Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gerard Eric Beasley, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefAug 21, 2026

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

GERARD ERIC BEASLEY,

Petitioner

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHARLES L. PRITCHARD JR.

Federal Public Defender

MATTHEW D. CAVENDER

Research and Writing

Attorney

Counsel of Record

201 South Orange Ave.,

Suite 300

Orlando, FL 32801

Matthew_Cavender@fd.org

(407) 648-6338

QUESTION PRESENTED

In the past year, this Court has twice summarily

reversed the Fourth Circuit for violating the partypresentation principle. Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285 (2026); Clark v. Sweeney,

607 U.S. 7 (2025). Under that principle, parties frame

the issue and courts decide that issue. Here, the parties argued only whether Petitioner Gerard Eric

Beasley’s second confession retained the taint of his

earlier involuntary confession. Neither party addressed harmlessness or the admissibility of the

firearm found in his car. Yet the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on that unbriefed ground, declining to answer

the briefed issue and instead holding that admitting

the second confession was harmless based on the admissibility of the firearm.

The question presented is:

Whether the decision below should be summarily

reversed as a violation of the party-presentation principle.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court

whose judgment is the subject of this petition follows:

 United States of America

 Gerard Eric Beasley

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (M.D. Fla.)

United States v. Beasley, No. 8:23-cr-00140

(judgment entered June 14, 2024)

United States Court of Appeals (11th Cir.)

United States v. Beasley, No. 24-12004

(judgment entered Apr. 7, 2026; rehearing denied

Apr. 28, 2026)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented ...................................................... i

Parties to the Proceeding ............................................ii

Related Proceedings ....................................................ii

Table of Authorities ..................................................... v

Opinions Below ............................................................ 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................. 1

Constitutional Provision Involved .............................. 2

Introduction ................................................................. 2

Statement of the Case ................................................. 4

Beasley was arrested and indicted for

being a felon in possession of a

firearm. ................................................... 4

II.

Beasley moved to suppress the firearm

and his confessions. ................................ 7

III.

The district court held a stipulated-facts

bench trial, convicted Beasley, and

sentenced him. ....................................... 9

IV.

Beasley’s appeal to the Eleventh

Circuit. .................................................... 9

The parties made their

arguments. ................................... 9

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed

based on an argument neither

party raised nor briefed............. 10

The Eleventh Circuit rejected

Beasley’s petition for panel

rehearing.................................... 11

Reasons for Granting the Petition ............................ 12

The Eleventh Circuit’s disregard of the

party-presentation principle warrants

summary reversal. ............................... 12

The party-presentation principle

is deeply rooted in our nation’s

history. ....................................... 12

The Court’s recent decisions hold

tight to the party-presentation

principle. .................................... 14

The Eleventh Circuit ignored the

party-presentation principle. .... 17

II.

This case warrants the Court’s

attention. .............................................. 21

Conclusion .................................................................. 22

Appendix A ................................................................ 1a

Appendix B ................................................................ 2a

Appendix C .............................................................. 15a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601 (1973) ........................................... 16

Castro v. United States,

540 U.S. 375 (2003) ........................................... 13

Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967) ............................................. 19

Clark v. Sweeney,

607 U.S. 7 (2025) ...................... i, 2, 12, 15–17, 20

Day v. McDonough,

547 U.S. 198 (2006) ........................................... 17

Greenlaw v. United States,

554 U.S. 237 (2008) ..................................... 12–14

In re Wild,

994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc) ......... 20

Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges,

146 S. Ct. 1285 (2026) .. i, 2, 12–13, 15–17, 20–21

McNeil v. Wisconsin,

501 U.S. 171 (1991) ........................................... 13

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966) ....................... 3, 6–11, 17–19

Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges v. Margolin,

160 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025) ........................... 20

Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges v. Owen,

139 F.4th 293 (4th Cir. 2025) ........................... 16

Nix v. Williams,

467 U.S. 431 (1984) ........................................... 18

Paven v. Smith,

582 U.S. 563 (2017) ........................................... 12

Rehaif v. United States,

588 U.S. 225 (2019) ........................................... 19

Sexton v. Beaudreaux,

585 U.S. 961 (2018) ........................................... 21

United States v. Burke,

504 U.S. 229 (1992) ........................................... 13

United States v. Campbell,

26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022)

(en banc) .......................................... 12–13, 20, 22

United States v. Dowdell,

70 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2023) ............................... 21

United States v. Edwards,

34 F.4th 570 (7th Cir. 2022) ............................. 21

United States v. Jones,

53 F.4th 414 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................. 22

United States v. Moyer,

282 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2002) ......................... 22

United States v. Pryce,

938 F.2d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ......................... 20

vii

United States v. Samuels,

808 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1987) ........................... 14

United States v. Sineneng-Smith,

590 U.S. 371 (2020) ................... 13–14, 16–17, 20

United States v. Vasquez De Reyes,

149 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1998) .............................. 18

Wood v. Milyard,

566 U.S. 463 (2012) ........................................... 22

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. V .......................................... 2, 7

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 3231 ...................................................... 1

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ............................................... 7

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .................................................. 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ...................................................... 1

Other Authorities

Jeffrey M. Anderson, The Principle of Party

Presentation, 70 Buff. L. Rev. 1029

(2022) ........................................................... 12–13

Pet. for Writ of Cert., Margolin, 146 S. Ct. 1285,

available at 2025 WL 3780658 ......................... 21

Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice

(11th ed. 2019)................................................... 21

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Gerard Eric Beasley respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the court of appeals denying panel rehearing (App., infra, 1a), is not reported, but is

reproduced at Appendix A.

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 2a–

14a) is not reported, but is available at 2026 WL

937995 and is reproduced at Appendix B.

The order of the district court (App., infra, 15a–

34a) is not reported, but is available at 2023 WL

7109668 and is reproduced at Appendix C.

JURISDICTION

The United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida had jurisdiction over this criminal

case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit had jurisdiction to review the final decision of

the district court.

The Eleventh Circuit issued its decision on April 7,

2026. App. 2a. Beasley petitioned for panel rehearing

on April 17, 2026, and it was denied on April 28, 2026.

App. 1a. On June 18, 2026, Justice Thomas extended

the time within which to file a petition for a writ of

certiorari to August 26, 2026. This Court’s jurisdiction

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

U.S. Const. amend. V provides, in relevant part:

No person . . . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against

himself . . . .

INTRODUCTION

Twice in the past year, this Court has summarily

reversed the Fourth Circuit for the same error: deciding a case on grounds neither party raised, briefed, or

had any chance to contest. Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of

Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285 (2026); Clark v.

Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7 (2025). Those decisions reaffirmed

a bedrock feature of our adversarial system—that

points not argued will not be considered—and clarified

that appellate courts cannot convert the case the parties actually litigated into a different case of the

court’s own design. Margolin, 146 S. Ct. at 1288.

The Eleventh Circuit did exactly that here. Beasley

appealed a single, narrow question: whether his confession to police, made twenty minutes after an earlier

confession that the district court suppressed as involuntary, retained the taint of that first illegality. That

was the only issue the parties briefed. The government

never argued inevitable discovery. It never argued

harmlessness. It never argued that the admissibility

of the firearm itself—an issue Beasley expressly declined to pursue on appeal—affected the admissibility

of his confession. The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless resolved the appeal on exactly that basis.

Without asking either side to weigh in, the Eleventh Circuit reached past the confession question,

recast the district court’s ruling on the firearm’s admissibility as an “alternative holding,” and held that

because the firearm would have been inevitably discovered, any error in admitting the confession was

harmless. In doing so, the court invented an entirely

different rationale for its decision, one that conflates

two doctrines (suppression of physical evidence and

voluntariness of a confession) that this Court’s precedents have never conflated, since a statement, unlike

a gun, cannot be “inevitably discovered.”

The consequences of that shortcut are not academic. Beasley’s post-Miranda1 confession was the

only direct evidence that he knowingly possessed the

firearm—an essential element of his conviction. By

manufacturing an inevitable-discovery theory the government never advanced, and by doing so without

briefing or argument from either party, the Eleventh

Circuit denied Beasley the adversarial testing that

might have exposed the flaws in its reasoning—just as

it would have in any case where a court trades its role

as neutral arbiter for that of an advocate.

This case presents the same party-presentation violation this Court has twice in the past year found

warrants summary reversal, and it presents that violation in a criminal case, where the stakes for the

individual defendant are highest and the need for adversarial testing most acute. The Court should grant

certiorari and summarily reverse, or set the case for

plenary review to resolve the circuit split over when—

if ever—an appellate court may depart from the partypresentation principle to decide a case on a ground no

party raised.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Beasley was arrested and indicted for

being a felon in possession of a firearm.2

In the late evening of March 17, 2023, Officer

Cincotta with the Tampa Police Department pulled

over a car being driven by Beasley.3 Doc. 69 at 2.4

Cincotta initiated the stop because the car didn’t have

its headlights on, and its loaded trunk was partially

open and unsecured. Id.

After Beasley pulled the car into the driveway of a

nearby residence, Cincotta approached and told

Beasley that he stopped him due to the unsecured

trunk. Doc. 53-1 at 22:31:00–27. Beasley explained

that he pulled into that particular driveway because

he was going to that house to get the trunk fixed. Id.

at 22:31:24–30. Cincotta responded that the trunk

“ain’t no big deal” and that he wasn’t “worried about

no tickets or nothing crazy.” Id. at 22:31:30–34.

Cincotta then asked Beasley for his driver’s license, but he didn’t have one, so he provided an

2 The facts discussed in this section are largely taken from the

arresting officer’s body-worn camera footage, which was admitted as an exhibit during the hearing on Beasley’s motion to

suppress. See Doc. 53-1. There’s no transcript from the footage,

so counsel has made his best efforts to accurately transcribe the

relevant portions for the Court.

Beasley’s fiancée’s daughter owned the car. See Doc. 120 at

7:21–9:17. Both Beasley and his fiancée had standing permission

to drive it. See id. at 10:1–13.

Docket entries in the district court are cited as “Doc. ___.”

Docket entries in the circuit court are cited as “Cir. Doc. ___.”

alternative form of identification. Id. at 22:31:32–50.

Because the car “smelled like weed,” Cincotta asked

Beasley if he had a medical marijuana card. Id. at

22:32:25–32. He said he didn’t have one. Id. Cincotta

then asked Beasley if he smoked earlier, and he responded that his wife (presumably referring to his

fiancée) did on the way to work. Id. at 22:32:32–36.

Cincotta asked whether there was any marijuana in

the car and Beasley said there wasn’t any. Id. at

22:32:36–38.

Cincotta then returned to his patrol car and entered Beasley’s information into the dashboard

computer while a backup officer spoke with Beasley.

Id. at 22:32:42–22:35:30. The backup officer also

smelled marijuana and noticed a bag in the car containing “blunts” and a prescription bottle. Id. at

22:35:12–24. Cincotta then decided to detain Beasley

and search the car. Id. at 22:35:25–50.

Cincotta approached Beasley, who was still sitting

in the car, and said, “Mr. Beasley, alright real quick

man, long story short, obviously, you don’t have a license, alright, and it smells like weed. So what I’m

going to do is I’m going to detain you for a second and

I’m going to search the car, make sure there ain’t nothing crazy, and then you’ll be good to go.” Id. at

22:35:55–22:36:06. Beasley then told Cincotta that his

fiancée was on her way. Id. at 22:36:05–12. Cincotta

responded, “That’s fine, I’m not worried about the

weed. If you got a little bit of weed in here, you’re not

going to jail for some stupid-ass weed, alright? I just

want you to be honest and upfront with me, that’s why

I’m asking.” Id. at 22:36:10–17. Beasley immediately

responded, “Actually, there’s a weapon in here. It belongs to her.” Id. at 22:36:17–20. Cincotta then said,

“Okay, that’s fine. We’ll take care of it, alright? What

I’m gonna do is I’m still gonna detain you, alright?

We’re gonna detain you. As long as you’re cool with

me, we’ll get it figured out, and we’ll go from there,

alright? Alright, man, jump out for me. You’re gonna

face the doorway, okay? Where’s that gun at—is it a

gun?” Id. at 22:36:20–37. Beasley replied, “It’s in my

pouch.” Id. at 22:36:36–40.

Cincotta then placed Beasley in handcuffs and

searched his person. Id. at 22:36:40–22:38:02. While

searching him, Cincotta asked Beasley, “What kind of

gun is it? Is it a pistol?” Id. at 22:37:11–12. He responded, “Yes, sir.” Id. at 22:37:12–13. Cincotta then

asked, “Why do you have it in your bag? Why are you

holding it?” Id. at 22:37:13–17. Beasley replied, “She

works at Checkers right here on Nebraska [Avenue],

so I just have it in the car.” Id. at 22:37:23–29.

Cincotta said, “I respect that.” Id. at 22:37:29–30. After completing the search, Cincotta placed Beasley in

the backseat of the patrol car. Id. at 22:38:00–32.

Twenty minutes later, Cincotta returned to the patrol car and opened the rear door to speak with

Beasley. Id. at 22:58:00–15. Cincotta said, “Alright,

my man. You know, straight to the game. Obviously,

you’ve been around the block a few times. I’m going to

read you your rights.” Id. at 22:58:15–20. Beasley then

interrupted and began reciting the Miranda warnings

himself, finishing with saying, “I’m guilty, let’s go.” Id.

at 22:58:20–35. Cincotta responded, “My man, I still

gotta read them to you, alright? I get it, you know, you

probably, in your past, whatever, you’ve dealt with

plenty of cops in your life. I’m gonna be one of the cool

ones, hopefully, that you’ve ever dealt with. Obviously

gonna read it to you, then you can tell me whatever

you need to tell me after that, you can tell me to go

fuck myself, whatever you need to tell me.” Id. at

22:58:35–51. Beasley responded, “What I got to tell

you is what you’re getting.” Id. at 22:58:51–55.

Cincotta replied, “Exactly, I respect that,” then read

Beasley his Miranda rights from a printed card. Id. at

22:58:55–22:59:16.

After reading the Miranda warnings, Cincotta

asked Beasley if he understood his rights, and he said

he did. Id. at 22:59:16–18. Cincotta then asked, “Are

you willing to answer questions and make a statement

without an attorney being present?” Id. at 22:59:18–

21. Beasley responded, “I was driving and I had no license and I had possession of a firearm. What can I

say?” Id. at 22:59:21–28. They continued to discuss his

firearm possession, with Beasley explaining that the

firearm was to protect his fiancée and was registered

to her, but that his fingerprints would be on it. See id.

at 22:59:28–23:01:50.

A grand jury returned a single-count indictment

charging Beasley with being a felon in possession of a

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Doc. 1.

II.

Beasley moved to suppress the firearm

and his confessions.

Beasley moved to suppress both the pre- and postMiranda confessions, as well as the firearm itself. Doc.

35 at 1. As to the confessions, he argued that they were

products of deceptive promises of leniency and were

thus involuntary under the Fifth Amendment. See id.

at 18–19. The government responded in opposition, arguing that his confessions were “spontaneous and

voluntary,” and that there was “no promise of leniency.” Doc. 44 at 15. The district court held an

evidentiary hearing on the motion, hearing testimony

from several witnesses, including Cincotta, and argument from counsel. Doc. 120 at 1–2.

The district court issued an order granting in part

and denying in part Beasley’s suppression motion.

Doc. 69. Specifically, the district court granted his motion regarding his pre-Miranda confession and denied

the rest of his motion regarding his post-Miranda confession and the firearm itself. See id. at 23.

As to Beasley’s pre-Miranda confession, the district court concluded that Cincotta’s early questioning

“sound[ed] in a theme of leniency-for-honesty,” and

that his “honest and upfront” comment5 was meant as

a question “to Beasley about whether there was any

other contraband in the vehicle beyond perhaps some

marijuana.” Doc. 69 at 20. Ultimately, “in the light of

the totality of the circumstances, [the district court]

conclude[d] that Beasley’s initial confession was not

voluntary and must be suppressed.” Id. at 21.

But as to the post-Miranda confession, the district

court found that it “displayed no indicia of coercion

and appear[ed] to have been knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id. The district court also concluded that

after Cincotta ensured that Beasley understood his

Miranda rights, “whatever implied suggestions of leniency may have been once conveyed, confessing

would not shield [him] from liability.” Id. at 22. Thus,

the district court held that any coercion that accompanied his pre-Miranda confession had dissipated such

that his post-Miranda confession was knowing and

voluntary. Id.

5 “I’m going to search the car, make sure there ain’t nothing crazy,

and then you’ll be good to go. . . . I’m not worried about the weed.

If you got a little bit of weed in here, you’re not going to jail for

some stupid-ass weed, alright? I just want you to be honest and

upfront with me, that’s why I’m asking.” Doc. 53-1 at 22:35:55–

22:36:17.

III.

The district court held a stipulated-facts

bench trial, convicted Beasley, and

sentenced him.

Beasley waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a stipulated-facts bench trial, at which the

district court found him guilty. Docs. 83, 87, 88, 90.

The stipulated facts included his post-Miranda confession. Doc. 83 at ¶ 6 (“Defendant Beasley admitted to

possessing the firearm.”). At sentencing, the district

court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 57

months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Doc. 105; Doc. 118 at 6:13–25, 34:4–14.

IV.

Beasley’s appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.

The parties made their arguments.

On appeal, Beasley argued in his initial brief that

the coercive circumstances that led the district court

to conclude that his pre-Miranda confession was involuntary had not dissipated when he confessed twenty

minutes later to the same officer. Cir. Doc. 22 at 18–

20. This was particularly so given his personal circumstances, which included his 59 IQ, his history of

physical and sexual abuse, and his long psychiatric

history. Id. at 19–20. He argued that these personal

factors suggested that his post-Miranda confession retained the taint of the first involuntary confession. Id.

at 20. Finally, he argued that the Miranda warnings

he received before his second confession didn’t purge

the taint from his first involuntary confession. Id. at

21–22. He expressly waived any argument regarding

suppression of the firearm itself. Id. at 7 n.3.

The government argued in response that Beasley’s

post-Miranda confession was voluntary, not coerced.

Cir. Doc. 34 at 15–26. The government argued that his

pre-Miranda confession only had slight coercion, see

id. at 17–20, and that this slight coercion was dissipated by the Miranda warning that he received before

his second confession, see id. at 20–26.

In reply, Beasley argued that “the only relevant

question” was “whether the coercive circumstances

that rendered [his] first statement involuntary had

dissipated by the time he made his second statement.”

Cir. Doc. 37 at 1. He explained that the only factor in

the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that favored

the government was that he received Miranda warnings before his second statement, id. at 7, but that

Miranda warnings alone aren’t enough to purge the

taint of a past involuntary statement, id. at 17.

Nowhere did the government argue that the firearm would inevitably have been discovered or that the

admission of the post-Miranda confession was harmless.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed

based on an argument neither party

raised nor briefed.

The Eleventh Circuit, after spending several pages

setting out the law on determining the voluntariness

of statements, App. 3a–7a, ultimately determined that

it “need not decide whether the district court correctly

held that the taint from the illegality of Beasley’s first

confession[ ] was purged,” App. 7a. That was so, the

Eleventh Circuit reasoned, because it “affirm[ed] the

district court’s alternative holding that the discovery

of the firearm in [his] possession was inevitable.” App.

8a. And because the discovery of the firearm was inevitable, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, “even if the

district court did err in admitting Beasley’s second

confession—an issue [the court] [did] not decide—the

error was harmless.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected

Beasley’s petition for panel

rehearing.

Beasley filed a petition for panel rehearing, pointing out that he “never argued on appeal that the

firearm itself should be suppressed. In fact, he explicitly waived that issue.” Cir. Doc. 45 at 10. He noted

that “[t]he admissibility of the firearm was simply not

at issue on appeal.” Id. at 11. He also pointed out that

“[t]he district court’s conclusion about the firearm was

not an ‘alternative holding,’” as the Eleventh Circuit

described it. Id. at 11. “Rather, it was a primary holding about a separate issue—whether the firearm itself

should be suppressed—that [he] elected not to pursue

on appeal.” Id.

Beasley also argued that “[p]olice cannot inevitably

discover a confession,” so “the inevitable discovery doctrine has no bearing on whether the erroneous

admission of his post-Miranda confession was harmless.” Id. at 12.

Finally, Beasley argued that his “post-Miranda

confession was necessary to secure his conviction, so

its admission could not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. That was so because that confession

was the only evidence of his knowing possession of the

firearm. Id.

The Eleventh Circuit denied Beasley’s petition for

rehearing in a one-sentence order. Cir. Doc. 47-2.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Twice in the last year, the Court summarily reversed the Fourth Circuit for violating the partypresentation principle. Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285, 1288–89 (2026); Clark

v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 10 (2025). One imagines that

the “strong medicine of summary reversal,” Paven v.

Smith, 582 U.S. 563, 569 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), will cure the Fourth Circuit’s particular ailment.

But the Fourth Circuit is not the only circuit that has

shown itself in need of this treatment. The Eleventh

Circuit violated that same principle here, warranting

the same “strong medicine.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit’s disregard of the

party-presentation principle warrants

summary reversal.

The party-presentation principle is

deeply rooted in our nation’s

history.

The United States has an adversarial justice system, with “deep historical roots that predate this

country’s founding.” United States v. Campbell, 26

F.4th 860, 893 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (Newsom &

Jordan, J.J., dissenting) (discussing the history of our

adversarial system). This system “follow[s] the principle of party presentation.” Greenlaw v. United States,

554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008); see also Jeffrey M. Anderson,

The Principle of Party Presentation, 70 Buff. L. Rev.

1029, 1038 (2022) (“The principle of party presentation . . . enjoyed almost uninterrupted dominance in

civil procedure from the Roman system to then-existing systems throughout Europe.”). It “rel[ies] on the

parties to frame the issues for decision and assign[s]

the courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the

parties present.” Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 243. “The central precept of an adversarial system is that the

combination of active litigants and passive, neutral

judges most likely produces results that are acceptable

both to the parties and to society.” Anderson, supra, at

1039 (quotation omitted).

“That principle—the ‘rule that points not argued

will not be considered’—distinguishes our adversarial

system of justice from an inquisitorial one.” Margolin,

146 S. Ct. at 1288 (quoting United States v. Burke, 504

U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). “What makes a system adversarial rather

than inquisitorial is . . . the presence of a judge who

does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and

legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the

basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by

the parties.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181

n.2 (1991). “Our adversary system is designed around

the premise that the parties know what is best for

them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and

arguments entitling them to relief.” Castro v. United

States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring

in part and concurring in the judgment).

In criminal law, any departures from this adversary system “have usually occurred to protect a pro se

litigant’s rights.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith,

590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020). Otherwise, “‘parties represented by competent counsel know what is best for

them.’” Id. (quoting Castro, 590 U.S. at 386 (Scalia, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))

(cleaned up). This is particularly true for the United

States, “the quintessential sophisticated, repeatplayer litigant.” Campbell, 26 F.4th at 908 (Newsom

& Jordan, J.J., dissenting); see also Greenlaw, 554

U.S. at 244 (“‘Counsel almost always know a great

deal more about their cases than we do, and this must

be particularly true of counsel for the United States,

the richest, most powerful, and best represented litigant to appear before us.’” (quoting United States v.

Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (R. Arnold, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc))).

The Court’s recent decisions hold

tight to the party-presentation

principle.

In Sineneng-Smith, this Court unanimously vacated a Ninth Circuit decision that “departed so

drastically from the principle of party presentation as

to constitute an abuse of discretion.” 590 U.S. at 375.

There, a criminal defendant challenged her conviction

on the ground that the statute did not apply to her

conduct and, if it did, it violated the First Amendment

as applied. Id. at 374. But the Ninth Circuit moved the

case “onto a different track,” “named three amici and

invited them to brief and argue issues framed by the

panel,” including whether the statute was facially unconstitutional—an issue that was not raised by the

defendant. Id. The parties were relegated to “a secondary role.” Id. at 375. They were permitted to file

supplemental briefs and participate in oral argument,

and the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the statute

was facially unconstitutional. Id. This Court held that

this “takeover of the appeal” was impermissible. Id. at

379. Although courts are “not hidebound by the precise

arguments of counsel,” “the Ninth Circuit’s radical

transformation of th[e] case [went] well beyond the

pale.” Id. at 380.

Last year, this Court summarily reversed the

Fourth Circuit for violating the party-presentation

principle. Sweeney, 607 U.S. at 10. There, a state inmate argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate whether the entire jury had been

tainted by one juror’s unauthorized crime-scene visit.

Id. at 8–9. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district

court’s denial of his habeas petition and ordered a new

trial. Id. at 9. But it didn’t do so based on the inmate’s

ineffective-assistance claim. Id. Instead, it relied on “a

combination of extraordinary failures from juror to

judge to attorney that deprived [the inmate] of his

right to be confronted with the witnesses against him

and his right to trial by an impartial jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court summarily

reversed because by ruling for the inmate based on a

claim that he never asserted and the State never addressed, the Fourth Circuit “transgressed the partypresentation principle.” Id.

Then, lest anyone think that the summary reversal

in Sweeney was a one-off, this Court again summarily

reversed the Fourth Circuit a few months ago for another violation of the party-presentation principle.

Margolin, 146 S. Ct. at 1288–89. There, an association

of immigration judges challenged in federal district

court a policy regulating the judges’ work-related

speech. Id. at 1287. The association, while acknowledging that the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA)

generally requires federal employees’ grievances to go

through the administrative review system under the

Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and the Special Counsel rather than federal district court, argued

that its members’ claims were not the type of claim

that needed to follow the MSPB route. Id. The district

court dismissed the claims, concluding that they were

covered by the CSRA and therefore could not be

brought in federal district court. Id.

On appeal, the association again “argued only that

its specific claims were not covered under the CSRA’s

claim-channeling scheme.” Id. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, but not based on that argument.

Id. Instead, it looked at “legal challenges to the tenure

protection afforded MSPB members and the Special

Counsel, and the MSPB’s lack of a quorum,” and questioned whether this “may require a ‘new examination

of Congressional intent’ to channel covered claims out

of district court.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr.

Judges v. Owen, 139 F.4th 293, 308 (4th Cir. 2025)).

So the Fourth Circuit “remanded for factfinding into

the current operation of the MSPB.” Id.

This Court once more summarily reversed. Id. at

1288–89. This Court noted that the Fourth Circuit had

sua sponte addressed a much broader question than

the one presented by the parties and had remanded

for further proceedings on that question without giving either side an opportunity to address the new

theory. Id. at 1288. Recognizing that “[f]ederal courts

are not ‘roving commissions,’ licensed to ‘sally forth

each day looking for wrongs to right,’” this Court summarily reversed because the Fourth Circuit “lost sight

of those principles.” Id. at 1288–89 (first quoting

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973), then

quoting Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 376).

To summarize: (1) the Ninth Circuit violated the

party-presentation principle in Sineneng-Smith by

converting a criminal defendant’s as-applied First

Amendment challenge into a facial First Amendment

challenge; (2) the Fourth Circuit violated the partypresentation principle in Sweeney by converting a habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim into a

trial error claim; and (3) the Fourth Circuit violated

the party-presentation principle in Margolin by converting a narrow challenge about whether the specific

claims were covered by the CSRA into a broad

challenge to the functioning of the MSPB as a whole.

The Eleventh Circuit ignored the

party-presentation principle.

That brings us to this case. Here, the Eleventh Circuit violated the party-presentation principle in an

even more egregious manner than the Ninth Circuit

in Sineneng-Smith and the Fourth Circuit in Sweeney

and Margolin. The Eleventh Circuit took “a turn at

bat,” Sweeney, 607 U.S. at 9, by converting a straightforward question about the admissibility of Beasley’s

post-Miranda confession into a question about the admissibility of the firearm itself—an issue that he

explicitly waived on appeal, Cir. Doc. 22 at 7 n.3, and

that the government never mentioned. One had nothing to do with the other, but that didn’t stop the

Eleventh Circuit from conflating the two.

To make matters worse, the Eleventh Circuit

reached its decision without giving Beasley a chance

to respond to its new theory of the case. At least in

Sineneng-Smith, the parties submitted supplemental

briefs and participated in oral argument. See 590 U.S.

at 375. Beasley was given no such opportunity. Cf. Day

v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006) (“Of course,

before acting on its own initiative” to decide a forfeited

issue, “a court must accord the parties fair notice and

an opportunity to present their positions.”). Instead,

the Eleventh Circuit concocted its inevitable discovery

hypothesis out of thin air and only sprung it on him

when it rendered its decision, giving him no opportunity to point out the folly of the argument.

And folly it was. Let’s set aside the party-presentation issue for a moment and consider the decision on

its own terms. On appeal, Beasley sought to suppress

his post-Miranda confession. Cir. Doc. 22 at 14. The

Eleventh Circuit, not the government, responded by

invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine. App. 7a.

Under that doctrine, “[i]f the prosecution can establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been

discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be

received.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).

Then the Eleventh Circuit relieved the government of

its burden of proving inevitable discovery and “affirm[ed] the district court’s alternative holding that

the discovery of the firearm in Beasley’s possession

was inevitable.” App. 7a–8a. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, any error in admitting his postMiranda confession was harmless, id., again relieving

the government of its burden. There are a bunch of

problems with that analysis.

First, the district court’s conclusion about the firearm was not an “alternative holding.” Id. Rather, it

was a primary holding about a separate issue—

whether the firearm itself should be suppressed—that

Beasley elected not to pursue on appeal. He did not

contend on appeal that the vehicle search was unlawful or that the firearm was fruit of the poisonous tree.

The admissibility of the firearm was simply not an issue on appeal.

Second, the inevitable-discovery doctrine addresses only physical evidence that would have been

found by lawful means independent of any illegality.

See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443–44. Police cannot inevitably

discover a confession. See United States v. Vasquez De

Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A] statement

not yet made is, by its very nature, evanescent and

ephemeral. Should the conditions under which it was

made change, even but a little, there could be no assurance the statement would be the same.”). The

inevitable discovery doctrine does not affect whether

the erroneous admission of his post-Miranda confession was harmless.

Third, Beasley’s post-Miranda confession was necessary to secure his conviction, so its admission could

not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). A felon in

possession conviction requires knowing possession of

the firearm. See Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225,

230–31 (2019). The only direct evidence of his knowing

possession of the firearm was his post-Miranda confession admitting it. Doc. 83 at ¶ 6. True, he was the

sole occupant of the vehicle at the time of the incident.

Id. at ¶ 1. But the gun was found in a pouch in the

backseat, id. at ¶ 5, the car was owned by his fiancée’s

daughter, and at least three people (Beasley, his fiancée, and his fiancée’s daughter) drove it, see Doc. 120

at 7:21–10:13. So even with the admission of the firearm itself, it was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt to admit his post-Miranda confession that put

the firearm in his hands.

Returning to where we started, the above discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision on its own terms

shows why the party-presentation principle is so important. Had the government made those arguments

in its brief, Beasley could have dispensed with them in

his reply brief. But without adversarial testing, it was

easy for the Eleventh Circuit to make its first obvious

mistake—confusing the district court’s decision about

the firearm as an “alternative holding,” App. 7a, rather than a primary holding about a different issue. It

was also easy for the Eleventh Circuit to mix up the

inevitable-discovery doctrine by applying it to the firearm, rather than the only issue on appeal—the

admissibility of his post-Miranda confession. Finally,

Beasley didn’t have the opportunity to push back on

the idea that the admissibility of the firearm itself

somehow made it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

for the confession putting the firearm in his hands to

come in. Like the circuit courts in Sineneng-Smith,

Sweeney, and Margolin, the Eleventh Circuit “violated

the party-presentation principle when it decided ‘a

case different from the one [the government] advanced.’” Margolin, 146 S. Ct. at 1288 (quoting Nat’l

Ass’n of Immigr. Judges v. Margolin, 160 F.4th 100,

118 (4th Cir. 2025) (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting from

denial of rehearing en banc)).

This violation was particularly egregious here because “[i]ntervening to aid the government in the

course of a criminal prosecution also implicates separation-of-powers concerns.” Campbell, 26 F.4th at 919

(Newsom & Jordan, J.J., dissenting). “[I]f ‘the government refuses to argue’ an alternative basis for

affirming a criminal conviction on appeal . . . a court

considering the unargued issue sua sponte both

(1) puts ‘the judiciary’s neutrality at issue’ and

(2) risks ‘encroaching into the executive branch’s prosecutorial prerogatives.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1352–54 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, J., dissenting in part)). Those dangers are most

acute in a criminal case where the government’s authority is pitted against an individual’s liberty.

Prosecutorial discretion comprises “‘the soup-to-nuts

entirety of a prosecutor’s power to choose from the options available in a criminal case.’” Id. (quoting In re

Wild, 994 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc))

(cleaned up). This “is clearly broad enough to cover the

appellate phase of a criminal case.” Id. The Eleventh

Circuit’s invasion of that discretion presents a serious

separation of powers problem.

II.

This case warrants the Court’s attention.

Fortunately, this case need not involve any heavy

lifting for the Court. Summary reversal is particularly

appropriate considering the Court’s recent admonishments to the circuit courts to abide by the partypresentation principle. See Stephen M. Shapiro et al.,

Supreme Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3), at 5-45 (11th ed.

2019) (“Most often, the Court will reverse summarily

when a lower court decision is ‘not just wrong’ but reflects ‘fundamental errors that this Court has

repeatedly admonished courts to avoid.’” (quoting Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 585 U.S. 961, 967 (2018))). Thus,

as the government suggested in its certiorari petition

in Margolin, the ordinary certiorari criteria don’t apply here given the focus on error correction. See Pet.

for Writ of Cert. at 26–27, Margolin, 146 S. Ct. 1285,

available at 2025 WL 3780658.

Still, to the extent they apply, the ordinary certiorari criteria favor intervention. At least two circuits

recognize that departing from the party-presentation

principle requires extraordinary circumstances. See

United States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134, 140 (3d Cir.

2023) (holding that “appellate courts may ‘resurrect’

forfeited arguments in ‘extraordinary circumstances,’”

and declining to address argument raised by the district court for the first time and not preserved by the

government on appeal); United States v. Edwards, 34

F.4th 570, 584 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e may base our decision on a forfeited ground when the record presents

an exceptional case.”). The Eleventh Circuit is a third.6

6 Although as this case demonstrates, the Eleventh Circuit’s ad-

herence to its own rules is wanting, as it never mentioned any

extraordinary circumstances that would allow it to raise the inevitable discovery or harmlessness arguments that the

See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 872 (“Courts do have the

ability to ‘resurrect’ forfeited issues sua sponte in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” (quoting Wood v.

Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 471 n.5 (2012)).

The Sixth Circuit, in contrast, will overlook a forfeiture because “courts have an independent

obligation to get the law right in criminal cases.”

United States v. Jones, 53 F.4th 414, 417 (6th Cir.

2022). Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has determined

that it must correct an illegally low sentence even

where the government doesn’t raise the issue. United

States v. Moyer, 282 F.3d 1311, 1317–19 (10th Cir.

2002).

The circuits are divided over whether, and when, a

circuit court can depart from the party-presentation

principle to introduce an argument the government

doesn’t make. This case is an excellent vehicle for deciding the issue and providing much-needed clarity to

the lower courts.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Beasley’s petition for a writ

of certiorari and summarily reverse the decision below. Alternatively, the Court should set the case for

plenary review.

government didn’t make.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES L. PRITCHARD JR.

Federal Public Defender

MATTHEW D. CAVENDER

Research and Writing

Attorney

August 21, 2026

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A Court of appeals rehearing order

Apr. 28, 2026 ................................... 1a

Appendix B Court of appeals opinion

Apr. 7, 2026 ..................................... 2a

Appendix C District court order

Oct. 27, 2023 ................................. 15a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-12004

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GERARD ERIC BEASLEY

Filed: April 28, 2026

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

(D.C. No. 8:23-cr-00140)

District Judge: Honorable Kathryn K. Mizelle

ORDER OF THE COURT

Before: LAGOA, ANDERSON, AND WILSON, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The Petition for Panel Rehearing filed by Appellant

Gerard Eric Beasley is DENIED.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-12004

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GERARD ERIC BEASLEY

Filed: April 7, 2026

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

(D.C. No. 8:23-cr-00140)

District Judge: Honorable Kathryn K. Mizelle

OPINION OF THE COURT

Before: LAGOA, ANDERSON, AND WILSON, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Gerard Eric Beasley appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal,

Beasley first argues that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress evidence of his second

confession because that confession was involuntary,

and the Miranda1 warning he received before that second confession did not cleanse the taint from his first

involuntary confession, which the court had suppressed. Second, Beasley argues that 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second

Amendment both facially and as applied to him.

We review the district court’s denial of a motion to

suppress evidence under a mixed standard, reviewing

the district court’s factfinding for clear error and the

district court’s application of the law to the facts de

novo. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302–03

(11th Cir. 2012). We grant substantial deference to

both the explicit and implicit credibility determinations of the district court acting as factfinder,

construing all facts in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party below. Id. at 1303. We must accept

the version of events adopted by the district court “unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so

inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v.

Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002)

(quotation marks omitted).

We review de novo whether a statement was voluntary, giving deference to the district court’s factual

findings. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1285

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

(11th Cir. 2010). The government must establish voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), protects a

defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by requiring that law enforcement officers

advise the “person subject to custodial interrogation of

certain rights and to respect the person’s invocation of

those rights.” United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594

F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2010).

The admission of evidence obtained in violation of

Miranda is subject to harmless-error analysis. Lall,

607 F.3d at 1292. “An error is harmless unless there

is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Hands, 184

F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks

omitted and alterations adopted). There is no need to

reverse if any error did not substantially influence the

outcome of the case and “sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.” Id. “The question

. . . is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the

evidence complained of might have contributed to the

conviction.” United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 960

(11th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). Reversal

is warranted only where an error had “substantial and

injurious effect or influence” on the verdict, and overwhelming evidence of guilt may be considered in

finding harmless error. United States v. Phanikone,

605 F.3d 1099, 1109 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks

omitted). When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a

suppression motion, we may consider any evidence

presented at the trial of the case, and we are not limited to the evidence introduced at the hearing on the

motion. United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d

1051, 1056 (11th Cir. 1995).

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person

. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. To

protect a person’s Fifth Amendment privilege against

self-incrimination, before the start of a custodial interrogation, an individual must be warned “that he has

the right to remain silent, that anything he says can

be used against him in a court of law, that he has the

right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him

prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Miranda, 384

U.S. at 478–79. A defendant may waive these rights,

but only if “the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly

and intelligently.” Id. at 444. To determine whether a

defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, a two-part inquiry is required: (1) “the

relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary

in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or

deception,” and (2) “the waiver must have been made

with a full awareness of both the nature of the right

being abandoned and the consequences of the decision

to abandon it.” Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). A

waiver is effective where the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an

uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

We consider whether a Miranda waiver was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, including

the details of the interrogation and the defendant’s

characteristics. United States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d

914, 935 (11th Cir. 2014). Factors considered include

“the defendant’s lack of education or low intelligence,

failure to appraise the defendant of his rights, the

length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical

punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.”

Id. (quotation marks omitted). A waiver may be considered voluntary if the record is devoid of any

suggestion that police resorted to physical or psychological pressure to elicit the defendant’s statements.

United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355, 1362 (11th

Cir. 1987). Further, the use of deception to obtain a

confession is an important factor when considering the

totality of the circumstances. Lall, 607 F.3d at 1285.

While misrepresentations of facts are not enough to

render a suspect’s subsequent confession involuntary

or to undermine a suspect’s Miranda waiver, misrepresentations of law are more likely to render a

confession involuntary. Id. Moreover, we have held

that law enforcement’s promise that nothing the defendant said would be used to prosecute him rendered

the defendant’s subsequent confession involuntary because it completely undermined the previously

administered Miranda warning’s prophylactic effect.

Id. at 1287.

When the police do not have probable cause to arrest the accused, and the initial seizure is illegal, any

confession subsequently acquired by the police must

be excluded “unless intervening events break the

causal connection between the illegal arrest and the

confession so that the confession is sufficiently an act

of free will to purge the primary taint.” Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (quotation marks

omitted). When considering whether such intervening

events occurred, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including: (1) the “temporal proximity of the

arrest and the confession;” (2) whether any intervening circumstances occurred and the significance of

those circumstances; and (3) “particularly, the purpose and flagrancy” of the initial misconduct. Brown

v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975). Whether Miranda warnings were administered prior to the

confession is relevant, but not determinative. Id. at

604.

However, this exclusionary rule is subject to an exception.

Under the inevitable discovery exception, if the prosecution can establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the

information would have ultimately been

recovered by lawful means, the evidence

will be admissible. Nix [v. Williams], 467

U.S. [431] at 434, 104 S. Ct. at 2509.

However, the mere assertion by law enforcement that the information would

have been inevitably discovered is not

enough. United States v. Brookins, 614

F.2d 1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980). This circuit also requires the prosecution to

show that “the lawful means which made

discovery inevitable were being actively

pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.” Jefferson [v. Fountain],

382 F.3d [1286] at 1296 [(11th Cir. 2004)]

(emphasis added).

United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th

Cir. 2007).

In this case, we need not decide whether the district court correctly held that the taint from the

illegality of Beasley’s first confession2 was purged, because we affirm the district court’s alternative holding

that the discovery of the firearm in Beasley’s

2 Nor need we decide whether the district court correctly held that

the first confession was illegal, a decision the district court characterized as very close.

possession was inevitable. The record evidence

demonstrated that—prior to any of Beasley’s statements about the firearm—Officer Cincotta had

decided to initiate the vehicle search based upon the

smell of marijuana and Beasley’s acknowledgment

that he did not have a medical marijuana card. Thus,

in this case, the means which made discovery inevitable were already being actively pursued prior to the

occurrence of the allegedly illegal conduct. Before the

bench trial, Beasley stipulated that law enforcement

discovered the firearm in the search of the vehicle

Beasley was driving, and that, at the time he was

found in possession of the firearm, Beasley knew that

he had been convicted of at least one felony.

Accordingly, even if the district court did err in admitting Beasley’s second confession—an issue we do

not decide—the error was harmless. Hands, 184 F.3d

at 1329.

II.

We review the constitutionality of a statute de

novo. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th

Cir. 2010). “A party abandons an issue when he makes

only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and

authority.” United States v. Harding, 104 F.4th 1291,

1300 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

We are bound to adhere to our prior panel precedent unless that precedent has been abrogated by this

Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. United

States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016).

“To constitute an overruling for the purposes of th[e]

prior panel precedent rule, the Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point.” United States v. Kaley,

579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks

and citation omitted). To abrogate a prior panel precedent, the Supreme Court must also “demolish and

eviscerate each of its fundamental props.” United

States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 893 (11th Cir. 2025)

(“Dubois II”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Second Amendment reads: “A well-regulated

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,

the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not

be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Section 922(g) of

Title 18 of the U.S. Code prohibits anyone who has

been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one

year of imprisonment from possessing a firearm or

ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). To obtain a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove

“both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm

and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category

of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif

v. United States, 588 U.S. 225. 237 (2019).

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme

Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a

District of Columbia law that barred the private possession of handguns in homes. 554 U.S. 570, 574–75

(2008). After considering both the text and history of

the Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it

granted an individual a right to keep and bear arms.

Id. at 595. The Supreme Court ultimately held that

the ban on handgun possession in the home violated

the Second Amendment. Id. at 635. However, the

Court acknowledged that the Second Amendment

right to keep and bear arms was “not unlimited,” emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be

taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on

the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally

ill.” Id. at 626. The Supreme Court labeled these restrictions as “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26. It

specifically ruled that the District of Columbia had to

10a

allow Heller to carry his handgun in his home

“[a]ssuming that Heller [was] not disqualified from

the exercise of Second Amendment rights[.]” Id. at

635.

After Heller, we considered, and rejected, a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons

possessing firearms. See United States v. Rozier, 598

F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he first question

to be asked” under Heller, we explained, was “whether

one is qualified to possess a firearm.” Id. at 770 (emphasis in original). We observed that Heller’s

clarification that it should not be read to cast doubt on

prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons “suggest[ed] that statutes disqualifying felons from

possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances

do not offend the Second Amendment.” Id. at 771. We

also noted that Heller recognized that prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively

lawful longstanding prohibition.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). Therefore, we held that § 922(g)(1) was a

constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment rights of convicted felons as a class of people

disqualified from possessing firearms. Id.

In a footnote, we rejected Rozier’s argument that

the statement from Heller that “nothing in our opinion

should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” was

merely dicta and should not be afforded authoritative

weight. Id. at 771 n.6. We reasoned that (1) to the extent that the statement “limit[ed] the Court’s opinion

to possession of firearms by law-abiding and qualified

individuals,” it was necessary to the decision reached;

and (2) even if the statement were superfluous to Heller’s central holding, we would still afford it

“considerable weight,” as dicta from the Supreme

Court is not to be lightly ignored. Id. Ultimately, we

11a

concluded that Rozier’s purpose for possessing a firearm and the fact that the firearm was constrained to

his home were immaterial because felons as a class

could be excluded from firearm possession. Id. at 771.

Several years later, the Supreme Court in New

York States Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S.

1 (2022), considered a Second Amendment challenge

to New York’s gun-licensing regime that limited when

a law-abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a

firearm outside the home. The Court recognized that

“the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an

individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense

outside the home.” Id. at 10. The Court explained that,

to determine whether a restriction on firearms was

constitutional, courts must begin by asking whether

the firearm regulation at issue governs conduct that

falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment.

Id. at 17. If the regulation does cover such conduct, the

court may uphold it only if the government “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is part of

the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds

of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. Bruen

emphasized that Heller established the correct test for

determining the constitutionality of gun restrictions.

See id. at 39 (applying “Heller’s text-and-history

standard” to the challenged statute). And, like Heller,

Bruen described Second Amendment rights as extending to “law-abiding, responsible citizens . . . for selfdefense.” Id. at 26 (quotation marks omitted).

After Bruen, we rejected a defendant’s Second

Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). United States v.

Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1291–93 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Dubois I”), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.,

Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025), reinstated by Dubois II, 139 F.4th 887, cert. denied, (U.S.

Jan. 20, 2026) (No. 25-6281). We held that the

12a

challenge was foreclosed by Rozier, which “interpreted

Heller as limiting the [Second Amendment] right to

law-abiding and qualified individuals and as clearly

excluding felons from those categories by referring to

felon in possession bans as presumptively lawful.” Id.

at 1293 (quotation marks omitted). Although the defendant argued that Bruen abrogated Rozier, we

observed that, even in Bruen, the Supreme Court continued to describe the right to bear arms as extending

only to “law abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We also rejected the defendant’s

argument that Bruen abrogated all prior Second

Amendment precedent based on a two-step, meansend scrutiny test because Rozier was not based on that

framework. Id. Instead, Rozier was based on our understanding that Heller limited the Second

Amendment’s protections “to law-abiding and qualified individuals” and excluded “felons from those

categories[.]” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Because

Bruen “repeatedly stated that its decision was faithful

to Heller,” we held that Bruen did not abrogate Rozier

based on Rozier’s reliance on Heller. Id. We concluded

that we were bound by Rozier and, because Rozier

foreclosed a Second Amendment challenge to

§ 922(g)(1), we affirmed the defendant’s conviction. Id.

In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024),

the Supreme Court considered a Second Amendment

challenge to § 922(g)(8), the federal statute that prohibits an individual who is subject to a domestic

violence restraining order from possessing a firearm

when the order includes a finding that he represents

a credible threat to the safety of an intimate partner,

a child of that partner, or individual. The Court also

held that this firearm restriction was constitutional.

Id. at 693. It also, once again, declared that the prohibition on “the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the

13a

mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” Id. at 699

(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). The Court

rejected the government’s argument that a person

could be disarmed because they were not “responsible,” reasoning that the term was vague and was used

in Heller and Bruen simply to describe the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second

Amendment right and those cases did not define the

term or say anything about the status of citizens who

were not “responsible.” Id. at 701–02.

On January 13, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court

granted certiorari in Dubois I and vacated and remanded the case to us for further consideration in

light of Rahimi. Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct.

1041 (2025). On June 2, 2025, we issued our opinion

in Dubois II on remand, holding that “Rahimi—like

. . . Bruen . . .—did not abrogate our holding in Rozier

that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.” Dubois II, 139 F.4th at 889.

Accordingly, we reinstated our prior opinion and affirmed Dubois’s convictions and sentence. Id. Thus, we

reaffirmed the precedential authority of Rozier over

Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). Id. at

893. We noted that the only time that Rahimi mentioned felons was to reiterate Heller’s conclusion that

prohibiting felons from possessing firearms is presumptively lawful. Id. at 892-93. “This endorsement of

the underlying basis for our prior holding that section

922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment suggests that Rahimi reinforced—not undermined—

Rozier.” Id. at 893. We stated that we needed “clearer

instruction from the Supreme Court before we may reconsider the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1).” Id.

The Supreme Court recently denied Dubois’s petition

for writ of certiorari. Dubois v. United States, (U.S.

Jan. 20, 2026) (No. 25-6281).

14a

More recently, we held that Rozier and Dubois II

continue to foreclose constitutional challenges to

§ 922(g)(1) as a violation of the Second Amendment

pursuant to the prior-panel-precedent rule. United

States v. Hicks, 166 F.4th 933, 939 (11th Cir. 2026).

Here, both Beasley’s facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under the

Second Amendment are foreclosed by our precedent in

Rozier.

AFFIRMED.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 8:23-cr-00140

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GERARD ERIC BEASLEY

Filed: Oct. 27, 2023

ORDER

MIZELLE, J.

A grand jury indicted Gerard Eric Beasley—a

felon—for possessing a firearm in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). See Indictment (Doc.

1). Beasley moves to suppress the firearm, his initial

confession, and “any derivative evidence.” Mot. to Suppress (MTS) (Doc. 35) at 1. Beasley contends that the

initial confession was coerced and that the firearm

was only discovered because of (1) the coerced confession, and (2) a warrantless search of his vehicle in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. I deny

Beasley’s motion as to the firearm and any derivative

evidence resulting from the search of his vehicle, but

16a

agree that his initial confession must be suppressed.

I. FACTUAL FINDINGS9

On March 17, 2023, at around 10:30 PM, Tampa

Police Department Officer Gino Cincotta conducted a

traffic stop of a black Nissan Sentra driven by Mr.

Beasley. Hr’g Tr. at 23:1–25:19. After following

Beasley for roughly a block, Cincotta initiated the stop

because Beasley’s vehicle did not have its headlights

on,10 and because the vehicle’s loaded trunk was partially open and appeared to be unsecured. Id. at 23:7–

15, 24:4–25:2; Cincotta Body-Worn Camera Video

(BC) (Doc. 53-1) at 22:30:51.11 Upon Cincotta engaging

his emergency lights, Beasley parked—partially in the

driveway of a nearby residence, partially on an adjacent public sidewalk. Hr’g Tr. at 25:3–10; BC at

22:31:08–18.

After pulling the Sentra over, Cincotta activated

his spotlight, exited his patrol cruiser, and approached

the driver’s side window to question Beasley. Hr’g Tr.

at 25:11–19; BC at 22:30:54–22:31:21. Upon approaching, Cincotta immediately observed the smell of

marijuana emanating from the Sentra. Hr’g Tr. at

25:20–26:25. Cincotta told Beasley that he had

stopped him because of the unsecured trunk. Id. at

9 The facts recounted here are based on witness testimony, video

evidence, and a recorded phone call presented at the evidentiary

hearing on August 9, 2023.

10 Although Beasley now claims that his lights were on, he admit-

ted the opposite during a phone call while in custody. Recorded

Call (RC) (Doc. 53-2) at 9:27–37.

11 Citations to Cincotta’s body-worn camera footage refer to the

video’s internal timestamp, located in the top right-hand corner

of the frame.

17a

59:8–11; BC at 22:31:24–32. Beasley explained that he

was on his way to the residence to have the trunk

fixed. Hr’g Tr. at 59:12–15; BC at 22:31:24–30. Because Cincotta did not consider the trunk to be a “big

deal,” he told Beasley not to worry about a ticket “or

anything crazy” on that account. Hr’g Tr. at 59:16–18,

61:22–62:1; BC at 22:31:22–32.

Cincotta next asked for a driver’s license and confirmed that Beasley did not possess one. Hr’g Tr. at

25:20–26:3; BC at 22:31:32–22:32:00. After being provided an alternative form of identification, Cincotta

explained that he was “not too worried about” the lack

of a license either. BC at 22:21:33–43. Noting that the

Sentra “smelled like weed,” Cincotta then asked

whether Beasley had a state-issued medical marijuana card, which he admitted that he did not, and

whether Beasley had smoked earlier that evening,

which he dodged, blaming the smell on his “wife.” Id.

at 22:32:27–33; Hr’g Tr. at 26:18–25. Cincotta also

asked whether there was any marijuana in the vehicle, which Beasley denied. BC at 22:32:28–37.

As backup had arrived, Cincotta returned to the

cruiser and entered Beasley’s identification information into his dashboard computer while another

officer spoke with Beasley, a process that took about

three minutes. Id. at 22:32:42–22:35:30. The second

officer confirmed Cincotta’s initial observation about

the smell of marijuana and identified a bag containing

suspected cannabis products and a prescription bottle.

Id. at 22:35:12–22:35:24. Based on these observations

and Beasley’s admitted lack of a medical marijuana

card, Cincotta decided to detain Beasley and search

the Sentra. Id. at 22:35:25–50; Hr’g Tr. at 34:18–24.

Explaining that a search of the car was about to occur,

Cincotta told Beasley: “alright real quick man, long

story short, obviously, you don’t have a license,

18a

alright, and it smells like weed. So what I’m going to

do is I’m going to detain you for a second, and we’re

going to search the car and make sure there ain’t nothing crazy, and then you’ll be good to go.” BC at

22:35:57–22:36:06. After Beasley explained that the

Sentra’s primary driver, Ednecia Durden,12 was

headed to the residence, Cincotta further assured

Beasley: “that’s fine, I’m not worried about the weed.

If you got [sic] a little bit of weed in here, you’re not

going to jail for some stupid-a** weed, alright? I just

want you to be honest and upfront with me, that’s why

I’m asking.” Id. at 22:36:10–17. Immediately afterward, Beasley replied that “actually, [there’s] a

weapon in here, it belongs to her.” Id. at 22:36:17–20.

Upon learning of the weapon, Cincotta told Beasley

“okay, that’s fine, we’ll take care of it, alright? What

I’m gonna do is I’m still gonna detain you, alright?

We’re gonna detain you, as long as you’re cool with me

we’ll get it figured out, and we’ll go from there, alright?

Alright, man, jump out for me. You’re gonna face the

doorway, okay? Where’s that gun at—is it a gun?” Id.

at 22:36:20–37. Beasley replied that the gun was in

the Sentra’s backseat pouch and was then detained

while police recovered the gun. Id. at 22:36:36–43.

About twenty minutes after the above conversation, Cincotta returned to the cruiser and attempted

to read Beasley his Miranda warnings. Beasley interrupted—repeating much of the contents of a Miranda

warning and explaining that he was familiar with

them—but Cincotta eventually finished reading

Beasley all of the Miranda warnings. Id. at 22:58:15–

22:59:18. Beasley then agreed to answer questions

12 At the suppression hearing, Durden testified that although she

drove the Sentra, her daughter owned it. Hr’g Tr. at 8:21–25.

19a

without an attorney present and confessed to possession of a firearm. Id. at 22:59:18–23:01:50. He also

confessed that the prescription bottle contained marijuana and crack cocaine. Id. at 23:04:51–23:05:52.

Beasley was arrested for possession of a firearm by

a felon, possession of cocaine, and possession of drug

paraphernalia in violation of Florida law. MTS at 8.

The State did not pursue charges, but the United

States indicted Beasley on the felon-in-possession

charge. Id. The pending motion to suppress followed.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const., amend.

IV. To object to a search under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must have a common-law property

interest or a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

area searched. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5

(2013). A defendant bears the burden of proving that

he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Rawlings

v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). “If the accused

successfully establishes an expectation of privacy, the

burden then shifts to the government to prove that the

search was reasonable based upon a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” United State v.

Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008).

“[A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be

free and voluntary . . . .” Bram v. United States, 168

U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (quotations and citations omitted). I evaluate voluntariness based on the totality of

the circumstances, and “[t]he burden is on the prosecution to establish, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that a challenged confession was voluntary.”

United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir.

20a

2010).

III. ANALYSIS

Beasley moves to suppress the firearm, along with

“any derivative evidence,” as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. MTS at 1. He also moves to suppress

his initial confession. Id. The United States responds

that Cincotta had probable cause to stop Beasley, that

the police did not prolong the stop and instead lawfully

searched the Sentra under the automobile exception

to the warrant requirement, and that Beasley’s confession was not coerced. See generally Resp. to MTS

(Doc. 44). I begin by addressing Beasley’s Fourth

Amendment challenge to the search of the Sentra.

A. Beasley has Fourth Amendment Standing

Colloquially referred to as the “standing” inquiry,

a defendant who seeks to suppress evidence based on

the Fourth Amendment must first establish that he

had either a common-law property interest or a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.

Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018);

Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5. Beasley asserts two forms of

standing to challenge the search of the Sentra. First,

Beasley claims that he has standing based on his lawful control of the Sentra at the time of the stop. MTS

at 14. The United States does not dispute this argument, Hr’g Tr. at 123:5–9, and I agree that Beasley

has standing via lawful control, see United States v.

Cohen, 38 F.4th 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 2022) (“For

[Fourth Amendment] standing purposes, it is typically

enough that the driver is operating a vehicle with the

permission of the owner.”).

Second, Beasley argues that he has standing based

on a claim that he parked the Sentra within a residence’s curtilage. MTS at 8–13, 16–18. As this theory

21a

of standing can have substantive implications for the

applicability of the automobile exception, see Collins v.

Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) (“[W]e conclude

that the automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage

in order to search a vehicle therein.”), I address it in

the alternative. Curtilage standing has two elements.

First, because Beasley does not allege that he formally

owned or rented the residence, MTS at 17 (describing

the residence as one only that Beasley “frequented and

occasionally stayed at), he must establish a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the residence by showing

that he possessed ‘an unrestricted right of occupancy

or custody and control of the premises as distinguished from occasional presence on the premises as a

mere guest or invitee.’” United States v. Chaves, 169

F.3d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States

v. Baron-Mantilla, 743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir. 1984)).

Second, Beasley must demonstrate that the Sentra

was within “[t]he area ‘immediately surrounding and

associated with the home’” at the time of the search.

Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (quoting Oliver v. United

States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).

The failure to prove either element is conclusive, so

I begin with the clearer ground upon which Beasley

lacks curtilage standing: the Sentra was not within

the residence’s curtilage. This conclusion is easy. In

the Eleventh Circuit, whether a search was conducted

within the curtilage “turns on four fact-intensive inquiries: ‘(1) the proximity of the area claimed to be

curtilage to the home; (2) the nature of the uses to

which the area is put; (3) whether the area is included

within an enclosure surrounding the home; and,

(4) the steps the resident takes to protect the area

from observation.’” United States v. Bruce, 977 F.3d

1112, 1121 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.

22a

Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006)). In Collins, the Supreme Court held that a motorcycle parked

and stored inside the top portion of a driveway directly

abutting a home, enclosed on three sides by two carheight brick walls and a wall of the home itself, was

within the curtilage. 138 S. Ct. at 1670–71. In doing

so, the Court emphasized that the “conception defining the curtilage is familiar enough that it is easily

understood from our daily experience.” Id. at 1671

(cleaned up).

Precedent, daily experience, and simple common

sense all suggest that the Sentra was not within the

curtilage. Footage from Cincotta’s body-worn camera

shows that, although the Sentra was partially pulled

into the residence’s driveway, a significant portion of

its chassis—including the open trunk and most of both

rear wheels—was jutting out onto a nearby public

sidewalk. See BC at 22:35:50–53. As a result, an ordinary person walking down that section of the sidewalk

would not only have observed the Sentra—including

the contents of its trunk—he would have had to

change course to avoid running directly into the vehicle. That a significant portion of the Sentra was

parked on a public sidewalk means that the second

Taylor factor cuts strongly against Beasley. 458 F.3d

at 1206.

So too, the third and fourth factors. See id. The bottom portion of the driveway where the Sentra was

partially parked was enclosed on, at most, two sides.

A car-height wooden privacy fence appears to enclose

the highest portion of the driveway toward the rear of

the property, and a waist-high slat-fence separates the

driveway from the next residence’s yard on the right.

See BC at 22:35:48–53. The bottom-left side of the

driveway, however, is unenclosed, and the entire area

is open to public view from above absent slight canopy

23a

coverage from a nearby tree. See id. Unlike in Collins,

where the defendant’s motorcycle was covered with a

tarp and parked at the top end of his driveway, enclosed by two car-height brick walls and a wall of the

home itself, the facts here do not reflect any attempt

to keep the Sentra and its contents private. And although Beasley suggests that nearby foliage from the

trees might conceal the driveway from airborne drones

or a Google Maps satellite, that is irrelevant because

the Sentra was parked such that it was on open and

obvious display to anyone using the adjacent public

sidewalk. Under these circumstances, the Sentra was

not within the curtilage despite being partially parked

on a residential driveway.

Second, even if the Sentra had been within the residence’s curtilage at the time of the search, I would

still conclude that Beasley lacked curtilage standing

because he failed to establish “an unrestricted right of

occupancy or custody and control of the premises.”

Baron-Mantilla, 743 F.2d at 870. At the suppression

hearing, Beasley provided no evidence that he paid

rent or contributed to utilities at the residence. See

Hr’g Tr. at 20:14–20. And during the arrest, Beasley

told Cincotta that he did not live “out here,” instead

claiming to live elsewhere with Durden. BC at

22:37:38–41. Finally, Beasley’s motion concedes that

he only “frequented and occasionally stayed” at the

residence. MTS at 17. Thus, although Beasley may

have stored some of his personal effects and kept his

dog at the residence, see Hr’g Tr. at 13:14–14:7, I conclude that he was at most “occasional[ly] presen[t]” as

a “guest or invitee,” Baron-Mantilla, 743 F.2d at 870

(quotations omitted). That cannot convey curtilage

standing under Eleventh Circuit precedent.13

13 Neither was Beasley an overnight guest. See United States v.

24a

For these reasons, Beasley lacks curtilage standing. Thus, I need not address the open question of

whether Collins extends to a situation where the record reflects that the traffic stop occurred

simultaneously to the car pulling into the driveway.

See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1673–74 (distinguishing an

earlier Supreme Court case, Scher v. United States,

305 U.S. 251, 255 (1938) (upholding the warrantless

search of a car within the curtilage), on the grounds

that Scher’s reasoning sounds “most appropriately” in

hot pursuit).

B. The Traffic Stop Was Reasonable

Having established Fourth Amendment standing,

Beasley argues that I must exclude the firearm and

“any derivative evidence” from the search of the Sentra as fruit of an unlawful traffic stop. MTS at 1, 14–

16. The United States responds that the stop was reasonable because Cincotta had probable cause to

believe that Beasley had violated multiple Florida

traffic laws. Resp. to MTS at 9–11. I agree with the

United States.

A traffic stop is constitutional if the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity has

occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. United

States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 880 (11th Cir. 2022)

(en banc). “In other words, an officer making a stop

must have a particularized and objective basis for

Maxi, 886 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2018). Beasley told Cincotta

that he was on a mission to fix the Sentra’s trunk, Hr’g Tr. at

27:7–9, and Durden testified that she had sent Beasley to the residence on an errand, id. at 14:8–16. So although Beasley does

appear to have intended to visit the residence, his presence would

“only [have been] for a brief commercial transaction,” which does

not confer Fourth Amendment standing. Maxi, 886 F.3d at 1326.

25a

suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” Id.

(quotations omitted). Even a minor traffic violation is

enough. Id. Cincotta testified that he stopped Beasley

based on two facts: (1) the Sentra was running without

lights after dark, and (2) the Sentra’s loaded trunk

was open and unsecured. Hr’g Tr. at 24:4–23. If true,

each fact independently gives rise to reasonable suspicion of a violation of Florida traffic law and justifies

initiating a stop. See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 880 (minor

traffic infractions sufficient); § 316.217(1)(a), Fla.

Stat. (use of headlights required when driving after

sunset); id. § 316.520(1) (“A vehicle may not be driven

or moved on any highway unless the vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to prevent any of its load from

dropping, shifting, leaking, blowing, or otherwise escaping therefrom.”).

I credit Cincotta’s account of the stop, as footage

from his body-worn camera broadly corroborates his

testimony. Beasley has introduced no evidence to support any other finding. Turning to the underlying

offenses, I conclude that Cincotta had reasonable suspicion to stop the Sentra on both grounds. First,

although Beasley now denies that the Sentra’s headlights were off, he admitted the opposite on a recorded

phone call while in custody. RC at 9:27–37. Although

some of Beasley’s statements on that call were no

doubt falsehoods meant to impress the person to

whom he was speaking (the inference being she was a

paramour), the lies revolved around a desire to prevent one woman in his life from learning about

another. See id. at 8:44–50, 9:20–31. Nothing about

this attempt to conceal a relationship casts doubt on

the truth of Beasley’s colorful admission, while explaining why he believed that he would ultimately not

be convicted, that he had forgotten to turn on the Sentra’s headlights that evening. See id. at 9:27–37.

26a

Even if Beasley’s contentions about his headlights

were correct, Cincotta would still have possessed reasonable suspicion based on the Sentra’s unsecured

trunk. Although nothing fell out of Beasley’s trunk before Cincotta decided to pull him over, body-worn

camera footage shows that the trunk was unsecured

and items were visible inside. See, e.g., BC at

22:31:17–21. Whether the exact harm Section

316.520(1) protects against materializes, any officer

observing a vehicle driving down the road with a trunk

that is (1) loaded, and (2) clearly unsecured, would

have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting” that the driver was violating Florida law. Indeed,

Durden testified that she knew officers might have exactly that reaction, which is why she sent Beasley on

an errand to have the trunk fixed. Hr’g Tr. at 14:8–16,

16:19–17:11.

Beasley’s argument to the contrary—that the Sentra’s trunk was loaded in a meticulous way that made

it impossible for its cargo to “drop[ ], shift[ ], leak[ ],

blow[ ], or otherwise escap[e] therefrom”—amounts to

a claim that Cincotta made a factual mistake when observing the trunk. From behind. While moving. In the

dark of night. But reasonable mistakes, whether of

fact or of law, do not defeat reasonable suspicion to

render an otherwise permitted stop unlawful. See

Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014).

C. Searching the Sentra Was Reasonable Under the Automobile Exception and Did not

Unlawfully Prolong the Stop

Beasley next challenges the warrantless search of

the Sentra, arguing that it was not justified by the automobile exception and that it unlawfully prolonged

the stop in violation of Rodriguez v. United States, 575

U.S. 348 (2015). MTS at 14–16. Both arguments fail.

27a

1. The Automobile Exception

To start, the warrantless search of the Sentra was

lawful. “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the police may search an

automobile and the containers within it where they

have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence

is contained.” United States v. Delva, 922 F.3d 1228,

1243 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted and alterations adopted). And under longstanding Circuit

precedent, the smell of marijuana emanating from a

vehicle is enough to provide probable cause. Merricks

v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 560 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015)

(“[T]he smell of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle is sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle.”);

see also United States v. Williams, 731 F. App’x 863,

867 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (collecting “a long

line of cases, [where the Eleventh Circuit has] held

that the smell of marijuana coming from a person’s

house or vehicle establishes probable cause for a

search”).

The automobile exception applies in the light of

Cincotta’s observation that the Sentra was emanating

the smell of marijuana and the fact that there appeared to be cannabis products stored in the vehicle.

Beasley also admitted to Cincotta that he did not have

a state-issued medical marijuana card, an odd statement without clarification if he were smoking

anything but marijuana. Beasley’s brief makes two arguments that this exception does not apply, but

neither are meritorious. First, he says, Cincotta could

not be sure that what he was smelling was illegal marijuana and not legal hemp. Again, that is, at most, a

reasonable mistake of fact, especially given that

Cincotta testified that never once in his career—over

the course of hundreds of similar interactions—did the

cannabis product in question turn out to be legal

28a

hemp. Hr’g Tr. at 90:8–13; see Heien, 574 U.S. at 60–

61 (“[I]f officers with probable cause to arrest a suspect

mistakenly arrest an individual matching the suspect’s description, neither the seizure nor an

accompanying search of the arrestee would be unlawful.”). Common sense and the realities of our modern

society confirm Cincotta’s police experience that he

smelled marijuana, not hemp. And, as it turns out, it

was not a mistake of fact after all.

Second, Beasley claims that the automobile exception is inapplicable because the Sentra was parked on

curtilage. MTS at 18 (citing Collins, 138 S. Ct. at

1675). As I explained above, however, this argument

fails at the threshold because Beasley lacks any basis

to assert the curtilage standing necessary to trigger

this exception-to-the-exception.

At the suppression hearing, Beasley raised an unbriefed third argument, that the Sentra was not

“readily mobile” because it was partially parked in a

driveway with police vehicles between it and the nearest road. See Hr’g Tr. at 118:2–119:6. Aside from being

forfeited, this argument is wrong. Yes, the automobile

exception requires that a vehicle be “readily mobile.”

United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th

Cir. 2007). But that refers to basic functionality, not

the practical ability to flee from police unhindered. Id.

at 1293 (“The requirement of mobility is satisfied

merely if the automobile is operational.” (quotations

omitted)), 1293 n.6 (“[T]he requirement ... is satisfied

by the ready mobility inherent in all automobiles that

reasonably appear to be capable of functioning.” (quotations omitted and emphasis in original)). Any other

conclusion would mean that the automobile exception

would almost never apply, as I am unaware of any

practice of conducting traffic stops and subsequent

searches while the vehicle to be searched is running

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and the driver is free from detention. Indeed, such a

practice would pose an unacceptable risk to officer

safety. Beasley has cited no authority that would compel this odd result.

2. Prolongation

Beasley next argues that the search unlawfully

prolonged the traffic stop because the stop’s initial

business, dealing with Beasley’s minor traffic infractions, had concluded once Cincotta suggested those

violations would not be an issue. MTS at 14–16. This

too, is wrong. To be sure, under Rodriguez “officers

cannot unlawfully prolong a stop,” once lawfully initiated, without violating the Fourth Amendment.

Campbell, 26 F.4th at 881. An officer does not prolong

a traffic stop, however, when he undertakes “ordinary

inquiries incident to” the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at

355 (quotations omitted). “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining

whether there are outstanding warrants against the

driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration

and proof of insurance.” Id. Officers may also “attend

to related safety concerns” without unlawfully prolonging a stop. Id. at 354. In other words, “to

unlawfully prolong, the officer must (1) conduct an unrelated inquiry aimed at investigating other crimes

(2) that adds time to the stop (3) without reasonable

suspicion.” Campbell, 26 F.4th at 884 (footnote omitted). For the same reasons I concluded that the

automobile exception applies, Cincotta’s knowledge

that the Sentra smelled like marijuana, that there appeared to be cannabis products stored in the vehicle,

and that Beasley lacked a medical marijuana card, all

mean that there was probable cause to conclude that

there were illegal drugs in the car. Merricks, 785 F.3d

at 560 n.3. Because Cincotta developed this separate

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suspicion upon beginning to question Beasley, see Hr’g

Tr. at 26:18–25, 87:19–25, searching the Sentra became justified before the stop’s animating mission

concluded. Thus, Cincotta did not unlawfully prolong

the stop.

D. Beasley’s Initial Confession Must Be Suppressed

Finally, Beasley moves to suppress his initial confession to Cincotta that there was a firearm in the

vehicle on the grounds that it was coerced by a promise of leniency. MTS at 18–19. The United States

responds that the confession was spontaneous and voluntary. Resp. to MTS at 15–16. In evaluating whether

Beasley’s initial confession was voluntary, I “look to

the totality of the circumstances.” Lall, 607 F.3d at

1285. Here, I agree with Beasley, in part.

Cincotta’s conversation with Beasley before learning about the firearm is best understood as a series of

questions about potential crimes: What’s going on

with the trunk? Do you have a driver’s license? Have

you been smoking? Do you have a medical marijuana

card? Is there any marijuana in the car? And although

Beasley answered most of these questions by essentially confessing to the relevant conduct, Cincotta

assured him each time that his admissions would not

result in any sanction (or at least not a severe one).

Cincotta explained that the traffic violation for an unsecured trunk was no “big deal” and that he would not

issue a ticket. He was also “not too worried” about the

fact that Beasley was driving without a license. And

when asking about marijuana, Cincotta explicitly

stated that “I’m not worried about the weed. If you got

[sic] a little bit of weed in here, you’re not going to jail

for some stupid-a** weed, alright?” BC at 22:36:08–17.

Beasley argues that the last thing Cincotta said to

31a

him before the initial confession—”I just want you to

be honest and upfront with me, that’s why I’m asking”—was another question in this series, and that it

carried the same implied promise of leniency established by Cincotta’s practice over the course of the

stop. See id. The United States responds that the alleged promise of leniency was—at most—implied, and

that such promises ordinarily rise to the level of Fifth

Amendment violations only when explicit. See Hr’g Tr.

at 125:21–127:9; Lall, 607 F.3d at 1283 (promising leniency contradicted a previous Miranda warning and

rendered a confession involuntary when detective

“told [the defendant] that he was not going to pursue

any charges against him” before soliciting the confession). One final note on the totality of the

circumstances. Just before delivering the “honest and

upfront” comment, Cincotta explained three things to

Beasley: (1) he was about to detained, (2) police were

about to search the Sentra, and (3) he would be “good

to go” so long as “nothing crazy” turned up. BC at

22:35:57–22:36:06. Although at this point Beasley had

not yet been read his Miranda warnings, he has chosen not to argue that Cincotta’s final pre-confession

comment was a custodial interrogation such that the

failure to provide Miranda warnings would be a freestanding Fifth Amendment problem. Still, I consider

these circumstances as part of the totality when evaluating whether Beasley’s initial confession was

voluntary.

The question of voluntariness is extremely close.

On the one hand, Cincotta’s questioning until then in

the stop did sound in a theme of leniency-for-honesty.

On the other hand, the questioning’s theme was also

much less explicit than the promise of non-prosecution

that rendered a confession involuntary in Lall, and the

“honest and upfront” comment could have been

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understood as a statement more than a question. And

as the Eleventh Circuit has explained, there is no such

thing as a per se involuntariness rule when a confession is “preceded by any direct or implied promises,

however slight.” Lall, 607 F.3d at 1285 (quotations

omitted). Instead, “the issue of voluntariness must be

determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Id. On these facts, the deciding factor is

whether Cincotta intended, and Beasley understood,

the “honest and upfront” comment as a question akin

to the ones that had come before or as a simple statement of preference. Both the body-worn camera

footage and Cincotta’s sworn testimony establish that

Cincotta meant the line as a question to Beasley about

whether there was any other contraband in the vehicle

beyond perhaps some marijuana. See BC at 22:36:14–

17. (“I just want you to be honest and upfront with me,

that’s why I’m asking.” (emphasis added)); Hr’g Tr. at

36:12–18 (Q: “And so, Officer Cincotta, when you

spoke to Mr. Beasley, after you told him that you were

going to search the car, did you even ask him if there

was a weapon in the car or did he volunteer that there

was a weapon in the car?” A: “I asked him if there was

any other contraband in the vehicle and then he volunteered the weapon.” (emphasis added)). Just as I did

in the Fourth Amendment analysis, I credit Cincotta’s

account of events, especially given its consistency with

Beasley’s immediate response volunteering the presence and location of the firearm. Thus, in the light of

the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that

Beasley’s initial confession was not voluntary and

must be suppressed.

To be clear, that I suppress Beasley’s initial confession does not mean that the United States may not

introduce the second confession, which was made almost a half-hour later and after Beasley was provided

33a

all his warnings. “The United States Supreme Court

has never held that an early inadmissible statement

automatically precludes the admission into evidence

of later voluntary statements.” Leon v. Wainwright,

734 F.2d 770, 772 (11th Cir. 1984). Instead, later confessions can be considered voluntary if the “distinction

is justified by a sufficiently isolating break in the

stream of events.” Id. Thus, the second confession is

admissible if “the coercion surrounding [Beasley’s initial confession] had been sufficiently dissipated so as

to make the second statement voluntary.” Id. at 773.

Cincotta’s body-worn camera captured complete audio

and video of both confessions. The second confession,

given roughly twenty minutes after the first, displayed no indicia of coercion and appears to have been

knowingly and voluntarily made. Beasley had not spoken to Cincotta for almost a half-hour—a “break in the

stream of events.” Leon, 734 F.2d at 772. By then it

had become clear, especially after Cincotta took pains

to ensure that Beasley was appropriately warned despite Beasley’s initial suggestion that he was familiar

with Miranda, that whatever implied suggestions of

leniency may have been once conveyed, confessing

would not shield Beasley from liability. Indeed, the

impetus of the second confession appears to have been

a desire by Beasley to distance Durden from association with the gun, rather than to protect himself. On

balance, I conclude that whatever coercion accompanied Beasley’s initial confession had sufficiently

dissipated to render his second confession knowing

and voluntary.14

14 This result is consistent with Beasley’s position at the suppres-

sion hearing, where he appeared to argue that a favorable ruling

on his Fifth Amendment challenge would require excluding the

firearm but not Beasley’s second, post-Miranda confession. Hr’g

34a

Similarly, that I exclude the initial confession is irrelevant to whether the firearm or any other physical

evidence must be suppressed. Cincotta had already

decided to detain Beasley and search the Sentra before

delivering the “honest and upfront” line and soliciting

Beasley’s initial confession. Cincotta said so explicitly

on the recording. BC at 22:35:25–50; Hr’g Tr. at 34:18–

24. Because a lawful search that would have uncovered the firearm had been set in motion, the United

States has shown that its discovery was inevitable despite any Fifth Amendment problem. McKathan v.

United States, 969 F.3d 1213, 1232 (11th Cir. 2020)

(explaining that “[t]he inevitable-discovery doctrine

can apply when a Fifth Amendment violation occurs”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc.

35) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Beasley’s initial confession that there was a firearm in

the Sentra is suppressed, but the United States may

introduce his later, post-Miranda confession. The

United States may also introduce any evidence derived from the lawful search of the Sentra, including

the firearm Beasley is charged with illegally possessing.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on October 27,

2023.

Tr. at 116:17–23.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.