Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mark Mahon, Petitioner v. Apple Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 4, 2026

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK MAHON,

No. 24-3571

Plaintiff - Appellant,

D.C.No.4:20-cv-01534-YGR

MEMORANDUM*

APPLE INC., ITUNES

STORE; APPLE

DISTRIBUTION

INTERNATIONAL

LTD,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2026**

Before:

CALLAHAN,

BRESS, Circuit Judges.

FRIEDLAND,

and

Mark Mahon appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment and dismissal order in his

action alleging copyright infringement in connection

with a film he created. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

This disposition is not appropriate for

publication and is not precedent except as provided

by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is

suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.

R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

novo. Csutoras v. Paradise High Sch.-, 12 F.4th 960,

965 (9th Cir. 2021) (cross motions for summary

judgment); Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of

Am., 15 F.4th 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2021) (order

granting a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6)). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary

judgment for defendants on Mahon’s copyright

claims because Mahon failed to create a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether defendants

directly infringed on the film’s copyrights within the

United States. See VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918

F.3d 723, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2019) (setting forth

elements to establish direct infringement, including

that the defendant must have been “actively involved

in the infringement”); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters

Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir.

1998) (explaining that for the Copyright Act to apply,

“at least one alleged infringement must be completed

entirely within the United States” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion

in applying judicial estoppel to bar Mahon’s

contention that he, not his company, Maron Pictures,

owned the relevant copyrights. See Baughman v.

Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir.

2012) (setting forth standard of review and factors

for applying judicial estoppel, including that a party

would gain an unfair advantage from arguing a

position inconsistent with one that this court

previously accepted in granting relief).

The district court properly dismissed Mahon’s

moral rights claim because federal law does not

recognize moral rights protection for motion pictures.

See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir.

2015) (en banc) (explaining that “[m]otion pictures

specifically are excluded from moral rights

protection” under the Visual Artists Rights Act of

1990).

We do not consider matters not specifically

and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief,

or arguments and allegations raised for the first time

on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985

n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Appellees’ motions (Docket Entry Nos. 13, 31,

and 41) to file under seal Volume 6 of the excerpts of

record, Volume 2 of the supplemental excerpts of

record, and portions of the answering and reply

briefs are granted. The Clerk will maintain under

seal Docket Entry Nos. 10, 33, 34, and 40.

All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK MAHON,

No. 24-3571

Plaintiff - Appellant,

D.C.No.4:20-cv-01534-YGR

Northern District of

California, Oakland

APPLE INC.; et al.,

ORDER

Defendants - Appellees.

Before:

CALLAHAN,

BRESS, Circuit Judges.

FRIEDLAND,

and

The panel has voted to deny the petition for

panel rehearing.

The full court has been advised of the petition

for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a

vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. See

Fed. R. App. P. 40.

The petition for panel rehearing and petition

for rehearing en banc (Docket Entry No. 70) are

denied.

This court will not entertain further filings in

this closed case.

APPENDIX C

10a

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK MAHON,

No. 24-3570

Plaintiff - Appellant,

D.C.No.4:20-cv-01525-YGR

MEMORANDUM*

YOUTUBE, LLC;

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2026**

Before:

CALLAHAN,

FRIEDLAND,

and

BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Mark Mahon appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment and dismissal order in his

action alleging copyright infringement in connection

Ila

with a film he created. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

This disposition is not appropriate for

publication and is not precedent except as provided

by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is

suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.

R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

novo. Csutoras v. Paradise High Sch., 12 F.4th 960,

965 (9th Cir. 2021) (cross motions for summary

judgment); Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of

Am., 15 F.4th 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2021) (order

granting a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6)). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary

judgment for defendants on Mahon’s copyright

claims because Mahon failed to create a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether defendants

directly infringed on the film’s copyrights within the

United States. See VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918

F.3d 723, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2019) (setting forth

elements to establish direct infringement, including

that the defendant must have been “actively involved

in the infringement”); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters

Television Inti, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir.

1998) (explaining that for the Copyright Act to apply,

12a

“at least one alleged infringement must be completed

entirely within the United States” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion

in applying judicial estoppel to bar Mahon’s

contention that he, not his company, Maron Pictures,

owned the relevant copyrights. See Baughman v.

Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir.

2012) (setting forth standard of review and factors

for applying judicial estoppel, including that a party

would gain an unfair advantage from arguing a

position inconsistent with one that this court

previously accepted in granting relief).

The district court properly dismissed Mahon’s

moral rights claim because federal law does not

recognize moral rights protection for motion pictures.

See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir.

2015) (en banc) (explaining that “[m]otion pictures

specifically are excluded from moral rights

protection” under the Visual Artists Rights Act of

1990).

We do not consider matters not specifically

and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief,

or arguments and allegations raised for the first time

on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985

n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Appellees’ motions (Docket Entry Nos. 12, 21,

29, and 38) to file under seal Volumes 5 and 6 of the

excerpts of record, Exhibits 6-8 to the Declaration II

of A. John P. Mancini, and portions of the answering

13a

and reply briefs are granted. The Clerk will maintain

under seal Docket Entry Nos. 9, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5, 31,

and 36.

All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

14a

APPENDIX D

15a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK MAHON,

No. 24-3570

Plaintiff - Appellant,

D.C.No.4:20-cv-01525-YGR

Northern District of

California, Oakland

YOUTUBE, LLC and

GOOGLE LLC,

ORDER

Defendants - Appellees.

Before:

CALLAHAN,

BRESS, Circuit Judges.

FRIEDLAND,

and

The panel has voted to deny the petition for

panel rehearing.

The full court has been advised of the petition

for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a

vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. See

Fed. R. App. P. 40.

The petition for panel rehearing and petition

for rehearing en banc (Docket Entry No. 69) are

denied.

This court will not entertain further filings in

this closed case.

16a

APPENDIX E

17a

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK MAHON,

No. 24-3589

Plaintiff - Appellant,

D.C.No.4:20-cv-01523-YGR

MEMORANDUM*

MAINSAIL, LLC;

SHORELINE

ENTERTAINMENT

INC.; SAM EIGEN;

MORRIS RUSKIN,

Defendants - Appellees.

and

ENTERTAINMENT

ONE US, INC.,

ENTERTAINMENT

ONE, LTD., El

ENTERTAINMENT UK

LTD.,

ENTERTAINMENT

ONE U.S., LP,

18a

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2026**

Before:

CALLAHAN,

BRESS, Circuit Judges.

FRIEDLAND,

and

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2026**

This disposition is not appropriate for

publication and is not precedent except as provided

by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is

suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.

R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

19a

Mark Mahon appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his action alleging

labels, and state law claims for fraud and conversion,

all in relation to a film he created. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo the district court’s decision on cross motions for

summary judgment. Csutoras v. Paradise High Sch.,

12 F.4th 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary

judgment for defendants on Mahon’s copyright

claims because Mahon failed to create a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether defendants

directly infringed on the film’s copyrights or

materially contributed to, induced, or had the right

and ability to supervise another’s infringement. See

VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 723, 731-32

(9th Cir. 2019) (setting forth elements to establish

direct infringement, contributory, and vicarious

infringement). The district court did not abuse its

discretion in applying judicial estoppel to bar

Mahon’s contention that he, not his company, Maron

Pictures, owned the relevant copyrights. See

Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131,

1133 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth standard of review

and factors for applying judicial estoppel, including

that a party would gain an unfair advantage from

arguing a position inconsistent with one that a court

previously accepted in granting relief).

20a

The district court properly granted summary

judgment for defendants on Mahon’s claims of

tiafficking in counterfeit or illicit labels because

Mahon failed to create a triable dispute as to

whether defendants transported, transferred, or

disposed of any such labels for financial gain or

possessed such labels with intent to do the same. See

18 U.S.C. §§ 2318(a)(1) (prohibiting trafficking in

“counterfeit” and “illicit” labels), 2320(f)(5) (defining

trafficking).

The district court properly granted summary

judgment for defendants on Mahon’s conversion

claims because Mahon failed to create a triable

dispute as to whether he owned or had a right to

possess the DVDs and royalties in question. See Lee

v. Hanley, 354 P.3d 334, 344 (Cal. 2015) (setting

forth elements of conversion under California law,

including that the plaintiff must own or have the

right to possess the property).

The district court properly granted summary

judgment for defendants on Mahon’s concealment

claims because Mahon failed to create a triable

dispute as to whether defendants concealed or

suppressed any material fact. See Boschma v. Home

Loan Ctr., Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 890 (Ct. App.

2011) (setting forth elements for fraud or deceit on

the basis of concealment).

We do not consider matters not specifically

and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief,

21a

or arguments and allegations raised for the first time

on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985

n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

22a

APPENDIX F

23a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK MAHON,

No. 24-3589

Plaintiff - Appellant,

D.C.No.4:20-cv-01523-YGR

Northern District of

California, Oakland

MAINSAIL, LLC; et al., ORDER

Defendants - Appellees.

ENTERTAINMENT

ONE LICENSING US,

INC.; et al.,

Defendants.

Before:

CALLAHAN,

BRESS, Circuit Judges.

FRIEDLAND,

and

The panel has voted to deny the petition for

panel rehearing.

The full court has been advised of the petition

for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a

vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. See

Fed. R. App. P. 40.

24a

The petition for panel rehearing and petition

for rehearing en banc (Docket Entry No. 54) are

denied.

This court will not entertain further filings in

this closed case.

25a

APPENDIX G

26a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Mark Mahon,

Plaintiff,

Mainsail LLC,

ET AL.,

Defendants

Mark Mahon,

Plaintiff,

YouTube LLC,

ET AL.,

Defendants.

Mark Mahon,

Plaintiff,

Apple Inc.,

ET AL.,

CaseNo.4:20-cv-01523-YGR

Order Granting

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

For Summary

Judgment and

Denying Plaintiff’s

Motion for

Summary Judgment

CaseNo.4:20-cv-01525-YGR

Order Granting

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

For Summary

Judgment and

Denying Plaintiff’s

Motion for

Summary Judgment

CaseNo.4:20-cv-01534-YGR

Order Granting

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

For Summary

Judgment and

Denying Plaintiff’s

27a

Defendants.

Motion for

Summary Judgment

Pro se plaintiff Mark Mahon brings claims for

and conversion against defendants related to the

motion picture and screenplay titled Strength and

Honour (the “Film”). (Dkt. No. 53 in Case No. 201523, Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”).1 After two

omnibus orders regarding motions to dismiss, the list

of defendants has been narrowed to three —

Mainsail,2 Apple, and YouTube. (See Dkt. Nos. 44,

52.) Plaintiff alleges that Mainsail defendants

wrongfully distributed physical and digital copies of

the Film, and that YouTube and Apple distributed

digital copies of the Film without a license. Plaintiff

moves for summary judgment on claims that the

Mainsail defendants are liable for copyright

infringement, trafficking in counterfeit labels,

omission fraud, and conversion. (Dkt. No. 119 at 1.)

1 Unless otherwise specified, the Court references the docket

with the lowest filing number. See Mahon v. Mainsail LLC, No.

20-cv-01523. Where appropriate, the Court directly references

the other cases by number. See Mahon v. YouTube LLC, No. 20cv-1525; Mahon v. Apple Inc., No. 20-1534.

2 The Mainsail defendants include Mainsail LLC, Shoreline

Entertainment, Inc., Sam Eigen, Morris Ruskin, and Does 1

through 21 (collectively, “Mainsail”).

28a

He also moves for summary judgment on claims that

YouTube and Apple are liable for copyright

infringement. All defendants move for summary

judgment on grounds that they are not liable for the

above claims.3

Having carefully considered the parties’

briefing, the admissible evidence, the record in this

case, the reasons set forth below, and upon further

consideration after the February 16, 2024, hearing,

and supplemental briefing,4 the Court GRANTS

defendants’ motions for summary judgment and

DENIES plaintiffs motions for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff, with his production company Maron

Pictures, created the Film over the course of several

3 Apple and YouTube move to seal several documents

referenced in the briefing and plaintiff objects to their motions

to seal. (Dkt. Nos. 153, 154, 155, 165, 168, 175 of Case No. 20cv-01525; and 138, 139, 140, 143, 146, 152, 159 of Case No. 20cv-01534.) The motions to seal are GRANTED except as used

in this Order.

4 In response to the supplemental briefs, the parties filed

multiple objections and motions for leave to file motions to

strike. The Court has noted all objections and hereby DENIES

all motions for leave to strike.

29a

years.5 On August 6, 2009, “Maron Pictures,” not

plaintiff, registered a copyright in the Film 6

Prior to that date, on April 27, 2009, plaintiff

signed on behalf of Maron Pictures a sales agency

agreement (the “SAA”) granting Mainsail “the sole

and exclusive right, license, and privilege to license

and distribute” the Film.7 The agreement included a

provision allowing distribution throughout “the

entire world, excluding North America and Ireland.”

(DRSS at 15; Dkt. No. 118-3, Ex. B at 1.)

In May 2009, however, the parties emailed

each other regarding distribution rights in Ireland as

part of a distribution deal with sublicensee

Entertainment One. Defendants argue that these

emails demonstrate a modification to the agreement

allowing for distribution in Ireland. (See Dkt. No. 122

at 7; Dkt. No. 164 of Case No. 20-cv-1525 at 14.) On

5 Dkt. No. 122-1, Defendant’s Responsive Separate Statement,

(“DRSS”) at 2, 7, 10, 12.

6 Dkt. No. 166-44 of Case No. 20-cv-1525, Plaintiffs Responsive

Separate Statement to YouTube (‘YouTube PRSS”), at 4; 148-6

of Case No. 20-cv-1525.) Maron Pictures was listed as the

author and copyright claimant on the registration, though

plaintiff now maintains that this was a filing error. (YouTube

PRSS at 5.)

7 Dkt. No. 121-84, Plaintiffs Responsive Separate Statement

(“PRSS”) at 5; DRSS at 15; YouTube PRSS at 7; 118-3, Ex B at

11 1-

30a

May 14, 2009, defendant Eigen emailed plaintiff to

confirm that plaintiff “gave [Eigen] the go ahead” to

“close terms” on a “UK/Ireland offer for all rights

@100,000.” (YouTube PRSS at 10.) Plaintiff

responded later that day, writing: “That is great,

thanks.” {Id. at 12). On May 16, Eigen confirmed the

deal in another email to plaintiff, stating that Eigen’s

company “sold Mark Mahon’s STRENGTH &

HONOUR to El Entertainment for UK and Eire.”

{Id. at 13.)

In January 2010, the Film was released in the

Republic of Ireland. (DRSS at 23.) On January 30,

2010, plaintiff sent a case and desist letter to the

Mainsail defendants instructing them to cease

distributing the Film and to remove the cover images

and trailer that were being used to market the Film

{Id. at 24.) Plaintiff sent multiple follow-up

communications to Mainsail and its sublicensee,

Entertainment One, attempting to stop distribution.

(See id. at 25-28.) Plaintiff then pursued litigation in

California state court in 2013. See infra Part I.B.

On October 1, 2015, plaintiff cancelled the

his company, Maron Pictures, purportedly severing

the licensing chain below. (PRSS at 42.)

Mark Mahon —> Maron Pictures —> Mainsail —>

Entertainment One -> Apple and YouTube

Shortly thereafter, an attorney representing plaintiff

and Maron Pictures sent a letter to Mainsail

31a

terminating the licensing agreement between Maron

Pictures and Mainsail. (Id. at 43; Dkt. No. 118-7, Ex.

JJ.) Notably, the licensing agreement contained a

survival clause allowing Mainsail to “complete deals

already in place at the time when the term is ended

(Existing Deals). . . . Sales Agent shall be entitled to

receive, on a continuing basis, any sales commission

generated from any Existing Deals.” (YouTube PRSS

at 9; Dkt. No. 118-3, Ex. B at U 2.5.) Also, the

Pictures, not Mark Mahon, as the author and

claimant of the Film. (YouTube PRSS at 5; Dkt. No.

148-6 of Case No. 20-cv-1525.) In 2017, plaintiff filed

a supplementary copyright application with the

from Maron Pictures to Mark Mahon. He claimed

that he did so to correct a filing error (YouTube

PRSS at 53), although defendants dispute this. (See

Dkt. No. 122 at 16:25-26.)

February

2018,

Maron

Pictures

unexpectedly received an email from Entertainment

One displaying revenue for the Film along with the

words “Shoreline Entertainment.” (DRSS at 45.)

Plaintiff argues that this email presents new

evidence that the Mainsail defendants, which include

Shoreline Entertainment, made revenue from the

Film despite representations to the contrary by

Mainsail and its representatives. (Dkt. No. 119 at

6:12-13; DRSS at 41, 45.)

32a

In early 2019, plaintiff purchased the Film

from YouTube and plaintiffs friend purchased a copy

from Apple. (DRSS at 46, 48.) In December 2019,

plaintiff contacted the defendants for the first time,

demanding the removal of the Film from their

platforms. (Dkt. No. 151 in Case No. 20-cv-1534

(“Apple PRSS”) at p.6; YouTube PRSS at 44.)

YouTube and Apple informed plaintiff that the Film

had already been removed from YouTube in March

2019, pursuant to instructions from Entertainment

One, and from Apple’s iTunes service in May 2019.

(Apple PRSS at p.6; YouTube PRSS at 28.)

In December 2019, Visual Data, a third party

to which plaintiff sent Film materials for processing

in 2009, sent plaintiff a chart displaying data about

the whereabouts of various assets, including two

DVD copies that plaintiff argues are film masters.

(DRSS at 17, 49.) The chart shows the two copies at

issue being sent to Mainsail’s office in 2017. (Id. at

50.) Plaintiff argues that this chart shows new, nontime-barred, evidence that “Visual Data had copied”

the Film on Mainsail’s direct instruction and

distributed these counterfeit copies to companies all

over the world.” (Dkt. No. 119 at 6:20-21.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, through his production company

Maron Pictures, of which he is the 100% owner

(DRSS at 10), sued Mainsail in California superior

court in March 2013. (Id. at 34.) In 2016, that court

33a

found in favor of Mainsail, ruling, among other

things, that Maron Pictures was not entitled to

terminate its agreement with Mainsail and was not

entitled to an accounting. See Maron Pictures Ltd. u.

Eigen, No. B280738, 2019 WL 642871, at *1 (Cal. Ct.

App. Feb. 15, 2019). In 2019, the California Court of

Appeal affirmed. Id. The California Supreme Court

then denied certiorari. Maron Pictures Ltd. v. Eigen,

140 S. Ct. 516, (2019).

Plaintiff then brought this dispute to the

federal courts, alleging copyright and related claims

that are separate from those raised in state court,

though they stem from the same agreement analyzed

by the California courts. (Compare TAC at | 27 with

Maron Pictures Ltd. 2019 WL 642871, at *1.)

Over the course of significant discovery and

two orders on motions to dismiss, this Court allowed

some limited claims to proceed,8 noting the following:

•

Plaintiffs copyright claims can proceed

under the (a) discovery rule (described as

“when a party discovers, or reasonably should

have discovered, the alleged infringement”

Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

8 In plaintiff s operative complaint against Mainsail, claim 1 is

for copyright infringement. (TAC

72-81.) Claim 2 is for

trafficking in counterfeit labels. (Id.

83-90.) Claim 3 is for

fraud. (Id.

92-100.) Claim 4 is for conversion. (Id. at

102108.) The only claim against the other two defendants is for

34a

922 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2019)) and (b)

separate accrual rule (stating “[e]ach time an

infringing work is reproduced or distributed”

and “[e]ach wrong gives rise to a discrete

‘claim’ that ‘accrues at the time the wrong

occurs.’” Id. The Court noted that plaintiff may

bring a claim for violations described in Visual

Data’s 2019 report and any other new

infringement he uncovers via discovery. (Dkt.

No. 44 at 8-9.)

Plaintiffs counterfeit label trafficking

claims must allege, in good faith, that

Mainsail possessed or transferred counterfeit

labels within the [statute of limitations

period], (denying prior claims that defendants

trafficked in counterfeit labels dating back to

2010.) (Dkt. No. 52 at 10.)

Plaintiffs fraud claims can proceed under

theories of omission fraud, stating “[i]n these

circumstances, Mainsail’s nondisclosure of its

instruction to Visual Data to send it master

copies of the Film in 2017 plausibly constitutes

an actionable omission because Mainsail had a

contractual duty to pay Mahon revenues from

its activities and concealed facts that would

have shown its failure to do so. (Dkt. No. 52 at

13.)

Plaintiffs California law conversion claim

can proceed if he can show evidence that

35a

Mainsail obtained master copies of the Film in

2017 without returning them. The Court noted

that conversion claims based solely on the

conversion of intangible property (copyrights)

are preempted. (Dkt. No. 52 at 14.)

As the Court previously noted, plaintiffs claims are

subject to a three-year statute of limitations.9 (Dkt.

No. 44 at 8, 15-17; Dkt. No. 52 at 9.) Plaintiff filed

suit against all defendants on March 2, 2020.

Therefore, the operative date for the three-year

statute of limitations period is March 2, 2017.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Procedural Framework

A party may move for summary judgment on a

“claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As a general

matter, where the party moving for summary

judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it

bears the initial burden of proof at summary

judgment as to each material fact and must show

that no reasonable jury could find other than for the

moving party. See S. California Gas Co. v. City of

Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003)

(internal citation omitted). Summary judgment is

appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute

9 Though the Court’s prior orders do not specify, the California

statute of limitations period for conversion is three years as

well. Strasberg v. Odyssey Group, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th

906, 915 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(c)).

36a

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

To determine if this is so, the court must view all

evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and draw all justified inferences on

its behalf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986).

“[W]hen parties submit cross-motions for

summary judgment, each motion must be considered

on its own merits.” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside

Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th

Cir. 2001) (alternation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, “[t]he court must rule on each party’s

motion on an individual and separate basis,

determining, for each side, whether a judgment may

be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.”

Id. (quoting WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2720, at 335-36

(3d. ed. 1998)). If, however, the cross-motions are

before the court at the same time, the court must

consider the evidence proffered by both sets of

motions before ruling on either one. Id. at 1135-36.

B. Liability Framework

1. Copyright Infringement - all defendants

Plaintiff alleges that the Mainsail defendants

committed direct, contributory, and vicarious

complaints against YouTube and Apple, he alleges

37a

that each committed direct and contributory

infringement.

“To prevail on a claim of direct copyright

infringement,” a party “must establish ownership of

the allegedly infringed material” and that the alleged

infringer “violated at least one exclusive right”

granted to it under 17 U.S.C. § 106. VHT, Inc. v.

Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 723, 731 (9th Cir. 2019)

(cleaned up). “Contributory liability requires that a

party (1) has knowledge of another's infringement

and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b)

induces that infringement. Id. at 745 (cleaned up). To

prevail on a vicarious liability claim, “[plaintiff] must

prove [defendant] has (1) the right and ability to

supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct

financial interest in the infringing activity.” Id. at

746 (cleaned up).

2. Counterfeit Labels - Mainsail only

Plaintiff brings claims that Mainsail trafficked

in counterfeit and illicit labels for the Film. The Anti

Counterfeiting Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2318,

prohibits trafficking of “counterfeit” and “illicit”

labels. 18 U.S.C. § 2318(a)(1). A “counterfeit label”

means “an identifying label or container that appears

to be genuine, but is not.” 18 U.S.C. § 2318(b)(1). An

“illicit label” means a labeling component that is

“used by the copyright owner to verify that [the

work] is not counterfeit or infringing” and that is

used without authorization to distribute another

38a

work or else the same work in greater quantities or

to more users than authorized. 18 U.S.C. §

2318(b)(4).

3. Fraud by Omission - Mainsail only

With respect to the claims for fraud or deceit

based on concealment under California law, plaintiff

must allege that (1) the defendant (a) concealed or

suppressed a material fact, (b) was under a duty to

disclose the fact to the plaintiff, and (c) intentionally

concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to

defraud the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff must have been

unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he

did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed

fact, and (3) as a result of the concealment or

suppression of fact, the plaintiff sustained damage.10

Boschma v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc., 198 Cal. App. 4th

230, 248 (2011).

4. Conversion - Mainsail only

Finally, with respect to the conversion claim

under California law, the elements of conversion are

(1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of

the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by

wrongful act inconsistent with the property rights of

10 An alternative formulation for fraud under California law

requires plaintiff to allege “(a) a misrepresentation (false

representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of

falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce

reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.”

Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009).

39a

the plaintiff; and (3) damages. In re Emery, 317 F.3d

1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiffs License-Based Claims for

Plaintiff alleges that Mainsail infringed his

to Entertainment One for distribution in Ireland.

(Dkt. No. 119 at 14-20.) Plaintiff also brings claims

that the Film’s distribution included counterfeit

labels. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiffs claims against YouTube

and Apple rest solely on he and his friend’s

purchases of the Film in Ireland. (See Dkt. No. 146 in

Case No. 20-cv-1525 at 7; Dkt. No. 136 in Case No.

20-cv-1534 at 7.) The defendants move to dismiss

plaintiffs claims on grounds that a valid license

existed permitting the sale of the Film in Ireland.

The Court analyzes this defense.

First, the Court finds no dispute that Maron

Pictures and Mainsail entered an agreement

granting “the sole and exclusive right, license, and

privilege to license and distribute” the Film to

defendant Mainsail. (Dkt. No. 121-84, Plaintiffs

Responsive Separate Statement (“PRSS”) at 5; DRSS

at 15; YouTube PRSS at 7.) Although the agreement

initially included a provision allowing distribution

throughout “the entire world, excluding North

America and Ireland” (DRSS at 15), the Court finds

40a

that the parties later modified the agreement to

allow for the Film’s distribution in Ireland.

On May 14, 2009, plaintiff received an email

from defendant Eigen confirming that plaintiff “gave

[Eigen] the go ahead” to “close terms” on a

“UK/Ireland offer for all rights @100,000.” (YouTube

PRSS at 10.) Plaintiff responded: “That is great,

thanks.” (Id. at 12.) He confirmed in his deposition

that this “UK/Ireland offer” was the Entertainment

One offer. (Id. at 11.) Then, on May 16, plaintiff

authorized Mainsail to enter a Distribution License

Agreement granting Entertainment One’s UK entity

a license to distribute the Film in the U.K and

Ireland. (Id. at 13.). That same day, Mainsail and

Entertainment One entered the Distribution License

Agreement. (Id. at 15.) Eigen also informed plaintiff

on May 16 that Mainsail sold S&H to eOne UK “for

UK and Eire.” (Id. at 13). Plaintiff responded the

next day, and confirmed he had “giv[en]

authorization” to Mainsail on May 16 “to close the

deal with [Entertainment One].” (Id. at 14).

Plaintiff thereafter continued to acknowledge

that Entertainment One’s license validly covered

distribution rights in Ireland. On September 28,

2009, Mahon asked an Entertainment One affiliate

to confirm when eOne would begin distributing S&H

in Ireland, stating “I had a conference call with my

Executive Producer . . . who told me that I wasn’t to

release the high res. Key art until we are given the

41a

dates for U.K. and Ireland (dvd) . . . .” (Dkt. No 164-6

of Case No. 20-1525 at 65.) Further, in December

2009, plaintiff emailed Eigen stating that he was in a

store in Ireland and asked Eigen why he wasn’t

seeing advertising for the Film. (Dkt. No. 122-3, Ex.

EEE), ii

Plaintiff asserts two arguments, neither of

which persuade. Plaintiffs only factual rebuttal

regarding a modification to sell in Ireland is an

unsupported statement that “Ireland” and “Eire” in

the above communications referenced Northern

Ireland, and not the Republic of Ireland. (Dkt. No

121 at 3.) Plaintiff presents no evidence at all that

anyone understood the agreement to affect Northern

Ireland, and the communications above demonstrate

an intention for the agreement to allow distribution

11 The record is replete with evidence mentioning the Film’s

sales and distribution in “Ireland” and “Eire,” without any

corrections or clarifications of “Northern Ireland.” The Court

need not credit plaintiffs self-serving declaration to the

contrary. See Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir.

1993) (“When the nonmoving party relies only on its own

affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an

issue of material fact.”). (See PRSS at Additional Fact 16

stating “Maron Pictures made clear it was prepared to overlook

the unauthorized Republic of Ireland release,” whereas the

evidence states plaintiff “want[s] to correct the DVD release in

Ireland, and is willing to pay the cost of that including changing

the art work,” citing Dkt. No. 121-26.)

42a

in the Republic of Ireland. Therefore, no reasonable

jury could find other than for the defendants on this

issue.

Plaintiff also argues that defendants have no

license to the Film because he revoked the license

from himself to his production company, Maron

Pictures, thereby severing the chain of licenses from

Maron Pictures to Mainsail, and subsequently Apple

and YouTube. Defendants argue plaintiff should be

judicially estopped from making such arguments.

Previously, Maron Pictures sued Mainsail and

represented to the state court that it owned the

plaintiff attempts to claim that Maron Pictures’

ownership was a mistake and he himself owned the

Judicial estoppel “prevents a party from

asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is

inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a

previous proceeding.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532

U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (cleaned up).

Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine

invoked by a court at its discretion. In

determining whether to apply the doctrine, we

typically consider (1) whether a party's later

position is clearly inconsistent with its original

position;

(2) whether the party has

successfully persuaded the court of the earlier

position; and (3) whether allowing the

43a

inconsistent position would allow the party to

derive an unfair advantage or impose an

unfair detriment on the opposing party.

United States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit

Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned

up). The Court considers those factors:

First, with respect to whether plaintiff has

asserted inconsistent positions, this element is

satisfied. Plaintiff now asserts that he reclaimed the

Film’s rights on October 1, 2015 and that he

therefore “does not recognize any rights that have

been unlawfully assigned by others,” including the

rights he assigned to Mainsail. (YouTube PRSS at

72; see id. 73 (citing Dkt. No. 148-8 in Case No. 20cv-1525 at 220:22-221:8 (“[O]bviously at any given

time in 2016, I could have filed an infringement

lawsuit because my rights had reverted back to

me.”)). However, in 2016, after plaintiffs alleged

revocation, Maron Pictures repeatedly represented to

the California state courts that it (not plaintiff

Mahon) owned the rights to the Film.12 (YouTube

PRSS at 47 (citing declaration to the Superior Court

in 2016 in Mahon’s name stating that “Maron

12 Plaintiff and Maron Pictures’ statements are attributable to

each other for the purposes of judicial estoppel analysis. See

Milton H. Greene Archives v. Marilyn Monroe, 692 F.3d 983, 996

(9th Cir. 2012) (judicial estoppel applies “not only against

actual parties to prior litigation, but also against a party that is

in privity to a party in a previous litigation”) (cleaned up).

44a

Pictures owns the rights to” the Film); id. at 64-66

(citing Maron Pictures’ appellate reply brief

representing that S&H was Maron Pictures’

“intellectual property” and that Maron Pictures

remained entitled to invoke the protections of federal

Plaintiff also asserts that he is now the owner

of the copyrights because he corrected a “filing error”

in the copyright’s registration, changing the owner

from Maron Pictures to himself, Mark Mahon. His

correction is dubious at best. On April 24, 2017,

while litigating in the California Court of Appeal (id

at 50-52), plaintiff filed a supplementary application

with the Copyright Office. He asked to change the

author from his company, Maron Pictures, to himself

individually. (Id. at 53.) He initially requested

“special handling” due to “ongoing litigation”

involving whether he or Maron Pictures was the

later identified the “ongoing litigation” as the state

court litigation between Maron Pictures and

Office rejected plaintiffs application, stating it was

suspending action on the supplementary application

until plaintiff informed the Copyright Office that the

litigation had been resolved. (Id. at 56-58.) Plaintiff

responded on May 26, 2017: “I can confirm that my

dispute with my company, Maron Pictures, has now

been resolved.” (Id. at 59.) This statement was false

45a

and misleading because there was no litigation

between plaintiff and Maron Pictures. (Id. at 60.)

Further, Maron Pictures’ state court appeal was not

resolved,13 as it remained active until 2019. (Id. at

62-66.) After receiving plaintiffs May 26 response,

the Copyright Office subsequently registered the

application, which listed Mahon as the author of the

Film. (Id. at 61.)

Second, with respect to whether plaintiff had

successfully persuaded the court of the earlier

position, this element is satisfied. Maron Pictures

successfully persuaded the California state courts to

adopt its earlier contentions.14 The California courts

accepted Maron Pictures’ previous claim that it

13 Plaintiff notes that he understood the litigation to be over at

that juncture. Even if that was plaintiff s understanding, his

statement discussed separate litigation, which did not exist, in

a way that likely misled the Copyright Office into changing the

registration when it likely would not otherwise do so. For these

reasons, the Court finds reason for estoppel, though it stops

short of finding that plaintiff committed fraud on the copyright

office as defendants urge. See Unicolors v. H&M Hennes &

Maruitz, 52 F.4th 1054, 1064-1067 (9th Cir. 2022).

14 Notably, the second prong does not require that the entire

prior case be resolved in a party’s favor. It is sufficient that a

court accept the earlier position. See Interstate Fire & Cas. v.

Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 139 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir.

1998) (holding a court’s mere recitation of a stipulated fact

satisfied the second factor, and that a court need not “rel[y] on

that fact in its decision.”).

46a

owned the rights to the Film after the purported

revocation on October 1, 2015. (Id. 49, 63 (State court

describing Maron Pictures as “the owner” of the

Film.)). In fact, Maron Pictures maintained this

position through the end of its litigation to the

California appellate court. (Id. at 64-66.)

Third, with respect to whether allowing

plaintiffs inconsistent position would allow the party

to derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair

detriment on the opposing party, this element is

satisfied. Plaintiff pursued his state court case as

Maron Pictures. His change-in-course is an explicit

attempt to rewrite history and retroactively revoke

rights from multiple entities that believed they had

such rights. Such action has “forced [parties] into

lengthy litigation” to which they would not otherwise

be subject. Monroe, 692 F.3d at 1000.

All three elements being satisfied, the Court

finds plaintiff is estopped from arguing that he

severed the licensing chain to Mainsail and its

downstream sublicensees. This finding “protectfs] the

integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties

from deliberately changing positions according to the

exigencies of the moment.” New Hampshire v. Maine,

532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001) (cleaned up).

Accordingly, the Court treats the licensing

agreement between Maron Pictures and Mainsail,

which plaintiff himself signed, as valid for the

purposes of this litigation. Because the parties

47a

agreed to license the Film in Ireland,15 defendants

did not infringe plaintiffs copyright, either directly

or vicariously. The Court finds that there was a valid

license agreement permitting such distribution.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS YouTube’s and

Apple’s motions in their entirety, and Mainsail’s

motion as to plaintiffs claims that it unlawfully

sublicensed the Film for distribution.

B. Plaintiffs Source-Master-Based

Conversion Claims Against Mainsail

Plaintiff alleges that there is new, non-timebarred evidence from 2019 that Mainsail asked

Visual data to ship it DVD master copies of the Film

in 2017. This allegation comprises part of plaintiffs

claims against Mainsail.

15 Plaintiff also argues that Apple and YouTube infringed by

transmitting the Film over servers in the U.S. Even if the Film

was copied, stored, or transmitted on U.S. servers during the

statute of limitations period, of which plaintiff provides no

evidence, the undisputed facts show that Entertainment One,

not Apple (Apple PRSS at p. 3-5) or YouTube (YouTube PRSS at

20-24, 27), exercised control over the uploads. Therefore,

YouTube and Apple did not perform the requisite volitional

conduct in the United States. VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918

F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2019) (“To demonstrate volitional conduct, a

party . . . must provide some evidence showing the alleged

infringer exercised control (other than by general operation of

its website.”) (cleaned up).

48a

Specifically, plaintiff argues that in April

2009, he provided master copies of the Film (“source

masters”) to Mainsail and Visual Data, a California

company, for processing pursuant to the agreement

between Maron Pictures and Mainsail. (Dkt. No. 119

at 3.) He alleges that Mainsail instructed Visual

Data to copy the source masters in in California, in

violation of the SAA, in 2009, and Mainsail and

Visual Data had a contractual relationship

preventing Visual Data from disclosing any copying

to plaintiff. {Id. at 12-13.) Plaintiff discovered

evidence on December 16, 2019, that Visual Data

sent several physical assets to Mainsail in 2017,

including two DVDs with bar-codes of 263626 and

263627 (the “626 and 627” copies.) {Id. at 27; DRSS

at 50, 58.)

Mainsail scrupulously accounts the history of

these DVDs, however, and provides undisputed

evidence that, in fact, it made the 626 and 627 copies

with plaintiffs permission in 2009, plaintiff was

aware of their existence in 2009, and that Visual

Data sent them back to Mainsail in 2017 without

Mainsail asking them to do so. Three months before

plaintiff delivered the film masters to Visual Data,

Mainsail produced on the 626 and 627 copies on their

own equipment. (PRSS at 12.) The DVDs were

created to be used as marketing tools to send to

prospective distributors only, for no cost to the

distributors. {Id. at 13-16.) In fact, defendants

49a

showed the DVDs’ contents, in the form of a trailer,

to plaintiff on May 9, 2009, and plaintiff commented

on the trailer. (Id. at 21-22.) Mainsail then sent the

DVDs to Visual Data on September 18, 2009, and

Visual Data assigned the 626 and 627 barcode

numbers to the DVDs. (Id. at 23-24.) Visual Data

then held the copies in their inventory until 2017,

and never made copies of the DVDs. (Id. at 25-26.)

In 2017, Visual Data asked Mainsail

permission to send a delivery of elements that Visual

Data had been keeping in storage. (Id. at 58.) Visual

Data did not specifically mention the Film. (Id. at

59.) Mainsail responded that Visual Data could ship

it the elements, and Visual Data did so. (Id. at 6061.) 626 and 627 were in the shipment, despite

Mainsail never specifically requesting them. (Id. at

63-64.) Visual Data made no copies after receiving

the 626 and 627 copies and there is no evidence of

any agreement requiring Visual Data to withhold

information from Mahon regarding the Film. (Id. at

67, 76.) Further, contrary to plaintiffs theory that

626 and 627 contain “clean versions” of the source

masters, the 626 and 627 copies do not contain

“clean” copies. (Id. 27-28.) Instead, they contain a

“dirty” version of the film, with the text

“SHORELINE ENTERTAINMENT” overlayed atop

the picture (to deter unauthorized copying). (Id. at

29.) Further, the SAA allowed Mainsail to have “full

and complete charge and control of the manner in

50a

which, and the terms upon which, the [Film] shall be

marketed and sold.” (Id. at 6; Dkt. No. 118-3, Ex. B.)

In response to Mainsail’s detailed account of

the history of these DVDs, plaintiff argues the

following. Plaintiff “disputes the discs presented in

exhibits are the real DVDs that were in the DVD

cases with markings 263626 and 263627, which

could have simply been changed by putting any disc

on the planet in those boxes.” (Dkt. No. 121 at 5.)

Next, he implies that it was not possible for Mainsail

to create the dirty copies because they “were only

initially provided a 35mm film print of the Film,” and

he “had not finished the sound mix for all the other

deliverable formats, including DVD until in or

around July 27/28, 2009.” (Id.) Plaintiffs arguments

are belied by evidence, however, that he was aware

that multiple companies had given “screener copies”

of the Film as of June 5, 2009. (Dkt. No. 118-5, Ex.

P.) He also knew that Mainsail made a trailer for the

Film as of May 9, 2009. (Dkt. No. 118-4, Ex. O.)

Therefore, it was clearly possible for copies of the

Film to be made before July, 2009, contrary to

plaintiffs arguments.

Therefore, finding no dispute of material fact,

the Court finds that (i) 626 and 627 were not source

masters, (ii) plaintiff was aware of them in 2009, (iii)

Mainsail conducted any copying with plaintiffs

knowledge and permission, and (iv) Mainsail did not

initiate their return from Visual Data in 2017.

51a

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Mainsail’s

motion for summary judgment as to all claims

stemming from the 626 and 627 copies. Although

plaintiff may have had valid concerns that new

evidence may have uncovered unauthorized behavior

with his Film’s masters, the discovery process has

served its purpose and revealed that there was no

such wrongdoing.

C. Plaintiffs El-Email-Based Copyright,

Fraud, and Conversion Claims Against

Mainsail

Finally, plaintiff brings claims that Mainsail

continued to receive revenue from the Film despite

prior court testimony to the contrary. Plaintiff argues

that around February 14, 2018, Maron Pictures

received a random royalty report for the Film from

Entertainment One, allegedly showing a balance of

GBP £7,815.74 for the Film, due to Shoreline

Entertainment. (DRSS at 45.) Plaintiff argues that

this email presents new, non-time-barred, evidence

that the Mainsail defendants, which include

Shoreline Entertainment, made revenue from the

Film despite representations to the contrary by

Mainsail and its representatives. (Dkt. No. 119 at 6;

DRSS at 41, 45.) This allegation comprises part of

plaintiffs copyright, fraud, and conversion claims

against Mainsail.

Through discovery, however, plaintiffs theory

has not been borne out by the evidence. In fact, the

52a

evidence is undisputed that Mainsail did not receive

revenue for the Film. Mainsail’s agreement with

Entertainment One required Mainsail to submit an

invoice to receive revenue payment for the Film from

E-l, and Mainsail has not submitted such an invoice

since 2014 or earlier. (PRSS at 68-69; Dkt. No. 118-8,

Ex. RR at 7.) The February 14 email sent from

Entertainment One to Maron Pictures confirms this

practice. The email clearly asks Maron Pictures to

“provide an invoice for the amount due to” to it. (Dkt.

No. 118-8, Ex. SS.) This language indicates that

Entertainment One’s practice is to receive an invoice

before sending royalty payments. It also refutes

plaintiffs theory that Mainsail conspired with

Entertainment One to defraud plaintiff out of

royalties. On the contrary, it appears that

Entertainment One is simply trying to pay plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Mainsail’s

motion for summary judgment as to all claims

stemming from the Entertainment One email.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS defendants’ motions for

summary judgment on grounds that admissible

evidence negates essential elements of all of

plaintiffs claims. The Court DENIES plaintiffs

motions for summary judgment on claims that

Mainsail

committed

infringement,

trafficking in counterfeit labels, omission fraud, and

53a

conversion. The Court also DENIES plaintiffs

claims that Apple and YouTube committed copyright

infringement and vicarious copyright infringement.

Defendants shall each provide a form of

judgment to the Court within ten business days.

Plaintiff shall be provided an opportunity to

comment on and/or approve the form of judgment.

Plaintiff is advised that consenting to a “form” of

judgment in no way impacts his rights to appeal the

decision of this Court.

This terminates Docket Nos. 118,119, and 145

of Case No. 20-cv-01523; 146, 147, 153, 154, 155, 165,

168, 175, and 192 of Case No. 20-cv-01525; and 136,

137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 146, 152, 159, and 180 of

Case No. 20-cv-01534.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 8, 2024

s/ Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JUDGE

54a

APPENDIX H

55a

DAVID R. EBERHART (S.B. #195474)

deberhart@omm.com

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor

San Francisco, California 94111-3823

Telephone: (415) 984-8700

REBECCA A. GIROLAMO (S.B. #293422)

bgirolamo@omm.com

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor

Los Angeles, California 90071-2899

Telephone: (213) 430-6000

Attorneys for Defendant Apple Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

MARK MAHON,

Plaintiff,

APPLE INC.,

Case No.4:20-cv-01534-YGR

JUDGMENT

Judge: Honorable Yvonne

Gonzalez Rogers

56a

Defendant.

Pursuant to, and for the reasons set forth in,

the Court’s Order on May 8, 2024 (Dkt. 181)

granting Defendant Apple Inc.’s (“Apple”) Motion for

Summary Judgment (Dkt. 137) in its entirety and

denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. 136) in its entirety, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY

ENTERED in Apple’s favor and against Plaintiff

WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED: June 4, 2024

s/ Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers

HON. YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

57a

APPENDIX I

58a

MAYER BROWN LLP

A. JOHN P. MANCINI (pro hac vice)

jmancini@mayerbrown.com

GREGORY J. APGAR (pro hac vice)

gapgar@mayerbrown.com

SARA A. SLAVIN (pro hac vice)

sslavin@mayerbrown.com

1221 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10020-1001

Telephone: (212) 506-2500

GRAHAM (GRAY) BUCCIGROSS (SBN 234558)

gbuccigross@mayerbrown.com

Two Palo Alto Square, Suite 300

3000 El Camino Real Palo Alto, CA 94306-2112

Telephone: (650) 331-2000

Attorneys for Defendants Google LLC

and its wholly owned subsidiary YouTube, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

MARK MAHON,

an individual,

Case No.4:20-cv-01525-YGR

59a

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

YOUTUBE, LLC,

Et al.,

Judge: Hon. Yvonne

Gonzalez Rogers

Defendants.

Pursuant to, and for the reasons set forth in,

the Court’s Order on May 8, 2024 (Dkt. 193)

granting Defendants Google LLC and its wholly

owned subsidiary, YouTube, LLC’s (“Defendants”)

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 147) in its

entirety and denying Plaintiff Mark Mahon’s

(“Plaintiff’) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.

146) in its entirety, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY

ENTERED in Google’s favor and against Plaintiff

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 4, 2024

s/ Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers

HON. YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

60a

APPENDIX J

61a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK MAHON,

an individual,

Case No.4:20-cv-01523-YGR

Plaintiff,

MAINSAIL LLC,

SHORLINE

ENTERTAINMENT,

INC., SAM EIGEN,

AN INDIVIDUAL,

MORRIS RUEKIN,

AN INDIVIDUAL,

AND DOES 1-21.

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

Judge: Hon. Yvonne

Gonzalez Rogers

62a

JUDGMENT

Having granted the motion for summary

judgment filed by Defendants MAINSAIL LLC,

SHORLINE

ENTERTAINMENT,

INC.,

SAM

EIGEN, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND MORRIS RUEKIN,

AN INDIVIDUAL (“Defendants”) (Dkt. 118), and

denied the motion for summary judgment filed by

Plaintiff Mark Mahon (“Plaintiff’) (Dkt. 119), see

Order (Dkt. 146), the Court hereby enters judgment

for Defendants and against Plaintiff with prejudice..

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 4, 2024

s/ Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers

HON. YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.