Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mahmoud Khalil, Petitioner v. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 19, 2026

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No. 26In the

Supreme Court of the United States

MAHMOUD KHALIL,

Petitioner,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Third Circuit

APPENDIX — Volume II of II

(APPENDICES E-F)

Baher A zmy

Counsel of Record

Samah Sisay

Center for Constitutional

Rights

666 Broadway, 7th Floor

New York, NY 10012

(212) 614-6464

bazmy@ccrjustice.org

A lina Das

Washington Square Legal

Services, Inc.

Immigrant Rights Clinic

245 Sullivan Street, 5th Floor

New York, NY 10012

Joshua L. Dratel

Dratel & Lewis

29 Broadway, Suite 1412

New York, NY 10006

Marc Van Der Hout

Johnny Sinodis

Oona Cahill

Kyle Barron

Of Counsel

Van Der Hout LLP

360 Post Street, Suite 800

San Francisco, CA 94108

Counsel for Petitioner

396486

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

VOLUME I

APPENDIX A – OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT, FILED JANUARY 15, 2026 . . . 1a

APPENDIX B – OPINION AND ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,

FILED JULY 25, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64a

APPENDIX C – OPINION AND ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,

FILED JUNE 11, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78a

APPENDIX D – OPINION AND ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,

FILED MAY 28, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96a

VOLUME II

APPENDIX E – OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, FILED

APRIL 29, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248a

APPENDIX F – DENIAL OF REHEARING

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,

FILED MAY 22, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404a

248a

APPENDIX E — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

Appendix

E

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW

JERSEY, FILED APRIL 29, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

No. 25-cv-01963 (MEF)(MAH)

MAHMOUD KHALIL,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. JOYCE et al.,

Respondents.

OPINION

[TABLE INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]

***

A lawful permanent resident is held in immigration

custody, and federal officials have begun proceedings

before an immigration judge to remove him from the

United States.

The lawful permanent resident has moved for a

preliminary injunction, claiming that one of the charges

against him is unconstitutional and that this Court should

therefore order him released.

249a

Appendix E

In response, federal officials argue that the motion

should be denied, in part because this Court cannot hear

the case. Certain statutes, they say, strip the Court of

jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional argument is not persuasive. This

Opinion explains why.

I.

Background

A.

The Facts

A lawful permanent resident1 was arrested by federal

officials. See Declaration of Amy E. Greer (ECF 11-1)

¶¶ 4-6; Second Supplemental Declaration of Acting Field

Office Director William P. Joyce (“Joyce Declaration”)

(ECF 72) ¶¶ 6-7.

While in custody, he was handed various forms. See

Declaration of Mahmoud Khalil (“Khalil Declaration”)

(ECF 73-1) ¶¶ 4-6; Joyce Declaration ¶ 7.

These said two main things.

First, that federal officials were seeking to remove

him from the United States based on 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)

(C)(i), of which more in a moment. See Joyce Declaration

¶ 7.

1. Mahmoud K halil. A law ful permanent resident is a

person who has “been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing

permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance

with the immigration laws[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).

250a

Appendix E

And second, that as part of that process he had

to appear before an immigration judge. 2 See Khalil

Declaration ¶ 5.

The proceedings before the immigration judge are

now underway.

***

At an immigration court hearing earlier this month,

the immigration judge assessed federal officials’ argument

that the lawful permanent resident should be removed

from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i).

Under that statute, “[a]n alien whose presence or

activities in the United States the Secretary of State

has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially

serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United

States is deportable.”

The immigration judge referred to a memorandum

from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security. See Audio Recording

of Hearing (April 11, 2025) (“April 11 Audio Recording”)

at 1:34:40 to 1:34:48.

2. Removing a lawful permanent resident from the United

States generally requires a hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Those

typically go forward before an immigration judge. See id. § 1229a

(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a). An immigration judge is an “attorney[ ]

whom the Attorney General appoints as [an] administrative judge[

] ... to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including [removal]

hearings under section 240 of the [Immigration and Nationality

Act].” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a).

251a

Appendix E

In the memo, the Secretary of State wrote that he had

“determined” that the Petitioner was “deportable” under

Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i). See Memorandum from Marco

Rubio, Secretary of State, to Kristi Noem, Secretary of

Homeland Security (“Determination”) (ECF 198-1) at 1.

Based on the memo, the immigration judge ruled that

the requirements of Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) had been met

and that the lawful permanent resident could therefore

be removed from the United States. See April 11 Audio

Recording at 1:37:46 to 1:38:25.

***

There are further immigration court proceedings to

come.

For example, an appeal of the immigration judge’s

decision might be taken to the Board of Immigration

Appeals. 3

3. The Board of Immigration Appeals “function[s] as an

appellate body charged with the review of ... administrative

adjudications under the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(1). It can hear appeals from a variety of decisions made

by immigration judges. See id. § 1003.1(b). The Attorney General

can review the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. See

id. § 1003.1(d)(7)(i), (h). Sometimes, the Attorney General opts to do

so. See, e.g., Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I. & N. Dec. 648 (A.G.

2022); Matter of B-Z-R-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 563 (A.G. 2022); Matter of

A-C-A-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 84 (A.G. 2020); Matter of O-F-A-S-, 28 I.

& N. Dec. 35 (A.G. 2020).

252a

Appendix E

And more proceedings have been scheduled before

the immigration judge.4

B. Procedural History

The lawful permanent resident filed a habeas corpus

petition in a federal district court.

From here, he is called “the Petitioner.” The various

people he named in his habeas petition are referred to,

collectively, as “the Respondents.”5

***

The Petitioner filed his case in New York, but it was

transferred to New Jersey. See Khalil v. Joyce, 2025 WL

849803 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2025).

4. In addition to the Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) charge, federal

officials have also pressed a second charge in immigration court

against the lawful permanent resident, for allegedly not disclosing

certain information when he applied for lawful permanent resident

status. See Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability at

1. Federal officials are also seeking to remove the lawful permanent

resident from the United States based on the failure-to-disclose

charge. See id. The immigration judge has scheduled a proceeding

for next month on that charge.

5. The Respondents are listed in the Petition as: President of

the United States Donald Trump; Acting Field Office Director of

New York, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

William P. Joyce; Warden of Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility

Yolanda Pittman; Acting Director of United States Immigration

and Customs Enforcement Caleb Vitello; Secretary of the United

States Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem; Secretary of

the United States Department of State Marco Rubio; and Attorney

General of the United States Pamela Bondi.

253a

Appendix E

In New Jersey, the Respondents moved to dismiss the

case, arguing it should go forward in Louisiana, where the

Petitioner is in custody. The motion was denied. The Court

held that habeas jurisdiction is proper in New Jersey. See

Khalil v. Joyce, 777 F.Supp.3d 369 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2025).6

But as the Court noted: there are “other jurisdictional

hurdles.” Khalil v. Joyce, 2025 WL 1019658, at *1 n.2

(D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2025).

This Opinion considers them.

C.

The Motion

The Petitioner has moved for a preliminary injunction.

See ECF 66.

Through this motion, he asks the Court to order three

things. See Petitioner’s Amended Memorandum of Law

in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief

(“Motion for Preliminary Injunction”) (ECF 124) at 9-10.

***

First, and as noted above, the Secretary of State has

determined that the Petitioner’s presence and activities in

6. The Respondents asked the Court of Appeals to review this

decision, and the Petitioner has opposed that request. See Petition

for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order of the United States

District Court for the District of New Jersey Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b) at 1-2, Khalil v. President U.S. (No. 25-08019); Opposition

to Petition for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order of the

U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) at 1-3, Khalil v. President U.S. (No. 25-08019).

254a

Appendix E

the United States “would have potentially serious adverse

foreign policy consequences and would compromise a

compelling U.S. foreign policy interest.” Determination

at 1. And based on the Secretary’s determination, the

immigration judge has ruled that the Petitioner can be

removed from the United States. See April 11 Audio

Recording at 1:37:46 to 1:38:25.

The Petitioner asks the Court to order that the

Secretary’s determination be set aside, vacated. See

Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9.

The determination, the Petitioner argues, was made in

retaliation for statements the Petitioner made on political

issues, and this retaliation violates the First Amendment.

See id. at 10-18.7

7. Two things. First, the Petitioner also argues that the

Secretary’s determination is unconstitutionally vague. See Motion

for Preliminary Injunction at 23-24. (But note that the Petitioner

does not argue in his petition that Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) is itself

unconstitutionally vague.) Second, in a footnote in one of his legal

briefs, the Petitioner references the second charge against him, the

one based on his alleged failure to make certain disclosures in his

lawful-permanent-resident application. See Petitioner’s Reply in

Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (“Reply Brief”)

(ECF 175) at 16 n.11. But there is no reference to this in the habeas

petition. See Salas v. Warren, 2019 WL 3423534, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J.

July 30, 2019) (declining to consider claims that the petitioner raised

in his traverse, rather than his petition); Quang Van Nguyen v.

Wenerowicz, 2013 WL 6473264, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2013) (similar,

as to claims first raised in a reply brief); accord, e.g., Carrascosa v.

McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 264 (3d Cir. 2008); St. John v. Ashcroft, 43 F.

App’x 281, 282 (10th Cir. 2002); Bracken v. Dormire, 247 F.3d 699, 702

255a

Appendix E

***

Second, the Petitioner alleges that the Respondents

are pursuing a policy to “to arrest, detain, and seek to

remove noncitizens who engage in expressive activities ...

supporting Palestinian rights,” id. at 4, --- and that it is

because of this policy that federal official are seeking to

remove him from the United States. See id.

The Petitioner asks the Court to order that the policy

be stopped. See id. at 9-10.

The policy violates the First Amendment, the

Petitioner says, because it is premised on “viewpoint

discrimination,” id. at 19 --- it operates against people

who take one view in certain public debates, but not those

who take other views.

And the policy also violates the Fifth Amendment, the

Petitioner says, because it is too vague --- and due process

requires precision, so that people can know in advance

what the government might seek to do. See id. at 16.

***

Third and finally, the Petitioner says he is being

detained by immigration authorities in retaliation for

the public statements he has made, see id. at 33, and

(8th Cir. 2001). Nor does the legal brief purport to seek relief from

the Court based on the second charge. No challenge to the second

charge is before the Court.

256a

Appendix E

also to “chill” him from making other statements. See id.

This, the argument goes, violates the Petitioner’s First

Amendment rights --- and the Court should therefore

order the Petitioner released from custody. See id. at 9.

D.

The Response

The Petitioner, as noted, has sought a preliminary

injunction as to each of the three things set out above.

In doing so, the Petitioner is asking for a remedy at

an early stage of this case, before it runs its typical and

full course. 8

To win a preliminary injunction, a litigant must show

a number of things.

One of them: that he is “likely” to be the ultimate

winner --- when the case is over and done, and reaches its

normal finish line. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney,

602 U.S. 339, 345, 144 S.Ct. 1570, 219 L.Ed.2d 99 (2024).

The Respondents argue that the Petitioner has not met

this standard. See Respondents’ Opposition to Petitioner’s

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (“Opposition Brief”)

(ECF 156) at 8-32.

As to why, some of the Respondents’ arguments focus

on the merits of the case. See id. at 23-32.

8. For example, there has been no discovery to this point, or

testimony.

257a

Appendix E

Others zero in on the Court’s power over the case --- in

particular, on a set of statutes that the Respondents say

take away this Court’s jurisdiction. See id. at 8-21.

II. The Question

“Ju r i s d ic t ion i s , a s a l w ay s , t he ‘ f i r st a nd

fundamental question.’ ” Baymont Franchise Sys., Inc. v.

Narnarayandev, LLC, 348 F.R.D. 220, 227 (D.N.J. 2024)

(quoting Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S.

449, 453, 20 S.Ct. 690, 44 L.Ed. 842 (1900)).

This is because a court that does not have jurisdiction

does not have power over a case. It cannot decide the

merits, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523

U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), and

so it should not speak to them.

Against this backdrop, the Court will consider in this

Opinion solely whether it has jurisdiction. Merits issues

(and other issues, like venue) will be taken up later.

***

Begin the jurisdictional analysis by getting a fuller

sense of the main issue that is on the table.

The Court starts off with jurisdiction here.

The habeas corpus statute gives federal district courts

jurisdiction over habeas cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a),

and this is a habeas case. See Second Amended Petition

(“Petition”) (ECF 162) ¶ 20.

258a

Appendix E

Moreover, the Court has previously ruled that it has

habeas jurisdiction over this case in particular. See Khalil,

777 F.Supp.3d 369.

The question, then, is this: does anything take away

the Court’s jurisdiction?

The Respondents say yes, and they point to two

“jurisdiction-stripping” statutes. See Opposition Brief at

9-20, 23.

The statutes are in Title 8 of the United States Code,

at Section 1252(g) and Section 1252(b)(9). Their current

versions became law in 2005.9

If these statutes do not strip away this Court’s habeas

jurisdiction, then things stay as they were and this Court

resolves the case.

If these statutes do strip away this Court’s habeas

jurisdiction, then the way forward is different. The frontline review will be done by the immigration courts.

Either way, though, the next rung up on the ladder is

the same. Whoever does the first-cut look, this Court or

the immigration courts, what follows is review in a federal

court of appeals (and after that, review would be possible

in the Supreme Court).10

9. Another statute is invoked, too. See Opposition Brief at 20–21.

But it is mostly irrelevant here, and is therefore taken up only later,

in Part VIII.

10. The text refers to immigration courts because, as noted in

footnote 3, certain rulings from immigration judges can be appealed

259a

Appendix E

III. The Court’s Approach

The Court first takes up the Respondents’ argument

that Section 1252(b)(9) strips jurisdiction.

Section 1252(b)(9), it is said, prevents this Court from

considering the Petitioner’s claim that the Secretary of

State’s determination under Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) was

unconstitutional.

Out of the gate, this Section 1252(b)(9) argument looks

strong. See Part IV.A.

But ultimately, it is not persuasive.

This is because Section 1252(b)(9) applies only after a

final order of removal has been entered by the immigration

courts. The words of the statute say so. See Part IV.B. And

so has the Third Circuit.11 See Part IV.C.

But no final order of removal has been entered in this

case. Therefore, Section 1252(b)(9) does not apply.

to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Review by a federal court of

appeals generally takes place only after the Board of Immigration

Appeals has ruled. See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 234

(3d Cir. 2003). If this Court has jurisdiction and is responsible for

initially handling the case, any appeal would be to the federal court

of appeals for the Third Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. If this Court

does not have jurisdiction and the immigration courts therefore do

the ground-floor review, then any appeal would be to the federal court

of appeals for the circuit that covers Louisiana, where the Petitioner

is held; that is the Fifth Circuit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).

11. In a case called Chehazeh v. Attorney General of the United

States, 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012).

260a

Appendix E

***

There is, though, a wrinkle.

In another case,12 the Third Circuit has suggested that

Section 1252(b)(9) can apply, as here, before a final order

of removal has been entered by the immigration courts.

But even on the assumption that the second case

is controlling, Section 1252(b)(9) does not remove

jurisdiction from this Court as to the Secretary of State’s

determination.

Under the second case, Section 1252(b)(9) strips

jurisdiction from a federal district court over a claim only

when that claim could still get “meaningful” federal court

review later --- after the immigration courts have wrapped

up their work, and the claim then goes to a federal court

for the first time, a federal court of appeals. See Part V.

But in this case, that sort of delayed federal court

review would not be “meaningful” federal court review.

This is for two reasons.

First, because there would be little to show for any

such delay. Usually, the immigration courts can tee

things up for the federal court of appeals, by providing a

remedy for any illegal conduct, by finding the facts, and by

12. EOHC v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland

Security, 950 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2020).

261a

Appendix E

applying their distinctive expertise. But the immigration

courts cannot do any of that as to the Secretary of State’s

determination. See Part VI.A to Part VI.C.

And second, the law requires sped-up judicial review

of First Amendment claims of the kind the Petitioner

raises here. That is not consistent with delaying federal

court review until after the immigration courts have

finished their work and the case then moves to a federal

court of appeals. See Part VI.D.

***

Next, the Court considers the Respondents’ argument

that Section 1252(g) cuts off review here of the Secretary

of State’s determination.

But the Section 1252(g) argument does not work. It

runs aground on the plain words of the statute and the

Supreme Court’s main decision in this area.13 See Part VII.

***

Finally, the Court considers the alleged policy that the

Petitioner has challenged --- and assesses whether Section

1252(b)(9) or Section 1252(g) take away jurisdiction from

this Court to consider it.

As to the policy, the jurisdiction-stripping argument

is not persuasive for most of the same reasons it was not

13. The decision is Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999).

262a

Appendix E

persuasive as to the Secretary’s determination, plus a few

more. See Part VIII.14

IV. Section 1252(b)(9) Does Not Apply Here

Get underway now with the jurisdictional analysis.

The Respondents’ first argument is that Section

1252(b)(9) removes this Court’s jurisdiction to consider

the Petitioner’s request for an injunction vacating the

Secretary of State’s determination. See Opposition Brief

at 9-14.

At first, this argument looks strong. See Part IV.A.

But in the end, it does not work. Section 1252(b)(9) does

not apply in cases like this one, in which a final order of

removal has not been entered by the immigration courts.

See Part IV.B. And the Third Circuit has confirmed as

much. See Part IV.C.

Bottom line: Section 1252(b)(9) is irrelevant here. It

applies to post-order-of-removal cases, and this is a preorder-of-removal case.

A.

Section 1252(b)(9)

To start off, bracket for a few moments the question

of whether Section 1252(b)(9) does or does not apply to

14. There is also a third statute. Its impact is marginal, and it

is considered briefly in Part VIII.

263a

Appendix E

pre-order-of-removal cases like this one. Assume, instead

--- and throughout this Part IV.A --- that Section 1252

(b)(9) applies to such cases.

Under the statute, there is a four-part test for deciding

whether Section 1252(b)(9) removes jurisdiction over a

given claim. See Part IV.A.2.

Applying that test, the Court concludes that Section

1252(b)(9), assuming that it applies, would strip away this

Court’s jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s claim that the

Secretary of State’s determination is unconstitutional.

See Part IV.A.3.

That sets the stage for the question taken up in Part

IV.B and in Part IV.C: does Section 1252(b)(9) apply in

pre-order-of-removal cases like this one?

1.

The Statute

Begin, as always, with the words Congress used in

the law it passed. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429,

440, 134 S.Ct. 1158, 188 L.Ed.2d 158 (2014); United States

v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d

246 (1981).

Here, those words are “clear and distinct,” Martin

v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339, 4 L.Ed.

97 (1816), so they must be enforced as written. See Conn.

Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct.

1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (collecting cases).

264a

Appendix E

And their effect here is unmissable. If Section 1252

(b)(9) applies, there is no jurisdiction in this Court over

the Petitioner’s challenge to the Secretary of State’s

determination.

***

In relevant part, Section 1252(b)(9) says:

Judicial review of all questions of law and fact,

including interpretation and application of

constitutional and statutory provisions, arising

from any action taken or proceeding brought to

remove an alien from the United States under

this subchapter shall be available only in judicial

review of a final order under this section.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

***

This part of Section 1252(b)(9) does not itself say when

and where the “judicial review” it mentions is to take place.

But other parts of Section 1252 do. They make clear

that the “judicial review” alluded to in Section 1252(b)(9)

is conducted only by federal courts of appeals, with federal

district courts having no role. And the court of appeals’

review kicks in after the immigration courts are done with

their work --- after the Board of Immigration Appeals has

affirmed the immigration judge’s order or after the time

for appealing to the Board has run out.15

15. The sources for the statements in the text are laid out here.

As to when the “judicial review” alluded to in Section 1252(b)(9) takes

265a

Appendix E

2.

The Question

As set out just above, if “judicial review” is covered

by Section 1252(b)(9), then that review must happen only

later (after the immigration courts have finished their

work) and only elsewhere (in the federal court of appeals,

not here).

The question, then, is this: is the judicial review

the Petitioner seeks here, of the Secretary of State’s

determination, covered by Section 1252(b)(9)?

If it is not covered, then Section 1252(b)(9) is no hurdle

to this Court keeping jurisdiction.

place: that review is of “an order of removal under subsection (a)(1),”

id. § 1252(b); subsection (a)(1) clarifies that an “order of removal” is

“a final order of removal,” id. § 1252(a)(1) (emphasis added); and an

order of removal becomes “final” on the earlier of “a determination

by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order” or “the

expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review

of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)

(47)(B); Yusupov v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 518 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir.

2008), as amended (Mar. 27, 2008). As to where “judicial review”

will go forward: in a federal court of appeals, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252

(a)(5), and in particular in the court of appeals that sits in “the judicial

circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings.”

Id. § 1252(b)(2); see Castillo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 109 F.4th 127, 129

(3d Cir. 2024). And critically: court of appeals review will be the

“[e]xclusive means of review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Exclusive means

exclusive. The federal “judicial review” described in Section 1252

(b)(9) will happen only in a court of appeals. That rules out a place

in the process for the district court.

266a

Appendix E

If it is covered, Section 1252(b)(9) strips jurisdiction

--- and review by this Court would be out of bounds.

***

To answer the question, look to the front end of Section

1252(b)(9), the part before the word “shall.”

Again, Section 1252(b)(9):

Judicial review of all questions of law and fact,

including interpretation and application of

constitutional and statutory provisions, arising

from any action taken or proceeding brought

to remove an alien from the United States

under this subchapter shall be available only

in judicial review of a final order under this

section.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added).

What judicial review is covered by the first half of

the sentence?

“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact,

including interpretation and application of constitutional

and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or

proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United

States under this subchapter[.]” Id.

In other words, Section 1252(b)(9) kicks in when four

conditions are met:

267a

Appendix E

1. There is “any action ... or proceeding,”

2. “to remove an alien from the United States,”

3. “under this subchapter,” and

4. judicial review is sought as to “a[ ] question

[ ] of law and fact” that “aris[es] from” such

“action” or “proceeding.”

Below, the Court ticks through these --- and concludes

that each of the four boxes is checked.

What this means: Section 1252(b)(9) covers judicial

review of the Secretary of State’s determination --- and so,

if Section 1252(b)(9) applies in the first place,16 that Section

prevents this Court from assessing the Secretary’s

determination.

3.

The Answer

Section 1252(b)(9), as noted, spins off a four-part test

for deciding whether judicial review of a claim is covered

by the statute. See Part IV.A.2.

As shown below, each part of the test is satisfied.17

16. Recall: that is assessed below, in Part IV.B and Part IV.C.

17. Section 1252(b)(9)’s key terms are not defined by the statute.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (defining other terms in the statute). Therefore,

the Court looks to the ordinary and contemporary meanings of the

words Congress used in the Section. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,

268a

Appendix E

a)

“Action”

Is the Secretary’s determination an “action” or

“proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1252(b)(9)?

The Court’s conclusion: it is an “action.”

At around the time of Section 1252(b)(9)’s initial

enactment in 1996, authoritative sources understood

“action” broadly.18

The Oxford English Dictionary defined “action” as “a

thing done, a deed.” Action, n., sense 3.a, Oxford English

Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). And a leading legal dictionary

went roughly the same way. See Action, Black’s Law

Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“something done.”).

In making his determination, formalized through

a memorandum, the Secretary of State took an action.

571 U.S. 220, 227, 134 S.Ct. 870, 187 L.Ed.2d 729 (2014). This includes

referring to time-of-enactment dictionaries, both general and legal.

See, e.g., Sandifer, 571 U.S. at 227, 134 S.Ct. 870; Taniguchi v. Kan

Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–67, 132 S.Ct. 1997, 182 L.Ed.2d

903 (2012); see also Khalil, 777 F.Supp.3d at 389-90.

18. Section 1252(b)(9) was first passed in 1996, and its current

version dates to 2005. Why the focus on 1996? Because that is when

the relevant sentence of Section 1252(b)(9) was passed. See Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.

L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. In 2005, more words were added to

Section 1252(b)(9) to specify that it reached habeas jurisdiction. See

REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 199 Stat. 305. But none

of those words is at issue in this Opinion.

269a

Appendix E

Writing or approving a memo is not something that just

happens; it takes doing --- the “do[ing]” of “something.”

The inquiry could end there.

And it would, except that something else reinforces

the conclusion that the Secretary’s determination is an

“action.” Namely, Congress put the word “any” before

the word “action”; the statute says “any action.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added).

And putting “any” before a word confirms it must be

understood in an inclusive way, to reach the outer edge

of its possible orbit.

A year after Section 1252(b)(9) first became law, for

example, the Supreme Court said: “Read naturally, the

word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or

some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ “ United States

v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d

132 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 97 (1976)).

This wide-angle view of “any” matches up with a long

line of Supreme Court cases.

In Collector of Internal Revenue v. Hubbard, 79

U.S. 12 Wall. 1, 15, 20 L.Ed. 272 (1870), for example, the

Supreme Court interpreted a statute that said certain tax

suits shall not “be maintained in any court.” 79 U.S. at

3. It was “quite clear” that “any court” meant any court,

federal or state. Id. at 15.

270a

Appendix E

More recently, the Court reaffirmed that “any”

“ordinarily ‘refers to a member of a particular group

or class without distinction or limitation’ and in this

way ‘implies every member of the class or group.’ “ SAS

Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362, 138 S.Ct. 1348, 200

L.Ed.2d 695 (2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Any, Oxford

English Dictionary (3d ed. 2016)); see also United States

v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 358, 114 S.Ct. 1599, 128

L.Ed.2d 319 (1994).

***

Bottom line:

The Secretary of State’s determination was a decision

made as to the Petitioner, and it culminated in a physical

thing in the world -- the memorandum that reflects the

determination. The determination was “something done,”

and that is what “action” means.

And whatever possible doubt there might be is

dissipated by Congress’ use of “any action.” Per that

phrase, Section 1252(b)(9) covers all actions --- without

qualification, nothing carved out.

This conclusion, that the Secretary’s determination

is an “action,” is linguistically obvious.

So much so that the Petitioner seems to see things in

the same way. In making his determination, the Petitioner

writes in his legal brief, the Secretary “had taken [an]

action.” Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17 (emphasis

271a

Appendix E

added); see also id. at 1, 7, 13 (describing the challenged

conduct as an “action”).

***

The first of the four Section 1252(b)(9) boxes is

checked. The Secretary’s determination counts as an

“action.”

***

Before moving on, note a possible counterargument.

Namely, it might be argued that Section 1252(b)(9)

refers only to an “action” of the legal sort --- as in, say, a

civil action, or some other kind of lawsuit. After all, one

of the basic definitions of “action” is “[a] legal process or

suit.” Action, n., sense 8, Oxford English Dictionary (2d

ed. 1989).

If this were the right understanding of Section 1252

(b)(9), the Secretary’s determination could not be chalked

up as an “action.” The determination is “a thing done.”

Action, n., sense 3, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.

1989). But it is not a lawsuit.

This sort of reading, though, does not make sense.

For starters, Section 1252(b)(9) does not speak of

“bringing” an action, but of “tak[ing]” one.

In everyday English, people “take action” all the time.

But people do not “take a civil action” --- they bring one.

272a

Appendix E

That is how the words have been used for centuries.

See, e.g., id. (quoting 1 Tomlins, Law Dictionary (1809))

(“A man attainted of treason ... cannot bring an action.”).

And to see the proof: across 200 years, the U.S.

Reports contain 136 mentions of a “civil action brought”

--- but none of a civil action “taken.” Cf. Delligatti v. United

States, {blank} U.S. {blank}, 145 S. Ct. 797, 813, 221

L.Ed.2d 303 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[A]nalyzing

‘how particular combinations of words are used in a vast

database of English prose’ can shed light on how ordinary

people understand statutory terms.”) (quoting Facebook,

Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395, 412, 141 S.Ct. 1163, 209

L.Ed.2d 272 (2021) (Alito, J., dissenting)).

Moreover, to read “action” in its legal sense would

make redundant another term in Section 1252(b)(9) --“proceeding.”

“Proceeding” covers a part of the legal process. See

Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“[T]he

form and manner of conducting juridical business before

a court or judicial officer.”); Proceeding, vbl. n., sense 3,

Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“The instituting

or carrying on of an action at law[.]”); see also Waetzig v.

Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 604 U.S. 305, 145 S. Ct.

690, 698-99, 221 L.Ed.2d 143 (2025) (surveying definitions

of “proceeding”).

As the Supreme Court confirmed this Term: “

‘proceeding’ encompasses all steps in an action.” Waetzig,

145 S. Ct. at 699.

273a

Appendix E

If “proceeding” sweeps in the full arc of “an action,”

as the Supreme Court’s recent opinion suggests, then

“action” --- if it is understood in its legal sense --- would

be fully encompassed within “proceeding.”

The two words would cover the same thing. They

would become redundant. One or the other would be

reduced to surplus, an unnecessary bit of add-on. And

reading statutes to create redundancies and surplus --that is not how things are supposed to go. See Bufkin v.

Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 145 S. Ct. 728, 741, 221 L.Ed.2d 192

(2025); Waetzig, 145 S. Ct. at 699; Marbury v. Madison, 5

U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

And note a final point.

On the few occasions it has discussed Section 1252

(b)(9), the Supreme Court has used “action” in its general

sense --- not in any legal sense. See, e.g., Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 293, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d

122 (2018) (suggesting that placing someone in detention

is an “action”); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940

(1999) (“AADC”) (similar).

In a nutshell: the possible counterargument sketched

out here does not work. As used in Section 1252(b)(9),

“action” means what it usually does. It does not mean a

lawsuit.19

19. To be sure, courts sometimes analyze a word with reference

to its neighbor. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389, 119

274a

Appendix E

b)

“To Remove”

The first of the four Section 1252(b)(9) boxes is

checked. See Part IV.A.3(a). The Secretary of State’s

determination was an “action taken.”

The next question: was the “action taken to remove

an alien from the United States”? 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)

(emphasis added).

It was.

The key word in the quoted phrase is “to.”

As used with the verb “remove,” “to” signals “purpose

or intention.” To, sense B.I, Oxford English Dictionary

(2d ed. 1989).

S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (“Statutory language must be

read in context and a phrase gathers meaning from the words around

it.”) (cleaned up); see also Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S.

303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961); Amy Coney Barrett,

Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2193,

2197 n.11 (2017). And so it might be argued here that “proceeding”

(which undoubtedly has a legal meaning) should be taken to overspill

itself, and to color the meaning of the neighboring “action” --- leaving

“action” with some legalistic hues (a civil action, a lawsuit). But that

does not work. If “action” and “proceeding” are each assigned a

legal-shaded meaning, the words become redundant. Courts often

look to contextual clues to avoid superfluous readings. See, e.g.,

United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 659 (5th Cir. 2015). But they

have rejected contextual arguments that create redundancy. See,

e.g., Waetzig, 145 S. Ct. at 699; Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S.

73, 78, 111 S.Ct. 415, 112 L.Ed.2d 374 (1990).

275a

Appendix E

And the cases confirm what the dictionaries say. See,

e.g., Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 354-55, 134

S.Ct. 2384, 189 L.Ed.2d 411 (2014) (concluding that “to

obtain” in 18 U.S.C. § 1344 signals “inten[t]”); Allison

Engine Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 668, 128

S.Ct. 2123, 170 L.Ed.2d 1030 (2008) (concluding that “to

get” in the relevant statute “denotes purpose”).

***

Given the above, the question is this: was the Secretary

of State’s determination (an “action”) done (“taken”) with

the purpose or intention (“to”) of removing an alien from

the United States”?

Yes, clearly.

When a Secretary of State says he has “reasonable

ground[s] to believe” that a person’s “presence or activities

in the United States ... would have potentially serious

adverse foreign policy consequences for the United

States” 20 --- that statement has only one known function

in our law.

And that function is to seek the person’s removal

from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i)

(“[a]n alien” who meets the criteria quoted just above “is

deportable.”).

20. That is in essence what the Secretary’s determination says

here. See Determination at 1–2.

276a

Appendix E

T he memo t h at for m a l i z e s t he S e c r et a r y ’s

determination confirms this.

Its “subject” line says that it concerns “[r]emovability

[d]eterminations” under the immigration laws. See

Determination at 1.

The first paragraph of the memo explains that the

Secretary has deemed the Petitioner to be a “deportable

alien[ ]” under the removal statute. See id. The second

paragraph lays out the Secretary’s understanding of the

relevant statute. See id. And the last paragraph asserts

that the Petitioner’s “presence” in the United State would

harm American foreign policy. See id. at 1-2.

In short: under Section 1252(b)(9), “to remove an alien

from the United States” means to act with the intent or

purpose to remove someone. And that was the purpose

of the Secretary’s determination.

c)

“Under This Subchapter”

Next: Section 1252(b)(9) applies when the claim in

question “aris[es] from any action taken ... under this

subchapter.”

The subchapter in question is Subchapter II of

Chapter 12 of Title 8 --- the part of the Immigration and

Nationality Act that spans Section 1151 to Section 1382.

And the Secretary made his determination under 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C), which is part of Subchapter II.

277a

Appendix E

So the Petitioner’s claim, which challenges the

Secretary’s determination, “aris[es] from an[ ] action

taken ... under this subchapter.”

d)

“Arising From”

To this point, the Court has concluded that the

Secretary’s determination was (a) an action taken (b)

to remove an alien from the United States (c) under the

relevant subchapter.

That leaves a fourth and final question.

Judicial review is sought here to enjoin the Petitioner’s

detention as a violation of the First Amendment. See

Petition ¶¶ 89-90.

Does assessment of that “question[ ] ... aris[e] from

an[ ] action taken [the Secretary’s determination] to

remove an alien [the Petitioner] from the United States”?

Yes.

The Supreme Court has recently debated what

“arising from” means in Section 1252(b)(9). See Jennings,

583 U.S. 281, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122. How tight

must the nexus be between A and B to say that B arises

from A?

Whatever the answer to that question might be in the

abstract, there can be no doubt that review of the legality

of the Petitioner’s detention “aris[es] from” the Secretary’s

determination.

278a

Appendix E

The two are tightly yoked together. The Secretary of

State’s determination is not tangential to the detention

of the Petitioner or his removal under Section 1227(a)(4)

(C)(i). Quite the opposite. The determination is what allows

removal to go forward in the first place --- indeed, it has

only that purpose under the law, and it is the only piece

of evidence put forward before the immigration courts in

support of a Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) removal.

***

To sum up:

Built into Section 1252(b)(9) is a four-part test for

deciding whether judicial review is or is not covered.

Here, that test is satisfied, for the reasons set out

above. 21 What this means: assuming that Section 1252

21. And also: this conclusion gets support from two statements

about Section 1252(b)(9) in AADC. There, the Supreme Court said

that Section 1252(b)(9) “channels judicial review of all” relevant

“decisions and actions, 525 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936 (emphasis

in original), to the immigration courts and the court of appeals.

And Section 1252(b)(9) is a “zipper” clause, that “says ‘no judicial

review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial

review.’ “ Id. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936. These statements strengthen

the conclusion that the Secretary’s determination is covered by

Section 1252(b)(9). But they should not be treated as definitively

fixing the meaning of Section 1252(b)(9). First, subsequent cases

have limited these statements. Justice Alito’s Jennings plurality

opinion, for example, construed Section 1252(b)(9) as allowing for

judicial review of prolonged immigration detention in a federal

district court, see 583 U.S. at 294–95 ---, 138 S.Ct. 830 and that

279a

Appendix E

(b)(9) applies here in the first place, this Court has no

jurisdiction to consider the Petitioner’s claim as to the

Secretary’s determination.

Is this assumption right? Take that up now.

would seem to be at odds with the quotes from AADC. Second, the

AADC statements about Section 1252(b)(9) were dicta; the holding

in AADC was about the meaning of a different immigration-related

provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See 525 U.S. at 473, 119 S.Ct. 936. And

third, when the AADC Court said that Section 1252(b)(9) covers “all”

actions and decisions, see id. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936, it was rejecting an

argument that Section 1252(g) covers all actions from the beginning

(“commence[ment]”) to the end (“execut[ion]” of removal orders). See

AADC, 525 U.S. at 482-83, 119 S.Ct. 936. Section 1252(g) could not

mean that, the Court reasoned, because Section 1252(b)(9) already

does. See id. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936. But even if 1252(b)(9) covers all

actions between commencement and execution, it might arguably

have nothing to say about the Secretary of State’s determination

--- because that is a pre-commencement step. All of this said, though,

the AADC statements tip the scales, at least to an extent, toward the

conclusion that the Secretary’s determination is covered by Section

1252(b)(9). After all, Supreme Court dicta carry special weight. See,

e.g., Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2019). And

the AADC Section 1252(b)(9) statements are not pure dicta; they

take some steps down the road in the “holding” direction. This is

because the AADC Court’s broad reading of Section 1252(b)(9) may

have been a necessary element of the Court’s actual holding, as to

the scope of Section 1252(g). See 525 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 936. And

logically necessary and explicitly invoked steps along the way to a

holding can be binding. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 67, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).

280a

Appendix E

B. The Text

The words of Section 1252(b)(9) seem to cover the

Petitioner’s challenge to the Secretary’s determination.

See Part IV.A.

But the analysis that supports this conclusion, see

id., is zoomed in to a fault. Pan out to see the rest of the

statute, and what becomes clear is this: Section 1252(b)(9)

does not apply here as a categorical matter. It does not

reach cases like this one, in which a final order of removal

has not been entered.

***

Section 1252(b)(9) is part of Section 1252(b), and

Section 1252(b) starts with a lead-in.

With respect to review of an order of removal

..., the following requirements apply:

From there, Section 1252(b) runs through a set of

numbered “requirements,” 1252(b)(1), (b)(2), and so on

--- out to (b)(9).

With that structure in mind, look to some relevant

parts of Section 1252(b):

(b) Requirements for review of orders of

removal

With respect to review of an order of removal

..., the following requirements apply:

281a

Appendix E

(1) Deadline

The petition for review must be filed

not later than 30 days after the date

of the final order of removal.

(2) Venue and forms

The petition for review shall be

filed with the court of appeals for

the judicial circuit in which the

immigration judge completed the

proceedings ....

(3) Service

(A) In general

... The petition shall be served on

the Attorney General and on the

officer or employee of the [federal

immigration agency] in charge of

the ... district in which the final

order of removal ... was entered....

(4) Scope and standard for review

Except as provided in paragraph

(5)(B)-(A) the court of appeals shall decide

the petition only on the administrative

282a

Appendix E

record on which the order of removal

is based, ....

[...]

(9) Consolidation of questions for

judicial review

Judicial review of all questions of law

and fact, including interpretation

and application of constitutional and

statutory provisions, arising from any

action taken or proceeding brought

to remove an alien from the United

States under this subchapter shall

be available only in judicial review

of a final order under this section.

Except as other wise provided in

this section, no court shall have

jurisdiction, by habeas corpus ..., or by

any other provision of law (statutory

or nonstatutory), to review such an

order or such questions of law or fact.

Looking to the full statute is required, and always has

been. 22

22. See The Mary Ann, 21 U.S. 8 Wheat. 380, 387, 5 L.Ed. 641

(1823) (“[T]hose rules for construing statutes, which are dictated

by good sense, and sanctioned by immemorial usage, ... require

that the intent of the Legislature shall have effect, which intent

is to be collected from the context[.]”); United States v. Fisher, 6

U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1805) (“It is undoubtedly a

283a

Appendix E

Doing so here makes clear that Section 1252(b)(9) has

no bearing on this case.

Section 1252(b)(9) speaks to cases in which judicial

review goes forward after the immigration courts enter

a final order of removal.

But Section 1252(b)(9) does not purport to say

anything about what happens when --- as here --- judicial

review takes place before an order of removal is entered.

***

The point is clear from the get-go.

The title of Section 1252(b) says that the Section,

which includes Section 1252(b)(9), is about “Requirements

for review of orders of removal.”

These words assume that an order of removal has

already been entered. After all, “review” means to “look

at a thing again.” Review, v., sense 1, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/review

(accessed Apr. 17, 2025); accord, e.g., Review, v., sense 2,

well established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every

part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be

extracted from the whole.”); accord Gundy v. United States, 588

U.S. 128, 141, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019); Nat’l Broad.

Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214-16, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344

(1943); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314, 3

L.Ed. 232 (1810); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 53, 68, 3

L.Ed. 150 (1810); see also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *59.

284a

Appendix E

Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“view, inspect,

or examine a second time or again”).

And there can be no looking “again” at a thing (here,

an order of removal) that does not already exist. If a

movie is not out until next year, a newspaper might run a

preview. But the review comes after the fact --- after the

filming and editing are wrapped up and someone can sit

and watch the final product.

Bottom line: Section 1252(b)’s heading (“Requirements

for review of orders of removal”) shows that Section

1252(b)(9) kicks in after a final order has been entered,

not before. 23

***

23. And note: in the context of Section 1252(b), courts routinely

reason from the language Congress used in the various statutory

headings. See EOHC v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d

177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020) (“That is also why the provision is captioned

‘Consolidation of Questions for Judicial Review.’ “) (cleaned up); see

also Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th

Cir. 2020); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Div. of Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007); Singh v. Gonzales, 499

F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2007); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191,

198 (1st Cir. 2003); Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 12 (1st Cir. 2000);

Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000); Cath.

Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 182 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999), on reh’g en

banc, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000); cf. Cunningham v. Cornell Univ.,

2025 WL 1128943, at *6, 604 U.S. 693, 145 S.Ct. 1020, 221 L.Ed.2d

591 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2025) (in a different context, looking to statutory

headings to resolve possible doubt about statutory construction).

285a

Appendix E

Other parts of Section 1252(b) point in the same

direction.

Start from the top, with the Section 1252(b) lead-in.

It says that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of

removal ..., the following requirements apply.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b) (emphasis added). And as noted, one of those

“requirements” listed under that Section is 1252(b)(9).

The clear implication: Section 1252(b)(9) is about

“review of an order of a removal,” not about a situation in

which review might take place before such an order exists.

Move now to the first substantive part of Section

1252(b), Section 1252(b)(1).

Section 1252(b)(1) lays down a deadline for when a

person must act if he or she wants to seek out the judicial

review that is the subject of Section 1252(b): “The petition

for review [in the court of appeals] must be filed not later

than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”

This timeline assumes that a final order of removal

has been entered. It happened. It was done on a certain

“date,” and the 30-day countdown goes from there.

And note: Section 1252(b) provides no deadline for a

court challenge that might be brought before the entry of

a final order of removal. Why not? Because Section 1252(b)

does not cover those sorts of challenges.

286a

Appendix E

Walk through the statute and see more of the same.

Under Section 1252(b), the court challenge is to go

forward in “the judicial circuit in which the immigration

judge completed the proceedings.” Id. § 1252(b). That

makes sense if Section 1252(b) covers situations in which

an order of removal has been entered. But not if it also

speaks to the period before an order has been entered.

At that point, the “proceedings” before the immigration

judge are not “completed.” They are underway.

And along the same lines:

Why would Congress require service where “the

final order of removal ... was entered,” id. § 1252(b)(3), if

it meant for Section 1252(b) to cover situations in which

there was not yet a final order of review that had been

“entered”?

Why would Congress limit review “only” to “the

administrative record on which the order of removal is

based,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A), if the review takes place

before an order of removal, “based” on the record, has

been entered?

In sum, a broader look shows that Section 1252(b)(9)

comes online after an order of removal has been entered

by the immigration courts.

Therefore, Section 1252(b)(9) does not purport to say

anything about what might happen in cases like this one,

cases that are brought before a final order of removal is

entered.

287a

Appendix E

The upshot: Section 1252(b)(9) has no role to play here,

and so it cannot strip this Court of jurisdiction.

***

A final note.

On the understanding sketched out just above, Section

1252(b)(9) has an important role to play.

It tells federal district courts that, after an order of

removal is finalized, they are not part of the mix. The

immigration courts will do the front-line work. And the

work of Article III judicial review belongs to the court of

appeals, and fully. An issue here or there --- those cannot

be plucked out by a district court for its own review.

By conveying this message, Section 1252(b)(9)

“streamlines” review, as courts have observed that it aims

to. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 424, 129 S.Ct. 1749,

173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009); F.J.A.P. v. Garland, 94 F.4th 620,

628 (7th Cir. 2024); Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258,

1269 (11th Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. Patel v. Garland, 596

U.S. 328, 142 S.Ct. 1614, 212 L.Ed.2d 685 (2022); Cooper

Butt ex rel. Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2020).

And it also cuts off “piecemeal” litigation, another of

its core purposes. See Gicharu v. Carr, 983 F.3d 13, 18

(1st Cir. 2020); Jama v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d

490, 496 (6th Cir. 2014); Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,

666 F.3d 118, 131 (3d Cir. 2012); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr.

& Customs Enf’t, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007).

288a

Appendix E

But Section 1252(b)(9) does those things only where

it applies --- and that is after orders of removal have been

entered, not, as here, before. 24

***

Here, the Petitioner does not seek judicial review of an

order of removal. None has been finalized. And therefore,

24. But it might be argued: this cannot be all. Even without

Section 1252(b)(9), few district judges would have imagined that

they could review an issue that is brought to them while a court of

appeals is already handling the overall case. But this ignores the

state of the law before Section 1252(b)(9) was passed in 1996. See,

e.g., Delligatti, 145 S. Ct. at 806–07 (looking to a “[legal] principle

[that] was well established” when a statute was enacted to inform

interpretation of the statute). In 1983, the Supreme Court held that

“final orders” of removal “include[ ] all matters on which the validity

of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations

actually made at the hearing.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938, 103

S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (cleaned up). This leaves behind

a good many issues. It might have been taken to imply that the

court of appeals, when it reviews a final order of removal, takes up

only a subset of questions (“all matters on which the validity of the

final order is contingent”) --- with room left for a district court to

look into other issues related to a case that is brought before it. See

Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 582, 140 S.Ct. 1683, 207 L.Ed.2d

111 (2020) (making a closely similar point in another immigrationlaw context). Section 1252(b)(9), where it applies, shuts the door on

that sort of thinking --- because it says that review in the court of

appeals occupies virtually the whole playing field of possible issues,

well beyond those that the order of removal was “contingent” on.

Court of appeals review covers “[j]udicial review of all questions of

law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional

and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding

brought to remove an alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

289a

Appendix E

Section 1252(b)(9) does not prevent this Court from

considering the Petitioner’s claim that the Secretary’s

determination must be set aside as unconstitutional.

“Jurisdictional rules ... should be ‘clear and easy to

apply.’ “ Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 212, 143

S.Ct. 890, 215 L.Ed.2d 151 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)

(quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chi.,

583 U.S. 17, 25, 138 S.Ct. 13, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017)).

This one is.

C.

Chehazeh

Do cases support the reading of Section 1252(b)(9)

laid out just above?

At the Supreme Court, there is no binding authority. A

majority of Justices has not directly passed on the question

one way or another. 25

25. In short passages here and there, various Justices have

weighed in. A dissent from Justice Breyer, joined by Justices

Ginsburg and Sotomayor, suggests that Section 1252(b)(9) applies

only to review of orders of removal that have already been entered.

“Jurisdiction ... is unaffected by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which by its

terms applies only ‘with respect to review of an order of removal

under § 1252(a)(1).’ The respondents challenge their detention

without bail, not an order of removal.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 355, 138

S.Ct. 830 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cleaned up). On the other hand,

a dissent from Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, seems to

suggest the opposite view, that Section 1252(b)(9) limits district-court

review even before an order of removal has been entered. “[Section]

1252(b)(9) covers all ‘questions of law and fact’ that an immigration

judge must decide as a result of the Government’s decision to initiate

290a

Appendix E

But the Supreme Court addressed Section 1252(b)(9)

in passing in an earlier case.

And based on that Supreme Court case, and based on

an earlier decision of its own, the Third Circuit has held

that Section 1252(b)(9) applies only after a final order of

removal has been entered --- and such an order, as noted,

has not been entered here as to the Petitioner.

The Third Circuit’s analysis and holding as to Section

1252(b)(9) is quoted here in full:

[T]he Supreme Court has noted that § 1252

(b)(9) is subject to the limitations of § 1252(b),

and, therefore, “applies only ‘with respect to

review of an order of removal under subsection

(a)(1).’ “ INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313, 121

S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347, (2001) (quoting 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)). Section 1252(b)(9), “by its

own terms,” does not bar review of an order

“not subject to judicial review under § 1252

(a)(1),” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313, 121 S.Ct. 2271,

and § 1252(a)(1) describes only “review of a

final order of removal.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)

(“Judicial review of a final order of removal ... is

governed only by chapter 158 of title 28, except

removal proceedings against an alien.” Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at 590,

140 S.Ct. 1683 (Thomas, J., dissenting). And note that a concurrence

from Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, necessarily rests

on the idea that Section 1252(b)(9) applies even before orders of

removal are entered. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 319–21, 138 S.Ct. 830

(Thomas, J., concurring). For more on Jennings, see Part IV.A.3(d).

291a

Appendix E

as provided in sub[s]ection (b) of this section

....”). Section 1252(b)(9), therefore, requires

only that, when there is an order of removal

under subsection (a)(1), review of any issues

related to that order must be consolidated into a

single petition for review and cannot be brought

piecemeal. One may not, for instance, follow a

petition for review with a habeas petition or a

petition for a writ of mandamus.

Although St. Cyr issued prior to the REAL ID

Act, the REAL ID Act did not modify § 1252(b)

or the instruction that § 1252(b)(9) “applies only

‘with respect to review of an order of removal

under subsection (a)(1).’ “ St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at

313, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)).

Since that time, both the Ninth and Eleventh

Circuits have held that, when a person is not

seeking review of “an order of removal under

subsection (a)(1),” the limitations of § 1252

(b)(9) do not apply. See Singh v. Gonzales, 499

F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2007) (“By virtue of its

explicit language ... 1252(b)(9) applies only to

those claims seeking judicial review of orders of

removal.”); Madu v. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362,

1367 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “section

1252(b)(9) applies only with respect to review

of an order of removal” and that the REAL

ID Act “did not expand the scope of § 1252

(b)(9) by making it applicable to cases other than

those involving ‘review of an order of removal’ ”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. House

292a

Appendix E

Conference Report on the REAL ID Act, H.R.

Rep. No. 109-72, at 175, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240,

300 (“Section 106 would not preclude habeas

review over challenges to detention that are

independent of challenges to removal orders.

Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review

only over challenges to removal orders.”).

While we have not written precedentially on the

scope of § 1252(b)(9) after the REAL ID Act,

we have addressed the effect of nearly identical

language in § 1252(a)(5). In Kumarasamy v.

Attorney General, we considered whether a

habeas petition that was before us on appeal

when the REAL ID Act came into effect

should be converted into a petition for review

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). 453 F.3d 169,

172 (3d Cir. 2006). That subsection states that

a “petition for review filed with an appropriate

court of appeals ... shall be the sole and

exclusive means for judicial review of an order

of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The petitioner

in Kumarasamy had not been seeking review

of an order of removal but was seeking habeas

relief, claiming that his deportation was illegal

“because there was no order of removal.” 453

F.3d at 172 (emphasis in original). We held that

§ 1252(a)(5) did not apply, because that provision

pertained only to “judicial review of an order of

removal.” Id. (emphasis in original). Our holding

in Kumarasamy supports the conclusion that,

because § 1252(b) refers only to “review of an

293a

Appendix E

order of removal under subsection (a)(1),” it, and

its subsections, are inapplicable when there is

no such order.

Not all courts agree with the conclusion

reached by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits

and suggested by us in Kumarasamy. The

First Circuit held in Aguilar v. United States

Immigration & Customs Enforcement that

“the reach of section 1252(b)(9) is not limited

to challenges to singular orders of removal.”

510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007). The reasoning

of Aguilar, however, appears to conflict with

the Supreme Court’s explicit instruction in St.

Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (“Section

1252(b)(9) applies only ‘with respect to review

of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).’

“), and with the language of § 1252(b) (“With

respect to review of an order of removal under

subsection (a)(1) of this section, the following

requirements apply ....”). We therefore join with

the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and hold that

§ 1252(b)(9) applies only “with respect to review

of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). Because Chehazeh is not

seeking review of any order of removal --- as

there has been no such order with respect to

him --- § 1252(b)(9) does not preclude judicial

review.

Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 131-33 (cleaned up).

294a

Appendix E

This is all but dispositive.

There is no order of removal in this case. And so

Section 1252(b)(9) does not apply under Chehazeh.

“Because [the Petitioner] is not seeking review of any

order of removal --- as there has been no such order with

respect to him --- § 1252(b)(9) does not preclude judicial

review.” Id.

***

Might Chehazeh be distinguished from this case on

factual grounds?

Chehazeh, after all, was an “unusual” case, id. at 121,

focused on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to

sua sponte reopen a decision. See id.

Perhaps, it might be argued, Chehazeh does not apply

to the more typical case, where a person in a removal

proceeding seeks federal district court review before the

immigration court proceedings have run their course.

But that sort of distinction seems to have been

considered and rejected by the Third Circuit in EOHC

v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland

Security, 950 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2020).

There, people in removal proceedings went to the

district court. See id. at 180. Up against Chehazeh, the

federal-government appellees argued that that case should

be limited to its facts. See Brief for Appellees at 37, EOHC,

295a

Appendix E

950 F.3d 177 (No. 19-2927). But the Third Circuit did not

seem to accept this position. This was the EOHC court’s

only mention of Chehazeh:

[Section 1252(b)(9)] does not reach “claims

that are independent of, or wholly collateral to,

the removal process,” like “claims that cannot

effectively be handled through the available

administrative process.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11;

accord J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032

(9th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases); Reply Br. 16

(interpreting Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,

666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012)); Oral Arg. Tr. 20-21.

EOHC, 950 F.3d at 186.

Now look to the page of the Reply Brief that was

cited as “interpreting” Chehazeh. It reads, in part: “the

government’s argument that this Court should ‘limit

Chehazeh to its facts’ ... is misplaced. Instead, ... the

applicability of section 1252(b)(9) depends on the nature

of the claim being considered.” Reply Brief for Appellants

at 16, EOHC, 950 F.3d 177 (No. 19-2927).

It appears that the EOHC court, by citing this page

of the brief, meant to signal that it rejected any cabining

of Chehazeh to its facts.

***

Might it be argued that Chehazeh has been implicitly

overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings?

296a

Appendix E

This seems unlikely.

The Third Circuit in EOHC referenced Chehazeh, as

noted. See EOHC, 950 F.3d at 186. And it also discussed

Jennings at length. See id. at 185-86. If Jennings overruled

Chehazeh, would EOHC not have said so?

And more directly: there is no reason to think

Jennings pushed aside Chehazeh.

To see why, look first to the facts of Jennings.

Noncitizens in immigration custody had been detained

for more than six months without bond hearings, and they

argued this was illegal under various statutes. See id.

at 290, 138 S.Ct. 830. Those statutes applied to certain

noncitizens --- those who had not received a final order of

removal. See id. at 291, 299, 303, 138 S.Ct. 830. 26

Jennings, then, was like Chehazeh --- a pre-order-offinal-removal case.

As to jurisdiction, what did the Supreme Court rule in

Jennings? Did Section 1252(b)(9) strip jurisdiction or not?

26. In the district court, one of the noncitizens sought

certification of a subclass under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which governs the

“[d]etention ... of aliens ordered removed.” See Jennings, 583 U.S. at

291, 138 S.Ct. 830. But the court of appeals held that this subclass

could not be certified, see id., and the Supreme Court did not revisit

that decision. See id. at 291–92, 138 S.Ct. 830. So the case before the

Court concerned only detention of people who had not been ordered

finally removed.

297a

Appendix E

The answer is not straightforward, because the

Jennings Court fragmented on the jurisdictional question.

See id. at 284, 138 S.Ct. 830. Eight justices took part and

there were three opinions; none commanded a majority.

See id. at 284, 292, 138 S.Ct. 830.

How to decide what to take away from this? When “a

fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale

explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the

holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken

by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the

narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,

193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (cleaned up); see

generally Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132

Harv. L. Rev. 1942 (2019).

But this “Marks rule” is not clarifying here. 27

Chehazeh held that, as a categorical matter, Section

1252(b)(9) does not apply before entry of an order of

removal. See 666 F.3d at 133.

27. A s a general matter, the Marks r ule can apply to

jurisdictional holdings. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 661

F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st

Cir. 2006); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723

(7th Cir. 2006). It just does not shed light here, as will be seen in

a moment. (Note that the Marks rule may be especially hard to

apply to a jurisdiction-stripping statute, because it is not obvious

what the right baseline is. Are the “narrower grounds” those that

narrow the reach of the statute (and therefore expand federal court

jurisdiction)? Or are the “narrower grounds” those that expand the

reach of the statute (and therefore narrow federal court jurisdiction)?

Cf. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63–64.)

298a

Appendix E

But on that question, there is no Jennings majority

to cobble together using Marks.

As noted, eight Justices took part in Jennings. See

583 U.S. at 284, 138 S.Ct. 830.

Two Justices, with Justice Thomas writing, held

that Section 1252(b)(9) can apply before a final order of

removal exists. See id. at 317-18, 138 S.Ct. 830 (Thomas,

J., concurring).

Three Justices, with Justice Breyer writing, suggested

that it cannot apply before a final order of removal exists.

See id. at 355, 138 S.Ct. 830 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

And three Justices, with Justice Alito writing, took

no explicit stance on the question.

Rather, Justice Alito’s opinion held that Section

1252(b)(9) did not control the particular case before the

Court --- because detention without a bail hearing did not

“aris[e] from” actions to remove the noncitizens, as Section

1252(b)(9) requires. See id. at 292-95, 138 S.Ct. 830.

But nothing can be read into Justice Alito’s opinion

as to whether Section 1252(b)(9) might otherwise apply

before an order of removal; therefore, no holding of his

can join that of another opinion, via the Marks rule, to

make a majority.

This is for two reasons.

299a

Appendix E

First, “[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record,

neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled

upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided

as to constitute precedents.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v.

Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170, 125 S.Ct. 577, 160

L.Ed.2d 548 (2004); see also, e.g., United States v. More,

7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172, 2 L.Ed. 397 (1805) (Chief

Justice Marshall making this point at oral argument as

to jurisdiction).

Justice Alito took no “position,” Marks, 430 U.S. at

193, 97 S.Ct. 990, on whether Section 1252(b)(9) could or

could not categorically have applied if the statute’s “arising

from” language had fit the case before the Court.

So why impute a position to him?

And all the more so because Justice Alito’s opinion

noted that the parties had not briefed “the scope” of

Section 1252(b)(9), see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294, 138 S.Ct.

830, and so, as Justice Alito put it, his opinion declined

“to provide a comprehensive interpretation” of Section

1252(b)(9), ruling only that the statute did not apply given

the facts at hand. See id. at 294, 138 S.Ct. 830.

To see the second point, start by noting that when an

explicit ruling (call it “CD”) necessarily rests on an implicit

logical proposition (call it “AB”) --- then both CD and AB

can count as rulings. See footnote 28 (discussing this).

If Justice Alito’s explicit ruling (CD) was that

jurisdiction was stripped in Jennings because of Section

300a

Appendix E

1252(b)(9)’s language, then that would logically rest on

the implicit idea (AB) that Section 1252(b)(9) applied in

the first place.

But that is not where Justice Alito’s opinion came

down.

It held that, because of Section 1252(b)(9)’s language,

jurisdiction was not stripped --- and that ruling does not

rest on a logically necessary sense that Section 1252(b)(9)

applied. After all, Justice Alito could have reached the

same result (no jurisdiction strip) regardless of his answer

to the question of whether Section 1252(b)(9) does or does

not categorically apply to pre-order-of-removal cases. 28

28. The second point in the text is abstract. Unpack it a bit more

here. The complexity is this: AB may typically get analyzed before

conclusion CD is reached; but whether AB is necessary to conclusion

CD --- that depends. To see why, imagine this statute: “if a person

is an employee, she cannot be discriminated against --- and if she is

discriminated against, the employer is liable and must pay.” Under

the statute, whether a person is an employee will usually be analyzed

before deciding whether she has been discriminated against. But

is a holding as to whether she is an employee logically implicit in

a holding as to whether the employer must pay? Sometimes yes,

sometimes no. If the court holds she was discriminated against

and that the employer must pay, then that must logically rest on a

particular resolution of the prior question, as to whether the person

was an employee. After all, if she was not an employee, how could the

employer have broken the statute and now be expected to pay? But if

the court holds she was not discriminated against, and the employer

need not pay, that does not logically need to have been based on any

particular decision on the question of whether the person was an

employee. Why not? Because the ruling (no pay) would come out the

301a

Appendix E

***

In sum: even after deploying the Marks rule, it cannot

be said that a Jennings majority spoke to the Chehazeh

question --- let alone implicitly overruled the Third

Circuit’s Chehazeh opinion.

V. If Section 1252(b)(9) Applies Here

Where things stand:

The Respondents argue that Section 1252(b)(9)

pulls away jurisdiction, such that this Court cannot

consider the Petitioner’s motion to enjoin the Secretary’s

determination.

That argument looks solid at first. See Part IV.A. But

look to all of Section 1252(b), and the argument melts

away. Section 1252(b)(9) is in play only when an order of

same way regardless of how the employee question was answered.

Another way to see this is to think about arguments made arguendo.

Justice Alito in Jennings could have said “assuming arguendo that

Section 1252(b)(9) can generally apply to pre-order-of-removal cases,

the statute’s language does not apply to this case --- and so there is no

jurisdiction strip here.” But for his part, Justice Thomas in Jennings

could not have said “assuming arguendo that Section 1252(b)(9) can

generally apply to pre-order-of-removal cases, its language applies

to this case --- and so there is a jurisdiction strip here.” For Justice

Alito’s bottom-line conclusion, the categorical question of whether

Section 1252(b)(9) applies is not logically necessary and therefore

can be assumed away arguendo; for Justice Thomas’ bottom-line

conclusion, the categorical question is logically necessary --- and

therefore cannot be bracketed for later.

302a

Appendix E

removal has been entered. That is what the statute says.

See Part IV.B. And that is what the Third Circuit has

held. See Part IV.C.

Therefore, Section 1252(b)(9) does not apply here --there is no order of removal.

But there is an important difficulty.

To see it, compare (a) Chehazeh and (b) EOHC, two

Third Circuit cases that have been mentioned at various

points above.

***

Chehazeh holds that Section 1252(b)(9) applies only

when an order of removal has been entered. The long

excerpt above, see Part IV.C, shows that.

Move now to EOHC.

It, too, was an immigration case. And it held that

Section 1252(b)(9) precluded the district court from

hearing a particular claim --- even though no order of

removal had been entered. See EOHC, 950 F.3d at 180.

Chehazeh and EOHC appear to pull in opposite

directions.

Does Section 1252(b)(9) apply when there is, as here,

no order of removal?

303a

Appendix E

Chehazeh seems to say no. EOHC seems to say yes.

If Chehazeh controls, then Section 1252(b)(9) is not

on the table in this case. It is categorically irrelevant.

Jurisdiction is not affected by it. See Part IV.B and IV.C.

But if EOHC controls, Section 1252(b)(9) potentially

does apply here --- and if it does, there is a solid textual

case, see Part IV.A, that it strips this Court of jurisdiction.

***

How to proceed?

The Court closely reviews EOHC, and concludes that

it stands for this principle: the question of whether Section

1252(b)(9) allows a federal district court to hear a claim

that has been brought to it depends on whether the claim

could get “meaningful review” if federal court review is

delayed out into the future --- as will happen if the federal

district court is divested of jurisdiction by Section 1252(b)

(9), and the case is then sent down the immigration courts

route. See Part V.A. 29

In other words:

Under EOHC, Section 1252(b)(9) strips jurisdiction

if later review in the federal court of appeals, after the

29. Recall: if a claim must first go to the immigration courts,

federal court review of the claim will happen only later, in a federal

court of appeals, after the immigration courts have done their work.

304a

Appendix E

immigration courts are done, would be meaningful. But

Section 1252(b)(9) does not strip jurisdiction if postimmigration-courts review would not be meaningful.

On this reading, EOHC essentially applies the Supreme

Court’s general administrative law jurisprudence in the

particular context of immigration law --- and that makes

sense, given that immigration law, in this area, is a part

of the administrative law family. See Part V.B.

And on this reading, EOHC is fully consistent with

one of the Third Circuit’s key relevant precedents --- the

opinion authored by then-Judge Alito in Massieu v. Reno,

91 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 1996). Massieu applied the same body

of general administrative law jurisprudence that EOHC

does. See Part V.C.

***

The question of how the referenced “meaningful

review” issue plays out in this case is taken up in Part VI.

For now, though, start with EOHC, and move on to

administrative law more generally and then to Massieu.

A.

EOHC

This is what the EOHC case was about:

A father and his minor daughter came to the United

States from Guatemala. See EOHC, 950 F.3d at 181.

305a

Appendix E

Federal officials began removal proceedings. See id.

The Board of Immigration Appeals eventually entered a

stay of removal, see id., but the father and his daughter

became concerned that they would be moved to Mexico, see

id., to wait things out there while American immigration

courts assessed whether they should be removed back to

Guatemala. 30 See id.

The father and his daughter filed a habeas petition in

Pennsylvania. See id. They pressed a set of claims, and as

to each one the Third Circuit asked the same question: can

this claim go forward in the federal district court? Or do

jurisdiction-stripping statutes take away that possibility,

requiring the claim to run down the immigration-court

track? See id. at 184.

To answer these questions, EOHC relied on this

principle: that Section 1252(b)(9) allows claims to be

brought in a federal district court now if there could not

be “meaningful” judicial review of those claims later --after the immigration courts have finished their work and

a federal court (the court of appeals) then gets involved.

See id. at 180 (“When a detained alien seeks relief that a

court of appeals cannot meaningfully provide on petition

for review of a final order of removal, § 1252(b)(9) does not

bar consideration by a district court.”); see also id. at 18687 (invoking meaningful review as to Section 1252(b)(9);

cf. id. at 189-90 (invoking meaningful review as to other

jurisdiction-stripping provisions).

30. This was during the period when the federal government

applied a protocol to send noncitizens to Mexico while they waited

for removal proceedings. See EOHC, 950 F.3d at 181.

306a

Appendix E

In immigration law, involvement by an Article III

federal court is typically a late-in-the-process thing. See

id. at 180. Immigration courts handle the case at Time 1,

and a federal court (a court of appeals) gets involved for

the first time only at Time 2. See id.

But, EOHC holds, if waiting until Time 2 would

undermine “meaningful” federal court review --- then

that review can be hurried up, and a “detained alien”

can first go to a federal court, a federal district court, at

Time 1, rather than have the immigration courts take the

initial look, with federal court review to take place only

afterwards (in a federal court of appeals).

In that circumstance, Article III judicial review --usually pushed out into the future as a job for a federal

court of appeals --- is pulled back into the present, and

is undertaken by a federal district court (whose work is

later reviewed by a federal court of appeals).

***

How does this principle work in practice?

The EOHC father and daughter claimed that they

would be temporarily moved to Mexico, to wait there

for the immigration courts’ decision in their removal

proceedings. See id. at 181. Such a claim, EOHC held,

can be taken up right away by a federal district court,

consistent with Section 1252(b)(9). See id. at 187.

Why?

307a

Appendix E

Because, per EOHC, there can be no “meaningful”

consideration later of such a claim by a court of appeals,

after the immigration courts have wrapped up their work.

By then, the father and daughter could already have been

in Mexico for years, and those years would have been

lost. See id. at 186-87. “Now-or-never” claims, id. at 186,

as that one was, can go forward now in a federal district

court because they fit into a broader umbrella category

--- claims that cannot later be “meaningful[ly]” reviewed

when they would ordinarily make their way to a federal

court of appeals.

And take a second example, to see the flip side of the

coin.

The EOHC father and daughter also claimed that

being moved to Mexico would fray their relationship with

their lawyer, which would violate their statutory right to

counsel at an eventual removal hearing. See id. at 187-88.

EOHC, citing Section 1252(b)(9), held that this claim

could not be brought right away in federal district court. 31

Why not?

Because the claim could get “meaningful” review later

--- as the court of appeals looked back on what happened

at the removal hearing, with an eye on any damage that

may have been done to the attorney-client relationship.

See id. at 188 (“[T]he court of appeals can redress any

31. This was a pre-order-of-removal claim.

308a

Appendix E

deprivation of counsel in the removal proceedings before

the alien is removed.”).

B. Administrative Law

In a nutshell, EOHC held that Section 1252(b)(9) does

not take jurisdiction away from federal district courts

when the alternative --- going the standard route, to the

immigration courts and then to a federal court of appeals

--- would undermine “meaningful” judicial review.

EOHC indicated that its approach flowed from a broad

range of sources --- statutory text, a recent Supreme

Court decision, and a set of presumptions. See id. at 18486.

And that approach is also closely consistent with

broader principles of administrative law --- the legal

family that, in this context, immigration law is part of.

1.

Structure

To begin seeing this, start with the classic picture of

adjudication in the federal system.

On the ground floor is a federal district court. Then

the next level up is a federal court of appeals. And finally

the Supreme Court sits atop the pyramid.

But the classic picture is not everywhere the current

one.

309a

Appendix E

In administrative law, for example, the federal

district court is often swapped out, its place taken by an

administrative court.

In cases related to the SEC, the FTC, the EPA, the

FDA, and the FCC, the rungs on the ladder often look like

this: an agency administrative judge (or an administrative

law judge, or some other non-Article III official), does

the front-line dispute resolution. And after that is done,

the case plugs back into the standard system --- with

the administrative judge’s decision then reviewed by an

Article III court, the federal court of appeals. See Federal

Appeals Jurisdiction and Practice § 15:1 (2025 ed.); 2

Charles H. Koch & Richard Murphy, Admin. L. & Prac.

§ 5:10 (3d ed. 2024).

***

There was a time when immigration detention was

commonly reviewed using the classic tools of American

adjudication.

A person in custody typically (though not always)

started off in the federal district court, seeking a habeas

corpus writ. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 531-32,

72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,

333 U.S. 6, 8, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948); U.S. ex rel.

Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 132-33, 44 S.Ct. 260, 68 L.Ed.

590 (1924) Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13, 28

S.Ct. 201, 52 L.Ed. 369 (1908); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189

U.S. 86, 87, 23 S.Ct. 611, 47 L.Ed. 721 (1903).

310a

Appendix E

But the plates began to shift during the mid-20th

century.

New jurisdictional statutes became law. 32

And now, immigration law looks in some basic ways

like a branch of administrative law.

Cases generally go in the first instance to immigration

judges, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10, and immigration judges are

roughly akin to other administrative judges. See footnote

2; 2 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 2:159. And as with administrative

judges, immigration judges’ decisions are ultimately

funneled out of the agency --- for relatively late-in-theprocess review by a federal court, a courts of appeals. See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).

Bottom line: immigration disputes are resolved using

many of the same basic structures as bread-and-butter

administrative disputes, like those involving the SEC,

FTC, or FDA.

32. After the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of

1952, there was some back and forth over where deportation orders

might be reviewed. See Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 186, 77

S.Ct. 252, 1 L.Ed.2d 225 (1956); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S.

48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S.

229, 235–36, 73 S.Ct. 603, 97 L.Ed. 972 (1953). But this was mostly

smoothed out by the passage of the 1961 amendments to the INA,

which made review in the federal courts of appeals the “sole and

exclusive procedure” for judicial review of final orders of deportation.

See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 651.

311a

Appendix E

The next section begins to explain why this similarity

matters.

2.

Thunder Basin

The key question covered by this Opinion is this: under

Section 1252(b)(9), must the Petitioner’s constitutional

challenge to the Secretary of State’s determination go

forward in the first instance before this Court or before

the immigration courts?

At its core, this question is a variant on an everyday

set of administrative law questions --- questions that are

spun off by administrative-agency adjudication that, as the

prior section shows, makes use of the same basic structure

(agency adjudication, followed by federal court of appeals

review) as modern immigration law.

Look here at how administrative law generally handles

issues of this sort, and then return, later, to immigration

law and to EOHC.

***

As a matter of administrative law:

What to do if a litigant tries to sue in federal district

court, but a separate system of administrative-agency

courts has been set up? Does she get to stay in the federal

district court, or must she move over to the agency’s

courts, and await federal court review in the court of

appeals?

312a

Appendix E

The Supreme Court has answered these questions

in a string of cases involving the Mine Safety and

Health Administration, the Public Company Accounting

Oversight Board, the Merit Systems Protection Board,

and the Federal Trade Commission.

The anchor case in the chain is Thunder Basin Coal

Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d

29 (1994), and so the law in this area often goes by the

shorthand of “Thunder Basin.”

Thunder Basin law in a nutshell:

If Congress has explicitly pulled jurisdiction away

from the federal district courts, the case goes to the

agency for first-cut adjudication there. See Axon, 598

U.S. at 185, 143 S.Ct. 890; Adorers of the Blood of Christ

v. FERC, 897 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2018); accord, e.g.,

Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Cochran

v. SEC, 20 F.4th 194, 205 (5th Cir. 2021); Bank of La. v.

FDIC, 919 F.3d 916, 923 (5th Cir. 2019); Jones Brothers,

Inc. v. Sec’y of Lab., 898 F.3d 669, 675 (6th Cir. 2018); E.

Bridge, LLC v. Chao, 320 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2003).

But if Congress has not explicitly pulled jurisdiction

away from the federal district courts, ask: is it “fairly

discernible” that Congress intended for claims to go

to administrative courts as opposed to federal district

courts? See Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 10,

132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012); Free Enter. Fund v.

Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489, 130 S.Ct.

313a

Appendix E

3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010); see also Axon, 598 U.S. at

185, 143 S.Ct. 890. 33

If the answer to the step-one “fairly discernible”

question is “no,” then the case stays in federal district

court.

If the answer to the “fairly discernible” question is

“yes,” then the focus narrows, to the particular “type”

of claim that is in play --- and whether (now, step-two)

Congress wanted that type of claim to make its first stop

in a federal court or before an administrative adjudicator.

See Axon, 598 U.S. at 186, 143 S.Ct. 890; Elgin, 567 U.S. at

22, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489, 130

S.Ct. 3138; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 208, 114 S.Ct. 771;

Adorers, 897 F.3d at 195; Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring

Co., 78 F.3d 868, 873 (3d Cir. 1996); accord, e.g., Cochran,

20 F.4th at 206; Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir.

2016); Bennett v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2016);

Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2015); Ne. Erectors

Ass’n of BTEA v. Sec’y of Lab., Occupational Safety &

Health Admin., 62 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1995).

33. This question is mainly answered as matter of statutory

interpretation --- with an eye, for example, on text and purpose. See

Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at

489, 130 S.Ct. 3138; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct. 771;

Adorers, 897 F.3d at 195; accord, e.g., Cochran, 20 F.4th at 199–205;

Bank of La., 919 F.3d at 923; Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th

Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2016); Bennett

v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2016); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765,

769 (7th Cir. 2015).

314a

Appendix E

To answer this “type” question, courts are to look

to whether agency-first adjudication would: (1) supply

“meaningful review”; (2) draw on agency expertise; and

(3) run through issues that are core, rather than collateral.

See Axon, 598 U.S. at 184-85, 143 S.Ct. 890; Elgin, 567

U.S. at 15, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at

489, 130 S.Ct. 3138; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13,

114 S.Ct. 771; accord, e.g., Bank of La., 919 F.3d at 923;

Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton,

824 F.3d at 281; Bennett, 844 F.3d at 181; Jarkesy, 803

F.3d at 17; Bebo, 799 F.3d at 769.

Of these three, “meaningful review” is by far the most

important. See Bennett, 844 F.3d at 183 n.7; Hill, 825 F.3d

at 1245; Tilton, 824 F.3d at 282; Bebo, 799 F.3d at 774.

Can there be “meaningful review” if Article III review

is deferred until after the administrative court finishes its

work and hands things over to the federal court of appeals?

Or does “meaningful review” require that the claim

be heard, now, in the federal district court?34

34. Saying yes to this question would bypass Congress’ broader

choice to send claims to the agency’s courts. But it would do so on

the theory that Congress would have wanted a particular “type” of

claim to go forward first in the federal district court if that is the

way to get “meaningful review.” See Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at

212—13, 114 S.Ct. 771.

315a

Appendix E

C. EOHC In Context

Come back now to the EOHC case, and see it in light

of the broader administrative law principles laid out just

above.

EOHC was an immigration-adjudication case.

And as discussed, the basic structure of immigration

adjudication is closely similar to the structure of

administrative adjudication more generally. See Part

V.B.1.

No surprise, then, that in those closely related

contexts, similar questions are answered in roughly the

same way.

The questions:

Do the relevant statutes mean that a case stays in

federal district court? Or do they mean that a case is

channeled in the first instance to agency tribunals, like

SEC, FTC, or immigration courts --- and only after they

are done with their work does the case potentially go to

federal court, a federal court of appeals?

The answer:

Under Thunder Basin (for administrative law

in general) and under EOHC (for immigration law in

particular) the answer is largely the same: it depends on

whether delayed federal court review is consistent with

the imperative of “meaningful review.”

316a

Appendix E

The key point: EOHC was, in essence, applying

general administrative law rules (the Thunder Basin

rules) to closely related immigration law questions.

And EOHC applied Thunder Basin systematically.

EOHC precisely invoked Thunder Basin’s stepone test. Compare Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 114

S.Ct. 771 (“In cases involving delayed judicial review ...,

we shall find that Congress has allocated initial review

to an administrative body where such intent is fairly

discernible.”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up), with EOHC,

950 F.3d at 188 (“We look to whether the congressional

intent to preclude judicial review is fairly discernible in

the statutory scheme.”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

EOHC undertook the basic step -one analysis

prescribed in Thunder Basin. Compare Thunder Basin,

510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct. 771 (to get at the question of

Congressional intent, looking to a “statute’s language,

structure, and purpose”), with EOHC, 950 F.3d at 188

(“In discerning that intent, we look at the statute’s ‘text,

structure, and purpose.’ “) (quoting Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10,

132 S.Ct. 2126).

And, as has been noted, EOHC focused on the main

Thunder Basin step-two concern --- “meaningful” judicial

review. Compare Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct.

771 (“Whether a statute is intended to preclude initial

judicial review is determined from ... whether the claims

can be afforded meaningful review.”), with EOHC, 950

F.3d at 180, 186, 189-90. 35

35. EOHC also cited a source that mentioned one of the other

two Thunder Basin factors. Compare Thunder Basin, 510 U.S.

317a

Appendix E

***

In applying the Thunder Basin rules,36 why did EOHC

land on the “meaningful review” rule?

Per the Thunder Basin line of cases, that is the

standard to use when Congress has not said in an

“explicit” way that certain types of cases must go to an

administrative court. See Part V.B.1.

Presumably, the EOHC court did not view Congress

as having provided sufficiently “explicit” direction as

at 212, 114 S.Ct. 771 (“[t]his Court previously has upheld district

court jurisdiction over claims considered wholly collateral to a

statute’s review provisions”), with EOHC, 950 F.3d at 186 (citing the

appellants’ reply brief at 16 --- which noted that “claims independent

of or collateral to the removal process are excluded”).

36. Too much should not be made of the fact that EOHC did not

cite Thunder Basin or explicitly invoke its two-step analysis. EOHC

cited Elgin, see EOHC, 950 F.3d at 188, and that is a key case in the

Thunder Basin line. More fundamentally, the question of whether

review will be “meaningful” --- and therefore whether federal court

review should be deferred in favor of agency review --- has long

been a part of administrative law’s DNA. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 192,

143 S.Ct. 890; McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496,

111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319, 341, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254, 262–63, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). It long

predates Thunder Basin and was clearly part of the EOHC court’s

thinking. Compare EOHC, 950 F.3d at 186 (citing McNary for the

proposition that there was no jurisdiction-stripping over certain

claims when “meaningful judicial review ... would [otherwise] be

foreclosed”), with Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 213–14, 114 S.Ct. 771

(reasoning from McNary).

318a

Appendix E

to whether certain cases must first go to immigration

courts. 37

***

In a nutshell: to determine whether to apply Section

1252(b)(9) to a given claim, EOHC applied Thunder Basin,

and in particular its “meaningful review” test.

D.

Massieu

EOHC sits atop Thunder Basin --- and foregrounding

this only emphasizes the close continuity between EOHC

and one of the Third Circuit’s key precedents in this area,

Massieu.

To see the point, look now to Massieu.

During the mid-1990s, the federal government sought

to remove a Mexican national, Mario Ruiz Massieu, from

the United States. See Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 41719 (3d Cir. 1996).

37. And such a conclusion is not surprising. After all, the

argument that there is an “explicit” congressional directive as

to where cases should go rests largely on Section 1252(b)(9). But

Chehazeh held that in this “type” of case, a pre-order-of-removal

case, Section 1252(b)(9) is inapplicable. And in any event, the

Justices have suggested a range of different views as to whether

Section 1252(b)(9) applies before entry of an order of removal. See

footnote 25. That suggests that the explicitness test is not met,

especially against the backdrop of the various presumptions against

jurisdiction-stripping that EOHC leaned on. See 950 F.3d at 184.

319a

Appendix E

This was to be done based on a determination made

by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, using the

same law invoked in this case to seek the removal of the

Petitioner. See id. at 418.

Massieu sued, and Judge Barry, then of this Court,

ruled that she had jurisdiction over the case. See Massieu

v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681, 697 (D.N.J. 1996), rev’d, 91 F.3d

416 (3d Cir. 1996). 38

The Third Circuit, per then-Judge Alito, reversed.

See Massieu, 91 F.3d at 425. It held that the case needed

to first go to the immigration courts. See id.

The Third Circuit in Massieu came to that conclusion

by analyzing the case using the two-step Thunder Basin

doctrine described above in Part IV.B.

First, Judge Alito looked to text, purpose, and other

sources to decide if Congress had expressed a “fairly

discernible” intent to send the case to an immigration

judge in the first instance, and not to a federal district

judge. See id. at 420.

And the Massieu court then went to the second step,

moving through each of the required Thunder Basin

factors --- the critical “meaningful review” factor, plus

the “collateral” and “expertise” factors. See id. at 422.

38. On the merits, Judge Barry held that 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)

(C)(i) (now 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i)) is unconstitutionally vague.

See Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 703. The Petitioner here has not made

that argument. See footnote 7.

320a

Appendix E

***

Massieu is relevant here in three main ways.

***

First, Massieu is very similar to this case.

The Respondents go so far as to say it is “on all fours.”

See Opposition Brief at 12. And there is a lot to that.

Massieu involved the same statute as this case (what is

now 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i)) and the same question as

this case (in what court should the claim start?).

Whether Massieu controls the outcome here is taken

up in the next Part.

***

Second, Massieu, as noted, is closely consistent with

EOHC.

EOHC and Massieu land in the same place --- on a

concern for “meaningful review” as a key touchstone for

deciding whether a case must go to the immigration courts

before a federal district court.

EOHC and Massieu thus point in the same direction.

Each suggests that, on the assumption that Section

1252(b)(9) applies here, 39 this Court must conduct a

39. See Part IV.B and Part IV.C.

321a

Appendix E

Thunder Basin-type analysis, and with an emphasis on

Thunder Basin’s most important factor --- “meaningful”

judicial review.40

***

Third and finally, Massieu undermines any argument

that the immigration laws in some “explicit” way require

that this case be sent now to the immigration courts.

After all, if the immigration laws were explicit on

that point, then Judge Alito’s opinion would not have

done what it did. It would not have conducted a Thunder

Basin analysis --- because that is called for only when the

relevant laws are not explicit.41

40. EOHC and Massieu are no outliers. Federal courts often

rely on Thunder Basin to decide whether a claim should be heard in

immigration courts or in the federal district court. See, e.g., Miriyeva

v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 9 F.4th 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2021);

Adi v. Mayorkas, 2022 WL 267989, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2022);

O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 136 (D.D.C. 2019); Ramirez v.

U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1, 37 (D.D.C. 2018);

Jafarzadeh v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 19, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2018);

Jafarzadeh v. Duke, 270 F. Supp. 3d 296, 308 (D.D.C. 2017); see also

J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2016); Aguilar,

510 F.3d at 11; cf. Duron v. Johnson, 898 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2018).

41. And the point can be seen more directly, too. For the key

proposition, Massieu cited a federal-common-law rule and a treatise,

not an explicit statutory provision.

Even where an alien is attempting to prevent an

exclusion or deportation proceeding from taking place

in the first instance and is thus not, strictly speaking,

attacking a final order of deportation or exclusion, it

322a

Appendix E

To be sure, the immigration laws have changed a good

deal since Massieu was handed down in 1996.

But the three main statutes that Judge Alito reasoned

from remain on the books, and in substantively similar

form.

The main one was 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1996) (“[A]n

order of deportation ... shall not be reviewed by any

court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative

remedies[.]”).

It has since been revised, with the current version

at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final

order of removal only if ... the alien has exhausted all

administrative remedies.”).

But the two statutes “state[ ] the same requirements

in essentially the same language.” Duvall v. Elwood, 336

is well settled that “judicial review is precluded if the

alien has failed to avail himself of all administrative

remedies,” one of which is the deportation or exclusion

hearing itself. See, e.g., Xiao v. Barr, 979 F.2d 151, 153

(9th Cir. 1992); see also 3 Charles Gordon & Stanley

Mailman, Immigration Law and Procedure § 81.02[2], at

81–26–28 (1996) (“A person against whom a deportation

proceeding is brought may feel that the proceeding is

unjustified and illegal but generally has no right to go

to court immediately to stop the proceeding. Congress

has provided an administrative device for passing upon

an alien’s deportability, and generally there must be a

final administrative ruling before judicial review can

be initiated.”).

Massieu, 91 F.3d at 421.

323a

Appendix E

F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2003). Indeed, the Third Circuit has

held that Massieu’s analysis still governs Section 1252

(d)(1). See id. at 232.

And the two other statutes that Massieu relied on

also remain on the books, tweaked here and there but

substantively the same. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)

(1996) (“the sole and exclusive procedure for ... the judicial

review of all final orders of deportation” is through a

petition for review), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1996) (“[T]he

[administrative] procedure so prescribed shall be the sole

and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability

of an alien under this section.”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)

(“[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of

appeals ... shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial

review[.]”), and 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (“[A] proceeding

under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure

for determining whether an alien may be ... removed from

the United States.”).

And the most relevant new, post-Massieu statute --Section 1252(b)(9) --- either does not apply to this case, per

Chehazeh, or does not provide explicit enough direction.

See footnote 37.

E. Conclusion

Pause now briefly to see where things stand:

The Third Circuit in Chehazeh held that Section

1252(b)(9) does not apply to cases like this one, in which

no order of removal has been entered. Therefore, Section

324a

Appendix E

1252(b)(9) is irrelevant here, and does not strip this Court

of jurisdiction. See Part IV.

But even if Section 1252(b)(9) were understood to

apply here, as EOHC might suggest, see Part V.A, that

Section would apply only when sending a case to the

immigration courts is consistent with the Thunder Basin

requirement of “meaningful review.”

That was the approach the Third Circuit took in

EOHC, see Part V.B and Part V.C, and that is consistent

with the Third Circuit’s approach in Massieu. See Part

V.D.

So assuming arguendo that Section 1252(b)(9) applies

here, the question is this: would this case get the required

“meaningful review” if it starts out in immigration court,

as opposed to here?

Take that up in the next Part.

VI. Meaningful Review

Immigration courts are tasked with doing important

work on behalf of our country. According to recent

statistics, for example, there are almost four million

pending immigration cases spread out across 700 or so

immigration judges. See Pending Cases, New Cases, and

Total Completions, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., https://

perma.cc/L659-S8P5 (accessed on Apr. 29, 2025); Office of

the Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev.,

https://perma.cc/8H5S-EPW6 (accessed on Apr. 29, 2025).

325a

Appendix E

But different institutions are built for different tasks

and given different tools.

Immigration courts are not legally permitted to

provide the relief (striking down the Secretary of State’s

determination) that the Petitioner seeks here. See Part

VI.A.

And immigration courts cannot be expected to

undertake the fact-finding that may potentially be

required to evaluate the Petitioner’s claim that the

Secretary’s determination is unconstitutional. See Part

VI.B.

To be sure, immigration courts routinely tee up

constitutional issues for eventual review by federal

courts of appeals --- even when the immigration courts

themselves lack the power to remedy the alleged violation.

But the immigration courts cannot do that here --- in

part because of a prior Board of Immigration Appeals

decision. See Part VI.C.

What this adds up to: the immigration courts could

not meaningfully develop this case, legally or factually.

Therefore, the period that might be spent before those

courts will not advance the ball.

In some circumstances, that may be just how it has to

be. Cases can take a while to resolve. And sending cases

to the immigration courts is typically required even when

doing so will accomplish only a modest amount.

326a

Appendix E

But in this case, what can be accomplished is much

less than that.

And a period of delay while this case is pending before

the immigration courts, knowing that there will be little

or nothing to show for it --- that does not work.

The reason is this: the Petitioner’s core argument is

that his free speech rights are being violated, now. See

Part VI.D.

And the Supreme Court has held over and over again,

in numerous contexts, that meaningful review of First

Amendment claims generally means rapid, prioritized

review. See id.

That is not consistent with postponing federal court

consideration of the Petitioner’s First Amendment claims.

Begin seeing all of this just below.

A.

Legal Remedies

As has been discussed, the Petitioner claims that

the Secretary of State’s determination is a product of

First Amendment retaliation, and that this Court should

therefore enter an order to vacate it. See Motion for

Preliminary Injunction at 9-10; see also Petition ¶¶ 88-90.

Can the immigration courts do this?

327a

Appendix E

The Respondents say the answer is no.42

Under the heading “The IJ Cannot Vacate the

Secretary of State’s Determination or Issue the Requested

Injunction,” they say:

The authority of immigration judges comes from

the INA and regulations. The INA provides

that an immigration judge “shall conduct

proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or

deportability of an alien.” The immigration judge

has the authority to determine removability

and to adjudicate requests for certain forms of

relief from removal. The INA and implementing

regulations do not provide the immigration

judge with general injunctive or equitable

authority. Thus, an immigration judge cannot

order the Secretary of State to take or not take

any action regarding the type of foreign policy

determination at issue here.

42. Were the Petitioner seeking to invalidate Section 1227(a)(4)

(C)(i) on constitutional grounds, which he is not, see footnotes 7 and

38, the immigration courts would lack the power to do that, too. See

In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 231 (BIA 2002) (“We have

long declared that we lack authority to rule on the constitutionality

of the statutes we administer.”); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415

U.S. 361, 368, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“[A]djudication

of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally

been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.”);

accord, e.g., Brienza-Schettino v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 221 F. App’x

140, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2007); Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir.

2001); Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1995).

328a

Appendix E

Respondents’ Letter (Apr. 11, 2025) (ECF 190) at 2

(cleaned up).

***

But this way of thinking is too formalistic.

When a court is asked to put a stop to allegedly illegal

behavior that is happening out in the world, the request

is usually framed as an ask for an injunction.

But things are different when a judge is asked to issue

an order as to a matter happening right before her, in her

own courtroom.

Imagine a judge overseeing a criminal prosecution.

Drugs were seized (but there was no warrant), and

a confession was made (but there were no Miranda

warnings).

The defendant might want an order from the court

suppressing the evidence, so that the jury cannot learn

of it. Order that the drugs be excluded as the fruit of a

Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant will say. And

order that the confession be put aside, as the product of

a Fifth Amendment breach.

But the defendant, seeking an order, will not describe

this as a request for an injunction (which is, after all, a

kind of order).43

43. One reason is this: an injunction generally issues only based

on a sense, among other things, that the public interest demands

329a

Appendix E

All of this implies that the right question here is not

whether the immigration courts can enjoin the Secretary’s

determination as being the result of a violation of the First

Amendment --- but rather whether the immigration courts

can suppress the Secretary’s determination as a violation

of the First Amendment.

And a suppression framing makes sense on the facts

of this case.

After all, the Secretary of State’s determination

is evidence (indeed, the only evidence) put forward in

support of the Department of Homeland Security’s effort

to remove the Petitioner under Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i).

it. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139,

156–57, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010); Winter v. Nat’l

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d

249 (2008); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391,

126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006); see also Samuel L. Bray,

The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 530, 585–86

(2016). A defendant wants to argue that drugs should be suppressed

because the search was illegal. He does not want to also have to

argue that suppressing the drugs is a good from the perspective of

the public interest. (And equitable claims are especially difficult to

make out in any number of other ways, too. For example, at least

some suppression orders likely could not issue as injunctions because

the defendant, seeking to suppress what is his own contraband, see

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387

(1978), could not make the “clean hands” showing that equity typically

requires. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach.

Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381 (1945); Johnson

v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387, 64 S.Ct. 622, 88 L.Ed.

814 (1944); see also Bray at 581.)

330a

Appendix E

And evidence obtained at Time 2 is sometimes ordered

suppressed at Time 3 because it was gathered at Time 1

in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth. So

why not the First?

The immigration courts, as noted, do not have power

to enjoin the Secretary of State’s determination on the

grounds that it violates the First Amendment.

But do they have the power to suppress the Secretary’s

determination on those same grounds?

***

Shifting the framing clarifies the question to ask. But

it does not change the answer.

The reason: with a caveat taken up below in footnote 46,

the Supreme Court has held that in removal proceedings

the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not available;

evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment

can come in. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,

1034, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984).

Part of the explanation is that the immigration courts,

per the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza, were built to

quickly determine whether someone is removable --- not

to ask and answer broader questions, such as whether

someone else violated the Constitution. Lopez-Mendoza:

The INS currently operates a deliberately

simple deportation hearing system, streamlined

331a

Appendix E

to permit the quick resolution of very large

numbers of deportation actions, and it is against

this backdrop that the costs of the exclusionary

rule must be assessed. The costs of applying

the exclusionary rule, like the benefits, must

be measured at the margin.

[In 1984] [t]he average immigration judge

handles about six deportation hearings per

day. Neither the hearing officers nor the

attorneys participating in those hearings are

likely to be well versed in the intricacies of

Fourth Amendment law. The prospect of even

occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule

might significantly change and complicate the

character of these proceedings.

Id. at 1048.

In support of its approach, the Lopez-Mendoza Court

quoted the Board of Immigration Appeals, which was also

opposed to Fourth Amendment exclusion remedies in

immigration courts. The Board, as quoted by the Supreme

Court:

Absent the applicability of the exclusionary

rule, questions relating to deportability

routinely involve simple factual allegations and

matters of proof. When Fourth Amendment

issues are raised at deportation hearings, the

result is a diversion of attention from the main

issues which those proceedings were created

332a

Appendix E

to resolve, both in terms of the expertise of

the administrative decision makers and of the

structure of the forum to accommodate inquiries

into search and seizure questions. The result

frequently seems to be a long, confused record

in which the issues are not clearly defined and

in which there is voluminous testimony.... The

ensuing delays and inordinate amount of time

spent on such cases at all levels has an adverse

impact on the effective administration of the

immigration laws.... This is particularly true

in a proceeding where delay may be the only

“defense” available and where problems already

exist with the use of dilatory tactics.

Id. at 1048-49 (quoting Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec.

70, 80 (BIA 1979)).

Building the record for a Fourth A mendment

suppression challenge would not always very dramatically

“change and complicate” removal hearings. See id. at 1048,

104 S.Ct. 3479.

After all, in many cases the Fourth Amendment

suppression evidence would come in wholly through the

immigration agents who made the relevant arrest in the

first place. See id. at 1043, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (“[T]he agency

officials who effect the unlawful arrest are the same

officials who subsequently bring the deportation action.”).

But even given that, the Supreme Court determined in

Lopez-Mendoza that the “diversion of attention” implicit in

Fourth Amendment suppression hearings weighed against

333a

Appendix E

allowing Fourth Amendment suppression motions to be

made in immigration proceedings. See id. at 1048-49, 104

S.Ct. 3479.

But if Fourth Amendment suppression motions cannot

generally be made --- then surely First Amendment

suppression motions have no place, either.

If a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing (typically

involving testimony from arresting immigration agents)

is a bridge too far, then a First Amendment suppression

hearing (which in this case could conceivably seek

testimony from our country’s top officials) is also a bridge

too far --- and then some.

***

The conclusion set out just above is buttressed from

two sides.

First, look to the one on-point case in this area. The

Second Circuit was asked whether immigration courts

can consider a First Amendment suppression argument.

Its answer was no. See Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381

(2d Cir. 1997) (“We decline [the] invitation to fashion an

exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of

an individual’s First Amendment rights.”) (citing LopezMendoza).

And second, look to what the immigration judge in

this case said about the scope of her powers.44

44. In deciding whether “meaningful review” can be conducted

before an administrative court, federal courts routinely look to what

334a

Appendix E

Before the immigration judge, the Petitioner made

various motions to compel discovery. For example, he

moved to issue a subpoena to the Secretary of State, as

well as to compel the production of certain documents.45

But the immigration judge denied those motions.

She said the authority of immigration judges “is very

limited to two things. Is [the Petitioner] removable from

the administrative court has in fact actually done. Take Jarkesy v.

SEC, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). There, an investment advisor filed

suit in a federal district court, pressing constitutional claims. Could

an SEC administrative law judge provide meaningful review? Yes,

the D.C. Circuit answered. See id. at 28. How to know? Because

the D.C. Circuit had read the administrative law judge’s decisions

and observed that she had “considered and rejected” the plaintiff’s

arguments. Id. Another example: in Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement Division, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), the First

Circuit asked whether the petitioners could have gotten “effective

relief” for their right-to-counsel claims through the immigration

courts. Yes, the First Circuit held. Id. at 14. “The proof” was that

during the removal proceedings “each petitioner who requested

a continuance for the purpose of retaining counsel received one.”

Id. And a final example. The Fifth Circuit considered whether the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s administrative proceedings

could adequately assess claims that the “enforcement proceedings

were tainted by constitutional violations.” See Bank of La., 919 F.3d

at 926. Yes. Part of why: the administrative law judge, per the Fifth

Circuit, had written a “lengthy, detailed, and well-reasoned opinion”

on the claims, such that it was clear that the proceedings qualified

as “meaningful judicial review.” Id.

45. It appears that this was likely understood as connected to

a First Amendment issue. See April 11 Audio Recording at 23:50

to 25:24.

335a

Appendix E

the United States, and does he have relief available to him

from removal if he is found removable.” Audio Recording

of Hearing (April 8, 2025) (“April 8 Audio Recording”)

at 21:12 to 21:24; see Petitioner’s Letter (Apr. 11, 2025),

at 3 n.4.

And the immigration judge suggested that to the

extent any constitutional issues were being raised, she

could not take them on. See April 11 Audio Recording at

1:35:35 to 1:36:00 (“I understand ... that you would like to

challenge the authority of the Secretary of State ..., but

you will need to take that up with Congress. This court is

without jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the validity

of such laws under the Constitution.”); see also April 8

Audio Recording at 21:12 to 21:24; Petitioner’s Letter

(Apr. 11, 2025), at 3 n.4.

Finally, as to seeking a subpoena for the Secretary of

State, the immigration judge said of the Petitioner that he

was “in the wrong court for that.” April 8 Audio Recording

at 20:55-58; see Petitioner’s Letter (Apr. 11, 2025), at 3 n.4.

***

In a nutshell:

The Petitioner seeks here an injunction vacating the

Secretary of State’s determination. But the immigration

courts cannot issue injunctions. And they cannot suppress

evidence (like the Secretary’s determination) on First

Amendment grounds. That conclusion is based on an

analogy to Fourth Amendment suppression, an on-point

336a

Appendix E

Second Circuit decision, and the immigration judge’s

approach here.46

46. A final note. In Lopez-Mendoza, a plurality of the Court, not

a majority, said this: “we do not deal here with egregious violations of

Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions

of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the

evidence obtained.” 468 U.S. at 1050–51, 104 S.Ct. 3479. This left the

door open, and a number of circuits have held that suppression is

indeed available in immigration courts when the Fourth Amendment

is violated in sufficiently “egregious” or “widespread” ways. See, e.g.,

Corado-Arriaza v. Lynch, 844 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2016); AlmeidaAmaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006); Yoc-Us v.

Att’y Gen. U.S., 932 F.3d 98, 111 (3d Cir. 2019); Yanez-Marquez

v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder,

629 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2010); Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673

F.3d 1029, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2011). Other circuits have suggested

openness to such an exception. See, e.g., United States v. NavarroDiaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005). Maybe it could be argued

that the “egregious” exception leaves room for First Amendment

suppression in this case? The argument would presumably run like

this: (a) the Lopez-Mendoza plurality allowed for the possibility

of an “egregious” Fourth Amendment suppression exception, (b)

the exception does in fact exist, (c) it should be extended to the

First Amendment suppression context in general, and (d) to this

“egregious” case in particular. If this argument is persuasive, then

maybe the immigration courts could provide a First Amendment

suppression remedy here. But the argument does not work. The

reason: link (b) in the chain cannot hold up. The immigration judge

here is in Louisiana, so any review will be to the Fifth Circuit, see

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), whose precedent will control. See Ballesteros

v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006). And the Fifth

Circuit has flatly held that “[i]t is well established that the fourth

amendment exclusionary rule is not to be applied in deportation

proceedings.” Mendoza-Solis v. INS, 36 F.3d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1994).

(Some other Fifth Circuit cases seem to go the other way, and to

337a

Appendix E

B. Factual Development

As noted just above, the immigration courts cannot give

the Petitioner the legal relief he seeks as to the Secretary of

State’s allegedly unconstitutional determination. Whether

through injunction or suppression --- the immigration

courts cannot push aside the Secretary’s determination.

But in some cases, a person is suing to get a statute

invalidated as it applies to him.

And most of the time (if not all of the time) that is not

something that an agency court is legally empowered to

do.

But even in those sorts of circumstances, federal

courts often require that the case be sent first to an

administrative court. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 17, 132 S.Ct.

2126; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215, 114 S.Ct. 771;

Massieu, 91 F.3d at 426; accord, e.g., Hill, 825 F.3d at 1245;

Tilton, 824 F.3d at 279, 290; Bennett, 844 F.3d at 176, 184;

Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767, 771; Nat’l Taxpayers Union v. U.S.

Soc. Sec. Admin., 376 F.3d 239, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2004).

treat an “egregious” Fourth Amendment suppression exception as

a part of the law. But one is dicta in a Bivens case. See De La Paz

v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 2015). And the rest are cases not

selected for publication. See Escobar v. Holder, 398 F. App’x 50, 53

(5th Cir. 2010); Gonzalez-Reyes v. Holder, 313 F. App’x 690, 695 (5th

Cir. 2009); Verduzco-Contreras v. Gonzales, 160 F. App’x 406, 408

(5th Cir. 2005). Under the Fifth Circuit’s rules, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5,

unpublished cases are out of bounds.)

338a

Appendix E

There are a number of reasons why.

One of them: even if the agency’s courts cannot

themselves deliver the requested remedy, they can

prepare the field --- by finding the facts, so that a federal

court of appeals will have a solid record to work from when

it gets the case. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 19-20, 132 S.Ct.

2126; accord, e.g., Bank of La., 919 F.3d at 927; Chau v.

SEC, 665 F. App’x 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2016); Hill, 825 F.3d at

1249; Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 21-22; Bebo, 799 F.3d at 773.

But in this case, the immigration courts would not be

able to do the fact-finding that a federal court of appeals

would need down the road.

The Court explains why here.

***

To see the limits of the immigration courts’ factfinding, try to peer around the corner --- to predict the

sorts of factual issues that may possibly come up as the

case unfolds.47

One of those issues is suggested by the Respondents,

and it provides a helpful example of the fact-finding

difficulties that the immigration courts would encounter

in this case.

47. The discussion in this section assumes that fact-finding

is necessary. But the Court has not developed views on whether

this case can be resolved on the papers, or will require evidentiary

development.

339a

Appendix E

The Petitioner claims that his detention is the

product of First Amendment retaliation. See Motion for

Preliminary Injunction at 3; see also Petition ¶¶ 88-90.

But the Respondents say that this argument “is likely to

fail.” Opposition Brief at 28.

The reason why: to make out a retaliatory-detention

claim under the First Amendment, the Respondents say,

the Petitioner must show that there was no probable cause

for his arrest. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 402, 139

S.Ct. 1715, 204 L.Ed.2d 1 (2019) (cited by the Opposition

Brief at 28).

But, the Respondents argue, the Petitioner cannot

make that showing. See Opposition Brief at 28. The

Secretary of State’s determination and the Petitioner’s

alleged failure-to-disclose on his lawful permanent

resident application are said to be “facially valid reasons”

to remove him from the country. Id. at 28.

Therefore, the Respondents’ argument goes, federal

officials had probable cause to detain the Petitioner --and under Nieves, cited just above, his First Amendment

argument hits a quick dead end. See id.

Moreover, the Respondents argue, the Petitioner has

not tried to use the exception to all this that the Supreme

Court suggested in Nieves. See id. at 28-29.

Under that exception, the Petitioner may not actually

need to establish an absence of probable cause. Per the

Nieves Court: “The no-probable-cause requirement should

not apply when [the Petitioner] presents objective evidence

340a

Appendix E

that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated

individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected

speech had not been.” 587 U.S. at 407, 139 S.Ct. 1715.

Look just a bit over the horizon, and it seems

possible that the Petitioner could try to press a selectiveenforcement defense --- contending, presumably, that

other “similarly situated individuals” have not been the

subject of a Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) determination by the

Secretary of State.

To make out this defense, the Petitioner would

potentially seek some discovery --- as to others, for

example, against whom enforcement actions may not have

been taken, and perhaps as to the decision-making process

of senior federal officials.

Can the immigration courts provide “meaningful”

factual development as to those issues?

It is hard to see how they could.

The Supreme Court, after all, has suggested that even

narrow-gauge Fourth Amendment suppression hearings

are not a good fit for the tight focus of the immigration

courts. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046-50, 104

S.Ct. 3479.

And as noted above, the immigration judge in this case

herself declined to permit any discovery. See April 8 Audio

Recording at 20:55-58 (stating the Petitioner was “in the

wrong court” for obtaining a subpoena of the Secretary).48

48. Selective enforcement can be raised as a kind of defense to

a defense, as in Nieves: does selective enforcement undermine the

341a

Appendix E

***

Given the limits of fact-finding in the immigration

cour ts, federal cour ts have sometimes taken up

immigration claims, rather than require them to wind

their way through agency courts.

probable cause defense to a First Amendment retaliation claim?

But selective enforcement can also be raised in more gardenvariety affirmative contexts: was a person targeted for immigration

enforcement in the first place based on selective enforcement? See

Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. granted,

judgment vacated sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, {blank} U.S. {blank},

141 S. Ct. 227, 208 L.Ed.2d 1 (2020); AADC, 70 F.3d at 1052;

Massieu, 91 F.3d at 418. Can the immigration courts draw on

their experience when it comes to building out the second sort of

selective-enforcement case to develop a factual record as to selective

enforcement that is raised in the first context? Not really. The reason

is that affirmative selective-enforcement claims are very rarely

handled by the immigration courts. For nearly 30 years, such claims

have largely been unavailable to noncitizens without lawful status in

the United States. See AADC, 525 U.S. at 488, 119 S.Ct. 936 (“[A]n

alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert

selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.”). And

even before AADC foreclosed many selective-enforcement claims,

immigration courts generally steered clear of them --- largely to

avoid trenching on federal immigration officials’ discretion. See

Matter of Merced, 14 I. & N. Dec. 644, 645 (BIA 1974); Matter of

Lennon, 15 I. & N. Dec. 9, 12 (BIA 1974), overruled on other grounds

by Matter of Esqueda, 20 I. & N. Dec. 850 (BIA 1994); Matter of

Geronimo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 680, 681 (BIA 1971); see also Corredor v.

Holder, 481 F. App’x 442, 444 (10th Cir. 2012); Cortez-Felipe v. INS,

245 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001); AADC, 70 F.3d at 1055; Johns

v. Dep’t of Just., 653 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1981); Lopez–Telles v.

INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The immigration judge is

not empowered to review the wisdom of the INS in instituting the

proceedings. His powers are sharply limited[.]”).

342a

Appendix E

For example, in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center,

Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005

(1991), the respondents challenged certain INS amnesty

procedures in a federal district court. See 498 U.S. at

487-88, 111 S.Ct. 888. But did they have to go through the

immigration courts first?

No, the Supreme Court held.

The case was a “pattern and practice case,” because

it challenged “[a] pattern of ... unconstitutional practices.”

Id. at 497, 111 S.Ct. 888 (cleaned up).

Pattern-and-practice cases require a “substantial

amount of evidence,” and an immigration judge adjudicating

one particular case would not have been able to gather it.

Id. This would leave the federal court of appeals in a bad

spot; it “would be in [no] position to provide meaningful

review of the type of claims raised.” Id.

So the Supreme Court’s decision: no need for the case

to go to the immigration courts --- keep it in the federal

district court. See id. at 494, 111 S.Ct. 888.

McNary is not directly on-point.

But it speaks to the idea that when it comes to

“meaningful” development of the factual record --- and

the knock-on question of whether adjudication in the

immigration courts is required --- federal courts do not

need to turn a blind eye to a common-sense reality.49

49. See generally Tennessee v. Dep’t of Educ., 104 F.4th 577,

606 (6th Cir. 2024) (suggesting that “practical realities” influence

whether there is “meaningful review” under Thunder Basin).

343a

Appendix E

And that is this: immigration courts are mainly built

for close-to-the-ground fact-finding. Not for fleshing out

the record as to potentially sweeping claims --- related to

“pattern and practice” issues, McNary, 498 U.S. at 497,

111 S.Ct. 888, for example, or selective enforcement.

And sweeping claims are plainly what the Petitioner

is pressing here. 50

***

As to the fact-finding difficulties here for the

immigration courts, consider briefly a final added point.

50. As briefly alluded to above, immigration courts are highvolume affairs. As of March 2025, there were around 3.9 million

cases in the backlog. See Pending Cases, New Cases, and Total

Completions, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., https://perma.cc/L659S8P5 (accessed on Apr. 29, 2025). Roughly 360,000 of those cases

were added in 2025. See id. This has an everyday impact. Per a 2022

congressional report, some immigration judges reported having

nearly 5,000 pending cases; others reported they heard 80 cases

each day. Holly Straut-Eppsteiner, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47077,

U.S. Immigration Courts & the Pending Cases Backlog 22 (2022);

cf. Malets v. Garland, 66 F.4th 49, 59 (2nd Cir. 2023) (“We have

repeatedly recognized the extraordinary caseload burdens faced by

IJs.”); Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir.

2011) (“We readily acknowledge that an IJ’s position is an impossibly

demanding and challenging one.”). The typical fact-finding in these

cases does not appear extensive. When a person is detained, the

first hearing seems to typically be the only one. See Ingrid Eagly &

Steven Shafer, Detained Immigration Courts, 110 Va. L. Rev. 691,

756 (2024). (Part of why: while discovery tools exist, see 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.10(b), 1003.35, they are rarely used in practice. See Geoffrey

Heeran, Shattering the One-Way Mirror: Discovery in Immigration

Court, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 1569, 1582–84 (2014).)

344a

Appendix E

One of the Petitioner’s core arguments is that he is

being retaliated against under a policy formulated by the

most senior officials in the federal government. See Motion

for Preliminary Injunction at 3; see also Petition ¶¶ 29-36.

More on that allegation later, in Part VIII.

For now, note that there is at least a potential argument

under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lozman v. Riviera

Beach, 585 U.S. 87, 100-01, 138 S.Ct. 1945, 201 L.Ed.2d

342 (2018), that the existence of such a policy could undo

the argument the Respondents have made here --- namely,

the argument that probable cause is a full defense to an

arrest made in retaliation for First Amendment activity.

See Opposition Brief at 28.

This means that the salience of the Nieves question

(was there probable cause such that First Amendment

retaliation may not matter?) could potentially turn under

Lozman on the answer to an earlier and broader question

(was there an official policy of retaliation?).

If fact-finding is one day required as to such a policy

--- whether it exists, what its scope might be, whether it

led to the Petitioner’s detention --- it cannot be done in a

“meaningful” way by the immigration courts, for reasons

that have already been discussed (and that were the focus

of the Supreme Court’s “pattern and practice” decision

in McNary).

But that is only the tip of the iceberg.

345a

Appendix E

Deciding, for example, whether Lozman applies to

a case like this one, involving only federal officials, may

require some complex legal judgments about constitutional

questions that have not yet been resolved in all federal

circuits. See, e.g., Novak v. City of Parma, 932 F.3d 421,

429 (6th Cir. 2019) (suggesting that Lozman is only

relevant as to claims against municipalities).

And that question may need to be answered at the

threshold of any fact-finding, to determine the scope of

discovery.

If Lozman applies, the Petitioner may try to prove up

a policy --- and to seek out evidence accordingly.

And if Lozman does not apply, then maybe what

matters is only proof as to probable cause and selective

enforcement --- which may imply a different (though still

potentially wide) scope for discovery.

***

Bottom line: the immigration courts cannot be

expected to supply sufficiently substantial fact-finding as

to the allegations in this case.

And the threshold questions that may determine the

scope of any possible discovery seem to themselves require

knowledge as to complex areas of constitutional law, areas

that are removed from the legal issues the immigration

courts typically consider. 51

51. The “meaningful review” test is designed to get a handle

on what Congress’ intent for a certain “type” of case might have

346a

Appendix E

C.

Expertise

The focus to this point has been on what the

immigration courts could accomplish in this case.

Could they grant the Petitioner the legal relief he

seeks? Could they substantially develop the factual record?

The Court’s answer has been no to each question. See

Part VI.A and Part VI.B.

been. See Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212, 114 S.Ct. 771. In terms

of how factual development might go forward --- would Congress

have wanted a case like this one to be handled by the immigration

courts? The first proposed subpoena here was to a cabinet official,

and the allegations in this case quote statements made about the

Petitioner by the President. See Petition ¶¶ 73, 74. It is unclear at

this point whether discovery might be needed here. See footnote 47.

But if it is, note that the federal courts have evolved any number of

potentially relevant doctrines in this area. See, e.g., United States

v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941) (as

to an agency action, a cabinet secretary “should never have been

subjected to” a deposition); In re U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 25 F.4th 692,

700 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2022) (suggesting that “[t]he rules for when a

court may allow the questioning of a cabinet secretary” “rest on a

constitutional foundation”) (cleaned up); see also In re United States,

985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Sec’y

of Lab., 766 F.2d 575, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Kyle Eng’g Co. v. Kleppe,

600 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1979). These aim to strike a fine balance

between the legitimate needs of parties seeking evidence and the

legitimate needs of senior federal officials --- whose time is pressed

and whose work files are likely to be especially sensitive, such that

they will require special judicial protection as to any discovery. It

seems unlikely that Congress would have thought that a case of this

“type,” raising these sorts of evidentiary issues, should go before

the immigration courts, which lack experience with them.

347a

Appendix E

The implications of this are taken up in Part VI.D,

which considers whether the Petitioner could get the

required “meaningful review” of his claim if it first goes

to the immigration courts.

Before getting there, though, take a quick detour

--- to see the impact here of a decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals.

***

“Meaningful review” is the most important of the

Thunder Basin factors. See Part V.B.2.

But there are two others.

***

The first is whether the claims in question are “wholly

collateral to the statute’s review provisions.” Axon, 598

U.S. at 186, 143 S.Ct. 890 (cleaned up).

The claim as to the Secretary’s determination is

not collateral. It is “the vehicle by which [the Petitioner]

seek[s] to” challenge his removal proceedings, Elgin, 567

U.S. at 22, 132 S.Ct. 2126 and per the statutory “review

provisions,” those are the “challenge[s]” that are generally

supposed to go before the immigration courts.

***

The second Thunder Basin factor relates to whether

the agency’s expertise can be brought to bear if a certain

348a

Appendix E

claim goes to it first. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 194, 143 S.Ct.

890; Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Free Enter.

Fund, 561 U.S. at 491, 130 S.Ct. 3138.

If agency expertise can be brought to bear, that is a

reason to think Congress wanted claims of the relevant

“type” to go to the agency’s courts (here, the immigration

courts).

But in this case, “agency expertise” would have

virtually no role to play as to any immigration court

assessment of the Secretary of State’s determination.

This Part VI.C explains why.

***

Agency adjudicatory bodies are experts in the laws

they routinely use, plus nearby bodies of law.

SEC adjudicators, for example, can be expected to

be fluent in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934. And they are almost surely experts

on related subjects, too. Common-law fraud, for example.

Immigration courts plainly have deep expertise in

immigration law.

But the Petitioner claims that the Secretary of

State’s determination is the product of First Amendment

retaliation. See Petition ¶¶ 8, 89; Motion for Preliminary

Injunction at 10-18.

349a

Appendix E

And First Amendment issues have little or no place on

an immigration judge’s docket. See Part VI.A. It follows

that there is no reason to think immigration courts have

special expertise in First Amendment law. See Axon, 598

U.S. at 194, 143 S.Ct. 890 (describing constitutional claims

as outside the administrative agency’s area of expertise);

Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 491, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (similar).

But agency expertise can still potentially be brought

to bear.

Indeed, the Thunder Basin “agency expertise” factor

can weigh in favor of upfront adjudication in the agency’s

courts --- even when the legal theory that undergirds

the claim is not one as to which an agency adjudicator

has any expertise. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22-23, 132 S.Ct.

2126; Rydie v. Biden, 2022 WL 1153249, at *8 (4th Cir.

Apr. 19, 2022).

But while that is true in general, in this particular

case the “agency expertise” factor does not point to the

immigration courts.

***

To see why, start with the idea that an agency

adjudicator’s decision, informed by special expertise, can

helpfully move the case along by eliminating the need for

later federal court intervention.

Take as an example Elgin v. Department of Treasury,

567 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).

350a

Appendix E

There, federal employees were fired because they did

not register for the draft, and they sued. See id. at 6-7,

132 S.Ct. 2126. Their argument: their termination for

failure to register was unconstitutional because, among

other things, the draft discriminated against men based

on sex. See id. at 7, 132 S.Ct. 2126.

Analyzing the Thunder Basin factors, the Supreme

Court ruled that the case needed to first be adjudicated

by the relevant agency, the Merit Systems Protection

Board. 52 See id. at 8, 132 S.Ct. 2126.

The Board did not have expertise on the underlying

constitutional issue. See id. at 22, 132 S.Ct. 2126. But

the Court noted that the Board might be able to wrap

up the case by applying its expertise to “threshold”

issues, without the need for a court to later take up the

constitutional question. See id.

For example, one of the fired employees had not been

formally fired --- instead, he argued that he had been

“constructive[ly] discharge[d].”53 Id. at 23, 132 S.Ct. 2126.

52. “ The Merit Systems Protection Board ... is a[n] ...

agency in the executive branch charged with protecting federal

employees against improper employment-related actions,” including

“favoritism, or engaging in reprisals against whistleblowers.” Jon

O. Shimabukuro & Jennifer A. Staman, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45630,

Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): A Legal Overview (2019)

(summary page).

53. Constructive discharge refers to “[a]n employer’s creation

of working conditions that leave a particular employee or group

of employees little or no choice but to resign.” Discharge, sense 7,

351a

Appendix E

If this employee was not in fact constructively

discharged, the constitutional challenge to his firing would

no longer exist --- because it could no longer be said that

he was fired. See id.

And that, per the Supreme Court, was a reason to

let the case run down the agency-adjudication track. See

id. After all, the question of whether a person is or is not

constructively discharged is “unique to the employment

context” and therefore “falls squarely within the [Board’s]

expertise.” Id. at 22-23, 132 S.Ct. 2126. 54

***

With this background in mind, turn back now to this

case.

Are there “threshold” issues here, id. at 22, that the

immigration courts could resolve, and that might put an

end to the Petitioner’s First Amendment challenge?

Yes, it would seem.

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “constructive

discharge”).

54. For other cases making this same point, see, for example,

Bank of La. v. FDIC, 919 F.3d 916, 929 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he [agency]

could have mooted the [plaintiff’s] constitutional claims by finding

the [plaintiff] innocent of the statutory violations it was accused of

committing.”), and Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(“[T]he agency could moot the need to resolve [the constitutional

question] by finding that he did not commit the securities-law

violations of which [the plaintiff] stands accused.”).

352a

Appendix E

After all, the Secretary of State determined that there

were “reasonable ground[s] to believe [the Petitioner’s

presence or activities in the United States] would have

potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences

for the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i).

Maybe the immigration courts could hold that there

were in fact not “reasonable grounds” --- and if so,

the Petitioner’s claim would be resolved on that basis,

without the need for a federal court to decide whether the

Secretary’s determination amounted to First Amendment

retaliation.

And indeed, after the Third Circuit sent Massieu’s

case to the immigration courts, that is precisely what

happened.

The immigration judge looked behind the curtain of the

Secretary of State’s “reasonable grounds” determination

--- and said the evidence was not there. See In re RuizMassieu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 833, 835-36 (BIA 1999).

But that was not the end of the road.

The Board of Immigration Appeals took it from there,

and held that what the immigration judge had done was

not allowed. Per the Board, the Secretary’s determination

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) is like a prior criminal

conviction --- it must be treated as a given if it seems solidenough on its face, with no possibility of getting under the

hood and examining its underlying factual basis.

353a

Appendix E

In the scheme adopted by Congress, the

Secretary of State’s determination as outlined

in section 241(a)(4)(C)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)

(C)(i)] of the Act is equivalent to a duly certified

record of criminal conviction by a state or

federal court....

[The alternative] would necessarily require the

Immigration Judge and this Board to intrude

into the realm of foreign policy....

For an example, we need only look to the opinion

in the present case. The Immigration Judge

held that the [Immigration and Naturalization]

Ser v ice must produce more than clea r,

unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the

Secretary of State held a facially reasonable

opinion that the alien’s presence would have

adverse foreign policy consequences. She

required the Service to convince her by clear,

unequivocal, and convincing evidence that

the Secretary’s opinion is reasonable. The

Immigration Judge found that the Service had

not shown that the opinion of the Secretary

of State is reasonable. Consequently, in the

absence of further evidence, she substituted

her judgment for that of the Secretary of

State. This standard of inquiry would entangle

the Immigration Court in matters of foreign

policy and involve that court in weighing

the importance of various factors in an area

in which it has no special expertise. Such

354a

Appendix E

an in-depth examination could well require

the Service to proffer secret or confidential

information and expert witnesses, or involve

a deposition of the Secretary of State. There

is no indication that Congress contemplated

an Immigration Judge, or even the Attorney

General, overruling the Secretary of State on

a question of foreign policy.

Id. at 844-45. 55

In short: “it is ... the opinion of the Secretary [of

State] that decides the issue,” id. at 845 n.13 --- and

because of the above-quoted ruling from the Board of

Immigration Appeals in Ruiz-Massieu, there would be

next to nothing for an immigration court to do in this

case. The reasonableness of the Secretary’s determination

might have been a “threshold” matter for the immigration

courts. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22, 132 S.Ct. 2126. But after the

Ruiz-Massieu decision, no longer. 56

55. Ruiz-Massieu is binding on immigration judges, see 8

C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(1), and serves as precedent for future Board of

Immigration Appeals proceedings regarding the same issue. See

id. § 1003.1(g)(2); see also April 11 Audio Recording at 1:34:30 to

1:36:00 (holding that Ruiz-Massieu bound the immigration court).

56. There might sometimes be fact-finding work for the

immigration courts to do in cases like this one. For example, there

may be a dispute as to whether the Secretary personally made

the relevant determination. That could take fact-finding, and the

immigration courts could do it. Cf. In re Ruiz-Massieu, 22 I. & N.

Dec. at 845 n.13. And that possibility was part of why Judge Alito

thought the Massieu case should be sent to the immigration courts.

355a

Appendix E

***

Are there other reasons why agency expertise might

matter?

Yes. Take up here the main added possible reason, and

then consider a second one below in footnote 57.

An agency’s narrowing construction of a statute

might potentially obviate the need for a federal court

to later reach the relevant constitutional issues. See id.

at 23, 132 S.Ct. 2126 (a “challenged statute may be one

that the [agency] regularly construes, and its statutory

interpretation could alleviate constitutional concerns”);

see also Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 29 (“[T]he [agency] could

offer an interpretation of the securities laws in the course

of the proceeding that might answer or shed light on

[the plaintiff’s] [constitutional] challenge. As our court

has previously observed, there are precious few cases

involving interpretation of statutes authorizing agency

action in which our review is not aided by the agency’s

statutory construction.”) (cleaned up); Am. Fed’n of Gov.

See Massieu, 91 F.3d at 426. But no one seems to be disputing

the Secretary of State’s personal involvement here. Indeed, the

Petitioner goes the other way --- and affirmatively alleges that there

was a good deal of personal involvement from the Secretary in this

case. See Petition ¶¶ 2-3, 33, 75, 80, 83. (Note that the Secretary

does not always need to be personally involved in passing on a

determination. Only when his determination is based on speech that

would be First Amendment–protected. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(4)

(C)(ii), 1182(a)(3)(C)(iii). But the immigration courts have no special

expertise on that First Amendment gating question.)

356a

Appendix E

Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748, 761 (D.C. Cir.

2019) (similar).

Imagine, for example, if the immigration courts

took first crack at this case --- and construed 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) as providing a basis for removal only if

the Secretary of State’s determination was not based on

any sort of retaliation whatsoever.

That could sw itch things up, transfor ming a

constitutional question into an immigration law question.

The constitutional question (was the Secretary’s

deter mination the product of Fi rst A mendment

retaliation?) would become one of immigration law (was

the Secretary’s determination the product of “any sort of

retaliation,” as defined by the immigration courts?).

And if so, it might make sense to allow the immigration

courts to assess the case first --- under what will, by

hypothesis, be their own standard.

But the Board of Immigration Appeals has already

construed Section 1227(a)(4)(C)(i), and it has not opted to

give it a limiting construction of any kind.

And in any event, a limiting agency construction would

carry less weight now that the Board of Immigration

Appeals decisions no longer get strong deference.

Compare Bautista v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 744 F.3d 54, 58

(3d Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Torres v.

Lynch, 578 U.S. 452, 136 S.Ct. 1619, 194 L.Ed.2d 737 (2016)

(Board of Immigration Appeals decisions get Chevron

deference), and Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder, 788 F.3d 444,

357a

Appendix E

448-49 (5th Cir. 2015) (same), with Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412, 144 S.Ct. 2244, 219 L.Ed.2d

832 (2024) (“Chevron is overruled.”).

***

Bottom line: the immigration courts would be unable

to apply their expertise here to resolve any substantial

threshold matter --- and they would be unable to interpret

the immigration laws in a way that would later receive

strong deference from a federal court.

In light of this, the Thunder Basin “agency expertise”

factor tilts the scales toward the conclusion that Congress

did not intend for immigration courts to handle this “type”

of case in the first instance. 57

57. Per the Supreme Court in Axon, the expertise factor

“reflect[s] ... the point of special review provisions --- to give the

agency a heightened role in the matters it customarily handles, and

can apply distinctive knowledge to.” 598 U.S. at 186, 143 S.Ct. 890.

But “the point” of the structure created by Congress for immigration

claims was not just to build up and lean on expertise --- but also to

keep the tide of immigration cases from swamping the federal courts

and displacing a good deal of their work on other cases. See Robbie

Clarke, Reaffirming the Role of the Federal Courts, 17 Wash. & Lee

J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 463, 474–75 & n.65 (2011). But any precedent

that might be set by this case does not implicate such concerns. It

is much too unusual for that. Because of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ Ruiz-Massieu decision, for example, there is virtually

nothing for the immigration courts to do here. And the sensitive and

sprawling nature of the discovery that might potentially be required

makes this case an especially serious misfit for immigration courts

fact-finding.

358a

Appendix E

D.

Conclusion

As to the Secretary of State’s determination, the

immigration courts cannot provide the Petitioner with

the legal relief he seeks. See Part VI.A. They cannot

be expected to knock out any fact-finding that might

potentially be necessary. See Part VI.B. And they cannot

bring their special expertise to bear in a substantial way.

See Part VI.C.

Does this mean that if this case starts off in the

immigration courts, the Petitioner cannot get “meaningful

review” --- and that, under Section 1252(b)(9), this Court

should therefore retain jurisdiction?58

To answer, go back for a moment to the key cases.

***

Recall that, in Elgin, employees were fired for not

signing up for the draft. See 567 U.S. at 6-7, 132 S.Ct.

2126. The Supreme Court held that the employees could

not sue first in the federal district court. They would have

to go down the administrative track, per a statute --- even

though they could not get constitutional relief there. See

id. at 13-14, 132 S.Ct. 2126.

Or look back to Massieu.

58. Recall: the Court here is proceeding on the assumption that

Section 1252(b)(9) applies in the first place. See Part IV.

359a

Appendix E

The underlying statute, essentially the same one that

is at issue here, was challenged as unconstitutional.

But the immigration judge’s hands were tied. She was

“not authorized to consider the constitutionality of the

statute.” 91 F.3d at 424.

The result? Same as in Elgin. The Third Circuit held

that the noncitizen would have to go to the immigration

courts and then over to the court of appeals, rather than

seek immediate relief in the district court. See id. at 422.

***

These precedents loom large. They suggest that going

to the administrative courts is necessary --- even when

they cannot be the litigation’s main event.

But in the end, the Court’s conclusion is this: neither

the Supreme Court’s Elgin decision nor the Third Circuit’s

Massieu decision dictates the outcome here.

Those cases are different than this one.

***

The first difference has already been discussed.

In Elgin and Massieu, the administrative courts could

realistically be expected to push things forward.

360a

Appendix E

They could gather facts. They could bring to bear

their distinctive expertise.

The cases would take longer to make it to federal court

--- a first trip there, to the federal court of appeals, could

go forward only after the administrative adjudication

was done.

But the time in Elgin and Massieu would have been

well spent. The administrative courts’ work (fact-finding,

using their expertise) would have set the table for the

federal court of appeals to make its constitutional decision.

But in this case, the time in the immigration courts

cannot be expected to advance the ball.

If there needs to be fact-finding here, it may

potentially be sprawling, and it may potentially involve

sensitive evidence, or (renewed) requests to depose senior

officials. See Part VI.B.

And the scope of discovery may depend not on

questions of immigration law, but on questions of

constitutional law, both procedural (for example: what

are the limits on subpoenaing a cabinet official?) and

substantive (for example: is there a “policy” exception

under Lozman to the Nieves First Amendment-retaliation

framework?). See id.

This is not the kind of fact-finding work the immigration

courts have been built for. See id.

361a

Appendix E

And in this case, the immigration courts would also

have no real chance to deploy their special expertise. The

Board of Immigration Appeals has already held that the

Secretary of State’s determination is conclusive. This

binds the immigration courts. And it means that, for those

courts at least, there is no room to examine the underlying

basis of the Secretary’s determination. See Part VI.C.

There is, in short, little that the immigration courts

can be expected to accomplish in this case.

The requirement of “meaningful review” under

Thunder Basin, Elgin, and Massieu can accommodate a

slower road to federal court. But those cases envision that

along the way things will get done. Facts will be found, law

will be interpreted, expertise will be used. See Thunder

Basin, 510 U.S. at 214-15, 114 S.Ct. 771; Elgin, 567 U.S.

at 22-23, 132 S.Ct. 2126; Massieu, 91 F.3d at 426.

The work in the administrative court may end the

case. And if not, then the time will have been used. The

jo

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