Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Isaiah Neal, Petitioner v. Troy E. Meink, Secretary of the Air Force, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 23, 2026

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No. 25-3625

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ISAIAH S. NEAL,

Petitioner,

v.

TROY E. MEINK, Secretary of the Air Force, United States Department of the Air

Force, et al,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

APPENDIX TO THE

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ISAIAH S. NEAL

Petitioner, pro se

TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Order of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered on Feb. 23, 2026 ........... 3a

APPENDIX B: Order of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered on November 17, 2025 ... 4a

APPENDIX C: District Court Summary Judgment Order entered on January 30, 2024 ......... 7a

APPENDIX D: District Court Order Dismissing Race Discrimination and Hostile Work

Environment Claims (1-SER-37-44)

>.............................................................................. 29a

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Case: 24-2403, 02/23/2026, DktEntry: 47.1, Page 1 of 1

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FEB 23 2026

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Nos. 24-1286, 24-2403

ISAIAH NEAL,

D.C. No. 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK

Plaintiff - Appellant,

District of Nevada,

Las Vegas

v.

TROY E. MEINK, Secretary of the Air

Force; et al.,

ORDER

Defendants - Appellees.

Before:

SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing.

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no

judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. See Fed. R.

App. P. 40.

The petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc (Docket

Entry No. 52 in Appeal No. 24-1286; Docket Entry No. 46 in Appeal No. 24-2403)

are denied.

No further filings will be entertained in this closed case.

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Document 102

Filed 11/17/25

Page 1 of 3

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NOV 17 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Nos. 24-1286,24-2403

ISAIAH NEAL,

D.C. No. 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MEMORANDUM*

TROY E. MEINK, Secretary of the Air

Force; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF THE AIR FORCE; DAVID S.

CRUIKSHANK; DOUGLAS C.

FITZPATRICK; KYLE KOWALCHUK;

ELIZABETH ANNE MCDUFFIE;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 12, 2025**

Before:

SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Document 102

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Isaiah Neal appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment and

dismissal order in his action alleging Title VII violations arising from his

employment with the Air Force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo. Csutoras v. Paradise High Sch., 12 F.4th 960, 965 (9th Cir.

2021) (decision on cross-motions for summary judgment); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Neal’s retaliation

claim because Neal failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

defendants’ legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating his employment were

pretextual. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.

2005) (explaining that when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to show

pretext, the evidence must be “specific and substantial to defeat the employer’s

motion for summary judgment” (citation omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Neal’s discrimination and hostile work

environment claims because Neal failed to allege facts sufficient to state the

requirements of either claim. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,

640-42 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of discrimination and hostile work

environment claims under Title VII).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Neal’s motions to

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Document 102

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Page 3 of-3

l

compel discovery because Neal did not demonstrate actual and substantial

prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth

standard of,review and explaining that a district court’s decision to deny discovery

will not be disturbed except upon a clear showing that denial of discovery results

in actual and substantial prejudice).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing costs against Neal

because Neal did not establish a reason to deny costs. See Dawson v. City of

Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of review and

explaining that “(u]nder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), there is a

presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded its taxable costs” and “(t]o

overcome this presumption, a losing party must establish a reason to deny costs”).

Neal’s motion (Docket Entry No. 47 in Appeal No. 24-1286; Docket Entry

No. 41 in Appeal No. 24-2403) to expedite is denied.

AFFIRMED.

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3

Case No.: 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK

Isaiah Neal,

Plaintiff

4

v.

5

Frank Kendall, et al.,

6

Order Granting Summary Judgment in

Favor of the Defendants and Closing this

Case

Defendants

[ECF Nos. 70, 72]

7

8

9

Pro se plaintiff Isaiah Neal sues the United States, the U.S. Department of the Air Force,

10 and U.S. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall (collectively, the Air Force) for retaliation under

11 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Neal and the Air Force crossmove for summary judgment.

12 The Air Force contends that Neal hasn’t established a causal link between his protected activity

13 and his termination and that, even if he has, he cannot prove that the legitimate,

14 nondiscriminatory reasons it proffered for terminating him are pretextual. Neal argues that he

15 has made out his prima facie retaliation case and that the Air Force’s stated reasons for

16 terminating him are mere pretext. Because Neal hasn’t shown that there is a triable issue of fact

17 as to whether the Air Force’s legitimate reasons for firing him are pretextual, 1 deny Neal’s

18 motion, grant summary judgment for the Air Force, and close this case.

19

Background

20

The Air Force hired Neal as a realty specialist in July 2016.1 The position had a

21 maximum two-year probationary period and could be “noncompetitively converted to a

22

23

1 ECF No. 71-1 at 2.

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1 permanent appointment” if he completed his program satisfactorily." The Air Foice describes

2 this as a “formal Air Force intern positionf] established under the PALACE ACQUIRE (PAQ)

3 program,” and the “purpose of this position [was] to serve as an advanced trainee in the Realty

4 discipline.”3 As part of this program, Neal’s first-level supervisor David Cruikshank completed

5 regular PAQ evaluations of Neal’s job performance.4 The evaluation reports list four possible,

6 ratings—exceeded requirements, met requirements, needs improvement, and unsatisfactory

7 across ten different job-related “elements,” such as work effort, problem solving, working

8 relationships, and communications.5

In. his first, informal evaluation report, Neal received “needs improvement” ratings for six

9

10 elements, though this was “an initial and informal” evaluation intended to “help focus current

11 progress.”6 In October 2016, Cruikshank completed Neal’s first formal evaluation, which

12 covered his first three months with the Air Force.7 Neal received “needs improvement" ratings

13 in two categories but “met requirements” ratings in the other eight.8 Cruikshank observed that,

14 although Neal had made some improvements, he needed to extend “more effort ... to foster

15 team and interpersonal/professional relations with coworkers” and that he could do more to

16

17

18

19

2 Id.

20 3 Id.

21 4 Id. at 45-51.

22

5 Id. at 46.

6 Id. Neal didn’t receive ratings for the other four elements. Id.

23 1 Id. at 41-4%.

8 Id.

2

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1 “enhance personal productivity.”9 For his overall recommendation for Neal, however,

2 Cruikshank checked off “Satisfactory or Above, Continue in Program.”10

But Cruikshank’s next PAQ evaluation report was far more critical of Neal’s

3

4 performance.11 In that January 2017 report, which covered the preceding three months,

5 Cruikshank gave Neal “unsatisfactory” ratings for four elements and “needs improvement”

6 ratings for three.12 Cruikshank included a two-page written summary with this report that

7 touched on all of the rated elements, provided specific examples of problems with Neal’s

8 performance, and described how he needed to improve.13 Cruikshank marked Neal s overall

9 recommendation as “Marginal, Conditional Continuation,” and he was placed on a 60-day

10 probation.14

One month later, Neal submitted an informal discrimination complaint to the Air Force’s

11

12 Equal Employment Office (EEO), primarily alleging racial discrimination.15 Cruikshank learned

13 of this complaint at some point between February 21,2017, and March 8, 2017.16 On March 28,

14 2017—shortly after Neal’s 60-day probation concluded—Cruikshank gave Neal a “Termination

15 During Probation” memorandum, which stated that Neal was going to be fired for

16 “unprofessional conduct and unsatisfactory performance.”17 In the memo, Cruikshank noted

17

9 Id. at 48.

18

10 Id.

19 11 See ECF No. 70-2.

20

12 Id. at 2. Neal didn’t get ratings for the other three elements. Id.

13 Id. at 5-6.

21 14 Id. at 3, 6.

22 15 ECF No. 77-2 at 2-3, 4; see also ECF No. 70-3.

16 ECF No. 77-2 at 7, 18-19. Exactly when Cruikshank became aware of this complaint is

23 disputed. See id.

17 ECF No. 70-4 at 2.

3

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1 that, during Neal’s 60-day probational period, he had failed to improve on four of the seven

2 elements that he received low ratings on in his prior evaluation.18 Cruikshank also listed several

3 instances of unprofessional conduct that factored into the decision to fire Neal.19

The next day, Neal filed a formal discrimination complaint with the EEO, once again

4

5 contending that he was discriminated against based on race.20 He also requested that his second-

6 level supervisor Douglas Fitzpatrick review the termination decision.21 Fitzpatrick performed .

7 this review but ultimately agreed that Neal should be fired “for the reasons stated in . . . the

8 termination letter.”22 Fitzpatrick’s “Notice of Termination Review Decision’' memorandum,

9 dated March 31,2017, noted that Neal’s termination from federal service was effective

10 immediately as of that day.23

Discussion

11

The principal purpose of the summary-judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

12

13 factually unsupported claims or defenses.24 The moving party bears the initial responsibility of

14 presenting the basis for its motion and identifying the portions of the record or affidavits that

15 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.25 If the moving party satisfies its

16

17

18

19

18 Id.

19 Id. at 2-3.

20 20 ECFNo. 70-5.

21 21 ECFNo. 70-4 at 3.

22

22 ECF No. 77-2 at 14.

23 Id.

23 24 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

25 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323;' Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

4

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1 burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present

2 specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial.26

' Who bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in question is critical. When the party

3

4 moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial (typically the plaintiff), he

5 “must come forward with evidence [that] would entitle [him] to a directed verdict if the evidence

6 went uncontroverted at trial.”27 Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine

7 issue of fact on each issue material to its case, “the burden then moves to the opposing party,

8 who must present significant probative evidence tending to support its claim or defense.

9 When instead the opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial,

10 the moving party (typically the defendant) doesn’t have to produce evidence to negate the

1,1 opponent’s claim; it merely has to point out the evidence that shows an absence of a genuine

12 material factual issue.29 The movant need only defeat one element of the claim to garner

13 summary judgment on it because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of

14 the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”-’0 ’‘When

15 simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claim are before the court, the

16

17

18

26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Anvil v. CBS

19 60 Minutes, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995).

27 C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000)

20 (quoting Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and quotations

omitted)).

21

28 Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation

22 omitted).

29 See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,885 (1990); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323—

23 24.

-Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

5

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1 court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in support

2 of’—and against—“both motions before ruling on each of them.”31

3 I.

Neal’s March 29, 2017, EEO complaint doesn’t give rise to a retaliation claim.

4

Retaliation claims under Title VII require the plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) he engaged

5 in a protected activity and (2) his employer took an adverse-employment action against him

6 (3) because of that protected activity.32 The Ninth Circuit has “said that ‘[c]ausation sufficient to

7 establish the third element of the prima facie case may be inferred from . . . the proximity in time

8 between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.”’33 But a causal

9 link can’t be established without evidence that the adverse-employment-action decisionmaker

10 knew that the plaintiff engaged in the protected activity, regardless of any such closeness in

11 time.34

12

Neal argues that the formal EEO complaint he filed on March 29, 2017, constitutes

13 “protected activity”35 and that the March 31 memo that officially ended his position was an

14 adverse-employment action that followed this “protected conduct by two days,” thereby

15 establishing a causal connection between the two events.36 The Air Force highlights that Neal

16 filed this formal complaint the day after he received notice that he would be terminated via the

17

18 31 Tulalip Tribes of Washington v. Washington, 783 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Fair

19

Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001)).

32 Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1034—35 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Ray

v.

20 Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).

33 Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1035 (citing Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987)).

21

34 See id.', see also Douglas v. DeJoy, 848 F. App’x 245, 247 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cohen v.

Fred

Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982)) (noting that establishing a decisionmaker’s

22

knowledge of protected activity “is ‘essential’ to show causation”).

23 35 ECF No. 72 at 9.

-Id. at 14.

6

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1 March 28 memo.37 It argues that the adverse-employment action at issue—Neal’s termination—

2 was therefore not subsequent to the filing of this complaint.38

3

The only action that might qualify as an adverse-employment action that followed Neal’s

4 March 29, 2017, formal EEO complaint is the March 31 memo. And it appears that it did

5 officially terminate his position as of that date “for the reasons stated in” the March 28 memo

6 after Fitzpatrick had reviewed Neal’s written response/9 Though I question whether the

7 issuance of the March 31 memorandum is a discrete adverse-employment action rather than

8 merely the culmination of a single adverse-employment action (Neal’s termination) that began

9 on March 28, 2017, that distinction is ultimately irrelevant. Any temporal-proximity based

10 inference of a causal link between the formal complaint and the March 31 memo or Neal's

11 termination is largely if not entirely undermined by the fact that the decision to terminate him

12 was made several days earlier. And more critically, Neal hasn’t presented any evidence that

13 Fitzpatrick knew that Neal had filed the formal complaint when the March 31 memo went out to

14 Neal. On the contrary, Neal’s evidence indicates that his managers didn’t know that he had fled

15 a formal complaint until May 2017—long after the Air Force had terminated him.40 So Neal’s

16 retaliation theory based on the formal EEO complaint fails because he hasn’t established a causal

17 link between this protected activity and the March 31 memo or his termination.

18

19

20

21

37 See EOF No. 70-4.

22

38 EOF No. 76 at 11.

23 39 EOF No. 72-2 at 16.

40 Id at 10.

7

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1 II.

Neal’s objections to the Air Force’s so called “new defenses”

2

Neal objects to various portions of the Air Force’s summary-judgment briefing, asserting

3 that they contain new, unpled affirmative defenses.41 Neal contends that these defenses will

4 “severely” prejudice him because he was “ambushed” by and “had no time to prepare and

5 conduct further discovery” on them, and because they will give the Air Force “an unfair

6 advantage in this case.”42 The Air Force counters that Neal is really just objecting to aiguments

7 that it raises rather than actual affirmative defenses, nothing requires them to plead all potential

8 future arguments with specificity in an answer, and Neal had fair notice of all of the arguments it

9 raises in its summary-judgment briefing.43

10

“A defense [that] demonstrates that [a] plaintiff has not met [his] burden of proof is not

11 an affirmative defense.”44 “An affirmative defense is defined as a defendant’s assertion raising

12 new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs . . . claim, even if all allegations

13 in the complaint are true.”45 It therefore “absolves a defendant of liability ‘even whe[n] the

14

15

16'

17

18 41 See ECF No. 77 at 2-9; ECF No. 79 at 2-9.

42 See, e.g., ECF No. 77 at 2-9.

19

43 ECF No. 78 at 2-3.

20 44 Zivkovic v. 5. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Flav-O-Rich

v. Rawson Food Service, Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1988)).

21

45 Ahrnedv. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 2017 WL 5720548, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2017)

(quoting Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Barnes v. AT &

22

TPension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2010)

(quoting Roberge v. Hannah Marie Corp., 1997 WL 468330, at *3 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n

23

affirmative defense ... is a defense that does not negate the elements of the plaintiff s claim, but

instead precludes liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiffs claim are proven.”).

8

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1 plaintiff has stated a prima facie case for recovery.’”46 And the defendant has the burden of

2 proving an affirmative defense.47

3

Neal’s objections fall into two categories. Some are to the Air Force’s McDonnell

4 Douglas Corporation v. Green& burden-shifting arguments that it had a legitimate reason to

5 terminate him and that he has not established, and cannot establish, that reason is pretextual.

6 But the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas merely provides an analytical

7 framework used in Title VII cases.50 None of its various steps are affirmative defenses, as

8 evidenced by the fact that the burden of persuasion (unlike the burden of production) never shifts

9 to the defendant.51 And even if the Air Force’s argument that it had a legitimate, nonretaliatory

10 reason for terminating Neal were construed as an affirmative defense, the Air Force put Neal on

11 notice that it would be making such an argument in its answer, in which it asserts that it “did not

12 retaliate against Plaintiff’; any action it took “with respect to [Neal’s] employment was taken for

13 legal, valid[,] and proper reasons”; and it “had legitimate reasons for its actions.”52

14

Neal also objects to various statements of fact that the Air Force makes and its

15 descriptions or characterizations of various pieces of evidence.53 But these too aren’t unpled

16

46 Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Delaware Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 442 (C.D. Cal. 2013)

17 (quoting Quintana v. Baca, 233 F.R.D. 562, 564 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).

18 47 Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P 'ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Tovar v. U.S.P.S., 3 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993)) (“In every civil case, the defendant bears

19 the burden of proof as to each element of an affirmative defense.”).

20

48 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

49 See, e.g., ECF No. 77 at 5-7; ECF No. 79 at 5-7.

21 50 Neal acknowledges that McDonnell Douglas is “precedent” and mandates performing a

“Burden Shift analysis.” ECF No. 79 at 16.

22

51 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).

23 52 ECF No. 47 at 11.

53 See ECF No. 77 at 2-9; EOF No. 79 at 2-9.

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1 affirmative defenses. They are just facts and evidence that the Air Force cites in support of the

2 arguments it is making within the McDonnell Douglas framework.54 My decision here is based

3 on the facts themselves, not attorney argument, so Neal isn’t prejudiced by the way the Air Force

4 portrays certain facts or documents. And Neal participated in discovery, so he cannot now claim

5 to be “ambushed” by the Air Force’s reliance on particular documents that he too had access to

6 and, in many instances, submitted in support of his own summary-judgment briefing.55 So

7 Neal’s objections to various arguments, facts, and exhibits that the Air Force presents within the

8 confines of the McDonnell Douglas framework are without merit.

9

10

The Air Force proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Neal’s

termination.

11

Motions for summary judgment in the employment-discrimination context are subject to

III.

12 the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.56 “Although intermediate evidentiary

13 burdens shift back and forth under this framework, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of

14 fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with

15 the plaintiff.”57

16

17

54 Neal also objects to several facts on the grounds that they are not facts, but rather evidence, or

18 that they are “background information” and thus not material. See ECF No. 77 at 9. But facts

are based in evidence, and a fact doesn’t have to be material to be mentioned in summary­

19 judgment briefing. Neal also raises a number of merits-based disputes about the validity of what

certain documents say and the bases, for decisions that the Air Force made. See id. at 9—15. To

20 the extent these “disputes” are relevant to the decision here, they are addressed infra.

21 55 Compare, e.g., ECF No. 77 at 4 (Neal objecting to the Air Force’s discussion of his informal

EEO complaint and the March 28 memo) with ECF No. 72-2 at 5-7 (the informal EEO

22 complaint that Neal submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment) and id. at 14-15

(the March 28 memo that Neal submitted in support of his.motion for summary judgment).

23 56 See Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1375.

57 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted).

10

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1

The McDonnell Douglas analysis involves three steps, the first of which requires the

2 employee to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.58 “Establishment of a priina facie case in

3 effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully [retaliated] against the employee.”59

4 Once the prima facie case has been established, “[t]he burden of production, but not persuasion,

5 then shifts to the employer,”60 who then “must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for

6 the challenged action.”61 The plaintiff must then show that the basis was either a mere pretext

7 for engaging in the unlawful conduct or that the proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.62

8 He can meet this burden by presenting circumstantial evidence that is “specific and

9 substantial.”63

10

Assuming without deciding that Neal has established his prima facie case, the Air Force

11 has articulated legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating Neal: his poor quarterly

12 evaluation, the 60-day plan he was subsequently put on, and his failure to sufficiently improve

13 during that 60-day probationary period, as well as various instances of inappropriate workplace

14 conduct.64 It also has “producfed] sufficient evidence to support [this] non[retaliatory]

15

16 58 See id. at 802.

59 Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty.

17 Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).

18 60 Chuang v. Univ, of California Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1 1 15, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000);

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.

19 61 Emeldi v. Univ, of Oregon, 698 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Davis v. Team Elec. Co.,

520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008)) (applying Title VII retaliation framework to Title IX

20 retaliation case).

21 62 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740,

746 (9th Cir. 2003).

22 63 Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff may

also provide direct evidence of such pretext, Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221

23 (9th Cir. 1998), but there is no direct evidence in this case, so I need not consider this issue.

64 See ECF No. 70 at 7.

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1 explanation for its decision”65 in the form of the quarterly evaluation and the March 28 memo

2 which states that these are the reasons it was firing Neal.66 Neal does dispute the veracity and

3 persuasiveness of the reasons that the Air Force has proffered, but such arguments go to

4 causation and pretext.67 So the Air Force has put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

5 terminating Neal.

6

7

Neal fails to identify genuine material factual issues regarding whether the Air

Force’s reasons for terminating him are pretextual.

8

Once the defendant articulates a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason “to explain the

IV.

9 challenged action, the burden shifts back to [the plaintiff] to show that the defendant’s articulated

10 reasons are pretextual.”68 A plaintiff can prove pretext “by showing that the employer’s

11 proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of credence’ because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise

12 unbelievable, or... by showing that the unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the

13 employer.”69 And he can “meet the burden to show pretext using either direct or circumstantial

14 evidence.”70 “But when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, that evidence must be

15 ‘specific and substantial’ to defeat the employer’s motion for summary judgment.”71 Neal points

16 to several issues that he argues demonstrate pretext, but none of them—either individually or in

17

18

65 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.

19 66 See ECF No. 70-2; ECF No. 70-4.

20 67 See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).(A defendant need only produce

evidence that, if “taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory

21 reason for the adverse action.”).

68 See Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 726 (9th Cir. 2023).

22

69 Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127 (citing Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220-22).

23 70 Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1094-95 (citing Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220).

71 Id. at 1095 (quoting Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222).

12

18a

Case 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK Document 81 Filed 01/30/24 Page 13 of 22

1 the aggregate—are sufficient to meet the “specific and substantial” standard and create a genuine

2 dispute of material fact as to pretext.

Temporal proximity

3

A.

4

Neal repeatedly highlights the temporal proximity between his February 17, 2017,

5 informal EEO complaint7? and his firing a month and a half later and argues that this is indicative

6 of pretext.73 The Air Force counters that the significance of this closeness in time is undermined

7 by the context because it had already placed Neal in a 60-day probation period following a poor

8 quarterly evaluation, he failed to improve during that time, and he was terminated shortly after

9 the probation period had concluded.74 Temporal proximity is a relevant consideration when

10 assessing pretext.75 But courts tend to find that this alone—while potentially sufficient to satisfy

II the relatively low-threshold showing of causation for a prima facie retaliation claim—is not

12 enough to establish pretext, especially when the proffered reason for the termination undermines

13 the significance of the temporal proximity.76

14

Viewed in isolation, the span between Neal’s informal EEO complaint and his

15 termination a month and a half later is short enough that it could arguably meet his prima facie

16 causation burden at the summary-judgment stage.77 But evidence consistent with both the Air

17 Force’s proffered reason and the timing of its decision diminishes the significance of this

18 closeness in time. Cruikshank gave Neal a subpar evaluation, rating him as “unsatisfactory” or

19

20

72 ECF No. 72-2 at 5-7.

73 See, e.g., ECF No. 72 at 12; ECF No. 77 at 20.

21 74 See ECF No. 78 at 4-5.

22 75 See Curley v. City ofN. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2014); Brown v. City of

Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003).

23 76 Curley, 772 F.3d at 634; Brown, 336 F.3d at 1187-88.

77 See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001).

13

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1 “needs improvement” across all rated categories in January 2017,78 prior to Neal’s engagement,

2 in any protected activity. Cruikshank also recommended that Neal continue only on a

3 “conditional” basis, placed him on 60-day probation, and described a number of areas in which

4 he needed to improve over that period.79 And the termination memorandum reflects that Neal

5 was fired shortly after the expiration of his 60-day probation because he failed to sufficiently

6 improve during that period.80 In light of this record of poor performance predating Neal’s

7 protected activity, the timing of his termination falls far short of a specific and substantial

8 showing of pretext.

9

B.

10

Neal focuses much of his attention on the subpar-performance evaluation that ultimately

Basis of January 2017 performance evaluation

11 led to the Air Force placing him on a 60-day probation, which he characterizes as “unwarranted

12 and unjustified.”81 He argues that the Air Force’s “whole case relies heavily on [this] one

13 unsupported [performance [evaluation,” but there was “no basis in fact” for this

14 underwhelming assessment of his work performance, which, according to Neal, establishes

15 pretext.82 The Air Force responds that Neal is simply trying to rehash his dismissed

16 discrimination claim, and whether he should “have been given a poor quarterly evaluation or

17 placed on a 60-day probation in the first place” are issues that “are not before the Court.”83

18

19

78 ECF No. 70-2 at 2. Neal’s supervisors did not provide ratings for three of the ten listed

20 categories. Id.

21 79 Id. at 3-6.-

22

80 See EOF No. 70-4; ECF No. 72-2 at 16.

81 ECF No'. 79 at 15.

23 82 ECF No. 77 at 23; see also ECF No. 79 at 21.

83 ECF No. 76 at 13.

.

14

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1

The overarching problem with Neal’s argument is that the low ratings he received for this

2 evaluation couldn’t have been retaliatory' because they predate any protected activity. So even if

3 he could establish that they were “unwarranted and unjustified,” this would do little to support

4 the argument that Neal needs to be making here—that the Air Force’s stated reasons for firing

5 him (his poor performance and conduct) were mere pretext for retaliation because he filed an

6 EEO complaint. And even if I were to look past that fundamental hurdle, Neal hasn’t submitted

7 sufficient evidence that these poor ratings were uncalled for. He first highlights that two prior

8 evaluations were “satisfactory.”84 But his performance being satisfactory at some earlier time

9 doesn’t mean that it remained so.

10

Plus these two earlier evaluations aren’t quite as rosy as Neal portrays them. In his first

11 informal evaluation, he received “needs improvement” ratings in six out of ten categories and did

12 not receive ratings for the other four.85 In his second evaluation, he was still rated as “needs

13 improvement” in two categories, though he “met requirements” in the other eight.86 The

14 evaluation’s “Problem Areas” section notes that Neal had made “improvements” but still needed

15 to put more effort into a couple areas.87 In short, these prior evaluations are not so inconsistent

16 with his January 2017 evaluation that they support an inference that there was some other

17 nefarious purpose behind his January 2017 ratings.

18

19

20

21 84 ECF No. 79 at 21..

. ■. ;

22 85 ECF No. 77-2 at 46. The evaluation notes that ratings for the other four categories were

“pending.” Id.

23 86 Id. at 47.

87 Id. at 48.

15

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Neal also focuses on the absence of “evidence or any other documentation” that supports

1

2 the poor marks he received in the January 2017 evaluation.88 But at the summary-judgment

3 stage a plaintiff must submit evidence’ to raise a genuine dispute of material fact merely

4 highlighting the absence of certain types of documents, without more, is insufficient.89 If, for

5 example, Neal could point to evidence that pool performers within his group typically received

6 additional writeups or demerits in their employment files beyond the reoccurring quarterly

7 performance assessments, that inconsistency might give rise to an inference that some other

8 unarticulated reason factored into the poor ratings from January 2017. But Neal has offered no

9 such evidence. And while he claims that “(i]t is unknown where these low ratings came from

10 and why he received them,”90 the underlying reasoning for them (supported by a number of

11 specific examples) is detailed in the evaluation itself.91

12

C.

13

Relatedly, Neal takes issue with the reasons the Air Force provided for his termination.

Reasons for termination

14 He first argues that that the Air Force “failed to articulate [a] consistent reason for” his

15 termination.92 According to Neal, it provided multiple explanations for his termination that are

16 “inconsistent,” and this inconsistency is indicative of pretext.93 The Air Force does reference

17

18

19

20 88 ECF No! 77 at 23; ECF No. 79 at 21.

21 89 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

90 ECF No. 77 at 23.

22

91 ECF No. 77-2 at 50-51.

23 92 ECF No. 79 at 22.

93 Id.

16

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1 both his performance and unprofessional conduct in the termination memoranda.94 But Neal

2 doesn’t explain how these reasons are inconsistent with one another rather than just cumulative.95

3

Neal also contends that the reasons that the Air Force provided are unjustified and thus

4 unworthy of credence. As to the Air Force’s critiques of his performance, Neal notes that he

5 didn’t receive any “performance disciplinary notes” or have any “professional conduct problems

6 in his work file.”96 But these assertions ignore his January 2017 quarterly evaluation report,

7 which heavily critiqued Neal’s job performance across many areas and placed him on 60-day

8 probation.97 To the extent that Neal is contending that there are not more performance-related

9 writeups beyond his quarterly evaluation, this argument fails for the reasons discussed in the

10 preceding section. It is Neal’s burden to come forth with “specific and substantial” evidence of

11 pretext. Merely highlighting that the Air Force didn’t present more evidence to support its

12 reasons for terminating him beyond the poor evaluation, 60-day probation, and termination

13 memoranda documenting his failure to sufficiently improve isn’t enough to satisfy this standard

14 and create a genuine issue of fact as to pretext when there isn’t any evidence that this sequence

15 of events was atypical.

16

17

94 See ECF No. 77-2 at 12-14.

.

18

95 Neal cites Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424 (1st Cir. 2000), for the

19 proposition that an employer offering “inconsistent post-hoc explanations for its employment

decisions is probative of pretext.” ECF No. 79 at 22. But the Dominguez-Cruz court explained

that

“[a] company may have several legitimate reasons to dismiss an employee” and that it is

20

“when a company, at different times, gives different and arguably inconsistent explanations” that

21 “a jury may infer that the articulated reasons are pretextual.” 202 F.3d at 432. Here, however,

the Air Force referenced both his job performance and workplace conduct at the time of his

22 termination, and Neal doesn’t explain why these two intertwined issues are inconsistent with one

another. See ECF No. 77-2 at 12-13.

23 96 ECF No. 79 at 22.

X

97 ECF No. 77-2 at 49-51.

:

17

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Neal also attacks the Air Force’s contention that he failed to adequately improve during

2 his 60-day probation,98 highlighting a February 16, 2017, email that PAQ coordinator Kimberly

Davis sent to Cruikshank in which she noted that she was “glad to hear that Neal’s performance

4 [had] improved.”99 But the email doesn’t identify what specific areas Neal had improved in,

5 how he had improved, or how pronounced any such improvements were.100 And the prospect

6 that Neal may have improved in some areas isn’t inconsistent with the March 28 memo because

7 it specifically notes that Neal hadn’t improved’ in only four of the seven total problem

8 “elements”101 identified in the January 2017 evaluation.102 So this single, vague email from a

9 month and a half before Neal was fired, mentioning some unquantified improvement in Neal’s

10 job performance, is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to pretext.103

11

12

98 ECF No. 77 at 24: ECF No. 79 at 23.

99 ECF No. 77-2 at 69. Neal didn’t submit the email from Cruikshank that Davis was replying to

13 and in which Cruikshank purportedly said Neal had improved. Id.

100 Id.

14

101 7<7. at 12.

15 102 Id. at 49. The January 2017 evaluation rated Neal as either needing improvement or

unsatisfactory in work effort, adaptability to work, problem solving, working relationships,

16 communications, work productivity, and customer service. Id. But the March 28 memo, which

summarized the reasons for Neal’s termination, only notes that he “failed to improve ... on

17 elements of work effort, adaptability to work, working relationships, and communication,” id. at

12, thus implying that he did improve in problem solving, work productivity, and customer

18 service during his 60-day probation.

103 In his reply brief, Neal also mentions an incident in which, according to Neal, Cruikshank

yelled at him and told some of Neal’s coworkers that he wouldn’t make it in the program. ECF

No. 79 at 24. This purportedly occurred several days after Neal filed his informal EEO

20

complaint, though it is disputed whether Cruikshank even had knowledge of the complaint at this

time. See ECF No. 77-2 at 7, 18-19. But even drawing all reasonable inferences in Neal’s favor

21

this doesn’t amount to “substantial” evidence of pretext because it at most implies that this

incident was a reaction to Neal’s complaint (though Cruikshank’s reason for yelling and those

22

statements could just as easily have been Neal’s documented performance issues) yet Neal

wasn’t fired for more than a month after this incident allegedly occurred (and after his 60-day

23

probation concluded), he didn’t experience any adverse-employment actions in the interim, and

Fitzpatrick—who wasn’t mentioned in the complaint—ratified his termination.

19

Case 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK Document 81 Filed 01/30/24 Page 19 of 22

1

Regarding inappropriate workplace conduct, Neal notes that he didn’t receive any

2 “disciplinary notes” on “unsatisfactory professionalism” and “did not have any professional

3 conduct problems in his work file.”104 But the March 28 memo itself describes several instances

4 of inappropriate workplace conduct, at least one of which predated any of Neal’s protected

5 activity.105 Neal’s prior quarterly evaluations also indicate that Neal had a history of issues

6 surrounding his interactions with coworkers.106 His January 2017 evaluation, for example, rates

7 him as “unsatisfactory” in working relationships and communications,107 references specific

8 conflicts with a coworker, and notes that he generally “[a]void[ed] contact and communication

9 with coworkers.”108 An October 2016 evaluation report similarly notes under its “Problem

10 Areas” section that Neal needed to make “more effort... to foster team and

11 interpersonal/professional relations with coworkers.”109 Even the email that implies Neal’s job

12 performance had improved suggests that he also had issues with “interpersonal skills” and

13 describes ongoing “communication conflicts between Neal and certain co-workers.”110 The

14 January 2017 evaluation also notes that Neal’s coworkers perceived him as “reluctant to

15 contribute to work assignments which may be perceived as menial work,”111 which is consistent

. 16 with an incident described in the March 28 memo in which Neal purportedly refused to complete

17

18

19

104 ECF No. 79 at 22.

105 ECF No. 77-2 at 12.

20 106 Id. at 45-51.

21 107 Id. at 49-51.

22

108 Id. at 50.

109 Id. at 47.

23 110 Id. at 69.

111 Id. at 50.

19

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1 a task that involved placing printed photos into frames.112 In short, the examples of

2 unprofessional conduct described in the March 28 memo aren’t inconsistent with issues

3 documented prior to Neal’s engagement in protected activity, so this also doesn’t establish

4 “specific and substantial” evidence of pretext.

Guidelines used to assess performaince

5

D.

6

Neal argues that Cruikshank didn’t rate him “according to the AF Core Document”

7 despite being required to do so and instead used “his own subjective means for” Neal’s

8 evaluations.113 Neal adds that the Air Force’s “deviation from its own standard procedures” is

9 evidence of pretext.114 He submits a document titled “Air Force Core Personnel Document,”

10 which purports to contain a “statement of the major duties, knowledges, skills, and abilities,

11 responsibilities, physical and performance requirements of his position.115 The document lists'

12 the “critical” duties those holding this position must perform, as well as “standards” for

13 discharging those duties.116 It also contains information on how the position is classified and

14 graded.117

Despite Neal’s assertions, however, it is not at all clear that this document is supposed to

15

16 be used as a tool for regular employee-performance evaluations within Neal’s program. Unlike

17 the PAQ evaluation reports, there is no clear “rating” system, sections to summarize progress,

18 program-specific recommendation checklists, or boxes to identify “problem areas” in an

19

20 112 See id. at 13.

21 113ECFNo. 77 at 23-24.

114 Id.

22

115 ECF No. 77-2 at 70.

23 116 ZrZ at 71-72.

117 Id. at 73-74.

20

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1 employee’s performance.118 It reads more as a general job-description and classification

2 document than anything else.119 And while Neal has argued that the Air Force should have used

3 this document—rather than the PAQ evaluation reports—to perform regular employee

4 evaluations for participants in his program, he hasn’t presented any'actual evidence that directly

5 supports this proposition.120

But even if Neal is correct that this personnel document should have been used, the Air

6

7 Force’s potential deviation from its standard procedures is only relevant to the extent that it

8 implies the legitimate reason it proffered for terminating him is pretextual. And it doesn’t here

.9 because Neal’s supervisors were using the PAQ evaluation reports throughout his entire tenure

10 and thus before he first engaged in protected activity.121 There also isn’t evidence in the record

11 that the Air Force used the personnel document (or anything other than the PAQ evaluation

12 reports) for evaluating other realty specialists in Neal’s program. So even if the Air Force did

13 deviate from standard evaluation procedures, any inference of pretext that this discrepancy might

14 give rise to is undermined by uncontroverted evidence that the Air Force consistently used this

i

15 method of assessment throughout Neal’s tenure.

16

18

19

I

2°i 118 Compare id. at 46-51 (PAQ evaluation reports) with id. at 70-74 (Air Force core personnel

21

document).

119 Id. at 71,73-74.

22 120 Indeed, the Air Force contends that it “substantially followed” Air Force standards in

evaluating Neal’s job performance. See ECF No. 77-2 at 22. Neal’s reference to.this “core”

23 personnel document doesn’t suggest otherwise.

12( ECF No. 77-2 at 46-51.

21

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Conclusion

1

2

Because the Air Force has shown legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating Neal,

3 and he is unable to come forward with specific and substantial evidence that its reasons are mere

4 pretext, I grant summary judgment in favor of the Air Force on Neal’s remaining claim.

5

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Air Force’s motion for summary judgment

6 [ECF No. 70] is GRANTED.

7

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Neal’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 72] is

8 DENIED.

9

The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of the defendants

10 and CLOSE THIS CASE.

11

12

U.S. District radge Jennifer A. Dorsey

January 30, 2024

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

22

28 a

Case 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK

Document 45

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3

Case No.: 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK

Isaiah Neal,

4

Page 1 of 8

Plaintiff

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and

Denying Motion to Amend Complaint

.5

v.

6

Frank Kendall,1 et al.,

[ECFNos. 34, 38]

7

Defendants

8

Earlier this year, I granted pro se plaintiff Isaiah Neal leave to file an amended complaint

9 to address the deficiencies in his initial pleading. In that order, I identified the elements of

10 retaliation and racial discrimination that Neal must allege for his claims to survive the motion-to-

11 dismiss stage. I also gave him leave to add a hostile-work-environment claim if he could

12 sufficiently allege one. Neal timely filed a first-amended complaint, adding claims for breach of

13 contract, failure to train or supervise, and hostile work environment. The defendants move to

14 dismiss, arguing that Neal’s first-amended complaint “is replete with jurisdictional and pleading

15 problems.”2 Neal opposes dismissal and moves for leave to file a second-amended complaint.

16 The defendants contend that Neal should be denied leave because his motion doesn’t comply

17 with this district’s local rules and he “has already had the benefit of two motions to dismiss that

18 highlight specific issues with the pleading [along with] this [c]ourt’s instructions for amending.”3

19

20

21

1 Frank Kendall began his role as Secretary of the United States Air Force in July 2021 and is the

current

head of that agency. I direct the clerk of court to substitute Frank Kendall for Barbara

22

Barrett as a defendant in this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

23 2 ECF No. 34 at 1 (defendants’ motion to dismiss).

3 ECF No. 43 at 2 (defendants’ response to Neal’s motion for leave to amend).

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I find that Neal has sufficiently pled a claim for retaliation at this stage, so this claim may

1

2 proceed. But he hasn’t adequately alleged that he was discriminated against based on his race, so

3 I dismiss that claim. And although he had leave to add a hostile-work-environment claim,

4 because his allegations fall short of what’s required, I dismiss it, too. Neal didn t have the

5 court’s permission to add additional claims to his amended pleading, so I grant the defendants

6 motion to dismiss the two other claims that Neal added to his first-amended complaint. And

7 because amendment would be futile, 1 deny Neal’s motion seeking leave to file a second-

8 amended complaint. This case thus proceeds on Neal’s retaliation claim only.

Discussion

9

10 I.

Legal standard

11

District courts employ a two-step approach when evaluating a complaint’s sufficiency on

12 a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court must first accept as true

13 all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, recognizing that legal conclusions are not

14 entitled to the assumption of truth.4 Mere recitals of a claim’s elements, supported by only

15 conclusory statements, are insufficient.5 The court must then consider whether the well-pled

16 factual allegations state a plausible claim for relief.6 A claim is facially plausible when the

17 complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is

18 liable for the alleged misconduct.7 A complaint that does not permit the court to infer more than

19

20

21

4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678—79 (2009).

22

3 Id.

23 6 Id. at 679.

JId.

2

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1 the mere possibility of misconduct has ‘"alleged—but riot shown—that the pleader is entitled to

2 relief,” and it must be dismissed.8

3 IL

Defendants’motion to dismiss

4

A.

5

I gave Neal leave to amend his. retaliation claim if he could allege true facts to support the

Neal has sufficiently pled a retaliation claim at this stage.

6 required elements because it wasn’t clear that he couldn’t cure that claim’s deficiencies through

7 amendment.9 So he added allegations to his first-amended complaint, including that his

8 termination occurred after he engaged in protected activity—contacting an Equal Employment

9 Opportunity (EEO) counselor.*0 He indicates that he filed an informal EEO complaint on

10 February 17, 2017; management became aware of that complaint four days later; and Neal was

11 eventually terminated from his position on March 28, 2017.11 Neal alleges that he was

12 terminated because he contacted the EEO counselor and possibly because he ultimately filed a

13 formal EEO complaint, but it remains unclear whether he filed that complaint before or after he

14 was terminated, as he filed it on the day of the termination.

15

To state a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) that he “undertook a

16 protected activity tinder Title VII,” (2) defendants subjected him to adverse employment action,

17 and (3) that there exists “a causal link between the two.”12 As to the third element, the Supreme

18 Court has held that Title VII retaliation claims must meet a stricter standard of causation than

19

20

21 8 BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

9 ECF No. 32 at 6-7.

22

10ECFNo. 33 at 9, 11.

23 1,1 Id. at 9.

12 Vasquez v. Cty. ofLos Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, .646 (9th Cir. 2003).

3ia

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1 discrimination claims.13 Retaliation “must be proved according to traditional principles of but2 for causation,” which “requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the

3 absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”14 So because Neal has pled

4 facts showing that he was terminated after he engaged in protected conduct—contacting the EEO

5 counselor-—his claim survives dismissal.

6

B.

7

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or

Neal has not pled a proper racial-discrimination claim.

8 otherwise”15 and aims to “assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those

9 discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to

10 the disadvantage of minority citizens.”16 A plaintiff “must offer evidence that give[s] rise to an

11 inference of unlawful discrimination,” and “the amount, that must be produced in order to create

12 aprima facie case is very little.”17 To sufficiently plead a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show

13 that: (1) he is a member of a protected class (2) who was qualified for his position (3) but was

14 subject to an adverse employment action (4) for a discriminatory reason or to which similarly

15 situated individuals outside his protected class weren’t subjected.18

When 1 dismissed Neal’s original racial-discrimination claim, 1 did so because I

16

17 concluded that “Neal’s complaint does not allege a prima facie case of racial discrimination

18

19 13 Univ, of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).

20 "Id.

15 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).

21

16 Id. at 800 (citations omitted).

22 17 Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1110—11 (9th Cir. 1991)

(cleaned up).

23

18 Chuang v. Univ, of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802).

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1 because it lacks allegations showing that he was terminated because of his race and fails to

2 establish the second and fourth elements of a racial-discrimination claim. ’19 Despite the

3 opportunity to add allegations to his complaint to cure this'deficiency, Neal’s amended pleading

4 still fails to meet these elements. Because it appears that leave to amend would be futile, as Neal

5 had leave and was unable to establish the required elements, 1 grant the defendants’ motion to

6 dismiss the racial-discrimination claim without further leave to amend.

Nor does he state a claim for hostile work environment.

7

C.

8

Under Title VII, “[a] hostile work environment is one [in which] ‘the workplace is

9 permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. . . that is sufficiently severe or

10 pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

11 environment.’”20 The defendants argue that “it is unclear which facts [Neal] wishes to utilize to

12 support his claim” and that he doesn’t “attempt to show that an objectively offensive

13 environment existed.”21

14

In his first-amended complaint, Neal indicates that he “seeks to amend his [c]omplaint to

15 add claims. . . including hostile work environment.”22 He conclusorily states that the defendants

16 “intimidated” him and “created ... a hostile and oppressive work environment, causing him to

17 be humiliated, threatened, scrutinized, and ultimately terminated from his federal position.”23

18 But he provides no other factual allegations supporting this claim. He alleges some odd

19

20

,9ECFNo. 32 at 5-6.

21 20 Ware v. NBC Nev. Merchants, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1051 (D. Nev. 2016) (quoting

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).

22

21 ECFNo. 34 at 13.

23 22 ECF No. 33 at 2.

22 Id. at 15.

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*

1 instances of the defendants’ behavior, including that a white supervisor drew Neal on a white

2 chalkboard as a small stick-figure, inside a little box and told [Neal] this is you—a square in a

3 box.”24 But he doesn’t sufficiently allege facts to support the kind of “pervasive” conduct that

4 typically amounts to a hostile-work-environment claim. So because Neal hasn’t demonstrated

5 that he can meet the elements of this claim, 1 grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss it.

6

7

Neal didn’t have leave to add claims for breach of contract or failure to train

or supervise:

8

When I granted Neal leave to file an amended complaint, I specified that he could amend

D.

9 his racial-discrimination and retaliation claims and add a hostile-work-environment claim.25 But

10 I didn’t give him leave to add other claims. Despite that limitation, he added claims for breach

11 of contract and failure to train or supervise to his first-amended complaint.26 The defendants

12 argue that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over both claims.27 I need not address these

13 jurisdictional arguments because Neal didn’t have the court’s permission to insert these

14 additional claims. I thus grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss them because they were filed

15 without the court’s permission.

16 III.

Neal’s motion for leave to file a second-amended complaint is denied.

17

On the same day that Neal filed his opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, he

18 also filed a “consent motion for leave to file [a] second[-]amended complaint.”28 In it, he

19 explains that “[t]he only difference between” the first-amended complaint and the one he would

20

21 24 ECF No. 33 at 7.

25 ECF No. 32 at 8-9.

22

26 ECF No. 33 at 9-13, 17.

23 27 ECF No. 34 at 6-8.

28 ECF No. 38.

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1 like to bring is that defendant Barbara Barrett would be replaced by Frank Kendall.29 This is

2 presumably in response to the defendants’ argument that Neal “faiI[ed] to name a proper

3 defendant.”30 In this order, 1 am rectifying the naming issue through Federal Rule of Civil

4 Procedure (FRCP) 25(d), so that issue is moot.31 And Neal seemingly also seeks leave to amend

5 his complaint to include allegations about his “[exhaustion of [administrative [Remedies” that

6 he included in his initial complaint.32 In my earlier order granting the defendants’ motion to

7 dismiss, I was clear that an “amended complaint would entirely replace [Neal's] original

8 complaint”.and “[a]ny specifics that Neal wishes to refer to in his complaint must appear on the

9 face of the new complaint and cannot be included merely through exhibits.”-13

10

As the defendants point out, Neal’s motion for leave also doesn’t comply with this

11 district’s local rules.34 Under Local Rule 15-1(a), “[u]nless the court orders otherwise, the

12 moving party must attach the proposed amended pleading to a motion seeking leave of the court

13 to file an amended pleading,” emphasizing that “[t]he proposed amended pleading must be

14 complete in and of itself.”35 The failure to attach a proposed amended complaint is a sufficient

15 basis on which to deny Neal’s motion. But even if it weren’t procedurally deficient, amendment

16 for the purposes that Neal seeks would be futile. He seeks to have the name of the defendant

17

18

19

29 Id. at 1-2.

20 30 ECF No. 34 at 6.

21 31 Supra note 1.

32 ECF No. 38 at 2-4.

22

33 ECF No. 32 at 7-9.

23 34 ECF No. 43 (citing L.R. 15-1 (a)).

35L.R. 15-1(a).

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I agency head replaced, but I already addressed that in the beginning of this order. So I deny him

2 leave to file another amended complaint.

Conclusion

3

4

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 34] is

5 GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Neal’s claims for racial' discrimination, hostile work

6 environment, breach of contract, and failure to train or supervise are dismissed. This case

7 proceeds on Neal’s retaliation claim only.

8

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Neal’s motion seeking leave to file an amended

9 complaint [ECF No. 38] is DENIED.

10

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the clerk

11 of court is directed to substitute Frank Kendall for Barbara Barrett as a defendant in this case.

U.S. District Jud^^^mi^fo^^Dorsey

12

13

August 26, 2022

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

8

36a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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