Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adam McLean, et al., Petitioners v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
Supreme Court briefAug 28, 2026
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No. 26In the
Supreme Court of the United States
ADAM MCLEAN AND JAMES DOYLE,
Petitioners,
v.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of A ppeals for the Eleventh Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Charles M. Billy
Law Offices of
Charles M. Billy, APC
22706 Aspan Street,
Suite 305
Lake Forest, CA 92630
Gene J. Stonebarger
Counsel of Record
Stonebarger Law, APC
101 Parkshore Drive,
Suite 100
Folsom, CA 95630
(916) 235-7140
gstonebarger@
stonebargerlaw.com
Counsel for Petitioners
August 28, 2026
395810
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
T he Un i for me d S e r v ic e s Employ me nt a nd
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) prohibits
civilian employers from denying servicemembers any
benefit of employment “on the basis of” their membership
in the uniformed services. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). Once an
employee shows that military service was “a motivating
factor” in an adverse employment action, the employer is
liable “unless the employer can prove that the action would
have been taken in the absence of such membership.”
Id. § 4311(c)(1).
The question presented is:
Whether the judge-made “honest belief” doctrine,
applied in Title VII cases to insulate an employer that fires
an employee based on a mistaken but sincerely held view
that the employee violated a work rule, may be imported
into USERRA cases to displace USERRA’s express
affirmative defense, which requires the employer to “prove
that the action would have been taken in the absence of”
the employee’s protected military service—and, if it may,
whether an employer’s assertedly “honest belief” can be
resolved in the employer’s favor at summary judgment,
when the existence, sincerity, and application of that belief
present inherently factual questions reserved to the jury.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Adam McLean and James Doyle were
plaintiffs in the district court and plaintiffs-appellants in
the court of appeals.
Respondent Delta Air Lines, Inc. was defendant in
the district court and defendant-appellee in the court of
appeals and is a publicly traded corporation whose stock
ticker symbol is DAL.
Because petitioners are individuals, no corporate
disclosure statement is required under Rule 29.6.
iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (N.D. Ga.): Sorenson
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00541-ELR (final
judgment entered May 30, 2024).
United States Court of Appeals (11th Cir.): McLean
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 24-11946 (opinion issued and
judgment entered April 22, 2026; petition for rehearing
en banc denied June 10, 2026); No. 23-12698 (dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, January 3, 2024); No. 23-13373
(dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, January 4, 2024).
There are no other proceedings in state or federal trial
or appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related to
this case within the meaning of Rule 14.1(b)(iii).
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . 1
OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Statutory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
C. Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
v
Table of Contents
Page
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 15
I.
T he C ou r t s O f A pp e a l s A r e No w
Divided Over Whether An Employer’s
“Honest Belief” Satisfies § 4311(c)(1)’s
Same-Action Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. Four circuits hold that § 4311(c)(1)
imposes a burden of persuasion on
counterfactual causation that subjective belief cannot carry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Four more circuits likewise enforce
§ 4311(c)(1)’s employer-side burden of
persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. The Eleventh Circuit stands alone: no
other circuit permits an employer’s
honest belief to satisfy § 4311(c)(1) . . . . . . . 18
D. The Eleventh Circuit’s rule is wrong . . . . . 19
E. The question is recurring, outcomedeterminative, and squarely presented
in this case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
II. The Decision Below Also Implicates A
Second, Broader Conflict: Whether An
Employer’s “Honest Belief” May Be Resolved
At Summary Judgment At All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
vi
Table of Contents
Page
A. The circuits are divided over whether
an asserted honest belief presents a
jury question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Resolving an employer’s state of mind
at summary judgment cannot be
squared with this Court’s precedents
committing credibility and motive to
the factfinder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
C. This record shows why: whether
Delta’s asserted belief was honest,
and whether the concurrent duty
policy was lawful or violated at all, are
questions for a jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
III. The Question Presented Is Important,
And This Case Is A Clean Vehicle For
Resolving It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
vii
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR
T H E ELE V EN T H CIRCU I T, FILED
APRIL 22, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
A PPEN DI X B — OR DER OF T H E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGI A , AT L A N TA DI V I SION,
FILED MARCH 31, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19a
A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED
JULY 24, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83a
APPENDIX D — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR
T H E ELE V EN T H CIRCU I T, FILED
JUNE 10, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97a
A PPENDI X E — J U DGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED
JUNE 26, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99a
A PPENDI X F — J U DGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED
SEPTEMBER 8, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101a
viii
Table of Appendices
Page
APPENDIX G — DELTA DEALS MEETING
AGENDA (D. CT. DOC. 19 4 - 6, FILED
MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103a
APPENDIX H — DOYLE INVESTIGATION
TRIGGER EMAIL (D. CT. DOC. 197-16,
FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107a
APPENDIX I — DELTA INTERNAL FOLLOWUP EMAIL RE DOYLE INVESTIGATION,
RECORD EXHIBIT (D. CT. DOC. 197-17,
FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109a
APPENDIX J — DELTA EMAIL CIRCULATING
MEME RE MILITARY LEAVE (D. CT.
DOC. 198-19, FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . 112a
A PPENDIX K — DELTA CHIEF PILOT
EMAILS RE MILITARY PILOTS (D. CT.
DOC. 199-2, FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . 114a
ix
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,
140 U.S. 76 (1891) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Aka v. Washington Hospital Center,
156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) . . . . . . . . 6, 29
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services,
605 U.S. 303 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Arroyo v. Volvo Group North America, LLC,
805 F.3d 278 (7th Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 19
Babcock v. Michigan,
812 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Blackorby v. BNSF Railway Co.,
936 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Boone v. Lightner,
319 U.S. 561 (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 33
Bradberry v. Jefferson County,
732 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Carroll v. Delaware River Port Authority,
843 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,
59 F.4th 424 (9th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
x
Cited Authorities
Page
Coffman v. Chugach Support Services, Inc.,
411 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.,
447 U.S. 191 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Coleman v. Donahoe,
667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc.,
196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999) . . . . 5, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v.
Greenwich Collieries,
512 U.S. 267 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,
328 U.S. 275 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 33
Flowers v. Troup County School District,
803 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015) . . . . 5, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22
Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp.,
453 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 30
Frost v. BNSF Railway Co.,
914 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
xi
Cited Authorities
Page
Fuentes v. Perskie,
32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 29
Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc.,
487 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital,
502 U.S. 215 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 33
Leisek v. Brightwood Corp.,
278 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Little v. Illinois Department of Revenue,
369 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.,
274 F.3d 1106 (6th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 30
Marshall v. Rawlings Co.,
854 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2,
427 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
McPherson v. New York City Department of Education,
457 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Miles v. South Central Human Resource Agency, Inc.,
946 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
xii
Cited Authorities
Page
Monroe v. Standard Oil Co.,
452 U.S. 549 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 33
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 22, 24
Myrick v. City of Hoover,
69 F.4th 1309 (11th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 7, 33
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc.,
379 U.S. 21 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 25
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
462 U.S. 393 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 22
Noyes v. Kelly Services,
488 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Orr v. City of Albuquerque,
531 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . 23, 26, 27, 30, 32
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 31
Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc.,
497 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Ronda-Perez v.
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria–Puerto Rico,
404 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
xiii
Cited Authorities
Page
Savage v. Federal Express Corp.,
856 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18
Scroggins v. University of Minnesota,
221 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Sheehan v. Department of the Navy,
240 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16, 26
Sorenson v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
174 F.4th 54 (11th Cir. 2026) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 31
Staub v. Proctor Hospital,
562 U.S. 411 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 22, 25
Thomas v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office,
71 F.4th 1305 (11th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety,
597 U.S. 580 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Travers v. Federal Express Corp.,
8 F.4th 198 (3d Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7
Trujillo v. PacifiCorp,
524 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
xiv
Cited Authorities
Page
United States v. Scheffer,
523 U.S. 303 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc.,
473 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Waggoner v. City of Garland,
987 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Westmoreland v. TWC Administration LLC,
924 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Woodard v. Fanboy, L.L.C.,
298 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Wyatt v. Nissan North America, Inc.,
999 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Young v. Dillon Cos.,
468 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . 23, 24, 30, 32
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
38 U.S.C. § 4301 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
38 U.S.C. § 4302 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
38 U.S.C. § 4311 . . . 3, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 17-19, 21, 22, 25, 28, 30, 34
xv
Cited Authorities
Page
Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025, Pub. L. No. 118-210, 138 Stat. 2797 . . . 8, 33
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 14-19, 22, 23, 29
RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sup. Ct. R. 29.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, pt. 1 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 22
Eric Schnapper, Honest Belief and Proof of
Unlawful Motive, 71 Buff. L. Rev. 769 (2023) . . . . . 24
1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Ada m McLean and Ja mes Doyle
respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported as
Sorenson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 174 F.4th 54 (11th Cir.,
April 22, 2026), and is reproduced in the Appendix hereto
at App. 1a-18a.1 The order of the court of appeals denying
rehearing and rehearing en banc is unreported and is
reproduced in the Appendix hereto at App. 97a-98a. The
order of the district court granting summary judgment
is unreported and reproduced in the Appendix hereto
at App. 19a-82a. The district court’s unreported order
denying reconsideration is reproduced in the Appendix
hereto at App. 83a–96a, and its unreported judgment is
reproduced in the Appendix hereto at App. 101a-102a.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on April 26,
2026 and a copy of the judgment appears in the Appendix
hereto at App. 99a-100a. A timely petition for rehearing
en banc was denied on June 10, 2026, and a copy of the
denial order appears in the Appendix hereto at App.
97a-98a. This petition is filed within ninety days of the
order denying rehearing. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3. This
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
1. Jeremy Sorenson was a Plaintiff in the District Court, who
did not appeal the Judgment entered against him, and he is not a
party to this appeal.
2
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 4301 of Title 38 provides in relevant part:
(a) The purposes of this chapter are—
(1) to encourage noncareer service in the
uniformed services by eliminating
or minimizing the disadvantages to
civilian careers and employment which
can result from such service;
(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives
of persons performing service in the
uniformed services as well as to their
employers, their fellow employees, and
their communities, by providing for the
prompt reemployment of such persons
upon their completion of such service;
and
(3) to prohibit discrimination against
persons because of their service in the
uniformed services.
Section 4302 of Title 38 provides in relevant part:
(b) This chapter supersedes any State law
(including any local law or ordinance), contract,
agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other
matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in
any manner any right or benefit provided by
this chapter . . .
3
Section 4311 of Title 38 provides in relevant part:
(a) A person who is a member of, applies to be a
member of, performs, has performed, applies to
perform, or has an obligation to perform service
in a uniformed service shall not be denied
initial employment, reemployment, retention
in employment, promotion, or any benefit of
employment by an employer on the basis of
that membership, application for membership,
performance of service, application for service,
or obligation.
(b) An employer may not discriminate in
employment against or take any adverse
employment action or other retaliatory action
against any person because such person (1) has
taken an action to enforce a protection afforded
any person under this chapter, (2) has testified or
otherwise made a statement in or in connection
with any proceeding under this chapter, (3)
has assisted or otherwise participated in an
investigation under this chapter, or (4) has
exercised a right provided for in this chapter.
The prohibition in this subsection shall apply
with respect to a person regardless of whether
that person has performed service in the
uniformed services.
(c) An employer shall be considered to have
engaged in actions prohibited—
(1) under subsection (a), if the person’s
membership, application for membership,
4
service, application for service, or obligation
for service in the uniformed services is a
motivating factor in the employer’s action,
unless the employer can prove that the
action would have been taken in the
absence of such membership, application
for membership, service, application for
service, or obligation for service; or
(2) under subsection (b), if the person’s (A)
action to enforce a protection afforded any
person under this chapter, (B) testimony or
making of a statement in or in connection
with any proceeding under this chapter,
(C) assistance or other participation in
an investigation under this chapter, or
(D) exercise of a right provided for in
this chapter, is a motivating factor in the
employer’s actions, unless the employer
can prove that the action would have been
taken in the absence of such person’s
enforcement action, testimony, statement,
assistance, participation, or exercise of a
right.
INTRODUCTION
“Military reservists play a vital role in our nation’s
defense policy.” Myrick v. City of Hoover, 69 F.4th 1309,
1312 (11th Cir. 2023). “When called to service, these
men and women are expected to leave their civilian
jobs, sometimes for years on end.” Id. USERRA enables
servicemembers to strike a balance between fulfilling
their military duties and civilian obligations, including
5
civilian jobs, without suffering discrimination. Id. (citing
Travers v. Fed. Express Corp., 8 F.4th 198, 199 (3rd Cir.,
Aug. 10, 2021)). To alleviate the burden of serving in
the military, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
(“USERRA”), which “recognizes that those who serve in
the military should be supported, rather than penalized,
for their service.” Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 59
F.4th 424, 429 (9th Cir. 2023).
Congress wrote a burden of proof into USERRA.
When an employee shows that military service was a
motivating factor in an adverse employment action, the
statute makes the employer liable “unless the employer
can prove that the action would have been taken in the
absence of such membership.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1). That
affirmative defense poses a single, objective question:
would the employer have treated the employee the same
way if the employee had never served in the military? Four
courts of appeals—the First, Third, Seventh, and Federal
Circuits—have held that the provision means what it says:
the employer must prove that the answer is yes.
In the published decision below, the Eleventh Circuit
adopted a fundamentally different rule. Importing the
“honest belief” doctrine from its Title VII precedents, the
court held that “[a]n employer who fires an employee under
the mistaken but honest impression that the employee
violated a work rule is not liable for discriminatory
conduct”—and affirmed summary judgment for Delta
Air Lines on that basis. App. 11a–12a (citing Damon v.
Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363
n.3 (11th Cir. 1999), and Flowers v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
803 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015)). Under that rule, the
6
employer need not prove what it would have done absent
the employee’s military service; it need only show that
it sincerely believed its own stated reason. A subjectivebelief inquiry has thus displaced the objective causation
inquiry Congress enacted.
The decision below also deepens a second, broader
conflict. The courts of appeals are openly divided over
whether the judge-made “honest belief” doctrine may
be used to take a discrimination case from the jury at
summary judgment at all, given the inherently factual
questions the doctrine asks a court to resolve. The D.C.
Circuit, sitting en banc, and the Third Circuit hold
that the credibility of an employer’s asserted belief is
“quintessentially” a question “for the finder of fact,” Aka
v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1299 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (en banc); see Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,
765 (3d Cir. 1994), while the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
apply the doctrine to withdraw such cases from juries
upon the employer’s assertion of sincerity. E.g., Majewski
v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117
(6th Cir. 2001); Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453
F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). The decision below places
the Eleventh Circuit at the far edge of that conflict—and
does so under a statute in which Congress assigned the
burden of persuasion to the employer, not the employee.
The question presented here is narrow, cleanly
presented, fully preserved, and outcome-determinative.
Because USERRA cases are overwhelmingly resolved
at summary judgment, the standards adopted below will
decide most such cases before any jury is empaneled. The
Court should grant the petition.
7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statutory Framework
USERRA is the latest in an unbroken line of statutes,
dating to 1940, protecting those “who left private life to
serve their country in its hour of great need.” Fishgold
v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285
(1946). This Court has long instructed that these statutes
are “to be liberally construed for the benefit” of returning
servicemembers, ibid., and “Congress adopted this rule
of construction when it enacted USERRA.” Myrick,
69 F.4th at 1318; see King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502
U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991); Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.,
447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980).) “Thus, when two plausible
interpretations of USERRA exist—one denying benefits,
the other protecting the veteran—we must choose the
interpretation that protects the veteran.” Myrick, 69
F.4th at 1318 (citing Travers, 8 F.4th at 208 n.25 (“[A]ny
interpretive doubt is construed in favor of the service
member, under the pro-veteran canon.”); see also Boone
v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).
Congress codified a specific causation framework
for discrimination claims—the framework this Court
articulated in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), and approved
for labor cases in NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401–03 (1983). See H.R. Rep. No. 10365, pt. 1, at 18–19 (1993). Under § 4311(c)(1), the employee
bears the initial burden of showing that military service
was “a motivating factor” in the adverse action.
“An employee proves a violation [of USERRA] by
establishing that his ‘service . . . in the uniformed services
8
[was] a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless
the employer can prove that the action would have been
taken in the absence of such . . . service.’” Thomas v.
Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 71 F.4th 1305, 1312 (11th
Cir., June 22, 2023)(citing §4311(c)(1)). “A person’s military
service is a motivating factor if ‘it is one of the factors that
a truthful employer would list if asked for the reasons for
its decision.” Id. “A wide range of evidence may prove that
an employee’s military status was a motivating factor in his
termination, including ‘an employer’s expressed hostility
towards members protected by the statute together
with knowledge of the employee’s military activity’ and
‘inconsistencies between the proffered reason and other
actions of the employer.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The burden then shifts to the employer, which escapes
liability only if it “can prove that the action would have
been taken in the absence of such membership.” 38
U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1); see Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S.
411, 417–20 (2011) (construing § 4311 by reference to
traditional tort-causation principles). The defense is an
affirmative one, on which the employer bears the burden
of persuasion, and its object is counterfactual causation—
what the employer would have done—not the employer’s
state of mind.
Congress recently reaffirmed USERRA’s protective
design, and strengthened the statute, in the Servicemember
Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (the “Dole Act”),
Pub. L. No. 118-210, 138 Stat. 2797 (Jan. 2, 2025).
9
B. Factual Background
1. Petitioners Adam McLean and James Doyle flew
for Delta Air Lines for nearly a decade while serving as
officers in the United States Air Force Reserve. App. 3a.
2. The summary-judgment record documented
sustained internal hostility at Delta toward military leave
and toward those whose military service required military
leave absences. Dist. Ct. dkt. 206 at 16-20. 2 Delta created
policies and practices designed to discourage and reduce
absences caused by military leave, to persuade pilots to
resign from military service, and to penalize pilots who
take military leave, with the goal of enabling Delta to
minimize its USERRA responsibilities and to enable Delta
to employ fewer pilots, thereby increasing its own profits.
Dist. Ct. dkt. 206 at 4, 11; Dist. Ct. dkts. 198-15, 198-17,
195-1, 195-3, 195-9, 195-11.
There are numerous examples of this company wide
hostility, including emails where Delta’s Chief Pilot wrote
that “[t]his is a case of the airlines subsidizing the military/
government,” that Delta would “start looking at whether
to hire [military] guys or not,” and that when “[Delta]
show[s] intent to be more discriminatory, [pilots] start
leaving the reserve/guard in droves. Cause and effect.”
App. 115a (Dist. Ct. dkt. 199-2 at 1); C.A. dkt. 50 at 11. 3
2. Citations to “Dist. Ct. dkt” refer to docket entries in the
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta
Division, Case No. 1:17-cv-00541-ELR.
3. Citations to “C.A. dkt” refer to docket entries in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Case
No. 24-11946.
10
Delta’s anti-military behavior was so egregious that even
Delta managers described the company’s treatment of
military pilots in emails as “boarders on harassment,” and
in writing observed that military commitments “make[]
one think twice about hiring Res and Guard guys.” App.
116a; Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-4 at 1; Dist. Ct. dkt. 199-2 at 2;
C.A. dkt. 50 at 11. Delta was even accused of waging a
“jihad” against pilots taking disfavored military leaves of
absences. C.A. dkt. 50 at 11; Dist. Ct. dkt. 207 at 18-19;
Dist. Ct. dkt. 197-2. Delta managers circulated by email
an offensive meme mocking pilots’ use of military leave.
App. 112a-113a.
3. To reduce its burdens and the inconveniences of
USERRA, Delta created and maintained a discriminatory
“concurrent duty policy” prohibiting a pilot from
performing military duty while being paid by or in a
paid status with Delta, but it did not restrict any other
activities. App. 10a. From 2006 until 2016, Delta’s
Concurrent Duty Policy was listed in Delta’s Flight
Operations Manual (“FOM”) as follows: “It is Delta’s
policy that a pilot participating in active military duty
is ineligible to perform Delta duties in any capacity,”
but was greatly expanded to the detriment of military
servicemembers after August 2016. Dist. Ct. dkt. 206-7
at 63. Factual evidence showed that the policy was applied
much more broadly than was written, such that military
pilots were prevented from performing both military duty
and working for Delta not just at the exact same moment
in time they are flying Delta aircraft, but on the same
calendar day, even when the two actions did not conflict
or overlap during that same day. Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-32.
In practice, and as used against the Plaintiffs, these
restrictions prevented individuals from performing
11
military duty during their own free time and/or on sick
leave, when notice under USERRA is not required to be
given to the employer; and these restrictions only applied
to those performing military work, and no other type of
work or activity. This policy was discriminatory because
the policy applied only to pilots with military obligations
and Delta imposed no analogous restriction on pilots
who pursued second jobs, side businesses, or any other
personal activities during or on the same day that Delta
compensated these employees, and the record showed such
“double-dipping” by non-military pilots was commonplace
and undisciplined. Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-36. This was not
a neutral policy applied to all employees, and military
affiliated pilots were subject to significant restrictions and
penalties based on what they did on their own time that
did not exist for any other pilots with second careers or
who participated in other activities outside of their Delta
employment. (see Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S.
549, 554 (1981).)
The concurrent duty policy overlapped with sick time
policies because if a pilot called in sick from Delta because
the pilot could not perform the duties of a commercial
airline pilot, and is paid by Delta for that sick time,
that pilot cannot do any type of military service, but
that pilot is not prohibited from doing anything outside
of the military while they are recovering on paid sick
leave. In fact, Delta’s written sick leave polices do not
address at all what a pilot can do, or not do, when they are
recovering on sick leave and cannot work for Delta. But
Delta’s concurrent duty policy prevented that person from
performing military duty while sick, unless the pilot goes
off of paid sick leave and on unpaid military leave. Dist.
Ct. dkt. 195 at 203:7-205:12. The concurrent duty policy
12
would allow a pilot to work as a dentist on the same day he
or she works for or is sick from Delta, but that same pilot
cannot perform work as a military dentist. Id. It would
allow a pilot to fly their own airplane, but that same pilot
could not fly a military airplane. The pilot can even drink
alcohol on the same day he or she is compensated by Delta,
but the person could not perform military duty. Delta
managers even acknowledged in writing that the policy
was “a slippery slope” the company had “gone down,” and
that managers enforcing it had themselves performed
concurrent duty. Dist. Ct. dkts. 198-32, 198-36, 202 at
46:14–47:18, 48:17–48:19.
4. Delta opened investigations into both petitioners—
Doyle in 2015, McLean in 2016 —because they took
military leave and performed military service, and only
later asserted that each had abused sick leave and military
leave. App. 3a–5a. Doyle’s investigation, which is clearly
described in email, was triggered because he took a “single
MLOA day in the middle of a reserve days block” which
reduced his availability and thus his productivity, so Delta
sought a pretext to punish him. App. 107a-111a; C.A. dkt.
30 at 16; C.A. dkt. 50 at 12. McLean was investigated
because frequent military duty impacted his Delta
availability, and following a hernia operation, McLean
was unable to perform all the duties of a commercial flight
crewmember, but he was well enough to perform other
activities with certain physical limitations. App. 71a-72a;
C.A. dkt. 50 at 12; C.A. dkt. 30 at 24–26; Dist. Ct. dkt. 17113. However, Delta’s contemporaneous internal records
illustrate what truly motivated the terminations, and if
military leave and military service was never performed,
the investigations would never have even begun. The
agenda for Delta’s August 24, 2016 “Deals Meeting”—a
working list of pilots facing discipline—identifies McLean
13
with the notation “MLOA abuse, manipulation, concurrent
duty” with the status “[p]reparing for termination,” and
identifies Doyle with the single notation “MLOA abuse”
with the status “[p]ending termination.” App. 103a, 106a
(Dist. Ct. dkt. 194-6). In this document Delta truthfully
lists it’s motivating factors for termination, and neither
entry mentions sick leave, sick leave abuse, or any other
company policy violations.
Only later did Delta’s subsequent notices of intended
termination mention misuse of military leave as an
“independent ground[] for termination” alongside asserted
sick-leave violations. App. 4a-5a. Only much later did Delta
find that Doyle flew for the military on a morning, and then
on the same day, injured his knee and called in sick for
Delta that afternoon, because he was unable to walk long
distances, and perform his duties as a commercial pilot.
C.A. dkt. 50 at 12–13; C.A. dkt. 30 at 17-18. This event
triggered a concurrent duty violation, even though the
facts show Doyle never actually worked for the military at
the same time he was on sick leave at Delta. Furthermore,
Delta never formally accused Doyle of skiing while on sick
leave, and Doyle never said or admitted he skied while
on sick leave, but during company investigations and his
deposition, he did discuss that people recovering from
illness are allowed to do other activities, including skiing,
even though they’re physically unable to perform other
duties as a flight crewmember. C.A. dkt. 50 at 13; C.A.
dkt. 30 at 18; C.A. dkt. 25. Both pilots felt forced to resign
rather than be terminated and risk their military security
clearances, their military careers, and future employment
at other airlines, and the courts below assumed they were
constructively terminated. App. 9a n.2.
14
C. Proceedings Below
1. Petitioners sued Delta in the Northern District of
Georgia, alleging (as relevant) that Delta constructively
terminated them because of their military service in
violation of § 4311. The district court granted summary
judgment to Delta. App. 19a–82a. On the § 4311 claim,
the court held that petitioners had “shown a prima facie
case that Delta pressured them to resign because of
their military service,” but that Delta was entitled to
judgment because it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons to discipline them, including admitted violations
of the concurrent duty policy, “disregard for Defendant’s
ability to schedule . . . [][military] leave (which no doubt
impacted other employees), lack of productivity, abuse
or misuse of Defendant’s leave systems” (App. 69a), and
“perform[ing] military duty while on paid sick leave”
(App. 71a), even though each reason is directly related to
USERRA protected military duty. App. 69a; C.A. dkt. 30
at 16; Dist. Ct. dkt. 207 at 10, 16, 25, nn. 3–4, 7; Dist. Ct.
dkt. 228-1 at 18–23.
2. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
Judgment in a published opinion. App. 1a–18a. At the
second step of § 4311(c)(1), the panel held that Delta’s
proffered belief that petitioners abused sick leave was
dispositive—“even if that reason was mistaken” and
even if the alleged violations never actually occurred.
App. 11a. Quoting its Title VII decisions in Damon and
Flowers, the panel held that “[a]n employer who fires
an employee under the mistaken but honest impression
that the employee violated a work rule is not liable for
discriminatory conduct,” and that employers “are free
to fire their employees for a good reason, a bad reason, a
15
reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as
long as [the] action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Id.
(citations modified). The panel deemed petitioners’ denials
of sick-leave abuse irrelevant because “the focus of the
second step . . . is on the employer’s reason for terminating
the employee, not the employee’s conduct.” Id.
3. The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing and
rehearing en banc on June 10, 2026. App. 97a-98a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
The Courts Of Appeals Are Now Divided Over
Whether An Employer’s “Honest Belief” Satisfies
§ 4311(c)(1)’s Same-Action Defense.
A.
Four circuits hold that § 4311(c)(1) imposes
a burden of persuasion on counterfactual
causation that subjective belief cannot carry.
The First, Third, Seventh, and Federal Circuits hold
that § 4311(c)(1) imposes on the employer a burden of
persuasion on counterfactual causation that a subjective
“honest belief” cannot satisfy. The Federal Circuit—
whose USERRA jurisprudence is the most developed
by virtue of its review of federal-sector claims—holds
that once discriminatory motivation is shown, the
employer bears “the burden of persuasion” to prove
“by a preponderance of the evidence[] that the action
would have been taken despite the protected status.”
Sheehan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013–14
(Fed. Cir. 2001). Because the “same-action” showing is
an affirmative defense, Sheehan explained, USERRA’s
scheme differs fundamentally from Title VII burden-
16
shifting, under which the burden of persuasion never
leaves the plaintiff: under USERRA, the employer must
do more than “articulat[e]” a legitimate reason—it must
prove the counterfactual. Ibid. And Sheehan identified the
very categories of circumstantial evidence that the honestbelief rule renders immaterial as the accepted means of
proving discriminatory motivation: “proximity in time
between the employee’s military activity and the adverse
employment action, inconsistencies between the proffered
reason and other actions of the employer, an employer’s
expressed hostility towards members protected by the
statute together with knowledge of the employee’s military
activity, and disparate treatment of certain employees
compared to other employees with similar work records
or offenses.” Id. at 1014.
The First Circuit follows the same rule. Under
Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc.,
473 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2007), once the employee carries his
motivating-factor burden, the employer “must prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the action would
have been taken in the absence of the employee’s military
service.” Id. at 17. The court was explicit about what that
allocation means for the honest-belief question: under
USERRA—unlike Title VII—“the employee does not
have the burden of demonstrating that the employer’s
stated reason is a pretext. Instead, the employer must
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the stated
reason was not a pretext.” Ibid. An employer’s sincere
belief in its stated reason therefore begins, rather than
ends, the second step: the employer itself must persuade
the factfinder that the proffered reason—and not the
employee’s service—was the real and sufficient cause of
the adverse action.
17
The Third and Seventh Circuits agree. In Carroll
v. Delaware River Port Authority, 843 F.3d 129, 132133 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit emphasized that
USERRA’s two-step framework differs materially from
the McDonnell Douglas regime precisely because both
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion
shift to the employer, and the employee at no point bears
the burden of proving pretext. And the Seventh Circuit
has expressly held that USERRA’s framework is “more
protective” than Title VII’s and that courts may not import
Title VII’s burden-shifting structure into USERRA cases.
Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 805 F.3d 278, 284286 (7th Cir. 2015). Applying that rule, Arroyo reversed
summary judgment for an employer that had discharged
an Army reservist for asserted attendance-rule violations
intertwined with her deployments, on a record containing
contemporaneous expressions of hostility to her military
obligations. In these four circuits, an employer’s sincerebut-mistaken belief that the employee broke a work rule
does not end the case; the factfinder must still decide
whether the employer has proved that, with military
service subtracted from the calculus, the same action
would in fact have been taken.
B. Four more circuits likewise enforce § 4311(c)(1)’s
employer-side burden of persuasion.
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
not yet confronted a square attempt to substitute the
Title VII honest-belief doctrine for § 4311(c)(1)’s sameaction showing. But each of those circuits likewise holds
that § 4311(c)(1) is an affirmative defense on which the
employer bears the burden of persuasion. See Bradberry
v. Jefferson Cnty., 732 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2013); Savage
18
v. Fed. Express Corp., 856 F.3d 440, 447 (6th Cir. 2017);
Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 551 (8th
Cir. 2005); Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895,
900 (9th Cir. 2002)(finding that the evidence only needs
to support an inference that military status or conduct
was a motivating or substantial factor in an employment
decision). In each, the second step is framed as an objective
showing about what the employer would have done—a
showing the employer must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence—not as an inquiry into the employer’s good
faith. Eight circuits thus enforce the employer-side burden
of persuasion Congress enacted; only the Eleventh Circuit
permits an employer to discharge that burden by attesting
to the sincerity of its stated reason.
C.
The Eleventh Circuit stands alone: no other
circuit permits an employer’s honest belief to
satisfy § 4311(c)(1).
No other court of appeals has adopted the honestbelief doctrine as a rule of decision under USERRA. The
decision below stands alone. At § 4311(c)(1)’s second step,
the panel asked not what Delta would have done absent
petitioners’ military service, but whether Delta honestly
believed petitioners had violated company policies (policies
that are directly related to military service)—expressly
extending to USERRA the “honest belief” rule of its Title
VII cases: “An employer who fires an employee under the
mistaken but honest impression that the employee violated
a work rule is not liable for discriminatory conduct.” App.
11a (citing Damon, 196 F.3d at 1363 n.3; Flowers, 803 F.3d
at 1338). On that holding, petitioners’ evidence disputing
the truth of the asserted rule violations—and their
evidence that the asserted violations were themselves
19
entangled with their military service—was immaterial
as a matter of law. App. 10a-11a.
The conflict is square and acknowledged in the
case law’s architecture. Damon and Flowers are Title
VII decisions; neither mentions USERRA or confronts
§ 4311(c)(1)’s text. The panel nonetheless made their
subjective-belief rule dispositive of a USERRA claim at
summary judgment—precisely what the Seventh Circuit
in Arroyo held impermissible, and precisely what the
Federal, First, and Third Circuits’ burden-of-persuasion
holdings foreclose. A USERRA plaintiff whose employer
honestly but wrongly believed him a rule-breaker survives
summary judgment in Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago,
but loses as a matter of law in Atlanta, Miami, and
Birmingham. Only this Court can resolve that conflict.
D.
The Eleventh Circuit’s rule is wrong.
1. The statutory text is unambiguous. Section
4311(c)(1) conditions the employer’s escape from liability
on its ability to “prove that the action would have
been taken in the absence of such membership.” Both
operative phrases point away from the honest-belief
rule. “Prove” imposes a burden of persuasion, not a
burden of articulation. And “would have been taken”
states a counterfactual-causation standard—an objective
inquiry into what this employer would in fact have done
in a world without the employee’s military service. An
employer’s honest belief in a proffered reason answers
a different question: what the employer thought. A
sincerely held reason may nonetheless be a reason the
employer would never have even acted upon absent the
employee’s protected status—particularly where, as here,
20
the evidence shows that Delta initiated its investigations
only because military service was performed, Delta’s
own contemporaneous termination worksheet listed only
military-leave-related grounds (App. 103a-106a), and the
“work rule” invoked applies exclusively to employees
performing military duty. App. 10a. If McLean and
Doyle were not members of the military and did not take
USERRA protected military leave, but instead behaved
similarly and worked at a regular civilian job for pay on
the same day they were paid by Delta, these investigations
would never have even begun.
The panel itself recited the governing standard: once
petitioners made “an initial showing . . . that military
status was at least a motivating . . . factor” in the adverse
employment actions, the burden passed to Delta, “upon
which the [employer] must” show “that the action would
have been taken despite the protected status.” App. 8a
(quoting Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1239). The court of appeals
was correct about that allocation—and that allocation
is fatal to the judgment, because Delta could not have
made the required showing on this record. The asserted
violations Delta labeled “sick leave” abuse were in fact
based on the performance of military duty while on
sick leave: the charge was not that petitioners engaged
in some outside activity unrelated to their service, but
that they performed military duty on days they were
medically unable to perform the duties of a commercial
flight crewmember. App. 4a–5a, 10a. But for petitioners’
protected status as military servicemembers, they would
not—and could not—have performed the military duty that
constituted the asserted violations, and Delta would not
have taken the adverse actions against them. An employer
cannot prove that the action “would have been taken” in
21
the absence of the employee’s military service when the
conduct underlying its stated reason is the performance
of military service. Cf. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379
U.S. 21, 23 (1964). Having recited Coffman’s standard, the
panel excused Delta from carrying it—accepting Delta’s
sincerity about a rationale that collapses into the very
protected status the statute shields.
The employer’s subjective state of mind is beside the
statutory point. Section 4311(c)(1)’s same-action defense
is a causation defense, not a good-faith defense. What the
employer honestly believed speaks, at most, to step one’s
motivating-factor inquiry; it cannot answer step two’s
question, because what an employer wrongly believed
says nothing about what it would have done absent the
employee’s military service obligations. Sincerity is not
sufficient to carry the defense: an employer may genuinely
believe an employee violated a work rule and still be unable
to prove that it would have acted on that belief absent
the employee’s military service—where, for example, it
tolerated identical conduct by employees without military
obligations, invoked the rule only against those who serve,
or, as here, would never have scrutinized the employee’s
conduct at all but for his performance of military service.
To “prove” the counterfactual is to carry a burden of
persuasion on an objective question of fact, see Dir., Office
of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries,
512 U.S. 267, 272–76 (1994) (“burden of proof” ordinarily
denotes the burden of persuasion), and an employer’s state
of mind—however honest—is not evidence of what it would
have done in a world where the employee never wore the
uniform. That is why the circuits that apply § 4311(c)(1) as
written hold that an employer’s proffer of a sincerely held
reason begins, rather than ends, the same-action inquiry.
22
2. The statutory history confirms the textual
reading. Congress modeled § 4311(c)(1) on the Mt. Healthy
same-decision framework, under which the defense is an
affirmative one carrying a burden of persuasion. H.R.
Rep. No. 103-65, pt. 1, at 18–19; see Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S.
at 287; Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 401–03. This Court in
Staub construed § 4311 by reference to traditional tortcausation principles, treating the same-action showing as
the employer’s affirmative defense—not as a deferential
review of the employer’s state of mind. 562 U.S. at 417–20.
When Congress wants an employer’s honest business
judgment to control, or wants the burden of persuasion
to remain with the plaintiff, it knows how to say so; it
wrote Title VII differently, and this Court has repeatedly
refused to homogenize distinct discrimination statutes’
causation standards. The Eleventh Circuit’s importation of
Title VII doctrine erases the very feature—an employerside burden of proof—that distinguishes USERRA’s
scheme.
3. The honest-belief doctrine cannot bear the
weight the panel placed on it even on its own terms. The
doctrine is a transplant. The panel borrowed it wholesale
from Damon and Flowers—Title VII cases in which
the burden of persuasion never leaves the plaintiff and
the doctrine serves only to blunt one particular form
of pretext evidence: proof that the employer’s asserted
factual premise was false. Even in that setting, an
employer’s honest belief is not an affirmative defense to
liability; it merely limits the inference a factfinder may
draw from the falsity of the employer’s explanation, and
it forecloses neither other proof of unlawful motive nor
a jury’s assessment of whether the asserted belief was
honestly held at all.
23
Courts applying the doctrine accordingly treat the
sincerity of the asserted belief as itself a question for
the factfinder: the inquiry is whether “the employer’s
explanation was so weak, implausible, inconsistent or
incoherent that a reasonable fact finder could conclude
that it was not an honestly held belief but rather was
subterfuge for discrimination,” Young v. Dillon Cos., 468
F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2006), and summary judgment
is unavailable where a jury could “disbelieve defendants’
claim” that a rule, like the concurrent duty policy and
its entanglement with sick leave, enforced against one
protected group but not others “was merely a mistake,”
Orr v. City of Albuquerque, 531 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir.
2008).4
4. Even under Title VII and other motive-based statutes,
courts—including the Eleventh Circuit—have refused to treat
an employer’s honest belief as a defense that forecloses liability
or removes the question from the jury. See, e.g., Miles v. S. Cent.
Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 890 n.5 (6th Cir. 2020)
(“[T]he ‘honest belief’ rule only applies as a defense to a lack of a
factual basis for the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered
by the employer.”); Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 400,
425 (6th Cir. 2021) (honest belief unavailing where the asserted
concerns “did not actually motivate” the decision); Westmoreland
v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 730 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven if
TWC honestly believed Westmoreland violated its policy, the jury
could reasonably infer (as it apparently did) that the company used
this as a pretext for discrimination”); Coleman v. Donahoe, 667
F.3d 835, 853 (7th Cir. 2012) (a stated reason, “even if actually
present to the mind of the employer,” is pretextual if it “wasn’t
what induced” the challenged action); Woodard v. Fanboy, L.L.C.,
298 F.3d 1261, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing summary
judgment where a reasonable jury could conclude the employer
“did not honestly believe” the facts underlying its stated reason);
Orr, 531 F.3d at 1216–18 & n.4 (reversing summary judgment
where the employer enforced against the protected group “a rule at
24
Transplanted to USERRA’s second step, the doctrine
does far more: it relieves the employer of the burden of
persuasion Congress expressly imposed and converts
a statutory causation defense into a good-faith defense
appearing nowhere in the statute’s text. Where Congress
has enacted a Mt. Healthy-style same-action defense,
courts have recognized that an honest belief cannot
carry it. Construing the Federal Railroad Safety Act’s
materially similar framework, the Eighth Circuit held
that “[l]iability will still exist notwithstanding such
a[n] [honest] belief if the employer’s retaliatory motive
also played a contributing role in the decision and if the
employer fails to carry the burden of proving” that it
would have taken the same action absent the protected
conduct—and it rejected a jury instruction that would
have directed a verdict for the employer upon a finding
of honest belief. Blackorby v. BNSF Ry. Co., 936 F.3d
733, 737 (8th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit likewise held
that a plaintiff may prevail “even if [the employer] had an
honestly-held, justified belief” in the asserted misconduct.
odds with Department policy and practice,” the written policy “did
not reflect what actually occurred in practice” (quoting Trujillo v.
PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2008)), and the employer’s
evidence of even-handed application post-dated notice of the
plaintiffs’ complaints and could be viewed as a “post-hoc effort
to cover up past discriminatory practices”); Young, 468 F.3d at
1251–52 (identifying, as proof that would defeat an asserted honest
belief, a reason “generated only after the termination,” a failure
to follow the employer’s own “written termination procedures,”
and evidence “deliberately suppressed from the decision makers
or ignored in order to further a discriminatory purpose”); see
generally Eric Schnapper, Honest Belief and Proof of Unlawful
Motive, 71 Buff. L. Rev. 769, 830 (2023) (“The existence of an
honest belief is not some sort of affirmative defense to a claim of
unlawful purpose.”).
25
Frost v. BNSF Ry. Co., 914 F.3d 1189, 1196–97 (9th Cir.
2019).
4. This Court’s precedents confirm that an employer’s
good faith cannot answer § 4311(c)(1)’s causation question.
Staub was itself a USERRA case in which the ultimate
decisionmaker acted on an honest assessment of the
information before her; the Court nonetheless held that the
employer may be liable where a supervisor’s antimilitary
animus was intended to cause, and proximately caused,
the adverse action. Staub, 562 U.S. at 414–23. Applying
Staub, the courts of appeals have repeatedly refused to let
employers invoke the honest-belief doctrine in cat’s-paw
cases, because “the decisionmaker’s intent does not matter,
and consequently the honesty of the decisionmaker’s belief
does not matter.” Marshall v. Rawlings Co., 854 F.3d 368,
380 (6th Cir. 2017). And where the asserted misconduct
arises out of the protected activity itself, this Court has
held that an employer’s good-faith belief that misconduct
occurred is no defense at all; the misconduct must actually
have occurred. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S.
21, 23 (1964). That principle speaks directly to this case:
the “concurrent duty” and leave “violations” Delta invoked
were not conduct independent of petitioners’ service—they
consisted of the performance of military duty itself. A rule
under which an employer’s mistaken belief about conduct
inseparable from protected service defeats liability as a
matter of law cannot be reconciled with Burnup & Sims,
much less with § 4311(c)(1)’s text.
5. Congress’s allocation of the burden also reflects
a reality this Court has long recognized: discrimination
rarely announces itself, is seldom open and notorious,
and an adverse employment action dressed in a facially
26
neutral justification may be nothing more than a pretext
concealing a discriminatory motive. A factfinder may
treat the falsity of, or inconsistencies in, an employer’s
explanation as affirmative evidence of discrimination.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 147 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 511 (1993). USERRA case law implements the same
principle: discriminatory motivation may be inferred
from, among other things, the timing of the adverse
action, inconsistencies between the proffered reason and
the employer’s other conduct, expressed hostility toward
those who serve, and disparate treatment of comparable
employees. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014.
The honest-belief rule dismantles that structure. By
making the employer’s sincerity dispositive, it places the
pretext inquiry—the principal means by which covert
discrimination against servicemembers is exposed—
beyond the factfinder’s reach: shifting explanations,
disparate enforcement, and contemporaneous expressions
of hostility all become immaterial the moment the
employer attests to its own good faith. This record
shows what is at stake. Delta’s contemporaneous “Deals
Meeting” worksheet identified only military-leave
grounds for the planned terminations, App. 103a-106a;
the sick-leave rationale surfaced only later, App. 5a; the
“concurrent duty” rule was enforced exclusively against
pilots performing military service while identical “doubledipping” by non-military pilots went undisciplined, Dist.
Ct. dkt. 198-36; and the deciding chain of command
documented its hostility to military leave in writing. App.
110a–116a; Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-4.
That is precisely the showing Orr held sufficient.
There the employer defended its differential treatment on
27
the ground that it was “merely applying a uniform policy
applicable to all employees,” 531 F.3d at 1212, and the
Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that
justification pretextual because the policy the employer
invoked was not the policy that in fact governed, and
because the employer’s practice for employees outside
the protected class diverged from the rule it enforced
against those within it. Id. at 1216–17. Delta’s concurrentduty policy presents the same proof and more: it was
written to bar a pilot from performing Delta duties while
“participating in active military duty,” but was enforced
to bar military service anywhere on the same calendar
day even absent any overlap; non-military pilots’ outside
work on Delta-compensated days went unrestricted and
undisciplined; the managers enforcing it had themselves
performed concurrent duty and described it in writing as
“a slippery slope”; and by its terms the rule reaches no
conduct except military service. App. 10a; Dist. Ct. dkt.
198-32; Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-36; Dist. Ct. dkt. 202 at 46:14–
47:18. The policy Delta invoked is therefore not a neutral
premise from which its good faith can be measured; it is
itself the evidence of pretext. Under the majority rule, that
is a textbook pretext case for a jury; under the decision
below, it is summary judgment for the employer.
6. Finally, the honest-belief rule inverts the statute’s
protective design. Under the decision below, any employer
that can articulate a plausible—even erroneous—workrule rationale obtains judgment as a matter of law,
no matter how strong the evidence of military-based
animus and no matter how disputed the underlying facts.
That converts an affirmative defense Congress made
deliberately demanding into a near-automatic exit from
liability at summary judgment.
28
E. The question is recurring, outcome-determinative,
and squarely presented in this case.
The § 4311(c)(1) standard is the fulcrum of virtually
every USERRA discrimination case: because such cases
are commonly resolved at summary judgment, the content
of the employer’s defense determines which cases reach
a jury at all. The decision below is published and now
binds every district court in the Eleventh Circuit. And the
question is dispositive here. The district court found—and
the panel accepted—that petitioners established a prima
facie case that military service was a motivating factor
in their constructive terminations. App. 6a, 9a. The case
turned entirely on step two. Petitioners’ evidence—the
termination worksheet identifying only “MLOA abuse,
manipulation, [and] concurrent duty” as grounds for
termination (App. 103a, 106a); a “concurrent duty policy”
that by definition applies only to pilots performing
military service (App. 10a); and documented hostility
to military leave within the deciding chain of command
(App. 110a-116a; Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-4)—created a genuine
dispute over whether Delta would have forced out these
pilots absent their military service. The honest-belief
rule applied below took that dispute from the jury. This
case accordingly presents the question cleanly, with no
antecedent or alternative ground obscuring it.
29
II. The Decision Below Also Implicates A Second,
Broader Conflict: Whether An Employer’s “Honest
Belief” May Be Resolved At Summary Judgment
At All.
A.
The circuits are divided over whether an
asserted honest belief presents a jury question.
Even on the honest-belief doctrine’s home ground—
Title VII and other motive-based statutes under which
the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion—the courts
of appeals are divided over whether the doctrine may be
applied at summary judgment at all, given the inherently
factual character of the questions it purports to resolve.
The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the notion that
an employer’s assertion of an honest belief can insulate its
explanation from a jury’s scrutiny: a jury may “conclude
that an employer who fabricates a false explanation has
something to hide,” and where an asserted belief appears
unreasoned or selectively applied, the jury may infer
pretext. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d
1284, 1292–93 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Credibility, the
court explained, is “quintessentially” an issue “for the
finder of fact.” Id. at 1299. The Third Circuit likewise
holds that whether an employer’s stated rationale is
“unworthy of credence” is a function reserved to the
factfinder. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir.
1994). The Ninth Circuit has never adopted the doctrine,
and it reverses summary judgment where circumstantial
evidence casts doubt on the employer’s explanation. Noyes
v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2007).
And the Tenth Circuit confines the doctrine narrowly,
Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1118 (10th
Cir. 2007), holding that the sincerity of the asserted belief
30
is itself for the jury whenever the explanation is “weak,
implausible, inconsistent or incoherent.” Young, 468 F.3d
at 1250; see Orr, 531 F.3d at 1216–18.
On the other side of the divide, the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits apply the doctrine robustly to withdraw cases
from juries, granting judgment as a matter of law where
the employer asserts a sincerely held belief in its stated
reason, even one that is factually mistaken. E.g., Majewski
v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117
(6th Cir. 2001); Babcock v. Michigan, 812 F.3d 531, 536
(6th Cir. 2016); Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453
F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (an “honest mistake, however
dumb,” is not pretextual); Little v. Illinois Department
of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2004).
The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits
recognize the doctrine in varying degrees. See RondaPerez v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria–P.R., 404
F.3d 42, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2005); McPherson v. New York
City Department of Education, 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir.
2006); Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208,
217–18 (4th Cir. 2007); Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987
F.2d 1160, 1165–66 (5th Cir. 1993); Scroggins v. University
of Minnesota, 221 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000). Where
a servicemember’s case is filed thus determines not only
who bears the burden of persuasion under § 4311(c)(1),
but whether an employer’s professed state of mind may
be resolved by a judge rather than a jury.
31
B. Resolving an employer’s state of mind at
summary judgment cannot be squared with
this Court’s precedents committing credibility
and motive to the factfinder.
This Court has held that circumstantial evidence of
discrimination suffices to take a case to the factfinder,
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003); that
the factfinder’s disbelief of the employer’s explanation—
together with the elements of the prima facie case—may
itself establish liability, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; and that
judge-made evidentiary frameworks may not be used to
impose atextual barriers on discrimination plaintiffs,
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S.
303 (2025). Those holdings rest on a much older principle:
determining “the weight and credibility” of testimony “has
long been held to be” a “part of every case that belongs
to the jury.” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S.
76, 88 (1891); accord United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.
303, 313 (1998). An employer’s state of mind—whether it
“honestly” believed its stated reason, and whether that
belief rather than the employee’s protected status in fact
produced the discharge—is the paradigm of a question
that turns on credibility and competing inferences, which
Rule 56 reserves to the jury.
C.
This record shows why: whether Delta’s
asserted belief was honest, and whether the
concurrent duty policy was lawful or violated
at all, are questions for a jury.
The courts below found that petitioners carried their
step-one burden: the investigations and adverse actions
32
against them were motivated by their performance of
military duty. App. 6a, 9a. And the “standalone” reasons
the district court articulated were dominated by asserted
violations of the concurrent duty policy—performing
military duty while in a paid status with Delta—and
related leave-system charges. App. 67a, 70a. That rule
prohibits nothing except the performance of military
service. Whether Delta honestly believed the concurrent
duty policy was lawful; whether Delta honestly believed
petitioners violated it; and whether that belief, rather
than hostility to their service, actually produced the
constructive terminations, are each questions of fact:
the managers who enforced the policy had themselves
performed concurrent duty and described the policy in
writing as “a slippery slope” the company had “gone down,”
Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-32; the policy as enforced diverged from
the policy as written, App. 10a; identical “double-dipping”
by non-military pilots went undisciplined, Dist. Ct. dkt.
198-36; and the sick-leave rationale surfaced only after a
termination worksheet that listed military-leave grounds
alone. App. 103a-106a. A court cannot resolve the honesty,
content, or operative force of that belief at summary
judgment without weighing credibility and choosing
among competing inferences—the very functions Rule
56 withholds from courts and preserves for juries. Even
the circuits most receptive to the honest-belief doctrine
treat the sincerity of an asserted belief as a jury question
on a record like this one. Young, 468 F.3d at 1250; Orr,
531 F.3d at 1216–18. The Eleventh Circuit resolved it as
a matter of law. On either side of either conflict, that was
error—and only this Court can restore uniformity.
33
III. The Question Presented Is Important, And This
Case Is A Clean Vehicle For Resolving It.
USERRA is the sole federal guarantee that the
hundreds of thousands of National Guard and Reserve
members employed by civilian employers will not suffer
for answering their country’s call. The statute rests on a
recognition of sacrifice: reservists are “expected to leave
their civilian jobs, sometimes for years on end,” Myrick,
69 F.4th at 1312, and Congress legislated “with the full
understanding” that their “frequent absences from work”
could “cause considerable inconvenience to an employer.”
Clarkson, 59 F.4th at 436 (quoting Monroe v. Standard Oil
Co., 452 U.S. 549, 555 (1981)). “Nevertheless, Congress has
provided that employers may not rid themselves of such
inconveniences and productivity losses by discharging
or otherwise disadvantaging employee-reservists solely
because of their military obligations.” Id. Because of the
sacrifice the Nation asks of those who serve, this Court
has instructed for eighty years that these statutes are
“always to be liberally construed to protect those who
have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up
the burdens of the nation.” Boone, 319 U.S. at 575; see
Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285; King, 502 U.S. at 220 n.9. The
honest-belief rule construes the statute in precisely the
opposite direction: it reads into § 4311(c)(1) a judge-made
escape from liability that Congress did not enact, and it
resolves every interpretive doubt against the veteran.
The nation’s reliance on the reserve components
has only deepened, and Congress underscored the point
by strengthening USERRA in the 2025 Dole Act. Pub.
L. No. 118-210, 138 Stat. 2797. This Court has recently
reaffirmed the seriousness of USERRA’s guarantees.
34
See Torres v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 597 U.S. 580
(2022). Yet the rules of decision that determine whether
USERRA claims ever reach a factfinder now differ openly
by circuit: the employer’s burden under § 4311(c)(1) is a
burden of persuasion in the First, Third, Seventh, and
Federal Circuits, but a subjective honest-belief showing
in the Eleventh. Servicemembers’ federal rights should
not depend on where their employer is headquartered.
This case is a clean vehicle. The courts below
accepted that petitioners established a prima facie
case that military service was a motivating factor in
their constructive terminations (App. 6a, 9a), so Delta’s
§ 4311(c)(1) defense is the only live issue, and the standard
governing that defense dictates the outcome. The decision
below is published and precedential. And the record
presents the honest-belief problem in unusually stark
relief: the employer’s own contemporaneous termination
worksheet identified only military-leave grounds (App.
103a-106a), yet the court of appeals held the employer’s
later-asserted belief in a different rationale dispositive
as a matter of law.
Nor does the brevity of the panel’s honest-belief
discussion obscure the question; it underscores how
settled the rule now is in the Eleventh Circuit. The panel
did not hold that Delta carried its affirmative defense by
proving that petitioners actually violated its sick-leave or
concurrent-duty policies. It held instead that the truth of
the asserted violations did not matter—Delta prevailed
“even if that reason was mistaken” (App. 11a)—and that
petitioners’ contrary evidence was beside the point because
“the focus of the second step . . . is on the employer’s
reason for terminating the employee, not the employee’s
35
conduct.” App. 11a. The honest-belief rule was therefore
the necessary ground of the judgment, not an alternative
holding. Had the panel instead required Delta to prove that
it would have taken the same actions absent petitioners’
military service, the disputed record—the military-leaveonly termination worksheet, the shifting explanations, the
selective enforcement, and the documented hostility—
would have precluded summary judgment. The question
presented is accordingly dispositive here.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Charles M. Billy
Law Offices of
Charles M. Billy, APC
22706 Aspan Street,
Suite 305
Lake Forest, CA 92630
Gene J. Stonebarger
Counsel of Record
Stonebarger Law, APC
101 Parkshore Drive,
Suite 100
Folsom, CA 95630
(916) 235-7140
gstonebarger@
stonebargerlaw.com
Counsel for Petitioners
August 28, 2026
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR
T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED
APRIL 22, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
A PPEN DI X B — OR DER OF T H E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGI A , AT L A N TA DI V I SION,
FILED MARCH 31, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19a
A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED
JULY 24, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83a
APPENDIX D — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR
T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED
JUNE 10, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97a
A PPENDI X E — J U DGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED
JUNE 26, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99a
A PPENDI X F — J U DGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED
SEPTEMBER 8, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101a
ii
Table of Appendices
Page
APPENDIX G — DELTA DEALS MEETING
AGENDA (D. CT. DOC. 19 4 - 6, FILED
MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103a
APPENDIX H — DOYLE INVESTIGATION
TRIGGER EMAIL (D. CT. DOC. 197-16,
FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107a
APPENDIX I — DELTA INTERNAL FOLLOWUP EMAIL RE DOYLE INVESTIGATION,
RECORD EXHIBIT (D. CT. DOC. 197-17,
FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109a
APPENDIX J — DELTA EMAIL CIRCULATING
MEME RE MILITARY LEAVE (D. CT.
DOC. 198-19, FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . 112a
A PPENDIX K — DELTA CHIEF PILOT
EMAILS RE MILITARY PILOTS (D. CT.
DOC. 199-2, FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . 114a
1a
APPENDIX A — Appendix
OPINIONAOF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 22, 2026
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-11946
JEREMY SORENSON, et al.,
AN INDIVIDUAL,
Plaintiffs,
ADAM MCLEAN, AN INDIVIDUAL,
JAMES DOYLE, AN INDIVIDUAL, ON BEHALF
OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
A DELAWARE CORPORATION,
Defendant- Appellee.
Filed April 22, 2026
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00541-ELR
Before Willia m P ryor , Chief Judge, and Luck and
Brasher, Circuit Judges.
2a
Appendix A
Luck, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves a dispute between an airline
and two of its former pilots. Adam McLean and James
Doyle worked for Delta Air Lines for nearly a decade.
At the same time, they also served in the United States
Air Force Reserve. The former pilots sued Delta alleging
that the airline pushed them out because of their military
service obligations, in violation of the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. They also
claimed that Delta’s pension-contribution and vacationtime-accrual benefit programs violated the Act. The
district court sided with Delta and granted summary
judgment for the airline on all three claims. This is
McLean’s and Doyle’s appeal. After careful review, and
with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Delta’s Leave Benefits and Policies
As part of their collective bargaining agreement,
Delta’s pilots receive a package of benefits. Four benefits
in that package are relevant to this appeal.
First, Delta provides military leave to pilots who
have military service obligations. When a pilot informs
Delta that he has military duty, the company notes the
military leave on the pilot’s schedule and marks him as
unavailable for work during the leave period. The “pilot
performing military duty (on orders . . . or any other
duty that is paid by the state or the U.S. government) is
ineligible to perform Delta duties in any capacity (except
while on military terminal leave).” The prohibition against
3a
Appendix A
working for Delta while on military orders is called the
concurrent duty policy.
Second, Delta offers paid sick leave for pilots who are
unable to fly for medical reasons. “Delta pilots are entitled
to use sick leave only when a personal medical condition,
physical or mental, disables the pilot from performing
duties as a flight crewmember.”
Third, Delta’s compensation includes pension
contributions for its pilots, even when they are on military
leave. For pilots on military leave, Delta calculates the
pension contribution using the “average line value,” which
projects the average number of hours that the pilot would
work if he were not on leave and then multiplies that
number by the pilot’s hourly rate.
And fourth, Delta allows pilots on known leaves of
absence to accrue vacation time. Delta offers this type
of leave to pilots when it needs to reduce its labor costs.
During a known leave of absence, a pilot remains “active”
but does not fly any routes.
The plaintiffs, McLean and Doyle, worked as Delta
pilots for nearly a decade. While flying for Delta, they
also served as reservists in the United States Air Force.
McLean
In 2017, Delta investigated McLean for abusing
his military-leave and sick-leave benefits. During its
investigation, Delta learned that McLean had “routinely
misused military leave and sick leave in multiple ways.”
4a
Appendix A
Once, for example, McLean told Delta that he was too
sick to fly, took paid sick leave, and then went on to fly
jets for the military while on sick leave. McLean did so
despite an express warning from his Delta supervisor that
he could be fired if he did side work while on sick leave.
Delta discovered at least ten other times when McLean
took paid sick leave and then performed military duty on
the same day.
The investigation also revealed that, twenty-five
times, McLean falsely informed Delta that he had military
duty. Because Delta cannot prevent its employees from
fulfilling their military service obligations, McLean’s false
reports kept Delta from scheduling him for work on those
days—despite the fact he was available. McLean further
violated Delta’s military leave policies by failing to inform
the airline of his military orders on over one hundred
days. At least twice, McLean flew military jets while he
was being paid to be on standby for Delta, meaning that
if the airline had needed him, he wouldn’t have been able
to fly. When asked about these incidents, McLean denied
abusing his military leave, but acknowledged how Delta
could have thought he was doing so. In total, Delta found
that McLean received at least $53,628.70 in unearned pay
and benefits due to his abuse of sick and military leave.
Based on the findings of the investigation, Delta notified
McLean that it intended to terminate his employment.
The notice listed two reasons for termination. First, it
recounted McLean’s extensive “misuse of military leave”
as an “independent ground[] for termination.” Second,
it laid out McLean’s sick leave violations and explained
that his abuse of Delta’s sick-leave benefits provided an
5a
Appendix A
“independent basis for [his] termination.” McLean was
entitled to contest his termination, but instead he chose
to resign.
Doyle
In 2015, Delta investigated Doyle for abusing his
military-and sick-leave benefits. Delta became concerned
about Doyle’s use of sick leave when he told a supervisor
that he had gone skiing over the New Year when he was
supposed to be on sick leave with the flu. Another time,
Doyle told Delta he could not fly because of a knee injury,
but his military record showed that he flew test flights for
the Air Force that same day. Delta also suspected that
Doyle was abusing its leave policies by stringing together
sick days with military leave and vacation days to extend
his time off.
Based on his leave-request records, Doyle said he
could understand why Delta would be concerned that
he was abusing his sick-leave benefits, although he
thought it was a misunderstanding. Before Delta finished
investigating him, Doyle resigned.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
McLean and Doyle sued Delta for violating the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act. They brought three claims. First, they alleged
that Delta discriminated against them by constructively
terminating them because of their military service.
Second, the pilots claimed that Delta contributed less to
their pensions while they were on military leave than the
6a
Appendix A
Act required. And third, they alleged that Delta allowed
pilots on comparable types of leave to accrue vacation time,
but not pilots on long-term military leave. 1
Delta moved for summary judgment on all three
claims, which the district court granted. First, as to
the constructive-termination claim, the district court
explained that McLean and Doyle had shown a prima
facie case that Delta pressured them to resign because
of their military service. But, the district court wrote,
Delta was entitled to summary judgment because the
evidence was undisputed that the airline had legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the forced resignations:
McLean and Doyle were abusing their sick-leave benefits.
Second, as to their pension-contribution claim, the
district court determined that the pilots’ compensation
was not reasonably certain and fluctuated month-tomonth. Thus, for the periods McLean and Doyle were
away on military leave, Delta was obligated to contribute
to their pensions their average rate of compensation over
the last twelve months. See 38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3)(B).
Because the evidence showed that Delta contributed more
to McLean’s and Doyle’s pensions than they were entitled
to under the Act, the district court granted summary
judgment to the airline.
And third, as to the vacation-time claim, the district
court concluded that McLean and Doyle were not
entitled to accrue vacation time during periods of longterm military leave under the Act because there was no
1. There were other plaintiffs and other claims in the district
court, but they are not relevant to this appeal.
7a
Appendix A
evidence that Delta allowed pilots on a comparable type
of leave to accrue vacation time.
McLean and Doyle appeal the summary judgment
for Delta.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga.,
967 F.3d 1121, 1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we
consider the summary judgment for Delta on McLean’s and
Doyle’s constructive-termination claim. Then, we address
the summary judgment on their pension-contribution
claim. Finally, we review the summary judgment on their
vacation-time claim.
The Constructive-Termination Claim
McLean and Doyle brought their constructivetermination claim under the general discrimination
provision of the Act. That provision says a “member
of . . . a uniformed service shall not be denied . . . any
benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that
membership.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). “An employer shall be
8a
Appendix A
considered to have engaged in actions prohibited . . . if
the person’s membership . . . in the uniformed services
is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the
employer can prove that the action would have been taken
in the absence of such membership. . . .” Id. § 4311(c)(1).
In the summary-judgment context, we’ve explained
that the general discrimination provision sets out a
two-step burden-shifting framework. At the first step,
the plaintiff may “establish his prima facie case” by
showing a genuine dispute that his military status “was
a motivating factor” in his termination (or any other
denial of an employment benefit). See Coffman v. Chugach
Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 111275 § 702, 124 Stat. 2864, 2887-88 (2010). “[M]ilitary status
is a motivating factor if the defendant relied on, took into
account, considered, or conditioned its decision on that
consideration.” Id. (citation modified).
If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, at the
second step, “the burden shifts to the employer” to show
undisputed evidence “that legitimate reasons, standing
alone, would have induced the employer to take the same
adverse action.” Id. at 1238-39 (citation modified); see also
Thomas v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 71 F.4th 1305,
1312 (11th Cir. 2023). Put together, in evaluating summary
judgment under the Act’s general discrimination provision,
“there must be an initial showing by the employee that
military status was at least a motivating . . . factor” in the
adverse employment action, “upon which the [employer]
must” show “that the action would have been taken despite
the protected status.” Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1239.
9a
Appendix A
As to the first step, the district court concluded that
McLean and Doyle established a prima facie case that
their constructive termination was motivated, at least in
part, by their military service.2And, at the second step, the
district court ruled that Delta would have constructively
terminated both pilots—irrespective of their military
service—for the legitimate reason, standing alone, that
they abused their sick-leave benefits. The summary
judgment evidence supports the district court’s conclusion.
Starting with McLean, he admitted he used his sickleave benefits to perform military duties. McLean told
Delta that he was too sick to fly, took paid sick leave, and
then flew jets for the military while he was on leave. He
did so despite a warning from his supervisor that he could
be fired if Delta learned he was flying while on sick leave.
Delta’s investigation into McLean revealed ten other times
when he took sick leave but then worked for the military
while on leave. Delta expressed an intent to fire McLean
because he abused his sick-leave benefits. The airline’s
notice of intended termination included that his “misuse
of Delta sick leave provide[d] an independent basis for
[his] termination.”
Doyle, too, abused his sick-leave benefits. Doyle told a
supervisor that he went skiing over New Year’s while on
sick leave with the flu. As part of its investigation, Delta
found another incident where Doyle called in sick with a
knee injury but then flew jets for the military on the same
day. Delta questioned Doyle about his “sudden increase in
[sick leave] usage beginning in 2012 and use of [sick leave]
2. We assume (without deciding) that McLean and Doyle were
constructively terminated.
10a
Appendix A
in conjunction with” other types of leave “in what appeared
to be an attempt to extend time off.” Doyle later resigned.
Against this evidence, McLean and Doyle argue that
Delta’s independent, standalone reason for constructively
terminating them was really that they violated its
concurrent duty policy. Because the concurrent duty
policy only applies to those in military service, the
argument goes, a termination based on that policy is a
termination because of their military service in violation
of the Act’s general discrimination provision. But the pilots
confuse Delta’s concurrent duty policy with its sick-leave
benefits. The concurrent duty policy prohibits a pilot from
performing military duty while also being paid by Delta.
It has nothing to do with sick leave. The sick-leave benefits
allow a pilot to take paid time off only if he is medically
unable to perform his job.
McLean points to notes from a Delta meeting agenda
which lists his name next to “preparing for termination”
for “[military leave] abuse, manipulation, [and the]
concurrent duty [policy].” But all these notes show is that
McLean’s concurrent duty violations were one of several
reasons Delta had for firing him. Delta was also concerned
about McLean’s “manipulation,” which is consistent
with his abuse of sick leave. Indeed, McLean’s notice of
termination listed his abuse of military and sick leave as
separate, “independent” grounds for his termination.
Similarly, Delta questioned Doyle because he told
his supervisor that he abused his sick-leave benefits
and appeared to be stringing together sick leave
with other types of leave to extend his time off. The
11a
Appendix A
undisputed evidence supports Delta’s standalone reason
for constructively terminating McLean and Doyle:
notwithstanding their military service, they abused their
sick-leave benefits.
The pilots also argue that because they denied
abusing their sick-leave benefits there was a factual
dispute for trial. But the focus of the second step in the
burden-shifting framework is on the employer’s reason
for terminating the employee, not the employee’s conduct.
The question is whether the employer would have taken
the same action, for an independent, standalone reason,
regardless of the employee’s military status. “An employer
who fires an employee under the mistaken but honest
impression that the employee violated a work rule is not
liable for discriminatory conduct.” Cf. Damon v. Fleming
Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.3 (11th
Cir. 1999); Flowers v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d
1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[E]mployers are free to
fire their employees for a good reason, a bad reason, a
reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all,
as long as [the] action is not for a discriminatory reason.”
(citation modified)). Here, there’s no dispute that Delta’s
independent, standalone reason for pushing out McLean
and Doyle was that they abused their sick-leave benefits,
even if that reason was mistaken.
The Pension-Contribution Claim
The pilots’ pension-contribution claim involved a
different provision of the Act governing pension benefit
plans. Under that provision, where an employee’s
compensation includes pension benefits, while he’s on
12a
Appendix A
military leave, he must “be treated as not having incurred
a break in service.” 38 U.S.C. § 4318(a)(2)(A). In other
words, while on military leave, the employee must receive
the same pension benefits that he would have received had
he been working instead of on military leave.
The Act requires the employer to “compute[]”
the employee’s compensation in one of two ways. Id.
§ 4318(b)(3). By default, the employer must compensate its
employee on military leave using “the rate the employee
would have received but for the period of [military]
service.” Id. § 4318(b)(3)(A). But there’s a different rule
when “the determination of such rate is not reasonably
certain.” Id. § 4318(b)(3)(B). In that case, the employer
must compensate the employee on military leave “on the
basis of the employee’s average rate of compensation
during the [twelve]-month period immediately preceding”
the period of military service. Id.
In reviewing the summary judgment evidence, the
district court concluded that the pilots’ compensation—
including payments made for their pensions—did not
violate the Act’s pension-benefits provision because their
compensation was not reasonably certain. It also found
that Delta paid more than the pilots’ average rate of
compensation during the twelve-month period before their
military leave. The pilots challenge the district court’s
first conclusion.
But the summary judgment evidence is undisputed that
McLean’s and Doyle’s compensation was not reasonably
certain. Delta’s policies allowed pilots flexibility in fixing
their schedules, and McLean’s and Doyle’s hours varied
13a
Appendix A
considerably. During months without leave, for example,
McLean’s hours ranged from seventy to ninety-nine,
while Doyle’s hours varied between seventy-two and 104.
In January 2011, McLean worked seventy-one hours. In
February, he worked ninety-five hours. And in March,
he worked eighty hours. It was the same story for Doyle;
his hours were also inconsistent. In February 2012, for
instance, Doyle worked seventy-six hours. The next month
he logged 104 hours.
To rebut this evidence, the pilots point to their expert’s
report, which they argue shows that the average rate of
compensation for Delta’s non-military pilots, as a group,
was reasonably certain. But that testimony is immaterial
under the Act’s pension-benefits provision, which
focuses on the reasonable certainty of “the employee’s
compensation,” 38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3) (emphasis added),
and not the group the employee is in. The Act’s pensionbenefits provision requires the employer to compensate the
employee “at the rate the employee would have received
but for the period of service,” or, if the employee’s rate of
compensation “is not reasonably certain, on the basis of
the employee’s average rate of compensation” in the twelve
months before the military leave. Id. § 4318(b)(3)(A) 0-(B)
(emphasis added). The pilots’ expert didn’t do that. She
did not calculate the rate of compensation for McLean and
Doyle. While the average non-military pilot may have had
a reasonably certain rate of compensation, we know from
the record that McLean and Doyle did not.
So, under the Act’s pension-benefits provision,
Delta was allowed to compensate McLean and Doyle
while they were on military leave “on the basis of [their]
average rate of compensation during the [twelve]-month
14a
Appendix A
period immediately preceding” their military leave. Id.
§ 4318(b)(3)(B). It is undisputed that Delta did that and
more. Delta’s average-line-value formula, implemented “to
benefit military reservists,” resulted in greater pension
contributions for McLean and Doyle than a normal twelvemonth average would have. Delta was free to contribute
more to McLean’s and Doyle’s pensions than the law
required. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.7(a) (explaining the Act
“establishes a floor, not a ceiling, for the employment and
reemployment rights and benefits of those it protects” and
that “an employer may provide greater rights and benefits
than [the Act] requires”).
The Vacation-Time Claim
McLean’s and Doyle’s final claim was that Delta did
not allow them to accrue vacation time while they were
on long-term military leave but permitted pilots on other
types of comparable leave to accrue vacation time while
on leave. The different treatment for long-term military
leave, they say, violated the Act’s rights-and-benefits
provision. Under that provision,
a person who is absent from a position of
employ ment by reason of ser vice in the
uniformed services shall be –
(A) deemed to be on furlough or leave of
absence while performing such service; and
(B) entitled to such other rights and benefits
not determined by seniority as are generally
provided by the employer of the person to
employees having similar seniority, status, and
15a
Appendix A
pay who are on furlough or leave of absence
under a contract, agreement, policy, practice,
or plan in effect at the commencement of
such service or established while such person
performs such service.
38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1). The Act’s regulations explain that
“accrual of vacation leave . . . must be provided by an
employer to an employee on a military leave of absence
only if the employer provides that benefit to similarly
situated employees on comparable leaves of absence.” 20
C.F.R. § 1002.150(c).
“[T]o determine whether any two types of leave are
comparable, the duration of the leave may be the most
significant factor to compare.” Id. § 1002.150(b). But “other
factors such as the purpose of the leave and the ability of
the employee to choose when to take the leave” are also
relevant. Id. “It is up to the employee to demonstrate that
any given stretch of military leave is comparable to a form
of non[-]military leave that is accorded a benefit.” White
v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616, 624 (7th Cir. 2021).
The district court granted summary judgment for
Delta on the pilots’ vacation-time claim because they did
not demonstrate that their long-term military leave was
comparable to a form of non-military leave that accrued
vacation time. On appeal, McLean and Doyle argue that
this was error. They point to known leaves of absence
as a comparable form of non-military leave. Delta, they
explain, violated the Act’s rights-and-benefits provision
because pilots on comparable known leaves of absence
accrued vacation time while pilots on long-term military
leave did not.
16a
Appendix A
But the undisputed summary judgment evidence
shows that the two kinds of leave were not comparable.
First, as to duration, a known leave of absence is only
offered one month at a time. In contrast, long-term
military leave, as the name suggests, lasts a long time—
even years. For example, the evidence shows that Doyle
was on long-term military leave from February 2008 to
November 2011—more than three years.
Second, as to purpose, Delta offers senior pilots a
known leave of absence when the company is overstaffed
and needs to furlough employees. Pilots are considered
active while on a known leave of absence—and can be
recalled—but do not fly any flights. Long-term military
leave, on the other hand, allows a pilot to perform military
service and Delta cannot call the pilot back to work.
And third, as to the ability to choose when to take
leave, Delta pilots can decide for themselves if they want to
take a known leave of absence when it is offered. Military
pilots have no choice. They must take leave when they are
ordered to report to military service.
In short, none of the factors show that known leaves
of absence are comparable to long-term military leave.
Because they are not comparable, Delta was entitled to
summary judgment on the pilots’ vacation-time claim. 3Cf.
3. For the first time in their summary judgment response,
the pilots added to their vacation-time claim that long-term
military leave was comparable to special conflict military leave,
a different type of military leave offered by Delta. The district
court rejected this late amendment because a plaintiff “may
17a
Appendix A
Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 59 F.4th 424, 434
(9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that summary judgment is
appropriate where “the facts of a case suggest that no
reasonable jury could see enough commonality for a
meaningful comparison” (citation modified)).
AFFIRMED.
not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing
summary judgment.” See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382
F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004). We reject it for the same reason.
The proper procedure for the pilots to assert a new “basis for
entitlement” was to seek to amend their complaint. See Hurlbert
v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc. 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th
Cir. 2006). Because they didn’t, the vacation-time claim based on
special conflict military leave was not properly before the district
court and is not properly before us on appeal.
18a
Appendix A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-11946
JEREMY SORENSON, et al.,
AN INDIVIDUAL,
Plaintiffs,
ADAM MCLEAN, AN INDIVIDUAL,
JAMES DOYLE, AN INDIVIDUAL, ON BEHALF
OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
A DELAWARE CORPORATION,
Defendant- Appellee.
ERRATA SHEET
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00541-ELR
The opinion has been changed as follows:
The footnote on page 17 of the opinion toward the end
of the footnote the stray quotation mark has been removed.
19a
B THE UNITED
APPENDIX B —Appendix
ORDER OF
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION,
FILED MARCH 31, 2023
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
1:17-CV-00541-ELR
JEREMY SORENSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
A DELAWARE CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Signed March 31, 2023
ORDER
There are several matters pending before the Court.
The Court sets forth its reasoning and conclusions
below.
20a
Appendix B
I.
Background1
This suit stems from employment disputes between
five (5) military-affiliated pilots and their former employer,
Delta Air Lines, Inc. See generally Compl. [Doc. 1].
Plaintiffs Jeremy Sorenson, Randal Reep, Randal Smith,
James Doyle, and Adam McLean initiated this suit on
behalf of themselves and a putative class of all others
similarly situated against Defendant, alleging claims
pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301, et
seq. (“USERRA”). 2 See generally id.
Plaintiff Sorenson has been employed as a pilot for
Defendant since he was hired on February 14, 2017; he
was also a member of the Indiana National Guard and
United States Air Force Reserves at the time Defendant
hired him until he retired from the armed services in
April 2020. See Deposition of Jeremy Sorenson (“Sorenson
1. The facts discussed herein are undisputed unless noted
otherwise. The Court excludes proposed facts that are immaterial,
includes facts drawn from its own review of the record, and
considers all proposed facts in light of the standard for summary
judgment. See LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2)(iii), NDGa.; see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials, but
it may consider other materials in the record.”); Tomasini v. Mt.
Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1260 n.11 (S.D. Fla.
2004) (explaining that a district court is not obligated to “scour
the record” to determine whether triable issues exist).
2. For factual and procedural history beyond that included
herein, the Court refers to its Orders dated February 16, 2018,
and April 29, 2022. [See Docs. 24, 191].
21a
Appendix B
Dep.”) at 28:11-30:15 [Doc. 175]. Plaintiff Reep worked for
Defendant as a pilot from April 16, 1998, through October
11, 2016; he was also a member of the Florida Air National
Guard during that time. See Deposition of Randal Reep
(“Reep Dep.”) at 17:7-19:21 [Doc. 172]; Declaration of Jason
Zawislak (“Zawislak Decl.”) ¶ 12 [Doc. 178-3]. Defendant
hired Plaintiff Smith as a pilot on September 3, 2007; he
was a member of the United States Navy at that time
and until he retired from military service on January
31, 2017. See Deposition of Randal Smith (“Smith Dep.”)
at 83:10-12, 42:15-43:2 [Doc. 174]. As explained further
below, Plaintiff Smith no longer works for Defendant.
Plaintiff McLean has been a member of the United States
Air Force Reserves since 2009 (prior to which he was a
member of the Iowa Air National Guard), and he worked
for Defendant as a pilot when it merged with another
airline that employed him during 2008 until he resigned
on February 22, 2017. See Deposition of Adam McLean
(“McLean Dep.”) at 91:16-92:4, 115:21-24, 274:24-275:5
[Doc. 171]. Defendant employed Plaintiff Doyle as a pilot
from April 16, 2007, until he resigned on September 8,
2016; he is also a member of the Air Force Reserves and
was during the time he was employed by Defendant. See
Deposition of James Doyle (“Doyle Dep.”) at 30:8-12,
49:22-50:2, 61:19-24 [Doc. 170].
A.
Plaintiffs’ Employment Relationship with
Defendant
Defendant’s pilots — such as Plaintiffs —work
pursuant to the terms of the Pilot Working Agreement
(the “PWA”), a collective bargaining agreement between
22a
Appendix B
Defendant and the relevant pilots’ union. See Defendant’s
“Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Def.’s
SOMF”) ¶ 4 [Doc. 178-1]; Zawislak Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant’s
pilots are paid based on the number of flight hours they
log each month—rather than a fixed salary—and each
pilot has an hourly rate that varies based on seniority,
the type of aircraft the pilot flies, and the routes the pilot
flies (for example, Defendant’s pilots receive bonus pay
for certain flight routes that are more difficult to staff).
See Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 5-11; Zawislak Decl. ¶ 5. A pilot’s
monthly number of flight hours per month necessarily
varies because, pursuant to the PWA, Defendant’s pilots
are able to use a Preferential Bidding System (“PBS”) to
shape their own schedules for the upcoming month. See
Def.’s SOMF ¶ 13; Zawislak Decl. ¶ 6.
As a result of this PBS, Defendant’s pilots “have
significant discretion and ability to choose the number,
type, and dates of [their] hours for the upcoming month[,]”
although ultimately, Defendant must approve a pilot’s
selections (or “bids”). See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 6; see also
Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s “Response to
Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement
of Additional Material Facts in Support of Opposition”
(“Pls. Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s Resp. to Def.’s SOMF”)
¶ 16 [Doc. 206-1]. 3 And even after a pilot’s initial work
3. Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean object to nearly all
of Defendant’s proffered material facts. See generally Pls. Smith,
Doyle, and McLean’s Resp. to Def.’s SOMF. Almost all of their
objections are argumentative (as are almost all of their responses,
23a
Appendix B
schedule has been established for the upcoming month
through the PBS, that schedule frequently changes
as pilots swap, drop, and pick up flights according to
“personal preferences[,]” or if out-of-the-ordinary events
require staff and schedule changes. See Zawislak Decl.
¶ 8; Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 15, 17. Regardless of seniority or role,
Defendant’s pilots typically are not assigned to fly (or be
“on call” to fly, which is called a “reserve day”) more than
eighteen (18) days per month and are often scheduled
to work even fewer days per month. See Zawislak Decl.
¶ 9; Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 19-20. Due to the flexible nature of
Defendant’s work schedule system, Defendant’s “pilots are
effectively part-time employees who have substantial,” but
not total, “discretion in setting their schedules and work
hours” and frequently “have other careers.” See Zawislak
Decl. ¶ 9; Def.’s SOMF ¶ 21.
even as to those facts they do not dispute), unsupported by the
record, immaterial, long-winded, or some combination of these.
E.g., id. ¶ 22 (disputing Defendant’s proffered fact that Plaintiff
Reep “was a practicing attorney while also flying for Delta” by
responding that “Reep was a practicing attorney while he was
also employed by Delta, but there is no evidence to suggest he
practiced law while flying for Delta” (emphasis in original)).
Such objections violate Local Rule 56.1(B)(2)(a), which requires a
response to the movant’s statement of material facts “contain . . .
concise, nonargumentative responses[.]” See LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(1),
NDGa. (emphasis added). The same Local Rule provides that the
Court “will deem each of the movant’s facts as admitted” where a
respondent fails to “directly refute[] the movant’s fact with concise
responses supported by specific citations to evidence[.]” See id.
56.1(B)(2)(a)(2). Thus, where the Court includes a proposed fact
with no comment on a corresponding objection, the corresponding
objection has been considered and overruled, or the proposed fact
has been deemed admitted. See id.
24a
Appendix B
At various times during their employment with
Defendant, all Plaintiffs took leaves of absence to
perform military duties, which, in this case, are referred
to as Military Leave(s) of Absence (“MLOA”). See Def.’s
SOMF ¶¶ 24-28. When military-affiliated pilots receive
notice of upcoming military duties, they provide notice to
Defendant, which notes the MLOA and does not schedule
the pilots to work that same day for which MLOA is
scheduled (pursuant to Defendant’s “concurrent duty”
policy). See Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 46-47, 65. Defendant does not
permit its pilots to work for Defendant or be on call for
Defendant during designated MLOA days.4 See id.; see
also Zawislak Decl. ¶ 10. According to Defendant, it does
not discriminate against military-affiliated pilots who take
MLOA and appropriately determines all employmentrelated benefits for such employees so that they are in no
way penalized for fulfilling their military obligations. See,
e.g., Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 48, 60. Conversely, Plaintiffs claim
that Defendant discriminated against them and deprived
them of employment benefits because they took MLOA.
See, e.g., Pls. Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s Resp. to Def.’s
SOMF ¶¶ 48, 60.
B. Overview of USERRA and Relevant Provisions
In 1994, Congress enacted USERRA:
(1) to encourage noncareer service in the
uniformed ser vices by eliminating or
4. It is Defendant’s position that it “cannot require [a] pilot to
perform any duties” for Defendant on “legally mandated MLOA
days[.]” See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 10; Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 63, 65.
25a
Appendix B
minimizing the disadvantages to civilian
careers and employment which can result
from such service;
(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of
persons performing service in the uniformed
services as well as to their employers, their
fellow employees, and their communities, by
providing for the prompt reemployment of
such persons upon their completion of such
service; and
(3) to prohibit discrimination against persons
because of their service in the uniformed
services.
38 U.S.C. § 4301(a). To achieves these ends, USERRA
makes it unlawful for any employer to deny “any benefit
of employment” to any “person who . . . has an obligation
to perform service in a uniformed service.” 38 U.S.C.
§ 4311(a). Specifically, in pertinent part, USERRA states:
A person who is a member of, applies to be a
member of, performs, has performed, applies to
perform, or has an obligation to perform service
in a uniformed service shall not be denied
initial employment, reemployment, retention
in employment, promotion, or any benefit of
employment by an employer on the basis of
that membership, application for membership,
performance of service, application for service,
or obligation.
26a
Appendix B
Id. In addition to prohibiting discrimination against
employees who perform military service, USERRA and
its implementing regulations provide guidelines as to how
employers must calculate employment benefits for the time
such employees are on MLOA. See 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1).
1.
Seniority-based benefits
In general, an employee “who is absent from a
position of employment by reason of service in the
uniformed services shall be[] deemed to be on furlough
or leave of absence while performing such service.” 38
U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(A). During any MLOA, USERRA
requires that an employee still accrue any seniority-based
benefits as if he or she was “continuously employed” with
the civilian employer and did not have any “break in
employment” by virtue of taking MLOA. See 38 U.S.C.
§ 4316(a) (“A person who is reemployed under this chapter
is entitled to the seniority and other rights and benefits
determined by seniority that the person had on the date
of the commencement of service in the uniformed services
plus the additional seniority and rights and benefits
that such person would have attained if the person had
remained continuously employed.” (emphasis added)). Put
differently, “the period of absence from employment due
to or necessitated by [MLOA] is not considered a break in
employment” for purposes of determining an employee’s
“seniority and seniority-based rights and benefits.” See
20 C.F.R. § 1002.210.
27a
Appendix B
2.
Non-seniority-based benefits
For those employment benefits that are not senioritybased, USERRA provides that employees who take
MLOA are “entitled to such . . . rights and benefits . . . as
are generally provided by the employer of the person to
employees having similar seniority, status, and pay[, and]
who are on furlough or leave of absence[.]”5 See 38 U.S.C.
§ 4316(b)(1)(B); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(a) (“The
non-seniority rights and benefits to which an employee
is entitled during a period of service are those that the
employer provides to similarly situated employees[,]”
including “those rights and benefits . . . that are provided
to similarly situated employees on furlough or leave
of absence.”). “If the non-seniority benefits to which
employees on furlough or leave of absence are entitled vary
according to the type of leave, the employee” on MLOA
“must be given the most favorable treatment accorded to
any comparable form of leave[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(b).
II. Procedural History
On February 13, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their original
Complaint. See Compl. They subsequently amended the
Complaint twice. See Am. Compl. [Doc. 12]; see also 2d Am.
Compl. [Doc. 84]. In their operative pleading, Plaintiffs
bring four (4) causes of action pursuant to USERRA,
5. “As a general matter, accrual of vacation leave is considered
to be a non-seniority benefit that must be provided by an employer
to an employee on [MLOA] only if the employer provides that
benefit to similarly situated employees on comparable leaves of
absence.” 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(c).
28a
Appendix B
which they label: (1) pension contributions, (2) vacation
time accrual, (3) profit sharing, and (4) discrimination.6
See generally 2d Am. Compl. Plaintiffs purport to bring
their claims on behalf of themselves and a potential class
of “pilots who are or were employed by [Defendant], and
were or are members of the United States Armed Services
or National Guard, who took [MLOA] from April 16, 1998[,]
to the present.” Id. ¶ 98.
On December 9, 2021, Plaintiffs Smith, McLean, and
Doyle submitted a “Motion for Appointment of Interim
Class Counsel” seeking to have their lead attorneys,
Mr. Gene Stonebarger and Mr. Charles Billy (together,
“Proposed Co-Lead Class Counsel”), appointed by the
Court as interim co-lead class counsel. [See Doc. 139].
Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep and their lead attorney,
Ms. Crystal Matter, did not join in that motion. [See
id.] Rather, Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep (through Ms.
Matter) submitted an “Ex Parte Notice and Motion for
Permission to File Motion for Injunctive Relief against
Mr. Gene J. Stonebarger and Mr. Charles M. Billy In
Camera or Under Seal, Also to be Heard Ex Parte[,]”
by which they sought to be heard regarding purported
misconduct by Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy. [See Doc.
137; 191 at 2-3]. Magistrate Judge Alan J. Baverman of this
district granted that motion in part and scheduled an ex
parte hearing with only Plaintiffs’ counsel for December
13, 2021. [Doc. 140].
6. Plaintiffs allege three (3) theories in support of their
USERRA discrimination claim, which they label as “counts”: (a)
“general harassment,” (b) “concurrent duty,” and (c) “five-year
limit.” See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 143-88.
29a
Appendix B
On December 13, 2021, Plaintiffs and their various
attorneys appeared before Magistrate Judge Baverman
for the ex parte hearing. [Doc. 141]. During that ex
parte hearing and in a minute order memorializing the
proceedings, Magistrate Judge Baverman “reminded
Plaintiffs that they must be represented in this court by
a member of the Bar of the Court and not just counsel
admitted pro hac vice.” [Id.]
The next day, on December 14, 2021, local counsel
for all Plaintiffs, Mr. Joseph Coomes, filed a motion to
withdraw from this case because “certain conflicts have
arisen among . . . Plaintiffs and their counsel (the nature
of which were disclosed to the Court in the context of the
ex parte hearing conducted December 13, 2021).” [See Doc.
142 at 2]. In his motion to withdraw, Mr. Coomes noted
that Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean (along with their
lead counsel, Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy) had already
obtained substitute local counsel: Mr. Stephen Anderson,
who entered his notice of appearance on December 9,
2021. [See Docs. 138 at 1; 142 at 2]. Further, Mr. Coomes
explained in his motion that he had advised Plaintiffs Reep
and Sorenson that “they are required to be represented
by local counsel admitted as a regular member of this
Court” and that their lead counsel, Ms. Matter, is not
such an attorney as she only appears before this Court on
a pro hac vice basis. [See Doc. 142 at 3]. Plaintiffs Reep
and Sorenson objected to Mr. Coomes’ withdrawal. [See
id. at 2-3].
At the request of Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson, the
undersigned scheduled an ex parte hearing for January 27,
30a
Appendix B
2022, to discuss (among other things) Mr. Coomes’ motion
and the issue of local counsel as it pertained to Plaintiffs
Reep and Sorenson. [See Doc. 147]. At the January 27,
2022 hearing, the Court discussed the local counsel
requirement with all Plaintiffs and their attorneys, and,
later that day, issued an Order granting Mr. Coomes’
motion to withdraw. [See Docs. 149, 150]. Thus, Ms.
Matter and her clients were put on specific notice of
the local counsel requirement contained in the Local
Rules of this district at least three (3) times: once by Mr.
Coomes prior to his withdrawal, once in a hearing before
Magistrate Judge Baverman, and once in hearing before
the undersigned. [See Docs. 141, 150]. Subsequently, Mr.
Alexander Cyclone Covey entered an appearance as local
counsel for Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson on February 7,
2022. [See Doc. 152].
Thereafter, on February 10, 2022, Plaintiffs Sorenson
and Reep filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs
Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s motion to appoint interim
class counsel and claimed that Messrs. Stonebarger
and Billy had engaged in “gross attorney misconduct”
by supposedly interfering with Ms. Matter’s ability to
represent them. [See generally Doc. 153]. In their response
brief, Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep request that Ms.
Matter be appointed interim class counsel or co-lead
interim class counsel alongside Messrs. Stonebarger and
Billy. [See id.] Although Defendant had not previously
challenged the motion to appoint Messrs. Stonebarger and
Billy as co-lead interim class counsel, it requested leave to
file a response after Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson brought
forth their allegations of attorney misconduct. [See Doc.
31a
Appendix B
160]. In an Order dated April 29, 2022, the Court accepted
Defendant’s response in opposition to the interim class
counsel motion attached to Defendant’s motion for leave
to file the same. [See Docs. 160-1; 191 at 11-14].
On March 14, 2022, Defendant filed its instant “Motion
for Summary Judgment” seeking judgment as a matter of
law on all five (5) Plaintiffs’ individual claims. [Doc. 178].
On May 12 and 13, 2022, Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy
timely submitted individual response briefs in opposition
on behalf of all five (5) Plaintiffs, even Plaintiffs Reep
and Sorenson, claiming they did so out of an “abundance
of caution.” 7 [See Docs. 191 at 23; 206; 207; 208; 209
at 1; 210 at 1]. Also on May 13, 2022, Ms. Matter filed
individual response briefs in opposition to Defendant’s
summary judgment motion on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep
and Sorenson. [See Docs. 211, 212].
7. The Court notes that Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy
signed the response briefs filed on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep
and Sorenson as “Attorneys for Plaintiffs Randal Reep, Randal
Smith, Adam Mc[L]ean, James Doyle, and the Putative Class[.]”
[See Docs. 209 at 26; 210 at 26]. However, in the response briefs
Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy submitted and signed on behalf
of Plaintiffs Smith, McLean, and Doyle, Plaintiffs Sorenson and
Reep’s names are noticeably absent from the text beneath the
attorney signature blocks. [See Docs. 206 at 25-26; 207 at 26; 208
at 25-26] (all indicating beneath Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy’s
signatures that they are “Attorneys for Plaintiffs Randal Smith,
Adam Mc[L]ean, James Doyle, and the Putative Class[,]” but not
Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep). Otherwise, at no point have Messrs.
Stonebarger or Billy indicated that they represent Plaintiff
Sorenson individually. [See, e.g., Doc. 210 at 26].
32a
Appendix B
Next, on May 19, 2022, through Ms. Matter, Plaintiffs
Reep and Sorenson each submitted a “Notice of Filing
of Errata to [Their] Response[s] in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment[,]” by which they purport to
“promptly” correct multiple “clerical errors” in their
summary judgment response briefs. [See Docs. 214, 215].
And on July 7, 2022, Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean
filed a “Motion to File a Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Reply
Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.”
[Doc. 223]. Defendant opposes Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and
McLean’s motion to file a surreply. [See Doc. 224]. Having
been fully briefed, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s
motion to appoint interim class counsel and motion to
file a surreply are ripe for the Court’s review. [Docs. 139,
178, 223].
III. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion
The Court now turns to Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, which Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and
McLean oppose (collectively, “Opposing Plaintiffs”).
[See Docs. 178-2, 206, 207, 208, 220]. For the reasons set
forth below, Defendant’s motion is deemed unopposed by
Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep. 8 The Court begins with the
relevant legal standard.
8. Although the Court considers Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment unopposed by Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep,
the Court still examine the merits of that motion as applied to
Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep’s claims. See United States v. One
Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Mia., 363 F.3d
1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004).
33a
Appendix B
A.
Legal Standard
The Court may grant summary judgment only if the
record shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute
is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute
is material if resolving the factual issue might change
the suit’s outcome pursuant to the governing law. See id.
At summary judgment, the moving party bears the
initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of
material fact exists. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson
Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court must
view all evidence in the record in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes
in the non-moving party’s favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097,
147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The moving party need not
positively disprove the opponent’s case; rather, the moving
party must show the lack of evidentiary support for the
non-moving party’s position. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
If the moving party meets this initial burden, it shifts
to the non-moving party to present competent evidence
beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue
for trial. See id. at 324-26, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The responding
party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is
34a
Appendix B
a genuine issue for trial.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2
F.3d 1112, 1116 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)). “If the adverse party does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the
adverse party.” Id. The essential question is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-movant’s case is
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.
at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. There must be evidence on which
the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.
See id.
B. Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep’s Summary
Judgment Response Briefs
To clarify the scope of the summary judgment
analysis herein, the Court begins by addressing the
two (2) sets of summary judgment response briefs filed
on behalf of Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep, one set by
Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy and a second, later set
by Ms. Matter. [See Docs. 209, 210, 211, 212]. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court finds both sets of
response briefs—as well as the accompanying responses
to Defendant’s statement of material facts and statements
of additional material facts [Docs. 209-1, 210-1, 211-1, 2121]—to be improper and declines to consider the arguments
advanced within them.
35a
Appendix B
First, it was improper for Messrs. Stonebarger and
Billy to file briefs on behalf of clients they do not represent.
It is undisputed that Mr. Stonebarger represents neither
Plaintiff Reep nor Plaintiff Sorenson, as they both
terminated him. See Declaration of Jeremy Sorenson
(“Sorenson Decl.”) ¶ 16 [Doc. 153-2]; see also Declaration
of Randal Reep (“Reep Decl.”) ¶ 10 [Doc. 153-3]. It is
further undisputed that Plaintiff Sorenson terminated Mr.
Billy. See Sorenson Decl. ¶ 15 (“Mr. Billy is no longer my
attorney.”). Although it is less clear whether Plaintiff Reep
terminated Mr. Billy, Plaintiff Reep offers several sworn
statements that Mr. Billy “constructively abandoned”
him as a client in late 2021 “because [Plaintiff Reep]
terminated Mr. Stonebarger.” See Reep Decl. ¶¶ 12, 15,
17. Plaintiff Reep further states that Ms. Matter is “our
attorney” (referring to himself and Plaintiff Sorenson)
and he casts various aspersions on Mr. Billy’s course of
conduct during this litigation. See id. ¶ 11.
No attorney who has appeared in this case has
presented documents showing the status of their legal
representation of Plaintiff Reep, such as a letter of
engagement, termination, or withdrawal. However, in
view of Plaintiff Reep’s sworn statements to this Court,
Mr. Billy’s statement that he filed a summary judgment
response brief on behalf of Plaintiff Reep only out of “an
abundance of caution and in consideration of existing
circumstances[,]” and various other materials presented
to the undersigned, the Court finds that Ms. Matter is
Plaintiff Reep’s attorney and that he terminated Mr.
Stonebarger. [See, e.g., Docs. 137 at 2 (Ms. Matter stating
that she represents Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep); 191 at
36a
Appendix B
7 (“Plaintiff Reep is represented by Attorneys Matter and
Covey”); Doc. 209 at 1, 26]; Reep Decl. ¶ 10; see also Est.
of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga.App. 103, 796 S.E.2d 489, 493
(2017) (noting that whether an attorney-client relationship
exists in Georgia is determined by looking to the putative
client’s “reasonable beliefs” about whether an attorney
represents him or her). The Court accordingly declines
to consider the summary judgment filings Messrs.
Stonebarger and Billy filed on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep
and Sorenson.
Second, the filing of duplicate summary judgment
response briefs on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep and
Sorenson—one set by Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy, one
set by Ms. Matter—directly violates the Local Rules of
this district and the undersigned’s April 29, 2022 Order.
[See Doc. 191]; see also LR 56.1, NDGa. Local Rule 56.1
provides that “[i]n accordance with [Local Rule 7.1(C)], the
parties shall not be permitted to file supplemental briefs
and materials, with the exception of a reply by the movant,
except upon order of the court.” See LR 56.1, NDGa. The
Local Rules also limit response briefs to twenty-five (25)
pages. See id. 7.1(D). The Court did not give Plaintiffs
Reep and Sorenson leave to file supplemental briefs or
materials. And by filing two (2) sets of response briefs,
Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson far exceed this page limit.
[See Docs. 209, 210, 211, 212].
Additionally, in its April 29, 2022 Order, the Court
expressly directed “each individual Plaintiff, through
his chosen, individual attorneys, to file a response [to
Defendant’s summary judgment motion] regarding
37a
Appendix B
only their own individual claims[.]” [See Doc. 191 at
10-11, 23] (reiterating the directives for “the attorneys
representing . . . Plaintiffs to respond to Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on behalf of their individual
clients[,]” for “Plaintiffs to file individual responses [to
Defendant’s summary judgment motion] through their
respective counsel[,]” and that all Plaintiffs “file their
briefs in accordance with the instructions stated herein
and in accordance with the Local Rules of this district”
(emphasis added)). Thus, as Defendant correctly notes,
the Court’s April 29, 2022 Order clearly permitted “a
total of 5 [summary judgment response] briefs”—one
for each Plaintiff—and no more. [See Doc. 220 at 16].
Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy clearly flouted this Court’s
directives when they filed response briefs on behalf of
Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep. “Such disregard for the
procedural rules of this Court will not be tolerated.” Hill
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:18-CV-05589JPB-WEJ, 2020 WL 12182139, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 5,
2020) (quoting Gainor v. Douglas Cnty., 59 F. Supp. 2d
1259, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 1998)). Messrs. Stonebarger and
Billy’s disregard for this district’s Local Rules and the
Court’s April 29, 2022 Order provides independent bases
for the undersigned to disregard the response briefs
they filed on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson even
absent any question about who represents them. See LR
7.1(E), NDGa.
Third, even if the only summary judgment response
briefs on behalf of Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep were
those filed by Ms. Matter, that set of briefs would still
be improper because neither contains the signature of
38a
Appendix B
local counsel. [See Docs. 211, 212]. The Court discussed
the local counsel requirement—and how it applied to Ms.
Matter and her clients specifically—during the January
27, 2022 ex parte hearing. [See Doc. 150]; see also LR
83.1(B)(4), NDGa. (“Local counsel must authorize and
sign all pleadings and other papers filed in the case by the
attorney appearing pro hac vice.”). Ms. Matter obtained
local counsel (Mr. Covey) on February 7, 2022. [See Doc.
152]. Yet, Mr. Covey’s signature is not present on any
of the summary judgment response filings Ms. Matter
made on May 13, 2022. [See Docs. 211 at 26-28; 212 at 2628]. Apparently realizing this error (and several others,
such as omitted exhibits, declarations labeled with the
wrong declarant’s name, and errors in multiple proffered
statements of material fact), nearly a week later, Ms.
Matter submitted “Notice[s] of Filing of Errata” which
purported to “correct” the “incomplete” signature pages
to add the signature of local counsel. [See Docs. 214, 215].
Ms. Matter’s filing are untimely attempts to amend the
summary judgment response briefs she filed on behalf of
her clients without the leave of Court. Thus, Ms. Matter’s
“Notice[s] of Filing of Errata” do not correct the crucial
error she made in omitting the signature of local counsel
from the filings at hand. [See Docs. 214, 215].
The Local Rules permit this Court, in its discretion,
to “decline to consider any . . . brief that fails to conform
to the requirements of” the Local Rules and to sanction
any party who fails to comply with the orders of the
Court. See LR 7.1(E), NDGa.; see also id. 16.5 (“failure to
comply with the court’s pretrial instructions may result
in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of the
39a
Appendix B
case”). And district courts have discretion in interpreting,
enforcing, and applying their Local Rules. See Ramion
v. Brad Cole Constr. Co., 805 F. App’x 948, 950 (11th Cir.
2020); see also Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d
1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that this district’s
Local Rule 56.1 “is designed to help the court identify and
organize the issues in the case”).
Therefore, the Court declines to consider the summary
judgment briefs submitted by Messrs. Stonebarger and
Billy on behalf of Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep because (1)
they were not authorized to make those filings and (2) the
filing of the duplicate set of briefs violated both the Local
Rules of this district and the express directives of this
Court. [See Docs. 209, 210]. Additionally, the Court finds
it proper to disregard the summary judgment briefs and
other associated filings Ms. Matter submitted on behalf
of Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep because (1) they do not
contain the signatures of local counsel in violation of both
the Local Rules of this district and the express directives
of this Court and (2) Ms. Matter’s “Notice[s] of Errata”
amount to no more than untimely, misguided attempts to
amend the pleadings she filed. [See Docs. 211, 212, 214,
215]. However, despite the veritable litany of failures
by Plaintiffs’ counsel that necessitate these decisions,
the Court is also mindful of its obligation to examine
the merits of the underlying summary judgment motion
and only enter summary judgment “when appropriate”
(instead of automatically) even though the motion is
deemed unopposed by Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep. See
One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., 363
F.3d at 1101. Accordingly, the Court turns to the merits
of Defendant’s motion.
40a
Appendix B
C.
Discussion
In the matter at hand, Defendant argues it is entitled
to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. 9
[See generally Docs. 178-2, 220]. The Court examines
Defendant’s motion with regard to each claim in turn,
beginning with those claims stemming from senioritybased employment benefits.
1.
Seniority-based benefits
Defendant contends it is entitled to summary
judgment on both claims regarding Plaintiffs’ senioritybased employment benefits: specifically, Plaintiffs’ claims
related to the funding of their pension plans during their
periods of MLOA and their profit-sharing payments.
[See Doc. 178-2 at 5-10]. As the Court discusses further
below, the Parties dispute the lawfulness of Defendant’s
methodology for calculating pension contributions and
profit-sharing cash awards for pilots who take MLOA.
[See Doc. 206 at 6-12]. The Court addresses each benefit
in turn.
a.
Pension contributions
In their first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant violated various provisions of USERRA by
9. Because the Opposing Plaintiffs’ briefs are identical, for
the most part, the Court primarily cites to the brief at Docket
Entry 206 in the analysis below. When addressing any Plaintiffspecific portion of an Opposing Plaintiff’s response brief, the Court
provides the citation to that Opposing Plaintiff’s brief.
41a
Appendix B
underfunding the pension plans of pilots who take MLOA.
See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-22. Defendant argues it is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim because
its methodologies for calculating Plaintiffs’ pension
contributions for periods of MLOA are in accordance with
USERRA. [See Doc. 178-2 at 3-10]. Defendant further
contends that it has actually provided Plaintiffs with
greater pension contributions than required by law. [See id.]
As discussed above, when a military-affiliated pilot
who works for Defendant takes MLOA, the military (but
not Defendant) pays that pilot during the MLOA period.
See 38 U.S.C. § 4331(a); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.210.
However, that military-affiliated pilot is still entitled
to accrue any seniority-based benefits provided by the
employer or required by USERRA as if he or she had
never been absent or had a “break in employment” due
to the MLOA. See 38 U.S.C. § 4316(a); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 1002.210. Contributions to pension plans are one such
seniority-based benefit. See 38 U.S.C. § 4318(a)(2)(A)
(USERRA provision specific to pension plans).
The Parties’ dispute here centers on the proper
method for calculating the earnings Plaintiffs would have
received from Defendant “but for [their] MLOA.” [See
Docs. 178-2 at 3; 206 at 6]. This initial earnings calculation,
in turn, allows Defendant to calculate the appropriate
pension contributions for a given employee who has taken
MLOA so that the employee receives the same pension
contributions as those employees who did not take MLOA
during the same time period. [See Docs. 178-2 at 2-3; 206
at 6]; see also 38 U.S.C. § 4318.
42a
Appendix B
Pursuant to § 4318 of USERRA, the amount of funds
an employer must contribute to an employee pension plan
during the employee’s “period of [military] service . . .
shall be computed” either:
(A) at the rate the employee would have
received but for the period of service . . . , or
(B) in the case that the determination of such
rate is not reasonably certain, on the basis of
the employee’s average rate of compensation
during the 12-month period immediately
preceding such period (or, if shorter, the period
of employment immediately preceding such
period).
38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3) (emphasis added).10 The Parties
refer to the formula in 28 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3)(B) for
earnings that are not reasonably certain as the “twelve
(12)-month lookback” calculation. [See Docs. 178-2 at 3;
206 at 8]. The Parties disagree on (1) whether Plaintiffs’
compensation was “reasonably certain,” and, if not, (2)
whether the methodology Defendant previously used or
currently uses to calculate their pension contributions
comports with USERRA.11
10. It is undisputed that Defendant “contributes a fixed
percentage of a pilot’s pensionable earnings into the pilot’s
individual 401k account.” See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 18.
11. From 2005-2011, Defendant used a twelve (12)-month
lookback calculation to determine the pension contributions at
issue. See id. ¶ 19. From 2012 forward, Defendant has used the
Average Line Value calculation described below. See id. ¶ 20.
43a
Appendix B
i.
Reasonably certain
Thus, the first inquiry the Court must resolve is
whether Plaintiffs’ regular compensation was “reasonably
certain.” See id. Defendant contends it was not. [See Doc.
178-2 at 3-7]. Opposing Plaintiffs appear to suggest it was.
[See Doc. 206 at 6-8].
Defendant’s pilots are paid by the flight hour, and each
pilot has an hourly rate that varies based on seniority,
type of aircraft, and flight route. See Zawislak Decl.
¶¶ 3, 5. Additionally, due to the PBS system that allows
Defendant’s pilots to “bid” for the schedules they want
and pilots’ ability to change their own schedules later,
variations in monthly compensation are to be expected.
See id. ¶¶ 6, 8; Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 13, 15, 17. In arguing
that Plaintiffs’ monthly compensation is not “reasonably
certain,” Defendant presents evidence of the range of
hours Plaintiffs worked during months when they took
no MLOA. [See Docs. 178-2 at 5-7; 220 at 3]. Thus, any
months when a Plaintiff took any MLOA are excluded
from the below:
• The average monthly total pay hours for Plaintiffs
was sixty-five and a half (65.5). [See Doc. 204-2 at
13].
• Between August 2014 and October 2020, Plaintiff
Sorenson’s monthly pay hours ranged from fortytwo (42) to 137. See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 14.
Opposing Plaintiffs do not challenge Defendant’s method of
calculating such seniority-based benefits prior to 2005. [See Doc.
206].
44a
Appendix B
• Between November 2008 and October 11, 2016,
Plaintiff Reep’s monthly pay hours ranged from
zero (as was the case during five (5) months where
he also took no MLOA or personal leave) to ninetyfive (95). See id. ¶ 12; [see also Doc. 178-3 at 160-62].
• Between September 2007 and October 2020—
during which he only worked a short time for
Defendant, as he was on MLOA almost the entire
time—Plaintiff Smith only surpassed twenty (20)
pay hours per month a total of eight (8) times and
never exceeded sixty-eight (68) pay hours in a single
month. See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 17; [see also Doc. 178-3
at 165-68].
• Between April 2007 and September 1, 2016, Plaintiff
Doyle’s monthly pay hours ranged from zero to 104.
See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 15.
• From January 2010 through February 22, 2017,
Plaintiff McLean’s monthly pay hours ranged from
fifty-seven (57) to ninety-nine (99). See id. ¶ 16.
Additionally, Defendant’s expert witness (Robert B.
Speakman, Jr., Ph.D.) opines that the standard deviation
of Plaintiffs’ pay hours in months where they took no
MLOA or other personal leave is 27.4 hours. [See Doc.
204-2 at 10-12]. As a comparison, according to materials
from the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) (cited and
replicated in Dr. Speakman’s expert report), a standard
deviation of 11.8 hours per month is sufficient to render
45a
Appendix B
an employee’s monthly pay “not reasonably certain.”12 [See
Doc. 204-2 at 10-12].
In their response brief, Opposing Plaintiffs contend
that the volatility in Plaintiffs’ monthly pay hours described
above is attributable to Defendant including months where
they were on MLOA. [See Doc. 206 at 10-11]. However,
in reaching the above calculations, Defendant’s expert
specifically excluded from his analysis “months in which
a pilot had any military leave days or personal leave days
at any time during the month[.]” [See Doc. 204-2 at 10]
(emphasis added) (copy of Dr. Speakman’s expert report).
And in Excel spreadsheets Defendant provided to Plaintiffs
during discovery (the authenticity of which has been
stipulated to by the Parties) listing the total pay hours for
each of Plaintiffs by bid month, “MLOA days” and personal
leave days are clearly separated out. [See Doc. 178-3 at
156-168]. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has
demonstrated the absence of material fact on this issue
and shown that Plaintiffs’ monthly pay is not “reasonably
certain” pursuant to USERRA.13 See 38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3).
12. “A standard deviation . . . is a measure of how dispersed
the data is in relation to the mean. Low standard deviation means
data are clustered around the mean, and high standard deviation
indicates data are more spread out.” See Standard Deviation,
Nat’l Libr. Of Med., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/stats_tutorial/
section2/mod8_sd.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2023). Thus, here, a
lower standard deviation would indicate that a Plaintiff’s monthly
pay hours remained fairly consistent from month to month.
13. Perplexingly, much of Opposing Plaintiffs’ argument
on this issue relies on citations to the sworn statement of Mr.
Billy, Opposing Plaintiffs’ counsel. [See, e.g., Doc. 206 at 8-11;
46a
Appendix B
ii.
Lawfulness of calculations
Having determined that Plaintiffs’ earnings were
not “reasonably certain,” the Court turns to assess
whether the two (2) methods Defendant has used to
calculate pension contributions during the relevant
time period comply with the requirements of USERRA.
First, from 2005 through 2011, Defendant used a twelve
(12)-month lookback calculation to determine the pension
contributions at issue. [See Doc. 178-2 at 7]. Second, since
2012, Defendant has used the Average Line Value (“ALV”)
calculation described below. [See id. at 8-9]. And, as noted,
USERRA requires that if an employee’s compensation is
not “reasonably certain,” the amount of funds an employer
must contribute to an employee pension plan during
the employee’s “period of [military] service . . . shall be
computed” based on “the employee’s average rate of
207 at 8-10, 10 n.3; 208 at 8-11] (all citing to various paragraphs
of the Declaration of Charles M. Billy (“Billy Decl.”) [Doc. 2062]). However, Mr. Billy lacks personal knowledge of the evidence
Opposing Plaintiffs attempt to advance through his declaration.
E.g., Billy Decl. ¶¶ 47, 53 (merely two (2) of the numerous examples
of paragraphs concerning Plaintiffs’ experiences, which could
not possibly be based on Mr. Billy’s own personal knowledge and
contain assertions with no citations to supporting evidence). The
Court declines to consider this “evidence” for this reason. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Tishcon Corp. v. Soundview Commc’ns,
Inc., Civil Action No. 1:04-CV524-JEC, 2005 WL 6038743, at
*5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2005) (explaining that “[t]o have personal
knowledge means more than to have been told that something is
what it purports to be or to have collected the information from
one’s client” and that it is “an unnatural, if not virtually impossible,
task for counsel, in his own case” to present objective testimony
that can be considered on a motion for summary judgment).
47a
Appendix B
compensation during the 12-month period immediately
preceding such period (or, if shorter, the period of
employment immediately preceding such period).” See 38
U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3)(B).
Opposing Plaintiffs do not rebut Defendant’s argument
that both methods are lawful. [See Docs. 206 at 6-11; 207 at
6-11; 208 at 6-11]. Instead of asserting that either method
of calculation used by Defendant violates USERRA,
Opposing Plaintiffs contend that their alternative
proffered method of calculating these benefits is “the
most accurate [and] most fair[.]” [E.g., Doc. 206 at 9-11]
(discussing Opposing Plaintiffs’ proposed methodology
of “Average Pay Hours” or “APH” to calculate monthly
compensation). Standing alone, Opposing Plaintiffs’
failure to respond to Defendant’s lawfulness argument
is sufficient for the Court to grant summary judgment in
Defendant’s favor on this claim. See Coal. for the Abolition
of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d
1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that a party’s failure
to brief and argue an issue before the district court is
grounds for declaring it abandoned); Resol. Tr. Corp. v.
Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“When
a party fails to respond to an argument or otherwise
address a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim
abandoned.”).
Nevertheless, the Court evaluates this issue on the
merits and finds that both methods Defendant has used
to calculate pension contributions during the relevant
time periods comply with the requirements of USERRA.
The “12-month lookback” method that Defendant used
48a
Appendix B
to establish a pilot’s compensation (a fixed percentage of
which goes to that pilot’s pension) between 2005 and 2011
looked to the pilot’s average rate of compensation during
the preceding twelve (12) months. See Zawislak Decl.
¶ 19. This method tracks the plain statutory language
of 38 U.S.C.§ 4318(b)(3)(B), and thus, the Court finds it
complied with USERRA.
As for the ALV method Defendant has used since
2012, that method calculates the “deemed earnings for
long-term MLOAs by multiplying a pilot’s hourly rate in
effect during the MLOA by the ALV for each month of the
MLOA.” [See Doc. 178-2 at 8] (citing Zawislak Decl. ¶ 20).
Importantly, Defendant’s ALV formula assumes that a
pilot works at least seventy-one (71) hours per month. [See
id.] (citing Zawislak Decl. ¶ 20). Plaintiffs rarely reached—
much less surpassed—this number of monthly pay hours
during any non-MLOA month. [See, e.g., Doc. 204-2 at
10-13]. And Defendant presents evidence that its “change
to the ALV calculation resulted in much higher [pension]
contributions for MLOA periods” than the “12-month
lookback calculation” because “the ALV calculation
typically includes higher hourly rates and higher pay hours
than the 12-month lookback calculation.” Zawislak Decl.
¶ 21. Specifically, Defendant presents evidence that the
ALV method has resulted in Defendant contributing over
$11 million more to military-affiliated pilots’ pension plans
than it would have under the twelve (12)-month lookback
calculation. See id. “USERRA establishes a floor, not a
ceiling, for the employment and reemployment rights and
benefits of those it protects. . . . [A]n employer may provide
greater rights and benefits than USERRA requires[.]” 20
49a
Appendix B
C.F.R. § 1002.7(a). Thus, the Court finds the ALV method
to be lawful pursuant to USERRA because it provided
Plaintiffs with more pension contributions than they
would have received pursuant to the plainly legal twelve
(12)-month lookback method. Therefore, the Court grants
summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiffs’ first
cause of action related to pension contributions.14
b.
Profit-sharing claims
In their third cause of action, Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant undercalculates “profit-sharing [payments]
for pilots on MLOA” in violation of USERRA by using
14. As Defendant notes in its instant motion, the Second
A mended Complaint does not refer to “deemed earnings
calculations for short-term (30 days or less) MLOAs” and
Defendant “is uncertain whether Plaintiffs are claiming that
[it] violated USERRA with regard to such MLOAs.” [Doc. 178-2
at 10 n.8]. However, Defendant states that “when a Delta pilot
takes even one day” of MLOA during a given month, Defendant
“provides them pension contributions as if they flew either ALV
or a very similar number of ‘reserve monthly guarantee hours[,]’”
both of which credit pilots for a higher average of monthly hours
than Plaintiffs worked during non-MLOA months. [See id. at 10]
(emphasis in original). Opposing Plaintiffs abandon any claim they
have related to pension contributions for short-term MLOA by
failing to address that claim in their response briefs. [See Doc. 206
at 8] (mentioning such a claim only in passing when asserting that
using ALV “undercalculates deemed earnings” “for both shortterm and long-term MLOA”); Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana
Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1326; Resol. Tr. Corp., 43 F.3d at 599. For
the reasons explained above, even if Opposing Plaintiffs did not
abandon their pension claims as it relates to short-term MLOA,
the Court agrees with Defendant that any such claim would fail.
50a
Appendix B
the “f lawed” and “artificially low” ALV method to
calculate “the deemed earnings a pilot would have
earned but for MLOA[.]” [See Doc. 206 at 11]. Opposing
Plaintiffs argue that “[p]rofit-sharing compensation is
pensionable, so the undercalculation also leads to . . .
pension underfunding” and is properly considered part
of their annual compensation such that it must “be equal
to the earnings the [pilot] would have received had the
individual been” continuously and “actively employed by
[Defendant]” and not on MLOA.15 [Id. at 11-12].
In its instant motion, Defendant explains that its
“pilots are covered by the company’s Annual ProfitSharing Plan (the ‘Profit-Sharing Plan’)” and that “[u]nder
the Profit-Sharing Plan, a pilot may receive a cash award
for each year when Delta makes profit-sharing payments.”
[Doc. 178-2 at 15] (citing Zawislak Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. G).
“The Profit-Sharing Plan determines cash awards by a
set percentage of a pilot’s [a]nnual [c]ompensation.” [Id.]
(internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant further
proffers:
In general, the Profit-Sharing Plan does
not “impute earnings” that a pilot has not
actually earned during leaves of absence.
(Zawislak Decl. Ex. G, Article 2.3.) There is
one exception to this rule, however. The ProfitSharing Plan does impute earnings for MLOA
periods when determining a pilot’s [a]nnual
15. Importantly, “Plaintiffs are not claiming Delta’s profitsharing plan is an ERISA plan under Section 4318.” [Doc. 206 at
11].
51a
Appendix B
[c]ompensation. (Id. at Articles 2.3(b) and 2.6.)
This is another example of [Defendant’s] proreservist employment policies.
[Doc. 178-2 at 15] (emphasis in original). With this context
in mind, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ profit-sharing
claim fails as a matter of law because (1) the pension
benefits provision of USERRA (§ 4318) “does not apply to
profit-sharing plans” and (2) Defendant does not “impute
earnings” towards pilots’ profit-sharing payments when
pilots take any type of extended leave other than MLOA,
such that Defendant essentially provides an extra benefit
to military-affiliated pilots not available to civilian pilots.
[See id. at 15-16].
It is well-established that “while USERRA requires
employers to treat servicemembers equally with respect
to other employees, it does not require preferential
treatment.” See Case v. Judd, No. 8:19-CV- 607-T33TGW, 2019 WL 10966204, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23,
2019) (collecting cases); see also Gross v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 636 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011); Crews v. City of
Mount Vernon, 567 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir. 2009); Rogers
v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 769 (5th Cir. 2004).
“While the Eleventh Circuit has not directly addressed
the issue presented here, other circuits have held that
USERRA does not cover benefits that are available only
to military-affiliated employees.” See Judd, 2019 WL
10966204, at *3 (citing Crews, 567 F.3d at 866). Where
an employer’s policy conveys preferential treatment to
military-affiliated employees that is “not available to
non-military employees, such policies are not ‘benefits
52a
Appendix B
of employment’ under USERRA” and, therefore, are not
actionable pursuant to USERRA.16 See id. The Court finds
that this authority squarely forecloses Plaintiffs’ profitsharing claim. Indeed, in the two (2) paragraphs of their
responses addressing this claim, Opposing Plaintiffs do
not refute Defendant’s argument that it only “imputes
earnings” toward profit-sharing payments for employees
who take MLOA—but not any other type of extended
leave—such that military-affiliated pilots who take MLOA
(like Plaintiffs) receive a “benefit” not available to other
employees on extended leave. [See Docs. 178-2 at 15; 206
at 11-12].
16. Further, the Court notes that Opposing Plaintiffs do not
argue—nor does the Second Amended Complaint allege—that
Defendant’s profit-sharing payments are automatically applied
to their pensions (as a type of deferred compensation) instead
of paid directly to pilots (as a bonus or extra compensation).
[See Doc. 206 at 11-12]; see also 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 136-42. Thus,
although Opposing Plaintiffs characterize Defendant’s profitsharing payments as “pensionable” because they may elect to
direct such payments to their pension plans, nothing in the record
suggests that the profit-sharing payments constitute “a deferred
compensation plan.” See Scanlan v. Am. Airlines Grp., Inc., 384
F. Supp. 3d 520, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2019); [see also Doc. 206 at 11].
And as at least one district court has observed, a plaintiff fails to
state a claim for relief pursuant to USERRA’s pension provision
(§ 4318) where “employees participating in [a] [profit-sharing
p]lan may place the lump sum payments in their retirement [or
pension] plans” but the profit-sharing plan is, in essence, “an
extra compensation or bonus plan where payments are awarded
in addition to regular compensation” instead of “a deferred
compensation plan.” See Scanlan, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (emphasis
added). This independent reason supports summary judgment in
favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs’ profit-sharing claim.
53a
Appendix B
The only argument Opposing Plaintiffs make in
an attempt to save their profit-sharing claim is that
Defendant should use their proposed APH to “calculate
deemed earnings . . . reflecting what a pilot would earn
but for MLOA.” [See Doc. 206 at 9-11]. For the reasons
explained above, the Court is not persuaded by this
argument. See supra part III.C.1.a. Accordingly, the
Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
as to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action related to profit
sharing payments.17
2.
Non-seniority-based benefit—vacation
accrual
In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant violated the USERRA provision pertaining
to non-seniority-based employment benefits because it
did not allow them to accrue vacation time during their
periods of long-term MLOA. See 2d Am Compl. ¶¶ 12635 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(B)). The Parties agree
that long-term MLOA lasts thirty (30) or more days, or
at least one “bid month” in the context of the monthly
schedule bidding system Defendant’s pilots use to create
their schedules. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant allows
17. In light of the above findings, the Court need not reach
Defendant’s alternative argument that “Plaintiffs’ profit-sharing
claims are not cognizable under USERRA Section 4316 (nonseniority benefits provision) or Section 4311 (antidiscrimination
provision) because the only leave for which De[fendant] provides
imputed earnings toward profit-sharing payments is MLOA.”
[Docs. 178-2 at 15; 220 at 25].
54a
Appendix B
“pilots on other forms of leave . . . [to] accrue vacation time
during their leaves of absences that are longer than a bid
month or greater than 30 consecutive days[,]” but excludes
pilots on long-term MLOA from this same benefit. See id.
¶¶ 131, 133. Other forms of leave (other than long-term
MLOA) during which Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
permits its pilots to accrue vacation time include if the
pilots are on “Association Business leave,” sick leave, jury
duty, “Known Personal Leaves [of Absence,] and certain
personal leaves of absence[.]” See id. ¶ 131.
In its motion, Defendant argues that it is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ vacation accrual claim
because long-term MLOA is not comparable to any of
other the types of leave listed by Plaintiffs with respect
to the duration of the leave, purpose of the leave, and a
pilot’s ability to schedule the leave. [See Doc. 178-2 at
11-14]. As Defendant correctly notes, USERRA entitles
employees on MLOA to the same non-seniority-based
benefits afforded to “employees having similar seniority,
status, and pay who are on furlough or leave[.]” See
38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(B). The corresponding federal
regulation, promulgated by DOL, instructs that “[i]f the
non-seniority benefits to which employees on furlough or
leave of absence are entitled vary according to the type
of leave, the employee must be given the most favorable
treatment accorded to any comparable form of leave when
he or she performs service in the uniformed services.”
See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(b) (emphasis added); see also id.
§ 1002.150(c) (“As a general matter, accrual of vacation
leave is considered to be a non-seniority benefit that must
55a
Appendix B
be provided by an employer to an employee on a [MLOA]
only if the employer provides that benefit to similarly
situated employees on comparable leaves of absence.”).
To determine whether MLOA is “comparable” to another
form of leave, the Court should consider (1) “the duration
of the leave” (which “may be the most significant factor
to compare”), (2) “the purpose of the leave[,]” and (3) “the
ability of the employee to choose when to take the leave[.]”
Id. § 1002.150(b).
Defendant cites to two (2) recent federal cases that
addressed this very issue and held that MLOA is not
comparable to either jury duty or sick leave based on
the above factors.18 [Doc. 178-2 at 12-14] (citing Moss
v. United Airlines, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 768 (N.D. Ill.
2019), aff’d, 20 F.4th 375 (7th Cir. 2021) and Hoefert
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 724 (N.D. Tex.
2020)). Additionally, Defendant contends that neither
“Association Business leave” nor sick leave are “leaves of
absence” (or furloughs) pursuant to the PWA govern
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