Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lawyers For Fair Reciprocal Admission, Petitioner v. United States, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 8, 2026

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APPENDIX A

Memorandum Disposition of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

No. 25-3551 (May 26, 2026)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

MAY 26 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAWYERS FOR FAIR RECIPROCAL ADMISSION,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER, Chief Justice of the

Arizona Supreme Court; JOHN R. LOPEZ IV, Justice,

Arizona Supreme Court; ROBERT BRUTINEL,

Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; CLINT BOLICK;

JAMES P. BEENE, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court;

WILLIAM G. MONTGOMERY, Justice, Arizona

Supreme Court; KATHERYN KING, Justice, Arizona

Supreme Court, Defendants – Appellees.

No. 25-3551

D.C. No. 2:24-cv-02175-GPC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Gonzalo P. Curiel, Senior District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Submitted May 21, 2026**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GOULD, BERZON, and HURWITZ, Circuit

Judges.

Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission (“LFRA”)

appeals the district court’s dismissal of its complaint

against members of the Arizona Supreme Court and

the district court’s pre-filing order applicable to LFRA’s

attorney, Joseph Giannini. We affirm.

1. LFRA’s complaint challenged Arizona Supreme

Court Rule 34(e), which permits attorneys licensed in

other states to be admitted in Arizona without taking

the Arizona Bar examination if their state of licensure

extends similar privileges to lawyers admitted in Arizona. LFRA argues that Rule 34 violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First

Amendment, and the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1738.1 These arguments are squarely fore**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

LFRA’s briefing does not challenge the dismissal of its procedural due process claims, its First Amendment right to petition or

association claims, or its claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. Nor does it meaningfully develop its argument that the Rule is a prior restraint.

These claims are therefore forfeited. Jones v. Allison, 9 F.4th

1136, 1139 n.6 (9th Cir. 2021); Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971,

977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for

an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim,

particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented

closed by our prior opinions involving challenges to bar

admission rules brought by the same attorney now representing LFRA. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement

of Multijurisdictional Prac. (“NAAMJP”) v. Berch, 773

F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2014), LFRA v. United States, 141

F.4th 1056, 1067-72 (9th Cir. 2025) (“LFRA I”), cert.

denied, 146 S. Ct. 890 (2025).

2. A three-judge panel is bound by Circuit precedent unless “an intervening Supreme Court decision

undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit,

and both cases are closely on point.” United States

v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned

up). Recognizing as much, LFRA argues that several

recent Supreme Court cases—National Institute of

Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755

(2018), Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President

and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023),

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), Fulton v.

City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021), and Chiles

v. Salazar, 146 S. Ct. 1010 (2026)—abrogate the

holdings in Berch and LFRA I. But none of these cases

deals with reciprocal admission rules, and Rule 34

plainly does not—as was the case with the schemes

challenged in those cases—discriminate on the basis

of race, the content of speech, or a particular viewpoint.

Nor does Rule 34 retaliate against LFRA’s members

“after the fact for having engaged in protected speech.”

Hou. Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 474

for review.”).

(2022).2

3. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a pre-filing order on attorney Giannini. Molski v.

Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir.

2007) (stating standard of review). District courts may

issue pre-filing orders against attorneys in response

to frivolous filings. Id. at 1063. A frivolous filing is

“baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.,

929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).

LFRA’s complaint fits this description. Its arguments were squarely foreclosed by Berch and LFRA

I, and no reasonable reading of subsequent Supreme

Court decisions undermines those precedents. Moreover, Giannini has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged lawyer admission schemes on similar theories

for decades. See, e.g., Giannini v. Real, 711 F. Supp.

992, 995 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Russell v. Hug, 275 F.3d

812, 815, 819-23 (9th Cir. 2002); NAAMJP v. Castille,

799 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2015); NAAMJP v. Roberts,

180 F. Supp. 3d 46, 52 (D.D.C. 2015); LFRA v. United

States, No. 22-2399, 2023 WL 145530, at *1 (D.N.J.

Jan. 10, 2023), appeal filed, No. 23-1154 (3d Cir.

LFRA also argues that the district court erred in denying leave

to amend so that it could add member declarations to its pleadings. But these declarations only attest to the members’ qualifications and how they are allegedly disadvantaged by Rule 34.

The district court correctly concluded that amendment to add

these declarations would be futile because they did not “cure

the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s legal theories.”

Jan. 26, 2023). The district court thus reasonably concluded that no lawyer, “after conducting an objectively

reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, would have

found the complaint to be well-founded.” Holgate v.

Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2005).

“[T]he sanction imposed must be tailored to curtail the attorney’s particular misconduct.” Molski, 500

F.3d at 1063. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a pre-filing order would curtail Giannini’s behavior. See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1062

(affirming imposition of a pre-filing order on a law firm

for vexatious litigation); see also Paciulan v. George, 38

F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1145-47 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (imposing pre-filing order against Giannini), aff’d on other

grounds, 229 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2000); NAAMJP v.

Gonzales, 211 F. App’x 91, 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming pre-filing order against Giannini). The prefiling order here only applies to complaints “regarding

admission to and the regulation of practice of law” in

Arizona and does not prevent Giannini from pursuing

nonfrivolous claims after an initial screening review by

a district judge. See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061.3

AFFIRMED.4

LFRA argues in passing that the pre-filing order violates the

Noerr-Pennington doctrine. LFRA forfeited this argument by

failing to raise it to the district court. Int’l Union of Bricklayers

v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985).

In any event, the doctrine only protects parties who petition

the government for redress from statutory liability. Sosa v.

DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006).

LFRA’s motion for judicial notice, Dkt. 54, is DENIED.

APPENDIX B

Orders of the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LAWYERS FOR FAIR RECIPROCAL ADMISSION,

Plaintiff,

ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER, Chief Justice of the

Arizona Supreme Court, and Justices JOHN R.

LOPEZ IV, ROBERT M. BRUTINEL, CLINT

BOLICK, JAMES P. BEENE, WILLIAM G.

MONTGOMERY, and KATHRYN H. KING,

Defendants.

Case No.: 24-cv-02175-PHX-GPC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF No. 13]

Plaintiff brings a constitutional challenge to the

Arizona Bar’s reciprocal admission rule, which admits

experienced lawyers from states with which Arizona

shares reciprocity to the Arizona Bar without requiring them to take another bar examination. Before

the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). ECF No. 13. Plaintiff Lawyer for Fair Reciprocal Admission (“LFRA”) filed an opposition and

Defendants replied. ECF Nos. 30, 31. The Court finds

that the matter is appropriate for decision without

oral argument pursuant to Local Civ. R. 7.2(f). For

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the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff, LFRA, filed the

instant action against the Justices of the Arizona

Supreme Court and the District Judges of the United

States District Court for the District of Arizona (“Defendants”).1 ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).

Plaintiff, LFRA, is a California corporation engaged in advocacy on behalf of lawyers. Compl. ¶

2-3. Plaintiff asserts that their members “have been

deprived of their citizenship rights” by the challenged

Arizona state and federal attorney licensing paradigms.

Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff states that their affected members

include “lawyers of color, women, patent lawyers,

military veterans and military spouses, registered

in-house counsel, indigent pro bono service lawyers,

federal practice specialists, and members of the bar

in good standing.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that many

of its “members and associates do not want to take

a second, third, and fourth entry-level competence

[examination] as already licensed lawyers in good

standing[.]” Id.

The complaint challenges the validity of Arizona’s

reciprocal rules of admission to the practice of law under the Constitution and federal law. See generally

Compl. Arizona Supreme Court Rule 34 states that

an attorney may be admitted to the practice of law in

the Arizona by: (1) admission by Arizona uniform bar

On October 25, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed the District Judges

from the action without prejudice. ECF No. 19.

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examination; (2) admission on motion; or (3) admission

by transfer of uniform bar examination score from another jurisdiction. Arizona R. Sup. Ct. 34(a). An applicant may apply for admission to the State of Arizona

Bar on motion without taking the Arizona bar examination if they have been admitted to practice law in

another jurisdiction that accepts the uniform bar examination (“UBE”) and practiced law for three of the

last five years in that state.2 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 34(f).

Arizona Supreme Court Rules 38 and 39 provides

a list of limited exceptions for the state bar admission

rules. Limited exceptions to the admission rules apply

to in-house counsel, full time law professors, and approved legal service organizations and pro bono counsel, and military spouses, among others. Ariz. R. Sup.

Ct. 38(a)(c)(d) and 39(d). These exceptions involve

limited or temporary admissions to practice law in Arizona without requiring attorneys to pass the UBE. Id.

In addition to these exceptions, an attorney who is not

a member of the State Bar of Arizona but is currently

a member in good standing of the bar of another state

and eligible to practice before the highest court in any

state may appear as counsel pro hac vice in any case

before any state or local court in the state of Arizona.

Arizona R. Sup. Ct. 39(a).

Plaintiff alleges that this attorney licensing scheme

violates the constitutional rights of attorneys because

it is based on “class” status and not on “individual”

merit. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12-13 (citing Students for Fair

The Court will refer to this scheme as Arizona’s “reciprocal admission rule” throughout this Order. In simple terms, Arizona

shares reciprocity with other states that offer the UBE.

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Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181 (2023)). Plaintiff alleges that

Arizona Supreme Court Rule 34(f) waives the Arizona

entry-level bar exam for “already licensed attorneys

who have practiced law for three of the last five years

from more than forty states.” Id. ¶ 13(ii). Plaintiff

further alleges that licensed attorneys in the nine

non-UBE states are not granted the same waiver of

admission requirements because their states do not

share reciprocity with Arizona. Id. ¶ 13.

Plaintiff brings four claims in its Complaint: (1)

violation of the Equal Protection and Privileges and/or

Immunities Clauses; (2) violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1738;

(3) violation of the First Amendment; and (4) violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

rights. See generally Compl.3

On September 27, 2024, Defendants filed a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, ECF No. 13,

which has been fully briefed. ECF No. 30.

JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY

REFERENCE

Plaintiff attached the following documents to its

opposition to the motion to dismiss: (1) several of

Plaintiff’s member’s declarations (ECF Nos. 30-1–

30-5; ECF No. 33 at 4-12) and (2) the declarants’

Certificates of Good Standing in their respective states

of bar admission (ECF Nos. 31-6; ECF No. 33 at 3).

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 28, 2024,

with additional claims. ECF No. 23. However, the Court

denied Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend its complaint on

January 31, 2025, pending this motion to dismiss. ECF No. 29.

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See generally ECF No. 30. Generally, when ruling on

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may only consider the

complaint, its attachments, documents incorporated

by reference in the complaint, and documents subject

to judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d

903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts may take judicial

notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable

dispute” when they (1) are “generally known within

the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction,” or (2) “can

be accurately and readily determined from sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). While Plaintiff does not explicitly

request that the court take judicial notice of these

documents attached to their opposition, the Court

may still take judicial notice of documents sua sponte.

See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1); see also Notes of Advisory

Committee on Proposed Rules Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1)

(“Under subdivision (c) the judge has a discretionary

authority to take judicial notice, regardless of whether

he is so requested by a party.”). The Court will therefore decide whether to consider Plaintiff’s exhibits in

deciding the motion to dismiss.

I. Declarations

The Court will first consider whether Plaintiff’s

proffered declarations are incorporation by reference

in the Complaint. ECF Nos. 30-1–30-5; ECF No.

33 at 4-12. Defendants argue that the Court should

not consider the declarations. ECF No. 31 at 2. In

deciding a motion to dismiss, the court can consider

only the pleadings, documents that are incorporated by

reference, and documents that are properly the subject

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of judicial notice.

Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 907-08. “If

the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the

document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim,” they

are incorporated by reference to the complaint. Id.

at 907. Courts in the Ninth Circuit regularly decline

to consider declarations and exhibits submitted in

opposition to a motion to dismiss if they constitute evidence not incorporated by reference in the complaint.

See United States v. Hawthorne Machinery Co., 2024

WL 4294878, at *3 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 2024); see also City

of Royal Oak Ret. Sys. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 880

F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

The declarations in Exhibits 30-1–30-5 discuss

LFRA members’ experiences and qualifications. ECF

No. 30-1–30-5. Plaintiff does not allege such facts in

its complaint. See generally Compl. The possibility

that the declarations might be relevant in assessing

the ultimate validity of LFRA’s claims does not mean

that the court can consider it in deciding a motion

to dismiss. Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Ent., 112 F.

Supp. 1011, 1022 (C.D. Cal. 2015). Because the

LFRA members’ experiences and qualifications were

not mentioned in the complaint, they cannot be found

to be incorporated by reference. See City of Royal Oak

Retirement, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.

Accordingly, the Court declines to consider the declarations in deciding the motion to dismiss.

II. Certificates of Good Standing

The Court also considers incorporation by reference

of the Certificates of Good Standing. See ECF No. 306; ECF No. 33 at 3.

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Plaintiff references the good standing of their members in the Complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 21. Plaintiff also

references throughout the complaint that it intends

on submitting Certificates of Good Standing. Compl.

¶¶ 51, 56. When documents have been referenced

extensively throughout the complaint, they are treated

as part of the document itself.

Khoja v. Orexigen

Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018).

Plaintiff sufficiently referenced the good standing of

their members in the Complaint, and therefore the

Certificates of Good Standing are incorporated by

reference. The Court also notes that the good standing

of the members of LFRA is publicly available on state

bar websites. See White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885

(9th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of membership

information reported on the California State Bar website); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 648,

650 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (taking judicial notice of an

attorney’s disbarment pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201).

Therefore, the Court will consider the Certificates

of Good Standing in deciding the motion to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6)

permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Rule 12(b)(6) requires the Court to dismiss claims

that fail to establish a cognizable legal theory or do

not allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal

theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr.,

521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

And under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a

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short and plain statement of the claim which entitles

the pleader to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for

a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonconclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences

from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a

claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S.

Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted); Doe v. United States, 419 F3d 1058,

1062 (9th Cir. 2005).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a

complaint does not need detailed factual allegations

but must provide allegations that raise a right to relief

above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

While the plausibility standard is not a probability

test, it does require more than a mere possibility

the defendant acted unlawfully. Id. at 556. “When

evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must

accept all material allegations in the complaint as

true and construe them in the light most favorable to

the moving party.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space

Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013).

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DISCUSSION4 5

Defendants assert that Plaintiff abandoned various claims because it failed to respond to a number of arguments in Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF No. 31 at 2; see generally

ECF Nos. 13 & 30. A plaintiff who makes a claim for relief

in their complaint but fails to raise the issue in response to a

defendant’s motion to dismiss abandons their claim. Manning

v. United States DOD, 791 F. App’x. 675, 676 (9th Cir. 2020)

(citing Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033,

1037 (9th Cir. 2006)). However, the Court finds that Plaintiff

provided sufficient argument in their opposition to the motion

to dismiss to maintain all claims for further review. See, e.g.,

ECF No. 30 at 21-22.

On March 18, 2025, one day after the Court vacated the hearing

on the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to

file supplemental authorities and a request for judicial notice.

ECF No. 39. Defendant opposes both. ECF No. 40. The supplemental authority Plaintiff brings to the Court’s attention

is Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch.

Dist., 82 F.4th 664 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). ECF No. 39 at

3-6. This case was decided in 2023, long before the briefing

on the instant motion to dismiss began. And the time to brief

the issues in this motion to dismiss has now passed. Because

Plaintiff does not explain why it could not have brought the case

to the Court’s attention in its original opposition, the Court

DENIES the motion for leave to file supplemental authorities.

See Taylor v. Borders, 2021 WL 9721279, at *1 (C.D. Cal.

Nov. 4, 2021) (denying motion for supplemental where plaintiff

failed to include citations to a certain case in previously filed

opposition brief and failed to explain why they were unable to

include the citations in the original opposition brief); see also

id. (noting that while the court has the inherent authority

to permit supplemental briefs upon a showing of good cause,

no such showing was made). Plaintiff also requests that the

Court take judicial notice of an op-ed regarding a different case

Plaintiff has brought against the United States concerning admission to federal district courts. See ECF No. 39 at 1-3; ECF

No. 39-1. “Courts may take judicial notice of publications in-

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I. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(5)

Defendants initially argued that dismissal was

required based on insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5). ECF No. 13 at 3-4. However,

Defendants subsequently filed a notice of waiver of

defects in service of process, in which they stated their

intent to waive this argument. ECF No. 18. Because

Defendants have explicitly waived their Rule 12(b)(5)

argument, the Court DENIES their motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5). See Alamzad v. Lufthansa

Consulting GMBH, 2005 WL 1869400, at *1 n.1 (N.D.

Cal. Aug. 4, 2005) (“a waiver of service normally

waives any challenge to the timeliness or sufficiency

of service); see also United States v. 79.36 Acres of

Land, 951 F.2d 364, at *2 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding

that defendant waived any claim of improper service

troduced to ‘indicate what was in the public realm at the time,

not whether the contents of those articles were in fact true.’”

Van Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592

F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Premier Growth Fund v.

Alliance Cap. Mgmt., 435 F.3d 396, 401 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006);

Heliotrope Gen. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981

n. 118 (9th Cir. 1999)). But Plaintiff’s request discusses the

substance of the article heavily, indicating that it would like

to introduce the article not just to acknowledge its existence,

but to bring its contents into consideration. This is improper,

especially considering the lack of relevance the existence of the

article holds here. See Gerritsen, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 1029-30

(“Gerritsen clearly seeks to have the court take judicial notice

of the truth of the facts states in the various press releases and

news articles. This the court cannot do. Because it is irrelevant

… that the information in the press releases and news articles

was publicly available, the court declines to take judicial notice…”). The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s request for

judicial notice.

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because it failed to object to the sufficiency of process)

(unpublished disposition); Campbell v. FernandoSholes, 2006 WL 2917353, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10,

2006) (“Oasis waived any objection to sufficiency of

service of process”).

II. Count One: Equal Protection and Privileges

and/or Immunities Clauses

Plaintiff’s Count One alleges that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities

Clauses. Compl. ¶¶ 38-45. Plaintiff’s Count One further alleges that the rule violates the Article IV, § 2

Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id.

The Court

will consider each of these challenges separately.

a. Equal Protection Clause

Defendants argue that the complaint fails to state

a claim that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection

Clause. ECF No. 13 at 4-5. “The Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that

no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler

v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). When a law or

rule makes a classification on suspect grounds, race,

ancestry, or alienage, or impinges upon a fundamental

right, it must satisfy a heightened level of scrutiny.

Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir.

2004). If a law or rule is not subject to heightened

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scrutiny, courts otherwise apply the lowest level of

scrutiny: the so-called “rational basis” review. FCC v.

Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).

i. Level of Scrutiny

The Court must first determine what level of scrutiny

to apply.

Defendants contends that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in NAAMP v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th

Cir. 2014), is directly applicable and defeats Plaintiff’s

claim. The Court agrees. In Berch, the court considered plaintiff’s6 argument that the Arizona Bar’s reciprocal admission rule violates, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The court first held that, because

the rule “does not disadvantage a suspect class or infringe on a fundamental right,” it is subject to rational

basis review. Id. The court reasoned that the rule

serves two legitimate state interests: regulating the

state bar and ensuring Arizona attorneys are treated

equally in other states. Id.

And the rule “serves

these purposes without being unduly restrictive,” as

there are alternative paths to bar membership, namely

passing the UBE. Id. Therefore, the court found that

the reciprocal admission rule did not violate the Equal

Protection Clause. Id.

The identical reciprocal admission rule here is also

subject to rational basis review. It does not make

classifications based upon race, ancestry, alienage,

The plaintiff in Berch was represented by Joseph Giannini,

who represents LFRA here. Berch, 773 F.3d at 1042. In fact,

Mr. Giannini has brought these types of challenges to bar admission requirements across the country for several decades.

See id. at 1043 (collecting cases).

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or any other suspect class. Nor does it burden any

fundamental rights. This Court joins a long list of

courts in subjecting these types of state bar and court

admission rules to rational basis review. See id.;

NAAMP v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216, 219-20 (3d Cir.

2015) (finding Pennsylvania’s reciprocity rule subject

to rational basis review because it “does not classify

attorneys based on residency, but rather, their state

of bar admission, and it does not erect a barrier to

migration”) (quoting Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d

1262, 1268 (3d Cir. 1992) (collecting cases)); NAAMP

v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding

district court’s reciprocity rule subject to rational basis

review because it does not infringe upon a fundamental right or make distinctions based on suspect

classes); see also Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354,

358 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[o]verwhelming legal authority

supports this view that review of state procedures for

bar admissions and testing is guided by the rational

basis standard”).

Plaintiff relies on language from the Supreme

Court’s recent decision Students for Fair Admissions,

Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600

U.S. 181 (2023), presumably to argue that Arizona’s

reciprocal admission rule should be subject to strict

scrutiny. See ECF No. 30 at 10-11. There, the Court

considered a challenge to Harvard College and the University of North Carolina’s admissions systems, which

both took race into account with the goal of bringing

the benefits of diversity to their campuses and the future workforce. Students for Fair Admissions, 600 U.S.

at 191, 214-15. The Court found that the admissions

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systems failed to overcome strict scrutiny because they

“lack sufficiently focused and measurable objectives

warranting the use of race, unavoidably employ race

in a negative manner, involve racial stereotyping, and

lack meaningful end points. Id. at 230.

In concluding, the Court stated that, instead, a

“student must be treated based on his or her experiences as an individual—not on the basis of race.” Id.

at 231. This is the reasoning that Plaintiff ostensibly

relies on when it argues that Arizona’s reciprocal

admission rule is subject to strict scrutiny because

it is based on “class status” and not “individual merit

and individual experience.” See ECF No. 30 at 10.

To be sure, the Supreme Court’s decision in Students

for Fair Admission endorses the idea that a student

should not be granted preference based on race alone,

but rather should be judged “by his or her own merit

and essential qualities.” 600 U.S. at 219-20; see also

id. at 231. But the “class status” at issue in Students

for Fair Admission is clearly race and ethnicity. Id.

at 214. The Court says nothing to indicate that the

same treatment would be applicable to a state professional licensing scheme that distinguishes between

experienced professionals who are licensed in different

states. Plaintiff says nothing to that end, either. Thus,

Plaintiff eludes the most important question raised

by its own challenge: why experienced lawyers from

certain states should constitute a “class” and therefore

be subject to strict scrutiny. Because Students for Fair

Admission has no relevance in this case—which does

not deal with race7 —Plaintiff’s attempt to cherry-pick

In fact, Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule does not mention

23a

its language to invoke strict scrutiny fails.

The Court will therefore apply rational basis review

to Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule.

ii. Rational Basis Review

Under rational basis review, the court must consider whether the challenged rule “rationally further[s] a legitimate state interest.” Nordlinger v.

Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). “[R]ational-basis review

in equal protection analysis ‘is not a license for courts

to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative

choices.’” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)

(quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313). Rather,

classifications subject to rational basis review are

“accorded a strong presumption of validity,” Heller,

509 U.S. at 319-20, and must be upheld “if there is

any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could

provide a rational basis for the classification,” Beach

Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313.

Here, the Ninth Circuit has already determined

that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule serves two

legitimate state interests. Berch, 773 F.3d at 1045.

First, the rule “helps Arizona regulate its bar: ‘The

Supreme Court is extremely deferential to legislative

classifications in actions challenging regulation of licensed professions.’” Id. (quoting Lupert v. Cal. State

Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985). Second,

reciprocity helps the state “ensure that its attorneys

are treated equally in other states,” as “[s]tates that

race at all. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 34(f). It applies to all out-of-state

experienced lawyers regardless of race, ancestry, alienage, gender, or any other suspect class. Id. This, it seems, is exactly

what Students for Fair Admission would call for.

24a

share reciprocity with Arizona will likely continue to

admit Arizona-barred attorneys on motion because

members of the bar in those states are eligible for

reciprocal privileges in Arizona.” Id. Further, there

are several viable alternatives to gaining admission

to the Arizona Bar based on reciprocity. Attorneys

seeking admission can pass the UBE, id., or apply for

pro hac vice admission, see Castille, 799 F.3d at 224.

Therefore, the reciprocal admission rule rationally

furthers the state’s legitimate interests “without being

unduly restrictive.” Berch, 773 F.3d at 1045.

Plaintiff argues that that Defendants’ reliance on

Berch is not persuasive because the “Supreme Court

has overturned the professional speech doctrine[.]”

ECF No. 30 at 12-16.8 In making this argument,

Plaintiff refers to the following sentence in the Berch

equal protection analysis: “The Supreme Court is

extremely deferential to legislative classifications in

actions challenging regulation of licensed professions.”

Berch, 773 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Lupert, 761 F.3d at

1328). While the Supreme Court has in fact invalidated the professional speech doctrine, that is of no

moment here. The professional speech doctrine dealt

with the level of scrutiny applied to content-based

restrictions of professional speech. Nat’l Inst. of Fam.

& Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755, 767-68 (2018).

This First Amendment doctrine would not apply in the

While Plaintiff makes this challenge in the context of its First

Amendment claims, the general attack on Berch is relevant

here. See ECF No. 30 at 12-16. And Plaintiff otherwise fails

to grapple with Defendants’ equal protection arguments. See

generally id. (absence).

25a

equal protection context. What is more, Berch and

Lupert’s equal protection analysis have nothing to say

about the professional speech doctrine. The court in

Berch does not reference Lupert to rely on any discussion about professional speech. Rather, Lupert—and

the cases cited therein—deals more generally with the

deference accorded to legislative classifications in the

context of licensed professions, such as opticians, see

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483

(1955), and physicians, Watson v. Maryland, 219 U.S.

173 (1910). See Lupert, 761 F.2d at 1328. This is the

general principle the Ninth Circuit relied on in Berch,

and which the Court relies on now. The validity of the

professional speech doctrine therefore does not impact

this equal protection analysis.

Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule violates the Equal

Protection Clause, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion to dismiss this claim.

b. Article IV, § 2 Privileges and Immunities

Clause

Plaintiff also alleges that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution.

Compl. §§ 38-45. “Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, ‘[t]he Citizens of each State [are]

entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens

in the several States.’” McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S.

221, 226 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S.

Const., art. IV., § 2, cl. 1). Courts employ a two-step

inquiry in assessing challenges under the Privileges

26a

and Immunities Clause. Marilley v. Bonham, 844

F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citing Sup.

Ct. of Va. V. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988)). First,

the plaintiff “must show that the challenged law treats

nonresidents differently from residents and impinges

upon a ‘fundamental’ privilege or immunity protected

by the Clause.’” Id. If the plaintiff makes this showing, “the burden shifts to the state to show that the

challenged law is ‘closely related to the advancement

of a substantial state interest.’” Id.

It is true that “[i]n Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, the Supreme Court held that the practice of law is a fundamental right under the Privileges

and

Immunities Clause because it is ‘important to the

national economy’ and because it ‘has a noncommercial

role and duty.’” Berch, 773 F.3d at 1045-46 (quoting

Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985)).

Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s claim fails at the first step because it cannot show that the rule treats nonresidents

differently from residents and impinges upon any protected privilege or immunity.

Defendants contend that Arizona’s attorney admission scheme “does not favor Arizona’s in-state citizens

over out of-state citizens.” ECF No. 13 at 6 (quoting Berch 773 F.3d at 1046) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Plaintiff responds that the rule “treats citizens from some states differently that [sic] citizens

from other states.” ECF No. 30 at 22.9 Plaintiff’s ar9

Again relying on its unfounded interpretation of Students for

Fair Admission, Plaintiff further argues that, because Arizona’s bar admission standards are allegedly based on “class

27a

gument misapplies the law. “The purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to prevent ‘a state from

discriminating against citizens of other states in favor

of its own.’” Berch, 773 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Hague v.

Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939)). As

the court reasoned in Berch, the rule here is neutral

because it “imposes the same bar admission requirements on its own citizens as it does on citizens of other

states.” Id. Thus, even if it were true that the rule

treats citizens of some states differently from citizens

of other states, it would not matter because it does

not favor Arizona citizens over citizens of other states.

Rather, the rule applies evenhandedly to all attorneys,

“irrespective of [their] residency or citizenship status.”

Id.; see also McBride v. Lawson, 2024 WL 4826378, at

*7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2024) (“[T]he complaint does

not include allegations to show California’s licensing

laws treat residents and nonresidents differently. The

Ninth Circuit has upheld equivalently neutral attorney licensing rules.”).

Plaintiff cites several Supreme Court cases dealing

with bar admission rules which imposed impermissible residency requirements on bar applicants in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See ECF

No. 30 (citing Piper, 470 U.S. at 274; Sup. Ct. of Va. v.

Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988); Barnard v. Thorstenn,

489 U.S. 546, 556 (1989)). Plaintiff seems to argue that

this line of cases warrants a similar holding here. See

status” and not “individual merit,” they are “obviously unconstitutional.” ECF No. 30 at 22. But Plaintiff does not make

clear how this argument fits into the Privileges and Immunities analysis. The Court rejects this irrelevant argument.

28a

id. The Ninth Circuit rejected a similar argument in

Berch:

The cases cited by Plaintiffs stand only for

the proposition that bar admission rules

that impose residency requirements on bar

applicants violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Piper, 470 U.S. at

275, 105 S.Ct. 1272 (resident of Vermont

challenging New Hampshire’s limit of bar

admission to New Hampshire residents);

Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S.

59, 61, 108 S.Ct. 2260, 101 L.Ed.2d 56

(1988) (resident of Illinois challenging Virginia’s limit of bar admission to Virginia

residents). The AOM Rule, on the other

hand, relies solely on state of bar admission, and applies equally to residents and

nonresidents of Arizona.

773 F.3d at 1046. The Court here similarly finds

that these cases are inapposite because they deal with

residency requirements, and not merely state of bar

admission. See Barnard, 489 U.S. at 556 (dealing with

“[t]he exclusion of nonresidents from the bar”).

Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2

of the Constitution, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion to dismiss this claim.

c. Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clauses

Plaintiff also claims that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s

29a

Privileges or Immunities Clause. Compl. ¶¶ 38-45.

Traditionally, this Clause “protected only those rights

accruing by virtue of being a citizen of the United

States.” Paciulan v. George, 229 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th

Cir. 200) (citing the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.

36 (1873); John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda,

Constitutional Law § 10.3 (5th ed. 1995)). But the

Supreme Court has also applied the clause “in a rightto-travel context to hold that travelers deciding to

become permanent residents of a new state enjoy ‘the

right to be treated like other citizens of that State.’” Id.

(quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-07 (1999)).

Defendants argue that the right to practice law is

not a fundamental right protected by the Privileges

or Immunities Clause. ECF No. 13 at 5. Defendants

are correct: “the right to practice law is not one of

those rights” accruing from United States citizenship. Berch, 773 F.3d 1046. Therefore, Plaintiff has

no claim under the Privileges or Immunities Clause

arising from the Fourteenth Amendment. See also

Castille, 799 F.3d at 220 (rejecting similar Privileges

or Immunities Clause claim for the same reasons the

court rejected appellants’ Equal Protection Clause

challenge).

To the extent Plaintiff asserts that Saenz changes

the outcome here, it is mistaken. In Saenz, California

limited the welfare benefits of those who had lived in

the state for less than one year. 526 U.S. at 493. The

Court reasoned that “the right to travel embraces the

citizen’s right to be treated equally in her new State

of residence[.]” Id. at 505. Here, much to the contrary, Arizona is treating all its citizens—both new and

30a

long-term—the same as citizens of any other state in

the country. For instance, an Arizona resident who

is admitted only to the state bar in California is subject to the same reciprocal admission rules as a New

York resident who is admitted only to the state bar in

California. See Berch, 773 F.3d at 1046-47 (“[i]n this

case, [the right to travel] is not infringed because the

AOM rule treats non-state residents the same way as it

treats residents of Arizona”); cf. Paciulan, 229 F.3d at

1229 (“[i]n requiring Appellants to meet the standard

requirements for admission to the California bar, the

State Bar is ensuring that they will be treated like all

other California citizens). Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument fails.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause.

d. Arizona Constitution’s “Special Law” Prohibition

In opposing the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff claims

that it adequately pleads a claim for a violation of the

Arizona Constitution’s “special law” rule.10 ECF No.

30 at 22-24. Plaintiff purportedly pleads this claim as

part of its Equal Protection Clause claim. Id. at 22. It

is true that “[t]he equal protection clauses of the 14th

Amendment and the state constitution have for all

practical purposes the same effect.” Valley Nat. Bank

Plaintiff included a claim under this state constitution provision in its proposed First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). See

ECF No. 25-1 at 64-66. However, the Court denied Plaintiff

leave to amend, ECF No. 29, and thus this claim is not explicitly pled in the operative complaint. See generally Compl.

31a

of Phoenix v. Glover, 159 P.2d 292, 299 (Ariz. 1945);

see Henry v. City of Somerton, 2021 WL 2514686, at

*12 (D. Ariz. June 17, 2021) (“the equal protection

analysis is the same under both constitutions”). Further, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does “not countenance dismissal

of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of

Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014). And Defendants

contend with the claim in their reply brief.11 See ECF

No. 31 at 10. Therefore, in the interests of judicial

efficiency, the Court will consider the imperfectly pled

state constitution claim here.

The Arizona Constitution provides that “[n]o local

or special laws shall be enacted … [r]egulating the

practice of courts of justice.” Ariz. Const. art. IV, Pt.

2 § 19. “Special laws favor one person or group and

disfavor others.” Gallardo v. State, 336 P.3d 717, 721

(Ariz. 2014). Plaintiff argues that the challenged rule

is a special law because it only requires experienced

lawyers from some states to pass the UBE to gain

admission to practice law in Arizona. Id. at 23-24.

As a threshold matter, article 4, part 2 of the Arizona Constitution applies to acts of the legislature, not

the state judiciary. See Hoffman v. Reagan, 429 P.3d

70, 72 (Ariz. 2018) (“[t]he legislature’s structure and

powers are outlined in article 4, part 2 of the Arizona

Constitution”); Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Sur11

Defendants also incorporate by reference their discussion on

special laws in their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

amend its complaint. ECF No. 26 at 10-11. There, Defendants

explained why Arizona’s prohibition against special laws does

not apply here. Id.

32a

prise, 800 P.2d 1251, 149 (Ariz. 1990) (in banc) (“the

legislature must enact laws that apply to all individuals who may benefit from its attempt to remedy a

particular evil”) (emphasis added). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot plausibly challenge Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule, which the state judiciary sets and implements, under article 4, part 2 of the Arizona Constitution.

Even if the special laws provision applies to Defendants, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. To determine

whether a law is a “special law,” Arizona courts decide

whether: (1) the law has “a rational relationship to a

legitimate legislative objective,” (2) the classification

the law makes is legitimate and encompasses all similarly situated people, and (3) the classification is elastic, allowing others to come within or leave the class.

Gallardo v. State, 336 P.3d 717, 721 (Ariz. 2014). As

discussed above, Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule

clearly has a rational basis. See “Discussion” Section

II.a, supra. The rule applies to all Arizona citizens

equally. See Republic Inv. Fund I, 800 P.2d at 1258

(“[t]o be general, a law need not operate on every person, place, or thing within the state; however, it must

apply uniformly to all cases and to all members within

the circumstances provided for by the law”). And the

rule is “elastic,” as it allows lawyers who gain admission to other state’s bars to come within the class, while

allowing those who have successfully gained admission

to the Arizona bar to exit the class. Thus, even assuming the prohibition against “special laws” applies here,

Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule does not constitute

a “special law.”

33a

Accordingly, Plaintiff does not state a claim under

the Arizona Constitution’s “special law” rule. The

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss this

claim.

III. Count Two: 28 U.S.C. § 1738

Plaintiff’s Count Two alleges that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule violates 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Compl.

¶¶ 46-62. “The Full Faith and Credit Clause and its

implementing statute[, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,] require that

federal courts give to a state-court judgment the same

preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was

rendered.” Heidrich v. PennyMac Fin. Servs., Inc., 792

F. App’x 540, 541 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

Defendants first argue that the Full Faith and

Credit Clause and its implementing statutes do not

give rise to an implied federal cause of action. ECF

No. 13 at 6. Indeed, the Supreme Court has squarely

stated that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in either its constitutional or statutory incarnations, does

not give rise to an implied federal cause of action.”

Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182 (1988).

Courts in this Circuit, along with other circuit courts,

are in accord with this interpretation. See Griffith

v. Paran LLP, 2021 WL 4442881, at *1 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 28, 2021) (“neither the Full Faith and Credit

Clause of the United States Constitution nor the corresponding statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, provides a private

right of action for plaintiff to obtain enforcement of a

foreign judgment”) (citing People of State of Cal. ex

34a

rel. McColgan v. Bruce, 129 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.

1942)); Williams v. Clark Cnty. Pub. Adm’r, 2010 WL

4340654, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2010) (“there is no

private right of action for enforcement of the Full Faith

and Credit Clause in federal court, either directly or

under the implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738”)

(citing Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72

(1904); Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 155556 (9th Cir. 1986)); Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia, 945 F.3d 1270, 1274-75

(10th Cir. 2019) (“the Full Faith and Credit Clause,

in either its constitutional or statutory incarnations,

does not give rise to an implied federal cause of action”)

(cleaned up).

Even if Plaintiff could bring a cause of action under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and 28 U.S.C. §

1738, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit

addressed a similar claim in Thaw v. Sessions, 712

F. App’x 604 (9th Cir. 2017). There, the appellants

challenged a District of Arizona local rule which “limits

membership in the bar of the district court to attorneys who are active members in good standing of the

Arizona bar.” Id. at 605. The court explained that

“the predicate for a full faith and credit claim is an

act, record, or judicial proceeding of some state that

establishes appellants’ entitlement to practice law in

the forum state.” Id. The Court found that no such

document had been adduced, and thus affirmed the

district court’s dismissal of the claim. Id. Similarly,

here, Plaintiff does not allege that any act, record, or

judicial proceedings in another state declares that any

of its members are entitled to practice law in Arizona.

35a

See Giannini, 911 F.2d at 360 (“Giannini’s claim lacks

merit because no act, record or judicial proceeding, in

New Jersey or Pennsylvania, states that Giannini is

entitled to practice law in California”).

Plaintiff cites several Supreme Court cases which

discuss the importance of the Full Faith and Credit

Clause, including VL v. EL, 577 U.S. 404 (2016) (per

curiam) (finding that Alabama courts must respect

the judgments of a Georgia court), and Univ. of Tenn.

v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) (finding that federal

courts must give a state “agency’s factfinding the

same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled

in the State’s courts”). ECF No. 30 at 17-18. Plaintiff

then argues that its members have been admitted

to practice law by “public acts, judicial records, and

[state supreme court] order[s],” and that therefore the

Arizona Supreme Court must recognize these “judgments.” Id. at 18-19. However, as discussed above,

Plaintiff does not allege that these acts, records, or

judicial proceedings entitle its members to practice

law in Arizona (as opposed to the members’ states of

admission). And even if they did, Plaintiff points to no

case law—and the Court is not aware of any case law—

which suggests that a state’s bar admissions are the

type of “acts, records, or judicial proceedings” which

are covered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and §

1738. See id. (absence).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

IV. Count Three: First Amendment

Plaintiff alleges a flurry of First Amendment viola-

36a

tions in its Complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 63-81. Plaintiff first

alleges that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on its constitutional right to petition. Id. ¶¶ 67-72. Plaintiff then alleges that the rule constitutes viewpoint, speaker, and

content discrimination. Id. ¶¶ 73-78.12 Plaintiff also

alleges that the rule violates its right to association.

Id. ¶¶ 79-81. The Court will consider these claims in

turn.

a. Prior Restraint; Right to Petition

Plaintiff alleges that the reciprocal admission rule

is a prior restraint on its member’s right to petition the

government for the redress of grievances. Id. ¶¶ 6772. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the rule repeals

petition rights because it assumes that “all licensed

lawyers from nine states will file sham petitions for an

anti-competitive purpose.” Id. ¶ 68A. Plaintiff further

alleges that “lawyers from nine states are required to

reinvent the wheel on an entry level licensing test and

lawyers from forty-one states get an exemption.” Id. ¶

72. Plaintiff does not specifically defend this claim in

its opposition brief. See ECF No. 30 at 12-16 (absence).

“[T]he Petition Clause protects the right of individuals to appeal to courts and other forums established

by the government for the resolution of legal disputes.”

Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379,

387 (2011). As Defendants point out, Plaintiff does

not allege—nor is it clear to the Court—that the reciprocal admission rule denies “meaningful access to

The Court will consider these together as a free speech challenge.

37a

the courts.” Berch, 773 F.3d at 1048. In fact, “[a]s

long as attorneys are admitted under the [reciprocal

admission rule], or pass the UBE, they may still practice in Arizona courts.” Id. (citing Paciulan, 229 F.3d

at 1230); see also Castille, 229 F.3d at 224 (rejecting

Petition Clause challenge in part because attorneys

“maintain the right to represent clients in Pennsylvania courts so long as they take the bar exam or apply

for pro hac vice admission”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails

to state a claim for relief under the Petition Clause.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Petition Clause claim.

b. Free Speech

The Court will first address Plaintiff’s various

claims that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule violates its Free Speech rights under the First Amendment. The First Amendment prevents the government

from “abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of

the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const.

amend. I. “We consider bar admission restrictions to

be time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.”

Berch, 773 F.3d at 1047 (citing Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 611 (9th Cir.

2005) (“In order to further its substantial interest in

regulating the legal profession, the State of Arizona

may institute reasonable time, place, and manner

restrictions on Arizonans’ First Amendment right to

consult with an attorney.”). Time, place, and manner

restrictions are reasonable if they “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, …

38a

narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental

interest, and … leave open ample alternative channels

for communication of the information.” Ward v. Rock

Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

i. Content Neutrality

Plaintiff first assails Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule as discriminating based on speaker, viewpoint, and content. Compl. ¶¶ 73-78; see ECF No.

30 at 14-16. Speech restrictions that target specific

speakers, viewpoints, or content are presumptively

unconstitutional and may be justified only if they survive strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576

U.S. 155, 163 (2015); see id. at 168-71. “Government

regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to

particular speech because of the topic discussed or the

idea or message expressed.” Id. at 163. For instance,

laws are content based if they “target speech based

on its communicative content,” id., or “single[] out

particular content for differential treatment,” Berger

v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009)

(en banc).

Plaintiff argues that the rule “favors the viewpoints

and the speech of lawyers” from the 39 states Arizona

shares reciprocity with, while it “disfavors” the viewpoints and speech of lawyers from the other states.

ECF No. 30 at 16. Defendants respond that the rule

do not target any speech based on content, viewpoint,

or speaker. ECF No. 13 at 8-9. The Court recognizes

that the rule subjects attorneys from some states to

different bar admission requirements than attorneys

39a

from other states. However, this fact alone does not

make the rule content or viewpoint based.

Rather, what is important here is that the rule does

not restrict speech based on who the attorney is, who

they are representing, the subject matter of representation, or any viewpoints the attorney holds. It simply

restricts speech based on state of bar admission. This

distinction does not make the rule speaker, viewpoint,

or otherwise content based. See Simandle, 658 F.

App’x at 136 n.12 (finding bar admission rule content

neutral because it “does not differentiate between

attorneys based upon their viewpoints or the content

of their speech,” but rather “differentiates between

them based only upon their state bar of admission”);

see also Lynch, 826 F.3d at 196 (“The Rule does not

compel attorneys to speak or regulate speech based on

its content. Neither does the Rule restrict attorneys

from speaking.”); Castille, 799 F.3d at 221-23 (finding

Pennsylvania’s reciprocal admission rule to be content

neutral because “the fact that attorneys of reciprocal

states face fewer hurdles to admission than attorneys

of nonreciprocal states does not constitute speaker

discrimination” and the rule does not “reflect the

Government’s preference for the substance of what

the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to what

the disfavored speakers have to say)”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the rule is content neutral, and therefore subject to intermediate

scrutiny.

ii. Narrow Tailoring and Alternative Channels of Communication

40a

Because Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule is a

content neutral time, place, and manner restriction

on speech, it must be “narrowly tailored to serve

a significant government interest” and “leave open

ample alternative channels for communication of the

information.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. Defendants

contend that the Court should follow Berch, where

the court found that Arizona’s reciprocal admission

rule helps “regulat[e] the practice of law,” which is a

“substantial government interest,” and provides the

option of passing the bar exam, “which reduces the

quantity of speech that the … [r]ule might otherwise

restrict.” ECF No. 13 at 8 (quoting Berch, 773 F.3d

at 1047). Plaintiff does not directly respond to this

argument. See ECF No. 30 at 14-16 (absence).

As Defendants point out, Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule helps the Arizona Bar regulate the practice of law within its jurisdiction and establish standards for licensing attorneys. These are substantial

government interests. Berch, 773 F.3d at 1047; Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 611 (recognizing Arizona’s “substantial interest in regulating the legal profession”);

see Thaw, 712 F. App’x at 606 (reaffirming Berch’s

First Amendment reasoning). And the rule places only

“minimal limitations on expressive activities,” primarily because of the ample alternative channels of communication available to LFRA’s members. Simandle,

658 F. App’x at 136; see Berch, 773 F.3d at 1047 (finding that the ample available alternatives “reduce[] the

quantity of speech that [the reciprocal admission rule]

might otherwise restrict”). Among these alternatives

are the opportunity to gain admission by taking the

41a

uniform bar examination and the ability to obtain pro

hac vice admission to practice in Arizona courts. Because the rule does not “impose a blanket prohibition”

on out-of-state attorneys’ admission to the Arizona

bar, it is narrowly tailored. Mothershed, 410 F.3d at

612; see Berch, 773 F.3d at 1047 (finding Arizona’s

reciprocal admission rule to be narrowly tailored);

see also Simandle, 658 F. App’x at 136 (“[u]nlicensed

attorneys are free to represent themselves pro se, pass

the New Jersey bar exam, or apply for admission pro

hac vice on a case-by-case basis”).

Accordingly, the challenged reciprocal admission

rule is a constitutional time, place, and manner restriction. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’

motion to dismiss the Free Speech claims.13

c. Right to Association

Plaintiff alleges that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule violates the First Amendment’s Free Associ13

Throughout its opposition brief, Plaintiff emphasizes that it

brings both as applied and facial challenges to the rule. ECF

No. 30 at 10, 16, 22. “An as-applied challenge contends that the

law is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant’s particular

speech activity, even though the law may be capable of valid application to others.” Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 125 F.4th 929,

939-40 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal citations omitted). A facial

challenge “requires a plaintiff to show that ‘a substantial number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional, judged in

relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” Id. (cleaned

up) (citing Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024)).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the reciprocal admission

rule is unconstitutional as applied in this specific scenario, or

in any context at all. Therefore, both of Plaintiff’s challenges

fail.

42a

ation Clause. Compl. ¶¶ 79-81. This Clause protects

the “right to associate with others in pursuit of a

wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,

religious, and cultural ends.” Boy Scouts of Am. v.

Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000).

In its motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that

Berch is on-point here. ECF No. 13 at 9. In Berch, the

court reasoned as follows:

Arizona attorneys and non-Arizona attorneys are free to associate with attorneys

who are members of the bars of other states,

whether these other states enjoy reciprocity

with Arizona or not. Moreover, the AOM

Rule provides bar applicants alternative

means for gaining membership in the Arizona Bar. The presence of these alternative

means significantly decreases any obstacles

to the freedom to associate that might otherwise result from the AOM Rule.

Berch, 773 F.3d at 1047-48. The same reasoning

applies here. The rule does not force out-of-state attorneys to associate with any states that enjoy reciprocity with Arizona, nor does it prevent out-of-state

attorneys from associating with the members of any

states’ bar. See Castille, 799 F.3d at 223-24 (rejecting

a similar freedom of association argument because the

rule did not significantly affect attorneys’ ability to advocate any viewpoints, require them to associate with

anyone, and left open alternatives to practicing law in

the state). Because the reciprocal admission rule does

43a

not impinge on out-of-state attorneys’ freedom to associate with others, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

relief under the Free Association Clause.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Free Association claim.

V. Count Four: Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Plaintiff’s fourth and final claim alleges violations

of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due

Process. Compl. ¶¶ 82-92. Plaintiff seems to allege

that “[a]n attorney has a constitutionally protected

property interest in his or her license to practice law,”

id. ¶ 85 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S.

12, 25 n.4 (2000); Gershenfeld v. Justs. of the Sup.

Ct. of Pa., 641 F. Supp. 1419, 1423 (E.D. Pa. 1986),

and that the State Bar is denying attorneys from nonreciprocal states this property right without adequate

due process, id. ¶ 86. Defendants dispute whether the

right to practice law is in fact a protectable property

interest. ECF No. 13 at 11-12.

“To allege a due process violation, a claimant must

initially demonstrate the existence of a protectable

property interest.” Paciulan, 229 F.3d at 1230 (citing

Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1979); Perry v.

Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972)). The court

in Paciulan held that the appellants had no viable due

process claim because the right to practice law pro hac

vice is not a protectable property interest. Id. (citing

Leis, 439 U.S. at 443 (“There is no right of federal

origin that permits such lawyers to appear in state

courts without meeting that State’s bar admission

44a

requirements.”)); Maynard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the

Cent. Dist. of Cal., 701 F. Supp. 738, 743 (C.D. Cal.

1988) (“Maynard does not cite any rule, statute, or

understanding that would support her claim of denial

of a property right to practice law in the district court.

Furthermore, courts have held that the right to practice law is not a property right protected by the Due

Process Clause.”) (internal citations omitted). For the

same reasons, Plaintiff fails to allege a protectable

property interest here.

Plaintiff relies on Cleveland and Gershenfeld to

argue that the right to practice law is a protected

property interest. The Court is not persuaded by

these cases. In Cleveland the Supreme Court only

noted that “[i]n some contexts, … individuals have

constitutionally protected property interests in stateissued licenses essential to pursuing an occupation

or livelihood.” Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 25 n.4. But

the Court’s only noted example was Bell v. Burson,

402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), where it found a protectable

property interest in a driver’s license. There, the Court

held that once the state had issued a driver’s license, it

could not then suspend the license without adequate

procedural due process. Id. at 540-42. However,

Paciulan and the instant case are distinct from Bell.

In Paciulan, the California Bar was not revoking existing licenses to practice law in California, but rather

was denying pro hac vice admission to those who had

licenses in other states. Paciulan, 229 F.3d at 122728. Similarly, here, the Arizona Bar is not revoking

licenses to practice law in Arizona, but rather denying

admission to those who are licensed in other states.

45a

Further, a license to practice law is much different

from a driver’s license, primarily because, as noted

throughout this Order, there are several viable alternatives to reciprocal admission, whereas there may

not be viable alternatives to driving to work. Thus,

Cleveland and Bell do not change the analysis here.

The court’s decision in Gerhenfeld is also inapposite. While the Court there did hold that the “plaintiff’s license to practice law … is a property interest

sufficient to invoke due process protections,” 641 F.

Supp. at 1423, the Court will decline to rely on this

out-of-circuit case because it is in direct conflict with

the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Paciulan, which is binding here. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170

(9th Cir. 2001) (“[b]inding authority must be followed

unless and until overruled by a body competent to do

so”).

Because Plaintiff does not plead a protectable property interest, its due process claim fails. The Court

therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Count Four.14

Plaintiff argues at the beginning of its motion that this case

“presents several novel legal theories,” and that “Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissals are especially disfavored in cases where the complaint sets forth a novel legal theory that can best be assessed

after factual development.” ECF No. 30 at 9-11 (quoting McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1270 (9th Cir. 2004).

However, Berch is on all fours with almost all of Plaintiff’s legal

theories, and Plaintiff’s long history of bringing constitutional

challenges to bar admission rules, see supra note 6, cuts against

any argument that the theories are novel. Plaintiff’s only potentially novel argument is the application of Students for Fair

Admission to the issues, but as the Court discussed above, that

seminal case is of no help to Plaintiff here. Therefore, the Court

46a

VI. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff requests leave to amend. ECF No. 30 at

11-12. Defendants argue leave to amend should be

denied as futile. ECF No. 31 at 11. Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be

granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v.

Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.

1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Here, the grounds for dismissal are strictly legal:

the challenged admission rule is constitutional under

all of Plaintiff’s legal theories. No additional factual allegations could possibly cure the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s legal theories. Therefore, the Court will not grant

Plaintiff leave to amend the claims which have been

dismissed in this Order. See Ofir v. Transamerica

Premier Life Ins. Co., 781 F. App’x 617, 619 (9th Cir.

2019) (“[a]mendment to add further factual allegations

would have been futile given the legal deficiencies in

Ofir’s theories of relief”) (citing Hoang v. Bank of Am.,

N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2018); see also

Allmaras v. Univ. Mech. & Eng’g Contractors, Inc.,

— F. Supp. 3d —-, 2024 WL 4860804, at *12 (S.D.

Cal. Nov. 20, 2024) (denying leave to amend because

grounds for dismissal were strictly legal and no additional facts would change this conclusion).

However, Plaintiff previously requested leave to

does not give much weight to the purported “novelty” of the

claims here, especially given that Plaintiff plainly fails to state

any claim for relief.

47a

amend its Complaint to add new claims, see ECF No.

25-1, which the Court denied pending the outcome of

the motion to dismiss, see ECF No. 29 at 7 (“[t]he Court

will revisit leave to amend upon deciding Defendants’

pending motion to dismiss”). To the extent Plaintiff

still wishes to bring claims not addressed in this Order, the Court will allow the Plaintiff to file a new

motion for leave to amend. In that motion, the Court

directs Plaintiff to address why the Court will have

jurisdiction over the claims in light of the dismissal of

the federal constitutional claims.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss with limited leave to file a

motion for leave to amend, as outlined in Section VI

of the “Discussion.” If Plaintiff opts to file a motion for

leave to amend, it must do so within 21 days of this

Order.15

The Court acknowledges that, in opposing Plaintiff’s late motion for leave to file supplemental authorities and request for

judicial notice, Defendants ask the Court to impose sanctions

on Plaintiff’s counsel and otherwise relieve Defendants’ counsel

from responding to any further filings while he is on vacation.

ECF No. 40 at 2-4. If Defendants’ counsel would like to proceed

with this request for sanctions, he should file a full motion for

sanctions, and the Court will subsequently issue a scheduling

order on the matter. The further request to relieve counsel

from responding to further filings is rendered moot by this Order.

48a

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2025

Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel

United States District Judge

49a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LAWYERS FOR FAIR RECIPROCAL ADMISSION,

Plaintiff,

ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER, Chief Justice of the

Arizona Supreme Court, and Justices JOHN R.

LOPEZ IV, ROBERT M. BRUTINEL, CLINT

BOLICK, JAMES P. BEENE, WILLIAM G.

MONTGOMERY, and KATHRYN H. KING,

Defendants.

Case No.: 24-CV-02175-PHX-GPC

ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION; (3) DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

COMPLAINT; AND (4) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

[ECF Nos. 42, 43, 44, 47]

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

amend its complaint, ECF No. 43, which was filed

alongside Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, ECF

No. 42, and Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, ECF

No. 44. Defendants timely opposed the motion for

leave to amend. ECF No. 46. Plaintiff did not timely

file a reply brief.

Also before the Court is Defendants’ motion for

sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel. ECF No. 47.

Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 51. Defendants

filed a reply. ECF No. 53.

50a

The Court has reviewed the papers on file in this

matter and finds the motions suitable for decision

without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(f).

For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration, DENIES Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, DENIES Plaintiff’s motion

for leave to amend its complaint, and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for sanctions.

BACKGROUND

On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant action against the Justices of the Arizona Supreme Court

and the District Judges of the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona (“Defendants”). ECF

No. 1 (“Compl.”). The complaint challenges the validity of Arizona’s reciprocal rules of admission to the

practice of law under the Constitution and federal law.

See generally Compl. Arizona waives the bar examination requirement for experienced, licensed attorneys

from 41 states, and those 41 states reciprocate this

waiver for experienced, licensed attorneys from Arizona. Id. ¶ 13(A), (B). Licensed attorneys from the

other nine states are not granted the same waiver because their state bars do not share the same reciprocity

with the Arizona Bar. Id. Plaintiff alleges that these

reciprocal rules of admission violate the constitutional

rights of attorneys who are not provided a waiver. Id.

¶¶ 38-92.

On March 19, 2025, the Court granted Defendant’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in full. See

ECF No. 41. The Court granted Plaintiff limited leave

to amend. Id. at 30. Specifically, the Court allowed

Plaintiff to file a motion for leave to amend its complaint, but only to add new claims not previously con-

51a

sidered by the Court.1 Id. On April 9, 2025, Plaintiff

filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint,

along with its proposed First Amended Complaint

(“proposed FAC”). ECF Nos. 43 & 43-1.2 Despite

the Court’s explicit instructions, the proposed FAC

brings the same constitutional claims: (A) violations

of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause,

Article IV § 2 privileges and immunities clause, Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clauses;

(B) violations of the First Amendment free speech

clause;3 and (C) violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process clauses. ECF

No. 43-1 (“Proposed FAC”) ¶¶ 61–68, 86–152. The

proposed FAC also re-alleges a claim under 28 U.S.C.

The Court dismissed the claims in the original complaint without leave to amend. ECF No. 41 at 30.

Plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice alongside the motion

for leave to amend its complaint. ECF No. 42. Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari

in Chiles v. Salazar, No. 24-539, 2025 WL 746313 (U.S. Mar.

10, 2025). Id. at 2. Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court’s

granting of certiorari in Chiles “directly calls into question”

several Ninth Circuit professional speech decisions. But the

Court did not rely on any of these cases, nor did it rely on the

professional speech doctrine, in its order granting the motion

to dismiss. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s request for

judicial notice because the materials Plaintiff asks the Court

to judicially notice are irrelevant. See Pearson v. Arizona, 2020

WL 5544373, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2020) (“Although relevance is not explicitly required to satisfy Rule 201, the Ninth

Circuit has declined to take judicial notice of facts that are irrelevant.”) (citing Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of

Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Flick

v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 386, 392 n.7 (9th Cir.

2000)).

As this Order will discuss in more detail below, the Proposed

FAC attempts to repackage the First Amendment claims as

“new” or “different” claims.

52a

§ 1738. Id. ¶¶ 69–85. Defendants opposed the motion

for leave to amend, arguing that the proposed FAC

fails to allege any new claims and that, in any event,

the proposed amendments are futile. ECF No. 46.

Plaintiff failed to file a timely reply.4

On April 9, 2025, Plaintiff also filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s First Amendment rulings

in its Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

the Complaint. ECF No. 44.5

On April 22, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for

sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel, Joseph R. Giannini. ECF No. 47. On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed an

Plaintiff filed a reply on May 8, 2025. ECF Nos. 49 & 50.

But under Local Rule 7.2(d), Plaintiff had “seven (7) days after

service of the responsive memorandum to file a reply memorandum[.]” Defendants filed their responsive memorandum on

April 22, 2025, which means that Plaintiff had until April 30,

2025 to file a timely reply. Plaintiff therefore filed a reply over

a week late and entirely failed to show any good cause for its

untimely filing. See generally ECF No. 49. This is not the first

time Plaintiff has flouted the Court’s deadlines. Previously,

Plaintiff failed to timely oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

and instead filed a procedurally improper amended complaint.

See ECF Nos. 16 & 23. Plaintiff never addressed its failure

to oppose or offered any good cause for its delay. The Court

ultimately set a new briefing schedule after denying its first

motion for leave to amend, which offered Plaintiff a new opportunity to oppose the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 29 at 7. Here,

due to the lack of good cause for the untimely filing, the Court

will not consider Plaintiff’s reply brief in deciding this motion.

See Anderson v. AMR, 348 F. App’x 322, 323 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

consider Anderson’s second untimely filed opposition”) (citing

Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th

Cir. 2007) (“[d]istrict courts retain broad discretion to control

their dockets”)).

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(g)(2), Defendants did not oppose

this motion because the Court did not order a response.

53a

opposition.6 ECF No. 51. On May 21, 2025, Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 53.7

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

The Court will first consider Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s First Amendment rulings in its Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 44.

The motion is untimely under the Local Rules.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(g)(2), “[a]bsent good cause

shown, any motion for reconsideration shall be filed no

later than fourteen (14) days after the date of the filing

of the Order that is subject to the motion.” Plaintiff’s

motion was filed 21 days after the Order that is subject

to the motion. See ECF No. 41. Non-compliance with

the Local Rules is grounds for summary denial of the

motion. See L.R. 7.2(i).

Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion fails on the merits. Local Rule 7.2(g)(1) states that “[n]o motion for recon6

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(c), Plaintiff’s opposition was due on

May 6, 2025. In Plaintiff’s untimely opposition, it explained

that its delay in responding was due to unsuccessful attempts

to informally resolve the matter with Defendants’ counsel. ECF

No. 51 at 4–5. Considering the need to give notice and an

opportunity to be heard before entering the type of pre-filing order Defendants request, see Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp.,

500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007), the Court will consider

Plaintiff’s opposition in deciding the motion for sanctions.

On May 25, 2025, Plaintiff improperly filed a sur-reply to the

motion for sanctions under the guise of a “Notice of Errata”

regarding Defendants’ reply brief. ECF No. 54. Because Plaintiff did not obtain leave of Court to file this sur-reply, the Court

will not consider this filing in deciding the motion for sanctions.

See Briggs v. Montgomery, 2019 WL 13039282, at *2 (D. Ariz.

Mar. 19, 2019) (“Neither Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 nor the local rules of

practice for this District provide for the filing of a sur-reply, and

sur-replies are not authorized by any other rules of procedure

absent express prior leave of the Court.”).

54a

sideration of an Order may repeat any oral or written

argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order.” Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration merely repeats Plaintiff’s previous arguments regarding the applicability

of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in NAAMJP v. Berch,

773 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2014), to its claims. See, e.g.,

ECF No. 44 at 2 (arguing that Berch “was resolved

through a summary judgment motion, rather than a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion”). Because “Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration simply restates arguments previously

considered by the Court …, Plaintiff has not shown

his entitlement to reconsideration under Local Rule of

Civil Procedure 7.2(g) or the standards routinely applied by this Court.” Taylor v. AFS Techs., Inc., 2010

WL 11515549, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 1, 2010) (citing

Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, Inc.,

215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003)).

The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

I. Legal Standards

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15,

a party may amend their pleading once as a matter of

course within 21 days after service of a motion under

Rule 12(b).8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Otherwise, a

party may amend only by leave of court or by written

consent of the adverse party.9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Here, Defendants served Plaintiff with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

on September 27, 2024, ECF No. 13, thus, Plaintiff had until

October 18, 2024 to amend as of right under Rule 15(a)(1). This

deadline passed by the time Plaintiff filed the FAC on November 28, 2024. ECF No. 23.

Plaintiff notes that its attempts to obtain Defendants’ consent

55a

Here, Plaintiff’s only path to amendment is leave of

court.

“The court should freely give leave when justice

so requires,” id., and this policy should be “applied

with extreme liberality,” Warren v. Penzone, 2024

WL 2246257, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2024) (quoting

Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048,

1051 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Thus, Plaintiffs’ amendment

request should be granted unless ‘the amendment:

(1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad

faith; (3) produces an undue delay in litigation; or (4)

is futile.’” Id. (quoting AmerisourceBergen Corp. v.

Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Absent prejudice or a strong showing of any of the

other factors, there is a “presumption under Rule 15(a)

in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Cap.,

316 F.3d at 1052.

II. Analysis

In granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

original complaint, the Court denied Plaintiff leave

to amend as to all claims which the Court dismissed

in its Order. ECF No. 41. However, the Court granted

Plaintiff an opportunity to request leave to amend

its complaint to add “claims not addressed in th[e]

Order.” Id. at 30. For the reasons below, the Court

finds that each claim Plaintiff brings in its proposed

FAC was already dismissed by the Court in its prior

Order, either because they are the same claims or

because Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempts to repackage

the same claims as different claims.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend largely spends

its pages repeating arguments about Berch’s applicability to its claims. See ECF No. 43 at 1–6. Plainto amend its complaint were unsuccessful. ECF No. 1-4.

56a

tiff’s arguments regarding amendment include: (1) an

argument that dismissal at the 12(b)(6) stage without

further leave to amend violates due process, id. at 2;

and (2) an argument that its professional speech, neutral and generally applicable, and retaliation claims

are “new claims” that were not previously dismissed,

id. at 5–7.

Defendants correctly point out in their opposition

that Counts One, Two, and Four in the proposed FAC

overtly reassert Counts One, Two, and Four from the

original complaint, all of which the Court already

addressed and dismissed. See ECF No. 41. The same

goes for certain claims within the proposed FAC’s

Count Three, including claims based on the right

to petition; prior restraint; viewpoint, speaker, and

content discrimination; and the right to associate.

Proposed FAC ¶¶ 91–104, 127–40, The Court denied

leave to amend the already-dismissed claims because

amendment of those claims would be futile. ECF No.

41 at 30. Accordingly, the Court DENIES leave to file

the proposed FAC as to Counts One, Two, and Four.

Plaintiff argues, however, that the proposed FAC’s

Count Three includes claims regarding the professional speech doctrine, whether the challenged rules

are neutral and generally applicable, and retaliation

claims, all of which are “new claims” that were not

previously dismissed. ECF No. 43 at 5–7. Defendants

respond that Plaintiff merely repackaged claims and

arguments that the Court previously rejected, and

that Plaintiff cannot reassert these claims because

they were already dismissed. ECF No. 46 at 2–4.

Defendants are correct.

Plaintiff’s original complaint made allegations regarding professional speech. See Compl. ¶ 45 (“the

practical effect of the Arizona Supreme Court’s tit-for-

57a

tat licensing paradigm is to discriminate against outof-state attorneys from nine states and a create a proxy

for [] professional speech…”). Further, Plaintiff’s reasserted theory was discussed heavily in the motion to

dismiss briefing. See ECF No. 30 at 12–13; ECF No.

31 at 3. And, based on the briefing, the Court rejected

Plaintiff’s theory in its Order granting the motion to

dismiss. ECF No. 41 at 13–14. Plaintiff cannot now

reallege this claim because it was already rejected by

the Court.

Plaintiff’s original complaint also alleged viewpoint

discrimination, speaker discrimination, and that Arizona’s reciprocal admission rule was content based.

Compl. ¶¶ 73–78. Again, the parties discussed the

rule’s neutrality heavily in their briefs. ECF No. 13

at 7–9; ECF No. 30 at 14–16 (discussing whether the

rule is neutral and generally applicable); ECF No.

31 at 3–5. The Court held that the rule is content

neutral, applied the appropriate level of scrutiny, and

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 41 at 24–26.

Because the Court already rejected this theory, Plaintiff’s attempt to repackage it as a claim that the rule

is not neutral and generally applicable, and therefore

subject to strict scrutiny, fails.

Plaintiff’s original complaint also alleged First

Amendment retaliation. Compl. ¶ 66A. Defendant’s

motion to dismiss directly analyzed the claim, ECF No.

13 at 10–11. The Court subsequently dismissed all of

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims without leave to

amend, and most relevant here, found that Arizona’s

reciprocal admission rule is a reasonable time, place,

and manner restriction. ECF No. 41 at 22–27, 30.

This finding was fatal to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim,

as the equal enforcement of a constitutional time,

place, and manner restriction against a large group

58a

of individuals cannot constitute retaliation against

Plaintiff, nor would it “chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in a protected activity.”

Fitzpatrick v. Little, 2024 WL 1308925, at *4 (D. Idaho

Mar. 26, 2024) (citing Capp v. Cnty. Of San Diego, 940

F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating the elements

of a First Amendment retaliation claim)). Plaintiff

cannot reallege this claim, which the Court previously

dismissed, in an amended complaint.10

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion

for leave to amend because it does not allege any new

claims which have not already been dismissed by the

Court.11

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS12

Moreover, each of these theories were clearly already known

to the Plaintiff at the inception of this action, which weighs

against granting leave to amend. See Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.

1986) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff also attached declarations from its members to its

proposed FAC. See ECF Nos. 43-2–43-6. However, as the Court

previously noted, “[n]o additional factual allegations could possibly cure the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s legal theories.” ECF

No. 41 at 30. Because Plaintiff does not assert any new legal

theories in the proposed FAC, these amendments are similarly

futile here.

Relatedly, Plaintiff’s attempt to revive its as-applied constitutional challenges fails here too. The Court previously found

that “Plaintiff has failed to allege that the reciprocal admission

rule is unconstitutional as applied in this specific scenario, or

in any context at all.” ECF No. 41 at 26 n.13. The Court

dismissed these claims without leave to amend. Id. at 26 n.13,

30. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint to reassert

these as as-applied claims.

Mr. Giannini argues, without citing any case law, that the

Court should not decide Defendants’ motion for sanctions without first providing him 30 days to find independent counsel.

59a

Defendants moved for sanctions against Plaintiff’s

counsel, Mr. Giannini. ECF No. 47. Specifically,

Defendants ask the Court to enter a pre-filing order.

Specifically, the order requires Mr. Giannini to obtain

leave of the Chief Judge of this court before filing

further actions “regarding admission to and the regulation of the practice of law in the State of Arizona.”

Id. at 1 (quoting Paciulan v. George, 38 F. Supp. 2d

1128, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 229 F.3d 1226 (9th

Cir. 2000)).

I. Legal Standards

Under Rule 11(b), an attorney who signs, files, submits, or later advocates for a “pleading, written motion, or other paper” certifies that:

it is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary

delay, or needlessly increase the cost of

litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and

other legal contentions are warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument

for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; [and]

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary

support or, if specifically so identified, will

likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Generally, sanctions are

appropriate under Rule 11 when an attorney files

However, Mr. Giannini had adequate notice to find counsel

and, regardless, offered his own opposition to the motion already. The Court finds this sufficient to decide the motion on

the current record. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Mr. Giannini’s request for a 30-day continuance.

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papers that are frivolous, that is, papers that are

“baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend v. Holman Consulting

Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990). Whether a

filing is frivolous is an objective inquiry: “[t]he issue in

determining whether to impose sanctions under Rule

11 is whether a reasonable attorney, having conducted

an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and

law, would have concluded that the offending paper

was well-founded.” Truesdell v. So. Cal. Permanente

Med. Grp., 209 F.R.D. 169, 174 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see

also Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir.

2005).

A violation of Rule 11 is grounds for sanctions,

including “nonmonetary directives; an order to pay

a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and

warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing

payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable

attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting

from the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4); RinggoldLockhart v. Cnty. of L.A., 761 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th

Cir. 2014). Ultimately, “Rule 11’s express goal is

deterrence.” Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390

(9th Cir. 1994).

II. Discussion

Defendants primarily contend that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the proposed FAC was both frivolous

and directly defied the Court’s previous dismissal

order. Id. at 1. Defendants assert that Mr. Giannini’s

prior conduct in this case supports their motion for

sanctions as well. Id. at 1–2. Plaintiff responds that

the Court should deny the motion because (1) attorneys

cannot be vexatious litigants, (2) the proposed FAC is

“not a sham,” and (3) Defendants’ motion for sanctions

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creates a conflict of interest between Mr. Giannini and

Plaintiff. ECF No. 51 at 1–5.13 Alternatively, Plaintiff

requests a 30-day continuance for Mr. Giannini to

seek his own counsel. Id. at 7–9.

First, the Court addresses whether it can enter a

pre-filing order against an attorney. Defendants base

their request on Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp.,

500 F.3d 1047, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2007), where the

Ninth Circuit explained that district courts have discretion to enter pre-filing orders against “vexatious litigants.” However, as Mr. Giannini notes in his opposition, the Ninth Circuit has been wary of entering

such orders against attorneys on the grounds that they

are vexatious litigants. See Weissman v. Quail Lodge,

Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We therefore conclude that an attorney appearing on behalf of a

client cannot be sanctioned as a vexatious litigant; by

definition, he or she is acting as an attorney and not

as a litigant.”); Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1061

(noting that the district court entered a pre-filing order against plaintiff “in her capacity as an individual,

not as an attorney, to comply with the Ninth Circuit’s

holding in Weissman, where it found “that attorneys

could not be sanctioned as vexatious litigants”). Indeed, the Molski test itself describes its procedural and

substantive analysis as a method to determine who is

a “vexatious litigant.” See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057–58

(“the factors define a specific method or course of action

that district courts should use to assess whether to declare a party a vexatious litigant and enter a pre-filing

order”). Thus, Molski’s vexatious litigant test is not

the appropriate avenue for entering a pre-filing order

Defendant also improperly attempts to re-litigate aspects of the

motion to dismiss in its opposition. ECF No. 51 at 5–7.

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against an attorney.

However, as Defendants note, the Molski court also

affirmed the district court’s sanctioning of plaintiff’s

attorneys by entering a similar pre-filing order against

the firm. See id. at 1062–65. The Ninth Circuit crafted

a substantially similar test for entering pre-filing orders against attorneys. “As a procedural matter …

the district court must afford the attorney notice and

an opportunity to be heard. As a substantive matter,

justifications for imposing a pre-filing sanction on an

attorney include the attorney’s willful abuse of the

judicial process, bad faith conduct during litigation, or

filing frivolous papers.” Id. at 1063 (citing Weissman,

179 F.3d at 1198) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, the pre-filing order “must

be tailored to curtail the attorney’s particular misconduct.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Chambers v. NASCO,

Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1991)). Accordingly, the

Court will consider Defendants’ motion in light of this

standard. See also Paciulan, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1145–

47 (entering pre-filing order against Mr. Giannini

after finding that plaintiff’s—his client’s—case was

legally frivolous and filed for an improper purpose

and that a pre-filing order was appropriate given the

previous ineffectiveness of monetary sanctions).

The Court will first consider whether the procedural requirement is met here. Defendants filed the

instant motion for sanctions on April 22, 2025, which

gave Mr. Giannini ample notice of the possibility for

sanctions. Further, Molski had an opportunity to oppose the motion in writing. This is sufficient to give

Mr. Giannini notice and an opportunity to be heard.

See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1058 (finding sufficient notice

and an opportunity to be heard where motion was filed

and served on plaintiff’s counsel, and where plaintiff

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opposed the motion in writing and at the hearing); see

also Pac. Harbor Cap., Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc.,

210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding, where a

court sanctioned an attorney, that “an opportunity to

be heard does not require an oral or evidentiary hearing on the issue,” and that “[t]he opportunity to brief

the issue fully satisfies due process requirements”).

As for the substantive requirements, Defendants

argue that Mr. Giannini’s filings in this case, specifically the motion for leave to amend, have been frivolous.

The Court agrees for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff’s motion

for leave to amend contravened the Court’s prior order;

and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint, proposed FAC, and other

filings throughout this litigation have been objectively

baseless. First, the Court made clear in its order

granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss that it was

not granting leave to amend any claims in Plaintiff’s

original complaint, and that Plaintiff could only amend

its complaint insofar as it brought claims that the

Court had not already dismissed. See ECF No. 41

at 29–30. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend its

complaint flew in the face of the Court’s directive.

Instead of bringing only new claims, the proposed FAC

re-alleged all prior dismissed claims and attempted to

repackage previously alleged claims as new ones. A

reasonable attorney would not have found the motion

well-founded after conducting an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, and specifically

after reviewing the Court’s granting of limited leave

to amend. Accordingly, the motion for leave to amend

that Giannini filed on behalf of his client was baseless

and frivolous.

Second, it is worth examining the broader context

of this litigation and Mr. Giannini’s history of bringing these types of claims. Indeed, as the Court has

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noted before, see ECF No. 41 at 10 n.6, Mr. Giannini

has been unsuccessful in challenging bar admission

rules on substantially similar legal theories across the

country for decades. The Court’s review of past case

law reveals numerous unsuccessful challenges steered

by Mr. Giannini, either as a plaintiff or as counsel.

See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Multijurisdiction

Practice (“NAAMJP”) v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.

2014) (unsuccessful challenge to Arizona’s reciprocal

bar admissions rule); Paciulan, 229 F.3d at 1226 (challenging California state court pro hac vice admission

rule, affirming district court’s imposition of pre-filing

order on Mr. Giannini); Blye v. Kozinski, 466 F. App’x

650 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing complaint because of

Mr. Giannini’s failure to comply with Paciulan prefiling order); Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.

1990) (challenging California bar admission rules);

Giannini v. Comm. of Bar Exam’rs of State Bar of

Cal., 847 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); NAAMJP

v. Gonzales, 211 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir. 2006) (challenging district court admissions rules); NAAMJP v.

Simandle, 658 F. App’x 127 (3d Cir. 2016) (same);

Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission (“LFRA”) v.

United States, 2023 WL 145530 (D.N.J. Jan. 10,

2023) (“[t]his case represents yet another effort by

Plaintiff’s counsel, Joseph Giannini, to establish a

legal right for lawyers to practice law in jurisdictions

that lack bar reciprocity with the state where such

lawyers are barred. Mr. Giannini has filed many such

cases in courts across the country over the last several

decades…”); NAAMJP v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216 (3d

Cir. 2015) (challenging Pennsylvania’s reciprocal bar

admissions rule); LFRA v. United States, 2024 WL

987979 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2024) (challenging Arizona’s

reciprocal bar admissions rule); NAAMJP v. Lynch,

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826 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2016) (challenging district court

admissions rule); NAAMJP v. Roberts, 180 F. Supp.

3d 46 (D.D.C. 2015) (same). Notwithstanding the

constant slew of opinions issued by respected jurists

across the country, all invariably finding that Mr.

Giannini’s legal theories are untenable, Mr. Giannini

continues to lodge the same challenges to bar and court

admissions rules. This includes several unsuccessful

challenges recently brought by the same Plaintiff as

in the instant case. The numerous unsuccessful challenges based on the same legal theories also support

a finding that Mr. Giannini’s filings in this case are

“baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362; see also

Molski, 500 F.3d at 1063 (finding that, where the

attorneys “filed numerous complaints containing false

factual allegations, thereby enabling [their client’s]

vexatious litigation,” there were sufficient grounds

to impose a pre-filing order); Paciulan, 38 F. Supp.

2d at 1146–47 (finding Mr. Giannini’s filings to be

frivolous where, “[a]t a minimum,” two courts had

rejected plaintiff’s claims).

Lastly, the Court considers whether requested

pre-filing order is tailored to curtail Mr. Giannini’s

misconduct. The order requires Mr. Giannini to

obtain leave of the Chief Judge of this court before

filing further actions “regarding admission to and

the regulation of the practice of law in the State of

Arizona.” As Defendants correctly contend, such a

pre-filing order “appropriately covers only the types of

claims [Mr. Giannini has been filing vexatiously”—

bar admission claims. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061.

Further, the pre-filing order still allows meritorious

bar admission claims after “an initial screening review

by a district judge.” Id. Further, the Court notes that

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monetary sanctions “have not deterred Giannini in the

past,” which supports the need for a pre-filing order to

curtail any further misconduct. Paciulan, 38 F. Supp.

2d at 1147. Lastly, “[a]t least two courts have gone so

far as to enjoin Mr. Giannini from filing additional

cases challenging bar admission rules without leave of

court,” which further supports the narrowly tailored

pre-filing order here. LFRA v. United States, 2023

WL 145530, at *1 (citing NAAMJP v. Bush, No. 05cv-5081, ECF No. 43, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23,

2006), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales, 211 F. App’x at 93;

Paciulan, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47, aff’d, 229 F.3d at

1226).

The Court can easily dispose of Mr. Giannini’s

other arguments against the imposition of a pre-filing

order. He argues that a lawsuit cannot be enjoined

unless it is a “sham” under Professional Real Estate

Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.

49 (1993). But in Columbia Pictures, the Supreme

Court addressed the “sham” exception to the antitrust

immunity doctrine. Id. at 51. This doctrine has no

applicability here, and the Court does not rely on it

to reach its conclusion here. Mr. Giannini further

argues, without citing any authority that Defendants’

motion for sanctions creates an impermissible conflict

of interest between himself and his client. But, in

addition to the lack of any precedent for this argument,

the Court notes that Mr. Giannini’s misconduct is tied

to his advocacy for Plaintiff’s own claims. It is difficult

to see how there could be a conflict given the alignment

of Mr. Giannini and Plaintiff’s interests.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants’ requested pre-filing order is warranted here. The Court

therefore ORDERS as follows:

Joseph R. Giannini is hereby ENJOINED from

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filing any further actions, either as an attorney or

a party, in the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, regarding admission to and the

regulation of the practice of law in the State of Arizona

without first obtaining leave of the Chief Judge of this

court. If Mr. Giannini wishes to file further actions

regarding admission to and the regulation of practice

of law in the District of Arizona, Mr. Giannini must

attach a copy of this order to his application for leave to

file such actions and supply a declaration supporting

the application stating: (1) that the matters asserted

in the new action have not previously been raised by

him, as an attorney or a party, and disposed of on the

merits by any court, state or federal; (2) that the claims

are not frivolous or made in bad faith; and (3) that Giannini has conducted a reasonable investigation of the

facts and certifies that they are accurate. Failure to

comply with any of these conditions shall be sufficient

grounds to deny the application or dismiss the action,

and any violation of this injunction may be treated as

contempt of court. See Paciulan, 38 F. Supp. 2d at

1147.

***

For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, DENIES Plaintiff’s

request for judicial notice, DENIES Plaintiff’s motion

for leave to amend its complaint, and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for sanctions. Because the Court has

now dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without leave to

amend, the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2025

Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel

United States District Judge

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APPENDIX C

Order Denying Panel Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

No. 25-3551, DktEntry 59.1 (July 2, 2026)

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FILED

JUL 2 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAWYERS FOR FAIR RECIPROCAL ADMISSION,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER, Chief Justice of the

Arizona Supreme Court; et al., Defendants –

Appellees.

No. 25-3551

D.C. No. 2:24-cv-02175-GPC

District of Arizona, Phoenix

ORDER

Before: GOULD, BERZON, and HURWITZ, Circuit

Judges.

The panel has unanimously voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing. Judge Gould voted to deny

the petition for rehearing en banc; Judges Berzon and

Hurwitz so recommended. The petition for rehearing

en banc was circulated to the judges of the Court, and

no judge requested a vote for en banc consideration.

Fed. R. App. P. 40(c).

The petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc,

Dkt. 58, is DENIED.

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APPENDIX D

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND RULE

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const. amend. I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause)

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United

States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and

all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall

be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

28 U.S.C. § 1738 — State and Territorial statutes

and judicial proceedings; full faith and credit

The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory,

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or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof,

shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such

State, Territory or Possession thereto.

The records and judicial proceedings of any court

of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies

thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts

within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the

court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is

in proper form.

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or

copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same

full faith and credit in every court within the United

States and its Territories and Possessions as they have

by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory

or Possession from which they are taken.

50 U.S.C. § 4025a — Portability of professional licenses of servicemembers and their spouses (as

amended by Pub. L. No. 118-159, § 587, Dec. 23,

2024)

(a) In general. If a servicemember or the spouse of

a servicemember has a covered license and relocates

residence because such servicemember receives military orders for military service in a State other than

the State of the licensing authority that issued the covered license, such covered license shall be considered

valid for the scope of practice in the State of the new

residence if such servicemember or spouse submits to

the licensing authority of such State an application described in subsection (c).

(b) Temporary licenses. If a licensing authority

is required to consider a covered license valid under

subsection (a) but cannot carry out such requirement

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during the 30 days after receiving an application described in subsection (c), the licensing authority may

issue to the applicant a temporary license that confers

the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities as a

permanent license.

subsection includes the following:

(1) Proof of military orders described in subsection

(a).

(2) If the applicant is the spouse of a servicemember, a copy of the marriage certificate.

(3) A notarized affidavit affirming, under the penalty

of law, that—

(A) the applicant is the person described and identified in the application;

(B) all statements made in the application are true

and correct and complete;

(C) the applicant has read and understands the requirements to receive a license, and the scope of practice, of the State of the licensing authority;

(D) the applicant certifies that the applicant meets

and shall comply with requirements described in subparagraph (C); and

(E) the applicant is in good standing in all States in

which the applicant holds or has held a license.

(d) Background checks. A licensing authority that

receives an application described in subsection (b) may

conduct a background check of the applicant before

carrying out subsection (a) or (b).

(e) Interstate compacts. If a servicemember or

spouse of a servicemember has a covered license to

operate in multiple States pursuant to an interstate

compact described in section 1784 of title 10—

(1) the servicemember or spouse of a servicemember shall be subject to the requirements of such com-

74a

pact or the applicable provisions of law of the applicable State; and

(2) this section shall not apply to such servicemember or spouse of a servicemember.

(f) Definitions. In this section:

(1) The term “covered license” means a professional

license that, with respect to a scope of practice—

(A) is in good standing with the licensing authority

that issued such license;

(B) has not been revoked or had discipline imposed

by any State;

it; and

(D) has not been voluntarily surrendered while

under investigation for unprofessional conduct in any

State.

(2) The term “license” means any license, certificate, or other evidence of qualification that an individual is required to obtain before the individual may engage in, or represent himself or herself to be a member

of, a particular profession.

(3) The term “licensing authority” means any State

board, commission, department, or agency that—

(A) is established in the State for the primary purpose of regulating the entry of persons into or the conduct of persons within, a particular profession; and

(B) is authorized to issue licenses.

(4) The term “military orders” has the meaning

given such term in section 3955 of this title.

(5) The term “scope of practice” means the defined

parameters of various duties or services that may be

provided by an individual under a license.

A.R.S. § 32-4302 — Out-of-state applicants; resi-

75a

dents; military spouses; licensure; certification;

exceptions; notice

A. Notwithstanding any other law, an occupational

or professional license or certificate shall be issued,

in the discipline applied for and at the same practice

level as determined by the regulating entity, pursuant

to this title to a person who establishes residence in

this state or without an examination to a person who

is married to an active duty member of the armed

forces of the United States and who is accompanying

the member to an official permanent change of station

to a military installation located in this state if all of

the following apply:

1. The person is currently licensed or certified in

at least one other state in the discipline applied for

and at the same practice level as determined by the

regulating entity and the license or certification is in

good standing in all states in which the person holds a

license or certification.

2. The person has been licensed or certified by another state for at least one year.

3. When the person was licensed or certified by

another state there were minimum education requirements and, if applicable, work experience and clinical

supervision requirements in effect and the other state

verifies that the person met those requirements in order to be licensed or certified in that state.

4. The person previously passed an examination

required for the license or certification if required by

the other state.

5. The person has not had a license or certificate

revoked and has not voluntarily surrendered a license

or certificate in any other state or country while under

investigation for unprofessional conduct.

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6. The person has not had discipline imposed by

any other regulating entity. If another jurisdiction has

taken disciplinary action against the person, the regulating entity shall determine if the cause for the action

was corrected and the matter resolved. If the matter

has not been resolved by that jurisdiction, the regulating entity may not issue or deny a license until the

matter is resolved.

7. The person does not have a complaint, allegation

or investigation pending before another regulating entity in another state or country that relates to unprofessional conduct. If an applicant has any complaints,

allegations or investigations pending, the regulating

entity in this state shall suspend the application process and may not issue or deny a license to the applicant until the complaint, allegation or investigation is

resolved.

8. The person pays all applicable fees.

9. The person does not have a disqualifying criminal history as determined by the regulating entity pursuant to section 41-1093.04.

B. This section does not prevent a regulating entity

under this title from entering into a reciprocity agreement with another state or jurisdiction for persons

married to active duty members of the armed forces

of the United States, except that the agreement may

not allow out-of-state licensees or certificate holders to

obtain a license or certificate by reciprocity in this

state if the applicant has not met standards that

are substantially equivalent to or greater than the

standards required in this state as determined by the

regulating entity on a case-by-case basis.

C. Except as provided in subsection A of this section, a regulating entity that administers an examination on laws of this state as part of its license or certifi-

77a

cate application requirement may require an applicant

to take and pass an examination specific to the laws of

this state.

D. A person who is licensed pursuant to this title

is subject to the laws regulating the person’s practice

in this state and is subject to the regulating entity’s

jurisdiction.

E. This section does not apply to:

1. A license or registration certificate that is issued

pursuant to chapter 24 or 26 of this title.

2. Requirements for a fingerprint clearance card

issued pursuant to title 41, chapter 12, article 3.1.

3. Criteria for a license, permit or certificate of eligibility that is established by an interstate compact.

4. The ability of a regulating entity under this title

to require an applicant to submit fingerprints in order

to access state and federal criminal records information for noncriminal justice purposes.

F. A license or certificate issued pursuant to this

section is valid only in this state and does not make the

person eligible to be part of an interstate compact. A

regulating entity under this title may determine eligibility for an applicant to be licensed or certified under

this section if the applicant is not part of an interstate

compact.

G. A regulating entity under this title shall prominently print the following notice on all license and certificate applications and regulating entity websites:

Pursuant to section 32-4302, Arizona Revised Statutes,

a person shall be granted an occupational or professional license or certificate if the person has been

licensed or certified in another state for at least twelve

months, the license or certificate is in the same discipline and at the same practice level as the license

or certificate for which the person is applying in this

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state and the person meets other conditions prescribed

by section 32-4302, Arizona Revised Statutes.

H. Before any regulating entity takes any official

action to deny a professional or occupational license

that a person applies for pursuant to this section, the

regulating entity shall submit the application and the

reason for denial to the governor for review. The regulating entity shall notify the governor of any required

time frames for approval or denial of the license application by the regulating entity.

I. Beginning July 1, 2022, all regulating entities

that are required to issue occupational or professional

licenses pursuant to this section shall track information about applications received in the format to be

determined by the governor and annually report that

information to the governor.

J. For the purposes of subsections H and I of this

section, “regulating entity”:

1. Means all executive departments, agencies and

offices and all state boards and commissions.

2. Does not include:

(a) A state agency that is headed by a single elected

state official.

(b) The corporation commission.

measure at or after the November 1998 general election.

(d) The judiciary.

Arizona Supreme Court Rule 34 — Application

for Admission (as amended effective January 1,

2026)

(a) Methods of Admission to the Practice of Law in

Arizona. Persons desiring to be admitted to the practice of law in the State of Arizona may apply for ad-

79a

mission by one of three methods: (1) admission by Bar

Exam, as defined in Rule 35(a)(1), (2) admission on

motion, or (3) admission by transfer of bar examination

score from another jurisdiction.

(b) Applicant Requirements and Qualifications.

1. No applicant will be recommended for admission

to the practice of law in Arizona by the Committee on

Character and Fitness unless the Committee is satisfied that:

A. the applicant is over the age of 21 years;

B. the applicant is of good moral character;

C. the applicant is mentally, emotionally and physically able to engage in the practice of law, and possesses the required knowledge of the law to do so;

D. the applicant is a graduate with a juris doctor

from a law school provisionally or fully approved by the

American Bar Association at the time of graduation

or the applicant is a graduate with a juris doctor and

has been actively engaged in the authorized practice of

law in one or more states, territories, or the District of

Columbia for at least 3 of the last 5 years prior to filing

an application for admission to practice in Arizona;

E. if ever admitted to practice in any jurisdiction,

foreign or domestic, the applicant is presently in good

standing concerning discipline, payment of mandatory

dues and compliance with mandatory legal education,

or the applicant resigned in good standing in that

jurisdiction; although, if the applicant is not in good

standing or did not resign in good standing in all

jurisdictions solely because of unpaid mandatory fees

or incomplete mandatory continuing legal education

requirements, and the applicant has attempted to but

cannot cure such deficiencies in the other jurisdiction(s), the Committee on Character and Fitness may

evaluate the circumstances and make a recommenda-

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tion to the Supreme Court for admission or denial of

admission.

F. the Bar Exam applicant has successfully completed the course on Arizona law described in paragraph (i) of this rule; and

G. for applicants seeking admission under Rule 35,

the applicant has earned a score deemed sufficient by

the Court on a professional responsibility examination.

i. An applicant must pass a professional responsibility examination, which shall be the Multistate

Professional Responsibility Examination prepared

by the National Conference of Bar Examiners or an

alternate professional responsibility examination, as

deemed appropriate by the Court. An applicant seeking to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility

Examination shall file an application directly with,

and pay the fees specified by, the National Conference

of Bar Examiners.

ii. The Court shall establish the minimum acceptable score for the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination.

iii. An applicant must submit proof satisfactory

to the Committee on Examinations that the applicant

has taken the Multistate Professional Responsibility

Examination and received a minimum acceptable

score within 8 years of a successful Bar Exam or

within the time frame for taking the oath of admission after the successful Bar Exam in order to have

the applicant’s score accepted by the Committee on

Examinations.

2. An applicant may be allowed to sit for the Bar

Exam prior to the award of a juris doctor degree if the

applicant:

A. is a currently enrolled student in good standing

at a law school fully or provisionally approved by the

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American Bar Association;

B. is expected to graduate with a juris doctor degree

within 120 days of the first day of early exam administration;

C. has satisfied all requirements for graduation

with a juris doctor except for not more than 8 semester

hours or its equivalent in quarter hours at the time of

early exam administration;

D. will not be enrolled in more than two semester

hours or its equivalent in quarter hours during the

month of early bar examination testing and the immediately preceding month;

E. has been determined by their school to be academically prepared for early testing;

F. provides by the deadline to the Committee on

Character and Fitness, on a form provided by the Committee, an affidavit attested to by the applicant and the

law school that they meet the above criteria. The law

school’s decision whether to certify that the student

meets the criteria is final and shall not be subject to

review by the Committee or the Court.

No applicant shall be recommended to practice law

until graduation or satisfaction of all requirements for

graduation, and completion of all requirements for admission to the practice of law under these rules. If

an applicant under this subsection has not graduated

with a juris doctor within 120 days of the first day of

early exam administration, all parts of the Bar Exam,

including the score, are void and the applicant’s examination scores shall not be disclosed for any purpose.

Scores may not be released until such time as satisfactory proof of award of juris doctor, as determined

by the Court, is provided to the Committee. An early

examination that is voided shall count as an Attempt

under Rule 35(a)(3).

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At the completion of the juris doctor requirements

and within 60 days after graduation, the applicant

must cause his or her law school, dean, or registrar

to submit to the Committee on Character and Fitness

proof of graduation, showing his or her juris doctor

was conferred within 120 days of the first day of early

exam administration. Failure to complete the course of

study within 120 days of the examination and provide

evidence of graduation within an additional 60 days

shall render the applicant’s score void.

3. All applicants who received a passing grade on

the Bar Exam and who are found to be otherwise qualified under these rules shall be recommended for admission to the practice of law.

4. The Committee on Character and Fitness shall

endeavor to complete its inquiries, some or all of which

may be delegated to the National Conference of Bar

Examiners, to be in a position to recommend for or

against a successful examinee’s admission to the practice of law no later than the time the results of the

Bar Exam are available for examination applicants.

This time limitation is aspirational only and may be

extended for further inquiry and formulation of a recommendation when the circumstances of a case so require.

Any person desiring to be admitted to the practice

of law in the State of Arizona must submit to the

Committee on Character and Fitness an application

in the form supplied by the Committee. The application for admission must be accompanied by required

supporting documents and application fee.

1. The Bar Exam applicant shall also complete and

submit a character report accompanied by a character

investigation fee as established by the Court. For Bar

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Exam applicants only, the character report and related

fee may be submitted separately from the application

for admission.

2. An applicant for admission under Rules 34(e)

or 34(g) shall submit character investigation materials

together with the application.

(d) Documents Required in Support of Application.

The following must accompany every application:

1. subject to the exception made in paragraph

(b)(1)(D) of this rule, the applicant’s law school diploma,

or other evidence satisfactory to the Committee on

Character and Fitness showing the applicant is a

graduate with a juris doctor degree from a law school

provisionally or fully approved by the American Bar

Association at the time of graduation;

2. if the applicant has been previously admitted to

practice law in any jurisdiction, foreign or domestic,

the certificate of the appropriate court agency(ies) or

the mandatory bar association, whichever has custody

of the roll of attorneys in such jurisdiction, indicating the date of admission and that the applicant

is presently in good standing concerning discipline,

payment of mandatory dues and compliance with

mandatory continuing legal education, or that the

applicant resigned in good standing in that jurisdiction; although, if the applicant is not in good standing

or did not resign in good standing in all jurisdictions

solely because of unpaid mandatory fees or incomplete

mandatory continuing legal education requirements,

and the applicant has attempted to but cannot cure

such deficiencies in the other jurisdiction(s), the Committee on Character and Fitness may evaluate the

circumstances and make a recommendation to the

Supreme Court for admission or denial of admission.

3. a full-face image of the applicant in a format as

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established by the Court; and

4. a complete set of the applicant’s fingerprints.

The Committee on Character and Fitness is authorized to receive criminal history information regarding

any applicant for admission from any law enforcement

agency in conjunction with the admissions process.

If after two attempts, the FBI determines the fingerprints provided are not readable, the applicant must

submit a written statement, under oath, that the applicant has not been arrested, charged, indicted, convicted of or pled guilty to any felony or misdemeanor,

other than as disclosed on the application.

(e) Admission on Motion.

1. An applicant who meets the requirements of (A)

through (G) of this paragraph (e)(1) may, upon motion,

be admitted to the practice of law in this jurisdiction.

The applicant shall:

A. either (i) have been admitted by bar examination to practice law in another jurisdiction allowing for

admission of Arizona lawyers on a basis equivalent to

this rule and primarily engaged in the active practice

of law in one or more state(s), territories, or the District

of Columbia for 3 of the 5 years immediately preceding

the date upon which the application was filed, or (ii)

have been admitted by bar examination to practice law

in another jurisdiction that does not allow for admission of Arizona lawyers on a basis equivalent to this

rule and thereafter were admitted to and primarily engaged in the active practice of law in another jurisdiction allowing admission of Arizona lawyers on a basis

equivalent to this rule for 3 of the 5 years immediately

preceding the date upon which the application is filed;

B. hold a juris doctor degree from a law school approved by the Council of the Section of Legal Education

and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Asso-

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ciation at the time of graduation;

C. submit evidence of a passing score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination as it is

established in this jurisdiction;

D. establish that the applicant is currently a member in good standing or resigned in good standing

concerning discipline, payment of mandatory dues,

and compliance with mandatory legal education, in all

jurisdictions where admitted; although, if the applicant is not in good standing or did not resign in good

standing in all jurisdictions solely because of unpaid

mandatory fees or incomplete mandatory continuing

legal education requirements, and the applicant has

attempted to but cannot cure such deficiencies in the

other jurisdiction(s), the Committee on Character and

Fitness may evaluate the circumstances and make a

recommendation to the Supreme Court for admission

or denial of admission;

E. establish that the applicant is not currently subject to lawyer discipline or the subject of a pending

disciplinary matter in any jurisdiction;

F. establish that the applicant possesses the character and fitness to practice law in this jurisdiction;

and

G. submit evidence of successful completion of the

course on Arizona law described in paragraph (j) of this

rule.

2. For the purposes of this rule, the “active practice of law” shall include the following activities, if performed in a jurisdiction in which the applicant is admitted, or if performed in a jurisdiction that permits

such activity by a lawyer not admitted to practice; however, in no event shall any activities that were performed in advance of bar admission in some state, territory, or the District of Columbia be accepted toward

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the durational requirement:

A. representation of clients in the practice of law;

B. service as a lawyer with a local, state, or federal

agency, including military service;

C. teaching law full-time at a law school approved

by the Council of the Section of Legal Education and

Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association;

D. service as a judge in a federal, state, territorial,

or local court of record;

E. service as a judicial law clerk;

F. service as corporate counsel; or

G. service as corporate counsel in Arizona while

registered pursuant to Rule 38(a). Active practice

performed within Arizona pursuant to Rule 38(a) may

be applied to meet active practice requirements found

in Rule 34(e)(1)(A)(ii) provided all other requirements

of Rule 34(e) are met.

3. For purposes of this rule, the active practice of

law shall not include work that, as undertaken, constituted the unauthorized practice of law in the jurisdiction in which it was performed or in the jurisdiction in

which the clients receiving the unauthorized services

were located. The “active practice of law” is further

defined to require that at all times in the durational

period the applicant has held a law license in “active”

status.

4. An applicant shall not be eligible for admission

on motion if within 3 years of filing the application

the applicant has either 1) failed the Bar Exam, or

2) passed another jurisdiction’s bar examination accepted by the Court, but failed to achieve the minimum

passing score deemed acceptable by the Court.

5. The Court shall approve jurisdictions considered

“reciprocal” to Arizona, and the Committee shall pub-

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lish and make available a list of reciprocal jurisdictions.

(f) Admission on Motion Application Filing; Fees.

Any applicant seeking admission on motion to the

practice of law in Arizona must meet the requirements

of paragraph (e) of this rule and:

1. shall file an application for admission on motion, including character investigation information, in

a manner established by the Court, including all required supporting documents;

2. shall pay the application fee as established by

the Court; and

3. may request that the Committee perform an

initial review of the applicant’s application to determine whether the applicant meets the active practice

requirement. The request must be received prior to

the Committee commencing its investigation. Upon

applicant’s written request, the Committee shall determine whether applicant meets the active practice

requirement and provide the applicant with a written

determination. If applicant fails to meet the active

practice requirement, the Committee shall refund

that portion of the application fee as determined by

the Court.

(g) Admission by Transfer of Bar Examination

Score.

1. An applicant who has taken another jurisdiction’s bar examination that is deemed acceptable by

the Court and who meets the requirements of (A)

through (G) of this paragraph (g)(1) may be admitted

to the practice of law in this jurisdiction. Admission

under this Rule 34(g) must be accomplished through

score transfer from another jurisdiction’s bar examination or other test of minimum competency deemed

acceptable by the Court.

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The applicant shall:

A. have achieved a score on another jurisdiction’s

bar examination that is equal to or greater than the

minimum acceptable score established by the Court

and that was earned within 5 years prior to the applicant’s taking the oath of admission and being admitted

to the practice of law in Arizona;

B. hold a juris doctor degree from a law school approved by the Council of the Section of Legal Education

and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association at the time of graduation;

C. submit evidence of a passing score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination as it is

established in this jurisdiction, earned within 8 years

of the date of application or within the time frame for

taking the oath of admission after the successful bar

examination in order to have the applicant’s score accepted by the Committee on Examinations;

D. establish that the applicant is currently a member in good standing concerning discipline, payment of

mandatory dues and compliance with mandatory continuing legal education in every jurisdiction, foreign

or domestic, wherever admitted to practice law, or the

applicant resigned in good standing; although, if the

applicant is not in good standing or did not resign in

good standing in all jurisdictions solely because of unpaid mandatory fees or incomplete mandatory continuing legal education requirements, and the applicant

has attempted to but cannot cure such deficiencies in

the other jurisdiction(s), the Committee on Character

and Fitness may evaluate the circumstances and make

a recommendation to the Supreme Court for admission

or denial of admission;

E. establish that the applicant is not currently subject to lawyer discipline or the subject of a pending

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disciplinary matter in any jurisdiction;

F. establish that the applicant possesses the character and fitness to practice law in this jurisdiction;

and

G. submit evidence of successful completion of the

course on Arizona law described in paragraph (i) of this

rule.

2. For the purpose of paragraph (g)(1)(A) of this

rule, a score is considered to have been earned on the

date of administration of the other jurisdiction’s bar

examination that resulted in the score.

3. An applicant who failed to earn the minimum

acceptable score established by the Court within 4 attempts, regardless of where the bar examination was

taken, shall not be eligible for admission by transfer of

bar examination score under this paragraph.

4. Before being admitted under this Rule 34(g), the

applicant must complete a course on Arizona law, the

content and method of delivery of which shall be approved by the Supreme Court.

(h) Admission by Transfer of Bar Examination

Score Application Filing; Fees. Any applicant seeking

admission to the practice of law under Rule 34(g) shall:

1. file an application for admission by transfer of

bar examination score, including character investigation information, in a manner established by the

Court, including all required supporting documents,

and

2. pay the application fee as established by the

Court.

(i) Completion of Course on Arizona Law. Before

being admitted, applicants applying to practice law in

Arizona under Rules 34(e), 34(g), or 35 must complete

a course on Arizona law, the content and delivery of

which shall be approved by the Supreme Court.

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(j) Deficiency in Character Report Materials. If

the Committee on Character and Fitness finds that

the character report materials are deficient, the Committee shall advise the applicant in writing of the

deficiency and shall allow a reasonable time for the applicant either to submit additional written information

or relevant documentation, or to correct or otherwise

remedy the defects in the applicant’s supporting documents. Thereafter, if such deficiencies have not been

cured within the designated time period, the application shall be considered abandoned by the applicant

and the Committee’s review of the investigation into

the applicant’s character shall cease, and the Committee shall advise applicant of such abandonment

and the reasons therefore. If the application has been

abandoned for more than one year and the applicant

later seeks to continue the admission process, applicant must submit a new application and associated

fees.

(k) Failure to Meet Standards; Effect on Time for

Reapplication. If the Committee or the Court has denied an applicant admission to the practice of law by

reason of the failure to meet the standards required

by paragraph (b) of this rule, such applicant may not

reapply for a period of 5 years from the date of denial of

admission, unless the Committee or the Court orders

otherwise.

(l) Completion of Professionalism Course.

1. New Admittee Professionalism Course. Except

as otherwise provided in this rule, within one year after being admitted to the practice of law, the applicant

shall complete the state bar course on professionalism,

or an equivalent course on the principles of professionalism approved or licensed by the Board of Governors

of the State Bar of Arizona for this purpose.

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A. A new admittee taking inactive status immediately upon admission is exempt from completing such

a course but shall complete one within 12 months of

becoming an active member of the state bar.

B. A new admittee who is an active member but

neither resides nor practices law in Arizona is exempt

from completing such a course but shall complete one

within 12 months of becoming a resident of or commencing the practice of law in Arizona.

2. Summary Suspension. A new admittee who fails

to comply with the requirements of paragraph (l)(1) of

this rule shall be summarily suspended from the practice of law in Arizona, upon motion of the state bar

pursuant to Rule 62, provided that a notice by certified, return receipt mail of such non-compliance shall

have been sent to the member, mailed to the member’s

last address of record in the state bar office at least 30

days prior to such suspension, but may be reinstated

in accordance with these rules.

Arizona Supreme Court Rule 38 — Certifications

and Limited Admissions to Practice Law (as

amended effective January 1, 2025)

(a) In-house Counsel.

(1) General Statement and Eligibility. As used in

this rule, “in-house counsel” shall refer to an attorney who is employed within the State of Arizona as

in-house counsel or a related position for a single forprofit or non-profit corporation, association, or other

organizational entity, which can include its parents,

subsidiaries and/or affiliates, the business of which is

lawful. A lawyer who is not a member of the State Bar

of Arizona who has been admitted to practice law in

another jurisdiction may apply for an Arizona Certificate of Registration of In-House Counsel if all of the

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following conditions are met:

(A) The applicant holds a juris doctor degree from

a law school approved by the Council of the Section

of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the

American Bar Association;

(B) The applicant is currently a member in good

standing concerning discipline, payment of mandatory

dues, and compliance with mandatory continuing legal

education, whether active, inactive, or retired, of the

bar of another state or the District of Columbia, or eligible to practice before the highest court in any state,

territory or insular possession of the United States;

although, if the applicant is not in good standing or

did not resign in good standing in all jurisdictions

solely because of unpaid mandatory fees or incomplete

mandatory continuing legal education requirements,

and the applicant has attempted to but cannot cure

such deficiencies in the other jurisdiction(s), the Committee on Character and Fitness may evaluate the

circumstances and make a recommendation to the

Supreme Court for admission or denial of admission;

and

Arizona as in-house counsel, as hereinabove defined,

may apply for an Arizona Certificate of Registration of

In- House Counsel (“Registration Certificate”).

(2) Foreign Lawyer Eligibility. A lawyer employed

as in-house counsel within the State of Arizona who is

admitted to practice and a member in good standing

in a jurisdiction outside of the United States, in accordance with the standards and requirements generally

applicable to the practice of law in that jurisdiction,

may also apply for a Registration Certificate.

(3) Filing Requirements. Any attorney who commences employment by an eligible organization as in-

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house counsel shall apply for a Registration Certificate

within ninety (90) days of the date of commencement

of employment.

(A) An applicant for a Registration Certificate

shall:

(i) file with the State Bar of Arizona its form of verified application for an Arizona Certificate of Registration of In-House Counsel;

(ii) attach to the verified application a certificate

from the state bar or from the clerk of the highest admitting court of each state, territory, or insular possession of the United States, or foreign jurisdiction, in

which the applicant has been admitted to practice law

certifying the current status of the applicant’s membership or eligibility to practice therein;

(iii) certify that the applicant has read and is familiar with the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct;

(iv) pay an application fee in an amount established

by the Supreme Court; and

(v) submit evidence that the applicant has successfully completed the course on Arizona law described in

Rule 34(j).

(B) Upon a determination by the State Bar of

Arizona that the applicant has complied with the

requirements of subdivision (3)(A), the State Bar shall

issue to the applicant a Registration Certificate. The

State Bar shall promptly notify any applicant if it

determines that an application fails to comply with the

requirements of subdivision (3)(A), and the applicant

shall have thirty (30) days from the date of such notice

in which to cure any deficiency. If the applicant fails to

cure such deficiency within that thirty (30) day period,

the application shall be deemed denied.

Court for a waiver of any of the requirements for reg-

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istration under this rule.

(4) Scope of Authority. Except as provided in this

rule, the holder of a valid and current Registration

Certificate shall be entitled to the benefits and responsibilities of active members of the State Bar of Arizona.

A Registration Certificate shall not authorize the registrant to provide legal services to any person or entity except when providing legal services to the one for

which the registrant serves as in-house counsel, or its

parents, subsidiaries or affiliates, or when providing

legal services under Rule 38(d).

(5) Discipline and Disability Jurisdiction. The

holder of a Registration Certificate shall be subject

to the jurisdiction of the courts and agencies of the

State of Arizona and to the State Bar of Arizona with

respect to the laws and rules of this state governing

the conduct and discipline of attorneys to the same

extent as an active member of the State Bar.

(6) Termination of Certification. A lawyer’s authority to practice as in-house counsel under a Registration

Certificate issued pursuant to this rule shall be suspended when the lawyer is suspended or disbarred for

disciplinary reasons in any jurisdiction of the United

States, or by any federal court or agency, or by any

foreign nation before which that lawyer has been admitted to practice.

(7) Registration, Fees and CLE Requirements.

(A) On or before February 1 of each year, in-house

counsel registered pursuant to the provisions of this

rule, who continues to be employed as in-house counsel within the State of Arizona, shall renew the Registration Certificate and pay a renewal fee set by the

Supreme Court.

(B) An attorney registered pursuant to this rule

who has become employed by a different eligible entity

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but continues to meet all the requirements of this rule,

must apply for the issuance of an amended Registration Certificate to reflect that change.

Certificate under this rule shall satisfy the continuing legal education requirements, if any, of at least

one of the other state(s) or jurisdiction(s) in which

that lawyer is admitted to practice. If not subject to

mandatory continuing legal education requirement

in the other state(s) or jurisdiction(s), the lawyer

shall comply with Arizona’s continuing legal education

requirements. On or before September 15 of each

calendar year, every registered in-house counsel shall

file an affidavit demonstrating full compliance with

this rule.

(8) Reporting Requirements. Each lawyer issued a

Registration Certificate shall report to the State Bar

of Arizona, within thirty (30) days, any change in bar

membership status in any jurisdiction of the United

States or in any foreign jurisdiction where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law, or the

imposition of any disciplinary sanction by any federal

or state court or agency before which the applicant has

been admitted to practice, or in any state in which the

lawyer has rendered legal services while temporarily

authorized under any rule or by admission pro hac vice.

If there is a change in circumstances, and an attorney holding a current Registration Certificate becomes

ineligible for such Certificate, the attorney shall notify the State Bar of Arizona of such change in writing

within thirty (30) days.

(9) Pro Hac Vice Admission. In providing legal

services to the lawyer’s employer, a lawyer who has

been issued a Registration Certificate under this rule

may also secure admission pro hac vice in Arizona

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to provide the services authorized in the preceding

paragraph by complying with the requirements of Rule

39 of these rules. A lawyer who has been issued a

Registration Certificate under this rule may provide

services under Rule 38(d) without securing admission

pro hac vice.

A lawyer serving as in-house counsel in Arizona

who fails to register pursuant to the provisions of this

rule shall be ineligible for admission pro hac vice in

Arizona, and may be referred by the State Bar of Arizona to the Bar admission and/or disciplinary regulatory authority in any jurisdiction in which that lawyer

has been admitted to practice law.

(10) Subsequent Admission. If an attorney registered under this rule is subsequently admitted to

the practice of law in Arizona, that attorney’s inhouse counsel registration shall be superseded by the

Arizona license to practice law.

(b) Foreign Legal Consultant.

(1) General Statement and Eligibility. A “foreign

legal consultant” is a person who is admitted to practice and is in good standing as an attorney or counselor

at law or the equivalent in a foreign country and has

been issued a certificate of registration as a foreign legal consultant. To be issued a certificate of registration

as a foreign legal consultant, an applicant must:

(A) have been admitted to practice and have been

in good standing concerning discipline, payment of

mandatory dues, and compliance with mandatory

continuing legal education as an attorney or counselor

at law or the equivalent in a foreign country for not

less than five years immediately preceding the date

of the application; although, if the applicant is not in

good standing or did not resign in good standing in all

jurisdictions solely because of unpaid mandatory fees

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or incomplete mandatory continuing legal education

requirements, and the applicant has attempted to but

cannot cure such deficiencies in the other jurisdiction(s), the Committee on Character and Fitness may

evaluate the circumstances and make a recommendation to the Supreme Court for admission or denial of

admission;

(B) have engaged in the practice of law in such country or in a profession or occupation that requires admission to practice and good standing as an attorney or

counselor at law or the equivalent in such country for

at least three of the five years immediately preceding

the date of the application;

all applicants for admission to the practice of law in

Arizona;

(D) intend to practice as a registered foreign legal

consultant in Arizona and to maintain an office in Arizona for that purpose; and

(E) possess the necessary documentation evidencing compliance with the immigration laws of the United

States;

(2) Filing Requirements. An applicant must file

an application for foreign legal consultant registration

with the Committee on Character and Fitness on a

form supplied by the Committee. An application must

include all of the following:

(A) an application fee as established by the Supreme

Court;

(B) a character report and character investigation

fee as established by the Supreme Court;

authority having jurisdiction over professional discipline in each foreign county in which the applicant is

admitted to practice, certifying the applicant’s admis-

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sion to practice, date of admission and good standing

as an attorney or counselor at law or the equivalent;

(D) a letter of recommendation from one of the

members of the executive body of each professional

body or public authority referenced in (2)(C) or from

one of the judge of the highest law court or court of

original jurisdiction in each foreign county in which

the applicant is admitted;

(E) duly authenticated English translations of the

certificate required by (2)(C) and the letter of recommendation required by (2)(D), if they are not in English; and

(F) other evidence of applicant’s educational and

professional qualifications, character and fitness, and

satisfaction of the conditions of (1) of this rule as the

Committee on Character and Fitness may require.

If strict compliance with the provisions of (C) of this

rule would cause the applicant unnecessary hardship

or upon a showing of exceptional professional qualifications to practice as a foreign legal consultant, the

Committee may waive or vary the application of those

provisions and permit the applicant to furnish other

evidence.

(3) Scope of Authority.

(A) Scope of Practice. A person registered to practice as a foreign legal consultant under this rule may

render legal services in Arizona subject, however, to

the limitations that he or she shall not:

(i) appear for a person other than himself or herself as attorney in any court, or before any magistrate

or other judicial officer, in this state other than upon

admission pro hac vice pursuant to Rule 39;

(ii) prepare any deed, mortgage, assignment, discharge, lease, or any other instrument affecting title

to real estate located in the United States of America;

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(iii) prepare any will or trust instrument affecting

the disposition on death of any property located in

the United States of America and owned by a resident

thereof;

(iv) prepare any instrument relating to the administration of a decedent’s estate in the United States of

America;

(v) prepare any instrument in respect to marital

relations, rights or duties of a resident of the United

States of America or the custody or care of the children

of a resident;

(vi) render professional legal advice on the law of

this state or of the United States of America (whether

rendered incident to the preparation of legal instruments or otherwise), except on the basis of advice from

a person duly qualified and entitled (otherwise than

by virtue of having been licensed under this rule) to

render professional legal advice in this state;

(vii) in any way hold himself or herself out as a

member of the state bar.

(B) Title of “Legal Consultant”. A person registered

as a foreign legal consultant under this rule shall at all

times use the title “legal consultant”, which shall be

used in conjunction with the name of the foreign country of his or her admission to practice, and shall not

carry on his or her practice under, or utilize in connection with such practice, any name, title or designation

other than one or more of the following:

(i) his or her own name;

(ii) the name of his or her law firm;

(iii) his or her authorized title in the foreign country

of his or her admission to practice, which may be used

in conjunction with the name of such country.

(4) Rights and Obligations. A foreign legal consultant registered under this rule shall not be a member of

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the state bar but shall be considered an affiliate of the

state bar subject to the same conditions and requirements as apply to a member of the state bar under the

Rules of the Supreme Court governing members of the

state bar, insofar as conditions and requirements are

consistent with the provisions of this rule, and shall:

(A) have the right, in the same manner and to the

same extent as members of the state bar, to:

(i) employ one or more members of the state bar;

(ii) be employed by one or more members of the

state bar or by any partnership or professional corporation that includes members of the state bar or that

maintains an office in this state; or

(iii) be a partner in any partnership or shareholder

in any professional corporation that includes members

of the state bar or that maintains an office in this state;

(B) enjoy and be subject to all rights and obligations

with respect to attorney-client privilege, work-product

privilege, and other professional privileges in the same

manner and to the same extent as members of the state

bar; and

registration, a foreign legal consultant shall complete

the state bar course on professionalism, or an equivalent course on the principles of professionalism approved or licensed by the Board of Governors of the

State Bar of Arizona for this purpose.

(5) Discipline and Disability Jurisdiction. A person

registered as a foreign legal consultant under this rule

shall be subject to professional discipline and disability proceedings in the same manner and to the same

extent as members of the state bar.

(6) Termination of Registration. If the Supreme

Court determines that a person registered as a foreign

legal consultant under this rule no longer meets the

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conditions for registration, it may summarily terminate the foreign legal consultant’s registration. Upon

termination of the registration, the person shall immediately cease acting as a foreign legal consultant,

notify in writing all clients in pending matters, and

opposing counsel in pending matters, of the termination of the person’s authority to act as a foreign legal

consultant, and take all necessary steps to protect the

interests of clients.

(7) Registration and Fees. A person registered as

a foreign legal consultant must renew his or her registration and pay a renewal fee set the Supreme Court

on or before February 1 of each year.

(8) Registration Number. A person registered as

a foreign legal consultant shall be assigned a registration number, which will be used to identify that

person’s registration status in Arizona. Any pleading

signed by the foreign legal consultant must include the

person’s registration number.

(9) Subsequent Attorney Admission. If a person

registered as a foreign legal consultant in Arizona is

subsequently admitted to the practice of law in Arizona, that person’s foreign legal consultant registration will be superseded by the Arizona license to practice law.

(1) General Statement and Eligibility. The Supreme

Court may certify a law professor who has been admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction in the United

States to practice law in Arizona if all the following

conditions are met:

(A) the applicant is a graduate with a juris doctor degree from a law school provisionally or fully approved by the American Bar Association at the time of

the applicant’s graduation;

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(B) the applicant is employed full-time as a faculty

member at a law school in Arizona which is provisionally or fully approved by the American Bar Association;

concerning discipline, payment of mandatory dues,

and compliance with mandatory continuing legal education of the bar of all courts and jurisdictions in which

the applicant is admitted to practice; although, if the

applicant is not in good standing or did not resign in

good standing in all jurisdictions solely because of unpaid mandatory fees or incomplete mandatory continuing legal education requirements, and the applicant

has attempted to but cannot cure such deficiencies in

the other jurisdiction(s), the Committee on Character

and Fitness may evaluate the circumstances and make

a recommendation to the Supreme Court for admission

or denial of admission;

(D) the applicant is not currently subject to an order of attorney discipline or the subject of a pending

formal disciplinary or disability proceeding in any jurisdiction; and

(E) the applicant possesses the character and fitness required of all applicants for admission to the

practice of law in Arizona.

(2) Filing Requirements. An applicant must submit

an application for law professor certification with the

Committee on Character and Fitness on a form supplied by the Committee. The application must include

all of the following:

(A) an application fee as established by the Supreme

Court;

(B) a character report and character investigation

fee as established by the Supreme Court;

(D) a certificate of good standing from all courts

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and jurisdictions in which the applicant is admitted to

practice; and

(E) evidence that the applicant has successfully

completed the course on Arizona law described in Rule

34(j).

(3) Certification of Full-time and Clinical Law Professors.

(A) Full-time Law Professors. If the Committee determines that the full-time law professor possesses the

character and fitness required of other applicants for

admission, it shall recommend to the Court the applicant’s certification to practice law. The applicant may

not act as counsel for a client until certified under this

rule by order of the Court. A copy of the order ce

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

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