ensuing appeal. (R.1980; Adv. D.E.290-301)

Page 10 of 22

On April 13, 2022, the state court responded to Petitioner’s motions to correct

the record in its order denying Petitioner’s motions to correct the “docket.” (R.882;

Adv. D.E.302; 245, 253, 254, 299, 302) (R.549, 606, 612, 658, 729, 869-879; Admin.

D.E.196; Adv. D.E.245, 253-254, 299, 302) Granted during the appeal, the order’s

last sentence provided Petitioner “leave to file any necessary pleadings or documents

she believes are necessary to further her appellate cause." (R.882; Adv. D.E.302)

in. The Intermediate Appellate Court Affirmed the Recharacterization

and the Imposed Premise Became the Judgment

Petitioner separately appealed the two summary judgment orders to Florida’s

Third District Court of Appeal (Adv. D.E.196, 285) and sought consolidation, which

was initially granted on August 11, 2022, and rescinded the following day. (App. 57a

- 58a)(Orders, Nos. 3D22-0410 and 3D21-1875 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 11 and 12, 2022)

On January 25, 2023, the appellate court affirmed the first appeal without opinion.

(App. 37a)(R.1006.)(App 29a - 46a) In the second appeal, Petitioner again raised due

process and challenged the reliance on affidavits without an opportunity to question

the attesting witnesses. Petitioner did not know the legal terminology of

recharacterization or presumption of regularity and used language such as the “Bad

Pro Se” and “Fiction of Normal.”(Id.)

In both appeals, Petitioner briefed the bypassing of the caveat, the reliance on

the outdated pleading containing the terminology error of “revocation,” the

inaccurate application of estate property arguments to the will, and the lack of an

adjudication on the will. Petitioner also repeatedly raised the deprivation of due

process. (Id.)

On July 5, 2023, the appellate court affirmed the second appeal through a threecitation opinion. (App. 47a. - 48a) (R. 1010-1011) The citations referenced

Page 11 of 22

authorities concerning cases devoid of merit, the evidentiary standard for fraud, and

the preservation of issues for appeal.

On January 6, 2023, Respondents’ granted motion for appellate attorney fees

stated: “Appellant’s proceeding in the trial court to overturn the Decedent’s Will was

filed pursuant to the Florida Probate Code.” (Adv. D.E. 351) In the motion for

rehearing in Appeal No. 3D-0410, Petitioner questioned whether a proponent of a

will could move for summary judgment prior to admission and before meeting the

statutory burden of proof. Since then, Petitioner has repeatedly raised the issue of

the imposed adversarial designation on the record. (Tr. May 22, 2024, Adv.

2019-5346)

IV. The Appeal Under Review

A. Admitting the Will Per Appellate Court Orders

Neither summary judgment admitted the will, and neither decision in the first

two appeals admitted the will. (App. 27, 28, 37-39, 47-49) On February 22, 2024,

after the Supreme Court of Florida declined jurisdiction, Respondents petitioned to

admit the will “per Appellate Court Orders.” (R.984—998; Adv. D.E.375)

Petitioner sought to subpoena the attesting witnesses. (Adv. D.E.376-378)

Respondents objected. (Adv. D.E.379, 386) The probate court reset the hearing,

necessitating amended subpoenas. (R.1014, 1958-1961; Adv. D.E.380-383) The

hearing was noticed as “evidentiary” with insufficient time to meet notice

requirements. (R. 1054-1095; Adv. D.E.385, 388-389) On March 27, 2024, a second

successor judge granted the petition based on the appeal’s mandate, the two

summary judgments, and the duration of proceedings. (App. 4a-8a)(Tr. 52:1-20,

54:1-25, 55:1-10)

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B. Why am I the Adversary?

On April 17, 2024, Petitioner moved for a hearing under Florida Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.540(b) to vacate the judgment. (R.1126-1131; Adv. D.E. 397)

Respondents used Petitioner’s emailed availability to set a hearing on their

proposed order to admit the will. (R.1171-1172; Adv. D.E.398-399.) There was no

accompanying filed motion. The court admonished Petitioner.

During the May 22, 2024 hearing, Petitioner expressly invoked the federal right:

“Respectfully, how is this not a violation of my rights under the 14th Amendment?”

(Tr. at 17:16-18) She further objected that there had been “[n]o evidentiary

hearings” and stated on the record, “There’s going to be a record for violation of

rights.” (Id. at 17:20-25; 21:4-9)

C. Degraded Record on Appeal

Petitioner appealed the May 22, 2024 order. (R.1969; Adv. D.E.407) The trial

court transmitted the record on September 3, 2024. (Adv. D.E.427.) Numerous pages

affecting Petitioner were blank. (R. 39, 99, 601, 644, 101, 901, 1123, 1423 R.S. 2026).

A portion of the record on appeal, covering the period between the prior appeal and

the order under review, was out of chronological order. (R. 1228-1229, [chronology

break]) Approximately half of the two hundred documents Petitioner had designated

were not included. After several requests, on February 3, 2025, most omissions were

supplemented five months later.

Petitioner repeatedly sought to correct the degraded record on appeal. The

intermediate appellate court did not order corrections. Petitioner filed a voluminous

appendix to cure the deficient record, which was stricken. (App. 59a) Her motion

asking the reason and seeking an opportunity to cure was denied without

explanation on August 13, 2025. (App. 60a) Her Suggestion of Non-Compliance,

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identifying record references in Respondents’ answer brief that she contended were

unsupported by the record, was stricken as unauthorized. (App.61a). Her

subsequent motion seeking authorization was denied on October 9, 2025. (App. 62a)

D. Affirmed on the Premise of a Revocation Proceeding

The initial brief argued that the adversary designation had been imposed with

no will in probate against which to be adversarial; that estate funds made available

through the fiduciary appointment were used to litigate admission; that the

proceedings included zero evidentiary hearings; and that the official account rested

on the premise that the will had been validated and Petitioner had moved to

overturn it. Petitioner also argued the state court recast her as an abuser of process.

(App. 50a - 52, table of contents from Petitioner’s initial brief) (Initial Br. 38-39, 42,

48, 54 (May 28, 2025)

On December 3, 2025, the appellate court affirmed through a four-citation

opinion on valid execution of wills. Braun v. Sager, No. 3D24-1192 (Fla. 3d DCA

Dec. 3, 2025) (App. la - 2a) The underlying authorities cited were revocation cases

dealing with already validated wills. The opinion cited no authority governing the

proponents’ initial proof of execution and attestation for validity.

On January 20, 2026, Petitioner moved for rehearing, arguing that the

authorities cited in the opinion addressed a type of proceeding that she had not

brought and that the case actually presented had never received review. (Mot. for

Reh’g pp. 3-4 (filed Jan. 20, 2026).) Respondents answered, requesting the state

court declare Petitioner a vexatious litigant. (Jan. 29, 2026). Rehearing was denied

on February 19, 2026. The Supreme Court of Florida declined discretionary review

on May 29, 2026.

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V. Recharacterization Superseded'Estate Administration

None of the unaccounted for assets detailed in the 2019-filed Amended Response

were accounted for. (R. 129-130, 269-271, 892, 894.) The estate allowed the

decedent’s widow to obtain fifty percent of the estate properties, despite the Internal

Revenue Service form on partnerships showing that ownership initiated after the

decedent’s demise. (R. 1422-1424 [front page of IRS form is a blank page in the

record on appeal], D.E. 290) A twenty-five percent interest in one of the beneficiary’s

companies received no vetting. (D.E. 11, 290).

Petitioner’s Request for an Order regarding inventory valuation, concealment,

and failure to investigate and marshal (Adv. D.E. 72) received no response from the

state probate court. In discovery, all objections regarding the estate’s administration

were based on relevance, and were sustained. (D.E. 256)

The decedent was a United States veteran.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The State Court’s Unannounced Recharacterization Violates Due

Process and Exposes a Gap Between Federal Supervisory Authority

and State Constitutional Obligations.

A. Castro v. United States Requires Notice Before Recharacterization, But

Its Federal Reach Leaves State Proceedings Vulnerable.

The Court has supervisory authority over the federal judiciary. Castro v. United

States, 540 U.S. 375, 382—383 (2003) Yet, federal courts hold no supervisory power

over state judicial proceedings. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000);

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982). In Castro, the Court developed a rule

providing safeguards to protect from the harm that recharacterization may cause.

Castro at 382.

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Castro holds no ties to the Fourteenth Amendment and state courts are not

bound by these safeguards. This gap leaves self-represented citizens in state courts

vulnerable to unannounced recharacterizations that could fundamentally alter their

motion, claim or, as Petitioner experienced, their case — without their consent or

knowledge. Below, the state probate court imposed litigation, installing a false

premise and switching the burden of proof. If due process safeguards were in effect,

the case may have resolved seven years ago, in 2019.

Under Castro, before a federal court may treat a self-represented party’s filing as

a different procedural vehicle, it must fulfill three mandatory requirements: provide

notice of the “intent to recharacterize,” “warn” the party of the legal consequences,

and afford an “opportunity to withdraw, or to amend” the filing. Castro v. United

States, 540 U.S. 375, 381-383 (2003). The purpose of this rule is informational; a lack

of warning prevents a party from making an informed choice about whether to

“contest the recharacterization” or not. Id. at 382.

The present case illustrates the exposure and vulnerability. Petitioner’s lawful

standing before the state court rested on a caveat filed as an interested person

before the petition for administration (R.45) (App.l3a). As Petitioner stated in the

March 27, 2024 hearing, before the successor judge, “ [A] caveat, you get a hearing,

and you cannot admit the will.- You cannot appoint a — a personal representative,

and you cannot issue letters of administration, which makes total sense because

you're giving someone keys to the kingdom that’s not theirs. [A]nd then that makes

me the adversary when I was never the adversary.” Tr. 45: 12)

Consistent with this standing, Petitioner’s operative pleading, authorized by the

the state court on October 31, 2019, explicitly opposed admission; it did not seek

revocation of a will that had not yet been admitted in order to revoke. (R. 115-164).

Page 16 of 22

Despite this clear baseline, the state court on its own initiative ordered an adversary

designation. (App. 16a). To do so, the court bypassed the authorized operative

pleading and instead anchored its order to a legally superseded response from six

months prior — because it contained a legal terminology error by employing the

plain meaning of a word. As Respondents stated in their motion: “revoke

consideration.” As Petitioner’s legal knowledge accumulated, language such as

“litigant” and “plaintiff” were not in her working vocabulary.

Without informed notice, Petitioner complied with a court order. Petitioner had

not previously initiated pro se litigation. From that first entry in the adversary

proceeding( App. 19a), the court imposed on her the designations of litigant,

plaintiff, and adversary.

This designation had cascading ramifications. It also

precluded pro bono representation from the local agencies.

The recharacterization cascades to successor judges and into appeals. These seven

years are hard to believe, even for Petitioner, whose assertions must have seemed

incredulous in the intermediate appellate court. There, expected was that “official

acts of public officers [were presumed to] have properly discharged their official

duties." United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926). This

presumption of regularity extends only “in the absence of clear evidence to the

contrary.” Id. Then, the practicality of administration engages. Caseloads and

commentaries on vexatious led to a considerably degraded from being corrected. If

there were safeguards similar to Castro, the matter may have never extended.

None of the Castro requirements were met in the state court below. Petitioner

received no notice of the court's intent to recharacterize her pre-administration

objection into a post-admission revocation proceeding. She received no warning that

this recharacterization would shift the statutory burden of proof — or give the

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appearance of switching the burden. Relying on a superseded terminology error to

impose litigation and a new procedural reality, the state court built the entire

probate proceeding on a false adversary premise. Civil court or criminal. Self-

inflicted or not. This was harm.

Castro was about habeas corpus. Without in any way underplaying the gravity of

that situation, Petitioner has felt as if she has been imprisoned by the state court for

the past seven years.

B. The State Court, misled by a ‘Pro Se Presumption,’

substituted Recharacterization for Neutral Adjudication

"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re

Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). This guarantee entitles a party to an

“impartial and disinterested tribunal.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242

(1980). To maintain this constitutional neutrality, the Fourteenth Amendment

demands that its tenets be a “two-way street.” Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474

(1973). A tribunal ceases to be impartial when it enforces arbitrary procedural

barriers against one side while moving the goal posts for the other. Lindsay v.

Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972).

When Faretta v. California constitutionalized the right to self-representation in

criminal court, there was concern that this would lead to "procedural confusion”

without benefiting the defendant. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975)

(Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, a state court abandons its constitutional

neutrality when it converts this administrative concern into an implicit "Pro Se

Presumption"—anticipating procedural ineptitude or abuse—and utilizes that

presumption to actively manufacture a false procedural characterization against an

unrepresented party. Conduct as well the case can be recharacterized.

Page-18 of 22

In the present case, the state court enforced a profound unconstitutional

asymmetry by utilizing this Pro Se Presumption to excuse the represented

proponents’ substantive failures, while heavily penalizing the self-represented

Petitioner. Under Florida law, the initial burden rests strictly upon the proponent of

a will to establish prima facie its formal execution and attestation. Fla. Stat. §§

733.107(1), 733.201. The trial court permitted the represented party to bypass this

statutory prerequisite. On December 17, 2019, the court granted the opposing party

fiduciary authority and total access to estate funds, despite the fact that no hearing

on admission had been held and no order admitting the will to probate existed

(R.521; Admin. D.E.73-74). The rising structural false premise rose from revocation

to switching the burden of proof.

Rather than neutrally adjudicating the timely caveat on the operative docket, the

state court resurrected a six-month-old, superseded pleading to impose litigation on

a self-represented interested person and respondent. (App. 16a). This unannounced

recharacterization unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof. This led to

fabrication of undue influence as Petitioner’s argument on the will when Petitioner’s

case had steadfastly been that her father did not know of the subject will, which

would preclude undue influence.

From initiating litigation to revoke a will that the court had not yet deemed

valid, to bypassing statutory prerequisites and switching the burden of proof, to the

fictionalizing an argument of undue influence, step-by-step the narrative

incrementally grew and was embedded in the court record until a successor judge

took over the case and concluded proceedings that rested on a false premise. This

travesty would not have happened to a represented party.

Page 19 of 22

This Court has firmly established that there are “minimum procedural

requirements” and a State violates due process when its own procedural machinery

operates to extinguish a property interest without the claim ever being heard on its

actual merits. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433-437 (1982). By

substituting an implicit Pro Se Presumption for neutral adjudication—insulating

the represented party from mandatory statutory prerequisites while binding the

self-represented party to a false "revocation" premise—the state court destroyed

Petitioner’s right to an impartial tribunal and enforced an unconstitutional

asymmetry. This asymmetry provided the exposure for harm.

I. This Case Presents a Clean Vehicle

To Resolve a Question of National Importance

A. The Federal Question is Cleanly Presented

on an Objective Record Without Factual Disputes.

“[T]he Court will not decide federal constitutional issues raised here for the first

time on review of state court decisions.” Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438

(1969) “Questions not raised below are those on which the record is very likely to be

inadequate, since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in mind.” Id. at

439. And “State...should be given the first opportunity to consider them.” Id. at 439.

The state court decision was the absence of consideration. No messy facts need

be reviewed by this Court as the messy facts were not reviewed below. The narrow

question before this Court is whether the State’s procedural machinery violated the

Fourteenth Amendment when it substituted the case Petitioner actually presented

with a fabricated procedural posture without providing informed notice and carried

this false premise through to finality.

The record definitively shows that the caveat was filed on November 20, 2018

(R.45) (App.l3a), preceding the petition for administration. The operative pleading

Page 20 of 22

was filed for the record on October 31, 2019 (R.115-164). The order declaring the

matter adversary issued on November 22, 2019 (App. 16a), relying strictly on a

superseded pleading to force the revocation premise. That sequence is an objective

matter of dates.

Further, the record is more than adequate. Petitioner labeled her motions,

increasingly descriptively:

Motion for Fair Play (D.E. 116); Plea for Relief from

Fraud on the Court (D.E. 216); Request for Procedural Guidance (On Correcting the

(Misapprised Premises to the Honorable Court that have led to Tainted Proceedings

and a Corrupted Official Record) (D.E. 257); Notice of Filing: Denied Opportunity to

be Heard on Real Estate, APSA [Adult Protective Services Act] and Legal

Representation (D.E. 298). None received acknowledgment. Still: pressed; preserved.

Petitioner appealed three times. The table of contents are in the appendix, from

both sides. In appellate briefs, Petitioner raised Armstrong v. Manzo and Goldberg v.

Kelly, not because she knew they were landmark but because they spoke to her

about her guaranteed right to due process. Because this question rests entirely on

the record, a record that Petitioner religiously documented, this case is an ideal,

clean vehicle for this Court’s review.

B. Public Trust and Self-Represented Citizens.

Applying the notice requirements of Castro v. United States to state courts under

the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent the type of systemic failure that

transpired below. Requiring a state court to provide informed notice and an

opportunity to withdraw or amend or nullify before recharacterizing a self­

represented party's case ensures that the correct procedural vehicle is established at

the outset. Self-represented citizens, by and large, are in state court.

Page 21 of 22

When state trial and appellate courts utilize judicial process to provide an illusion

of due process, they do more than commit a legal error against a single individual.

Petitioner repeatedly raised the matter of court orders reciting hearings that did not

happen to create this illusion of due process; Was she the only one seething?

With humility, this petition presents this Court with an opportunity to reinforce

the boundaries established by the Fourteenth Amendment. Enforcing these

boundaries does not require this Court to act outside its calling. This Court can

remind and reaffirm that no state court possesses the authority to withhold the

rights guaranteed by virtue of being a citizen of the United States — in any state.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be granted.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

with accompanying Appendix is true and correct, to the best of my understanding

and belief.

Respectfully submitted by,

Dated: August 27, 2026

ZsZ Susan Braun

Susan Karrie Braun

Petitioner, pro se

45 NW 44th Street

Miami, FL 33127

(786) 224-3098

susanbraun 18@gmail. com

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