Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mahmoud Khalil, Petitioner v. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 19, 2026
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No. 26In the
Supreme Court of the United States
MAHMOUD KHALIL,
Petitioner,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of A ppeals for the Third Circuit
APPENDIX — Volume II of II
(APPENDICES E-F)
Baher A zmy
Counsel of Record
Samah Sisay
Center for Constitutional
Rights
666 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10012
(212) 614-6464
bazmy@ccrjustice.org
A lina Das
Washington Square Legal
Services, Inc.
Immigrant Rights Clinic
245 Sullivan Street, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10012
Joshua L. Dratel
Dratel & Lewis
29 Broadway, Suite 1412
New York, NY 10006
Marc Van Der Hout
Johnny Sinodis
Oona Cahill
Kyle Barron
Of Counsel
Van Der Hout LLP
360 Post Street, Suite 800
San Francisco, CA 94108
Counsel for Petitioner
396486
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
VOLUME I
APPENDIX A – OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT, FILED JANUARY 15, 2026 . . . 1a
APPENDIX B – OPINION AND ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,
FILED JULY 25, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64a
APPENDIX C – OPINION AND ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,
FILED JUNE 11, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78a
APPENDIX D – OPINION AND ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,
FILED MAY 28, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96a
VOLUME II
APPENDIX E – OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, FILED
APRIL 29, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248a
APPENDIX F – DENIAL OF REHEARING
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
FILED MAY 22, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404a
248a
APPENDIX E — OPINION
OF THE
UNITED STATES
Appendix
E
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY, FILED APRIL 29, 2025
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
No. 25-cv-01963 (MEF)(MAH)
MAHMOUD KHALIL,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. JOYCE et al.,
Respondents.
OPINION
[TABLE INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]
***
A lawful permanent resident is held in immigration
custody, and federal officials have begun proceedings
before an immigration judge to remove him from the
United States.
The lawful permanent resident has moved for a
preliminary injunction, claiming that one of the charges
against him is unconstitutional and that this Court should
therefore order him released.
249a
Appendix E
In response, federal officials argue that the motion
should be denied, in part because this Court cannot hear
the case. Certain statutes, they say, strip the Court of
jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional argument is not persuasive. This
Opinion explains why.
I.
Background
A.
The Facts
A lawful permanent resident1 was arrested by federal
officials. See Declaration of Amy E. Greer (ECF 11-1)
¶¶ 4-6; Second Supplemental Declaration of Acting Field
Office Director William P. Joyce (“Joyce Declaration”)
(ECF 72) ¶¶ 6-7.
While in custody, he was handed various forms. See
Declaration of Mahmoud Khalil (“Khalil Declaration”)
(ECF 73-1) ¶¶ 4-6; Joyce Declaration ¶ 7.
These said two main things.
First, that federal officials were seeking to remove
him from the United States based on 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)
(C)(i), of which more in a moment. See Joyce Declaration
¶ 7.
1. Mahmoud K halil. A law ful permanent resident is a
person who has “been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance
with the immigration laws[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).
250a
Appendix E
And second, that as part of that process he had
to appear before an immigration judge. 2 See Khalil
Declaration ¶ 5.
The proceedings before the immigration judge are
now underway.
***
At an immigration court hearing earlier this month,
the immigration judge assessed federal officials’ argument
that the lawful permanent resident should be removed
from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i).
Under that statute, “[a]n alien whose presence or
activities in the United States the Secretary of State
has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially
serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United
States is deportable.”
The immigration judge referred to a memorandum
from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security. See Audio Recording
of Hearing (April 11, 2025) (“April 11 Audio Recording”)
at 1:34:40 to 1:34:48.
2. Removing a lawful permanent resident from the United
States generally requires a hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Those
typically go forward before an immigration judge. See id. § 1229a
(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a). An immigration judge is an “attorney[ ]
whom the Attorney General appoints as [an] administrative judge[
] ... to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including [removal]
hearings under section 240 of the [Immigration and Nationality
Act].” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a).
251a
Appendix E
In the memo, the Secretary of State wrote that he had
“determined” that the Petitioner was “deportable” under
Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i). See Memorandum from Marco
Rubio, Secretary of State, to Kristi Noem, Secretary of
Homeland Security (“Determination”) (ECF 198-1) at 1.
Based on the memo, the immigration judge ruled that
the requirements of Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) had been met
and that the lawful permanent resident could therefore
be removed from the United States. See April 11 Audio
Recording at 1:37:46 to 1:38:25.
***
There are further immigration court proceedings to
come.
For example, an appeal of the immigration judge’s
decision might be taken to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. 3
3. The Board of Immigration Appeals “function[s] as an
appellate body charged with the review of ... administrative
adjudications under the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(1). It can hear appeals from a variety of decisions made
by immigration judges. See id. § 1003.1(b). The Attorney General
can review the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. See
id. § 1003.1(d)(7)(i), (h). Sometimes, the Attorney General opts to do
so. See, e.g., Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I. & N. Dec. 648 (A.G.
2022); Matter of B-Z-R-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 563 (A.G. 2022); Matter of
A-C-A-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 84 (A.G. 2020); Matter of O-F-A-S-, 28 I.
& N. Dec. 35 (A.G. 2020).
252a
Appendix E
And more proceedings have been scheduled before
the immigration judge.4
B. Procedural History
The lawful permanent resident filed a habeas corpus
petition in a federal district court.
From here, he is called “the Petitioner.” The various
people he named in his habeas petition are referred to,
collectively, as “the Respondents.”5
***
The Petitioner filed his case in New York, but it was
transferred to New Jersey. See Khalil v. Joyce, 2025 WL
849803 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2025).
4. In addition to the Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) charge, federal
officials have also pressed a second charge in immigration court
against the lawful permanent resident, for allegedly not disclosing
certain information when he applied for lawful permanent resident
status. See Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability at
1. Federal officials are also seeking to remove the lawful permanent
resident from the United States based on the failure-to-disclose
charge. See id. The immigration judge has scheduled a proceeding
for next month on that charge.
5. The Respondents are listed in the Petition as: President of
the United States Donald Trump; Acting Field Office Director of
New York, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
William P. Joyce; Warden of Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility
Yolanda Pittman; Acting Director of United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Caleb Vitello; Secretary of the United
States Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem; Secretary of
the United States Department of State Marco Rubio; and Attorney
General of the United States Pamela Bondi.
253a
Appendix E
In New Jersey, the Respondents moved to dismiss the
case, arguing it should go forward in Louisiana, where the
Petitioner is in custody. The motion was denied. The Court
held that habeas jurisdiction is proper in New Jersey. See
Khalil v. Joyce, 777 F.Supp.3d 369 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2025).6
But as the Court noted: there are “other jurisdictional
hurdles.” Khalil v. Joyce, 2025 WL 1019658, at *1 n.2
(D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2025).
This Opinion considers them.
C.
The Motion
The Petitioner has moved for a preliminary injunction.
See ECF 66.
Through this motion, he asks the Court to order three
things. See Petitioner’s Amended Memorandum of Law
in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
(“Motion for Preliminary Injunction”) (ECF 124) at 9-10.
***
First, and as noted above, the Secretary of State has
determined that the Petitioner’s presence and activities in
6. The Respondents asked the Court of Appeals to review this
decision, and the Petitioner has opposed that request. See Petition
for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) at 1-2, Khalil v. President U.S. (No. 25-08019); Opposition
to Petition for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) at 1-3, Khalil v. President U.S. (No. 25-08019).
254a
Appendix E
the United States “would have potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences and would compromise a
compelling U.S. foreign policy interest.” Determination
at 1. And based on the Secretary’s determination, the
immigration judge has ruled that the Petitioner can be
removed from the United States. See April 11 Audio
Recording at 1:37:46 to 1:38:25.
The Petitioner asks the Court to order that the
Secretary’s determination be set aside, vacated. See
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9.
The determination, the Petitioner argues, was made in
retaliation for statements the Petitioner made on political
issues, and this retaliation violates the First Amendment.
See id. at 10-18.7
7. Two things. First, the Petitioner also argues that the
Secretary’s determination is unconstitutionally vague. See Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 23-24. (But note that the Petitioner
does not argue in his petition that Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) is itself
unconstitutionally vague.) Second, in a footnote in one of his legal
briefs, the Petitioner references the second charge against him, the
one based on his alleged failure to make certain disclosures in his
lawful-permanent-resident application. See Petitioner’s Reply in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (“Reply Brief”)
(ECF 175) at 16 n.11. But there is no reference to this in the habeas
petition. See Salas v. Warren, 2019 WL 3423534, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J.
July 30, 2019) (declining to consider claims that the petitioner raised
in his traverse, rather than his petition); Quang Van Nguyen v.
Wenerowicz, 2013 WL 6473264, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2013) (similar,
as to claims first raised in a reply brief); accord, e.g., Carrascosa v.
McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 264 (3d Cir. 2008); St. John v. Ashcroft, 43 F.
App’x 281, 282 (10th Cir. 2002); Bracken v. Dormire, 247 F.3d 699, 702
255a
Appendix E
***
Second, the Petitioner alleges that the Respondents
are pursuing a policy to “to arrest, detain, and seek to
remove noncitizens who engage in expressive activities ...
supporting Palestinian rights,” id. at 4, --- and that it is
because of this policy that federal official are seeking to
remove him from the United States. See id.
The Petitioner asks the Court to order that the policy
be stopped. See id. at 9-10.
The policy violates the First Amendment, the
Petitioner says, because it is premised on “viewpoint
discrimination,” id. at 19 --- it operates against people
who take one view in certain public debates, but not those
who take other views.
And the policy also violates the Fifth Amendment, the
Petitioner says, because it is too vague --- and due process
requires precision, so that people can know in advance
what the government might seek to do. See id. at 16.
***
Third and finally, the Petitioner says he is being
detained by immigration authorities in retaliation for
the public statements he has made, see id. at 33, and
(8th Cir. 2001). Nor does the legal brief purport to seek relief from
the Court based on the second charge. No challenge to the second
charge is before the Court.
256a
Appendix E
also to “chill” him from making other statements. See id.
This, the argument goes, violates the Petitioner’s First
Amendment rights --- and the Court should therefore
order the Petitioner released from custody. See id. at 9.
D.
The Response
The Petitioner, as noted, has sought a preliminary
injunction as to each of the three things set out above.
In doing so, the Petitioner is asking for a remedy at
an early stage of this case, before it runs its typical and
full course. 8
To win a preliminary injunction, a litigant must show
a number of things.
One of them: that he is “likely” to be the ultimate
winner --- when the case is over and done, and reaches its
normal finish line. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney,
602 U.S. 339, 345, 144 S.Ct. 1570, 219 L.Ed.2d 99 (2024).
The Respondents argue that the Petitioner has not met
this standard. See Respondents’ Opposition to Petitioner’s
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (“Opposition Brief”)
(ECF 156) at 8-32.
As to why, some of the Respondents’ arguments focus
on the merits of the case. See id. at 23-32.
8. For example, there has been no discovery to this point, or
testimony.
257a
Appendix E
Others zero in on the Court’s power over the case --- in
particular, on a set of statutes that the Respondents say
take away this Court’s jurisdiction. See id. at 8-21.
II. The Question
“Ju r i s d ic t ion i s , a s a l w ay s , t he ‘ f i r st a nd
fundamental question.’ ” Baymont Franchise Sys., Inc. v.
Narnarayandev, LLC, 348 F.R.D. 220, 227 (D.N.J. 2024)
(quoting Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S.
449, 453, 20 S.Ct. 690, 44 L.Ed. 842 (1900)).
This is because a court that does not have jurisdiction
does not have power over a case. It cannot decide the
merits, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), and
so it should not speak to them.
Against this backdrop, the Court will consider in this
Opinion solely whether it has jurisdiction. Merits issues
(and other issues, like venue) will be taken up later.
***
Begin the jurisdictional analysis by getting a fuller
sense of the main issue that is on the table.
The Court starts off with jurisdiction here.
The habeas corpus statute gives federal district courts
jurisdiction over habeas cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a),
and this is a habeas case. See Second Amended Petition
(“Petition”) (ECF 162) ¶ 20.
258a
Appendix E
Moreover, the Court has previously ruled that it has
habeas jurisdiction over this case in particular. See Khalil,
777 F.Supp.3d 369.
The question, then, is this: does anything take away
the Court’s jurisdiction?
The Respondents say yes, and they point to two
“jurisdiction-stripping” statutes. See Opposition Brief at
9-20, 23.
The statutes are in Title 8 of the United States Code,
at Section 1252(g) and Section 1252(b)(9). Their current
versions became law in 2005.9
If these statutes do not strip away this Court’s habeas
jurisdiction, then things stay as they were and this Court
resolves the case.
If these statutes do strip away this Court’s habeas
jurisdiction, then the way forward is different. The frontline review will be done by the immigration courts.
Either way, though, the next rung up on the ladder is
the same. Whoever does the first-cut look, this Court or
the immigration courts, what follows is review in a federal
court of appeals (and after that, review would be possible
in the Supreme Court).10
9. Another statute is invoked, too. See Opposition Brief at 20–21.
But it is mostly irrelevant here, and is therefore taken up only later,
in Part VIII.
10. The text refers to immigration courts because, as noted in
footnote 3, certain rulings from immigration judges can be appealed
259a
Appendix E
III. The Court’s Approach
The Court first takes up the Respondents’ argument
that Section 1252(b)(9) strips jurisdiction.
Section 1252(b)(9), it is said, prevents this Court from
considering the Petitioner’s claim that the Secretary of
State’s determination under Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) was
unconstitutional.
Out of the gate, this Section 1252(b)(9) argument looks
strong. See Part IV.A.
But ultimately, it is not persuasive.
This is because Section 1252(b)(9) applies only after a
final order of removal has been entered by the immigration
courts. The words of the statute say so. See Part IV.B. And
so has the Third Circuit.11 See Part IV.C.
But no final order of removal has been entered in this
case. Therefore, Section 1252(b)(9) does not apply.
to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Review by a federal court of
appeals generally takes place only after the Board of Immigration
Appeals has ruled. See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 234
(3d Cir. 2003). If this Court has jurisdiction and is responsible for
initially handling the case, any appeal would be to the federal court
of appeals for the Third Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. If this Court
does not have jurisdiction and the immigration courts therefore do
the ground-floor review, then any appeal would be to the federal court
of appeals for the circuit that covers Louisiana, where the Petitioner
is held; that is the Fifth Circuit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
11. In a case called Chehazeh v. Attorney General of the United
States, 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012).
260a
Appendix E
***
There is, though, a wrinkle.
In another case,12 the Third Circuit has suggested that
Section 1252(b)(9) can apply, as here, before a final order
of removal has been entered by the immigration courts.
But even on the assumption that the second case
is controlling, Section 1252(b)(9) does not remove
jurisdiction from this Court as to the Secretary of State’s
determination.
Under the second case, Section 1252(b)(9) strips
jurisdiction from a federal district court over a claim only
when that claim could still get “meaningful” federal court
review later --- after the immigration courts have wrapped
up their work, and the claim then goes to a federal court
for the first time, a federal court of appeals. See Part V.
But in this case, that sort of delayed federal court
review would not be “meaningful” federal court review.
This is for two reasons.
First, because there would be little to show for any
such delay. Usually, the immigration courts can tee
things up for the federal court of appeals, by providing a
remedy for any illegal conduct, by finding the facts, and by
12. EOHC v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland
Security, 950 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2020).
261a
Appendix E
applying their distinctive expertise. But the immigration
courts cannot do any of that as to the Secretary of State’s
determination. See Part VI.A to Part VI.C.
And second, the law requires sped-up judicial review
of First Amendment claims of the kind the Petitioner
raises here. That is not consistent with delaying federal
court review until after the immigration courts have
finished their work and the case then moves to a federal
court of appeals. See Part VI.D.
***
Next, the Court considers the Respondents’ argument
that Section 1252(g) cuts off review here of the Secretary
of State’s determination.
But the Section 1252(g) argument does not work. It
runs aground on the plain words of the statute and the
Supreme Court’s main decision in this area.13 See Part VII.
***
Finally, the Court considers the alleged policy that the
Petitioner has challenged --- and assesses whether Section
1252(b)(9) or Section 1252(g) take away jurisdiction from
this Court to consider it.
As to the policy, the jurisdiction-stripping argument
is not persuasive for most of the same reasons it was not
13. The decision is Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999).
262a
Appendix E
persuasive as to the Secretary’s determination, plus a few
more. See Part VIII.14
IV. Section 1252(b)(9) Does Not Apply Here
Get underway now with the jurisdictional analysis.
The Respondents’ first argument is that Section
1252(b)(9) removes this Court’s jurisdiction to consider
the Petitioner’s request for an injunction vacating the
Secretary of State’s determination. See Opposition Brief
at 9-14.
At first, this argument looks strong. See Part IV.A.
But in the end, it does not work. Section 1252(b)(9) does
not apply in cases like this one, in which a final order of
removal has not been entered by the immigration courts.
See Part IV.B. And the Third Circuit has confirmed as
much. See Part IV.C.
Bottom line: Section 1252(b)(9) is irrelevant here. It
applies to post-order-of-removal cases, and this is a preorder-of-removal case.
A.
Section 1252(b)(9)
To start off, bracket for a few moments the question
of whether Section 1252(b)(9) does or does not apply to
14. There is also a third statute. Its impact is marginal, and it
is considered briefly in Part VIII.
263a
Appendix E
pre-order-of-removal cases like this one. Assume, instead
--- and throughout this Part IV.A --- that Section 1252
(b)(9) applies to such cases.
Under the statute, there is a four-part test for deciding
whether Section 1252(b)(9) removes jurisdiction over a
given claim. See Part IV.A.2.
Applying that test, the Court concludes that Section
1252(b)(9), assuming that it applies, would strip away this
Court’s jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s claim that the
Secretary of State’s determination is unconstitutional.
See Part IV.A.3.
That sets the stage for the question taken up in Part
IV.B and in Part IV.C: does Section 1252(b)(9) apply in
pre-order-of-removal cases like this one?
1.
The Statute
Begin, as always, with the words Congress used in
the law it passed. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429,
440, 134 S.Ct. 1158, 188 L.Ed.2d 158 (2014); United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d
246 (1981).
Here, those words are “clear and distinct,” Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339, 4 L.Ed.
97 (1816), so they must be enforced as written. See Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct.
1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (collecting cases).
264a
Appendix E
And their effect here is unmissable. If Section 1252
(b)(9) applies, there is no jurisdiction in this Court over
the Petitioner’s challenge to the Secretary of State’s
determination.
***
In relevant part, Section 1252(b)(9) says:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of
constitutional and statutory provisions, arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to
remove an alien from the United States under
this subchapter shall be available only in judicial
review of a final order under this section.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
***
This part of Section 1252(b)(9) does not itself say when
and where the “judicial review” it mentions is to take place.
But other parts of Section 1252 do. They make clear
that the “judicial review” alluded to in Section 1252(b)(9)
is conducted only by federal courts of appeals, with federal
district courts having no role. And the court of appeals’
review kicks in after the immigration courts are done with
their work --- after the Board of Immigration Appeals has
affirmed the immigration judge’s order or after the time
for appealing to the Board has run out.15
15. The sources for the statements in the text are laid out here.
As to when the “judicial review” alluded to in Section 1252(b)(9) takes
265a
Appendix E
2.
The Question
As set out just above, if “judicial review” is covered
by Section 1252(b)(9), then that review must happen only
later (after the immigration courts have finished their
work) and only elsewhere (in the federal court of appeals,
not here).
The question, then, is this: is the judicial review
the Petitioner seeks here, of the Secretary of State’s
determination, covered by Section 1252(b)(9)?
If it is not covered, then Section 1252(b)(9) is no hurdle
to this Court keeping jurisdiction.
place: that review is of “an order of removal under subsection (a)(1),”
id. § 1252(b); subsection (a)(1) clarifies that an “order of removal” is
“a final order of removal,” id. § 1252(a)(1) (emphasis added); and an
order of removal becomes “final” on the earlier of “a determination
by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order” or “the
expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review
of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)
(47)(B); Yusupov v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 518 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir.
2008), as amended (Mar. 27, 2008). As to where “judicial review”
will go forward: in a federal court of appeals, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252
(a)(5), and in particular in the court of appeals that sits in “the judicial
circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings.”
Id. § 1252(b)(2); see Castillo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 109 F.4th 127, 129
(3d Cir. 2024). And critically: court of appeals review will be the
“[e]xclusive means of review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Exclusive means
exclusive. The federal “judicial review” described in Section 1252
(b)(9) will happen only in a court of appeals. That rules out a place
in the process for the district court.
266a
Appendix E
If it is covered, Section 1252(b)(9) strips jurisdiction
--- and review by this Court would be out of bounds.
***
To answer the question, look to the front end of Section
1252(b)(9), the part before the word “shall.”
Again, Section 1252(b)(9):
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of
constitutional and statutory provisions, arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought
to remove an alien from the United States
under this subchapter shall be available only
in judicial review of a final order under this
section.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added).
What judicial review is covered by the first half of
the sentence?
“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of constitutional
and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States under this subchapter[.]” Id.
In other words, Section 1252(b)(9) kicks in when four
conditions are met:
267a
Appendix E
1. There is “any action ... or proceeding,”
2. “to remove an alien from the United States,”
3. “under this subchapter,” and
4. judicial review is sought as to “a[ ] question
[ ] of law and fact” that “aris[es] from” such
“action” or “proceeding.”
Below, the Court ticks through these --- and concludes
that each of the four boxes is checked.
What this means: Section 1252(b)(9) covers judicial
review of the Secretary of State’s determination --- and so,
if Section 1252(b)(9) applies in the first place,16 that Section
prevents this Court from assessing the Secretary’s
determination.
3.
The Answer
Section 1252(b)(9), as noted, spins off a four-part test
for deciding whether judicial review of a claim is covered
by the statute. See Part IV.A.2.
As shown below, each part of the test is satisfied.17
16. Recall: that is assessed below, in Part IV.B and Part IV.C.
17. Section 1252(b)(9)’s key terms are not defined by the statute.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (defining other terms in the statute). Therefore,
the Court looks to the ordinary and contemporary meanings of the
words Congress used in the Section. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
268a
Appendix E
a)
“Action”
Is the Secretary’s determination an “action” or
“proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1252(b)(9)?
The Court’s conclusion: it is an “action.”
At around the time of Section 1252(b)(9)’s initial
enactment in 1996, authoritative sources understood
“action” broadly.18
The Oxford English Dictionary defined “action” as “a
thing done, a deed.” Action, n., sense 3.a, Oxford English
Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). And a leading legal dictionary
went roughly the same way. See Action, Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“something done.”).
In making his determination, formalized through
a memorandum, the Secretary of State took an action.
571 U.S. 220, 227, 134 S.Ct. 870, 187 L.Ed.2d 729 (2014). This includes
referring to time-of-enactment dictionaries, both general and legal.
See, e.g., Sandifer, 571 U.S. at 227, 134 S.Ct. 870; Taniguchi v. Kan
Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–67, 132 S.Ct. 1997, 182 L.Ed.2d
903 (2012); see also Khalil, 777 F.Supp.3d at 389-90.
18. Section 1252(b)(9) was first passed in 1996, and its current
version dates to 2005. Why the focus on 1996? Because that is when
the relevant sentence of Section 1252(b)(9) was passed. See Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. In 2005, more words were added to
Section 1252(b)(9) to specify that it reached habeas jurisdiction. See
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 199 Stat. 305. But none
of those words is at issue in this Opinion.
269a
Appendix E
Writing or approving a memo is not something that just
happens; it takes doing --- the “do[ing]” of “something.”
The inquiry could end there.
And it would, except that something else reinforces
the conclusion that the Secretary’s determination is an
“action.” Namely, Congress put the word “any” before
the word “action”; the statute says “any action.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added).
And putting “any” before a word confirms it must be
understood in an inclusive way, to reach the outer edge
of its possible orbit.
A year after Section 1252(b)(9) first became law, for
example, the Supreme Court said: “Read naturally, the
word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or
some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ “ United States
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d
132 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 97 (1976)).
This wide-angle view of “any” matches up with a long
line of Supreme Court cases.
In Collector of Internal Revenue v. Hubbard, 79
U.S. 12 Wall. 1, 15, 20 L.Ed. 272 (1870), for example, the
Supreme Court interpreted a statute that said certain tax
suits shall not “be maintained in any court.” 79 U.S. at
3. It was “quite clear” that “any court” meant any court,
federal or state. Id. at 15.
270a
Appendix E
More recently, the Court reaffirmed that “any”
“ordinarily ‘refers to a member of a particular group
or class without distinction or limitation’ and in this
way ‘implies every member of the class or group.’ “ SAS
Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362, 138 S.Ct. 1348, 200
L.Ed.2d 695 (2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Any, Oxford
English Dictionary (3d ed. 2016)); see also United States
v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 358, 114 S.Ct. 1599, 128
L.Ed.2d 319 (1994).
***
Bottom line:
The Secretary of State’s determination was a decision
made as to the Petitioner, and it culminated in a physical
thing in the world -- the memorandum that reflects the
determination. The determination was “something done,”
and that is what “action” means.
And whatever possible doubt there might be is
dissipated by Congress’ use of “any action.” Per that
phrase, Section 1252(b)(9) covers all actions --- without
qualification, nothing carved out.
This conclusion, that the Secretary’s determination
is an “action,” is linguistically obvious.
So much so that the Petitioner seems to see things in
the same way. In making his determination, the Petitioner
writes in his legal brief, the Secretary “had taken [an]
action.” Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17 (emphasis
271a
Appendix E
added); see also id. at 1, 7, 13 (describing the challenged
conduct as an “action”).
***
The first of the four Section 1252(b)(9) boxes is
checked. The Secretary’s determination counts as an
“action.”
***
Before moving on, note a possible counterargument.
Namely, it might be argued that Section 1252(b)(9)
refers only to an “action” of the legal sort --- as in, say, a
civil action, or some other kind of lawsuit. After all, one
of the basic definitions of “action” is “[a] legal process or
suit.” Action, n., sense 8, Oxford English Dictionary (2d
ed. 1989).
If this were the right understanding of Section 1252
(b)(9), the Secretary’s determination could not be chalked
up as an “action.” The determination is “a thing done.”
Action, n., sense 3, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.
1989). But it is not a lawsuit.
This sort of reading, though, does not make sense.
For starters, Section 1252(b)(9) does not speak of
“bringing” an action, but of “tak[ing]” one.
In everyday English, people “take action” all the time.
But people do not “take a civil action” --- they bring one.
272a
Appendix E
That is how the words have been used for centuries.
See, e.g., id. (quoting 1 Tomlins, Law Dictionary (1809))
(“A man attainted of treason ... cannot bring an action.”).
And to see the proof: across 200 years, the U.S.
Reports contain 136 mentions of a “civil action brought”
--- but none of a civil action “taken.” Cf. Delligatti v. United
States, {blank} U.S. {blank}, 145 S. Ct. 797, 813, 221
L.Ed.2d 303 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[A]nalyzing
‘how particular combinations of words are used in a vast
database of English prose’ can shed light on how ordinary
people understand statutory terms.”) (quoting Facebook,
Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395, 412, 141 S.Ct. 1163, 209
L.Ed.2d 272 (2021) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
Moreover, to read “action” in its legal sense would
make redundant another term in Section 1252(b)(9) --“proceeding.”
“Proceeding” covers a part of the legal process. See
Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“[T]he
form and manner of conducting juridical business before
a court or judicial officer.”); Proceeding, vbl. n., sense 3,
Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“The instituting
or carrying on of an action at law[.]”); see also Waetzig v.
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 604 U.S. 305, 145 S. Ct.
690, 698-99, 221 L.Ed.2d 143 (2025) (surveying definitions
of “proceeding”).
As the Supreme Court confirmed this Term: “
‘proceeding’ encompasses all steps in an action.” Waetzig,
145 S. Ct. at 699.
273a
Appendix E
If “proceeding” sweeps in the full arc of “an action,”
as the Supreme Court’s recent opinion suggests, then
“action” --- if it is understood in its legal sense --- would
be fully encompassed within “proceeding.”
The two words would cover the same thing. They
would become redundant. One or the other would be
reduced to surplus, an unnecessary bit of add-on. And
reading statutes to create redundancies and surplus --that is not how things are supposed to go. See Bufkin v.
Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 145 S. Ct. 728, 741, 221 L.Ed.2d 192
(2025); Waetzig, 145 S. Ct. at 699; Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
And note a final point.
On the few occasions it has discussed Section 1252
(b)(9), the Supreme Court has used “action” in its general
sense --- not in any legal sense. See, e.g., Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 293, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d
122 (2018) (suggesting that placing someone in detention
is an “action”); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940
(1999) (“AADC”) (similar).
In a nutshell: the possible counterargument sketched
out here does not work. As used in Section 1252(b)(9),
“action” means what it usually does. It does not mean a
lawsuit.19
19. To be sure, courts sometimes analyze a word with reference
to its neighbor. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389, 119
274a
Appendix E
b)
“To Remove”
The first of the four Section 1252(b)(9) boxes is
checked. See Part IV.A.3(a). The Secretary of State’s
determination was an “action taken.”
The next question: was the “action taken to remove
an alien from the United States”? 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
(emphasis added).
It was.
The key word in the quoted phrase is “to.”
As used with the verb “remove,” “to” signals “purpose
or intention.” To, sense B.I, Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989).
S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (“Statutory language must be
read in context and a phrase gathers meaning from the words around
it.”) (cleaned up); see also Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S.
303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961); Amy Coney Barrett,
Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2193,
2197 n.11 (2017). And so it might be argued here that “proceeding”
(which undoubtedly has a legal meaning) should be taken to overspill
itself, and to color the meaning of the neighboring “action” --- leaving
“action” with some legalistic hues (a civil action, a lawsuit). But that
does not work. If “action” and “proceeding” are each assigned a
legal-shaded meaning, the words become redundant. Courts often
look to contextual clues to avoid superfluous readings. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 659 (5th Cir. 2015). But they
have rejected contextual arguments that create redundancy. See,
e.g., Waetzig, 145 S. Ct. at 699; Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S.
73, 78, 111 S.Ct. 415, 112 L.Ed.2d 374 (1990).
275a
Appendix E
And the cases confirm what the dictionaries say. See,
e.g., Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 354-55, 134
S.Ct. 2384, 189 L.Ed.2d 411 (2014) (concluding that “to
obtain” in 18 U.S.C. § 1344 signals “inten[t]”); Allison
Engine Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 668, 128
S.Ct. 2123, 170 L.Ed.2d 1030 (2008) (concluding that “to
get” in the relevant statute “denotes purpose”).
***
Given the above, the question is this: was the Secretary
of State’s determination (an “action”) done (“taken”) with
the purpose or intention (“to”) of removing an alien from
the United States”?
Yes, clearly.
When a Secretary of State says he has “reasonable
ground[s] to believe” that a person’s “presence or activities
in the United States ... would have potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United
States” 20 --- that statement has only one known function
in our law.
And that function is to seek the person’s removal
from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i)
(“[a]n alien” who meets the criteria quoted just above “is
deportable.”).
20. That is in essence what the Secretary’s determination says
here. See Determination at 1–2.
276a
Appendix E
T he memo t h at for m a l i z e s t he S e c r et a r y ’s
determination confirms this.
Its “subject” line says that it concerns “[r]emovability
[d]eterminations” under the immigration laws. See
Determination at 1.
The first paragraph of the memo explains that the
Secretary has deemed the Petitioner to be a “deportable
alien[ ]” under the removal statute. See id. The second
paragraph lays out the Secretary’s understanding of the
relevant statute. See id. And the last paragraph asserts
that the Petitioner’s “presence” in the United State would
harm American foreign policy. See id. at 1-2.
In short: under Section 1252(b)(9), “to remove an alien
from the United States” means to act with the intent or
purpose to remove someone. And that was the purpose
of the Secretary’s determination.
c)
“Under This Subchapter”
Next: Section 1252(b)(9) applies when the claim in
question “aris[es] from any action taken ... under this
subchapter.”
The subchapter in question is Subchapter II of
Chapter 12 of Title 8 --- the part of the Immigration and
Nationality Act that spans Section 1151 to Section 1382.
And the Secretary made his determination under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C), which is part of Subchapter II.
277a
Appendix E
So the Petitioner’s claim, which challenges the
Secretary’s determination, “aris[es] from an[ ] action
taken ... under this subchapter.”
d)
“Arising From”
To this point, the Court has concluded that the
Secretary’s determination was (a) an action taken (b)
to remove an alien from the United States (c) under the
relevant subchapter.
That leaves a fourth and final question.
Judicial review is sought here to enjoin the Petitioner’s
detention as a violation of the First Amendment. See
Petition ¶¶ 89-90.
Does assessment of that “question[ ] ... aris[e] from
an[ ] action taken [the Secretary’s determination] to
remove an alien [the Petitioner] from the United States”?
Yes.
The Supreme Court has recently debated what
“arising from” means in Section 1252(b)(9). See Jennings,
583 U.S. 281, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122. How tight
must the nexus be between A and B to say that B arises
from A?
Whatever the answer to that question might be in the
abstract, there can be no doubt that review of the legality
of the Petitioner’s detention “aris[es] from” the Secretary’s
determination.
278a
Appendix E
The two are tightly yoked together. The Secretary of
State’s determination is not tangential to the detention
of the Petitioner or his removal under Section 1227(a)(4)
(C)(i). Quite the opposite. The determination is what allows
removal to go forward in the first place --- indeed, it has
only that purpose under the law, and it is the only piece
of evidence put forward before the immigration courts in
support of a Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) removal.
***
To sum up:
Built into Section 1252(b)(9) is a four-part test for
deciding whether judicial review is or is not covered.
Here, that test is satisfied, for the reasons set out
above. 21 What this means: assuming that Section 1252
21. And also: this conclusion gets support from two statements
about Section 1252(b)(9) in AADC. There, the Supreme Court said
that Section 1252(b)(9) “channels judicial review of all” relevant
“decisions and actions, 525 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936 (emphasis
in original), to the immigration courts and the court of appeals.
And Section 1252(b)(9) is a “zipper” clause, that “says ‘no judicial
review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial
review.’ “ Id. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936. These statements strengthen
the conclusion that the Secretary’s determination is covered by
Section 1252(b)(9). But they should not be treated as definitively
fixing the meaning of Section 1252(b)(9). First, subsequent cases
have limited these statements. Justice Alito’s Jennings plurality
opinion, for example, construed Section 1252(b)(9) as allowing for
judicial review of prolonged immigration detention in a federal
district court, see 583 U.S. at 294–95 ---, 138 S.Ct. 830 and that
279a
Appendix E
(b)(9) applies here in the first place, this Court has no
jurisdiction to consider the Petitioner’s claim as to the
Secretary’s determination.
Is this assumption right? Take that up now.
would seem to be at odds with the quotes from AADC. Second, the
AADC statements about Section 1252(b)(9) were dicta; the holding
in AADC was about the meaning of a different immigration-related
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See 525 U.S. at 473, 119 S.Ct. 936. And
third, when the AADC Court said that Section 1252(b)(9) covers “all”
actions and decisions, see id. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936, it was rejecting an
argument that Section 1252(g) covers all actions from the beginning
(“commence[ment]”) to the end (“execut[ion]” of removal orders). See
AADC, 525 U.S. at 482-83, 119 S.Ct. 936. Section 1252(g) could not
mean that, the Court reasoned, because Section 1252(b)(9) already
does. See id. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936. But even if 1252(b)(9) covers all
actions between commencement and execution, it might arguably
have nothing to say about the Secretary of State’s determination
--- because that is a pre-commencement step. All of this said, though,
the AADC statements tip the scales, at least to an extent, toward the
conclusion that the Secretary’s determination is covered by Section
1252(b)(9). After all, Supreme Court dicta carry special weight. See,
e.g., Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2019). And
the AADC Section 1252(b)(9) statements are not pure dicta; they
take some steps down the road in the “holding” direction. This is
because the AADC Court’s broad reading of Section 1252(b)(9) may
have been a necessary element of the Court’s actual holding, as to
the scope of Section 1252(g). See 525 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936. And
logically necessary and explicitly invoked steps along the way to a
holding can be binding. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 67, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).
280a
Appendix E
B. The Text
The words of Section 1252(b)(9) seem to cover the
Petitioner’s challenge to the Secretary’s determination.
See Part IV.A.
But the analysis that supports this conclusion, see
id., is zoomed in to a fault. Pan out to see the rest of the
statute, and what becomes clear is this: Section 1252(b)(9)
does not apply here as a categorical matter. It does not
reach cases like this one, in which a final order of removal
has not been entered.
***
Section 1252(b)(9) is part of Section 1252(b), and
Section 1252(b) starts with a lead-in.
With respect to review of an order of removal
..., the following requirements apply:
From there, Section 1252(b) runs through a set of
numbered “requirements,” 1252(b)(1), (b)(2), and so on
--- out to (b)(9).
With that structure in mind, look to some relevant
parts of Section 1252(b):
(b) Requirements for review of orders of
removal
With respect to review of an order of removal
..., the following requirements apply:
281a
Appendix E
(1) Deadline
The petition for review must be filed
not later than 30 days after the date
of the final order of removal.
(2) Venue and forms
The petition for review shall be
filed with the court of appeals for
the judicial circuit in which the
immigration judge completed the
proceedings ....
(3) Service
(A) In general
... The petition shall be served on
the Attorney General and on the
officer or employee of the [federal
immigration agency] in charge of
the ... district in which the final
order of removal ... was entered....
(4) Scope and standard for review
Except as provided in paragraph
(5)(B)-(A) the court of appeals shall decide
the petition only on the administrative
282a
Appendix E
record on which the order of removal
is based, ....
[...]
(9) Consolidation of questions for
judicial review
Judicial review of all questions of law
and fact, including interpretation
and application of constitutional and
statutory provisions, arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought
to remove an alien from the United
States under this subchapter shall
be available only in judicial review
of a final order under this section.
Except as other wise provided in
this section, no court shall have
jurisdiction, by habeas corpus ..., or by
any other provision of law (statutory
or nonstatutory), to review such an
order or such questions of law or fact.
Looking to the full statute is required, and always has
been. 22
22. See The Mary Ann, 21 U.S. 8 Wheat. 380, 387, 5 L.Ed. 641
(1823) (“[T]hose rules for construing statutes, which are dictated
by good sense, and sanctioned by immemorial usage, ... require
that the intent of the Legislature shall have effect, which intent
is to be collected from the context[.]”); United States v. Fisher, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1805) (“It is undoubtedly a
283a
Appendix E
Doing so here makes clear that Section 1252(b)(9) has
no bearing on this case.
Section 1252(b)(9) speaks to cases in which judicial
review goes forward after the immigration courts enter
a final order of removal.
But Section 1252(b)(9) does not purport to say
anything about what happens when --- as here --- judicial
review takes place before an order of removal is entered.
***
The point is clear from the get-go.
The title of Section 1252(b) says that the Section,
which includes Section 1252(b)(9), is about “Requirements
for review of orders of removal.”
These words assume that an order of removal has
already been entered. After all, “review” means to “look
at a thing again.” Review, v., sense 1, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/review
(accessed Apr. 17, 2025); accord, e.g., Review, v., sense 2,
well established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every
part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be
extracted from the whole.”); accord Gundy v. United States, 588
U.S. 128, 141, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019); Nat’l Broad.
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214-16, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344
(1943); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314, 3
L.Ed. 232 (1810); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 53, 68, 3
L.Ed. 150 (1810); see also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *59.
284a
Appendix E
Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“view, inspect,
or examine a second time or again”).
And there can be no looking “again” at a thing (here,
an order of removal) that does not already exist. If a
movie is not out until next year, a newspaper might run a
preview. But the review comes after the fact --- after the
filming and editing are wrapped up and someone can sit
and watch the final product.
Bottom line: Section 1252(b)’s heading (“Requirements
for review of orders of removal”) shows that Section
1252(b)(9) kicks in after a final order has been entered,
not before. 23
***
23. And note: in the context of Section 1252(b), courts routinely
reason from the language Congress used in the various statutory
headings. See EOHC v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d
177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020) (“That is also why the provision is captioned
‘Consolidation of Questions for Judicial Review.’ “) (cleaned up); see
also Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th
Cir. 2020); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Div. of Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007); Singh v. Gonzales, 499
F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2007); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191,
198 (1st Cir. 2003); Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 12 (1st Cir. 2000);
Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000); Cath.
Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 182 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999), on reh’g en
banc, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000); cf. Cunningham v. Cornell Univ.,
2025 WL 1128943, at *6, 604 U.S. 693, 145 S.Ct. 1020, 221 L.Ed.2d
591 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2025) (in a different context, looking to statutory
headings to resolve possible doubt about statutory construction).
285a
Appendix E
Other parts of Section 1252(b) point in the same
direction.
Start from the top, with the Section 1252(b) lead-in.
It says that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of
removal ..., the following requirements apply.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b) (emphasis added). And as noted, one of those
“requirements” listed under that Section is 1252(b)(9).
The clear implication: Section 1252(b)(9) is about
“review of an order of a removal,” not about a situation in
which review might take place before such an order exists.
Move now to the first substantive part of Section
1252(b), Section 1252(b)(1).
Section 1252(b)(1) lays down a deadline for when a
person must act if he or she wants to seek out the judicial
review that is the subject of Section 1252(b): “The petition
for review [in the court of appeals] must be filed not later
than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”
This timeline assumes that a final order of removal
has been entered. It happened. It was done on a certain
“date,” and the 30-day countdown goes from there.
And note: Section 1252(b) provides no deadline for a
court challenge that might be brought before the entry of
a final order of removal. Why not? Because Section 1252(b)
does not cover those sorts of challenges.
286a
Appendix E
Walk through the statute and see more of the same.
Under Section 1252(b), the court challenge is to go
forward in “the judicial circuit in which the immigration
judge completed the proceedings.” Id. § 1252(b). That
makes sense if Section 1252(b) covers situations in which
an order of removal has been entered. But not if it also
speaks to the period before an order has been entered.
At that point, the “proceedings” before the immigration
judge are not “completed.” They are underway.
And along the same lines:
Why would Congress require service where “the
final order of removal ... was entered,” id. § 1252(b)(3), if
it meant for Section 1252(b) to cover situations in which
there was not yet a final order of review that had been
“entered”?
Why would Congress limit review “only” to “the
administrative record on which the order of removal is
based,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A), if the review takes place
before an order of removal, “based” on the record, has
been entered?
In sum, a broader look shows that Section 1252(b)(9)
comes online after an order of removal has been entered
by the immigration courts.
Therefore, Section 1252(b)(9) does not purport to say
anything about what might happen in cases like this one,
cases that are brought before a final order of removal is
entered.
287a
Appendix E
The upshot: Section 1252(b)(9) has no role to play here,
and so it cannot strip this Court of jurisdiction.
***
A final note.
On the understanding sketched out just above, Section
1252(b)(9) has an important role to play.
It tells federal district courts that, after an order of
removal is finalized, they are not part of the mix. The
immigration courts will do the front-line work. And the
work of Article III judicial review belongs to the court of
appeals, and fully. An issue here or there --- those cannot
be plucked out by a district court for its own review.
By conveying this message, Section 1252(b)(9)
“streamlines” review, as courts have observed that it aims
to. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 424, 129 S.Ct. 1749,
173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009); F.J.A.P. v. Garland, 94 F.4th 620,
628 (7th Cir. 2024); Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258,
1269 (11th Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. Patel v. Garland, 596
U.S. 328, 142 S.Ct. 1614, 212 L.Ed.2d 685 (2022); Cooper
Butt ex rel. Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2020).
And it also cuts off “piecemeal” litigation, another of
its core purposes. See Gicharu v. Carr, 983 F.3d 13, 18
(1st Cir. 2020); Jama v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d
490, 496 (6th Cir. 2014); Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,
666 F.3d 118, 131 (3d Cir. 2012); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr.
& Customs Enf’t, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007).
288a
Appendix E
But Section 1252(b)(9) does those things only where
it applies --- and that is after orders of removal have been
entered, not, as here, before. 24
***
Here, the Petitioner does not seek judicial review of an
order of removal. None has been finalized. And therefore,
24. But it might be argued: this cannot be all. Even without
Section 1252(b)(9), few district judges would have imagined that
they could review an issue that is brought to them while a court of
appeals is already handling the overall case. But this ignores the
state of the law before Section 1252(b)(9) was passed in 1996. See,
e.g., Delligatti, 145 S. Ct. at 806–07 (looking to a “[legal] principle
[that] was well established” when a statute was enacted to inform
interpretation of the statute). In 1983, the Supreme Court held that
“final orders” of removal “include[ ] all matters on which the validity
of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations
actually made at the hearing.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938, 103
S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (cleaned up). This leaves behind
a good many issues. It might have been taken to imply that the
court of appeals, when it reviews a final order of removal, takes up
only a subset of questions (“all matters on which the validity of the
final order is contingent”) --- with room left for a district court to
look into other issues related to a case that is brought before it. See
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 582, 140 S.Ct. 1683, 207 L.Ed.2d
111 (2020) (making a closely similar point in another immigrationlaw context). Section 1252(b)(9), where it applies, shuts the door on
that sort of thinking --- because it says that review in the court of
appeals occupies virtually the whole playing field of possible issues,
well beyond those that the order of removal was “contingent” on.
Court of appeals review covers “[j]udicial review of all questions of
law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional
and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding
brought to remove an alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
289a
Appendix E
Section 1252(b)(9) does not prevent this Court from
considering the Petitioner’s claim that the Secretary’s
determination must be set aside as unconstitutional.
“Jurisdictional rules ... should be ‘clear and easy to
apply.’ “ Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 212, 143
S.Ct. 890, 215 L.Ed.2d 151 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chi.,
583 U.S. 17, 25, 138 S.Ct. 13, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017)).
This one is.
C.
Chehazeh
Do cases support the reading of Section 1252(b)(9)
laid out just above?
At the Supreme Court, there is no binding authority. A
majority of Justices has not directly passed on the question
one way or another. 25
25. In short passages here and there, various Justices have
weighed in. A dissent from Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, suggests that Section 1252(b)(9) applies
only to review of orders of removal that have already been entered.
“Jurisdiction ... is unaffected by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which by its
terms applies only ‘with respect to review of an order of removal
under § 1252(a)(1).’ The respondents challenge their detention
without bail, not an order of removal.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 355, 138
S.Ct. 830 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cleaned up). On the other hand,
a dissent from Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, seems to
suggest the opposite view, that Section 1252(b)(9) limits district-court
review even before an order of removal has been entered. “[Section]
1252(b)(9) covers all ‘questions of law and fact’ that an immigration
judge must decide as a result of the Government’s decision to initiate
290a
Appendix E
But the Supreme Court addressed Section 1252(b)(9)
in passing in an earlier case.
And based on that Supreme Court case, and based on
an earlier decision of its own, the Third Circuit has held
that Section 1252(b)(9) applies only after a final order of
removal has been entered --- and such an order, as noted,
has not been entered here as to the Petitioner.
The Third Circuit’s analysis and holding as to Section
1252(b)(9) is quoted here in full:
[T]he Supreme Court has noted that § 1252
(b)(9) is subject to the limitations of § 1252(b),
and, therefore, “applies only ‘with respect to
review of an order of removal under subsection
(a)(1).’ “ INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313, 121
S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347, (2001) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)). Section 1252(b)(9), “by its
own terms,” does not bar review of an order
“not subject to judicial review under § 1252
(a)(1),” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313, 121 S.Ct. 2271,
and § 1252(a)(1) describes only “review of a
final order of removal.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)
(“Judicial review of a final order of removal ... is
governed only by chapter 158 of title 28, except
removal proceedings against an alien.” Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at 590,
140 S.Ct. 1683 (Thomas, J., dissenting). And note that a concurrence
from Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, necessarily rests
on the idea that Section 1252(b)(9) applies even before orders of
removal are entered. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 319–21, 138 S.Ct. 830
(Thomas, J., concurring). For more on Jennings, see Part IV.A.3(d).
291a
Appendix E
as provided in sub[s]ection (b) of this section
....”). Section 1252(b)(9), therefore, requires
only that, when there is an order of removal
under subsection (a)(1), review of any issues
related to that order must be consolidated into a
single petition for review and cannot be brought
piecemeal. One may not, for instance, follow a
petition for review with a habeas petition or a
petition for a writ of mandamus.
Although St. Cyr issued prior to the REAL ID
Act, the REAL ID Act did not modify § 1252(b)
or the instruction that § 1252(b)(9) “applies only
‘with respect to review of an order of removal
under subsection (a)(1).’ “ St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at
313, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)).
Since that time, both the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have held that, when a person is not
seeking review of “an order of removal under
subsection (a)(1),” the limitations of § 1252
(b)(9) do not apply. See Singh v. Gonzales, 499
F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2007) (“By virtue of its
explicit language ... 1252(b)(9) applies only to
those claims seeking judicial review of orders of
removal.”); Madu v. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362,
1367 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “section
1252(b)(9) applies only with respect to review
of an order of removal” and that the REAL
ID Act “did not expand the scope of § 1252
(b)(9) by making it applicable to cases other than
those involving ‘review of an order of removal’ ”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. House
292a
Appendix E
Conference Report on the REAL ID Act, H.R.
Rep. No. 109-72, at 175, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240,
300 (“Section 106 would not preclude habeas
review over challenges to detention that are
independent of challenges to removal orders.
Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review
only over challenges to removal orders.”).
While we have not written precedentially on the
scope of § 1252(b)(9) after the REAL ID Act,
we have addressed the effect of nearly identical
language in § 1252(a)(5). In Kumarasamy v.
Attorney General, we considered whether a
habeas petition that was before us on appeal
when the REAL ID Act came into effect
should be converted into a petition for review
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). 453 F.3d 169,
172 (3d Cir. 2006). That subsection states that
a “petition for review filed with an appropriate
court of appeals ... shall be the sole and
exclusive means for judicial review of an order
of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The petitioner
in Kumarasamy had not been seeking review
of an order of removal but was seeking habeas
relief, claiming that his deportation was illegal
“because there was no order of removal.” 453
F.3d at 172 (emphasis in original). We held that
§ 1252(a)(5) did not apply, because that provision
pertained only to “judicial review of an order of
removal.” Id. (emphasis in original). Our holding
in Kumarasamy supports the conclusion that,
because § 1252(b) refers only to “review of an
293a
Appendix E
order of removal under subsection (a)(1),” it, and
its subsections, are inapplicable when there is
no such order.
Not all courts agree with the conclusion
reached by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
and suggested by us in Kumarasamy. The
First Circuit held in Aguilar v. United States
Immigration & Customs Enforcement that
“the reach of section 1252(b)(9) is not limited
to challenges to singular orders of removal.”
510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007). The reasoning
of Aguilar, however, appears to conflict with
the Supreme Court’s explicit instruction in St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (“Section
1252(b)(9) applies only ‘with respect to review
of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).’
“), and with the language of § 1252(b) (“With
respect to review of an order of removal under
subsection (a)(1) of this section, the following
requirements apply ....”). We therefore join with
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and hold that
§ 1252(b)(9) applies only “with respect to review
of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). Because Chehazeh is not
seeking review of any order of removal --- as
there has been no such order with respect to
him --- § 1252(b)(9) does not preclude judicial
review.
Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 131-33 (cleaned up).
294a
Appendix E
This is all but dispositive.
There is no order of removal in this case. And so
Section 1252(b)(9) does not apply under Chehazeh.
“Because [the Petitioner] is not seeking review of any
order of removal --- as there has been no such order with
respect to him --- § 1252(b)(9) does not preclude judicial
review.” Id.
***
Might Chehazeh be distinguished from this case on
factual grounds?
Chehazeh, after all, was an “unusual” case, id. at 121,
focused on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to
sua sponte reopen a decision. See id.
Perhaps, it might be argued, Chehazeh does not apply
to the more typical case, where a person in a removal
proceeding seeks federal district court review before the
immigration court proceedings have run their course.
But that sort of distinction seems to have been
considered and rejected by the Third Circuit in EOHC
v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland
Security, 950 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2020).
There, people in removal proceedings went to the
district court. See id. at 180. Up against Chehazeh, the
federal-government appellees argued that that case should
be limited to its facts. See Brief for Appellees at 37, EOHC,
295a
Appendix E
950 F.3d 177 (No. 19-2927). But the Third Circuit did not
seem to accept this position. This was the EOHC court’s
only mention of Chehazeh:
[Section 1252(b)(9)] does not reach “claims
that are independent of, or wholly collateral to,
the removal process,” like “claims that cannot
effectively be handled through the available
administrative process.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11;
accord J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032
(9th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases); Reply Br. 16
(interpreting Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,
666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012)); Oral Arg. Tr. 20-21.
EOHC, 950 F.3d at 186.
Now look to the page of the Reply Brief that was
cited as “interpreting” Chehazeh. It reads, in part: “the
government’s argument that this Court should ‘limit
Chehazeh to its facts’ ... is misplaced. Instead, ... the
applicability of section 1252(b)(9) depends on the nature
of the claim being considered.” Reply Brief for Appellants
at 16, EOHC, 950 F.3d 177 (No. 19-2927).
It appears that the EOHC court, by citing this page
of the brief, meant to signal that it rejected any cabining
of Chehazeh to its facts.
***
Might it be argued that Chehazeh has been implicitly
overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings?
296a
Appendix E
This seems unlikely.
The Third Circuit in EOHC referenced Chehazeh, as
noted. See EOHC, 950 F.3d at 186. And it also discussed
Jennings at length. See id. at 185-86. If Jennings overruled
Chehazeh, would EOHC not have said so?
And more directly: there is no reason to think
Jennings pushed aside Chehazeh.
To see why, look first to the facts of Jennings.
Noncitizens in immigration custody had been detained
for more than six months without bond hearings, and they
argued this was illegal under various statutes. See id.
at 290, 138 S.Ct. 830. Those statutes applied to certain
noncitizens --- those who had not received a final order of
removal. See id. at 291, 299, 303, 138 S.Ct. 830. 26
Jennings, then, was like Chehazeh --- a pre-order-offinal-removal case.
As to jurisdiction, what did the Supreme Court rule in
Jennings? Did Section 1252(b)(9) strip jurisdiction or not?
26. In the district court, one of the noncitizens sought
certification of a subclass under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which governs the
“[d]etention ... of aliens ordered removed.” See Jennings, 583 U.S. at
291, 138 S.Ct. 830. But the court of appeals held that this subclass
could not be certified, see id., and the Supreme Court did not revisit
that decision. See id. at 291–92, 138 S.Ct. 830. So the case before the
Court concerned only detention of people who had not been ordered
finally removed.
297a
Appendix E
The answer is not straightforward, because the
Jennings Court fragmented on the jurisdictional question.
See id. at 284, 138 S.Ct. 830. Eight justices took part and
there were three opinions; none commanded a majority.
See id. at 284, 292, 138 S.Ct. 830.
How to decide what to take away from this? When “a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (cleaned up); see
generally Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132
Harv. L. Rev. 1942 (2019).
But this “Marks rule” is not clarifying here. 27
Chehazeh held that, as a categorical matter, Section
1252(b)(9) does not apply before entry of an order of
removal. See 666 F.3d at 133.
27. A s a general matter, the Marks r ule can apply to
jurisdictional holdings. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 661
F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st
Cir. 2006); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723
(7th Cir. 2006). It just does not shed light here, as will be seen in
a moment. (Note that the Marks rule may be especially hard to
apply to a jurisdiction-stripping statute, because it is not obvious
what the right baseline is. Are the “narrower grounds” those that
narrow the reach of the statute (and therefore expand federal court
jurisdiction)? Or are the “narrower grounds” those that expand the
reach of the statute (and therefore narrow federal court jurisdiction)?
Cf. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63–64.)
298a
Appendix E
But on that question, there is no Jennings majority
to cobble together using Marks.
As noted, eight Justices took part in Jennings. See
583 U.S. at 284, 138 S.Ct. 830.
Two Justices, with Justice Thomas writing, held
that Section 1252(b)(9) can apply before a final order of
removal exists. See id. at 317-18, 138 S.Ct. 830 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
Three Justices, with Justice Breyer writing, suggested
that it cannot apply before a final order of removal exists.
See id. at 355, 138 S.Ct. 830 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
And three Justices, with Justice Alito writing, took
no explicit stance on the question.
Rather, Justice Alito’s opinion held that Section
1252(b)(9) did not control the particular case before the
Court --- because detention without a bail hearing did not
“aris[e] from” actions to remove the noncitizens, as Section
1252(b)(9) requires. See id. at 292-95, 138 S.Ct. 830.
But nothing can be read into Justice Alito’s opinion
as to whether Section 1252(b)(9) might otherwise apply
before an order of removal; therefore, no holding of his
can join that of another opinion, via the Marks rule, to
make a majority.
This is for two reasons.
299a
Appendix E
First, “[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record,
neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled
upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided
as to constitute precedents.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170, 125 S.Ct. 577, 160
L.Ed.2d 548 (2004); see also, e.g., United States v. More,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172, 2 L.Ed. 397 (1805) (Chief
Justice Marshall making this point at oral argument as
to jurisdiction).
Justice Alito took no “position,” Marks, 430 U.S. at
193, 97 S.Ct. 990, on whether Section 1252(b)(9) could or
could not categorically have applied if the statute’s “arising
from” language had fit the case before the Court.
So why impute a position to him?
And all the more so because Justice Alito’s opinion
noted that the parties had not briefed “the scope” of
Section 1252(b)(9), see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294, 138 S.Ct.
830, and so, as Justice Alito put it, his opinion declined
“to provide a comprehensive interpretation” of Section
1252(b)(9), ruling only that the statute did not apply given
the facts at hand. See id. at 294, 138 S.Ct. 830.
To see the second point, start by noting that when an
explicit ruling (call it “CD”) necessarily rests on an implicit
logical proposition (call it “AB”) --- then both CD and AB
can count as rulings. See footnote 28 (discussing this).
If Justice Alito’s explicit ruling (CD) was that
jurisdiction was stripped in Jennings because of Section
300a
Appendix E
1252(b)(9)’s language, then that would logically rest on
the implicit idea (AB) that Section 1252(b)(9) applied in
the first place.
But that is not where Justice Alito’s opinion came
down.
It held that, because of Section 1252(b)(9)’s language,
jurisdiction was not stripped --- and that ruling does not
rest on a logically necessary sense that Section 1252(b)(9)
applied. After all, Justice Alito could have reached the
same result (no jurisdiction strip) regardless of his answer
to the question of whether Section 1252(b)(9) does or does
not categorically apply to pre-order-of-removal cases. 28
28. The second point in the text is abstract. Unpack it a bit more
here. The complexity is this: AB may typically get analyzed before
conclusion CD is reached; but whether AB is necessary to conclusion
CD --- that depends. To see why, imagine this statute: “if a person
is an employee, she cannot be discriminated against --- and if she is
discriminated against, the employer is liable and must pay.” Under
the statute, whether a person is an employee will usually be analyzed
before deciding whether she has been discriminated against. But
is a holding as to whether she is an employee logically implicit in
a holding as to whether the employer must pay? Sometimes yes,
sometimes no. If the court holds she was discriminated against
and that the employer must pay, then that must logically rest on a
particular resolution of the prior question, as to whether the person
was an employee. After all, if she was not an employee, how could the
employer have broken the statute and now be expected to pay? But if
the court holds she was not discriminated against, and the employer
need not pay, that does not logically need to have been based on any
particular decision on the question of whether the person was an
employee. Why not? Because the ruling (no pay) would come out the
301a
Appendix E
***
In sum: even after deploying the Marks rule, it cannot
be said that a Jennings majority spoke to the Chehazeh
question --- let alone implicitly overruled the Third
Circuit’s Chehazeh opinion.
V. If Section 1252(b)(9) Applies Here
Where things stand:
The Respondents argue that Section 1252(b)(9)
pulls away jurisdiction, such that this Court cannot
consider the Petitioner’s motion to enjoin the Secretary’s
determination.
That argument looks solid at first. See Part IV.A. But
look to all of Section 1252(b), and the argument melts
away. Section 1252(b)(9) is in play only when an order of
same way regardless of how the employee question was answered.
Another way to see this is to think about arguments made arguendo.
Justice Alito in Jennings could have said “assuming arguendo that
Section 1252(b)(9) can generally apply to pre-order-of-removal cases,
the statute’s language does not apply to this case --- and so there is no
jurisdiction strip here.” But for his part, Justice Thomas in Jennings
could not have said “assuming arguendo that Section 1252(b)(9) can
generally apply to pre-order-of-removal cases, its language applies
to this case --- and so there is a jurisdiction strip here.” For Justice
Alito’s bottom-line conclusion, the categorical question of whether
Section 1252(b)(9) applies is not logically necessary and therefore
can be assumed away arguendo; for Justice Thomas’ bottom-line
conclusion, the categorical question is logically necessary --- and
therefore cannot be bracketed for later.
302a
Appendix E
removal has been entered. That is what the statute says.
See Part IV.B. And that is what the Third Circuit has
held. See Part IV.C.
Therefore, Section 1252(b)(9) does not apply here --there is no order of removal.
But there is an important difficulty.
To see it, compare (a) Chehazeh and (b) EOHC, two
Third Circuit cases that have been mentioned at various
points above.
***
Chehazeh holds that Section 1252(b)(9) applies only
when an order of removal has been entered. The long
excerpt above, see Part IV.C, shows that.
Move now to EOHC.
It, too, was an immigration case. And it held that
Section 1252(b)(9) precluded the district court from
hearing a particular claim --- even though no order of
removal had been entered. See EOHC, 950 F.3d at 180.
Chehazeh and EOHC appear to pull in opposite
directions.
Does Section 1252(b)(9) apply when there is, as here,
no order of removal?
303a
Appendix E
Chehazeh seems to say no. EOHC seems to say yes.
If Chehazeh controls, then Section 1252(b)(9) is not
on the table in this case. It is categorically irrelevant.
Jurisdiction is not affected by it. See Part IV.B and IV.C.
But if EOHC controls, Section 1252(b)(9) potentially
does apply here --- and if it does, there is a solid textual
case, see Part IV.A, that it strips this Court of jurisdiction.
***
How to proceed?
The Court closely reviews EOHC, and concludes that
it stands for this principle: the question of whether Section
1252(b)(9) allows a federal district court to hear a claim
that has been brought to it depends on whether the claim
could get “meaningful review” if federal court review is
delayed out into the future --- as will happen if the federal
district court is divested of jurisdiction by Section 1252(b)
(9), and the case is then sent down the immigration courts
route. See Part V.A. 29
In other words:
Under EOHC, Section 1252(b)(9) strips jurisdiction
if later review in the federal court of appeals, after the
29. Recall: if a claim must first go to the immigration courts,
federal court review of the claim will happen only later, in a federal
court of appeals, after the immigration courts have done their work.
304a
Appendix E
immigration courts are done, would be meaningful. But
Section 1252(b)(9) does not strip jurisdiction if postimmigration-courts review would not be meaningful.
On this reading, EOHC essentially applies the Supreme
Court’s general administrative law jurisprudence in the
particular context of immigration law --- and that makes
sense, given that immigration law, in this area, is a part
of the administrative law family. See Part V.B.
And on this reading, EOHC is fully consistent with
one of the Third Circuit’s key relevant precedents --- the
opinion authored by then-Judge Alito in Massieu v. Reno,
91 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 1996). Massieu applied the same body
of general administrative law jurisprudence that EOHC
does. See Part V.C.
***
The question of how the referenced “meaningful
review” issue plays out in this case is taken up in Part VI.
For now, though, start with EOHC, and move on to
administrative law more generally and then to Massieu.
A.
EOHC
This is what the EOHC case was about:
A father and his minor daughter came to the United
States from Guatemala. See EOHC, 950 F.3d at 181.
305a
Appendix E
Federal officials began removal proceedings. See id.
The Board of Immigration Appeals eventually entered a
stay of removal, see id., but the father and his daughter
became concerned that they would be moved to Mexico, see
id., to wait things out there while American immigration
courts assessed whether they should be removed back to
Guatemala. 30 See id.
The father and his daughter filed a habeas petition in
Pennsylvania. See id. They pressed a set of claims, and as
to each one the Third Circuit asked the same question: can
this claim go forward in the federal district court? Or do
jurisdiction-stripping statutes take away that possibility,
requiring the claim to run down the immigration-court
track? See id. at 184.
To answer these questions, EOHC relied on this
principle: that Section 1252(b)(9) allows claims to be
brought in a federal district court now if there could not
be “meaningful” judicial review of those claims later --after the immigration courts have finished their work and
a federal court (the court of appeals) then gets involved.
See id. at 180 (“When a detained alien seeks relief that a
court of appeals cannot meaningfully provide on petition
for review of a final order of removal, § 1252(b)(9) does not
bar consideration by a district court.”); see also id. at 18687 (invoking meaningful review as to Section 1252(b)(9);
cf. id. at 189-90 (invoking meaningful review as to other
jurisdiction-stripping provisions).
30. This was during the period when the federal government
applied a protocol to send noncitizens to Mexico while they waited
for removal proceedings. See EOHC, 950 F.3d at 181.
306a
Appendix E
In immigration law, involvement by an Article III
federal court is typically a late-in-the-process thing. See
id. at 180. Immigration courts handle the case at Time 1,
and a federal court (a court of appeals) gets involved for
the first time only at Time 2. See id.
But, EOHC holds, if waiting until Time 2 would
undermine “meaningful” federal court review --- then
that review can be hurried up, and a “detained alien”
can first go to a federal court, a federal district court, at
Time 1, rather than have the immigration courts take the
initial look, with federal court review to take place only
afterwards (in a federal court of appeals).
In that circumstance, Article III judicial review --usually pushed out into the future as a job for a federal
court of appeals --- is pulled back into the present, and
is undertaken by a federal district court (whose work is
later reviewed by a federal court of appeals).
***
How does this principle work in practice?
The EOHC father and daughter claimed that they
would be temporarily moved to Mexico, to wait there
for the immigration courts’ decision in their removal
proceedings. See id. at 181. Such a claim, EOHC held,
can be taken up right away by a federal district court,
consistent with Section 1252(b)(9). See id. at 187.
Why?
307a
Appendix E
Because, per EOHC, there can be no “meaningful”
consideration later of such a claim by a court of appeals,
after the immigration courts have wrapped up their work.
By then, the father and daughter could already have been
in Mexico for years, and those years would have been
lost. See id. at 186-87. “Now-or-never” claims, id. at 186,
as that one was, can go forward now in a federal district
court because they fit into a broader umbrella category
--- claims that cannot later be “meaningful[ly]” reviewed
when they would ordinarily make their way to a federal
court of appeals.
And take a second example, to see the flip side of the
coin.
The EOHC father and daughter also claimed that
being moved to Mexico would fray their relationship with
their lawyer, which would violate their statutory right to
counsel at an eventual removal hearing. See id. at 187-88.
EOHC, citing Section 1252(b)(9), held that this claim
could not be brought right away in federal district court. 31
Why not?
Because the claim could get “meaningful” review later
--- as the court of appeals looked back on what happened
at the removal hearing, with an eye on any damage that
may have been done to the attorney-client relationship.
See id. at 188 (“[T]he court of appeals can redress any
31. This was a pre-order-of-removal claim.
308a
Appendix E
deprivation of counsel in the removal proceedings before
the alien is removed.”).
B. Administrative Law
In a nutshell, EOHC held that Section 1252(b)(9) does
not take jurisdiction away from federal district courts
when the alternative --- going the standard route, to the
immigration courts and then to a federal court of appeals
--- would undermine “meaningful” judicial review.
EOHC indicated that its approach flowed from a broad
range of sources --- statutory text, a recent Supreme
Court decision, and a set of presumptions. See id. at 18486.
And that approach is also closely consistent with
broader principles of administrative law --- the legal
family that, in this context, immigration law is part of.
1.
Structure
To begin seeing this, start with the classic picture of
adjudication in the federal system.
On the ground floor is a federal district court. Then
the next level up is a federal court of appeals. And finally
the Supreme Court sits atop the pyramid.
But the classic picture is not everywhere the current
one.
309a
Appendix E
In administrative law, for example, the federal
district court is often swapped out, its place taken by an
administrative court.
In cases related to the SEC, the FTC, the EPA, the
FDA, and the FCC, the rungs on the ladder often look like
this: an agency administrative judge (or an administrative
law judge, or some other non-Article III official), does
the front-line dispute resolution. And after that is done,
the case plugs back into the standard system --- with
the administrative judge’s decision then reviewed by an
Article III court, the federal court of appeals. See Federal
Appeals Jurisdiction and Practice § 15:1 (2025 ed.); 2
Charles H. Koch & Richard Murphy, Admin. L. & Prac.
§ 5:10 (3d ed. 2024).
***
There was a time when immigration detention was
commonly reviewed using the classic tools of American
adjudication.
A person in custody typically (though not always)
started off in the federal district court, seeking a habeas
corpus writ. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 531-32,
72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6, 8, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948); U.S. ex rel.
Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 132-33, 44 S.Ct. 260, 68 L.Ed.
590 (1924) Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13, 28
S.Ct. 201, 52 L.Ed. 369 (1908); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189
U.S. 86, 87, 23 S.Ct. 611, 47 L.Ed. 721 (1903).
310a
Appendix E
But the plates began to shift during the mid-20th
century.
New jurisdictional statutes became law. 32
And now, immigration law looks in some basic ways
like a branch of administrative law.
Cases generally go in the first instance to immigration
judges, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10, and immigration judges are
roughly akin to other administrative judges. See footnote
2; 2 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 2:159. And as with administrative
judges, immigration judges’ decisions are ultimately
funneled out of the agency --- for relatively late-in-theprocess review by a federal court, a courts of appeals. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
Bottom line: immigration disputes are resolved using
many of the same basic structures as bread-and-butter
administrative disputes, like those involving the SEC,
FTC, or FDA.
32. After the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, there was some back and forth over where deportation orders
might be reviewed. See Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 186, 77
S.Ct. 252, 1 L.Ed.2d 225 (1956); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S.
48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S.
229, 235–36, 73 S.Ct. 603, 97 L.Ed. 972 (1953). But this was mostly
smoothed out by the passage of the 1961 amendments to the INA,
which made review in the federal courts of appeals the “sole and
exclusive procedure” for judicial review of final orders of deportation.
See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 651.
311a
Appendix E
The next section begins to explain why this similarity
matters.
2.
Thunder Basin
The key question covered by this Opinion is this: under
Section 1252(b)(9), must the Petitioner’s constitutional
challenge to the Secretary of State’s determination go
forward in the first instance before this Court or before
the immigration courts?
At its core, this question is a variant on an everyday
set of administrative law questions --- questions that are
spun off by administrative-agency adjudication that, as the
prior section shows, makes use of the same basic structure
(agency adjudication, followed by federal court of appeals
review) as modern immigration law.
Look here at how administrative law generally handles
issues of this sort, and then return, later, to immigration
law and to EOHC.
***
As a matter of administrative law:
What to do if a litigant tries to sue in federal district
court, but a separate system of administrative-agency
courts has been set up? Does she get to stay in the federal
district court, or must she move over to the agency’s
courts, and await federal court review in the court of
appeals?
312a
Appendix E
The Supreme Court has answered these questions
in a string of cases involving the Mine Safety and
Health Administration, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, the Merit Systems Protection Board,
and the Federal Trade Commission.
The anchor case in the chain is Thunder Basin Coal
Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d
29 (1994), and so the law in this area often goes by the
shorthand of “Thunder Basin.”
Thunder Basin law in a nutshell:
If Congress has explicitly pulled jurisdiction away
from the federal district courts, the case goes to the
agency for first-cut adjudication there. See Axon, 598
U.S. at 185, 143 S.Ct. 890; Adorers of the Blood of Christ
v. FERC, 897 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2018); accord, e.g.,
Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Cochran
v. SEC, 20 F.4th 194, 205 (5th Cir. 2021); Bank of La. v.
FDIC, 919 F.3d 916, 923 (5th Cir. 2019); Jones Brothers,
Inc. v. Sec’y of Lab., 898 F.3d 669, 675 (6th Cir. 2018); E.
Bridge, LLC v. Chao, 320 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2003).
But if Congress has not explicitly pulled jurisdiction
away from the federal district courts, ask: is it “fairly
discernible” that Congress intended for claims to go
to administrative courts as opposed to federal district
courts? See Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 10,
132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012); Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489, 130 S.Ct.
313a
Appendix E
3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010); see also Axon, 598 U.S. at
185, 143 S.Ct. 890. 33
If the answer to the step-one “fairly discernible”
question is “no,” then the case stays in federal district
court.
If the answer to the “fairly discernible” question is
“yes,” then the focus narrows, to the particular “type”
of claim that is in play --- and whether (now, step-two)
Congress wanted that type of claim to make its first stop
in a federal court or before an administrative adjudicator.
See Axon, 598 U.S. at 186, 143 S.Ct. 890; Elgin, 567 U.S. at
22, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489, 130
S.Ct. 3138; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 208, 114 S.Ct. 771;
Adorers, 897 F.3d at 195; Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring
Co., 78 F.3d 868, 873 (3d Cir. 1996); accord, e.g., Cochran,
20 F.4th at 206; Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir.
2016); Bennett v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2016);
Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2015); Ne. Erectors
Ass’n of BTEA v. Sec’y of Lab., Occupational Safety &
Health Admin., 62 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1995).
33. This question is mainly answered as matter of statutory
interpretation --- with an eye, for example, on text and purpose. See
Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at
489, 130 S.Ct. 3138; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct. 771;
Adorers, 897 F.3d at 195; accord, e.g., Cochran, 20 F.4th at 199–205;
Bank of La., 919 F.3d at 923; Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th
Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2016); Bennett
v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2016); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765,
769 (7th Cir. 2015).
314a
Appendix E
To answer this “type” question, courts are to look
to whether agency-first adjudication would: (1) supply
“meaningful review”; (2) draw on agency expertise; and
(3) run through issues that are core, rather than collateral.
See Axon, 598 U.S. at 184-85, 143 S.Ct. 890; Elgin, 567
U.S. at 15, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at
489, 130 S.Ct. 3138; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13,
114 S.Ct. 771; accord, e.g., Bank of La., 919 F.3d at 923;
Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton,
824 F.3d at 281; Bennett, 844 F.3d at 181; Jarkesy, 803
F.3d at 17; Bebo, 799 F.3d at 769.
Of these three, “meaningful review” is by far the most
important. See Bennett, 844 F.3d at 183 n.7; Hill, 825 F.3d
at 1245; Tilton, 824 F.3d at 282; Bebo, 799 F.3d at 774.
Can there be “meaningful review” if Article III review
is deferred until after the administrative court finishes its
work and hands things over to the federal court of appeals?
Or does “meaningful review” require that the claim
be heard, now, in the federal district court?34
34. Saying yes to this question would bypass Congress’ broader
choice to send claims to the agency’s courts. But it would do so on
the theory that Congress would have wanted a particular “type” of
claim to go forward first in the federal district court if that is the
way to get “meaningful review.” See Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at
212—13, 114 S.Ct. 771.
315a
Appendix E
C. EOHC In Context
Come back now to the EOHC case, and see it in light
of the broader administrative law principles laid out just
above.
EOHC was an immigration-adjudication case.
And as discussed, the basic structure of immigration
adjudication is closely similar to the structure of
administrative adjudication more generally. See Part
V.B.1.
No surprise, then, that in those closely related
contexts, similar questions are answered in roughly the
same way.
The questions:
Do the relevant statutes mean that a case stays in
federal district court? Or do they mean that a case is
channeled in the first instance to agency tribunals, like
SEC, FTC, or immigration courts --- and only after they
are done with their work does the case potentially go to
federal court, a federal court of appeals?
The answer:
Under Thunder Basin (for administrative law
in general) and under EOHC (for immigration law in
particular) the answer is largely the same: it depends on
whether delayed federal court review is consistent with
the imperative of “meaningful review.”
316a
Appendix E
The key point: EOHC was, in essence, applying
general administrative law rules (the Thunder Basin
rules) to closely related immigration law questions.
And EOHC applied Thunder Basin systematically.
EOHC precisely invoked Thunder Basin’s stepone test. Compare Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 114
S.Ct. 771 (“In cases involving delayed judicial review ...,
we shall find that Congress has allocated initial review
to an administrative body where such intent is fairly
discernible.”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up), with EOHC,
950 F.3d at 188 (“We look to whether the congressional
intent to preclude judicial review is fairly discernible in
the statutory scheme.”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up).
EOHC undertook the basic step -one analysis
prescribed in Thunder Basin. Compare Thunder Basin,
510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct. 771 (to get at the question of
Congressional intent, looking to a “statute’s language,
structure, and purpose”), with EOHC, 950 F.3d at 188
(“In discerning that intent, we look at the statute’s ‘text,
structure, and purpose.’ “) (quoting Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10,
132 S.Ct. 2126).
And, as has been noted, EOHC focused on the main
Thunder Basin step-two concern --- “meaningful” judicial
review. Compare Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct.
771 (“Whether a statute is intended to preclude initial
judicial review is determined from ... whether the claims
can be afforded meaningful review.”), with EOHC, 950
F.3d at 180, 186, 189-90. 35
35. EOHC also cited a source that mentioned one of the other
two Thunder Basin factors. Compare Thunder Basin, 510 U.S.
317a
Appendix E
***
In applying the Thunder Basin rules,36 why did EOHC
land on the “meaningful review” rule?
Per the Thunder Basin line of cases, that is the
standard to use when Congress has not said in an
“explicit” way that certain types of cases must go to an
administrative court. See Part V.B.1.
Presumably, the EOHC court did not view Congress
as having provided sufficiently “explicit” direction as
at 212, 114 S.Ct. 771 (“[t]his Court previously has upheld district
court jurisdiction over claims considered wholly collateral to a
statute’s review provisions”), with EOHC, 950 F.3d at 186 (citing the
appellants’ reply brief at 16 --- which noted that “claims independent
of or collateral to the removal process are excluded”).
36. Too much should not be made of the fact that EOHC did not
cite Thunder Basin or explicitly invoke its two-step analysis. EOHC
cited Elgin, see EOHC, 950 F.3d at 188, and that is a key case in the
Thunder Basin line. More fundamentally, the question of whether
review will be “meaningful” --- and therefore whether federal court
review should be deferred in favor of agency review --- has long
been a part of administrative law’s DNA. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 192,
143 S.Ct. 890; McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496,
111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 341, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262–63, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). It long
predates Thunder Basin and was clearly part of the EOHC court’s
thinking. Compare EOHC, 950 F.3d at 186 (citing McNary for the
proposition that there was no jurisdiction-stripping over certain
claims when “meaningful judicial review ... would [otherwise] be
foreclosed”), with Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 213–14, 114 S.Ct. 771
(reasoning from McNary).
318a
Appendix E
to whether certain cases must first go to immigration
courts. 37
***
In a nutshell: to determine whether to apply Section
1252(b)(9) to a given claim, EOHC applied Thunder Basin,
and in particular its “meaningful review” test.
D.
Massieu
EOHC sits atop Thunder Basin --- and foregrounding
this only emphasizes the close continuity between EOHC
and one of the Third Circuit’s key precedents in this area,
Massieu.
To see the point, look now to Massieu.
During the mid-1990s, the federal government sought
to remove a Mexican national, Mario Ruiz Massieu, from
the United States. See Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 41719 (3d Cir. 1996).
37. And such a conclusion is not surprising. After all, the
argument that there is an “explicit” congressional directive as
to where cases should go rests largely on Section 1252(b)(9). But
Chehazeh held that in this “type” of case, a pre-order-of-removal
case, Section 1252(b)(9) is inapplicable. And in any event, the
Justices have suggested a range of different views as to whether
Section 1252(b)(9) applies before entry of an order of removal. See
footnote 25. That suggests that the explicitness test is not met,
especially against the backdrop of the various presumptions against
jurisdiction-stripping that EOHC leaned on. See 950 F.3d at 184.
319a
Appendix E
This was to be done based on a determination made
by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, using the
same law invoked in this case to seek the removal of the
Petitioner. See id. at 418.
Massieu sued, and Judge Barry, then of this Court,
ruled that she had jurisdiction over the case. See Massieu
v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681, 697 (D.N.J. 1996), rev’d, 91 F.3d
416 (3d Cir. 1996). 38
The Third Circuit, per then-Judge Alito, reversed.
See Massieu, 91 F.3d at 425. It held that the case needed
to first go to the immigration courts. See id.
The Third Circuit in Massieu came to that conclusion
by analyzing the case using the two-step Thunder Basin
doctrine described above in Part IV.B.
First, Judge Alito looked to text, purpose, and other
sources to decide if Congress had expressed a “fairly
discernible” intent to send the case to an immigration
judge in the first instance, and not to a federal district
judge. See id. at 420.
And the Massieu court then went to the second step,
moving through each of the required Thunder Basin
factors --- the critical “meaningful review” factor, plus
the “collateral” and “expertise” factors. See id. at 422.
38. On the merits, Judge Barry held that 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)
(C)(i) (now 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i)) is unconstitutionally vague.
See Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 703. The Petitioner here has not made
that argument. See footnote 7.
320a
Appendix E
***
Massieu is relevant here in three main ways.
***
First, Massieu is very similar to this case.
The Respondents go so far as to say it is “on all fours.”
See Opposition Brief at 12. And there is a lot to that.
Massieu involved the same statute as this case (what is
now 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i)) and the same question as
this case (in what court should the claim start?).
Whether Massieu controls the outcome here is taken
up in the next Part.
***
Second, Massieu, as noted, is closely consistent with
EOHC.
EOHC and Massieu land in the same place --- on a
concern for “meaningful review” as a key touchstone for
deciding whether a case must go to the immigration courts
before a federal district court.
EOHC and Massieu thus point in the same direction.
Each suggests that, on the assumption that Section
1252(b)(9) applies here, 39 this Court must conduct a
39. See Part IV.B and Part IV.C.
321a
Appendix E
Thunder Basin-type analysis, and with an emphasis on
Thunder Basin’s most important factor --- “meaningful”
judicial review.40
***
Third and finally, Massieu undermines any argument
that the immigration laws in some “explicit” way require
that this case be sent now to the immigration courts.
After all, if the immigration laws were explicit on
that point, then Judge Alito’s opinion would not have
done what it did. It would not have conducted a Thunder
Basin analysis --- because that is called for only when the
relevant laws are not explicit.41
40. EOHC and Massieu are no outliers. Federal courts often
rely on Thunder Basin to decide whether a claim should be heard in
immigration courts or in the federal district court. See, e.g., Miriyeva
v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 9 F.4th 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2021);
Adi v. Mayorkas, 2022 WL 267989, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2022);
O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 136 (D.D.C. 2019); Ramirez v.
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1, 37 (D.D.C. 2018);
Jafarzadeh v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 19, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2018);
Jafarzadeh v. Duke, 270 F. Supp. 3d 296, 308 (D.D.C. 2017); see also
J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2016); Aguilar,
510 F.3d at 11; cf. Duron v. Johnson, 898 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2018).
41. And the point can be seen more directly, too. For the key
proposition, Massieu cited a federal-common-law rule and a treatise,
not an explicit statutory provision.
Even where an alien is attempting to prevent an
exclusion or deportation proceeding from taking place
in the first instance and is thus not, strictly speaking,
attacking a final order of deportation or exclusion, it
322a
Appendix E
To be sure, the immigration laws have changed a good
deal since Massieu was handed down in 1996.
But the three main statutes that Judge Alito reasoned
from remain on the books, and in substantively similar
form.
The main one was 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1996) (“[A]n
order of deportation ... shall not be reviewed by any
court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative
remedies[.]”).
It has since been revised, with the current version
at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final
order of removal only if ... the alien has exhausted all
administrative remedies.”).
But the two statutes “state[ ] the same requirements
in essentially the same language.” Duvall v. Elwood, 336
is well settled that “judicial review is precluded if the
alien has failed to avail himself of all administrative
remedies,” one of which is the deportation or exclusion
hearing itself. See, e.g., Xiao v. Barr, 979 F.2d 151, 153
(9th Cir. 1992); see also 3 Charles Gordon & Stanley
Mailman, Immigration Law and Procedure § 81.02[2], at
81–26–28 (1996) (“A person against whom a deportation
proceeding is brought may feel that the proceeding is
unjustified and illegal but generally has no right to go
to court immediately to stop the proceeding. Congress
has provided an administrative device for passing upon
an alien’s deportability, and generally there must be a
final administrative ruling before judicial review can
be initiated.”).
Massieu, 91 F.3d at 421.
323a
Appendix E
F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2003). Indeed, the Third Circuit has
held that Massieu’s analysis still governs Section 1252
(d)(1). See id. at 232.
And the two other statutes that Massieu relied on
also remain on the books, tweaked here and there but
substantively the same. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)
(1996) (“the sole and exclusive procedure for ... the judicial
review of all final orders of deportation” is through a
petition for review), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1996) (“[T]he
[administrative] procedure so prescribed shall be the sole
and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability
of an alien under this section.”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)
(“[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
appeals ... shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial
review[.]”), and 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (“[A] proceeding
under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure
for determining whether an alien may be ... removed from
the United States.”).
And the most relevant new, post-Massieu statute --Section 1252(b)(9) --- either does not apply to this case, per
Chehazeh, or does not provide explicit enough direction.
See footnote 37.
E. Conclusion
Pause now briefly to see where things stand:
The Third Circuit in Chehazeh held that Section
1252(b)(9) does not apply to cases like this one, in which
no order of removal has been entered. Therefore, Section
324a
Appendix E
1252(b)(9) is irrelevant here, and does not strip this Court
of jurisdiction. See Part IV.
But even if Section 1252(b)(9) were understood to
apply here, as EOHC might suggest, see Part V.A, that
Section would apply only when sending a case to the
immigration courts is consistent with the Thunder Basin
requirement of “meaningful review.”
That was the approach the Third Circuit took in
EOHC, see Part V.B and Part V.C, and that is consistent
with the Third Circuit’s approach in Massieu. See Part
V.D.
So assuming arguendo that Section 1252(b)(9) applies
here, the question is this: would this case get the required
“meaningful review” if it starts out in immigration court,
as opposed to here?
Take that up in the next Part.
VI. Meaningful Review
Immigration courts are tasked with doing important
work on behalf of our country. According to recent
statistics, for example, there are almost four million
pending immigration cases spread out across 700 or so
immigration judges. See Pending Cases, New Cases, and
Total Completions, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., https://
perma.cc/L659-S8P5 (accessed on Apr. 29, 2025); Office of
the Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev.,
https://perma.cc/8H5S-EPW6 (accessed on Apr. 29, 2025).
325a
Appendix E
But different institutions are built for different tasks
and given different tools.
Immigration courts are not legally permitted to
provide the relief (striking down the Secretary of State’s
determination) that the Petitioner seeks here. See Part
VI.A.
And immigration courts cannot be expected to
undertake the fact-finding that may potentially be
required to evaluate the Petitioner’s claim that the
Secretary’s determination is unconstitutional. See Part
VI.B.
To be sure, immigration courts routinely tee up
constitutional issues for eventual review by federal
courts of appeals --- even when the immigration courts
themselves lack the power to remedy the alleged violation.
But the immigration courts cannot do that here --- in
part because of a prior Board of Immigration Appeals
decision. See Part VI.C.
What this adds up to: the immigration courts could
not meaningfully develop this case, legally or factually.
Therefore, the period that might be spent before those
courts will not advance the ball.
In some circumstances, that may be just how it has to
be. Cases can take a while to resolve. And sending cases
to the immigration courts is typically required even when
doing so will accomplish only a modest amount.
326a
Appendix E
But in this case, what can be accomplished is much
less than that.
And a period of delay while this case is pending before
the immigration courts, knowing that there will be little
or nothing to show for it --- that does not work.
The reason is this: the Petitioner’s core argument is
that his free speech rights are being violated, now. See
Part VI.D.
And the Supreme Court has held over and over again,
in numerous contexts, that meaningful review of First
Amendment claims generally means rapid, prioritized
review. See id.
That is not consistent with postponing federal court
consideration of the Petitioner’s First Amendment claims.
Begin seeing all of this just below.
A.
Legal Remedies
As has been discussed, the Petitioner claims that
the Secretary of State’s determination is a product of
First Amendment retaliation, and that this Court should
therefore enter an order to vacate it. See Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 9-10; see also Petition ¶¶ 88-90.
Can the immigration courts do this?
327a
Appendix E
The Respondents say the answer is no.42
Under the heading “The IJ Cannot Vacate the
Secretary of State’s Determination or Issue the Requested
Injunction,” they say:
The authority of immigration judges comes from
the INA and regulations. The INA provides
that an immigration judge “shall conduct
proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or
deportability of an alien.” The immigration judge
has the authority to determine removability
and to adjudicate requests for certain forms of
relief from removal. The INA and implementing
regulations do not provide the immigration
judge with general injunctive or equitable
authority. Thus, an immigration judge cannot
order the Secretary of State to take or not take
any action regarding the type of foreign policy
determination at issue here.
42. Were the Petitioner seeking to invalidate Section 1227(a)(4)
(C)(i) on constitutional grounds, which he is not, see footnotes 7 and
38, the immigration courts would lack the power to do that, too. See
In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 231 (BIA 2002) (“We have
long declared that we lack authority to rule on the constitutionality
of the statutes we administer.”); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 368, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“[A]djudication
of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally
been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.”);
accord, e.g., Brienza-Schettino v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 221 F. App’x
140, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2007); Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir.
2001); Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1995).
328a
Appendix E
Respondents’ Letter (Apr. 11, 2025) (ECF 190) at 2
(cleaned up).
***
But this way of thinking is too formalistic.
When a court is asked to put a stop to allegedly illegal
behavior that is happening out in the world, the request
is usually framed as an ask for an injunction.
But things are different when a judge is asked to issue
an order as to a matter happening right before her, in her
own courtroom.
Imagine a judge overseeing a criminal prosecution.
Drugs were seized (but there was no warrant), and
a confession was made (but there were no Miranda
warnings).
The defendant might want an order from the court
suppressing the evidence, so that the jury cannot learn
of it. Order that the drugs be excluded as the fruit of a
Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant will say. And
order that the confession be put aside, as the product of
a Fifth Amendment breach.
But the defendant, seeking an order, will not describe
this as a request for an injunction (which is, after all, a
kind of order).43
43. One reason is this: an injunction generally issues only based
on a sense, among other things, that the public interest demands
329a
Appendix E
All of this implies that the right question here is not
whether the immigration courts can enjoin the Secretary’s
determination as being the result of a violation of the First
Amendment --- but rather whether the immigration courts
can suppress the Secretary’s determination as a violation
of the First Amendment.
And a suppression framing makes sense on the facts
of this case.
After all, the Secretary of State’s determination
is evidence (indeed, the only evidence) put forward in
support of the Department of Homeland Security’s effort
to remove the Petitioner under Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i).
it. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139,
156–57, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010); Winter v. Nat’l
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d
249 (2008); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391,
126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006); see also Samuel L. Bray,
The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 530, 585–86
(2016). A defendant wants to argue that drugs should be suppressed
because the search was illegal. He does not want to also have to
argue that suppressing the drugs is a good from the perspective of
the public interest. (And equitable claims are especially difficult to
make out in any number of other ways, too. For example, at least
some suppression orders likely could not issue as injunctions because
the defendant, seeking to suppress what is his own contraband, see
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387
(1978), could not make the “clean hands” showing that equity typically
requires. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381 (1945); Johnson
v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387, 64 S.Ct. 622, 88 L.Ed.
814 (1944); see also Bray at 581.)
330a
Appendix E
And evidence obtained at Time 2 is sometimes ordered
suppressed at Time 3 because it was gathered at Time 1
in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth. So
why not the First?
The immigration courts, as noted, do not have power
to enjoin the Secretary of State’s determination on the
grounds that it violates the First Amendment.
But do they have the power to suppress the Secretary’s
determination on those same grounds?
***
Shifting the framing clarifies the question to ask. But
it does not change the answer.
The reason: with a caveat taken up below in footnote 46,
the Supreme Court has held that in removal proceedings
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not available;
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
can come in. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1034, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984).
Part of the explanation is that the immigration courts,
per the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza, were built to
quickly determine whether someone is removable --- not
to ask and answer broader questions, such as whether
someone else violated the Constitution. Lopez-Mendoza:
The INS currently operates a deliberately
simple deportation hearing system, streamlined
331a
Appendix E
to permit the quick resolution of very large
numbers of deportation actions, and it is against
this backdrop that the costs of the exclusionary
rule must be assessed. The costs of applying
the exclusionary rule, like the benefits, must
be measured at the margin.
[In 1984] [t]he average immigration judge
handles about six deportation hearings per
day. Neither the hearing officers nor the
attorneys participating in those hearings are
likely to be well versed in the intricacies of
Fourth Amendment law. The prospect of even
occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule
might significantly change and complicate the
character of these proceedings.
Id. at 1048.
In support of its approach, the Lopez-Mendoza Court
quoted the Board of Immigration Appeals, which was also
opposed to Fourth Amendment exclusion remedies in
immigration courts. The Board, as quoted by the Supreme
Court:
Absent the applicability of the exclusionary
rule, questions relating to deportability
routinely involve simple factual allegations and
matters of proof. When Fourth Amendment
issues are raised at deportation hearings, the
result is a diversion of attention from the main
issues which those proceedings were created
332a
Appendix E
to resolve, both in terms of the expertise of
the administrative decision makers and of the
structure of the forum to accommodate inquiries
into search and seizure questions. The result
frequently seems to be a long, confused record
in which the issues are not clearly defined and
in which there is voluminous testimony.... The
ensuing delays and inordinate amount of time
spent on such cases at all levels has an adverse
impact on the effective administration of the
immigration laws.... This is particularly true
in a proceeding where delay may be the only
“defense” available and where problems already
exist with the use of dilatory tactics.
Id. at 1048-49 (quoting Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec.
70, 80 (BIA 1979)).
Building the record for a Fourth A mendment
suppression challenge would not always very dramatically
“change and complicate” removal hearings. See id. at 1048,
104 S.Ct. 3479.
After all, in many cases the Fourth Amendment
suppression evidence would come in wholly through the
immigration agents who made the relevant arrest in the
first place. See id. at 1043, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (“[T]he agency
officials who effect the unlawful arrest are the same
officials who subsequently bring the deportation action.”).
But even given that, the Supreme Court determined in
Lopez-Mendoza that the “diversion of attention” implicit in
Fourth Amendment suppression hearings weighed against
333a
Appendix E
allowing Fourth Amendment suppression motions to be
made in immigration proceedings. See id. at 1048-49, 104
S.Ct. 3479.
But if Fourth Amendment suppression motions cannot
generally be made --- then surely First Amendment
suppression motions have no place, either.
If a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing (typically
involving testimony from arresting immigration agents)
is a bridge too far, then a First Amendment suppression
hearing (which in this case could conceivably seek
testimony from our country’s top officials) is also a bridge
too far --- and then some.
***
The conclusion set out just above is buttressed from
two sides.
First, look to the one on-point case in this area. The
Second Circuit was asked whether immigration courts
can consider a First Amendment suppression argument.
Its answer was no. See Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381
(2d Cir. 1997) (“We decline [the] invitation to fashion an
exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of
an individual’s First Amendment rights.”) (citing LopezMendoza).
And second, look to what the immigration judge in
this case said about the scope of her powers.44
44. In deciding whether “meaningful review” can be conducted
before an administrative court, federal courts routinely look to what
334a
Appendix E
Before the immigration judge, the Petitioner made
various motions to compel discovery. For example, he
moved to issue a subpoena to the Secretary of State, as
well as to compel the production of certain documents.45
But the immigration judge denied those motions.
She said the authority of immigration judges “is very
limited to two things. Is [the Petitioner] removable from
the administrative court has in fact actually done. Take Jarkesy v.
SEC, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). There, an investment advisor filed
suit in a federal district court, pressing constitutional claims. Could
an SEC administrative law judge provide meaningful review? Yes,
the D.C. Circuit answered. See id. at 28. How to know? Because
the D.C. Circuit had read the administrative law judge’s decisions
and observed that she had “considered and rejected” the plaintiff’s
arguments. Id. Another example: in Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Division, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), the First
Circuit asked whether the petitioners could have gotten “effective
relief” for their right-to-counsel claims through the immigration
courts. Yes, the First Circuit held. Id. at 14. “The proof” was that
during the removal proceedings “each petitioner who requested
a continuance for the purpose of retaining counsel received one.”
Id. And a final example. The Fifth Circuit considered whether the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s administrative proceedings
could adequately assess claims that the “enforcement proceedings
were tainted by constitutional violations.” See Bank of La., 919 F.3d
at 926. Yes. Part of why: the administrative law judge, per the Fifth
Circuit, had written a “lengthy, detailed, and well-reasoned opinion”
on the claims, such that it was clear that the proceedings qualified
as “meaningful judicial review.” Id.
45. It appears that this was likely understood as connected to
a First Amendment issue. See April 11 Audio Recording at 23:50
to 25:24.
335a
Appendix E
the United States, and does he have relief available to him
from removal if he is found removable.” Audio Recording
of Hearing (April 8, 2025) (“April 8 Audio Recording”)
at 21:12 to 21:24; see Petitioner’s Letter (Apr. 11, 2025),
at 3 n.4.
And the immigration judge suggested that to the
extent any constitutional issues were being raised, she
could not take them on. See April 11 Audio Recording at
1:35:35 to 1:36:00 (“I understand ... that you would like to
challenge the authority of the Secretary of State ..., but
you will need to take that up with Congress. This court is
without jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the validity
of such laws under the Constitution.”); see also April 8
Audio Recording at 21:12 to 21:24; Petitioner’s Letter
(Apr. 11, 2025), at 3 n.4.
Finally, as to seeking a subpoena for the Secretary of
State, the immigration judge said of the Petitioner that he
was “in the wrong court for that.” April 8 Audio Recording
at 20:55-58; see Petitioner’s Letter (Apr. 11, 2025), at 3 n.4.
***
In a nutshell:
The Petitioner seeks here an injunction vacating the
Secretary of State’s determination. But the immigration
courts cannot issue injunctions. And they cannot suppress
evidence (like the Secretary’s determination) on First
Amendment grounds. That conclusion is based on an
analogy to Fourth Amendment suppression, an on-point
336a
Appendix E
Second Circuit decision, and the immigration judge’s
approach here.46
46. A final note. In Lopez-Mendoza, a plurality of the Court, not
a majority, said this: “we do not deal here with egregious violations of
Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions
of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the
evidence obtained.” 468 U.S. at 1050–51, 104 S.Ct. 3479. This left the
door open, and a number of circuits have held that suppression is
indeed available in immigration courts when the Fourth Amendment
is violated in sufficiently “egregious” or “widespread” ways. See, e.g.,
Corado-Arriaza v. Lynch, 844 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2016); AlmeidaAmaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006); Yoc-Us v.
Att’y Gen. U.S., 932 F.3d 98, 111 (3d Cir. 2019); Yanez-Marquez
v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder,
629 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2010); Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673
F.3d 1029, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2011). Other circuits have suggested
openness to such an exception. See, e.g., United States v. NavarroDiaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005). Maybe it could be argued
that the “egregious” exception leaves room for First Amendment
suppression in this case? The argument would presumably run like
this: (a) the Lopez-Mendoza plurality allowed for the possibility
of an “egregious” Fourth Amendment suppression exception, (b)
the exception does in fact exist, (c) it should be extended to the
First Amendment suppression context in general, and (d) to this
“egregious” case in particular. If this argument is persuasive, then
maybe the immigration courts could provide a First Amendment
suppression remedy here. But the argument does not work. The
reason: link (b) in the chain cannot hold up. The immigration judge
here is in Louisiana, so any review will be to the Fifth Circuit, see
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), whose precedent will control. See Ballesteros
v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006). And the Fifth
Circuit has flatly held that “[i]t is well established that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule is not to be applied in deportation
proceedings.” Mendoza-Solis v. INS, 36 F.3d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1994).
(Some other Fifth Circuit cases seem to go the other way, and to
337a
Appendix E
B. Factual Development
As noted just above, the immigration courts cannot give
the Petitioner the legal relief he seeks as to the Secretary of
State’s allegedly unconstitutional determination. Whether
through injunction or suppression --- the immigration
courts cannot push aside the Secretary’s determination.
But in some cases, a person is suing to get a statute
invalidated as it applies to him.
And most of the time (if not all of the time) that is not
something that an agency court is legally empowered to
do.
But even in those sorts of circumstances, federal
courts often require that the case be sent first to an
administrative court. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 17, 132 S.Ct.
2126; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215, 114 S.Ct. 771;
Massieu, 91 F.3d at 426; accord, e.g., Hill, 825 F.3d at 1245;
Tilton, 824 F.3d at 279, 290; Bennett, 844 F.3d at 176, 184;
Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767, 771; Nat’l Taxpayers Union v. U.S.
Soc. Sec. Admin., 376 F.3d 239, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2004).
treat an “egregious” Fourth Amendment suppression exception as
a part of the law. But one is dicta in a Bivens case. See De La Paz
v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 2015). And the rest are cases not
selected for publication. See Escobar v. Holder, 398 F. App’x 50, 53
(5th Cir. 2010); Gonzalez-Reyes v. Holder, 313 F. App’x 690, 695 (5th
Cir. 2009); Verduzco-Contreras v. Gonzales, 160 F. App’x 406, 408
(5th Cir. 2005). Under the Fifth Circuit’s rules, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5,
unpublished cases are out of bounds.)
338a
Appendix E
There are a number of reasons why.
One of them: even if the agency’s courts cannot
themselves deliver the requested remedy, they can
prepare the field --- by finding the facts, so that a federal
court of appeals will have a solid record to work from when
it gets the case. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 19-20, 132 S.Ct.
2126; accord, e.g., Bank of La., 919 F.3d at 927; Chau v.
SEC, 665 F. App’x 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2016); Hill, 825 F.3d at
1249; Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 21-22; Bebo, 799 F.3d at 773.
But in this case, the immigration courts would not be
able to do the fact-finding that a federal court of appeals
would need down the road.
The Court explains why here.
***
To see the limits of the immigration courts’ factfinding, try to peer around the corner --- to predict the
sorts of factual issues that may possibly come up as the
case unfolds.47
One of those issues is suggested by the Respondents,
and it provides a helpful example of the fact-finding
difficulties that the immigration courts would encounter
in this case.
47. The discussion in this section assumes that fact-finding
is necessary. But the Court has not developed views on whether
this case can be resolved on the papers, or will require evidentiary
development.
339a
Appendix E
The Petitioner claims that his detention is the
product of First Amendment retaliation. See Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 3; see also Petition ¶¶ 88-90.
But the Respondents say that this argument “is likely to
fail.” Opposition Brief at 28.
The reason why: to make out a retaliatory-detention
claim under the First Amendment, the Respondents say,
the Petitioner must show that there was no probable cause
for his arrest. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 402, 139
S.Ct. 1715, 204 L.Ed.2d 1 (2019) (cited by the Opposition
Brief at 28).
But, the Respondents argue, the Petitioner cannot
make that showing. See Opposition Brief at 28. The
Secretary of State’s determination and the Petitioner’s
alleged failure-to-disclose on his lawful permanent
resident application are said to be “facially valid reasons”
to remove him from the country. Id. at 28.
Therefore, the Respondents’ argument goes, federal
officials had probable cause to detain the Petitioner --and under Nieves, cited just above, his First Amendment
argument hits a quick dead end. See id.
Moreover, the Respondents argue, the Petitioner has
not tried to use the exception to all this that the Supreme
Court suggested in Nieves. See id. at 28-29.
Under that exception, the Petitioner may not actually
need to establish an absence of probable cause. Per the
Nieves Court: “The no-probable-cause requirement should
not apply when [the Petitioner] presents objective evidence
340a
Appendix E
that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated
individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected
speech had not been.” 587 U.S. at 407, 139 S.Ct. 1715.
Look just a bit over the horizon, and it seems
possible that the Petitioner could try to press a selectiveenforcement defense --- contending, presumably, that
other “similarly situated individuals” have not been the
subject of a Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) determination by the
Secretary of State.
To make out this defense, the Petitioner would
potentially seek some discovery --- as to others, for
example, against whom enforcement actions may not have
been taken, and perhaps as to the decision-making process
of senior federal officials.
Can the immigration courts provide “meaningful”
factual development as to those issues?
It is hard to see how they could.
The Supreme Court, after all, has suggested that even
narrow-gauge Fourth Amendment suppression hearings
are not a good fit for the tight focus of the immigration
courts. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046-50, 104
S.Ct. 3479.
And as noted above, the immigration judge in this case
herself declined to permit any discovery. See April 8 Audio
Recording at 20:55-58 (stating the Petitioner was “in the
wrong court” for obtaining a subpoena of the Secretary).48
48. Selective enforcement can be raised as a kind of defense to
a defense, as in Nieves: does selective enforcement undermine the
341a
Appendix E
***
Given the limits of fact-finding in the immigration
cour ts, federal cour ts have sometimes taken up
immigration claims, rather than require them to wind
their way through agency courts.
probable cause defense to a First Amendment retaliation claim?
But selective enforcement can also be raised in more gardenvariety affirmative contexts: was a person targeted for immigration
enforcement in the first place based on selective enforcement? See
Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, {blank} U.S. {blank},
141 S. Ct. 227, 208 L.Ed.2d 1 (2020); AADC, 70 F.3d at 1052;
Massieu, 91 F.3d at 418. Can the immigration courts draw on
their experience when it comes to building out the second sort of
selective-enforcement case to develop a factual record as to selective
enforcement that is raised in the first context? Not really. The reason
is that affirmative selective-enforcement claims are very rarely
handled by the immigration courts. For nearly 30 years, such claims
have largely been unavailable to noncitizens without lawful status in
the United States. See AADC, 525 U.S. at 488, 119 S.Ct. 936 (“[A]n
alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert
selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.”). And
even before AADC foreclosed many selective-enforcement claims,
immigration courts generally steered clear of them --- largely to
avoid trenching on federal immigration officials’ discretion. See
Matter of Merced, 14 I. & N. Dec. 644, 645 (BIA 1974); Matter of
Lennon, 15 I. & N. Dec. 9, 12 (BIA 1974), overruled on other grounds
by Matter of Esqueda, 20 I. & N. Dec. 850 (BIA 1994); Matter of
Geronimo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 680, 681 (BIA 1971); see also Corredor v.
Holder, 481 F. App’x 442, 444 (10th Cir. 2012); Cortez-Felipe v. INS,
245 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001); AADC, 70 F.3d at 1055; Johns
v. Dep’t of Just., 653 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1981); Lopez–Telles v.
INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The immigration judge is
not empowered to review the wisdom of the INS in instituting the
proceedings. His powers are sharply limited[.]”).
342a
Appendix E
For example, in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center,
Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005
(1991), the respondents challenged certain INS amnesty
procedures in a federal district court. See 498 U.S. at
487-88, 111 S.Ct. 888. But did they have to go through the
immigration courts first?
No, the Supreme Court held.
The case was a “pattern and practice case,” because
it challenged “[a] pattern of ... unconstitutional practices.”
Id. at 497, 111 S.Ct. 888 (cleaned up).
Pattern-and-practice cases require a “substantial
amount of evidence,” and an immigration judge adjudicating
one particular case would not have been able to gather it.
Id. This would leave the federal court of appeals in a bad
spot; it “would be in [no] position to provide meaningful
review of the type of claims raised.” Id.
So the Supreme Court’s decision: no need for the case
to go to the immigration courts --- keep it in the federal
district court. See id. at 494, 111 S.Ct. 888.
McNary is not directly on-point.
But it speaks to the idea that when it comes to
“meaningful” development of the factual record --- and
the knock-on question of whether adjudication in the
immigration courts is required --- federal courts do not
need to turn a blind eye to a common-sense reality.49
49. See generally Tennessee v. Dep’t of Educ., 104 F.4th 577,
606 (6th Cir. 2024) (suggesting that “practical realities” influence
whether there is “meaningful review” under Thunder Basin).
343a
Appendix E
And that is this: immigration courts are mainly built
for close-to-the-ground fact-finding. Not for fleshing out
the record as to potentially sweeping claims --- related to
“pattern and practice” issues, McNary, 498 U.S. at 497,
111 S.Ct. 888, for example, or selective enforcement.
And sweeping claims are plainly what the Petitioner
is pressing here. 50
***
As to the fact-finding difficulties here for the
immigration courts, consider briefly a final added point.
50. As briefly alluded to above, immigration courts are highvolume affairs. As of March 2025, there were around 3.9 million
cases in the backlog. See Pending Cases, New Cases, and Total
Completions, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., https://perma.cc/L659S8P5 (accessed on Apr. 29, 2025). Roughly 360,000 of those cases
were added in 2025. See id. This has an everyday impact. Per a 2022
congressional report, some immigration judges reported having
nearly 5,000 pending cases; others reported they heard 80 cases
each day. Holly Straut-Eppsteiner, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47077,
U.S. Immigration Courts & the Pending Cases Backlog 22 (2022);
cf. Malets v. Garland, 66 F.4th 49, 59 (2nd Cir. 2023) (“We have
repeatedly recognized the extraordinary caseload burdens faced by
IJs.”); Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir.
2011) (“We readily acknowledge that an IJ’s position is an impossibly
demanding and challenging one.”). The typical fact-finding in these
cases does not appear extensive. When a person is detained, the
first hearing seems to typically be the only one. See Ingrid Eagly &
Steven Shafer, Detained Immigration Courts, 110 Va. L. Rev. 691,
756 (2024). (Part of why: while discovery tools exist, see 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.10(b), 1003.35, they are rarely used in practice. See Geoffrey
Heeran, Shattering the One-Way Mirror: Discovery in Immigration
Court, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 1569, 1582–84 (2014).)
344a
Appendix E
One of the Petitioner’s core arguments is that he is
being retaliated against under a policy formulated by the
most senior officials in the federal government. See Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 3; see also Petition ¶¶ 29-36.
More on that allegation later, in Part VIII.
For now, note that there is at least a potential argument
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lozman v. Riviera
Beach, 585 U.S. 87, 100-01, 138 S.Ct. 1945, 201 L.Ed.2d
342 (2018), that the existence of such a policy could undo
the argument the Respondents have made here --- namely,
the argument that probable cause is a full defense to an
arrest made in retaliation for First Amendment activity.
See Opposition Brief at 28.
This means that the salience of the Nieves question
(was there probable cause such that First Amendment
retaliation may not matter?) could potentially turn under
Lozman on the answer to an earlier and broader question
(was there an official policy of retaliation?).
If fact-finding is one day required as to such a policy
--- whether it exists, what its scope might be, whether it
led to the Petitioner’s detention --- it cannot be done in a
“meaningful” way by the immigration courts, for reasons
that have already been discussed (and that were the focus
of the Supreme Court’s “pattern and practice” decision
in McNary).
But that is only the tip of the iceberg.
345a
Appendix E
Deciding, for example, whether Lozman applies to
a case like this one, involving only federal officials, may
require some complex legal judgments about constitutional
questions that have not yet been resolved in all federal
circuits. See, e.g., Novak v. City of Parma, 932 F.3d 421,
429 (6th Cir. 2019) (suggesting that Lozman is only
relevant as to claims against municipalities).
And that question may need to be answered at the
threshold of any fact-finding, to determine the scope of
discovery.
If Lozman applies, the Petitioner may try to prove up
a policy --- and to seek out evidence accordingly.
And if Lozman does not apply, then maybe what
matters is only proof as to probable cause and selective
enforcement --- which may imply a different (though still
potentially wide) scope for discovery.
***
Bottom line: the immigration courts cannot be
expected to supply sufficiently substantial fact-finding as
to the allegations in this case.
And the threshold questions that may determine the
scope of any possible discovery seem to themselves require
knowledge as to complex areas of constitutional law, areas
that are removed from the legal issues the immigration
courts typically consider. 51
51. The “meaningful review” test is designed to get a handle
on what Congress’ intent for a certain “type” of case might have
346a
Appendix E
C.
Expertise
The focus to this point has been on what the
immigration courts could accomplish in this case.
Could they grant the Petitioner the legal relief he
seeks? Could they substantially develop the factual record?
The Court’s answer has been no to each question. See
Part VI.A and Part VI.B.
been. See Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212, 114 S.Ct. 771. In terms
of how factual development might go forward --- would Congress
have wanted a case like this one to be handled by the immigration
courts? The first proposed subpoena here was to a cabinet official,
and the allegations in this case quote statements made about the
Petitioner by the President. See Petition ¶¶ 73, 74. It is unclear at
this point whether discovery might be needed here. See footnote 47.
But if it is, note that the federal courts have evolved any number of
potentially relevant doctrines in this area. See, e.g., United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941) (as
to an agency action, a cabinet secretary “should never have been
subjected to” a deposition); In re U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 25 F.4th 692,
700 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2022) (suggesting that “[t]he rules for when a
court may allow the questioning of a cabinet secretary” “rest on a
constitutional foundation”) (cleaned up); see also In re United States,
985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Sec’y
of Lab., 766 F.2d 575, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Kyle Eng’g Co. v. Kleppe,
600 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1979). These aim to strike a fine balance
between the legitimate needs of parties seeking evidence and the
legitimate needs of senior federal officials --- whose time is pressed
and whose work files are likely to be especially sensitive, such that
they will require special judicial protection as to any discovery. It
seems unlikely that Congress would have thought that a case of this
“type,” raising these sorts of evidentiary issues, should go before
the immigration courts, which lack experience with them.
347a
Appendix E
The implications of this are taken up in Part VI.D,
which considers whether the Petitioner could get the
required “meaningful review” of his claim if it first goes
to the immigration courts.
Before getting there, though, take a quick detour
--- to see the impact here of a decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
***
“Meaningful review” is the most important of the
Thunder Basin factors. See Part V.B.2.
But there are two others.
***
The first is whether the claims in question are “wholly
collateral to the statute’s review provisions.” Axon, 598
U.S. at 186, 143 S.Ct. 890 (cleaned up).
The claim as to the Secretary’s determination is
not collateral. It is “the vehicle by which [the Petitioner]
seek[s] to” challenge his removal proceedings, Elgin, 567
U.S. at 22, 132 S.Ct. 2126 and per the statutory “review
provisions,” those are the “challenge[s]” that are generally
supposed to go before the immigration courts.
***
The second Thunder Basin factor relates to whether
the agency’s expertise can be brought to bear if a certain
348a
Appendix E
claim goes to it first. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 194, 143 S.Ct.
890; Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Free Enter.
Fund, 561 U.S. at 491, 130 S.Ct. 3138.
If agency expertise can be brought to bear, that is a
reason to think Congress wanted claims of the relevant
“type” to go to the agency’s courts (here, the immigration
courts).
But in this case, “agency expertise” would have
virtually no role to play as to any immigration court
assessment of the Secretary of State’s determination.
This Part VI.C explains why.
***
Agency adjudicatory bodies are experts in the laws
they routinely use, plus nearby bodies of law.
SEC adjudicators, for example, can be expected to
be fluent in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. And they are almost surely experts
on related subjects, too. Common-law fraud, for example.
Immigration courts plainly have deep expertise in
immigration law.
But the Petitioner claims that the Secretary of
State’s determination is the product of First Amendment
retaliation. See Petition ¶¶ 8, 89; Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 10-18.
349a
Appendix E
And First Amendment issues have little or no place on
an immigration judge’s docket. See Part VI.A. It follows
that there is no reason to think immigration courts have
special expertise in First Amendment law. See Axon, 598
U.S. at 194, 143 S.Ct. 890 (describing constitutional claims
as outside the administrative agency’s area of expertise);
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 491, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (similar).
But agency expertise can still potentially be brought
to bear.
Indeed, the Thunder Basin “agency expertise” factor
can weigh in favor of upfront adjudication in the agency’s
courts --- even when the legal theory that undergirds
the claim is not one as to which an agency adjudicator
has any expertise. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22-23, 132 S.Ct.
2126; Rydie v. Biden, 2022 WL 1153249, at *8 (4th Cir.
Apr. 19, 2022).
But while that is true in general, in this particular
case the “agency expertise” factor does not point to the
immigration courts.
***
To see why, start with the idea that an agency
adjudicator’s decision, informed by special expertise, can
helpfully move the case along by eliminating the need for
later federal court intervention.
Take as an example Elgin v. Department of Treasury,
567 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).
350a
Appendix E
There, federal employees were fired because they did
not register for the draft, and they sued. See id. at 6-7,
132 S.Ct. 2126. Their argument: their termination for
failure to register was unconstitutional because, among
other things, the draft discriminated against men based
on sex. See id. at 7, 132 S.Ct. 2126.
Analyzing the Thunder Basin factors, the Supreme
Court ruled that the case needed to first be adjudicated
by the relevant agency, the Merit Systems Protection
Board. 52 See id. at 8, 132 S.Ct. 2126.
The Board did not have expertise on the underlying
constitutional issue. See id. at 22, 132 S.Ct. 2126. But
the Court noted that the Board might be able to wrap
up the case by applying its expertise to “threshold”
issues, without the need for a court to later take up the
constitutional question. See id.
For example, one of the fired employees had not been
formally fired --- instead, he argued that he had been
“constructive[ly] discharge[d].”53 Id. at 23, 132 S.Ct. 2126.
52. “ The Merit Systems Protection Board ... is a[n] ...
agency in the executive branch charged with protecting federal
employees against improper employment-related actions,” including
“favoritism, or engaging in reprisals against whistleblowers.” Jon
O. Shimabukuro & Jennifer A. Staman, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45630,
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): A Legal Overview (2019)
(summary page).
53. Constructive discharge refers to “[a]n employer’s creation
of working conditions that leave a particular employee or group
of employees little or no choice but to resign.” Discharge, sense 7,
351a
Appendix E
If this employee was not in fact constructively
discharged, the constitutional challenge to his firing would
no longer exist --- because it could no longer be said that
he was fired. See id.
And that, per the Supreme Court, was a reason to
let the case run down the agency-adjudication track. See
id. After all, the question of whether a person is or is not
constructively discharged is “unique to the employment
context” and therefore “falls squarely within the [Board’s]
expertise.” Id. at 22-23, 132 S.Ct. 2126. 54
***
With this background in mind, turn back now to this
case.
Are there “threshold” issues here, id. at 22, that the
immigration courts could resolve, and that might put an
end to the Petitioner’s First Amendment challenge?
Yes, it would seem.
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “constructive
discharge”).
54. For other cases making this same point, see, for example,
Bank of La. v. FDIC, 919 F.3d 916, 929 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he [agency]
could have mooted the [plaintiff’s] constitutional claims by finding
the [plaintiff] innocent of the statutory violations it was accused of
committing.”), and Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he agency could moot the need to resolve [the constitutional
question] by finding that he did not commit the securities-law
violations of which [the plaintiff] stands accused.”).
352a
Appendix E
After all, the Secretary of State determined that there
were “reasonable ground[s] to believe [the Petitioner’s
presence or activities in the United States] would have
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences
for the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i).
Maybe the immigration courts could hold that there
were in fact not “reasonable grounds” --- and if so,
the Petitioner’s claim would be resolved on that basis,
without the need for a federal court to decide whether the
Secretary’s determination amounted to First Amendment
retaliation.
And indeed, after the Third Circuit sent Massieu’s
case to the immigration courts, that is precisely what
happened.
The immigration judge looked behind the curtain of the
Secretary of State’s “reasonable grounds” determination
--- and said the evidence was not there. See In re RuizMassieu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 833, 835-36 (BIA 1999).
But that was not the end of the road.
The Board of Immigration Appeals took it from there,
and held that what the immigration judge had done was
not allowed. Per the Board, the Secretary’s determination
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) is like a prior criminal
conviction --- it must be treated as a given if it seems solidenough on its face, with no possibility of getting under the
hood and examining its underlying factual basis.
353a
Appendix E
In the scheme adopted by Congress, the
Secretary of State’s determination as outlined
in section 241(a)(4)(C)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)
(C)(i)] of the Act is equivalent to a duly certified
record of criminal conviction by a state or
federal court....
[The alternative] would necessarily require the
Immigration Judge and this Board to intrude
into the realm of foreign policy....
For an example, we need only look to the opinion
in the present case. The Immigration Judge
held that the [Immigration and Naturalization]
Ser v ice must produce more than clea r,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
Secretary of State held a facially reasonable
opinion that the alien’s presence would have
adverse foreign policy consequences. She
required the Service to convince her by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence that
the Secretary’s opinion is reasonable. The
Immigration Judge found that the Service had
not shown that the opinion of the Secretary
of State is reasonable. Consequently, in the
absence of further evidence, she substituted
her judgment for that of the Secretary of
State. This standard of inquiry would entangle
the Immigration Court in matters of foreign
policy and involve that court in weighing
the importance of various factors in an area
in which it has no special expertise. Such
354a
Appendix E
an in-depth examination could well require
the Service to proffer secret or confidential
information and expert witnesses, or involve
a deposition of the Secretary of State. There
is no indication that Congress contemplated
an Immigration Judge, or even the Attorney
General, overruling the Secretary of State on
a question of foreign policy.
Id. at 844-45. 55
In short: “it is ... the opinion of the Secretary [of
State] that decides the issue,” id. at 845 n.13 --- and
because of the above-quoted ruling from the Board of
Immigration Appeals in Ruiz-Massieu, there would be
next to nothing for an immigration court to do in this
case. The reasonableness of the Secretary’s determination
might have been a “threshold” matter for the immigration
courts. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22, 132 S.Ct. 2126. But after the
Ruiz-Massieu decision, no longer. 56
55. Ruiz-Massieu is binding on immigration judges, see 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(1), and serves as precedent for future Board of
Immigration Appeals proceedings regarding the same issue. See
id. § 1003.1(g)(2); see also April 11 Audio Recording at 1:34:30 to
1:36:00 (holding that Ruiz-Massieu bound the immigration court).
56. There might sometimes be fact-finding work for the
immigration courts to do in cases like this one. For example, there
may be a dispute as to whether the Secretary personally made
the relevant determination. That could take fact-finding, and the
immigration courts could do it. Cf. In re Ruiz-Massieu, 22 I. & N.
Dec. at 845 n.13. And that possibility was part of why Judge Alito
thought the Massieu case should be sent to the immigration courts.
355a
Appendix E
***
Are there other reasons why agency expertise might
matter?
Yes. Take up here the main added possible reason, and
then consider a second one below in footnote 57.
An agency’s narrowing construction of a statute
might potentially obviate the need for a federal court
to later reach the relevant constitutional issues. See id.
at 23, 132 S.Ct. 2126 (a “challenged statute may be one
that the [agency] regularly construes, and its statutory
interpretation could alleviate constitutional concerns”);
see also Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 29 (“[T]he [agency] could
offer an interpretation of the securities laws in the course
of the proceeding that might answer or shed light on
[the plaintiff’s] [constitutional] challenge. As our court
has previously observed, there are precious few cases
involving interpretation of statutes authorizing agency
action in which our review is not aided by the agency’s
statutory construction.”) (cleaned up); Am. Fed’n of Gov.
See Massieu, 91 F.3d at 426. But no one seems to be disputing
the Secretary of State’s personal involvement here. Indeed, the
Petitioner goes the other way --- and affirmatively alleges that there
was a good deal of personal involvement from the Secretary in this
case. See Petition ¶¶ 2-3, 33, 75, 80, 83. (Note that the Secretary
does not always need to be personally involved in passing on a
determination. Only when his determination is based on speech that
would be First Amendment–protected. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(4)
(C)(ii), 1182(a)(3)(C)(iii). But the immigration courts have no special
expertise on that First Amendment gating question.)
356a
Appendix E
Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748, 761 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (similar).
Imagine, for example, if the immigration courts
took first crack at this case --- and construed 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) as providing a basis for removal only if
the Secretary of State’s determination was not based on
any sort of retaliation whatsoever.
That could sw itch things up, transfor ming a
constitutional question into an immigration law question.
The constitutional question (was the Secretary’s
deter mination the product of Fi rst A mendment
retaliation?) would become one of immigration law (was
the Secretary’s determination the product of “any sort of
retaliation,” as defined by the immigration courts?).
And if so, it might make sense to allow the immigration
courts to assess the case first --- under what will, by
hypothesis, be their own standard.
But the Board of Immigration Appeals has already
construed Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i), and it has not opted to
give it a limiting construction of any kind.
And in any event, a limiting agency construction would
carry less weight now that the Board of Immigration
Appeals decisions no longer get strong deference.
Compare Bautista v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 744 F.3d 54, 58
(3d Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Torres v.
Lynch, 578 U.S. 452, 136 S.Ct. 1619, 194 L.Ed.2d 737 (2016)
(Board of Immigration Appeals decisions get Chevron
deference), and Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder, 788 F.3d 444,
357a
Appendix E
448-49 (5th Cir. 2015) (same), with Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412, 144 S.Ct. 2244, 219 L.Ed.2d
832 (2024) (“Chevron is overruled.”).
***
Bottom line: the immigration courts would be unable
to apply their expertise here to resolve any substantial
threshold matter --- and they would be unable to interpret
the immigration laws in a way that would later receive
strong deference from a federal court.
In light of this, the Thunder Basin “agency expertise”
factor tilts the scales toward the conclusion that Congress
did not intend for immigration courts to handle this “type”
of case in the first instance. 57
57. Per the Supreme Court in Axon, the expertise factor
“reflect[s] ... the point of special review provisions --- to give the
agency a heightened role in the matters it customarily handles, and
can apply distinctive knowledge to.” 598 U.S. at 186, 143 S.Ct. 890.
But “the point” of the structure created by Congress for immigration
claims was not just to build up and lean on expertise --- but also to
keep the tide of immigration cases from swamping the federal courts
and displacing a good deal of their work on other cases. See Robbie
Clarke, Reaffirming the Role of the Federal Courts, 17 Wash. & Lee
J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 463, 474–75 & n.65 (2011). But any precedent
that might be set by this case does not implicate such concerns. It
is much too unusual for that. Because of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ Ruiz-Massieu decision, for example, there is virtually
nothing for the immigration courts to do here. And the sensitive and
sprawling nature of the discovery that might potentially be required
makes this case an especially serious misfit for immigration courts
fact-finding.
358a
Appendix E
D.
Conclusion
As to the Secretary of State’s determination, the
immigration courts cannot provide the Petitioner with
the legal relief he seeks. See Part VI.A. They cannot
be expected to knock out any fact-finding that might
potentially be necessary. See Part VI.B. And they cannot
bring their special expertise to bear in a substantial way.
See Part VI.C.
Does this mean that if this case starts off in the
immigration courts, the Petitioner cannot get “meaningful
review” --- and that, under Section 1252(b)(9), this Court
should therefore retain jurisdiction?58
To answer, go back for a moment to the key cases.
***
Recall that, in Elgin, employees were fired for not
signing up for the draft. See 567 U.S. at 6-7, 132 S.Ct.
2126. The Supreme Court held that the employees could
not sue first in the federal district court. They would have
to go down the administrative track, per a statute --- even
though they could not get constitutional relief there. See
id. at 13-14, 132 S.Ct. 2126.
Or look back to Massieu.
58. Recall: the Court here is proceeding on the assumption that
Section 1252(b)(9) applies in the first place. See Part IV.
359a
Appendix E
The underlying statute, essentially the same one that
is at issue here, was challenged as unconstitutional.
But the immigration judge’s hands were tied. She was
“not authorized to consider the constitutionality of the
statute.” 91 F.3d at 424.
The result? Same as in Elgin. The Third Circuit held
that the noncitizen would have to go to the immigration
courts and then over to the court of appeals, rather than
seek immediate relief in the district court. See id. at 422.
***
These precedents loom large. They suggest that going
to the administrative courts is necessary --- even when
they cannot be the litigation’s main event.
But in the end, the Court’s conclusion is this: neither
the Supreme Court’s Elgin decision nor the Third Circuit’s
Massieu decision dictates the outcome here.
Those cases are different than this one.
***
The first difference has already been discussed.
In Elgin and Massieu, the administrative courts could
realistically be expected to push things forward.
360a
Appendix E
They could gather facts. They could bring to bear
their distinctive expertise.
The cases would take longer to make it to federal court
--- a first trip there, to the federal court of appeals, could
go forward only after the administrative adjudication
was done.
But the time in Elgin and Massieu would have been
well spent. The administrative courts’ work (fact-finding,
using their expertise) would have set the table for the
federal court of appeals to make its constitutional decision.
But in this case, the time in the immigration courts
cannot be expected to advance the ball.
If there needs to be fact-finding here, it may
potentially be sprawling, and it may potentially involve
sensitive evidence, or (renewed) requests to depose senior
officials. See Part VI.B.
And the scope of discovery may depend not on
questions of immigration law, but on questions of
constitutional law, both procedural (for example: what
are the limits on subpoenaing a cabinet official?) and
substantive (for example: is there a “policy” exception
under Lozman to the Nieves First Amendment-retaliation
framework?). See id.
This is not the kind of fact-finding work the immigration
courts have been built for. See id.
361a
Appendix E
And in this case, the immigration courts would also
have no real chance to deploy their special expertise. The
Board of Immigration Appeals has already held that the
Secretary of State’s determination is conclusive. This
binds the immigration courts. And it means that, for those
courts at least, there is no room to examine the underlying
basis of the Secretary’s determination. See Part VI.C.
There is, in short, little that the immigration courts
can be expected to accomplish in this case.
The requirement of “meaningful review” under
Thunder Basin, Elgin, and Massieu can accommodate a
slower road to federal court. But those cases envision that
along the way things will get done. Facts will be found, law
will be interpreted, expertise will be used. See Thunder
Basin, 510 U.S. at 214-15, 114 S.Ct. 771; Elgin, 567 U.S.
at 22-23, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Massieu, 91 F.3d at 426.
The work in the administrative court may end the
case. And if not, then the time will have been used. The
jo
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