Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Darrell Leon McClanahan, III, Petitioner v. Donald Trump, President of the United States, et al.

APPENDIX COVER SHEET:

APPENDIX

to

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Darrell Leon McClanahan III,

Petitioner,

v.

Donald J. Trump, President of the United States,

et al.,

Respondents.

No.

APPENDIX A

United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

Per Curiam Opinion

January 27, 2026

Case No. 25-3007

Judges Duane Benton, David R. Stras, and Jonathan A. Kobes

1A

United States Court of Appeals

For The Eighth Circuit

Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse

111 South 10th Street, Room 24.329

St. Louis, Missouri 63102

VOICE (314) 244-2400

FAX (314) 244-2780

Susan E. Bindler

Clerk of Court

www.ca8.uscourts.gov

January 27,2026

Darrell Leon McClanahan III

24346 S. 2425 Road

Milo, MO 64767

RE: 25-3007 Darrell McClanahan, III v. Donald Trump, et al

Dear Darrell McClanahan:

The court today issued an opinion in this case. Judgment in accordance with the opinion

was also entered today.

Please review Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Eighth Circuit Rules on post­

submission procedure to ensure that any contemplated filing is timely and in compliance with the

rules. Note particularly that petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc must be

received in the clerk's office within 45 days of the date of the entry of judgment. Counsel-filed

petitions must be filed electronically in CM/ECF. Paper copies are not required. Except as

provided by Rule 25(a)(2)(iii) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, no grace period for

mailing is allowed. Any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc which is not

received within the 45 day period for filing permitted by FRAP 40 may be denied as untimely.

Susan E. Bindler

Clerk of Court

NDG

Enclosure(s)

cc:

Wyatt R. Nelson

Paige A. Wymore-Wynn

District Court/Agency Case Number(s): 3:25-cv-05025-MDH

AppeHaK Casa 25-3007

Page: 1

Date Filed: 01/27/2026 Entry !D: 5601196

Wuteb States Court of Sippeds

Jfor tlje (Bigljtlj Circuit

No. 25-3007

Darrell Leon McClanahan, III

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Donald Trump, President of the United States; United States Department of

Justice; United States Department of Education

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

Submitted: January 21, 2026

Filed: January 27, 2026

[Unpublished]

Before BENTON, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Darrell McClanahan, a Missouri resident, appeals following the district

courts1 dismissal of his pro se complaint for lack of standing. Having jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

'The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

Upon careful review, this court concludes that the district court did not err in

dismissing the case, nor in denying leave to amend the complaint. See Gelschus v.

Hogen, 47 F.4th 679, 686 (8th Cir. 2022) (standard of review); U.S. ex rel. Raynor

v. Nat\l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin., Corp., 690 F.3d 951, 957 (8th Cir. 2012) (same).

McClanahan did not allege sufficient facts to render plausible that he suffered an

injury the defendants caused and the court can remedy

a jurisdictional necessity.

See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 D24 (2021) (standard for Article

III standing); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(pleading standard).

The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

APPENDIX B

United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

Order Denying Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

February 25, 2026

Case No. 25-3007

2B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-3007

Darrell Leon McClanahan, III

Appellant

v.

Donald Trump, President of the United States, et al.

Appellees

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

(3:25-cv-05025-MDH)

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is

also denied.

February 23, 2026

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Susan E. Bindler

Appellate Case. 25-3007

Page' i

Date Ried. 0223/2026 Entry ID: 56iC”l3

APPENDIX C

United States District Court

Western District of Missouri

Order Dismissing Complaint and Denying Leave to Amend September 30, 2025

Case No. 3:2025cv05025

District Judge M. Douglas Harpool

3C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION

DARRELL McCLANAHAN,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

v.

Case No.: 3:25-cv-05025-MDH

)

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, et. al.,

)

)

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants EMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Motion

to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 41). Defendants filed suggestions in support, Plaintiff

filed suggestions in opposition (Doc. 42) and Defendants have replied. (Doc. 46). Additionally,

before the Court is PlaintiffB Pro Se Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 56).

Plaintiff filed suggestions in support, Defendants filed suggestions in opposition (Doc. 57) and

Plaintiff has filed a reply. (Doc. 58). The motions are now ripe for adjudication on the merits. For

the reasons discussed herein, Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is

GRANTED, Defendants EMotion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is FOUND AS MOOT,

and PlaintiffB Pro Se Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings his action challenging the constitutionality of Executive Orders 13899 and

14188 based on alleged violations of his First Amendment Right of free speech, violation of his

Fifth Amendment Right under the Due Process Clause; and violation of the Establishment Clause

of the First Amendment. Plaintiff is a resident of Milo, Missouri. Plaintiff is suing President

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Donald J. Trump in his official capacity as well as the United States Department of Education and

the United States Department of Justice.

On December 11, 2019, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13899, directing

federal agencies to use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (QHRAp definition of

antisemitism in enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. On January 29, 2025, President Trump

issued Executive Order 14188 titled Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism. It states that

□t shall be the policy of the United States to combat anti-Semitism vigorously, using all available

and appropriate legal tools, to prosecute, remove, or otherwise hold to account the perpetrators of

unlawful anti-Sematic harassment and violence. (Emphasis added). Plaintiff alleges Executive

Order 14188 orders the Department of Education and Department of Justice to investigate

individuals and institutions critical of Israel and to withhold federal funding from universities that

allow such criticisms. Plaintiff alleges that Executive Order 13899 and its expanded enforcement

constitute a direct violation of his civils rights. Specifically, Plaintiff brings three counts against

Defendants. Court I

Violation of the First Amendment (Free Speech); Count II □Violation of

the Fifth Amendment (Due Process Clause); and Count III □Violation of the Establishment Clause

of the First Amendment.

Defendants bring their current motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for lack of

jurisdiction arguing that Plaintiff has failed to establish standing in this case. Alternatively,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief and thus this Court should

dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint. The Court will evaluate each of Defendants ^Motions in turn.

STANDARD

Un order to properly dismiss [a case] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule

12(b)(1), the complaint must be successfully challenged on its face or on the factual truthfulness

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of its averments.

Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). In a facial attack, the court

LJestricts itself to the face of the pleadings and Qhe non-moving party receives the same

protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6). Osborn v. United

States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990). Dismissal is appropriate only where fit appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.

Id. In a factual attack, 3he court considers matters outside the pleadings . . . and

the~non-moving party ‘does mot have the benefit of 12(b)(6) safeguards.

‘7<7.

Dismissal is

appropriate in such cases where, upon weighing the evidence, the court is not satisfied that the

plaintiff has, in fact, proved jurisdiction. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n, 549 F.2d

884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

ANALYSIS

I.

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

Defendants alleges that Plaintiff alleges four injuries: (1) a chilling effect on free speech,

(2) a potential loss of his childrens Medicaid benefits and his own Rural Development government

home loan, (3) due process violations and (4) online content restrictions. Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs first three allegations of injury do not allege any injuiy-in-fact, a necessary prerequisite

to standing. As to the online content restrictions, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege

whether or how Defendants carried out the restrictions pursuant to the executive orders and thus

fails to allege how a judgment declaring the executive orders unconstitutional would redress his

alleged injury. Plaintiff argues that he properly has standing and that he has injury-in-fact on all

four of his injuries. Plaintiff also argues that a declaratory judgment from this Court would redress

his injuries as such a declaration would remove the governmental imprimatur and directive behind

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the expanded definition of antisemitism and the associated enforcement policies, thereby

alleviating the chilling effect on his speech, removing the direct threat to his federal benefits, and

mitigating the government influenced online censorship.

To establish Article III standing, which limits federal judicial authority to the resolution of

□bases and controversies, Das the Constitution requires, the plaintiff must show Q[i) that he suffered

an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was

likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.

Denmon v. Kansas Couns., Inc., No. 23-3612, 2025 WL 2329189, at *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025)

(quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 210 L.Ed.2d 568 (2021)).

E[T]he concrete harm inquiry is fact specific. QOjogwu v. Rodenburg Law Firm, 26 F.4th 457, 463

n.4 (8th Cir. 2022). SThe party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing She

or she suffered a concrete injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130,

119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In general, allegations of intangible injury such as distress and alarm (Tall

short of cognizable injury as a matter of general tort law. Ojogwu, 26 F.4th at 462 (quotation

omitted).

A.

Chilling Effect on Free Speech

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs assertion that his speech has been chilled are purely

subjective, and thus are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Plaintiff argues that the

chilling effect on free speech is objectively reasonable and palpable fear stems directly from the

Executive Orders. Plaintiff argues that the explicit declaration of intent to Ehold to accounts

citizens for speech deemed Sinti semi tic Screates an immediate and actional chilling effect.

Self-censorship can itself constitute injury in fact. 281 Care Comm. V. Arneson, 638 F.3d

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621, 627 (8th Cir. 2011). See also Virginia v. Am. Booksellers AssF, 484 U.S. 383, 393, 108 S.Ct:

636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988). However, self-censorship based on mere allegations of a BubjectiveD

chill resulting from a statute is not enough to support standing. Id. (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408

U.S. 1, 13D14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972)). Persons having no fears of prosecution

expect those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs.

Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Natdi Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895

(1979). The relevant inquiry is whether a party B decision to chill his speech in light of the

challenged statue was Objectively reasonable.T281 Care Comm. V. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 627

(8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2009). Reasonable chill

exists when a plaintiff shows On intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with

a constitutional interest, but proscribed by [the] statute, and there exists a credible threat of

prosecution. CBabbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat\l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60

L.Ed.2d 895 (1979).

Plaintiff has failed to show that his self-censorship was objectively reasonable and thus has

failed to show an injury-in-fact as to chilling effect on his free speech. Plaintiffs Complaint as it

relates to his claims of standing on the chilling effect on free speech states:

The Fact Sheets language, particularly the stated focus on enforcement on

American streets, creates uncertainty about what speech might be deemed unlawful,

compelling me to self-censor my political and religious viewpoints to avoid

potential prosecution. Courts have recognized that government policies creating

ambiguity and fear of punishment violate the First Amendment. Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).

(Complaint *[[ 15). Plaintiff in addition to his Complaint has submitted what Plaintiff has marked

as [Exhibit A Dwinell is a printout of an online fact sheet published by the White House titled Fact

Sheet; President Donald J. Trump Takes Forceful and Unprecedented Steps to Combat AntiSemitism. (Doc. 5-2); see also The White House, Fact Sheet; President Donald J. Trump Takes

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Forceful and

Unprecedented Steps

to

Combat Anti-Semitism,

(January

30,

2025),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-takesforceful-and-unprecedented-steps-to-combat-anti-semitism/. The fact sheet in relevant part states:

Immediate action will be taken by the Department of Justice to protect law and

order, quell pro-Hamas vandalism and intimidation, and investigate and punish

anti-Jewish racism in leftist, anti-American colleges and universities. The order

demands the removal of resident aliens who violate our laws. . . . Aggressively

enforce the law, protect public order, and prosecute anti-Semitic crimes: 01 will

issue clear orders to my Attorney General to aggressively prosecute terroristic

threats, arson, vandalism and violence against American Jews.

Id. While the fact sheet contains inflammatory political rhetoric, it does nothing but reinforce the

stated laws already passed by Congress, that is enforcement of any crimes against a particular

religious sect. While the Trump Administration has the right to signal its proprieties through

Executive Orders, Plaintiff has failed to show how the Executive Orders, or even the Fact Sheet

create an objectively reasonable chill. These Executive Orders, or the Fact Sheet, does nothing that

would prohibit any speech that is protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiff has failed to show a

credible threat of prosecution. Plaintiff identifies no party in a similar situation that has been

prosecuted based off of these Executive orders. Plaintiff himself has not faced any adverse

consequences based on his First Amendment speech by Defendants. Nor do these Executive

Orders bar any speech that would otherwise be prohibited. In sum, Plaintiffs subjective chill based

on speculation of what might occur should he exercise his First Amendment is not enough in this

case to establish an injury-in-fact. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff has failed to show an injury-in-

fact as to his allegation of a chilling effect on his free speech.

B.

Potential Loss of Benefits and Government Loans

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allegation that he and his children could face a potential

loss of federal benefits is not sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact. Additionally, Defendants

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argue that Plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating that he will lose his federal benefits as a result

of his speech, nor otherwise be subject to any harm. Plaintiff argues that federal agencies

administering Medicaid and federal housing loans are bound by the Executive Orders. Plaintiff

argues that if his speech is nonetheless labeled antisemitic Bunder the Executive Orders Bbroad

directive, the threat to his and his family B benefits become imminent and concrete.

Plaintiff has failed to establish an injury-in-fact as to the potential loss of benefits and

government loans. PlaintiffB Complaint alleges:

My four children rely on Medicaid, a government benefit, for essential healthcare.

The potential loss of this benefit, due to the administrations policy of withholding

federal funding based on certain speech, directly threatens their access to necessary

medical care. Additionally, I am a recipient of a Rural Development government

home loan, crucial for my family B financial stability. The administrationB policy

of withholding federal funding based on certain speech demonstrates a willingness

to use economic leverage to regulate expression. These concerns are not

speculative, but grounded in established legal precedent, where selective

enforcement and indirect coercion were deemed unconstitutional. Clapper v.

Amnesty IntCDUSA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).

(Complaint

16). Plaintiffs Complaint fails to show any concrete and particularized injury.

Plaintiff has yet to suffer any adverse consequence from Defendants based upon his speech.

Plaintiff makes conclusionary statements about the administrations policy of withholding federal

funding based on certain speech, but has failed to show any individuals in a similar position losing

benefits to Medicaid or a rural development home loan by Defendants or their policies. Plaintiff

cites to Clapper v. Amnesty Infill USA, 568 U.S. 398, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) to

support his proposition that his concerns are not speculative. However, the Supreme Court in that

case found that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the future injury they purportedly feared was

certainly impending and failed to establish the future injury they purportedly feared was fairly

traceable to the FISA provision at issue. Id. Plaintiff has provided no evidence in his Complaint

that his purported fears of the loss of benefits are anything more than speculative. For the reasons

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stated, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to establish an injury-in-fact as to the potential loss of

benefits and government loans.

C.

Due Process Violations

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs assertion of a due process violation contains no detail as

to any proceeding where he has been denied due process and is not sufficient to grant this Court

jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that when the Government issues an Executive Order defining what

speech might lead to prosecution, removal, or holding to account, Sthat definition must provide

fair notice. Plaintiff further argues that those ambiguities within the IHRA definition, particularly

its application to criticism of Israel, denies fair notice to citizens, thereby creating an imminent

threat of arbitrary enforcement without due process.

Plaintiff has failed to establish an injury-in-fact as to his alleged due process violations.

Plaintiffs Complaint alleges E[t]he Order B vague definition of anti-Semitic crimes Diacks clear

statutory guidance, raising serious Fifth Amendment concerns regarding fair notice and potential

arbitrary enforcement. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239 (2012).□(Complaint

17). However, Plaintiff has alleged no facts that show he has suffered a concrete or particularized

harms. As stated earlier, Qhe concrete harm inquiry is fact specific. IJOjogwu v. Rodenburg Law

Firm, 26 F.4th 457, 463 n.4 (8th Cir. 2022). [The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the

burden of establishing Qhe or she suffered a concrete injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130,119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In general, allegations of intangible injury such

as distress and alarm Tall short of cognizable injury as a matter of general tort Xaw.^Ojogwu, 26

F.4th at 462 (quotation omitted). Plaintiff has not stated any injury-in-fact he has suffered and

instead cites only to a speculative harm to his Fifth Amendment rights in general. For these reasons,

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the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to establish an injury-in-fact as to his alleged due process

violations.

D.

Online Content Restrictions

To satisfy the traceability requirement, the plaintiff needs to show a causal connection

between the injury and the conduct complained of.QLujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560,

112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). This connection does not have to be direct or absolute,

but it does need to be more than speculative. In other words, the plaintiff must show that its injuries

arise, at least in part, from the defendants actions or potential actions. Stanley M. Herzog Found.

V. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commfb, 781 F.Supp.3d 897, 911 (W.D. Mo. 2025); see also

California v. Texas, 593 U.S, 659, 669, 141 S.Ct. 2104, 210 L.Ed.2d 230 (2021) (finding no

traceability where defendant could not enforce challenged provision against plaintiff). Similarly,

to satisfy the redressability requirement, the plaintiff must show a reasonable likelihood that the

requested relief will address some injury the plaintiff faces. Stanley M. Herzog Found, v. Equal

Emp. Opportunity Commfh, 781 F.Supp.3d 897, 911 (W.D. Mo. 2025); see also Massachusetts v.

EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). E[A] plaintiff satisfies the

redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury

to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury. □Zarson v.

Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege whether or how Defendants carried out the

restrictions pursuant to the executive orders and thus fails to allege how a judgment declaring the

executive orders unconstitutional would redress his alleged injury. Plaintiff argues that a

declaratory judgment from this Court would redress his injuries as such a declaration would

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remove the governmental imprimatur and directive behind the expanded definition of

Antisemitism Dand the associated enforcement policies, thereby alleviating the chilling effect on

his speech, removing the direct threat to his federal benefits, and mitigating the government

influenced online censorship.

Plaintiff has failed to establish the traceability of his alleged online content restrictions by

Defendants. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges:

The federal government has previously exerted pressure on social media platforms

and institutions to suppress speech (as evidenced in Missouri v. Biden). I have

personally experienced online content restrictions when discussion political issues

related to Israel, further reinforcing the likelihood that government influence

extends beyond direct legal actions. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).

(Complaint

18). Plaintiff alleges he has personally experienced online content restrictions but

fails to allege any facts that would demonstrate that Defendants are responsible for said online

content restrictions. Plaintiff argues that Missouri v. Biden, 83 F.4th 350 (5th Cir.), cert, granted

sub nom. Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S.Ct. 7, 217 L.Ed.2d 178 (2023), and rev\Zl and remanded sub

mm. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 144 S.Ct. 1972, 219 L.Ed.2d 604 (2024) shows that the

Government has previously exerted pressure on social media platforms and institutions to suppress

speech.1 However, Plaintiff fails to show that the case he cites was reversed and remanded by the

Supreme Court of the United States. See Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 144 S.Ct. 1972, 219

L.Ed.2d 604 (2024). The Court reversed and remanded the Fifth Circuit decision, finding that the

States failed to establish that past social-media restriction of a state representatives post was

1 The case Missouri v. Biden that Plaintiff cites alleges that during the 2020 election season and the COVID-19

pandemic, social-media platforms frequently removed, demoted, or fact checked posts containing allegedly false or

misleading information. At the same time, federal officials, concerned about the spread of CmisinformationOon social

media, communicated extensively with the platforms about their content-moderation efforts. The plaintiffs, two States

and five social-media users, sued dozens of Executive Branch officials and agencies, alleging that they pressured the

platforms to suppress protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit agreed, concluding that

the officialsLCommunications rendered them responsible for the private platformsDmoderation decisions.

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traceable to the Centers for Disease Control and PreventionB (CDC) communications with

platforms, and thus there was not evidence of expected future harm required for Article III

standing. Id. The Court also found that certain social-media users failed to establish that past

restrictions were traceable to defendants; plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their alleged injuries

were redressable by enjoining Government defendants among other reasons for dismissing the

case based on standing. Id. PlaintiffB Complaint fails for similar reasoning. He has failed to show

traceability as to the GovernmentB role in the alleged online content restrictions he claims.

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would demonstrate the Defendants in this case had any

bearing on the decisions of those social media companies. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff has

failed to establish the traceability of his alleged online content restrictions by Defendants.

Plaintiff has failed to establish standing as to any of his claims and thus the Court finds that

Plaintiff does not have standing in this Court for his causes of action. For the reasons stated,

Defendants DMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is GRANTED.

II.

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Defendants next argue that Part I of the Courts June 9, 2025, Order denying PlaintiffB

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order detailed the inadequacies of PlaintiffB Complaint and

have adopted those rationales as part of their Motion to Dismiss. The Court, already having granted

Defendants CMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, need not further evaluate the arguments

in Defendants SMotion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. For the reasons stated, Defendants

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is FOUND AS MOOT.

III.

Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint

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Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to file an Amended Complaint. Plaintiff wishes to submit

an Amended Complaint stating he seeks:

To amend his original Complaint to include all factual allegations, legal arguments,

religious evidence, and citations that have become relevant or more clearly defined

since the initial filing. This includes:

•

•

•

•

•

Arguments concerning the Establishment Clause.

Evidence of Viewpoint Discrimination.

Specific factual allegations and direct citations showing standing.

References to Christian Identity beliefs, including baptism, crucifixion, and

related religious doctrine.

Equal Protection under the law claims under the U.S. Constitution.

(Doc. 56, pages 1 -2). Defendants argue that the Proposed Complaint includes no factual allegations

which cure the deficiencies previously identified in the Courts Order denying Plaintiffs Motion

for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 23) and DefendantsSMotion to Dismiss. (Doc. 41).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amended and supplemental pleadings.

Specifically, it states:

(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a

matter of course no later than:

(A) 21 days after serving it, or

(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days

after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion

under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.

(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only

when the opposing partyB written consent or the courts leave. The court should

freely give leave when justice so requires.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A Court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for leave to amend

when there are [Compelling reasons such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, repeated

failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving

party, or futility of the amendment. CAnderson v. Bank of the W., 23 F. 4th 1056, 1060 (8th Cir.

2022) (quoting Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1065

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(8th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit has defined futility in the leave-to-amend content to mean that

□he amended complaint could not withstand a Rule 12 motion, and has evaluated whether a

proposed amended complaint could Survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. UBurgess v.

CS3 BPAssocs, LLC, No. 4:22-CV-00063-SRC, 2022 WL 2643505, at *6 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2022);

see also In re Senior Cottages ofAm., LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2007).

The record indicates that service of PlaintiffB Compliant was executed on June 25, 2025.

Plaintiff could have amended his Complaint as a matter of course on or before July 16, 2025.

Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint on August 28, 2025, and

therefore cannot amend his Complaint as a matter of course. As such, Plaintiff may amend his

pleading only when the opposing partyB written consent or the courts leave. Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). Here, the Court finds that PlaintiffB Proposed Amended Complaint is futile as the

Amended Complaint suffers from the same defects as the current Complaint.

As to standing, Plaintiffs Proposed Complaint alleges:

Plaintiff has suffered ongoing coercive harm, including threats of enforcement

against his religious beliefs. Plaintiff faces a real and imminent risk of further harm

under the IHRA definition, including the potential loss of federal benefits (e.g.,

Medicaid, rural development housing loans), constituting an injury sufficient to

confer standing for declaratory and injunctive relief.

(Doc. 56, pages 5-6). Plaintiffs Proposed Complaint only makes conclusory statements or

rehashes arguments that the Court has already dismissed. Plaintiff has failed to show any coercive

harm that he has suffered by Defendants in this case.2 Plaintiff continues to allege only speculative

harms that are not sufficient as to the injury-in-fact requirement or fail as to the traceability of his

2 Plaintiff makes the argument in his Proposed Complaint that he has been defamed by the Anti-Defamation League

and has been targeted by the Missouri Republican Party. (Doc. 56, page 6). However, these groups are not parties to

the current action and have no bearing as to the issues presented by Defendants in this case.

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injury. For the reasons stated, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint based on a finding of futility.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants OMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is

GRANTED. Defendants EMotion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is FOUND AS MOOT

and Plaintiffs Pro Se Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2025

/s/ Douglas Harpool______________

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Case 3:25-cv-05025-MDH

Document 60

Filed 09/30/25

Page 14 of 14

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.