Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Willie M. Walker, Petitioner v. Columbus Division of Police, et al.

1

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WILLIE M. WALKER,

Petition

er, v.

COLUMBUS DIVISION OF

POLICE, FRANKLIN COUNTY

PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, FRANKLIN

COUNTY CORONER’S OFFICE, CITY

OF COLUMBUS, ROBBY WARNICK,

ROBERT WACHALEC, TERRY

MCCONNELL, MICHELLE HENRY, AND

JANET A. GRUBB, et al,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

WILLIE M. WALKER

2012 Hegemon Crest Drive Columbus, OH 43219

walker22w@aol.com

Received

SEP-8 ®

suprei^court^^

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la

No. 25-3625

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WILLIE M. WALKER )

)

) ON APPEAL FROM

) THE UNITED STATES

v.

) DISTRICT COURT

) FOR THE SOUTHERN

) DISTRICTOF OHIO

COLUMBUS DIVISION)

OF POLICE, et al.,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS,

Circuit Judges.

Entered on Feb. 24, 2026

2a

Pro se Ohio plaintiff Willie M. Walker

appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint.

Walker moves to supplement the district court

record. This case has been referred to a panel of

the court that, upon examination, unanimously

agrees that oral argument is not needed. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). For the reasons below,

we affirm the district court’s judgment

dismissing Walker’s

federal claims

with

prejudice, vacate the district court’s judgment

dismissing Walker’s state-law claims with

prejudice, and remand the case to the district

court with instructions to dismiss the state-law

claims without prejudice.

On October 16, 2015, first responders

answered a call at 321 Johnson Street in

Columbus, Ohio, where they found Walker’s son,

Vonmason Walker, dead from a gunshot wound

to his head. Columbus Division of Police homicide

detectives concluded that Walker committed

suicide, as did the Franklin County Coroner.

Walker was convinced, however, that Vonmason

3a

had been murdered.

Walker therefore retained private detectives

to investigate Vonmason’s death. Walker’s

investigators developed evidence and witnesses

indicating that three men (whom their report

identified) had murdered Vonmason over a

disputed debt and then staged the crime scene to

make it look like a suicide. In 2016 and 2017, the

investigators wrote reports that explained their

findings, and Walker provided copies of those

reports to the police department. Walker also

turned over to the police Vonmason’s cellphone,

which allegedly contained a threatening text from

one of the suspects. Lastly, Walker’s investigators

arranged for the police to interview one of their

witnesses, but the homicide detectives treated her

so poorly that she refused to cooperate with the

investigation.

Walker’s private investigation prompted

the coroner to change Vonmason’s cause of death

from suicide to undetermined and ultimately to

homicide. Yet the Franklin County Prosecuting

Attorney did not file charges against the men

4a

whom Walker had identified as suspects. Homicide

detectives Subsequently concluded that Vonmason’s

shooting death was accidental and not suicide. The

detectives returned Vonmason’s cellphone to

Walker, but they allegedly deleted the threatening

text message that Vonmason had received. And the

police and prosecutor

have

since

denied

Walker’s repeated requests to reopen the case and

charge someone with murdering Vonmason.

In February 2025, Walker filed a § 1983

complaint in the district court against the

Columbus Division of Police, the City of

Columbus, the Franklin County Prosecutor’s

Office, the Franklin County Coroner’s Office, and

24 individuals associated with those agencies.

Walker asserted that the defendants engaged in

a pattern of misconduct in investigating

Vonmason’s death and refusing to file criminal

charges against the men who allegedly murdered

Vonmason, including obstruction of justice, filing

false documents, dereliction of duty, witness

intimidation, and failure to supervise employees.

Walker claimed that the defendants’ actions

and/or failure to act violated his federal

5a

constitutional rights to due process, to equal

protection, and to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures. Walker also brought statelaw claims against the defendants for wrongful

death, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

and negligence.

On motion of the defendants, the district

court dismissed Walker’s claims under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that

certain defendants were not sui juris, that

absolute immunity shielded the prosecutor, and

that the claims were untimely under their

respective statutes of limitations. The district court

denied Walker leave to amend his complaint.

On appeal, Walker argues that the district

court erred in dismissing his complaint and

denying him leave to amend.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), we “construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff and accept all factual allegations as

true.” Laborers’ Loc. 265 Pension Fund v. iShares

Tr., 769 F.3d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 2014). “To survive

a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

6a

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. “To state a claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” Hester v. Chester

County, 162 F.4th 780, 784 (6th Cir. 2025)

(citation modified).

Before considering the district court’s

reasons for dismissing Walker’s § 1983 claims, we

address the preliminary and dispositive question

of whether he even stated constitutional claims

against the defendants. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of

Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.

439, 447 (1993) (“[A] court may consider an issue

antecedent to and ultimately dispositive of the

7a

dispute before it, even if the parties fail to identify

and brief the issue.”).

Walker asserted that the defendants’

conduct violated several different constitutional

provisions. But the thrust of Walker’s claims is

that

the

defendants’

investigation

into

Vonmason’s death and their refusal to arrest and

prosecute the men he had identified as suspects

were rife with misconduct. Even if these

allegations are true, Walker states no cognizable

constitutional claim against the defendants

because he has no protected interest in having

another person prosecuted. See Town of Castle

Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005); see

also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“[N]othing in

the language of the Due Process Clause itself

requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and

property of its citizens against invasion by

private actors.”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410

U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a

judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution

or nonprosecution of another.”). Also, there is no

constitutional right to an investigation. Mitchell

8a

V. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007).

Thus, the district court properly dismissed

Walker’s federal constitutional claims. Having

dismissed those federal claims before trial,

however, the district court should have declined

supplemental jurisdiction over Walker’s state law claims and dismissed those claims without

prejudice. Kowall v. Benson, 18 F.4th 542, 549

(6th Cir. 2021); Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed.

Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir.

1996). We therefore vacate the district court’s

dismissal of Walker’s state-law claims with

prejudice.

Finally, because Walker did not file a copy

of his proposed amended complaint, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Walker leave to amend. See Warman v. Mount

St. Joseph Univ., 144 F.4th 880, 899 (6th Cir.

2025).

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the

district court’s judgment dismissing Walker’s

federal constitutional claims with prejudice,

VACATE

the

district

court’s

judgment

9a

dismissing Walker’s state- law claims with

prejudice, and REMAND this case to the district

court with instructions to dismiss the state-law

claims without prejudice. We DENY Walker’s

motions to supplement the record as moot.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Kellly L. Stephens, Clerk

10a

No. 25-3625

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WILLIE M. WALKER )

)

) ON APPEAL FROM

) THE UNITED STATES

v.

) DISTRICT COURT

) FOR THE SOUTHERN

) DISTRICTOF OHIO

COLUMBUS DIVISION)

OF POLICE, et al.,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

Defendants-Appellees.

)

ORD ER

Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS,

Circuit Judges.

Entered on Mar. 10,2026

Pro se Ohio plaintiff Willie M. Walker

11a

petitions for a panel rehearing of our order of

February 24, 2026, affirming in part and

vacating in part the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for

failure to state a claim.

We DENY Walker’s petition because he has

not cited any misapprehension of law or fact that

would alter our prior decision. See Fed. R. App. P.

40(b)(1)(A).

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

1 0,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIE M. WALKER ) Case No. 2:25-CV-0162

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

)

)

)

)

COLUMBUS DIVISION)

OF POLICE, et al.,

)

)

Defendants-Appellees.

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Entered on June 24, 2025

Willie M. Walker, proceeding pro se,

filed this action against the Columbus

Division of Police (“CPD”), City of Columbus,

Franklin

County

Prosecutor’s

Office,

Franklin County Coroner’s

Office,

and

individual employees of those agencies,

13a

alleging

that they failed to properly

investigate the death of his son and prosecute

the potential suspects involved. The Franklin

County Defendants1 and City Defendants2

filed their separate Motions to Dismiss.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 16, 2015, Mr. Walker’s son,

Vonmason Walker, sustained a gunshot

wound to his head, killing him. This suit

1

Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office, Franklin County

Coroner’s Office, and Janet Grubb (First Assistant Prosecuting

Attorney) collectively filed three identical Motions to Dismiss

(ECF Nos. 12-14), raising the same arguments for dismissal.

Though Dr. Kent Harshbarger (Franklin County Coroner)

originally joined in those Motions, Mr. Walker has voluntarily

dismissed him. (ECF No. 23).

2 The City Defendants are the City of Columbus, CPD, Detective

Robby Warnick, Detective Robert Wachalec, Sergeant Terry

McConnell, Detective Michelle Henry, Detective Gary Cooper,

Detective Raymond Guman, Sergeant Strayer, Lieutenant

Smith, Sergeant Roy Lisath, Commander Michael Gray, Deputy

Chief Becker, Chief Kim Jacobs, Chief Quinlan, Interim Chief

Michael Woods, Commander Dinner, Kate Pishotti, Robert

Clark, Assistant Chief Lashanna Potts,. 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. ECF

Nos. 12-15.) For the reasons below, the Motions are GRANTED.

14a

hold the actors involved accountable. This

case

is

tragic.

And

the

succeeding

investigation

into

Vonmason’s

death

certainly raises more questions than it

answers. But the Court is duty-bound to

apply the law as it stands to the facts as they

are. It endeavors to do so here.

When considering a motion to dismiss,

the Court construes the factual allegations

in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See

Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 639—40 (6th

Cir. 2016).

Following Vonmason’s death, CPD

detectives, including Detective Warnick and

Detective Wachalec, investigated the case.

(CompL, H 2; ECF Doc. 1-1, PAGEID # 910.)

Despite the overwhelming evidence of

foul play, the CPD detectives initially

determined that the cause of death was a

suicide, and, later, accidental. (Id., IT 13.)

In Mr. Walker’s view, the CPD failed to

15a

properly investigate his son’s death. (Id.,

2.) He alleges that Detective Wachalec

deleted an incriminating text message that a

potential suspect sent to Vonmason. (Compl.,

27; ECF Doc. 1-1, PAGEID # 9-11.) 2.)

Moreover, Detective Warnick changed a witness

statement, and failed to follow up on leads. (Id.,

PAGEID # 9—10.)

Given his dissatisfaction with CPD’s

investigation, Mr. Walker hired several

private investigation firms to uncover the

truth. In or around July 2016, Mr. Walker’s

private investigator interviewed a witness

that provided critical evidence suggesting

Vonmason was murdered — she identified

three potential suspects, and alleged that

those potential suspects had manipulated

the crime scene to appear like a suicide. (Id.,

28; ECF Doc. 1-1, PAGEID #15.) The

witness retreated from the case due to

aggressive treatment by CPD. (Id.,

28.)

According to Mr. Walker, “five independent

investigations concluded that Vonmason was

murdered, and that the crime scene was

16a

staged to look like an accidental shooting.”

(Id., If 34.) His private investigators

presented their findings to the Franklin

County Coroner, Dr. Harshbarger. (Id., 14.)

Subsequently, in or around November 2016,

Dr. Harshbarger changed Vonmason’s cause

of death to homicide. (Id.', ECF Doc. 1-1,

PAGEID # 26.)

Despite the evidence suggesting that

Vonmason was murdered, the Franklin

County Prosecutor’s Office failed to prosecute

anyone. Indeed, on December 1, 2022, Ms.

Grubb

informed

Mr.

Walker

that

Vonmason’s case was not prosecutable,

finding that it lacked sufficient evidence to

proceed against any of the potential suspects.

(ECF No. 24, PAGED # 639).

II.

D

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUN

Mr. Walker now asserts five claims

against all of the Defendants: 1) violation of

the

Fourth,

Fifth,

and

Fourteenth

Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2)

17a

wrongful death, 3) obstruction of justice,3 4)

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

5) negligence. (Compl.) He also brings a

municipality liability § 1983 claim against the

City of Columbus and the Franklin County

Prosecutor’s Office, (see Id.) In response to the

Motions to Dismiss, Mr. Walker opposed the

Motions and requested leave to amend his

Complaint to cure any deficiencies. (ECF Nos.

16, 22).

III.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

A.

Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with

sufficient specificity to “give the defendant fair

notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal alteration and

3

In response to the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

Mr. Walker conceded that obstruction of justice is a criminal

offense under Ohio and federal law, not a private cause of action.

(Reply, ECF No. 22, PAGEID # 618.) Accordingly, Mr. Walker’s

obstruction of justice claim is DISMISSED.

18a

quotations omitted). A complaint which falls

short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be

dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). The Supreme Court has explained:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual

content

that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin

to a probability requirement, but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a

complaint pleads facts that are merely

consistent with a defendant’s liability, it

stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). The

complaint need not contain detailed factual

19a

allegations, but it must include more than

labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of

the elements of a cause of action. Directv, Inc.

v. Treesh, 487 F.3d, 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In

ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court “may

consider the Complaint and any exhibits

attached thereto,

public records,

items

appearing in the record of the case and exhibits

attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so

long as they are referred to in the Complaint

and are central to the claims contained

therein.” Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430

(6th Cir. 2008).

These standards apply equally when

the plaintiff is pro se. Although a pro se

litigant is entitled to a liberal construction of

his pleadings and filings, he still must do

more than assert bare legal conclusions, and

the “complaint must contain either direct or

inferential allegations respecting all the

20a

material elements to sustain a recovery

under some viable legal theory.” Mezibov v.

Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005).

B.

Analysis

The Defendants move for dismissal of Mr.

Walker’s Complaint for three reasons (among

other things): 1) sui juris and immunity, 2)

statute of limitations, and 3) failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF

Nos. 12—15.) Their first two arguments are

dispositive.

1.

Sui

Immunity

Juris

and

Absolute

The

Defendants argue that the

Franklin County Coroner’s Office, Franklin

County Prosecutor’s Office and CPD are

incapable of being sued because they are not

sui juris. (ECF Nos. 12—15.) They are

correct. See Miller v. Ohio, No. 2:22-CV1712, 2022 WL 4779804, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct.

3, 2022) (Morrison, J.) (finding that the

Delaware County Prosecutor’s Office and

21a

City of Hilliard’s Police Division are not sui

juris.) (citations omitted).

In

addition,

the

Franklin

County

Defendants argue that Ms. Grubb is immune

from suit. In fact, even though she refused to

prosecute the potential suspects in Vonmason’s

death, Ms. Grubb is entitled to prosecutorial

immunity because she was acting in her

capacity as a prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit

explains that “[p]rosecutors are entitled to

absolute immunity for conduct ‘intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process.’” Marietta v. Macomb Cty. Enf’t

Team, 141 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,

430, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976)).

This includes “[a] prosecutor’s decision to file a

criminal complaint and seek an arrest

warrant and the

presentation of these

materials to a judicial officer.” Marietta, 141

F.3d at 274 (quoting Ireland v. Tunis, 113

F.3d 1435, 1446 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 139

L. Ed. 2d 401, 118 S. Ct. 560, 522 U.S. 996

(1997)).

22a

Accordingly, the Franklin County

Defendants’

Motion

to

Dismiss

is

GRANTED. To the extent that the City

Defendants seek dismissal of CPD, the

Motion is GRANTED. The Franklin

County Coroner’s Office, Franklin County

Prosecutor’s Office, CPD, and Ms. Grubb

are DISMISSED.

2.

Statute of Limitations

City Defendants also argue that Mr.

Walker’s claims are barred by the statute of

limitations. Ohio’s two-year general statute

of limitations contained in Ohio Revised

Code § 2305.10 applies to § 1983 actions

arising in Ohio. Banks v. City of Whitehall,

344 F.3d 550, 553-54 (6th Cir. 2003);

Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir.

1996). The statute of limitations for

intentional infliction of emotional distress

and negligence claims is four-years. Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.09; see also Cleavenger

v. B.O , 184 N.E.3d 968, 975-976 (Ohio

Ct. App. 2022) (statute of limitations for

intentional infliction emotional distress is

23a

ordinarily four years). A wrongful death action

has a two-year statute of limitations. Ohio Rev.

Code Ann. § 2125.02(F)(1).

“[Because] Ohio’s statute of limitations

applies to § 1983 claims, so does its tolling

statute, unless the result is inconsistent with

federal law.” Michelle R. v. Village of

Middleport, No. 2:19-CV-2272, 2019 WL

4452678, at *3 (S.D.

Ohio Sep.

17,

2019) (Sargus, J.). “Under Ohio law, the

statute of limitations for § 1983 claims may

only be tolled when—at the time the cause of

action accrued— the plaintiff was either a

minor or was ‘of unsound mind.’” Id. (citing

Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.16). Yet, federal law

governs when a cause of action accrues, and

when the statutory period begins to run.

Bishop v. Children's Ctr. for Developmental

Enrichment, 618 F.3d 533, 536 (6th Cir.

2010). “And that accrual occurs ‘when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury which is the basis of his action.’”

Jones v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:22-CV530, 2024 WL 707288, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb.

24a

21, 2024) (Cole, J.) (internal citation omitted).

Taking the factual allegations raised in

the Complaint as true, Mr. Walker’s claims

are time-barred. He knew or should have

known about

the

alleged

mishandled

police

investigation

after

his

private

investigators uncovered the foul play in or

around July 2016. So Mr. Walker had until

July 2018 to bring his § 1983, Monell, and

wrongful death claims and July 2020 to bring

his negligence and intentional infliction of

emotional distress claims. The Complaint

was filed on February 18, 2025.

In his opposition, Mr. Walker argues that

the discovery rule and the doctrine of equitable

tolling save his claims. But neither theory is

availing.

a)

Discovery Rule

“As a general matter, the statute of

limitations begins to run when the plaintiff

has a ‘complete and present cause of action.’”

Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 235-36, 143 S.

25a

Ct. 955, 215 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2023) (quoting Bay

Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension

Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp, of Cal., 522

U.S. 192, 201, 118 S. Ct. 542, 139 L. Ed.

2d 553 (1997)). “[T]he discovery rule begins

once a plaintiff learns of an injury from the

defendant’s conduct—even if the plaintiff does

not discover the full extent of the injury until

later.” Shelton v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous.

Auth., l:23-CV-483, 2024 WL 4336371, at *5

(N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2024) (quoting Reguli v.

Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 883 (6th Cir. 2024).

The discovery rule does not extend the

date that Mr. Walker’s statute of limitations

period began to run. According to Mr.

Walker, Defendants’ misconduct continued to

unfold over time, and he did not know the full

scope of his injury until December 2022. He

alleges that the CPD detectives concealed

evidence such that he was delayed in

discovering his injury until after all the

private

investigators

ended

their

investigations; and, on December 1, 2022,

Ms. Grubb declined to prosecute any suspects

26a

in connection with Vonmason’s death. But

the discovery rule does not allow Mr. Walker

to wait until he has discovered the full extent

of the alleged misconduct by the Defendants.

Rather, the statute of limitations accrues

when he knew that there was an injury — in

this case, the significant misconduct and foul

play that was uncovered by his private

investigators as early as July 2016.

b)

Equitable Tolling

Ohio’s tolling rules apply to § 1983 claims

as long as they are not inconsistent with

federal law or policy. Jones, 2024 WL 707288,

at *10. In Ohio, “equitable tolling is only

available in compelling cases which justify a

departure from established procedure.” Roach

v. Vapor Station Columbus, Inc., No. 21AP511, 2022 WL 2211529, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.

June 21, 2022) “A litigant seeking equitable

tolling must demonstrate he diligently pursued

his

rights,

but

some

extraordinary

circumstance ... prevented timely action.” Id.

“The doctrine is generally limited to

circumstances

in which a litigant is

27a

intentionally misled or tricked into missing the

filing deadline.” Id. (citation omitted).

The equitable tolling doctrine does

not apply here. Mr. Walker does not explain

how he was intentionally misled or tricked

into missing the filing deadlines for his

claims. Even accepting as true his allegations

that some Defendants concealed evidence

and threatened witnesses, none of these

factual allegations took place in the four

years prior to Mr. Walker initiating this

lawsuit.

Thus, Mr. Walker’s claims are barred

by the statute of limitations. The City

Defendants’

Motion

to

Dismiss

is

GRANTED.

IV.

MOTION

FOR

LEAVE

TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

In the event the Court found any

deficiencies in his Complaint, Mr. Walker

seeks leave to amend the Complaint. Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the

28a

Court should give leave for a party to amend

its pleading “when justice so requires.” “The

thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the principle

that cases should be tried on their merits

rather than the technicalities of pleadings.”

Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir.

1982) (citations omitted); Oleson v. United

States, 21 F. App’x 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotations omitted) (noting that

courts interpret the language in Rule 15(a) as

conveying “a liberal policy of permitting

amendments to ensure the determination of

claims on their merits”). “Nevertheless, leave

to amend ‘should be denied if the amendment

is brought in bad faith, for dilatory purposes,

results in undue delay or prejudice to the

opposing party, or would be futile.’” Carson

v. U.S. Off. of Special Counsel, 633 F.3d

487,

495

(6th

Cir.

2011)

(quoting

Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir.

1995)). A court may deny leave to amend as

futile if the amendment could not withstand

a motion to dismiss. Riverview Health Inst.

LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512

(6th Cir. 2010); Midkiff v. Adams Cty. Reg'l

29a

Water Dist., 409 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir.

2005).

The Court finds that allowing Mr.

Walker leave to amend his Complaint would

be futile. In his opposition to the Motions,

Mr. Walker explains that his amendment

would address the procedural issues. (ECF

No. 22, PAGEID # 621.) But he cannot

overcome the statute of limitations bar on his

claims.

Accordingly, Mr. Walker’s Motion for

Leave to Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 22)

is DENIED as futile.

V.

CONCLUSION

The

Franklin

County

Defendants’

Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 12—14) and

City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.

15) are GRANTED.

Mr. Walker’s Motion for Leave to

Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 22) is

DENIED.

30a

Mr. Walker’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 27) and Motion to

Correct a Mistake (ECF No. 34) are

DENIED as moot.

The

Clerk

is

DIRECTED

terminate this case on the docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison

to

31a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIE M. WALKER )

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v-

)

)

)

)

COLUMBUS DIVISION)

OF POLICE, et al.,

)

Defendants-Appellees.

)

COMPLAINT

1.

COMES NOW Plaintiff WILLIE

WALKER, and files this action against

Defendants COLUMBUS DIVISION OF

POLICE,

FRANKLIN

COUNTY

PROSECUTOR’S

OFFICE,

FRANKLIN

COUNTY CORONER’S OFFICE, CITY OF

COLUMBUS, ROBBY WARNICK, ROBERT

WACHALEC,

TERRY

MCCONNELL,

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.