Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mirsad Ramic, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefAug 18, 2026

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No. 26-____________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MIRSAD RAMIC

PETITIONER,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENT.

______________________________________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

______________________________________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Joshua Michael Reho

Counsel of Record

Scott T. Wendelsdorf

Office of the Federal Defender

200 Theatre Building

629 Fourth Avenue

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

(502) 584-0525

Josh_Reho@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The § 3A1.4 terrorism sentencing guideline

enhancement incorporates the statutory definition for a

“Federal crime of terrorism[.]”

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4,

Application Note 1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)’s

definition of a “Federal Crime of Terrorism” refers to “an

offense that … is calculated to influence or affect the conduct

of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate

against government conduct.” Neither “government” nor

“calculated” is defined.

After the President derecognized the Bashar al-Assad

regime as the legitimate government of Syria, Mirsad Ramic

left the United States, joined ISIS, and fought in the Syrian

civil war. A federal jury later convicted him of terrorismrelated offenses, and the District Court applied the § 3A1.4

terrorism sentencing enhancement, a decision that a Sixth

Circuit panel affirmed.

The questions presented are:

I. Whether a foreign regime that the President of the

United States has derecognized as a government is a

“government” under the definition for a “Federal crime of

terrorism”?

II. Whether leaving the United States, joining ISIS,

and fighting in the Syrian civil war is conduct that is

“calculated” to influence or affect the United States under the

definition for a “Federal crime of terrorism”?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner Mirsad Ramic was the defendant in the District Court and the

appellant-cross-appellee in the Court of Appeals. Respondent United States of

America was the plaintiff in the District Court and the appellee-cross-appellant in

the Court of Appeals.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:

United States v. Ramic, Case 25-5392 (Defendant Appeal)

United States v. Ramic, Case 25-5471 (U.S. Cross Appeal)

Published Opinion Issued: May 13, 2026

(reported as United States v. Ramic, 175 F.4th 761 (6th Cir. 2026))

Order Denying Panel Rehearing Entered: June 1, 2026

United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky:

United States v. Mirsad Ramic, Case 1:21-CR-13

Judgment Entered: April 15, 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

SENTENCING GUIDELINE AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. The § 3A1.4 terrorism sentencing guideline enhancement and

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)’s definition for a “Federal crime of terrorism”

II. Facts and Procedural History

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The President had derecognized the Bashar al-Assad regime as the

legitimate government of Syria before Mirsad Ramic went to Syria and

fought in the Syrian civil war. The lower courts’ rulings that the § 3A1.4

terrorism sentencing enhancement applied to Mr. Ramic because the

Assad regime was a “government” under the definition for a “Federal

Crime of Terrorism” merits review.

II. Mirsad Ramic left the United States, joined ISIS, and fought in the Syrian

civil war. The Sixth Circuit panel’s finding that he “calculated” his

conduct to affect or influence the United States warrants review.

iii

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

Appendix A

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion

Appendix B

Western District of Kentucky Judgment

17a

Appendix C

Sixth Circuit Order Denying Panel Rehearing

25a

Appendix D

Transcript of Sentencing Hearing

26a

Appendix E

Sentencing Guideline and Statutes Involved

85a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)

22-23

Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022)

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938)

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)

Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. 189 (2016)

16-17

Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979)

Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220 (2014)

Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024)

United States v. Alhaggagi, 978 F.3d 693 (9th Cir. 2020)

United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2105)

United States v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard M/T Arina

with Int’l Mar. Org. No. 9189952, 173 F.4th 342 (D.C. Cir. 2026)

(petition for certiorari on other grounds pending, see All PetroleumProduct Cargo Onboard M/T/ Arina with Int’l Mar. Org. No.

9189952, et al., v. United States, Case 26-103 (filed July 17, 2026))

United States v. Alowemer, 96 F.4th 386 (3d Cir. 2024)

23-24

27-29, 34-35

United States v. Ansberry, 976 F.3d 1008 (10th Cir. 2020)

25-26, 28

United States v. Arcila Ramirez, 16 F.4th 844 (11th Cir. 2021)

28, 32, 35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2010)

28-30

United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)

United States v. Christianson, 586 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2009)

United States v. Hassan, 742 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 2014)

United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011)

United States v. Kahn, 938 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2019)

24-25, 31

United States v. Kurashev, 2026 WL 1746968 (9th Cir. June 17, 2026)

(unpublished)

United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004)

United States v. Mohamed, 757 F.3d 757 (8th Cir. 2014)

23-24, 28

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)

United States v. Rahim, 860 Fed. Appx. 47 (5th Cir. 2021)

United States v. Ramic, 175 F.4th 761 (6th Cir. 2026)

ii, 1, 15

United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 2012)

United States v. Stein, 985 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2021)

United States v. Ullah, 173 F.4th 399 (2nd Cir. 2026)

United States v. Van Haften, 881 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2018)

32-33

United States v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2014)

28-29

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)

18-19, 23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 78 (2015)

(Scalia, J., Dissenting)

Constitutional Provision

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10

Sentencing Guidelines

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4

i, 2, 9, 11-12, 14-17, 23-25

U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A, Sentencing Table

Statutes

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214

19-20

18 U.S.C. § 11

2, 20

18 U.S.C. § 478

18 U.S.C. § 546

18 U.S.C. § 1116

2, 20-21

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)

i, 2-3, 15, 17-18, 21, 23, 25-27

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i)

18 U.S.C. § 2332f(e)(12)

2, 21

18 U.S.C. § 2339B

18 U.S.C. § 2339D

vii

Statutes

Page

18 U.S.C. § 3231

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1254

Rule

Supreme Court Rule 10(c)

viii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Mirsad Ramic respectfully petitions this Court to issue a writ of

certiorari to review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Sixth Circuit panel’s opinion is published at United States v. Ramic, 175

F.4th 761 (6th Cir. 2026), and is reprinted at App. 1a-16a. The Sixth Circuit panel’s

unreported order denying Mr. Ramic’s petition for panel rehearing is available

online at 2026 WL 1642462, and is provided at App. 25a.

The District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Bowling Green

Division, judgment imposing sentence is United States of America v. Mirsad Ramic,

Case 1:21-CR-13, Record (R.) 308, Judgment, Page ID# 4718-4725, entered April

15, 2025, and is reproduced at App. 17a-24a.

JURISDICTION

The Sixth Circuit panel issued its decision on May 13, 2026. App. 1a.

The

panel denied Mr. Ramic’s timely petition for panel rehearing on June 1, 2026. App.

25a. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

SENTENCING GUIDELINE AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 is set out in the Appendix at App. 85a.

18 U.S.C. § 11 is set out in the Appendix at App. 86a.

18 U.S.C. § 1116 is set out in the Appendix at App. 86a.

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) is set out in the Appendix at App. 86a-88a.

18 U.S.C. § 2332f(e)(12) is set out in the Appendix at App. 88a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The § 3A1.4 terrorism sentencing guideline enhancement and

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)’s definition for a “Federal crime of terrorism”

The § 3A1.4 terrorism sentencing guideline enhancement increases the offense

level by 12 levels, sets the minimum offense level at 32, and fixes the criminal

history category as Category VI. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4. The minimum guideline

sentence range under the enhancement is 210 to 262 months. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4;

U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A, Sentencing Table.

The enhancement applies to “a felony that involved, or was intended to

promote, a federal crime of terrorism[.]” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a). It does not define

“federal crime of terrorism.” Instead, it uses the statutory definition that is set out

in 18 U.S.C § 2332b(g)(5). U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, App. Note 1. This definition has two

parts.

One lists specific criminal statutes that a person must violate.

See §

2332b(g)(5)(B). The other explains that the offense must have been “calculated to

influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to

retaliate against government conduct[.]” § 2332b(g)(5)(A).

II.

Facts and Procedural History

Mirsad Ramic was born into a Bosnian Muslim family in Bosnia and

Herzegovina in 1990. (R.291-1, Interview and Evaluation at Page ID# 4413). A

civil war took place there during his childhood. App. 2a. It included “genocide and

war crimes targeted at minority groups, including Bosnian Muslims[,]” and “Mr.

Ramic’s father was killed during this conflict.” App. 2a.

Mr. Ramic and his family came to the United States as refugees. App. 2a.

They “ultimately settled in Bowling Green, Kentucky[.]” App. 2a. In 2009, he

became a naturalized citizen. (R.326, Transcript (“TR”) Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID#

5411). The Sixth Circuit panel that heard his appeal stated that, “[d]uring his

naturalization ceremony, [Mr.] Ramic refused to cite the oath of allegiance to the

United States[,]” and “[i]nstead … proclaimed an Islamic oath and cursed all

nonbelievers.” App. 2a. But this information came from someone who had been an

FBI online covert employee who testified that Mr. Ramic later told him that. (R.272,

TR Trial, Hasan Hodzic Testimony, at 4159-4160, 4168).

Mr. Ramic began practicing Islam in his late teens and early twenties. (See

R.291-1, Interview and Evaluation at Page ID# 4418-4419). He attempted to go to

Yemen in 2010, (R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5412), but was not allowed to

enter because he did not have a student visa. App. 2a. Mr. Ramic told the FBI that

he had traveled there to study religion. App. 3a. Law enforcement, however,

“thought he was being radicalized and wanted to join terrorist groups engaged in

jihad[,]” something that, “in the terrorism context, means a religious holy war

against those who don’t believe in Islam.” App. 3a.

When communicating online with the covert FBI employee mentioned above,

Mr. Ramic revealed that he had not been honest about why he went to Yemen.

(R.272, TR Trial, Hasan Hodzic Testimony, at 4164-4166, 4170-4172).

endorsed claiming, as subterfuge, to be going to another country to study Arabic,

and to apply to a school because “it’s easier to get [a] visa,” and then after arriving,

“you can just distance yourself, get separate from that school.” (Id. at 4165-4166).

Mr. Ramic “twice applied to study at a University in Saudi Arabia” and tried to get

a student visa so that he could “travel there, but that plan never came to fruition.”

App. 3a.

Mr. Ramic also took part in an online chat room for a Muslim cleric, (see

R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5413-5414), who argued for violent jihad,

recruited for ISIS, and “instructed his followers on how to covertly travel to Syria

and Iraq to join ISIS.” App. 3a. He helped raise money for this cleric. App. 3a.

The FBI surveilled Mr. Ramic from 2010 to 2014. (R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5,

at Page ID# 5472). The surveillance did not discover any criminal activity, though

he was charged with a traffic violation involving a suspended license. (R.326, TR

Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5474; see also R.323, TR Trial, Vol. 2, at Page ID# 5276).

In 2011, some Syrians began an effort to “install democracy” in Syria. (R.326,

TR Trial, Vol. 5 at Page ID# 5360). Though it “started off as somewhat of a peaceful

movement[,]” it did not remain so. (Id.). The Syrian government was “a state

sponsor of terrorism” and “a violator of human rights[,]” (R.279, TR Trial, CrossExam of Dr. Lorenzo Vidino, at Page ID# 4261), and the Bashar al-Assad regime

turned to violence “‘to suppress the Syrian rebellion[.]’” (Id. at 4219).

Dr. Lorenzo Vidino testified at trial that the regime was the internationally

recognized government of Syria. (Id. at 4251, 4261-4262). On December 11, 2012,

however, President Obama had derecognized the Assad regime as the legitimate

government of Syria – as Britain, France, Turkey, and the Gulf Cooperation Council

had – and recognized the Syrian National Opposition Coalition in its stead. (Mr.

Ramic’s Court of Appeals Brief, Sixth Circuit Case 25-5392, Docket Entry# 43, at

Page ID# 38-39) (citations omitted).

ISIS would “become[] one of the key players in the Syrian civil war[.]”

(R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5350). To attract fighters, it conducted “a

massive propaganda effort” that claimed that it “was building this new society” and

that “it’s your duty as a Muslim to come here and join the state and help fight for it,

help build it.” (Id. at 5365-5366). It asserted that “[w]e are the only Muslims that

live Islam correctly.” (Id. at 5367).

On May 15, 2014, the United States Secretary of State amended its 2004

designation of al-Qaida in Iraq as a foreign terrorist organization to add as one alias

the “‘Islamic state of Iraq and al-Sham.’” (R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID#

5343-5344; R.279, TR Trial, Cross-Exam of Dr. Lorenzo Vidino at Page ID# 42444245). From the start, the group had issued “fatwas, statements, threats against the

United States, in particular, but all western countries, in general, and most countries

in the region[.]” (R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5356-5357).

On June 3, 2014, Mr. Ramic and two other men left the United States, traveled

to Turkey, (R.323, TR Trial, Vol. 2, at Page ID# 5189-5190), and entered Syria on

June 11. (R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5428-5429). At trial, the Government

ultimately did not ask the jury to find that Mr. Ramic knew that the United States

had designated ISIS a foreign terrorist organization because that declaration is

published in the Federal Register and “[w]e don’t expect people to read that.”

(R.292, TR U.S. Closing Argument at Page ID# 4504).

“Upon arriving in Syria, [Mr.] Ramic completed an ISIS intake form,

indicating that he wished to become a fighter.” App. 4a. The two other men did as

well. (R.317, TR Trial, Vol. 3B, at Page ID# 4893-4899). At the time, ISIS was

fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, in

the Syrian civil war. (R.300, Defense Sentencing Memo at Page ID# 4591) (citing

Presentence Report (“PSR”) at ¶ 23).

A retained Licensed Clinical Psychologist, (see R.291, Interview and

Evaluation at Page ID# 4411), stated that Mr. Ramic’s “main motivation” for joining

ISIS in Syria “was to rescue civilians with whom he identified[,]” (Id. at 4419), and

that “[t]he idyllic (utopian) society that was also promised in internet images and

ISIS propaganda was a main second influence[.]” (Id. at 4421). In addition to these

pull factors, “one motivation to leave was that he felt too harassed by the FBI to stay

in the U.S.” (Id. at 4419).

With ISIS, Mr. Ramic received “military-style training where he learned

warfare tactics and how to use combat weapons.” App. 4a. On July 30, 2014, he

sent a direct message on Twitter to one of his associates that, when translated, read

in part that he fired an anti-aircraft weapon “‘at planes[.]’” (R.326, TR Trial, Vol.

5, at Page ID# 5439-5440). In the middle of September 2014, the battle of Kobane

started. (Id. at 5388-5389). Mr. Ramic “was on the front lines of the initial assault

of the city.” App. 4a.

As ISIS acquired territory in Iraq and Syria in 2014 and “launched attacks

around the world, including in France and Belgium[,]” the United States and allies

worked to stop the organization. App. 3a. Kobane was “the first operation” where

a “coalition” led by the United States executed air strikes against ISIS. (R.326, TR

Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5393). The strikes started in “late September 2014.” (Id.).

Especially at first, the “main” countries “[we]re the [United States] and the [United

Kingdom] and local allies[,]” with Jordan and Saudi Arabia being the “main ones

who [we]re actually deploying their airplanes[.]” (Id.).

Mr. Ramic used social media when in Syria. See App. 4a, 8a. During the

battle of Kobane, he posted one message about the presence of planes and drones,

and he posted another commenting that the Assad regime’s bombs leave larger holes

than the United States’ bombs. (R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5460). Among

other messages, he also posted about the killings of Coptic Christians (R.323, TR

Trial, Vol. 2, at Page ID# 5256-5257); about President Obama’s daughters one day

being sold as slaves (Id. at 5261-5262); bragged that slave girls were cleaning their

houses (Id. at 5258); and posted an image on August 29, 2014, of a brochure for

families of fallen American veterans, an Islamic State flag, and weapons, with a

message stating, “‘Are you ready for a joint mission? To make more of them fall.

Hashtag IS, hashtag Iraq, hashtag US.’” (R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 54495451).

“Eventually, [Mr.] Ramic became disillusioned with ISIS” because “it didn’t

apply[] Islamic principles’ strictly enough and that the people he met in Syria ‘did

not practice the Muslim faith at all.’” App. 4a (quoting R.291-1, Interview and

Evaluation at Page ID# 4420, 4423). He left ISIS and went to Turkey, where Turkish

authorities arrested and imprisoned him. App. 4a.

In May 2021, a federal grand jury charged Mr. Ramic with violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 2339B by providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, ISIS, from

on or about June 2014 to September 2015; violating § 2339B by conspiring with

others to provide material support to ISIS during that time; and violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 2339D by receiving military-type training during that time from a foreign terrorist

organization, ISIS, “while in Syria.” (R.7, Indictment at Page ID# 23-26). The

District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because it involves offenses

against the laws of the United States. In December 2021, the FBI took custody of

Mr. Ramic from Turkey. (R.323, TR Trial, Vol. 2, at Page ID# 5232).

A jury convicted Mr. Ramic of all three charges. App. 5a. After trial, Mr.

Ramic objected, through counsel, to the specific offense characteristic of the

Presentence Report describing the Assad regime as the legitimate government of

Syria and stated that “[t]here was and is no ‘legitimate’ Syrian government.” (R.285,

Defense Objections to Preliminary PSR at Page ID# 4363-4364) (citing Preliminary

PSR at ¶ 49).

Defense counsel also objected to applying the U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 terrorism

sentencing enhancement. (Id. at 4364) (citing Preliminary PSR at ¶ 50). Counsel

argued that it did not apply because “Mr. Ramic’s offense conduct in this case was

not committed with the specific intent ‘to influence or affect the conduct of

government by intimidation, coercion, or to re[]taliate against government conduct’

within the meaning of §3A1.4.” (Id.). Counsel pointed out that the United States

Secretary of State had designated ISIS and the PKK as foreign terrorist organizations

and the Assad regime as a state sponsor of terrorism. (Id.).

As set out in Mr. Ramic’s sentencing memorandum, the final Presentence

Report asserted that the § 3A1.4 enhancement applied and that his actions “‘were

calculated to influence or [a]ffect … the conduct of a foreign government (Syria) by

intimidation or coercion.’” (R.300, Defense Sentencing Memo at Page ID# 4586)

(quoting PSR at ¶ 50). It did not name any other government. (Id.). The Presentence

Report applied the § 3A1.4 enhancement and calculated a total offense level of 40.

(Id.) (citing PSR at ¶ 56). It set the criminal history category at Category VI as

required by § 3A1.4(b). (Id.) (citing PSR at ¶ 62). Without this enhancement, Mr.

Ramic’s criminal history score was one and his criminal history category would be

Category I. (Id.) (citing PSR at ¶ 61-62). With a total offense level of 40, criminal

history category of Category VI, and the statutory maximum penalties for the

offenses, Mr. Ramic’s sentencing guideline range was 360 to 600 months. (See Id.)

(citing PSR at ¶ 85).

Mr. Ramic’s memorandum pointed out that the Presentence Report identified

the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, and Syria as the two entities that his conduct

had supposedly influenced or affected. (Id. at 4590-4591). Counsel stated that the

§ 3A1.4 enhancement did not apply because the PKK is a designated foreign terrorist

organization, not a government, and the Bashar al-Assad regime does not count as a

government because the United States did not recognize it as one. (Id. at 4591).

In its memorandum, the Government asserted that § 3A1.4 applied because

Mr. Ramic had committed qualifying offenses that met the first element for the

statutory definition for a “federal crime of terrorism[,]” (R.299, U.S. Sentencing

Memo at Page ID# 4563), and that the offenses he committed with ISIS were

calculated to influence, affect, or retaliate against the Syrian and United States

governments. (Id. at 4564 and n. 7).

At sentencing, defense counsel continued to argue that the § 3A1.4

enhancement did not apply because the Presentence Report listed only Syria as the

government that justified applying the enhancement and the President did not

recognize the Assad regime as the legitimate government of that country. (R.311,

TR Sentencing at Page ID# 4734-4736; App. 29a-31a). Counsel noted that the

Government had not objected to the Presentence Report naming only the Syrian

government, App. 32a-33a; that it did not assert that the United States had also been

impacted until its sentencing memorandum; and that it was too late to make that

argument. App. 33a. Counsel also said that the Government had not claimed “that

the PKK is a government.” App. 32a.

The Government asserted that the District Court could consider reliable,

relevant conduct, and that it was not “limited to” the part of the Presentence Report

that only listed the Syrian government. App. 34a. According to the Government,

Mr. Ramic had been convicted of eligible offenses under the definition for a federal

crime of terrorism, “[s]o we’re only really looking at is calculated to influence the

conduct of a government[,]” and “the statute just uses the word ‘government.’ It

doesn’t say ‘government recognized by the United States of America.’” App. 35a.

The District Court determined that the § 3A1.4 enhancement applied. App.

40a-41a. When doing so, it used Merriam-Webster’s dictionary and Black’s Law

Dictionary for a definition of “government[.]” See App. 35a, 38a-39a. It stated that

if the statute was meant “to say ‘government recognized for diplomatic purposes by

the United States,’ that’s what it would have said.” App. 38a. It concluded that,

because the Syrian government met the dictionary definition for government, it

“satisfies the requirement that the offense conduct was intended to influence or affect

the conduct of government[.]” App. 39a.

The District Court agreed with defense counsel, however, that based on its

“recollection of the evidence[,]” Mr. Ramic’s conduct had only directly impacted

forces for the Assad regime and the PKK. App. 41a. It disagreed with the

Government that Mr. Ramic had acted as a propagandist for ISIS. App. 58a. It

commented on the lack of evidence as to how many people, aside from his two

associates, had seen his social media posts, and it stated that “in terms of this crime

of providing material support, the United States didn’t make the connection with me

on that.” App. 56a-58a.

Applying the terrorism enhancement, the District Court calculated Mr.

Ramic’s sentencing guideline range to be 360 to 600 months. App. 45a-46a. It said

that Mr. Ramic had difficulty acclimating to life in the United States and “was

disillusioned, unhappy.” App. 79a. It stated that in his early 20s, he became

influenced “by extremist views of radical Sunni Muslim clerics” and developed “a

sincerely held belief that he had an obligation to go to war for this religion.” App.

79a. It remarked that “I do think to me this case is as important about what it’s not

as opposed to what it is. There is no evidence that Mr. Ramic undertook to engage

in any acts of terrorism -- in a more common sense term of that.” App. 79a-80a. It

added that “[t]here were no bombs. There were no horrible incidents of gun violence

against crowds.” App. 80a.

Instead, the District Court said, Mr. Ramic “joined as a soldier, and that’s what

he did. He fought as a soldier.” App. 80a. It emphasized the ISIS border intake

form that indicated that “he wanted to be a fighter.” App. 80a. It said that if there

had been “evidence that Mr. Ramic had engaged in any acts of senseless violence

against innocent people, I think this case would be completely different.” App. 80a.

And it thought that “the evidence was clear that he wanted to fight for a caliphate

where the Sunni Muslims would require strict adherence to sharia law.” App. 80a.

When sentencing Mr. Ramic, the District Court believed that “one of the big

factors” was to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between him and similarly

situated defendants. App. 81a. It stated that a person “convicted of similar-based

crimes, of the same base crime, and hav[ing] the identical criminal history and

offense level as” him received a mean sentence of 220 months and a median sentence

of 168 months. App. 81a. It credited him with the 67 months that he had spent

incarcerated in Turkey and imposed a total sentence of 101 months’ imprisonment.

App. 81. Following that, it imposed a lifetime term of supervised release. App. 82a.

Among other conditions of supervised release, it ordered that if he is deported, he

may not reenter the United States without permission. App. 82a.

Mr. Ramic appealed, (R.313, Defense Notice of Appeal at Page ID# 4793),

and challenged the procedural reasonableness of the sentence based on the District

Court applying the § 3A1.4 sentencing enhancement. See Mr. Ramic’s Court of

Appeals Brief, Sixth Circuit Case 25-5392, Docket Entry# 43, Summary of

Argument, at Page ID# 25-26. The Government cross-appealed, (R.315, U.S. Notice

of Appeal at Page ID# 4797), and contested the substantive reasonableness of the

sentence. See U.S.’s Court of Appeals Brief, Sixth Circuit Case 25-5392, Docket

Entry# 49, Summary of Argument, at Page ID# 21-22.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit panel issued a published opinion finding that the

District Court had imposed a procedurally reasonable, but substantively

unreasonable, sentence. United States v. Ramic, 175 F.4th 761 (6th Cir. 2026); App

1a-16a. The panel vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

App. 2a.

The panel found that the District Court imposed a substantively

unreasonable sentence because it had incorrectly weighed three 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)

factors. App. 9a. As for procedural reasonableness, the panel determined that the

District Court did not err in applying § 3A1.4 because 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)

uses the “ordinary meaning” for the word “government”; that this does not impact

the President’s power to recognize a foreign regime as a government; and that Mr.

Ramic’s conduct toward the Assad regime warranted applying the enhancement.

App. 6a-7a. The panel further found that, notwithstanding the Assad regime, the

enhancement also applied because Mr. Ramic had “calculated [his conduct] to

influence or affect the United States” too. App. 8a (footnote omitted). The panel

denied Mr. Ramic’s timely petition for panel rehearing. App. 25a (order available

online at 2026 WL 1642462).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Mirsad Ramic respectfully requests that this Court grant this petition to address

what “government” and “calculated” mean in the statutory definition for a “Federal

crime of terrorism” that is located at 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A).

In this case, the Sixth Circuit panel’s published opinion concluded that the §

3A1.4 terrorism sentencing enhancement applied – and so Mr. Ramic’s offenses

“involved, or w[ere] intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism,” U.S.S.G. §

3A1.4(a) – because he directed his conduct toward both the Bashar al-Assad regime

and the United States. See App. 7a-8a.

But the District Court and Sixth Circuit panel intruded upon the President’s

exclusive power to recognize a foreign government by determining that the Assad

regime was a “government” under the statute, even though the President had

derecognized that regime as the government of Syria. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit

panel further found that Mr. Ramic had also “calculated” his conduct to affect or

influence the United States, even though he left the United States, joined ISIS, and

fought in the Syrian civil war.

“A district court that ‘improperly calculate[es]’ a defendant’s Guidelines

range… has committed a ‘significant procedural error.’” Molina-Martinez v. United

States, 578 U.S. 189, 199 (2016) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007) (ellipsis added, brackets in Molina-Martinez). Because the Sixth Circuit

affirmed the District Court’s reason for applying the terrorism enhancement and

further found a second, independent reason that it applies, Mr. Ramic was sentenced

under the wrong guideline range if both grounds were erroneous. They were. For

the reasons set out below, the Sixth Circuit panel’s interpretation of both

“government” and “calculated” under § 2332b(g)(5)(A) merits review in this case.

The President had derecognized the Bashar al-Assad regime as the

legitimate government of Syria before Mirsad Ramic went to Syria and

fought in the Syrian civil war. The lower courts’ rulings that the § 3A1.4

terrorism sentencing enhancement applied to Mr. Ramic because the

Assad regime was a “government” under the definition for a “Federal

Crime of Terrorism” merits review.

This Court should grant review to determine who decides what is a

“government” under § 2332b(g)(5)(A)’s definition for a “Federal crime of

terrorism[.]” This question is important because it implicates statutory construction,

separation of powers, and foreign policy.

Here, because the statute does not define “government[,]” the District Court

and the Sixth Circuit panel turned to dictionaries to determine what that word means.

App. 35a, 38a-39a) (dictionary citations omitted); see also App. 6a (citations

omitted). Both found that the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria met dictionary

definitions of “government[.]” App. 38a-39a; App. 6a. So after a jury convicted

Mirsad Ramic of terrorism-related offenses, (see R.262, Verdict Forms at Page ID#

4055-4056), the District Court determined that the terrorism enhancement applied to

him because of his conduct toward “the government of Syria.” App. 39a. The Sixth

Circuit panel affirmed this ruling, stating that “the district court didn’t err by

concluding that [Mr.] Ramic’s conduct directed at the Assad regime justified

applying the terrorism enhancement.” App. 7a.

When finding that the Assad regime was a “government,” however, the

lower courts invaded the President’s absolute power to recognize a foreign

government.

“The power ‘to control recognition determinations’ of foreign

countries is… an ‘exclusive power of the President[,]’” Trump v. United States, 603

U.S. 593, 609 (2024) (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 32

(2015)), that is sourced in the President’s Article II powers. See Zivotofsky, 576 U.S.

at 11-14 (citations omitted). This “exclusive power extends no further than [the

President’s] formal recognition determination.

But as to that determination,

Congress may not enact a law that directly contradicts it.” Id. at 30. The lower

courts in this case interpreted § 2332b(g)(5)(A) in a way that directly contradicts the

President’s recognition power.

On December 11, 2012, President Obama derecognized the Assad regime and

recognized the Syrian National Opposition Coalition as the legitimate government

of Syria. (See Mr. Ramic’s Court of Appeals Brief at 31-32) (citations omitted).

More than a year after that, in June 2014, Mr. Ramic left the United States and

arrived in Syria, where he joined ISIS. (See R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID#

5426-5428; R.317, TR Trial, Vol. 3B, at Page ID# 4888-4892). He fought for ISIS

in the Syrian civil war, (R.300, Defense Sentencing Memo at Page ID# 4585) (citing

PSR at ¶ 23, 39), and then traveled to Turkey in September 2015, (R.326, TR Trial,

Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5478), where he was arrested. App. 4a. So the lower courts’

findings that the Assad regime was a “government” under the definition for a

“Federal crime of terrorism” contradicted the President’s earlier decision to

derecognize that regime as the government of Syria. This conflict warrants this

Court’s review.

When explaining why the ordinary meaning of “government” applied, the

Sixth Circuit panel noted that the President’s “‘exclusive power’” to recognize a

foreign government stops at “‘formal recognition[.]’” App. 7a (quoting Zivotofsky,

576 U.S. at 30). Consequently, the panel said, “Congress can still legislate pursuant

to its own powers, which include the power ‘[t]o define and punish … Offences

against the Law of Nations.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 and citing

Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 16). According to the panel, Congress did that “when it

defined a federal crime of terrorism as conduct directed at a government, regardless

of whether the United States has recognized that government.”

Id. (citing

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301,

110 Stat. 1214, 1217).

But Congress did not say “regardless of” recognition, Id., when it defined a

“Federal crime of terrorism[.]” And Congress knows how to do just that.

In his dissent in Zivotofsky, supra, that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito

joined, Justice Scalia explained that “Congress has legislated without regard to

recognition for a long time and in a range of settings.” Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 78

(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited statutes that “prohibit[] murdering a

foreign government’s officials, 18 U.S.C. § 1116, counterfeiting a foreign

government’s bonds, § 478, and using American vessels to smuggle goods in

violation of a foreign government’s laws, § 546—all ‘irrespective of recognition by

the United States,’ §§ 11, 1116.” Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 78 (Scalia, J., dissenting)

(italics added here).

Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 11 and 1116 are explicit on this point. Section 11 says that

“[t]he term ‘foreign government,’ as used in” Title 18, except for some specific,

listed statutes, “includes any government, faction, or body of insurgents within a

country with which the United States is at peace, irrespective of recognition by the

United States.”

§ 11.

Likewise, § 1116, the statute addressing “Murder or

manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected

persons[,]” defines “‘Foreign government’” to mean “the government of a foreign

country, irrespective of recognition by the United States.” § 1116(b)(2). By stating

that recognition does not matter, these statutes respect the President’s power in that

area. Moreover, they show that Congress can make plain when it is prohibiting

conduct against a regime regardless of whether that regime is recognized as a

government by the United States. The definition of a “Federal crime of terrorism[,]”

however, lacks any language indicating that Congress meant to do that with

“government” here.

The Sixth Circuit panel saw the lack of modification to “government” in §

2332b(g)(5)(A) differently. As support that the ordinary definition of that word

applied, it pointed out that “Congress has used specialized definitions for other terms

in the terrorism statutes.” App. 6a (italics in original, citation omitted). As an

example, the panel cited 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(e)(12) and described it as “defining

‘state’ as having ‘the same meaning as that term under international law’[.]” Id.

(quoting § 2332f(e)(12)). Like statutes that announce that recognition does not

matter, however, a statute that outsources the definition of “state” to “international

law” does not invade the President’s recognition power. It does not require a court

to decide whether, in the United States’s view, a foreign regime is a “government.”

Unless Congress says that recognition does not matter or demonstrates that it does

not matter by specifying a definition to apply, a court must look to what the President

has said because only the President may formally recognize a regime as a

“government.”

The Sixth Circuit panel further stated that a court applying the terrorism

enhancement to a foreign regime does not implicitly recognize that entity as a

“government[.]” See App. 7a. This is so, the panel said, because it is not the type

of conduct that “generally” demonstrates recognition, see Id. (citations omitted), and

it does not “compel the Executive Branch to take any diplomatic action.” Id.

But courts have no role in determining recognition at all. “[W]ho is the

sovereign of a territory is not a judicial question, but one the determination of which

by the political departments conclusively binds the courts[.]” United States v.

Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937) (President recognized Soviet government and

compact between those governments where Soviet government assigned to United

States government Russian corporation’s deposits in American bank was valid)

(discussing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)); see also Zivotofsky,

576 U.S. at 18-19 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304

U.S. 126, 137-138 (1938)) (the “‘political department[’s] … action in recognizing a

foreign government and in receiving its diplomatic representatives is conclusive on

all domestic courts’”) (italics and brackets in Zivotofsky). Simply put, “[r]ecognition

is a topic on which the Nation must ‘speak … with one voice[,]’” Zivotofsky, 576

U.S. at 14 (quoting American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003))

(quotation marks and additional citation omitted, ellipsis in Zivotofsky), and “[t]hat

voice must be the President’s.” Id. Just as “Congress may not enact a law that

directly contradicts” the President’s “formal recognition determination[,]” Id. at 30,

a court may not make a judicial finding that does so either.

Though the Sixth Circuit is the first Court of Appeals to decide that the § 3A1.4

terrorism sentencing enhancement applied because a foreign regime that the

President does not recognize is nonetheless a “government” under § 2332b(g)(5)(A),

it is not the only one to have touched upon the subject. This Court should grant

review to provide instruction on this matter to courts in all circuits.

The Ninth Circuit has issued an unpublished memorandum opinion concluding

that the Assad regime is a “government” under the “Federal crime of terrorism”

statute because it meets the “ordinary meaning” of that term. United States v

Kurashev, 2026 WL 1746968 at *2 (9th Cir. June 17, 2026) (unpublished). But the

Court left some room to later decide this differently. It remarked that Mr. Kusharev

sought plain error review, Id., and that “[a]t a minimum, he cannot show that the

district court’s application of ordinary meaning was a clear or obvious error.” Id.

(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).

The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, has at least implied that some

recognition may be required for the terrorism enhancement to apply. When finding

that it applied to Ms. Ali and Ms. Hassan, the Court noted that, “[r]elying upon expert

testimony from trial, the district court found that the [Transitional Federal

Government] was the recognized government of Somalia at all relevant times” and

the defendants do not “meaningfully challenge this finding on appeal.” United

States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1032, n.4 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). As support,

the Eighth Circuit cited United States v. Mohamed, 757 F.3d 757, 760 (8th Cir.

2014), and summarized that case as “affirming application of the § 3A1.4

enhancement where plea agreement stated that defendant ‘assisted men with

travelling to Somalia, so that the men could fight against Ethiopian troops who were

Somalia

assisting

the

internationally-recognized

Transitional

Federal

Government’.” Ali, 799 F.3d at 1032, n.4 (ellipsis omitted in Ali).

And in United States v. Kahn, 938 F.3d 713, 719 (5th Cir. 2019), the Fifth

Circuit vacated Mr. Kahn’s sentence and remanded the case because the district

court had erred when finding, “as a matter of law, that the terrorism enhancement

does not apply and therefore failing to determine whether, as a factual matter, the

enhancement applies.”

As for whether the facts supported applying the

enhancement, Mr. Kahn argued “that he only intended to fight against the forces

supporting Assad and to influence the Assad regime.” Id. at 718. He “maintain[ed]

that the United States had ceased to recognize the legitimacy of the government led

by Assad as the Syrian government and had instead recognized the Syrian National

Opposition Coalition as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.” Id.

The Fifth Circuit decided that it “need not resolve this issue” because Mr. Kahn

“had intended to enter Iraq… to join ISIS[,]” had “encouraged” and assisted another

to join ISIS, “ISIS is an enemy of the United States[,]” and that “[s]upporting ISIS”

provided some proof that his “conduct was calculated to influence or affect the

conduct of the United States because ISIS’s terrorist acts are intended to intimidate

or coerce” it. Id. at 718-719. Therefore, while it is up to the district court to decide

first whether the facts support the enhancement, its procedural error in failing to

apply the enhancement was not moot “because there is evidence that would support

a finding that [Mr.] Kahn’s conduct was calculated to influence or affect the conduct

of the government of Iraq, the United States, or both[.]” Id. at 719.

The Tenth Circuit, meanwhile, has stated that “‘government,’ as used in [§

2332b(g)(5)(A)], refers to an objectively recognizable entity.” United States v.

Ansberry, 976 F.3d 1108, 1128, n. 11 (10th Cir. 2020) (dictionary citation omitted).

The Sixth Circuit panel cited Ansberry as an authority for using the “ordinary

meaning” of “government.” See App. 6a. But Ansberry was talking about what, not

who, is government.

Mr. Ansberry had tried to detonate a homemade bomb outside the Nederland,

Colorado police station. Ansberry, 976 F.3d at 1111. The district court applied the

terrorism enhancement at sentencing because this “offense was in retaliation for his

friend’s killing by the town’s marshal.” Id. at 1115. The Tenth Circuit, however,

“h[e]ld that… if a sentencing court applies a § 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement on the

ground that the defendant’s offense was calculated to retaliate against government

conduct, the conduct that the defendant retaliates against must objectively be

government conduct.” Id. at 1129. The Court remanded Mr. Ansberry’s case for

resentencing, in part, because the district court had applied the enhancement without

making that finding. Id. at 1130 (footnote omitted). So the Tenth Circuit was

addressing whether law enforcement killing someone qualified as government

conduct, not whether Nederland, Colorado, law enforcement was “government.”

Ultimately, and regardless of what various Courts of Appeals have said or not

said, the Sixth Circuit panel’s opinion “has decided an important question of federal

law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court[.]” Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). Mr.

Ramic respectfully requests that this Court grant this petition.

II.

Mirsad Ramic left the United States, joined ISIS, and fought in the Syrian

civil war. The Sixth Circuit panel’s finding that he “calculated” his

conduct to affect or influence the United States warrants review.

This Court should grant review to address what “calculated” means in §

2332b(g)(5)(A)’s definition for a “Federal crime of terrorism[.]” This question also

involves statutory construction and foreign policy.

Section 2332b(g)(5)(A) does not define “calculated[.]” Unlike the word

“government[,]” however, it does not implicate the President’s constitutional

powers.

So the “‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that, ‘unless

otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary,

common meaning[,]’” Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2014)

(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)), should apply.

In this case, Mirsad Ramic left the United States and traveled to Syria, where

he and two associates joined ISIS as fighters. (R.323, TR Trial, Vol. 2, at Page ID#

5189-5190; R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5428-5429; R.317, TR Trial, Vol.

3B, at Page ID# 4888-4899). A federal jury convicted him of providing material

support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization; conspiring to do

so; and receiving military-style training from a foreign terrorist organization.

(R.262, Verdict Forms at Page ID# 4055-4056).

These crimes fall under §

2332b(g)(5)(B)(i). Thus, he committed “Federal crime[s] of terrorism” if these

offenses were “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by

intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct[.]” See §

2332b(g)(5)(A). The Sixth Circuit panel found that, along with the Assad regime,

Mr. Ramic had “also calculated” his conduct “to influence or affect the United

States.” App. 8a (footnote omitted).

Recently, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[t]he calculation

requirement is akin to an intent requirement.” United States v. All PetroleumProduct Cargo Onboard M/T Arina with Int’l Mar. Org. No. 9189952, 173 F.4th

342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (citations omitted) (petition for certiorari on other grounds

pending, see All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard M/T Arina with Int’l Mar. Org.

No. 9189952, et al., v. United States, Case 26-103 (filed July 17, 2026)). Citing

decisions from the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh

Circuits, the D.C. Circuit said that this “is the consensus view among other courts of

appeals that have addressed the question in more depth.” All Petroleum-Product

Cargo, 173 F.4th at 348 (citations omitted). The cases that the D.C. Circuit cited,

see Id., have described this as a “specific intent” requirement. See United States v.

Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 317 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 148

(4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2014); United

States v. Mohamed, 757 F.3d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Alhaggagi,

978 F.3d 693, 701 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ansberry, 976 F.3d 1108, 1128

(10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Arcila Ramirez, 16 F.4th 844, 855 (11th Cir. 2021).

The Third Circuit has acknowledged that its “sister circuits” understand

“‘calculated’” to have a specific intent requirement, United States v. Alowemer, 96

F.4th 386, 389 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation omitted), and applied it where “[t]he parties

agree[d].” Id. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that “many… sister

circuits” interpret the statute to have “a specific intent requirement[,]” United States

v. Rahim, 860 Fed. Appx. 47, 57, n.4 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted), and assumed

that is correct. Id. at 57.

In the Seventh Circuit, meanwhile, “a court is to consider the defendant’s

‘purpose’ or ‘motive’ in committing the offense[.]” Wright, supra, 747 F.3d at 408

(6th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Christianson, 586 F.3d 532, 539-540 (7th

Cir. 2009)). The D.C. Circuit noted in All Petroleum-Product Cargo, 173 F.4th at

349, however, that courts of appeals have not understood “calculation” to be “the

same as ‘motive.’” Rather, the offense must be “calculated to affect government

conduct, even if that effect ‘is not his personal motivation.’” Id. (quoting Awan, 607

F.3d at 317, and citing Wright, 747 F.3d at 408) (parenthetical quotation from Wright

omitted).

Mr. Ramic’s motive for leaving the United States and fighting with ISIS in the

Syrian civil war was not to influence or affect the United States. Nor were the federal

offenses that he committed, regardless of his ultimate goal, calculated to do so.

“‘Motive’ is concerned with the rationale for an actor’s particular conduct.”

Awan, 607 F.3d at 317 (citations omitted). Mr. Ramic said that he went to Syria to

rescue people he felt a kinship toward, (R.291-1, Interview and Evaluation at Page

ID# 4419), and he had expected to find a pure, slower-paced, Muslim culture. (Id.

at 4421). These reasons for fighting in the Syrian civil war were not to influence or

affect the United States. And his rationale for later leaving ISIS underscores this.

He saw corruption and hypocrisy, and that it did not adhere to Islamic principles.

(See Id.). After discovering the truth about ISIS, he went to Turkey, (Id.), where

authorities arrested and imprisoned him. App. 4a.

Aside from motive, Mr. Ramic’s offenses were not otherwise calculated to

influence or affect the United States either. “‘Calculation’ is concerned with the

object that the actor seeks to achieve through planning or contrivance.” Awan, 607

F.3d at 317 (citation omitted). Mr. Ramic fought in the Syrian civil war with ISIS

to establish a caliphate, not to influence or affect the United States.

The District Court that presided over his case – including his trial – concluded

that Mr. Ramic “went to join an army, and that’s what he did.” App. 80a. His ISIS

border intake form confirms this. It lists “Fighter” where it asks “Fighter, or martyr,

or embedded?” (Trial Ex. 10A; R.317, TR Trial, Vol. 3-B, at Page ID# 4892). The

District Court described this document as “probably the most significant piece of

evidence in terms of what Mr. Ramic actually did[,]” and stated that “he wanted to

be fighter. He wanted to fight a war. I think the evidence was clear that he wanted

to fight for a caliphate where the Sunni Muslims would require strict adherence to

sharia law.” App. 80a. The Sixth Circuit panel noted that he later said “that he

wanted to become a martyr for ISIS[,]” but did not follow through because of how

long he had to wait. App. 4a. This comes from three Twitter messages that he sent

over three days to one of his associates. (See R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID#

5457-5458). Even if true, these messages do not show an intent to influence or affect

the United States.

Moreover, the United States was not participating in the Syrian civil war when

he arrived. ISIS was fighting the Assad regime and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,

or PKK in a civil war at the time. (R.300, Defense Sentencing Memo at Page ID#

4591) (citing PSR at ¶ 23). As the District Court stated, “these ISIS terrorists -- it’s

a foreign terrorist organization, so they were terrorists by definition. But they

weren’t fighting the United States. They were fighting for their own caliphate. They

were fighting the Kurds, the PKK, and the Syrian government.” App. 38a.

Despite all this, the Sixth Circuit panel decided that Mr. Ramic had calculated

his conduct to influence or affect the United States. See App. 8a.

To start, according to the panel, he joined ISIS after “the group had declared

war on the United States and issued religious decrees encouraging its supporters to

attack American interests.” App. 8a. As support, the panel quoted United States v.

Khan, 938 F.3d 713, 719 (5th Cir. 2019), to say that “‘ISIS’s terrorist acts are

intended to intimidate or coerce the United States,’ so a defendant’s provision of

material support to ISIS is evidence that he sought to influence the United States.”

App. 8a.

But this reasoning conflicts with the “‘uniform and constant in the federal

judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an

individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes

mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.’” Concepcion

v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 492 (2022) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.

81, 113 (1996)). Mr. Ramic joined ISIS to fight in the Syrian civil war. He would

not be sentenced as an individual if, no matter what he had personally calculated his

own actions to accomplish, his affiliation with a group was, in and of itself, proof

that he had the specific intent to influence or affect the United States.

Additionally, the panel referenced a social media post from Mr. Ramic that

expressed hope that ISIS would enslave President Obama’s daughters, and another

that discussed wanting more American service members to be killed, as proof that

he “openly embraced ISIS’s mission to target the United States.” App. 8a. To

support this, the panel cited, with a Cf signal, United States v. Van Haften, 881 F.3d

543, 544-545 (7th Cir. 2018), and noted that the terrorism enhancement applied in

that case “to an ISIS supporter who posted on social media that he wanted to see

President Bush’s and President Obama’s children and grandchildren ‘sold as slaves

at [ISIS] markets[.]’” App. 8a.

“Sometimes … the record will contain statements by the defendant expressing

an intent to influence, affect, or retaliate against government conduct.” Arcila

Ramirez, 16 F.4th at 854 (citing United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1115 (11th

Cir. 2011) and United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004)); see

also United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 709-710 (2d Cir. 2012) (anti-American

statements when in Afghanistan’s custody, and threats uttered “shortly after firing

on the American interview team,” were “as a whole, … a sufficient factual basis …

that [Ms.] Siddiqui’s offense was calculated to retaliate against the United States”);

United States v. Ullah, 173 F.4th 399, 437 (2nd Cir. 2026) (saying “that he was

motivated to commit his attack by American foreign policy in the Middle East,

us[ing] the phrase ‘So die in your rage, America’ multiple times, and post[ing] a

message on social media stating, ‘Oh, Trump, you failed to protect your nation.

Baqiya[,]’” supplied “substantial evidence that he intended to influence conduct of

government by intimidation or coercion”); United States v. Stein, 985 F.3d 1254,

1267 (10th Cir. 2021) (“[d]efendants’ manifesto… addressed to the U.S. government

and aimed to ‘wake up the American people’ to the ‘tyrannical government[,]’”

comments in manifesto, and defendants’ “numerous references” about immigration

policy “as a motivating factor for the attack” supported applying enhancement); Van

Haften, 881 F.3d at 544-545.

Social media posts, however, are speech, not conduct. Indeed, while the

District Court acknowledged that Mr. Ramic’s postings “were inflammatory” and

“certainly did give an insight into [his] mindset[,]” App. 58a, it had the impression

that few people had seen them, and it rejected the idea that he provided material

support to ISIS as a propagandist. See App. 54a-59a. In short, Mr. Ramic’s actions

– leaving the United States, going to Syria, joining ISIS, and fighting in the Syrian

civil war – speak louder than his social media posts as to what he had calculated his

conduct to accomplish.

Finally, the panel stated that he “knowingly battled American forces during the

siege of Kobane.” App. 9a. The panel referred to his social media post “that ‘planes

[were] circling and drones hovering[,]’” App. 8a (quoting R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5,

at Page ID# 5460); his post that American bombs and bombs from the Assad regime

leave different sized holes; and it noted expert testimony that the “United States

launched air strikes against ISIS forces at Kobane.” App. 8a-9a.

But Mr. Ramic was fighting in the Syrian civil war before the United States

entered the conflict at Kobane. He got to Syria with his associates in June 2014.

(R.326, TR Trial, Vol. 5, at Page ID# 5428-5429). On July 30, he sent a Twitter

message to one of his associates that translated to saying in part that he “‘shot

Dushka’” – an anti-aircraft weapon – “‘at planes[.]’” (Id. at 5439-5440). More than

a month after that, the battle of Kobane “start[ed] in middle September[.]” (Id. at

5388-5389). Then, beginning in “late September[,]” and for the first time, “the

coalition the [United States] led on the ISIS coalition start[ed] carrying out air strikes

in support of local forces.” (Id. at 5393).

The D.C. Circuit has remarked that “the calculation requirement can be met

through reasonable inferences based on objective ‘circumstantial evidence.’” All

Petroleum-Product Cargo, 173 F.4th at 349 (quoting Arcila Ramirez, 16 F.4th at

854). And in 2014, the United States “led an international effort to combat” ISIS as

the group gained territory in Iraq and Syria. App. 3a. But the Sixth Circuit panel

stated that “there’s no specific evidence about what [Mr.] Ramic did during the

siege” of Kobane. App. 11a. Nonetheless, it found that he “calculated” his conduct

to influence or affect the United States, in part, by participating in that battle. It

reached this conclusion without citing evidence that he had fired a shot at American

military.

In sum, Mr. Ramic did not need to leave the country if he had the specific intent

to influence or affect the United States. He respectfully requests that this Court grant

this petition to address a matter that is important to the administration of justice:

what “calculated” means in the statutory definition for a “Federal Crime of

terrorism[.]”

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

_________________________

Joshua Michael Reho

Counsel of Record

Scott T. Wendelsdorf

Office of the Federal Defender

200 Theatre Building

629 Fourth Avenue

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

(502) 584-0525

Josh_Reho@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.