Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Valerie Prevost, Petitioner v. City of Houston, Texas Legal Department, Labor and Employment

Supreme Court briefAug 10, 2026

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

VALERIE PREVOST,

Petitioner,

CITY OF HOUSTON,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Valerie Prevost

Petitioner Pro Se

13538 Forest Gully

Houston, Texas 77067

(832) 297-9379

vprevostl @vahoo.com

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix

Description

Appendix Opinion and Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, No. 25-20264 (May 2, 2026)

Appendix Memorandum and Order of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas (dated '

Appendix Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Denying

Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Appendix jnjex of Overlooked Evidentiary Record

Page

App. 1

App. 24

App. 51

App. 52

Appendix Written Medical Restriction Notes from Petitioner's Treating Physicians

App. 110

Requiring No Long-Distance Walking

Appendix City of Houston Workplace Incident Reports and Medical Records

App. 122

Concerning Petitioner's Two Workplace Falls

Appendix City of Houston Documents Concerning Hazardous Workplace Conditions

App. 135

Affecting Petitioner

Appendix j^eSpOn(jentis EEOC Position Statement and Supporting Record Documents App. 147

Appendix Documents Reflecting Petitioner’s Approved Reasonable Accommodation

App. 162

and Respondent's Termination of the Interactive Process

Appendix City of Houston Internal Equal Employment Opportunity and

App. 185

Discrimination Reports

Valerie Prevost

Petitioner Pro Se

13538 Forest Gully

Houston, Texas 77067

(832)297-9379

vprevost 1 @yahoo.com

Dated:

Z>s£ ,2026

APPENDIX A

Opinion and Judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Case No. 25-20264

Date Issued: May 26,2026

The opinion andjudgment of the United States Court ofAppealsfor the Fifth Circuit are

reproduced beginning on the following page.

Hutieii States Court of Appeals

for We JfifW Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 2, 2026

No. 25-20264

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Valerie Prevost,

Plaintiff—Appellant^

versus

City of Houston, Legal Department Labor and Employment,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDCNo. 4:23-CV-4115

Before Jones, Duncan, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

This cause was considered on the record on appeal and the briefs on

file.

IT IS ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the

District Court is AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant pay to Appellee the

costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court.

No. 25-20264

The judgment or mandate of this court shall issue 7 days after the time

to file a petition for rehearing expires, or 7 days after entry of an order denying

a timely petition for panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion

for stay of mandate, whichever is later. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). The

court may shorten or extend the time by order. See 5th Cir. R. 41I.O.P.

Certified as a true copy and issued

as the mandate on May 26,2026

A"ts,:

Clerk, U.S. court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

Case: 25-20264

Document: 108-1

Page: 1

Date Filed: 04/02/2026

(Elniteti States Court of appeals:

tor tlje Jfiftlj Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 2, 2026

No. 25-20264

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Valerie Prevost,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

City of Houston, Legal Department Labor and Employment,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:23-CV-4115

Before Jones, Duncan, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

From 1993 to her retirement in 2022, Valerie Prevost was an

administrative specialist in Houston’s Office of Emergency Management

(OEM). After her retirement, she filed an employment lawsuit against

Houston, alleging theories of discrimination based on her religion, age, and

disability. Because her claims are all either unexhausted or insufficiently

supported, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

’ This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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No. 25-20264

Prevost works in a “high security” gated facility. In 2017, Prevost

began suffering from disabilities, and her supervisor allowed her husband to

drive through the gate and drop her off close to the door. This arrangement

continued until 2021, when a security breach prompted OEM to change its

protocols for entry onto the secure grounds. The new policy required all

employees being dropped off at the entrance to submit a copy of the vehicle

operator’s driver’s license and the vehicle make, model, color, and license

plate number. Each time the vehicle arrived at the gate, the driver would

then simply show the security guard his driver’s license. OEM affirmed that

it would continue to allow Prevost’s husband access to the facility to drop her

off near the building entrance as long as he followed the same security

procedures as everyone else. No exceptions to this simple security regulation

were granted to anyone. Prevost objected to the new security arrangement,

declined to provide her husband’s driver’s license, and informed OEM that

she had “no further interest” in having her husband drop her off at the door.

On October 8, 2021, Prevost fell as she was walking to the door of the

building.

On May 22,2022, Prevost informed the City that she would retire on

August 31. On December 22, 2022, Prevost filed a charge of discrimination

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming she was

forced to retire because Houston denied her accommodation request to be

dropped off at the door of the facility.1 In her charge, she complained about

being unable to be dropped off in front of the building. She did not allege

1 On January 10, 2023, Prevost inexplicably filed an identical amended EEOC

charge.

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other facts.2 Her charge contains conclusory allegations of discrimination

based on her age and religion, but Prevost did not include any facts to

establish these claims. On July 24, 2023, the EEOC dismissed Prevost’s

charge and granted her the right to sue. Prevost then filed suit in federal

district court.

After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the magistrate

judge recommended that summary judgment be awarded in favor of

Houston. The magistrate judge ’ s memorandum noted that most of Prevost ’ s

claims are barred because she failed to exhaust administrative remedies for

all claims except for the sole issue of gate access. Furthermore, the

magistrate judge ruled that Prevost did not establish a prima facie case of

discrimination or retaliation under the ADA, the ADEA, or Title VII.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation

and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Prevost timely appealed.3

II.

“This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment,

including on cross-motion, de novo.” Willis v. Barry Graham Oil Serv.,

L.L.C., 122 F.4th 149, 153 (5th Cir. 2024). “Summary judgment is

appropriate when ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

2 Prevost’s brief does not contain a fact section. In district court, she raised a litany

of employment-related issues spanning many years. However, these issues are irrelevant

to this appeal because they have not been administratively exhausted.

3 An appellant’s brief must contain “citations to the authorities and parts of the

record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6) and (8)(A). Prevost’s

brief does not meet this requirement, and “ [failure to comply with the rules of this court

regarding the contents of briefs can be grounds for dismissing a party’s claims.” United

States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651,653 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

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any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ’ ”

Id. at 154 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

III.

Most of Prevost’s claims are barred because she failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. For her sole unexhausted claim, she fails to

successfully make out a prima facie case of discrimination.4

“To bring a suit under Title VII, the ADA (disability), or the ADEA

(age), a complainant must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC to

exhaust [her] administrative remedies. ” Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publ'g Co., Inc.,

931 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2019). “[T]he crucial element of a charge of

discrimination is the factual statement contained therein.” Id. at 379

(quotingPrice v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 687 F.2d 74,78 (5th Cir. 1982)). The only

facts contained in Prevost’s charge relate to her gate access claim. Therefore,

she failed to exhaust her other claims, and they are barred.

Prevost has not shown that her employer’s gate access restrictions

amounted to discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA. “ Cases

of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence are subject to the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.” Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid

Transit, 383 F.3d 309,316 (5th Cir. 2004). “To survive summary judgment

under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first present evidence of a prima

facie case of discrimination. ” Id. “If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case,

4 Prevost also alleges that the Magistrate Judge was biased against her. Prevost’s

argument is frivolous and does not merit extended review, except to affirm the district

court’s finding that Prevost’s argument is “entirely unavailing.”

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discrimination is presumed, and the burden shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the underlying

employment action.” Id. “If the employer is able to state a legitimate

rationale for its employment action, the inference of discrimination

disappears and the plaintiff must present evidence that the employer’s

proffered reason was mere pretext.” Id.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the

plaintiff must prove that she “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was

qualified for the position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action;

and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or, in the case

of disparate treatment, shows that other similarly situated employees were

treated more favorably.” Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 358, 360

(5th Cir. 2004). Prevost cannot establish the fourth prong because all

employees were subject to the same, simple gate access policy. All her

husband—and any other person dropping off an employee at work—had to

do to gain access to the secure complex was present a driver’s license to the

gate guard. The fact that she and her husband voluntarily chose not to

comply with this sensible security regulation does not establish

discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA, a

plaintiff must prove that “(1) [she] was discharged; (2) [she] was qualified

for the position; (3) [she] was within the protected class at the time of

discharge; and (4) [she] was either i) replaced by someone outside the

protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged

because of [her] age.” Dabbasi v. Motiva Enters., L.L.C., 107 F.4th 500,505

(5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374,378

(5th Cir. 2010)). Prevost cannot establish that the OEM’s gate access policy

discriminated against her on the basis of her age. All employees, regardless

of age, were subject to the same gate access policy, and all employees could

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No. 25-20264

be dropped off near the door if the driver of the car merely presented a

driver’s license to the gate guard.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a

plaintiff must show that “(1) [she] has a disability or was regarded as

disabled; (2) [she] was qualified for the job; and (3) [she] was subject to an

adverse employment decision because of [her] disability.” Nall v. BNSF Ry.

Co., 917 F.3d 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2019). As with the above theories of

discrimination, Prevost’s claim under the ADA fails as well. As with any

other employee, she was able to be dropped off in front of the building,

provided that the driver of her car present a driver’s license to the gate guard.

Notably, this is not a failure-to-accommodate case, as Prevost never

submitted any requests for an ADA accommodation. Even if she had, an

accommodation would not have been necessary because the OEM allowed all

employees to be dropped off near the entrance if they followed the standard

security procedure.

To establish a retaliation claim under all three statutory schemes, a

plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) she participated in a... protected activity,

(2) she suffered an adverse employment action by her employer, and (3) there

is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. ”

Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009); Sherrod

v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998). Prevost fails to

establish any causal link between her complaints of discrimination and any

adverse action. The record demonstrates that OEM took Prevost’s

complaints seriously and promptly forwarded them to the Office of Inspector

General. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence that there was a

connection between Prevost’s complaints and any hypothetical adverse

action, such as her retirement.

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No. 25-20264

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

Case No. 4:23-CV-04115

Memorandum and Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

(dated May 20,2025

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United States District Court

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

Valerie Prevost,

Plaintiff,

City of Houston,

Defendant.

May 20, 2025

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

Civil Action No. 4:23-CV-4115

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

This employment discrimination and retaliation case in which Plaintiff is

proceeding pro se is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.1

ECF 80; ECF 82. Having

considered the parties’ submissions and the law, the Court recommends that

Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion be DENIED.2

Background

Plaintiff Valerie Prevost was employed as an administrative specialist in the

City of Houston’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) from 1993 until her

retirement effective August 31, 2022. ECF 80-5 at 9; ECF 88 at 2. Her office was

located at the Houston Emergency Center (HEC) building at 5320 N. Shepherd Dr.

1 The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), the Cost and Delay Reduction Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act,

and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. ECF 4.

2 The Court has reviewed and considered all arguments and issues raised by the parties, whether

explicitly addressed herein or not.

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ECF 80-5 at 17. Plaintiff began suffering from physical disabilities in 2017. ECF

80-5 at 38. Plaintiff has multiple complaints about her employment with the City

from 2017 and up to the time of her retirement. The Court sets out below, in roughly

chronological order, the issues raised by Plaintiff in this case:

Job Reclassification.

Starting in 2019, Plaintiff began requesting a job

reclassification. She contends that her job classification was incorrect because it did

not align with the job duties she actually was performing. Her 2019,2020, and 2021

reclassification requests were denied by Deputy Directors Rick Flanagan, Nickea

Bradley, and Thomaz Munoz, respectively.

Computer Sabotage. Plaintiff contends that she began noticing suspicious

computer activity in 2020 “when discriminatory African American female Nickea

Bradley, Former Deputy Director started.” ECF 88 at 2. Plaintiff contends that

Bradley fostered a discriminatory and hostile environment in the OEM and often

made derogatory remarks about Plaintiff’s age. See ECF 82 at 3. Plaintiff believes

that an unknown person or persons tampered with her City-issued laptop, deleting

and altering her emails, and stealing documents. See e.g. ECF 90 at 14-23; ECF 80-

5 at 21,23,35. The implication is that Bradley is somehow responsible for someone

tampering with Plaintiff’s computer. See ECF 100 at 2 (stating that Bradley

discriminated against Plaintiff and “Hamilton Howard, OEM IT administrator, gave

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Bradley access to Plaintiff’s network profile.”). Bradley resigned from the City

effective July 19,2021. ECF 80-10.

The record indicates these issues began after Plaintiff received a new laptop

in 2019 and her old emails were no longer saved on the laptop. ECF 90 at 15.

Plaintiff submitted a ticket to the IT service desk on August 5, 2020 seeking help

retrieving her emails. Id. An IT representative informed Plaintiff that all emails

from the prior two years should be accessible if she logs in with her “0365

credentials,” but Plaintiff wanted to retrieve emails from 2014-2018. Id. at 17-18.

The City contends that an IT investigation into Plaintiff’s computer issues concluded

the problems were the result of “user error,” not hacking or intentional acts by other

persons, but Plaintiff insists it was “an inside employee cyber-attack against

Plaintiff.” ECF 81-10; ECF 88.

Grant Administrator Position. Plaintiff applied for a position as a grant

administrator in February 2021 and was not selected. ECF 81-2; ECF 80-5 at 27.

Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging age and disability discrimination on March 26,

2021. ECF 81-3. Because the grievance alleged discrimination it was referred to

City’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) for an investigation. ECF 81-4; 81-5. The

OIG informed Plaintiff on August 21,2021 that “[b]ased on the differences between

the educational credentials and the professional experience between you and the

successfill candidate for the [grant administrator] position” the OIG did not sustain

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her allegations of discrimination. ECF 81 -9. Plaintiffs grievance continued through

the multi-step review process and after a hearing on January 12,2022 the Grievance

Review Committee upheld the OIG’s conclusion. ECF 80-9.

April 2021 Performance Improvement Discussions (PIDs). While her OIG

Complaint was pending, on April 12, 2021, Plaintiff had a PID meeting with her

direct supervisor, Vlad Ibarra. Ibarra drafted a PID Worksheet after the meeting

dated April 16,2021 but neither Ibarra nor Plaintiff signed it. ECF 80-15. The draft

PID Worksheet was marked as addressing a performance issue due to “cancellation

of our quarterly goals meeting and the confrontational email tones displayed.” Id.

The April 16,2021 PID also noted that Plaintiff repeatedly brought “the Lord Jesus

Christ” into conversations. Id. Plaintiff disagreed with Ibarra’s statements and

submitted a response stating that Ibarra insulted her religion and violated her First

Amendment Rights by telling her to stop talking about Jesus Christ and that she had

to pray during their meeting due to the “hostile environment” he created. Id. Ibarra

then drafted and signed an April 26,2021 PID marked as addressing a behavior issue

regarding Plaintiff’s “cancellation of our quarterly goals meeting and the

unacceptable communications you provided on April 12.” ECF 81-17. The April

26,2021 PID does not mention religion. Plaintiff refused to sign the April 26,2021

PID. Id.

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June 10, 2021 Fall. At some point in 2020, a construction project started at

the HEC building to create more office space. As a result, Plaintiff was required to

move offices. ECF 80-5 at 15-16. Outside of her office was a large space that was

only occupied during an “activation.” Id. at 16. A leaky roof in the area made the

carpet outside Plaintiff’s office wet. Id, On June 10,2021, Plaintiff slipped and fell

on the wet carpet outside her office door. Id.; ECF 90 at 1 -5. Plaintiff did not receive

medical treatment at the scene but testified that she received medical treatment at an

urgent care center that day or the day after. ECF 80-5 at 12-13; ECF 90-1 at 2.

Gate Access and October 8, 2021 Fall. After Plaintiff began suffering from

physical disabilities in 2017, her then-supervisor, Joe Laud, gave permission for

Plaintiff’s husband to drive through the HEC gate to pick up and drop off Plaintiff

close to the building entrance. This procedure remained in place without issue until

September 23, 2021, when a security breach prompted stricter protocols. See ECF

80-12. Laud informed Plaintiff that her husband would have to provide his driver’s

license and other identifying information in order to continue driving through the

gate. Id.; ECF 80-5 at 20-22. Plaintiff was hesitant to provide personal information

to the guards and insists that it was not necessary because she had been granted

access permission years before. Id. Plaintiff told Laud that she would not provide

the requested information again. ECF 80-5 at 22. Plaintiff contends that after

September 23, 2021, the City forced her walk to and from the building despite her

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documented disability. Id. On October 8,2021, Plaintiffs legs gave out as she was

leaving the building and she fell. ECF 80-5 at 7; EOF 90 at 5-7. Paramedics arrived

at the scene and Plaintiff declined transportation to the hospital. ECF 90 at 7.

Plaintiffs husband followed the protocol to provide identification and was granted

access to drive through the front gate to pick up Plaintiff. ECF 80-14 at 2.

On November 7, 2021, Plaintiff sent an email to Chief George Buenik

complaining about harassment, discrimination, and retaliation by Joe Laud relating

the gate issue, and by Thomas Munoz, Vlad Ibarra, Robert Mock, and Mark Rayne

related to Covid-19 compliance. ECF 80-5 at 33-34. The matter was referred to the

OIG, which found no discrimination. Id.', ECF 80-19. The OIG noted that Plaintiff

had not submitted the Medical Questionnaire required to request an ADA

accommodation. Id.

Plaintiffs Retirement Plaintiff submitted her resignation to the City on May

22,2022 informing the City of her intent to retire as of August 31,2022. ECF 80-5

at 8-9; ECF 80-8. Plaintiff testified that she resigned “mainly for retirement and two

other issues: job reclassification and because my health was declining by specifically

going back and forth,” referring to the walk to and from the building. Id. However,

she was able to work between May 22 and August 31,2022. Id. at 7.

On August 25, 2022, Plaintiff received a medical opinion from a neurologist,

Dr. Fayaz A. Faiz, that she was completely disabled and unable to work. ECF 80-5

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at 7; ECF 82-9. Plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability benefits and in

February 2023 the Social Security Administration found her 100% disabled and

entitled to benefits. Id.

This Lawsuit. Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge of age, disability, and religious

discrimination and retaliation on December 22, 2022, which she amended on

January 1, 2023. ECF 80-6; ECF 80-7. Both the original and amended charges

allege that Plaintiff was forced to retire due to being denied gate access for drop off

and pick up at the front of the building. Id. Plaintiff’s EEOC charge does not raise

any of the other issues discussed above. See id. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right

to Sue on July 24, 2023, and Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 19, 2023. ECF

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint raises the gate issue, as well as the other issues discussed

above. Both parties now seek Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims for

age, disability, and religious discrimination and retaliation.

II.

Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issues of material fact exist,

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there

are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.

v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). Dispute about a material fact is

“genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving

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party. Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016). “An issue is material if

its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd.

v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 F.3d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 2002). If the

moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and must present evidence such as affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file to show “specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue fortrial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

The court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. R.L. Inv. Prop., LLC

v. Hamm, 715 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2013). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment the Court does not “weigh evidence, assess credibility, or determine the

most reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.” Honore v. Douglas, 833

F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1987). However, “[c]onclus[ory] allegations and denials,

speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic

argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine

issue for trial.” U.S. ex rel. Farmer v. City ofHouston, 523 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted).

When parties file cross motions for summary judgment, each motion “must

be considered separately, as each movant bears the burden of establishing that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of

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law.” Shaw Constrs. v. ICF Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir.

2004). Only “(i]fthere is no genuine issue and one of the parties is entitled to prevail

as a matter of law” can summary judgment be entered on cross motion. Id.

The Court applies the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework when deciding motions for summary judgment in discrimination cases

based on circumstantial evidence. Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309,

316-17 (5th Cir. 2004) (Title VII); Nall v. BNSFRy. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340-41 (5th

Cir. 2019) (ADA); Goudeau v. Nat'l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470,474 (5th Cir.

2015) (ADEA). “To survive summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, the

plaintiff must first present evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination.” Davis,

383 F.3d at 317 (citing Patel v. Midland Mem 7 Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333,

342 (5th Cir. 2002). If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, discrimination is

presumed, and the burden shifts to the employer. Id. The employer must then

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the underlying employment

action. Id. If the employer can state a legitimate reason for its action, the inference

of discrimination disappears, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present

evidence that the employer’s proffered reason was merely pretextual. Id.

III.

Analysis

The Court first addresses Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment before

turning to Plaintiff’s cross-motion. Defendant raises several grounds for summary

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dismissal of this case. First, Defendant argues that many of Plaintiff claims are

barred by her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Second, Defendant

argues that many of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Third,

to the extent any claims remain, Defendant argues they should be dismissed because

Plaintiff (i) cannot show constructive discharge; (ii) cannot show a prima facie case;

and (iii) cannot show that the City’s legitimate reasons for its actions are pretext for

discrimination or retaliation. Plaintiffs Response rehashes the allegations of her

Complaint. See ECF 88. Plaintiffs Response does not directly address Defendant’s

arguments or cite any legal authority in her favor. See id.

Plaintiffs claims that were not raised in her December 22, 2025

EEOC charge must be dismissed for lack of exhaustion.

Many of Plaintiff s claims are barred by her failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. A plaintiff is required to exhaust her administrative remedies before

pursuing Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims in federal court. Taylor v. Books A

Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2002) (Title VII); Dao v. Auchan

Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1996) (ADA); D.A. ex rel. Latasha A.

v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450,455 (5th Cir. 2010) (ADEA).

A plaintiff exhausts administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC

and receiving a right to sue letter. Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379. A Plaintiff s claims are

are limited to those claims like or related to allegations contained in the charge and

growing out of such allegations. Stingley v. Watson Quality Ford, Jackson, MS, 836

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EEOC charge is the issue with access to the gate.3 The charge does not even allude

to other acts of discrimination or retaliation. The other allegations Plaintiff raises in

this lawsuit—such as her computer issues, her job classification, her failure to be

promoted, and being written up on PID worksheet—are not “like or related to” her

allegations that her husband was denied gate access and nothing in the charge would

have triggered an EEOC investigation into such allegations. Therefore, Plaintiffs

claims based on any act other than construction discharge due to denial of gate access

must be dismissed for lack of exhaustion.

Plaintiffs claims based on actions that occurred prior to February

25,2022 are barred by the statute of limitations.

A plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300

days of the alleged discriminatory act. Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S.

541, 544 (2019) (Title VII); Ramirez v. City ofSan Antonio, 312 F.3d 178,181 (5th

Cir. 2002) (ADA). Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of California, 304 F.3d 379,384 (5th Cir.

2002). It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge on December 22,2022.

ECF 80-5 at 8; ECF 80-6.

Plaintiff may proceed only on claims based on

discriminatory acts that occurred after February 25, 2022. Thus, all of Plaintiffs

3 Plaintiffs EEOC charge mentions religious discrimination, but her factual

allegations relate only to gate access and are in no way connected to religion. ECF

80-6. To the extent the mention of freedom of religion in the EEOC charge can be

interpreted as raising Plaintiffs complaints about her First Amendment rights being

violated in connection with the April 2021 PID, such claims are time-barred as

discussed in Section III.B.

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claims except for her alleged constructive discharge due to the City’s continuing

refusal to allow her husband to enter the HEC gate to pick up and drop off Plaintiff

at the front door of the building are time-barred and must be dismissed with

prejudice.

Plaintiff cannot meet her burden to show a prima facie case of

disability, age, or religious discrimination, or retaliation, based on

the denial of gate access.

In order to make a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII and the

ADEA, Plaintiff must show she (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was

qualified for the position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4)

was replaced by someone outside the protected class or other similarly situated

employees were treated more favorably. Ray v. Columbia Brazoira Indep. Sch.

Dist., No. 24-20227, 2025 WL 1219191, at *5 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2025). The

elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA are that Plaintiff:

(1) has a disability or was regarded as disabled; (2) was qualified for the job; and (3)

was subject to an adverse employment decision because of her disability. Nall v.

BNSFRy. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2019).

The elements of a retaliation claim are the same under Title VII, the ADA,

and the ADEA. Plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the adverse

employment action and the protected activity. Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132

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F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998) (ADA and ADEA); Hernandez v. Yellow Transp.,

Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir, 2012) (Title VII). In the retaliation context, an

adverse employment action is one that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). A Plaintiff must show that the

adverse action would not have been taken “but-for” the retaliation. Univ, of Texas

Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013).

Defendant’s first argues that Plaintiff cannot show she was subjected to an

adverse employment decision because she cannot meet the standards for constructive

discharge. A constructive discharge occurs when a plaintiff shows that her working

conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled

to resign. Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016).

Given Plaintiffs obvious physical disability and difficulty walking, the Court

will assume for current purposes that Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material

fact as to her constructive discharge. In addition, Plaintiff does not need to prove

constructive discharge for purposes of her retaliation claims, which require her to

show only an adverse action that would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from

engaging in protected activity. In this case, it is not necessary for the Court to make

a definitive ruling on constructive discharge to rule on the pending summary

judgment motions because Plaintiff cannot meet the causation element of a prima

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facie case of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA

based on the denial of gate access.

Taking all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record

contains no evidence of a causal connection between the denial of gate access and

Plaintiff’s disability, age, religion, or protected activity. It is undisputed that Joe

Laud gave Plaintiff the accommodation of having her husband enter the gate to pick

her up and drop her off at the front of the building sometime in 2017. The record

conclusively shows that the rules for gate access changed in September 2021. ECF

80-5 at 20-21; ECF 80-12. Joe Laud sent Plaintiff an email on September 23,2021

informing her that she needed to give the guards her husband’s name, license

number, pictures of her and her husband’s ids, vehicle make/model/color, and

license plate. ECF 80-12 at 5-6. Plaintiff responded that she was already approved

to go through the gate and has provided the requested information before. Id. at 5.

She stated “[d]ue to havfing] so many different guard changes, we can’t provide the

license. We have been victims of identity theft, we don’t give our information out

unless we are doing business.” Id.

Plaintiff interpreted the request for the

information again as an indication it had been lost and further stated “I am not willing

to take that chance with the information being exposed. Since you are putting this

mandate in place, I will figure out how to get to the gate to be picked up.” Id. Laud

explained that he was directed to ask for the information at that time because new

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protocols were being implemented for all “staff who will be requesting approval for

similar procedures for pickup/drop off to/from HEC.” Id. at 4. Again, Plaintiff

responded that she had previously provided the information and would not do it

again because they lost it. Id. Again, she stated “since this is the new mandate, I

will try to walk to the gate.” Id. Plaintiff complained about the new protocols in a

September 26, 2021 email asking why the guards did not still have her husband’s

the license plate information and asking why they are compromising her safety when

she was not responsible for the recent security breaches. Id. at 3. After her October

8,2021 fall, she sent another email to Joe Laud complaining about not being allowed

to have her husband enter the gate despite having had approval for years, and

expressing concern about giving personal information to guards that she doesn’t

know when the City has had the information for years. Id. at 2. Laud again explained

that the new protocols were for the safety of everyone. Id. at 1.

In November, in an apparent attempt to be helpful, Chris Newsome, who had

worked for the former HEC security provider, sent the information she had on file

for Plaintiff’s husband to Joe Laud. ECF 80-13 at 3. Because Newsome apparently

did not have Plaintiff’s permission to share the information, Laud told her to keep it

confidential. Id. at 2. Plaintiff, having been copied on the email exchange, reiterated

to Laud that she had already been approved for 6 A years due to her disabilities and

stated “[i]t is apparent you are not trying to approve this request.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff

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clearly stated: There is no further interest in clearance, please discard.” Id.

The evidence summarized above shows that gate access was denied because

Plaintiff refused to provide the necessary information for her husband to be approved

for entry under new protocols that took effect in September 2021. The fact that

Plaintiff had previously submitted the required information and did not think it was

fair to have to do it again does not make the City’s requirement, which Plaintiff

concedes was applied equally to all employees (ECF 80-5 at 15,23), discriminatory

or retaliatoiy. Plaintiff’s fervent belief that she was treated unfairly is not enough to

create a genuine issue of material fact on her claims for violation of federal anti

discrimination statutes. See E.E. O. C. v. Louisiana Off. of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438,

1448 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the Fifth Circuit has “consistently held that

an employee's subjective belief of discrimination, however genuine, cannot be the

basis of judicial relief.”). Plaintiff has no evidence that any younger person, non

disabled person, or non-Christian person was treated more favorably than she was

treated. In fact, Plaintiff’s claim is that the City unfairly denied her husband gate

access despite her documented disability, not because of hex disability.

Finally, this is not a case about Defendant’s failure to grant Plaintiff a

reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

To succeed on a failure to

accommodate claim, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a qualified individual with

a disability; (2) her disability and its consequential limitations were known to the

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City; and (3) the employer failed to make reasonable accommodations for her known

limitations. Patton v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2017).

“If the employee fails to request an accommodation, the employer cannot be held

liable for failing to provide one.” Way v. City ofMissouri City, 133 F.4th 509, 517

(5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is disabled and

the City knew it. Plaintiff submitted medical evidence to support her request for

intermittent FMLA leave, which the City granted. ECF 82-5; ECF 82-6; ECF 82-7.

However, the record contains no evidence showing that Plaintiff submitted the

required paperwork, including a Medical Questionnaire, to request an ADA

accommodation. See ECF 80-19. As a corollary, the record contains no evidence

showing that Defendant denied Plaintiff an ADA accommodation. Indeed, the City

expressly informed Plaintiff that she did not need an ADA accommodation for her

husband to be granted gate access, she simply had to provide the requested

identifying information. ECF 80-5 at 25; ECF 80-14. Plaintiff choose not to comply.

Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is conclusory and does not explain

how the attached evidence supports the elements of her Title VII, ADA, and ADEA

claims. See generally ECF 82: ECF 100; ECF 102. For example, Plaintiff submits

her employee evaluations showing she performed her job well, but the City has not

disputed that Plaintiff was qualified for her position and there is no issue in this case

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related to Plaintiffs job performance. ECF 82-1. Plaintiff submits evidence from

the OIG’s investigation of complaints against Nikea Bradley, but Bradley resigned

on July 19,2021 and this evidence is not relevant to Plaintiffs claims in this case.

ECF 82-2. Further, the Court notes that the “Analysis” section of Plaintiff s Motion

appears to have been pasted from an unrelated case and does not relate in any way

to the specific claims and facts in this case. ECF 82 at 6.

In connection with Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court

considered the entire record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and found that

Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to create a genuine issue of material fact on

required elements of her Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims. It follows that Plaintiff

cannot show that she is entitled to summary judgment in her favor on these claims.

IV.

Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons discussed above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 80) be GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF 82) be DENIED.

The Clerk of the Court shall send copies of the memorandum and

recommendation to the respective parties, who will then have fourteen days to file

written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written

objections within the time period provided will bar an aggrieved party from attacking

the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.

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Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415. 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on

other grounds.

Signed on May 20. 2025. at Houston. Texas.

Christina A. Biyan v

United States Magistrate Judge

APPENDIX C

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En

Banc

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

The order denying rehearing and rehearing en banc is reproduced beginning on the following

page.

Case: 25-20264

Document: 116-1

Page: 1

Date Filed: 05/18/2026

Wmtefc &tate£ Court of Appeals

for tlje Jfiftlj Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 18,2026

No. 25-20264

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Valerie Prevost,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

City of Houston, Legal Department Labor and Employment,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:23-CV-4115

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

AND REHEARING EN BANC.

Before Jones, Duncan, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Because no member

of the panel or judge in regular active service requested that the court be

polled on rehearing en banc (Fed._R_. App. P.40 and 5,TH ClR. JR .-40) , the

petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

Case: 25-20264

Document: 111-1

Page: 1

Date Filed: 04/15/2026

No. 25-20264

In The United States Court of Appeals

for The Fifth Circuit

Valerie Prevost,

Plaintiff- Appellant

City of Houston, Legal Department, Labor and Employment,

Defendants - Appellees

Case No. 25-20264

On appeal from Civil Action No. 4:23-CV-04115 in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division

PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING

I. INTRODUCTION

Valerie Prevost, Appellant respectfully petitions for panel rehearing en banc

because the Court erred in concluding that no genuine dispute of material facts exist

and controlling legal issues, including Plaintiff’s under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and evidence of an unsafe and discriminatory work environment.

(A) Valerie PREVOST, Appellant state with particularity each point of law orfact

that the petitioner she believes the court has overlooked or misapprehended; and

(B) argue in support of the petition.;

The Court’s decision to affirm the judgment did not adequately address the civil

rights and disability discrimination case against the City of Houston, a municipal

employer. This case involved violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA) 1990 makes it unlawful to discriminate in employment against a qualified

individual with a disability, Title I include failure to provide reasonable

accommodations, discrimination, unsafe workspace, physical barrier-(gate access).

Additionally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is also part of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, since Appellee City of Houston receive federal funding.

The evidence and arguments presented demonstrate that Valerie Prevost, Appellant

a municipal disabled employee, was subjected to hazardous working conditions in

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Document: 111-1

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Date Filed: 04/15/2026

her office, with a leaky roof and wet carpet, where Prevost fell. Despite Appellee

City of Houston having knowledge of these conditions, the employer failed to take

appropriate action. Employer s Knowledge ofworkplace hazards and picture of the

hazard, Roof report (ROA volume 667602- page 345-365) Doctor certification for

disability, (ROA volume 667607-page 2.-21, volume 667606page 383-399, 66707

page 22-47)

The panel opinion conflicts with controlling Fifth Circuit precedent governing

failure-to-accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In Feist v.

Louisiana Department of Justice, 730 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2013_), this Court reversed

summary judgment and held that denial of reasonable accommodation constitutes

actionable discrimination under the ADA. In Cutrera v. Board of Supervisors of

Louisiana State University, 429F.3d 108 (5th CiL2QQ5), the Court likewise reversed

in part and held that once an employer has knowledge of an employee’s disability, it

must engage in a good-faith interactive process to determine reasonable

accommodation. In EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 E3iL68& (5th Cul2Q14), the

Court reversed dismissal and reaffirmed that employer knowledge of a disability

combined with failure to accommodate establish liability. Similarly, in Neely v.

PSEG Texas, Ltd. Partnership, 735.E3O242 (5th CiL^OjJ), the Court reversed and

held that employers may not ignore or summarily reject accommodation requests

without proper consideration.

The panel opinion conflicts with controlling precedent and overlooks material facts

relevant to liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The record reflects

Appellant Prevost, a qualified individual with a known disability. Appellant Prevost

experienced two workplace falls caused by hazardous conditions, including leaking

ceilings and wet carpeting, and the accommodation change which forced Prevost to

walk to and from the gate with her disability. The City of Houston never provided

access or an alternative after Prevost fulfilled all gate requirements. Prevost followed

up and was told by Joe Laud, "Until further notice." never let Prevost and Husband

caregiver back through the gate, which caused Prevost to fall. City of Houston

Incident reports (ROA volume 667603page 174-176, volume 667602page 366-370)

The City of Houston was fully aware of both the appellant disability and the unsafe

conditions but nonetheless revoked previously granted accommodations. Despite

knowing about Prevost Appellant disability, the City revoked accommodation that

had been in place for six years and did not address the hazardous conditions that led

to injuries. The panel did not adequately consider these critical factors, which

conflict with established legal precedent and justify rehearing. Harassment/Hostile

Work Environment: Forcing an employee to perform painful tasks (like walking

Case: 25-20264

Document: 112

Page: 3

Date Filed: 04/28/2026

long distances/ unsafe working environment) specifically because of their disability

constitute ’’severe or pervasive" harassment.

II. III. ARGUMENT

A. The Panel Opinion Conflicts with Fifth Circuit Precedent

This Court has consistently held that the ADA and Title 1 imposes a continuing duty

on employers to provide reasonable accommodations and to engage in a good-faith

interactive process.

In Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178jm2UU35-36 (5th CixJ^2), this Court

recognized that both employer and employee must participate in the interactive

process. In EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., 52QJ£M6fl^fi21-22 (5th Cit

2QQS), the Court held that an employer’s failure to engage in that process constitute

actionable discrimination. Likewise, in Feist v. Louisiana Department ofJustice, 23Q

F.3d 450,452-54 (5th Cir.2013). the Court confirmed that the denial of a reasonable

accommodation is itself a form of discrimination under the ADA.

The panel’s decision erred to meaningfully apply these principles. It does not address

the City’s unilateral revocation of six-year accommodation, nor its failure to provide

any alternative or engage in the required interactive process.

B. The Decision Conflicts with Persuasive Authority from Other Circuits

Other circuits uniformly hold that an employer may not withdraw an effective

accommodation without justification or replacement.

For example, in Isbell v. John Crane, Inc., 3fLEAthJJ2_6A-J27Z—78 (11th CiL-2fi22),

the Eleventh Circuit recognized that removing an accommodation without providing

an alternative violates the ADA. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in EEOC v. Ford Motor

Co., 782 F.3d 753. 761-63 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc), emphasized the employer’s

obligation to provide reasonable accommodations tailored to the employee s

limitations.

Courts have also recognized that an employer’s failure to address known

workplace hazards affecting a disabled employee give rise to liability. See Colwell

v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495.50^05 (3d Cu^OM Searls v. Johns Hopkins

Hospital: Addressed an employer's failure to provide necessary environment

adjustments for an employee’s physical limitations, emphasizing that the employer

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Document: 111-1

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Date Filed: 04/15/2026

an "interactive process" once notified of the disability. Roby v. McKesson Corp.:

A landmark case where an employer’s harassing behavior toward a disabled

employee—including forcing them to perform unnecessary physical tasks and social

ostracization—resulted in a massive verdict for disability harassment.

The panel’s erred to reconcile its decision with these authorities creates

inconsistency in the application of federal disability laws.

C. The Panel Overlooked Material Facts

The panel did not meaningfully address critical, undisputed facts, including:

• The City’s actual knowledge of Appellant disability.

• The existence of six-year accommodation that was effective and safe;

• The City’s revocation of that accommodation without justification.

• The presence of known hazardous conditions; and

• The causal connection between those conditions and Appellant injuries.

Doctor confirming injuries (ROA volume 667602 page 189-194)

• The issues and falls caused Prevost to become 100% disabled, requiring

constructive discharge. SSDI Disability confirmed (ROA volume 667603

page 147-148)

These facts are central to ADA liability and Title I. Their omission constitutes clear

errors and materially affected the outcome.

ffl. REHEARING IS WARRANTED

Rehearing is appropriate because the panel’s decision conflicts with prior decisions

of this Court and raises questions of exceptional importance regarding the scope of

an employer’s duty under the ADA.

Absent a rehearing, the decision risks undermining established protections for

disabled employees and creating uncertainty about employers’ obligations to

maintain reasonable accommodations and safe working conditions.

IV GROUNDS FOR REHEARING

Case: 25-20264

Document: 111-1

Page: 5

Date Filed: 04/15/2026

1. Failure to Address ADA and Title I serious issues

The Court did not adequately analyze Plaintiff’s rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and Title I. Plaintiff presented evidence showing:

Valerie Prevost, Appellant, is a qualified individual with a medical disability as

certified by doctors.

Defendant City of Houston had knowledge of Plaintiff’s disability and medical

accommodation for 6 years, confirmed by her supervisor and HEC Director prior to

accommodation being illegally revoked. (ROA volume 667602-page 306-308

picture-page 328)

City of Houston Defendant Reasonable accommodation and safety obligations were

not met, by not providing an alternative to gate access for Prevost a disabled

Employee who is medically disabled for painful mobility yet made disable employee

walk to and from the building where she worked and fell. Joe Laud never let Prevost

and her husband, who is her caregiver back through gate after all information was

provided, he stated until further notice email from Joe Laud, COH, Director

confirmed didn’t need accommodation policy to be approved through gate. (ROA

volume 667602page 324-325, 312-315)

The City of Houston reason to revoke gate access is because they stated she did not

provide medical documentation under City of Houston Position Statement when her

disability medical was on file at the City of Houston from her medical doctors for 6

years. Valerie Prevost - Appellant, after providing all information, Prevost and

husband were never let back through the gates. (ROA Doctor certification for

disability, (ROA volume 667607-page 2.-21, volume 667606page 383-399, 66707

page 22-47) Position Statement (ROA volume 667602 page 288)

The Court’s opinion provided limited consideration of the relevant ADA and Title I

issues and supporting evidence.

2. The Court erred in considering all Unsafe Working Conditions relevant to

the ADA and Title I

The record includes evidence that the workplace was unsafe for disabled employee

and never should have been in this horrible condition according to COH Policy and

OHHA violation Valerie Prevost, Appellant, including:

Case: 25-20264

Page: 6

Document: 111-1

Date Filed: 04/15/2026

• Roof leakage and wet carpet identified in Valerie Prevost, Appellant, office

workspace.

• Wet and hazardous carpeted areas where the employee's office was.

• Known maintenance issues reported by the City of Houston as evidence.

Despite this evidence, the Court did not properly evaluate the employer’s knowledge

or erred to correct these hazardous conditions. Employer’s Knowledge ofworkplace

hazards and picture of the hazard, Roof report (ROA volume 667602- page 345365) Doctor certification for disability, (ROA volume 667607-page 2.-21, volume

667606page 383-399, 66707page 22-47)

3. The Court erred in addressing material evidence and Material Fact

Valerie Prevost, Appellant, submitted OIG complaint forms, employees' affidavits,

and supporting documentation showing: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964. OIG Workplace Environment discrimination for other employees who

experience discrimination in the OEM office, including disability, U.S. law often

calls “reverse discrimination " or " racism against white employees, sexual

orientation, religion, disability, and age from an African American female deputy

director in the OEM Department. OIG, Affidavits, complaint forms (ROA volume

667602 page 251-287) Graham v. Ford (Michigan Dept, of Corrections)

Outcome: Court allowed the claim to proceed

• Valerie Prevost, Appellant Repeated reporting of unsafe conditions and

request to be moved. Prevost was denied, and she should never have been in

this unsafe working environment as a disabled employee.

• Employer awareness of the hazards of making Valerie Prevost, Plaintiff Appellant, fall and cause injuries is confirmed by doctor reports

• Ongoing failure to correct dangerous conditions forced disabled Valerie

Prevost Appellant, to walk to and from the gate, despite her mobility issues,

and kept her in the office, which had leaky roof and wet carpet conditions that

caused her to fall in both incidents.

The Court erred did not fully addressing or analyzing this evidence.

4. Causation and Injuries

The Court erred consider Appellant’s injuries.

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Document: 111-1

Page: 7

Date Filed: 04/15/2026

5. Discriminatory Environment and Unsafe Work Environment under the Law

workplace safety, discriminatory, and disability-related discrimination that were not

addressed in the Court’s opinion.

6.The Court's decision erred in addressing the OEM's discriminatory environment

against other employees. OIG, Affidavits, complaint forms (ROA volume 667602

page 251-287)

7. The Court’s decision did not address at all age discrimination and religion, as well

as the retaliation of deleted government emails and documents in this case.

8. Valerie Prevost, Appellant, was forced to retire due to injuries from falls and

her issue of Physical pain and suffering under constructive discharge. Prevost's

plan was to get her full benefit at retirement. Appellant Letter of Resignation

(ROA. volume 667605 page 157)

Table of Authorities/

• The Court did not evaluate under key laws: ADA (Title I) - ADEA- Title VIITexas Labor Code, §§ 21.051, 21.055 The Court erred to apply the correct

standards, analyzed evidence adequately, and viewed facts, (see Tolan v.

Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014)). Appellants' experience under federal and state

anti-discrimination laws resulted in a denial of a fair adjudication. Appellant

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Defendant City of Houston's

summary judgment and grant Plaintiff summary Judgement with proper legal

standards. Case Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Product, Outcome: Supreme

court ruled unanimously (9-0 infavor oftheplaintiff(Reeves on June 12,2000,

reversing the court ofappeal decision)

• Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) The

Supreme Court ruled that if a plaintiff proves a prima facie case of

discrimination and shows the employer's explanation is false, a fact finder

may infer intentional discrimination. The Court stated that disbelieving the

employer’s explanation, combined with the prima facie case, can establish

intentional discrimination.

Case: 25-20264

Document: 111-1

Page: 8

Date Filed: 04/15/2026

• Hams v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)

Outcome: The Supreme Court held that a Title VII hostile work environment

claim does not require proof of psychological injury. It is enough for the

harassment to be objectively hostile or abusive, as perceived by a reasonable

person and subjectively by the victim. The District Court's requirement for

evidence of psychological harm was incorrect, leading to its judgment in a

"close case." The Supreme Court reversed.

® United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) Topic This case underscores that no

official, including judges, may ignore the law or binding precedent. Judicial decisions

must be based on established legal principles and explained with proper reasoning.

® EEOC v. The Princess Martha (2026): A federal court upheld a jury verdict

where management failed to engage in the "interactive process" for an

employee’s medical needs. The court noted that ignoring proactive disclosures

of a condition constitutes reckless indifference.

• EEOC v. Kroger (2026): The EEOC recently sued over the removal of

existing accommodations, arguing that stripping a disabled worker of

necessary environmental support violates the ADA.

• Strife v. Austin ISD (2024): This case involved claims of a hostile work

environment and failure to accommodate physical limitations. While the court

initially dismissed some claims, it highlighted that employers must provide

functional adjustments to overcome physical workplace barriers

Premises Liability Argument (Texas Law) Premises Liability - Negligence

of the City of Houston-The City of Houston owed Plaintiff Valerie Prevost a

duty to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition

and to protect invitees from unreasonable risks of harm. This duty is heightened

where the property owner has actual knowledge of dangerous conditions and

of a plaintiff s known physical limitations. Plaintiff suffers from a documented

disability affecting her lower extremities, including weak legs, muscle weakness,

nerve pain, muscle atrophy, and a high risk of falling. These limitations

substantially impair her ability to walk long distances or stand for extended

periods. The City of Houston had actual notice of Plaintiff s condition through

medical documentation, Health Care provider certification on file with the City

of Houston from 2017 through 2022

On October 8, 2021, Prevost fell on Defendant’s property outside on concrete

walkways due to being forced to walk to and from the gate, knowing of Prevost's

disability, and on June 10, 2021, Plaintiff fell on unsafe areas of Defendant’s

property, her exterior office areas affected by a leaking roof, wet carpet, and

Case: 25-20264

Document: 111-1

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Date Filed: 04/15/2026

ongoing construction activity. These conditions constituted unreasonably

dangerous hazards that the City of Houston created or allowed them to persist.

Defendant failed to: Repair or remediate the hazardous conditions, Warn Plaintiff

of the known dangers, and take reasonable precautions considering Plaintiffs

known disability.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff suffered

additional serious injuries, including Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, Cervical

Radiculopathy, and Lumbar Radiculopathy, transforming a lower-extremity

disability into permanent upper and lower extremity impairment. Plaintiff is

now 100% disabled and unable to work.

V. CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY gTH CIR,

J certify that:

. This petition is made in good faith and not for delay; and

. The issues presented meet the standards for rehearing consideration under

Fed. R. App, P, 35IaJ. 42 U.S.C, 5 12112(W5M&

• Fed. R, Aop, P.40fdX2J and $th Cir, R1..4Q,.2J2-

IV. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

1. For the reasons stated above, Valerie Prevost, - Appellant respectfully

requests that the Court grant:

2. Rehearing to correct the legal and factual oversights in the Court’s prior

decision.

3. Reverse Summary Judgement grant for Valerie Prevost, - Appellant who

filed Summary Judgement as well.

4. Dismiss case in favor Valerie Prevost, -Appellant under ADA, Title I and

Title VII violation of the laws.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Petitioner Valerie Prevost Appellant respectfully requests that

the panel grant Petitioner requests a rehearing. Therefore, respectfully asks vacate

the panel’s decision, and issue an opinion consistent with controlling precedent.

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Document: 111-1

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Date Filed: 04/15/2026

Respectfully submitted on April 28,2026, to prose filing,

f(s)) "Piderie {Frevert

Valerie Prevost

Appellant, Pro Se

Valerie Prevost

13538 Forest Gully

Houston Texas

832 297-9379

Vprevost 1 @yahoo.com

Pro Se Valerie Prevost

Word of the LORD AUTHORITIES

Deuteronomy 1:17 states: "Do not showpartialityin judging; hear both smal

I and great alike. Do not be afraid of anyone, forjudgment belongs to God."

Word of the Lord God:

Deuteronomy 16:18 (NKJV) states: "You shall appointjudges and officers in all

your gates, which the Lord your God gives you, according to your tribes, and

they shall judge the people with just judgment." This verse emphasizes the

importance of appointing judges and officials to ensure justice and fairness in

governance.

b. Leviticus 19:15 (NKJV): You shall do no injustice in judgment. You should

not be partial to the poor, nor honor the person of the mighty. In righteousness

you shalljudge your neighbor.

Word of the Lord: Revelation 21:8 (NKJV):;

"But the cowardly, unbelieving, abominable, murderers, immoral, sorcerers,

idolaters, and all liars shall have their part in the lake which bums withfire and

brimstone, which is the second death."

The Word of the Lord God: Proverbs 29:7 “The righteous care about justice for

the poor, but the wicked have no such concern.”

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Word of the lord: James 2:4 “Have you not made distinctions among yourselves

and becomejudges with evil thoughts? ”

Word of Lord God: Isaiah 10:1-4 Woe to those who make unjust laws, to those

who issue oppressive decrees, to deprive the poor of their rights and withhold

justice from the oppressed of my people, making widows their prey and robbing

the fatherless..3 What will you do on the day of reckoning, when disaster comes

from afar? To whom will you run for help? Where will you leave your

riches?4 Nothing will remain but to cringe among the captives orfall among the

slain. Yetfor all this, his anger is not turned away, his hand is still upraised.

WORD OF THE Lord: Luke 11:46 New International Version

46 Jesus replied, “And you experts in the law, woe to you, because you load people

down with burdens they can hardly carry, and you yourselves will not lift one

finger to help them.

Respectfully submitted

(fsl) "Ftkiie&TWoet

Valerie Prevost

Appellant, Pro Se

Valerie Prevost

13538 Forest Gully

Houston Texas

832 297-9379

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This petition complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 40 because it contains

3,350 words. This document is 13 pages.

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by ProSe e-service

system and via email e-service on 04/28/2026, the following counsel of record:

ARTURO G. MICHEL

City Attorney

Case: 25-20264

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Donald B. Hightower

Senior Assistant City Attorney

donald.hightower@houstontx.gov

Samantha Cobb, Assistant City Attorney

Samantha. cobb@houstontx. gov

Majorie Cohen, Senior City Attorney

majorie.cohen@houstontx.com

CITY OF HOUSTON LEGAL DEPARTMENT

900 Bagby, 4th Floor

Houston, Texas 77002

Telephone: 832.393.6429

Facsimile: 832.393.6259

Defendants-Appellees City ofHouston, Legal Department.

Date Filed: 04/15/2026

Case: 25-20264

Document: 1j 2

Page: 2

Date Filed: 04/28/2026

a municipal disabled employee, was subjected to hazardous working conditions in

her office, with a leaky roof and wet carpet, where Prevost fell. Despite Appellee

City of Houston having knowledge of these conditions, the employer failed to take

appropriate action. Employers Knowledge ofworkplace hazards and picture of the

hazard, Roof report (ROA volume 667602- page 345-365) Doctor certification for

disability, (ROA volume 667607- page 2.-21, volume 667606page 383-399, 66707

page 22-47)

The panel opinion conflicts with controlling Fifth Circuit precedent governing

failure-to-accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In Feist v.

Louisiana Department of Justice, 730_F3_d_45Q (5th Ciik2fll3), this Court reversed

summary judgment and held that denial of reasonable accommodation constitutes

actionable discrimination under the ADA. In Cutrera v. Board of Supervisors of

Louisiana State University, 429 F.3dJLQ8 (5th CiLjOfli), the Court likewise reversed

in part and held that once an employer has knowledge of an employee’s disability, it

must engage in a good-faith interactive process to determine reasonable

accommodation. In EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 2Z3_E3dd588. (5th CiL 2014), the

Court reversed dismissal and reaffirmed that employer knowledge of a disability

combined with failure to accommodate establish liability. Similarly, in Neely v.

PSEG Texas, Ltd. Partnership, 735 E3dJ242 (5th CiL 20H), the Court reversed and