Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Heidi Cid, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefJul 16, 2026
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No. ______
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
HEIDI CID,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
HECTOR A. DOPICO
Federal Public Defender
MICHAEL CARUSO
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Counsel of Record
150 West Flagler Street, Suite 1700
Miami, FL 33130
(305) 533-4200
michael_caruso@fd.org
QUESTION PRESENTED
In Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), this Court held that the
word “obtained” in the criminal-forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), limits forfeiture
to property the defendant actually acquired and forecloses joint-and-several liability
for proceeds that his co-conspirators obtained. The operative language of 18 U.S.C. §
982(a)(2)(A)—the statute under which petitioner was ordered to forfeit “proceeds the
person obtained directly or indirectly”—is identical.
The district court ordered petitioner to forfeit $6,554,250 on the express ground
that the sum represented “approximately forty-five percent of the total proceeds the
Defendant jointly obtained with her co-conspirators.” Pet. App. 4a & n.1. The
Eleventh Circuit dismissed petitioner’s appeal without reaching that question,
enforcing the appeal waiver in her plea agreement under a categorical rule this Court
recently abrogated in Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026).
The question presented is:
Whether, in light of Hunter, an appeal waiver may be enforced to bar review of
a criminal forfeiture order imposing joint-and-several liability for proceeds the
defendant did not obtain—a form of forfeiture that 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A), as
construed in Honeycutt v. United States, does not authorize.
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(b)(i), petitioner submits that there are no parties
to the proceeding other than those named in the caption of the case.
Petitioner Cid was the defendant in the district court and appellant below.
Respondent United States of America was the plaintiff in the district court
and appellee below.
ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This petition arises from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Heidi Cid, No. 24-14081. The Eleventh
Circuit’s judgment was entered December 18, 2025; the court denied rehearing on
March 18, 2026.
This petition is related to the following proceeding in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida: United States v. Heidi Cid, No. 23-cr20421-RNS.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................ ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS......................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................ vii
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................................................ 1
OPINION BELOW......................................................................................................... 1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............................................................................... 2
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ...................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 5
A.
The Conspiracy and Cid’s Limited Role .............................................................. 5
B.
What Cid Personally Acquired .............................................................................. 5
C.
The Plea Agreement and Its Waivers ........................................................... 6
D.
The Forfeiture Order ..................................................................................... 7
E.
The Eleventh Circuit’s Per Curiam Dismissal ............................................. 8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ............................................................ 9
I.
The decision below rests on a categorical appeal-waiver rule that Hunter
abrogated, and a GVR is the appropriate disposition ....................................... 9
A.
The panel applied the precise categorical rule Hunter rejected ............. 9
iv
B.
There is a reasonable probability that Hunter affects the
disposition ............................................................................................... 10
1.
The forfeiture rests on a joint-and-several liability theory §
982(a)(2)(A) does not authorize ................................................... 11
2.
Any futility objections that the government may raise are for the
court of appeals; regardless, they fail ......................................... 13
C.
II.
The relief sought is modest .................................................................... 16
The question is recurring and important, which reinforces a GVR and
supports plenary review in the alternative...................................................... 17
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 18
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
(December 18, 2025) .................................................................................................... 1a
Appendix B: Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida (December 5, 2024) ................................................. 2a
Appendix C: Decision Denying En Banc Review (March 18, 2026) ........................... 8a
Appendix D: Plea Agreement, United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida (April 22, 2024) .............................................................................. 9a
Appendix E: Factual Proffer, United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida (April 22, 2024) ............................................................................ 19a
Appendix F: Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida (April 22, 2024) ..................................... 26a
v
Appendix G: Transcript of Sentencing and Motion for Preliminary Order,
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (December 5,
2024) ........................................................................................................................... 49a
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709 (2005) ............................................................................................ 13, 15
Honeycutt v. United States,
581 U.S. 443 (2017) ....................................................................... i, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 17
Hunter v. United States,
608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026) ........................................................ i, 4, 5, 9–18
Jones v. United States,
No. 25-524 (U.S. June 30, 2026) .............................................................................. 16
King v. United States,
41 F.4th 1363 (11th Cir. 2022) ...................................................................... 9, 10, 17
Lawrence v. Chater,
516 U.S. 163 (1996) .................................................................................................. 10
Libretti v. United States,
516 U.S. 29 (1995) .............................................................................................. 13, 14
Myrick v. United States,
No. 25-6860 (U.S. June 29, 2026) ...................................................................... 16, 18
Ton Ton Aquino v. United States,
No. 25-79 (U.S. June 29, 2026) ................................................................................ 16
United States v. Andis,
333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).................................................................... 17
vii
United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993) ........................................................ 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14
United States v. Cingari,
952 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2020) ................................................................................ 15
United States v. Goldstein,
989 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2021) ................................................................................ 15
United States v. Grinard-Henry,
399 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) .............................................................. 4, 8, 9, 10, 14
United States v. Hahn,
359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)................................................................ 17
United States v. Kim,
988 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 2021) .................................................................................... 12
United States v. West,
137 F.4th 395 (5th Cir. 2025) .................................................................................. 16
United States v. Young,
108 F.4th 1307 (11th Cir. 2024) .............................................................................. 15
United States v. Yung,
37 F.4th 70 (3d Cir. 2022).................................................................................. 12, 17
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A) .............................................................. i, 3, 4, 8, 11, 13, 17, 18
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) ..................................................................................................... i, 11
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................................................................ ii
viii
Rules
Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(b)(i) ..................................................................................................... ii
ix
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. ______
HEIDI CID,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Heidi Cid respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
OPINION BELOW
A copy of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal from the judgment and commitment of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, is contained in
the Appendix. Pet. App. 1a.
1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The decision of the court of appeals was issued on December 18, 2025. Pet. App.
1a. On March 18, 2026, the court of appeals denied a timely petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 8a. On June 9, 2026, Circuit Justice
Thomas extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to
and including July 16, 2026 (No. 25A1370). This Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
2
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
18 U.S.C. § 982 provides, in relevant part:
(a)(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of a
violation of, or a conspiracy to violate—(A) section . . . 1343 . . . shall
order that the person forfeit to the United States any property
constituting, or derived from, proceeds the person obtained directly or
indirectly, as the result of such violation.
3
INTRODUCTION
The district court ordered Heidi Cid to forfeit $6,554,250 because that sum
represented “approximately forty-five percent of the total proceeds [she] jointly
obtained with her co-conspirators.” Pet. App. 4a & n.1. That is joint-and-several
forfeiture liability—holding Cid answerable for proceeds her co-conspirators
obtained—precisely the theory this Court held the word “obtained” forecloses in
Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017). The operative language of the statute
under which Cid was sentenced, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A), is identical to the language
construed in Honeycutt.
When Cid appealed, the Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether the forfeiture
exceeded the court’s statutory authority. Instead, the court dismissed her appeal in a
one-paragraph order, enforcing the appeal waiver in her plea agreement under a
categorical rule—the rule of United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th
Cir. 1993), and United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.
2005)—that admits of no exception for a miscarriage of justice. Six months later, this
Court abrogated that rule. In Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1702
(2026), the Court held that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when enforcing it would
cause a miscarriage of justice. The rule this Court rejected is the same categorical,
no-exception approach the Eleventh Circuit had applied.
Accordingly, the decision below rests on a rule that no longer exists, applied
without any consideration of whether the forfeiture Cid challenges is unlawful. The
4
appropriate disposition is to grant Cid’s petition, vacate the judgment, and remand
(GVR) for the Eleventh Circuit to apply Hunter in the first instance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Conspiracy and Cid’s Limited Role
From May through July 2020, Cid participated in a conspiracy to submit
fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program loan applications. Pet. App. 20–21a. At the
direction of co-conspirator Lazaro Verdecia, Cid submitted approximately 147
applications; about 64 were approved, generating $14,565,000 in disbursements. Pet.
App. 21a.
The financial structure of the conspiracy controls the forfeiture analysis. The
$14,565,000 was disbursed to the shell companies of the co-conspirators who applied
for the loans—not to Cid. Pet. App. 21a. Cid had no ownership interest in those
companies and never received the gross proceeds. Pet. App. 21–25a. The
government’s own proffer recited only that the companies then paid “40 to 50 percent
of the funds to [Cid], [Verdecia], and [co-conspirator Yadier Rodriguez], jointly.” Pet.
App. 21a.
B. What Cid Personally Acquired
Three categories of property passed through Cid’s control. First, $201,700 in
fraud-derived funds were at various points deposited into accounts she owned; the
proffer recited that a material portion was then disbursed to a real-estate attorney
handling a transaction for Verdecia and did not inure to Cid’s benefit. Pet. App. 21–
25a. Second, agents recovered $541,181 in cash from Cid’s residence; the proffer
5
recited that this was Verdecia’s property, given to Cid for safekeeping. Pet. App. 25a.
Third, Verdecia purchased and gave Cid a Rolex watch. Pet. App. 25a.
When the district court asked at sentencing what Cid “personally receive[d]”
for her role, defense counsel explained that, after accounting for the pass-through and
excluding the currency held for Verdecia, the amount Cid retained was approximately
$34,000. Pet. App. 53–55a. The government did not dispute that figure. Even
counting every dollar that ever passed through Cid’s hands—regardless of beneficial
ownership—the maximum was approximately $743,000 ($201,700 plus $541,181),
plus the Rolex.
C. The Plea Agreement and Its Waivers
Cid pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Pet. App. 44a. Her plea
agreement identified specific directly forfeitable property and additionally provided
for “a forfeiture money judgment in a sum to be determined, which represents the
value of the property subject to forfeiture.” Pet. App. 9–18a. No amount, formula, or
ceiling was disclosed. Cid did not contest forfeiture of the specifically itemized
property she agreed to surrender by name—the $541,181 in currency and the Rolex
watch—even though that property belonged to Verdecia; that itemized stipulation is
independent of the statutory question presented here. Pet. App. 15–17a. She
challenged only the open-ended money judgment the district court later fixed at
$6,554,250, roughly $5.8 million of which rests on proceeds her co-conspirators, not
she, obtained.
6
Cid’s plea agreement contained a general sentence-appeal waiver of the right
to “appeal any sentence imposed” unless the sentence exceeded the statutory
maximum or resulted from an upward departure or variance. Pet. App. 16–17a. The
agreement separately contained a forfeiture-specific waiver of “any appeal of the
forfeiture” and of “all constitutional, legal, and equitable defenses to the forfeiture.”
Pet. App. 15a.
At the change of plea colloquy, the district court confirmed Cid’s awareness of
the forfeiture allegation and the waivers, but did not disclose any anticipated
forfeiture amount, did not describe the joint-acquisition theory the government would
later advance, and did not advise Cid of the construction this Court placed on
identical statutory language in Honeycutt. Pet. App. 33a, 36–39a.
D. The Forfeiture Order
At sentencing, the government requested forfeiture of $6,554,250—
approximately 45 percent of the $14,565,000 in total conspiracy proceeds distributed
across all three principal co-conspirators. Pet. App. 61a. The government’s stated
basis was the proffer’s reference to Cid, Verdecia, and Rodriguez “jointly” receiving
40 to 50 percent of conspiracy proceeds. Pet. App. 62a.
Cid objected that Honeycutt foreclosed joint forfeiture liability and that her
individually acquired proceeds were a small fraction of the figure sought. Pet. App.
61–67a. The district court overruled the objection and ordered forfeiture of
$6,554,250. Pet. App. 67a. The preliminary order described the judgment as “proceeds
received by [Cid],” but acknowledged in a footnote that the figure represented
7
“approximately forty-five percent of the total proceeds the Defendant jointly obtained
with her co-conspirators.” Pet. App. 4a & n.1. The order identifies no independent
acquisition by Cid approaching that sum, and the record contains none.
E. The Eleventh Circuit’s Per Curiam Dismissal
Cid timely appealed, arguing that the forfeiture order was unlawful under §
982(a)(2)(A) and Honeycutt, and that the waivers could not bar review of a forfeiture
imposed in excess of statutory authority.
On December 18, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal in a oneparagraph per curiam order, relying on Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350–51, and GrinardHenry, 399 F.3d at 1296. Pet. App. 1a. The panel did not explicitly address whether
the forfeiture exceeded statutory authority, whether Honeycutt governs §
982(a)(2)(A), or whether any exception to waiver applied. The disposition was purely
procedural. The court denied rehearing on March 18, 2026. Pet. App. 8a.
8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This case is an ideal candidate for an order granting the petition, vacating the
judgment below, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Hunter v. United
States, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026). The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Cid’s
appeal under a categorical appeal-waiver rule—the rule of Bushert and GrinardHenry—that this Court abrogated in Hunter. Because the legal premise of the
dismissal no longer stands, and because there is a reasonable probability that
Hunter’s newly announced standard would change the disposition, a GVR is the
natural course. In the alternative, the Court should grant plenary review.
I.
The decision below rests on a categorical appeal-waiver rule
that Hunter abrogated, and a GVR is the appropriate disposition
A.
The panel applied the precise categorical rule Hunter rejected
The Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal rested on a rule that admits of no exception
for a miscarriage of justice. Under Bushert and Grinard-Henry, a knowing and
voluntary appeal waiver bars all challenges to the resulting sentence—reaching not
only frivolous claims but “difficult or debatable legal issues or even blatant error.”
Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d at 1296; see Pet. App. 1a. As the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged just before the decision below, that court had “never adopted a general
‘miscarriage of justice’ exception” to appeal waivers. King v. United States, 41 F.4th
1363, 1368 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022). Hunter cited King as one of the “few others” that, like
the Fifth Circuit, had adopted that categorical, no-exception approach—the position
the Court now rejects in favor of the majority miscarriage-of-justice rule. See Hunter,
146 S. Ct. at 1709–10 & n.2 (citing King, 41 F.4th at 1368 n.3).
9
King reflects the same categorical, no-exception rule the panel applied here
through Bushert and Grinard-Henry. The rule the panel enforced is therefore the
same approach Hunter forecloses. The panel enforced the waiver and dismissed
without inquiring whether the forfeiture caused a miscarriage of justice.
Hunter held the opposite. This Court ruled that “an agreement not to appeal a
sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning,
when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial
system into disrepute.” Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1708. The Court “approve[d] the majority
view among the courts of appeals” and rejected the contrary categorical approach of
the Fifth Circuit “and a few others.” Id. at 1710, 1713. The Eleventh Circuit’s rule
was on the rejected side of that divide. Whatever the precise contours of the
miscarriage-of-justice standard, the categorical no-exception rule the panel applied is
no longer good law.
B.
There is a reasonable probability that Hunter affects the
disposition
A GVR is warranted where an intervening decision of this Court reveals a
“reasonable probability” that the court below would reach a different result on
reconsideration. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167–74 (1996) (per curiam). That
standard is comfortably satisfied. The panel decided this case under a rule that no
longer exists; it never asked the question Hunter now makes dispositive—whether
enforcing Cid’s waiver would leave in place an egregious error that brings the judicial
system into disrepute—and Hunter itself identifies, as the first category of such error,
“a sentence exceeding what the relevant statute allows.” Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1713.
10
The district court’s own order supplies a non-speculative basis to believe this
forfeiture falls within that category—and does so not because the amount is large,
but because the order rests on a theory of liability the statute does not permit.
The defect is one of authority, not amount. The district court did not
miscalculate what Cid obtained. Rather, the court’s order measured Cid’s forfeiture
as “approximately forty-five percent of the total proceeds the Defendant jointly
obtained with her co-conspirators.” Pet. App. 4a & n.1. That is the imposition of jointand-several liability by holding Cid answerable for proceeds her co-conspirators
obtained. And joint-and-several liability is the precise theory Honeycutt holds the
word “obtained” forecloses. The question is therefore not whether the district court
erred in calculating an authorized forfeiture, but whether it had authority to impose
this kind of forfeiture at all. It did not.
1.
The forfeiture rests on a joint-and-several liability theory §
982(a)(2)(A) does not authorize
Section 982(a)(2)(A) authorizes forfeiture only of “proceeds the person
obtained.” In Honeycutt, this Court construed the identical word in § 853(a): forfeiture
“is limited to property the defendant himself actually acquired,” and held that the
statute “does not authorize the Government to seize property [the defendant] jointly
obtained with other conspirators if [the defendant] himself did not actually acquire
it.” 581 U.S. at 449, 454. Because the operative language of the two statutes is
identical, Honeycutt’s construction governs § 982(a)(2)(A). The district court made no
finding that Cid individually acquired $6,554,250; it found that she “jointly obtained”
it. Pet. App. 4a & n.1. That is not a hard exercise of discretion within an authorized
11
range; it is the entry of a forfeiture the statute forecloses—“a sentence exceeding what
the relevant statute allows,” Hunter’s first and least contestable category of
miscarriage—the category even the courts on the rejected side of the split honored
before Hunter. See United States v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 810 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021)
(declining to enforce an appeal waiver where the sentence exceeded statutory
authorization—“the legal truism that a court must not impose a sentence” that is
“unauthorized by law”); Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1713 (relying on Kim to define this
category). Three members of this Court have already read this category to reach
forfeitures and other monetary remedies directly: category one, Justice Gorsuch
explained, “should likewise include . . . ones that order remedies the law does not
permit.” See Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1720 (Gorsuch, J., concurring, joined by Sotomayor
and Jackson, JJ.) (citing United States v. Yung, 37 F.4th 70, 82 (3d Cir. 2022)
(restitution)).
The disparity between the judgment and anything Cid obtained confirms the
point. No individual-acquisition theory yields $6,554,250—roughly 8.8 times the most
that ever passed through Cid’s hands ($743,000) and orders of magnitude beyond the
approximately $34,000 she retained. The figure is untethered from what Cid obtained
because the court’s order never measured her acquisitions at all, only the conspiracy’s
gross proceeds.
2.
Any futility objections that the government may raise are for the
court of appeals; regardless, they fail
The government may respond that a remand would be futile—because the plea
agreement contained an express forfeiture waiver, because Libretti v. United States,
12
516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995), treats forfeiture as part of the sentence, and because Eleventh
Circuit decisions have permitted some joint forfeiture. None of those grounds was
passed on below. The panel dismissed solely on the appeal-waiver provision; the panel
did not reach the forfeiture-specific waiver, Libretti, the scope of Honeycutt, the
Circuit’s joint-forfeiture precedents, or any exception to waiver. This Court is “a court
of review, not of first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005), and
Hunter itself remanded rather than decide whether enforcing the waiver there
worked a miscarriage of justice. Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1710. The futility arguments
are matters for the court of appeals to address on remand, not reasons for this Court
to deny certiorari.
Notwithstanding, any futility objections fail on their own terms—and
disposing of them requires no extension of Hunter. Forfeiture is part of the sentence.
Libretti, 516 U.S. at 49. Hunter, in turn, governs the enforceability of an agreement
“not to appeal a sentence,” and a forfeiture exceeding § 982(a)(2)(A) is “a sentence
exceeding what the relevant statute allows.” Applying Hunter here therefore asks the
Eleventh Circuit to apply the decision within its existing domain, not to extend it to
a new one. Bushert—the very decision the panel invoked—already supplies the
governing rule: a court “may not impose a penalty for a crime beyond that which is
authorized by statute,” and a defendant does not waive review of such a sentence. 997
F.2d at 1350 n.18. An appeal waiver—whether the general sentence-appeal waiver or
the forfeiture-specific one—thus does not reach a forfeiture the statute does not
authorize.
13
Hunter’s exception does not turn on the defendant’s interest in the right
waived, or on how freely that right may be bargained away; it turns on the judiciary’s
own stake. Courts are “too enmeshed in [a plea agreement’s] approval and
implementation to escape responsibility” for leaving an unlawful sentence in place.
Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1713. However freely Cid could agree to forfeit her property, no
agreement relieves the court of responsibility for entering a forfeiture Congress did
not authorize. The operative ground is thus not Libretti but Hunter itself—its first
category of statutory excess and its rationale of institutional responsibility—and
neither depends on whether the waiver is general or forfeiture-specific.
Nor does the forfeiture-specific waiver’s broader language change the
analysis—and the panel below never invoked it to do so. The plea agreement waives
not only “any appeal of the forfeiture” but “all constitutional, legal, and equitable
defenses to the forfeiture,” language more sweeping than the general sentence-appeal
waiver. Pet. App. 15a. But the panel’s dismissal relied exclusively on Bushert and
Grinard-Henry—both general-waiver decisions. Pet. App. 1a. The court never cited
or discussed the forfeiture waiver, never distinguished it from the general waiver,
and never analyzed whether its language barred this claim. Any argument that the
forfeiture waiver forecloses relief is a ground the panel did not reach; like the futility
arguments addressed above, it is a matter for the Eleventh Circuit to take up on
remand, not a reason for this Court to deny. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 718 n.7.
Regardless, the argument fails on its own terms. Hunter’s exception rests on
the judiciary’s own institutional stake in not enforcing a sentence the law forecloses,
14
not on the breadth of the words the parties chose. See Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1714. No
drafting choice by the parties can enlarge a court’s authority to impose a forfeiture
Congress did not authorize, any more than a broadly worded waiver could authorize
a judge to impose a term of life imprisonment for a misdemeanor. See id. at 1713.
Nor do the Eleventh Circuit’s joint-forfeiture decisions foreclose relief. The
government relied below on United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir.
2021), United States v. Young, 108 F.4th 1307 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v.
Cingari, 952 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2020). Each involved proceeds the defendant jointly
controlled. See Goldstein, 989 F.3d at 1203 (proceeds deposited into accounts both
defendants “controlled”); Cingari, 952 F.3d at 1306 (married couple jointly operating
a single fraudulent business, with proceeds in a shared family account).
Here the $6,554,250 was not measured by anything Cid controlled; it was
approximately 45 percent of the gross conspiracy proceeds disbursed to shell
companies in which Cid had no interest—joint-and-several liability in its purest form.
At a minimum, whether those decisions survive Hunter and reach this forfeiture is
for the Eleventh Circuit to decide in the first instance under the standard this Court
has just announced.
Nor does Hunter’s “high bar” counsel denial. The exception excludes ordinary
disputes over the calculation of an authorized sentence, Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1713,
but this is not such a dispute. Cid does not quarrel with how an authorized forfeiture
was computed; she contends the court entered a forfeiture it had no authority to
impose. Courts applying the unwaivability principle draw the same line,
15
distinguishing a challenge to the methodology of calculating an authorized award
from a challenge that the court entered an award it had no statutory authority to
impose at all. See United States v. West, 137 F.4th 395, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2025).
C. The relief sought is modest
Cid does not contend that Hunter makes reversal inevitable. Hunter itself did
not resolve whether the condition at issue there was a miscarriage of justice. The
Court remanded for that determination. Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1710. Cid asks only
that the judgment below—entered under a categorical rule that no longer exists, and
without any consideration of the merits, the scope of the waivers, or any exception—
be vacated so that the Eleventh Circuit may apply the standard Hunter announced
to a record that is already fully developed. That is the paradigm posture for a GVR.
The Court has already treated similarly postured Eleventh Circuit cases this way:
within days of Hunter, it GVR’d two Eleventh Circuit appeal-waiver dismissals for
reconsideration in light of that decision. See Ton Ton Aquino v. United States, No. 2579 (U.S. June 29, 2026); Myrick v. United States, No. 25-6860 (U.S. June 29, 2026);
see also Jones v. United States, No. 25-524, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 30, 2026)
(statement of Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (declining to GVR
where the waiver at issue barred a conviction-validity challenge outside “the
sentencing context,” rather than, as here, a challenge to the sentence—of which
forfeiture is part—itself).
16
II.
The question is recurring and important, which reinforces a GVR
and supports plenary review in the alternative.
Every court of appeals agrees that a general appeal waiver does not bar a
defendant from challenging punishment imposed in excess of a court’s statutory
authority; the disagreement before Hunter was over the framework for that principle.
Hunter resolved that general dispute by adopting the majority’s miscarriage-ofjustice standard. What Hunter did not decide—and what no court of appeals has yet
decided—is whether that standard reaches a criminal forfeiture entered in excess of
§ 982(a)(2)(A) under Honeycutt. That forfeiture-specific question is open and recurs
in every multi-defendant fraud and trafficking conspiracy in which the government
seeks a joint money judgment.
The structural principle on which the answer turns is uniform across the
circuits that have addressed analogous monetary orders. See, e.g., Yung, 37 F.4th at
78 (waiver of restitution appeal unenforceable because “[a] defendant cannot waive
his right to appeal a sentence unauthorized by Congress”); United States v. Andis,
333 F.3d 886, 891–92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (miscarriage exception reaches
monetary sentences “imposed in violation of law”); United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d
1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same). Members of this Court have read
Hunter’s first category to reach monetary remedies the law does not permit. See
Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1720 (Gorsuch, J., concurring, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson,
JJ.). There is no principled basis to distinguish forfeiture under § 982(a)(2)(A), limited
to “proceeds the person obtained,” from restitution and other monetary punishments
cabined by congressional limits.
17
This case is a clean vehicle to resolve that question, whether now or after a
remand. The issue was preserved at every stage—objected to at sentencing, briefed
on appeal, and pressed on rehearing. The panel reached no merits question; its
dismissal was confined to the appeal-waiver ground. There is no mootness or finality
problem, and the statutory excess appears on the face of the district court’s own order
rather than resting on a contestable inference. The Eleventh Circuit will soon be
reconsidering its categorical appeal-waiver rule in other cases on remand from this
Court. See Aquino v. United States, No. 25-79 (U.S. June 29, 2026); Myrick v. United
States, No. 25-6860 (U.S. June 29, 2026). This case gives that court the opportunity
to address the forfeiture-specific question in the same posture.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted, the judgment below
vacated, and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of Hunter v. United
States. In the alternative, the petition should be granted and the case set for plenary
briefing and argument.
Respectfully submitted,
HECTOR A. DOPICO
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
By:
/s/ Michael Caruso
Michael Caruso
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Counsel of Record
150 West Flagler Street
Suite 1700
Miami, FL 33130
(305) 533-4200
18
michael_caruso@fd.org
Miami, Florida
July 16, 2026
19
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.