Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Isaiah Neal, Petitioner v. Troy E. Meink, Secretary of the Air Force, et al.

Ng6-5364

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

filed

JUL 2 3 2026

SUPREEMEFCO^UR7;Lu;s^

ISAIAH NEAL,

Petitioner,

v.

TROY E. MEINK, Secretary of the Air Force, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ISAIAH NEAL

PO Box 30483

Las Vegas, NV 89173

Email: mrnealmail@gmail.com

Petitioner, pro se

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that Title VII plaintiffs make a “specific and

substantial” showing of pretext to survive summary judgment is in direct conflict with Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), and with the First, Fifth, Seventh,

and D.C. Circuits, which hold that no such pretext showing is required.

2. Whether, under Article III and the party-presentation principle recognized in United States v.

Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020), a federal court of appeals may affirm a dispositive

judgment on the basis that the district court raised sua sponte and that no party raised or had a

meaningful opportunity to contest.”

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner: ISAIAH S. NEAL

Respondents:

TROY E. MEFNK, Secretary of the Air Force; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE: DAVID S. CRUIKSHANK; DOUGLAS C.

FITZPATRICK; KYLE KOWALCHUK; ELIZABETH ANNE MCDUFFIE; UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA

RELATED CASES

1.

Nealv. Kendall et al., No. 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK, United States District Court

for the District of Nevada. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

and closed the case by Order entered on January 30, 2024 (Dkt. No. 81).

2.

Neal v. Troy E. Meink, et al., Nos. 24-1286 and 24-2403 (consolidated), United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s

judgment by unpublished Memorandum disposition entered on November 17, 2025.

3.

Neal v. Troy E. Meink, et al., Nos. 24-1286 and 24-2403, United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc by Order entered on February 23, 2026.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED............................................................................................... •>

LIST OF PARTIES...'.

;......................................

RELATED CASES

..........................................................

TABLE OF CONTENTS'

iii

.

'v

................................................. ;

TABLE OF APPENDICES

v

.............................................................. vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............................................................................................

OPINIONS BELOW ..

JURISDICTION

'................................................................ 9

........................................................................

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

9

:..............................................................9

.......................... 9

Factual Background

II. Procedural Background

............................................................. 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

9

3

The Ninth Circuit’s “Specific and Substantial” requirement creates a square

conflict with Reeves and this Court’s precedents

3

A.

The case is a Clean Vehicle

5

B.

The dispositive issue was squarely decided below

5

C.

Absence of factual disputes

6

D.

No jurisdictional or procedural obstacles

6

II. The Ninth Circuit’s rule deepens an entrenched circuit split

6

III. The question presented is of substantial national importance

8

A.

Federal agency defendant ensures nationwide impact

8

B.

National impact on civil rights enforcement.............. ■................ 9

IV. The District Court’s Sua Sponte Imposition of a Burdensome Pretext

Requirement Violates the Party-Presentation Principle...... ......................

9

A.

National Importance................................................................ 11

B.

Importance of Uniform Federal Standards................................. 12

C.

The Court Routinely Reverses Departures Without Full Merits

Briefing

D.

...................................

This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question

presented................................................................................... 12

E.

Both issues are cleanly presented and preserved........................ 13

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF.............. ............................................ 13

TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Order of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered on Feb. 23, 2026 ............ 3a

APPENDIX B: Order of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered on November 17, 2025 ... 4a

APPENDIX C: District Court Summary Judgment Order entered on January 30, 2024 .......... 7a

APPENDIX D: District Court Order Dismissing Race Discrimination and Hostile Work

Environment Claims (1-SER-37-44).......................................................................................

vii

29a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)..................... 7

Clark v. Sweeney, No. 25-52, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2025) (per curiam)............................ 11

Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005)................................. 6. 8

Desert Palace, Lnc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94, 98-99 (2003).................................................... 8, 12

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Lnc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998)................................... ■■........... 7

Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008).............................................................. 10

Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003)......................... ;............................................7

Ortizv. 'Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)

:.........................

7

Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54-56 (1st Cir. 2013).................................. 7

Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)................................................ 3

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371,377 (2020)........................................................... 10

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)..............................................................................................................................2

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)-(e).........

2

Rules

Supreme Court Rule 10(a)............................................................................................

7

Supreme Court Rule 10(c)................................................................................................................ 5

Supreme Court Rule 13.1.....................................................................................................................2

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const, art. HI................................................................................................................................. 2

viii

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is an unpublished

Memorandum disposition in Nos. 24-1286 and 24-2403, entered November 17, 2025, affirming

the district court. The order denying rehearing and rehearing en banc was entered February 23,

2026.

The opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada granting

summary judgment is reported at Diet. No. 81 (Jan. 30, 2024). The earlier order partially dismissing

claims appears at the relevant SER pages.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered judgment on November

17, 2025, and denied rehearing on February 23, 2026. This petition is timely under Supreme Court

Rule 13.1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const, art. Ill - Vesting of judicial power; limits on federal court jurisdiction. This

case arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as applied to federal employees, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)-(e). Title VII prohibits discrimination and retaliation in federal employment

on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The relevant statutory text is reproduced

in the Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Factual Background

Petitioner began working in July 2016 as a Realty Specialist in a Palace Acquire program.

The appointment was contingent on satisfactory performance and permitted noncompetitive

conversion to a permanent position upon successful completion. Petitioner’s supervisor conducted

periodic evaluations using a standardized form that rated performance from Exceeded

Requirements to Unsatisfactory, together with an overall continuation recommendation. In

October 2016, Petitioner received an overall rating of Satisfactory or Above, Continue in Program.

On January 15, 2017, a subsequent evaluation covering October 2016 through January 2017

identified four elements as needing improvement or unsatisfactory and placed Petitioner on a

60-day probationary action plan, with an overall assessment of Marginal, Conditional

Continuation. On February 17, 2017, Petitioner fried an informal Equal Employment Opportunity

complaint alleging race discrimination by his supervisor. On March 28, 2017, the supervisor issued

a memorandum titled Termination During Probation, citing performance and lack of improvement.

Petitioner filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity complaint on March 29, 2017. On March

31,2017, Petitioner’s second-line supervisor issued a termination memorandum ending his federal

employment.

II. Procedural Background

Petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada alleging

race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district

court dismissed the discrimination and hostile work environment claims at the pleading stage but

allowed the retaliation claim to proceed. Discovery closed, and both parties filed cross-motions

for summary judgment.

On January 30, 2024, the district court entered judgment for Respondents. The Court held

that Petitioner’s formal Equal Employment Opportunity complaint could not support retaliation

because it post-dated the initial termination decision. As to the informal complaint, the Court

concluded that Petitioner had not produced “specific and substantial” proof of pretext under the

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McDonnell Douglas framework. The district court applied this standard sua sponte. The

Ninth Circuit affirmed on specific and substantial requirement in a memorandum disposition on

November 17, 2025. Rehearing was denied on February 23, 2026. This petition follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Ninth Circuit’s “Specific and Substantial” requirement creates a square conflict

with Reeves and this Court’s precedents

The framework for evaluating discrimination and retaliation claims at summary judgment

has been settled by this Court for decades. Beginning with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973), and refined in Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248

(1981), the Court established a burden-shifting structure designed to ensure that plaintiffs could

prove discrimination through circumstantial evidence. Under that framework, once a plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case and the employer offers a nondiscriminatory explanation, the

plaintiff may survive summary judgment by producing evidence from which a factfinder could

disbelieve the employer’s stated reason.

This Court’s decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133

(2000), crystallized the rule. Reeves held that “a plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with

sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier

of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Id. at 148. The Court emphasized

three principles: (1) circumstantial evidence permitting disbelief of the employer’s explanation

may itself support a finding of discrimination; (2) courts may not weigh competing evidence or

resolve credibility disputes at summary judgment; and (3) courts may not demand additional “plus”

evidence beyond proof from which a jury could find the employer’s explanation false. Id. at 147—

51.

3

The Ninth Circuit’s “specific and substantial” requirement cannot be reconciled with these

holdings. Pet. App. 5a. By requiring plaintiffs to produce “specific and substantial” evidence of

pretext, the Ninth Circuit imposes a pretext requirement that this Court has expressly rejected. That

rule authorizes courts to evaluate the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, to discount inferences

that Reeves requires courts to credit, and to demand more than disbelief of the employer's

explanation. In effect, the Ninth Circuit has substituted Reeves's permissive standard with a

judicially created barrier.

The doctrinal break is stark. Reeves prohibits weighing circumstantial evidence; the Ninth

Circuit’s rule requires it. Reeves allows a case to reach a jury when the employer’s explanation

may be disbelieved; the Ninth Circuit demands a showing beyond that. This is not a minor variation

in phrasing. It is a direct contradiction of this Court’s precedents.

The consequences are outcome-controlling. In circuits that follow Reeves, plaintiffs may

reach a jury when they cast doubt on the employer’s explanation. In the Ninth Circuit, those same

plaintiffs are dismissed at summary judgment unless they meet this threshold. The rule was

dispositive of the judgment below, and it continues to bar claims across the largest circuit in the

country.

This doctrinal conflict is precisely the kind of issue that warrants review under Supreme

Court Rule 10(c). The Ninth Circuit’s rule is flatly inconsistent with Reeves, and its recurrence

undermines the uniform application of Title VII nationwide. Unless corrected, millions of

employees in the Ninth Circuit will face a materially higher burden than employees elsewhere, and

the enforcement of federal civil rights law will remain fractured.

4

A. The case is a Clean Vehicle

The district court raised the “specific and substantial” pretext standard sua sponte,

petitioner preserved its objection to the legal standard applied. In the opening brief, petitioner

invoked Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), and argued that

requiring'“specific and substantial” rule to raise a triable issue of pretext is incorrect standard,

contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent. See France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015)

(“a burden to raise a triable issue of pretext is hardly onerous”); Earl v. Nielsen Media Research,

Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). Opening Brief at 38- 39, Neal v. Kendall, No. 24-1286

(9th Cir.). Petitioner renewed this objection in the Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En

Banc at 4 of 7, Neal v. Meinke, No. 24-1286, 24-2403 (9th Cir.) “The court of appeals nevertheless

affirmed on the same ‘specific and substantial’ ground, citing Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC,

413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005).” Pet. App. 5a.

The judgment thus rests entirely on the wrong pretext standard, and the issue is fully

preserved. This case is therefore an ideal vehicle to resolve whether the Ninth Circuit permits a

“specific and substantial” requirement for pretext, or whether Reeves controls.

B. The dispositive issue was squarely decided below

The Ninth Circuit expressly applied its “specific and substantial” requirement to affirm

summary judgment. That rule was not incidental; it was dispositive of the judgment. Pet. App. 5a.

The conflict with Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), is therefore

squarely presented. The Ninth Circuit did not merely reference the rule in passing; it relied on it

as the governing standard. This ensures that the question is preserved, cleanly presented, and

directly controlled the outcome below.

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C. Absence of factual disputes

This case turns on a legal standard, not on contested facts. The evidentiary record is

undisputed; the only question is whether circumstantial evidence must meet a “specific and

substantial” threshold. That makes the case a clean vehicle: the Court can decide the legal issue

without wading into fact-bound disputes. Pet. App. 5a.

D. No jurisdictional or procedural obstacles

This case arises from a final judgment. There are no jurisdictional defects, mootness

concerns, or interlocutory complications. The question presented was preserved and passed upon

below. The Court can resolve the issue without entanglement in subsidiary factual disputes. The

record is straightforward, and the dispositive legal question is clear.

II. The Ninth Circuit’s rule deepens an entrenched circuit split

Uniformity in the application of federal law is a central reason for this Court’s review.

Supreme Court Rule 10(a) provides that certiorari is warranted when “a United States court of

appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of

appeals on the same important matter.” The Ninth Circuit’s “specific and substantial” requirement

for circumstantial proof of pretext stands alone among the circuits and directly conflicts with the

approach taken by its sister courts.

The First Circuit has expressly rejected this requirement, holding that circumstantial

evidence permitting disbelief of the employer’s explanation is sufficient to reach a jury.

Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54-56 (1st Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit

likewise applies Reeves directly, explaining that “a plaintiff may establish pretext by showing that

the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572,

578 (5th Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit follows the same rule, emphasizing that all evidence must

6

be considered together to determine whether discrimination occurred. See Ortiz v. Werner

Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). The D.C. Circuit has also adhered to Reeves,

holding that disbelief of the employer’s explanation permits a jury to infer discrimination. Aka v.

Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290—91 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

These circuits reflect a consistent national rule: circumstantial evidence that casts doubt on

the employer’s explanation is sufficient to reach a jury;

By contrast, the Ninth Circuit requires plaintiffs relying on circumstantial evidence to

produce “specific and substantial” proof of pretext. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d

1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998) (establishing the rule); Coghlan v. American Seafood Co., 413 F.3d

1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying the rule to affirm summary judgment, including in the

decision below). Pet. App. 5a. This rule demands more than disbelief of the employer’s

explanation; it requires courts to weigh the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and to discount

inferences that Reeves requires courts to credit. The Ninth Circuit’s approach is not merely a matter

of phrasing. It is a doctrinal departure that imposes a materially higher burden on plaintiffs than

the burden applied in other circuits.

The divergence is entrenched and outcome-determinative. Plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit

face dismissal at summary judgment in cases that would reach a jury in the First, Fifth, Seventh,

or D.C. Circuits. The rule was dispositive of the judgment below, and it continues to bar claims

across the largest circuit in the country. This entrenched split means that the enforcement of Title

VII depends on geography: employees in the Ninth Circuit must meet a higher threshold , while

employees elsewhere may proceed under Reeves.

The Ninth Circuit covers nearly one-fifth of the nation’s population, including major states

such as California, Arizona, and Washington. Its rule therefore affects millions of employees and

7

thousands of Title VII cases each year. Allowing the Ninth Circuit to impose a higher burden

inconsistent with Reeves undermines the uniform application of federal civil rights law nationwide.

This Court has long recognized that circuit splits on the interpretation of federal statutes warrant

review. See Desert Palace; Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (granting certiorari to resolve

circuit split over whether Title VII mixed-motive plaintiffs must present direct evidence of

discrimination): The Ninth. Circuit’s departure from Reeves is precisely the kind of entrenched,

outcome-controlling conflict that Supreme Court Rule 10(a) identifies as warranting certiorari.

III.

The question presented is of substantial national importance

Title VII was enacted to provide uniform protections against employment discrimination

nationwide. Its reach is sweeping: it governs millions of private employees and every federal

agency. The standard applied at summary judgment determines whether those employees may

obtain a trial when they present circumstantial evidence of pretext. A circuit-specific burden

therefore has consequences far beyond a single case.

A. Federal agency defendant ensures nationwide impact

The Respondent is a federal agency, the Court’s resolution will have immediate nationwide

effect. Federal employees across circuits should not face different burdens in proving

discrimination. This case therefore offers a uniquely strong vehicle for clarifying the governing

standard under Title VII. The presence of a government defendant magnifies the systemic

importance: the federal government must apply Title VII uniformly, and disparities in federal

employment law are especially intolerable.

This case arises in the context of federal employment. The federal government is the

Nation’s largest employer, and its compliance with Title VII must be consistent across

jurisdictions. Yet under the Ninth Circuit’s “specific and substantial” rule, federal employees in

8

that circuit face a materially higher burden than federal employees elsewhere. That disparity

undermines Congress’s intent that Title VII provide equal protections nationwide and creates

unequal treatment within the federal workforce itself.

B. National impact on civil rights enforcement

The Ninth Circuit encompasses a vast population and a significant share of federal

employment disputes. Its evidentiary rule therefore affects thousands of Title VII cases each yeai,

including claims brought by federal employees. Because circumstantial evidence is often the only

proof available in discrimination cases, the standard for evaluating such evidence at summary

judgment has broad consequences for civil rights enforcement. Allowing one circuit to impose a

“specific and substantial” requirement inconsistent with Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133.(2000), fractures Title VII’s application and weakens its remedial purpose.

IV.The District Court’s Sua Sponte Imposition of a Burdensome Pretext Requirement

Violates the Party-Presentation Principle.

This Court has long recognized that the federal judiciary functions within an adversarial

system. We rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of

neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371,377

(2020). The adversarial framework ensures fairness, predictability, and respect for party autonomy.

When courts invent dispositive issues on their own initiative, they undermine the integrity of

judicial decision-making and exceed the limits of Article III section.

The pretext requirement applied here was not raised or briefed by either party. The district

court introduced and applied the “specific and substantial” standard sua sponte, and the Ninth

Circuit affirmed on that same unpresented ground. Pet. App. 5a, 18a. Petitioner was denied notice,

9

briefing, and adversarial right of the rule that controlled the outcome. This departure is not a minor,

it is a structural violation of the constitutional frame.

This Court has made clear that appellate courts may not “alter a case by deciding issues

I

not raised.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237,243—44 (2008). In Sineneng-Smith, the Court

unanimously reversed when the Ninth Circuit decided a case on grounds not presented by the

parties, stressing that “our system is designed around the premise that parties represented by

competent counsel know what is best for them.” 590 U.S. at 377. And in a recent per curiam

decision, the Court emphasized the point with clarity: “To put it plainly, courts ‘call bails and

strikes’: they don’t get a turn at bat.” Clark v. Sweeney, No. 25-52, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Nov. 24,

2025) (per curiam). The error here is identical: the dispositive standard was created by the court,

not the parties. By affirming on that basis, the Ninth Circuit confirmed a practice this Court has

condemned.

The party-presentation principle is not a technicality. It safeguards fairness. When courts

decide cases on grounds not raised, they deprive litigants of notice and opportunity to be heard,

eliminate waiver and forfeiture, transform judges into advocates, and erode public confidence in

the judiciary. The adversarial system exists to prevent precisely this kind of judicial overreach.

The consequences are especially grave in Title VII litigation. Employment discrimination

cases often turn on specific standards. Plaintiffs must anticipate and respond to the rules that

govern their claims. If courts may impose requirements sua sponte, plaintiffs face insurmountable

hurdles without warning. Federal employees across the country are entitled to consistent and

predictable adjudication. The Ninth Circuit’s approach denies them that right, creating a system in

which litigants do not know the rules or law until after judgment has been entered.

10

This Court’s precedents reflect a consistent commitment to adversarial adjudication.

Greenlaw forbids appellate courts from raising issues sua sponte to alter outcomes.

Sineneng-Smith reversed the Ninth Circuit for deciding a case on grounds not presented by the

parties. These decisions collectively demonstrate that courts must respect the boundaries set by

litigants. The decision below flouts that principle; creating a direct conflict with controlling

precedent. If left uncorrected, it signals to lower courts that they may continue to disregard party

presentation, this court's precedent. Lastly, by imposing a dispositive rule sua sponte, the district

court deprived the petitioner of adversarial rights, and undermined fairness. Pet. App. 23a. The

Ninth Circuit’s affirmance compounds the error, signaling to district courts that they may continue

to decide dispositive issues without engaging in the party presentation precedent. The adversarial

system is not merely procedural; it is a constitutional requirement rooted in Article III.

A. National Importance

The national importance of this question cannot be overstated. Title VII governs federal

employment discrimination nationwide. If district courts may impose dispositive requirements sua

sponte, without notice or briefing, federal employees across the country face unpredictable and

unfair court actions. Uniformity in federal law is essential. The Ninth Circuit’s approach creates

uncertainty and undermines confidence in the judicial process. Federal employees must have

consistent standards in litigation. Allowing courts to invent dispositive rules sua sponte erodes

trust in the fairness of federal employment litigation and threatens the integrity of the adversarial

system itself. The problem is not confined to employment law; it extends to all areas of federal

litigation. Whenever courts decide cases on grounds not raised, they undermine the legitimacy of

judicial decision-making.

11

This Court’s intervention is necessary to restore uniformity and reaffirm the constitutional

limits of Article III. The Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of a dispositive judgment on a basis raised sua

sponte by the district court, and never presented by the parties, directly conflicts with this Court’s

precedents. It is a question presented as of exceptional national importance. Review is warranted.

B. Importance of Uniform Federal Standards

This Court has consistently recognized the need for uniform standards in cases involving

federal statutes and agencies. Clarifying the governing standard for pretext at summary judgment

is therefore a matter of substantial national importance under Rule 10(c). The question presented

implicates not only the rights of millions of private employees but also the integrity of federal

employment law and the government’s own compliance with civil rights statutes.

C. The Court Routinely Reverses Departures Without Full Merits Briefing

The Court’s enforcement of the party-presentation principle is longstanding and well

settled, hi Clark v. Sweeney, the Fourth Circuit affirmed on a theory the petitioner never asserted.

The Supreme Court summarily reversed, without merits briefing or oral argument, because the

court of appeals had departed from its role as a neutral arbiter and decided the case on a ground no

party raised.” party raised. The same structural error occurred here: the dispositive ground was

raised sua sponte by the district court and adopted by the court of appeals. This departure from the

adversarial framework is precisely the kind of structural error the Court has consistently

D. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented

This petition presents a clean and preserved legal question that warrants this Court’s

review. The Ninth Circuit’s rule was dispositive of the judgment, the party-presentation violation

was squarely decided, and no jurisdictional or procedural obstacles complicate review.

12

E. Both issues are cleanly presented and preserved

The petition presents two independent and cert-worthy questions: (1) whether the Ninth

Circuit’s “specific and substantial” requirement conflicts with Reeves and other circuits, and (2)

whether the district court’s sua sponte imposition of that requirement violates the

party-presentation principle. Both questions are purely legal, preserved, and outcome-controlling.

Each provides a separate ground for reversal, and together they make this case an ideal vehicle foi

resolving entrenched doctrinal conflicts and reaffirming structural principles of adjudication.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Ninth Circuit’s decision entrenches a evidentiary rule that cannot be reconciled with

this Court’s precedent in Reeves and fractures the uniform application of Title VII across the

Nation. By affirming a dispositive standard that neither party invoked, the court below

compounded that conflict with a structural error that strikes at the core of the adversarial system.

The Ninth Circuit’s affirmance repeats the same violation this Court unanimously condemned in

Sineneng-Smith, where the Court held that appellate courts may not decide cases on theories the

parties never presented. This Court has enforced that principle more recently, including in Clark

v. Sweeney, No. 25-52, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Nov. 24,2025) (per curiam), where it summarily reversed

the Fourth Circuit for affirming a theory the petitioner never raised.”

The resulting rule imposes a materially heavier burden on federal employees within the

Ninth Circuit than on their counterparts elsewhere, undermining Congress’s intent that Title VII

operate with equal force nationwide. This petition presents exactly the circumstances that Rule 10

identifies as warranting review: a direct conflict with controlling precedent (Reeves), an

entrenched circuit split with the First, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits, a structural error violating

the party-presentation principle (Greenlaw; Sineneng-Smith; Sweeney), and substantial national

13

importance magnified by a federal agency defendant. The case is also an exceptionally clean

vehicle, with preserved issues, final judgment, and no factual or procedural complications.

Taken together, these features make this case a textbook example of cert-worthiness. The

Court’s intervention is necessary to restore uniformity in Title VII enforcement, protect the

integrity of the adversarial process, and reaffirm the national importance of consistent civil rights

protections. '

For these reasons, the Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the

judgment below, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s precedents in

Reeves, Greenlaw, Sineneng-Smith, and Sweeney.

Dated: July 23, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

ISAIAH S.NEAL

Petitioner, pro se

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