Supplemental Brief — Andrew Valles, Petitioner v. Todd Blanche, Attorney General, et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 5, 2026
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26-5229
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ANDREW VALLES,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT (SECOND CIRCUIT NO. 25-2918;
RELATED NO. 24-1596)
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 15.8
The Sister Petition and the Government's Failure to Identify Any Pre-Enforcement § 20915(b)
Disqualification Complete the Operative-Duty Controversy
Andrew Valles
c/o Michael Goldsmith
P.O. Box 1103, Church Street Station
New York, New York 10008-1103
+1 646.369.9946
its.for.legal.use.only@outlook.com
Petitioner, Pro Se
5 August 2026
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER UNDER RULE 15.8
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner respectfully submits this supplemental brief under Supreme Court Rule 15.8 to call
attention to intervening adversarial, judicial, and procedural matter unavailable when the petition
was filed. The new matter does not create a different controversy. It completes the controversy
the Second Circuit's 13 January 2026 gatekeeping order expressly left unresolved: whether any
Utah or independently valid federal registration duty actually attached to these pre-Act Utah
misdemeanours and remained legally operative in May 2018 and July 2019.
Approximately one week before this filing, Petitioner mailed a corrected petition for certiorari
before judgment arising from Valles v. Attorney General of the United States, No. 1:25-CV-2215
(AS), and pending Second Circuit No. 26-610. That sister petition presents the declaratory,
prospective, compelled-speech, and separation-of-powers lane. This petition presents the
conviction, collateral-review, and continuing supervised-release lane. The judgments and
remedies remain distinct. Their spinal threshold is identical: the Goverment cannot impose
criminal and continuing consequences without identifying the complete, person-specific, date-
specific duty that allegedly existed.
The 26-610 appeal is fully briefed. The Government selected a Tier I theory and relied upon a
nominal fifteen-year period. Petitioner placed the complete duration statute - including 34 U.S.C.
§ 20915(b) - squarely before the court. That completed adversarial record exposes the decisive
omission. Section 20915(b) supplies a mandatory five-year reduction upon satisfaction of the
statutory clean-record conditions. The enforcement chain began in May 2018. The Government
therefore had to identify a statutory disqualification or unmet condition existing before
enforcement began.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS DELIVERED NONE.
It has not identified a pre-July-2016 conviction punishable by more than one year; a sex-offence
conviction; an uncompleted period of Utah supervision; an uncompleted applicable treatment
programme; or any other record fact that prevented the clean-record reduction from maturing.
The later August 2018 California financial conviction cannot retroactively revive a period that
had already ended.
Two independent duration paths consequently converge at July 2016: the federal habeas record's
ten-year Utah chronology measured from the July 2006 release, and the Government's own Tier I
theory when the mandatory five-year reduction is applied. Both end before the May 2018
warrant and the July 2019 federal prosecution posture. The Government continues to answer
only whether SORNA can sometimes operate independently of state law. It has not answered
what duty actually attached here and survived the complete statute on the relevant dates.
1. THE MAILED RULE 11 SISTER PETITION PRESENTS THE SAME THRESHOLD
THROUGH A DISTINCT DECLARATORY AND STRUCTURAL LANE
The petition arising from No. 25-2918 seeks review of the denial of authorisation to pursue
successive § 2255 relief from the § 2250(a) judgment. Its immediate concern is retrospective:
whether the conviction and its continuing consequences may remain insulated by gatekeeping
when the initiating Utah authority and the independently necessary federal duty have not been
established.
The corrected Rule 11 petition arises from a different civil judgment in No. 2215 and a pending
appeal in No. 26-610. Its immediate concern is prospective and structural: whether government
may continue compelling registration conduct, maintaining a public-facing status, threatening
renewed prosecution, and relying upon executive pre-Act specification without first identifying
the complete duty Congress enacted.
The two petitions are not duplicates, and neither renders the other moot. The present petition
challenges the continuing validity and enforceability of a criminal judgment and the refusal to
permit ordinary collateral adjudication. The sister petition seeks review of a separate declaratory
judgment and asks for statutory, due-process, First Amendment, and Article I rules governing
present and prospective enforcement. Coordinated consideration would preserve - not collapse -
those remedial lanes.
Both petitions arise from one legal chain: pre-Act applicability under § 20913(d); qualification of
the Utah counts; federal tier; commencement and duration under § 20915(a)-(b); existence of a
present duty; prosecution under § 2250(a); supervised-release enforcement; compelled status
maintenance; dissemination; and collateral operational consequences. If the antecedent duty fails
at any required step, later repetition cannot repair it.
2. THE FULLY BRIEFED 26-610 RECORD SUPPLIES THE INDEPENDENT-
FEDERAL-DUTY ANALYSIS THE ORDER BELOW SAID WAS MISSING
The order sought to be reviewed stated that Petitioner had not shown that the absence of a New
York duty also meant that no Utah or federal duty remained, and that the probationary status and
warrant had not been shown to bear upon guilt. Pet. App. A 1-2. The post-petition record now
isolates that missing antecedent analysis,
In No, 26-610, the Government affirmatively argued that federal law independently required
Petitioner to register as a Tier I offender for fifteen years after release. Gov't C.A. Br. 5, 16.
Petitioner did not accept the classification or commencement premise, but demonstrated that
even the Government's chosen theory cannot stop at § 20915(a)(1). Subsection (a) operates with
subsection (b), and the Reply demanded identification of the specific statutory condition, if any,
that prevented the five-year reduction. Pet. C.A. Reply 4-11.
That development answers the procedural concern below without asking this Court to decide
sealed facts in the first instance. The Court may decide the pure statutory proposition that an
asserted Tier I period cannot be calculated by taking subsection (a) while omitting subsection
(b), then remand for a count-specific and record-based application. Nichols v. United States, 578
U.S. 104, 110-15 (2016), requires textual discipline when identifying SORNA duties. The same
discipline governs duration.
The 3 June 2025 New York determination and the official 10 April 2026 California withdrawal
do not bind federal classification. They demonstrate that jurisdiction-specific officials
independently refused to assume the predicate the Government treats as automatic. Reynolds v.
United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012), and Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 446-47 (2010),
further show why abstract federal independence cannot substitute for valid pre-Act applicability,
attachment, tier, duration, reduction, interstate sequence, and charged-date enforceability.
3. THE COMPLETE § 20915(b) RECORD REQUIRES A DIRECT ANSWER, NOT AN
UNREDUCED FIFTEEN-YEAR ABSTRACTION
The federal habeas record, relying upon the Government-generated Presentence Report,
described the Utah obligation as the ten years following Petitioner's July 2006 release. That
account places the Utah endpoint in July 2016. The Utah misdemeanour case and court probation
had ended in January 2010 without a recorded extension or reserved violation. The public record
therefore identifies no Utah duty remaining when the May 2018 warrant issued.
The intervening federal calculation produces the same endpoint if the Government's Tier I
premise is accepted arguendo. A nominal fifteen-year period beginning in July 2006 would end
in July 2021. But § 20915(b) directs that the full registration period for a Tier I offender shall be
reduced by five years when the prescribed clean record is maintained for ten years. Congress
enacted one duration statute. Subsection (a) cannot be used to announce fifteen years while the
mandatory modifying subsection is omitted.
The focused 23 July and 2 August 2026 filings in Nos. 672/7835 identify the Governmentgenerated records relevant to every statutory condition: conviction history during the ten-year
period; any new sex offence; completion of supervision; and completion of appropriate
treatment. They request protected review in camera where necessary and do not publicly
reproduce the Presentence Report. The public chronology places release in July 2006,
termination of the Utah case and probation in January 2010, no new conviction before July 2016,
and no new sex-offence conviction.
If a contrary pre-enforcement record fact exists, the Government can identify it and the
sentencing court can determine its legal effect. But the Government may not preserve a
conviction and continuing supervision by repeating a nominal period while withholding the very
condition that allegedly prevented Congress's reduction from taking effect. The absence is not
semantic. It is the missing answer to the first element of § 2250(a).
4. THE 31 JULY ORDER AND 2 AUGUST FILINGS CONFIRM THAT THE
CONSEQUENCES REMAIN LIVE
On 31 July 2026, the sentencing court confirmed that all existing supervised-release conditions
remain in force. On 2 August, Petitioner submitted a combined 672/7835 motion requesting a
separately numbered, case-specific Government response identifying the qualifying counts,
federal definition, pre-Act applicability, tier, commencement, duration, clean-record condition
allegedly unsatisfied, interstate sequence, jurisdiction of required performance, and treatment of
the New York and California determinations.
Those submissions do not ask this Court to manage the district court. They demonstrate that the
unanswered predicate continues to administer Petitioner's liberty while the Government has not
supplied the elemental answer. No. 8050 separately concerns operational actors, warrants,
custody, supervision, dissemination, records, correction, and damages. No. 5919 concerns
separate California custody and access-to-courts injuries. Those lanes retain their own parties
and remedies, but their continuing existence confirms that the disputed predicate propagates
beyond the original judgment.
The same distinction governs the July 2026 Chelsea Piers exclusion. Petitioner does not ask the
Court to infer governmental causation or private liability. The incident is live-injury context
showing that unresolved public-status and criminal-record architecture may be operationalised in
ordinary life while the source duty remains unidentified.
5. THE PAIRED PETITIONS PROVIDE BOTH A NARROW STATUTORY
DISPOSITION AND A STRUCTURAL VEHICLE
A narrow disposition is available. The Court may grant the petition, vacate the order below, and
remand for application of the complete statutory framework and a count-specific, tier-specific,
duration-specific, and date-specific determination of the duty claimed to exist in May 2018 and
July 2019. That course answers the exact gap identified in No. 25-2918 without deciding
protected facts in the first instance.
The sister petition provides a structural vehicle if broader review is warranted. It presents
whether executive specification under § 20913(d), prosecution under § 2250(a), and criminally
coerced maintenance of a public-facing status may continue without identification of the
antecedent duty. It also presents the Article I question in the posture identified by the No. 2215
court: lower courts remain bound by Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128 (2019), and only this
Court may reconsider that precedent.
Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001), and Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 840-42
(2003), require determination whether the conduct satisfied the statutory element under the law
properly understood at the relevant time. A later conviction cannot circularly create the
antecedent duty upon which that conviction depended. A plea or subjective belief cannot
manufacture a legal-status element that the governing law did not supply.
Petitioner requests coordinated consideration or cross-reference, not consolidation of the
judgments or remedies. The Court should see the complete chain: conviction and gatekeeping in
this lane; declaratory, prospective, speech, and separation-of-powers consequences in the sister
lane,
CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted. Alternatively, the Court should grant, vacate, and remand for a
record-based determination under the complete statute, including 34 U.S.C. § 20915(b). The
Court should coordinate or cross-reference this petition with the corrected Rule 11 petition
arising from Nos. 1:25-CV-2215 and 26-610 while preserving the distinct judgments and
remedial lanes.
Signature:
Andrew Valles 4
Petitioner, Pro Se
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.