Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adam McLean, et al., Petitioners v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., a Delaware Corporation

Supreme Court briefAug 28, 2026

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No. 26In the

Supreme Court of the United States

ADAM MCLEAN AND JAMES DOYLE,

Petitioners,

v.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of A ppeals for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Charles M. Billy

Law Offices of

Charles M. Billy, APC

22706 Aspan Street,

Suite 305

Lake Forest, CA 92630

Gene J. Stonebarger

Counsel of Record

Stonebarger Law, APC

101 Parkshore Drive,

Suite 100

Folsom, CA 95630

(916) 235-7140

gstonebarger@

stonebargerlaw.com

Counsel for Petitioners

August 28, 2026

395810

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

T he Un i for me d S e r v ic e s Employ me nt a nd

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) prohibits

civilian employers from denying servicemembers any

benefit of employment “on the basis of” their membership

in the uniformed services. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). Once an

employee shows that military service was “a motivating

factor” in an adverse employment action, the employer is

liable “unless the employer can prove that the action would

have been taken in the absence of such membership.”

Id. § 4311(c)(1).

The question presented is:

Whether the judge-made “honest belief” doctrine,

applied in Title VII cases to insulate an employer that fires

an employee based on a mistaken but sincerely held view

that the employee violated a work rule, may be imported

into USERRA cases to displace USERRA’s express

affirmative defense, which requires the employer to “prove

that the action would have been taken in the absence of”

the employee’s protected military service—and, if it may,

whether an employer’s assertedly “honest belief” can be

resolved in the employer’s favor at summary judgment,

when the existence, sincerity, and application of that belief

present inherently factual questions reserved to the jury.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Adam McLean and James Doyle were

plaintiffs in the district court and plaintiffs-appellants in

the court of appeals.

Respondent Delta Air Lines, Inc. was defendant in

the district court and defendant-appellee in the court of

appeals and is a publicly traded corporation whose stock

ticker symbol is DAL.

Because petitioners are individuals, no corporate

disclosure statement is required under Rule 29.6.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (N.D. Ga.): Sorenson

v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00541-ELR (final

judgment entered May 30, 2024).

United States Court of Appeals (11th Cir.): McLean

v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 24-11946 (opinion issued and

judgment entered April 22, 2026; petition for rehearing

en banc denied June 10, 2026); No. 23-12698 (dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction, January 3, 2024); No. 23-13373

(dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, January 4, 2024).

There are no other proceedings in state or federal trial

or appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related to

this case within the meaning of Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

A. Statutory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

B. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

C. Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

v

Table of Contents

Page

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 15

I.

T he C ou r t s O f A pp e a l s A r e No w

Divided Over Whether An Employer’s

“Honest Belief” Satisfies § 4311(c)(1)’s

Same-Action Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

A. Four circuits hold that § 4311(c)(1)

imposes a burden of persuasion on

counterfactual causation that subjective belief cannot carry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

B. Four more circuits likewise enforce

§ 4311(c)(1)’s employer-side burden of

persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

C. The Eleventh Circuit stands alone: no

other circuit permits an employer’s

honest belief to satisfy § 4311(c)(1) . . . . . . . 18

D. The Eleventh Circuit’s rule is wrong . . . . . 19

E. The question is recurring, outcomedeterminative, and squarely presented

in this case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

II. The Decision Below Also Implicates A

Second, Broader Conflict: Whether An

Employer’s “Honest Belief” May Be Resolved

At Summary Judgment At All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

vi

Table of Contents

Page

A. The circuits are divided over whether

an asserted honest belief presents a

jury question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

B. Resolving an employer’s state of mind

at summary judgment cannot be

squared with this Court’s precedents

committing credibility and motive to

the factfinder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

C. This record shows why: whether

Delta’s asserted belief was honest,

and whether the concurrent duty

policy was lawful or violated at all, are

questions for a jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

III. The Question Presented Is Important,

And This Case Is A Clean Vehicle For

Resolving It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

vii

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR

T H E ELE V EN T H CIRCU I T, FILED

APRIL 22, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A PPEN DI X B — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

GEORGI A , AT L A N TA DI V I SION,

FILED MARCH 31, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19a

A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED

JULY 24, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83a

APPENDIX D — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR

T H E ELE V EN T H CIRCU I T, FILED

JUNE 10, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97a

A PPENDI X E — J U DGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED

JUNE 26, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99a

A PPENDI X F — J U DGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED

SEPTEMBER 8, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101a

viii

Table of Appendices

Page

APPENDIX G — DELTA DEALS MEETING

AGENDA (D. CT. DOC. 19 4 - 6, FILED

MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103a

APPENDIX H — DOYLE INVESTIGATION

TRIGGER EMAIL (D. CT. DOC. 197-16,

FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107a

APPENDIX I — DELTA INTERNAL FOLLOWUP EMAIL RE DOYLE INVESTIGATION,

RECORD EXHIBIT (D. CT. DOC. 197-17,

FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109a

APPENDIX J — DELTA EMAIL CIRCULATING

MEME RE MILITARY LEAVE (D. CT.

DOC. 198-19, FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . 112a

A PPENDIX K — DELTA CHIEF PILOT

EMAILS RE MILITARY PILOTS (D. CT.

DOC. 199-2, FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . 114a

ix

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,

140 U.S. 76 (1891) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Aka v. Washington Hospital Center,

156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) . . . . . . . . 6, 29

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services,

605 U.S. 303 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Arroyo v. Volvo Group North America, LLC,

805 F.3d 278 (7th Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 19

Babcock v. Michigan,

812 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Blackorby v. BNSF Railway Co.,

936 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Boone v. Lightner,

319 U.S. 561 (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 33

Bradberry v. Jefferson County,

732 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Carroll v. Delaware River Port Authority,

843 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,

59 F.4th 424 (9th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

x

Cited Authorities

Page

Coffman v. Chugach Support Services, Inc.,

411 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.,

447 U.S. 191 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Coleman v. Donahoe,

667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc.,

196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999) . . . . 5, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,

539 U.S. 90 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v.

Greenwich Collieries,

512 U.S. 267 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,

328 U.S. 275 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 33

Flowers v. Troup County School District,

803 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015) . . . . 5, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22

Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp.,

453 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 30

Frost v. BNSF Railway Co.,

914 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

xi

Cited Authorities

Page

Fuentes v. Perskie,

32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 29

Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc.,

487 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital,

502 U.S. 215 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 33

Leisek v. Brightwood Corp.,

278 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Little v. Illinois Department of Revenue,

369 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.,

274 F.3d 1106 (6th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 30

Marshall v. Rawlings Co.,

854 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2,

427 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

McPherson v. New York City Department of Education,

457 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Miles v. South Central Human Resource Agency, Inc.,

946 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

xii

Cited Authorities

Page

Monroe v. Standard Oil Co.,

452 U.S. 549 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 33

Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.

Doyle,

429 U.S. 274 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 22, 24

Myrick v. City of Hoover,

69 F.4th 1309 (11th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 7, 33

NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc.,

379 U.S. 21 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 25

NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,

462 U.S. 393 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 22

Noyes v. Kelly Services,

488 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Orr v. City of Albuquerque,

531 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . 23, 26, 27, 30, 32

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 31

Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc.,

497 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Ronda-Perez v.

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria–Puerto Rico,

404 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

xiii

Cited Authorities

Page

Savage v. Federal Express Corp.,

856 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18

Scroggins v. University of Minnesota,

221 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Sheehan v. Department of the Navy,

240 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16, 26

Sorenson v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,

174 F.4th 54 (11th Cir. 2026) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 31

Staub v. Proctor Hospital,

562 U.S. 411 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 22, 25

Thomas v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office,

71 F.4th 1305 (11th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety,

597 U.S. 580 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Travers v. Federal Express Corp.,

8 F.4th 198 (3d Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7

Trujillo v. PacifiCorp,

524 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

xiv

Cited Authorities

Page

United States v. Scheffer,

523 U.S. 303 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc.,

473 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Waggoner v. City of Garland,

987 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Westmoreland v. TWC Administration LLC,

924 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Woodard v. Fanboy, L.L.C.,

298 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Wyatt v. Nissan North America, Inc.,

999 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Young v. Dillon Cos.,

468 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . 23, 24, 30, 32

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

38 U.S.C. § 4301 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

38 U.S.C. § 4302 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

38 U.S.C. § 4311 . . . 3, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 17-19, 21, 22, 25, 28, 30, 34

xv

Cited Authorities

Page

Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2025, Pub. L. No. 118-210, 138 Stat. 2797 . . . 8, 33

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 14-19, 22, 23, 29

RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Sup. Ct. R. 29.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, pt. 1 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 22

Eric Schnapper, Honest Belief and Proof of

Unlawful Motive, 71 Buff. L. Rev. 769 (2023) . . . . . 24

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Ada m McLean and Ja mes Doyle

respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported as

Sorenson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 174 F.4th 54 (11th Cir.,

April 22, 2026), and is reproduced in the Appendix hereto

at App. 1a-18a.1 The order of the court of appeals denying

rehearing and rehearing en banc is unreported and is

reproduced in the Appendix hereto at App. 97a-98a. The

order of the district court granting summary judgment

is unreported and reproduced in the Appendix hereto

at App. 19a-82a. The district court’s unreported order

denying reconsideration is reproduced in the Appendix

hereto at App. 83a–96a, and its unreported judgment is

reproduced in the Appendix hereto at App. 101a-102a.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on April 26,

2026 and a copy of the judgment appears in the Appendix

hereto at App. 99a-100a. A timely petition for rehearing

en banc was denied on June 10, 2026, and a copy of the

denial order appears in the Appendix hereto at App.

97a-98a. This petition is filed within ninety days of the

order denying rehearing. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

1. Jeremy Sorenson was a Plaintiff in the District Court, who

did not appeal the Judgment entered against him, and he is not a

party to this appeal.

2

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 4301 of Title 38 provides in relevant part:

(a) The purposes of this chapter are—

(1) to encourage noncareer service in the

uniformed services by eliminating

or minimizing the disadvantages to

civilian careers and employment which

can result from such service;

(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives

of persons performing service in the

uniformed services as well as to their

employers, their fellow employees, and

their communities, by providing for the

prompt reemployment of such persons

upon their completion of such service;

and

(3) to prohibit discrimination against

persons because of their service in the

uniformed services.

Section 4302 of Title 38 provides in relevant part:

(b) This chapter supersedes any State law

(including any local law or ordinance), contract,

agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other

matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in

any manner any right or benefit provided by

this chapter . . .

3

Section 4311 of Title 38 provides in relevant part:

(a) A person who is a member of, applies to be a

member of, performs, has performed, applies to

perform, or has an obligation to perform service

in a uniformed service shall not be denied

initial employment, reemployment, retention

in employment, promotion, or any benefit of

employment by an employer on the basis of

that membership, application for membership,

performance of service, application for service,

or obligation.

(b) An employer may not discriminate in

employment against or take any adverse

employment action or other retaliatory action

against any person because such person (1) has

taken an action to enforce a protection afforded

any person under this chapter, (2) has testified or

otherwise made a statement in or in connection

with any proceeding under this chapter, (3)

has assisted or otherwise participated in an

investigation under this chapter, or (4) has

exercised a right provided for in this chapter.

The prohibition in this subsection shall apply

with respect to a person regardless of whether

that person has performed service in the

uniformed services.

(c) An employer shall be considered to have

engaged in actions prohibited—

(1) under subsection (a), if the person’s

membership, application for membership,

4

service, application for service, or obligation

for service in the uniformed services is a

motivating factor in the employer’s action,

unless the employer can prove that the

action would have been taken in the

absence of such membership, application

for membership, service, application for

service, or obligation for service; or

(2) under subsection (b), if the person’s (A)

action to enforce a protection afforded any

person under this chapter, (B) testimony or

making of a statement in or in connection

with any proceeding under this chapter,

(C) assistance or other participation in

an investigation under this chapter, or

(D) exercise of a right provided for in

this chapter, is a motivating factor in the

employer’s actions, unless the employer

can prove that the action would have been

taken in the absence of such person’s

enforcement action, testimony, statement,

assistance, participation, or exercise of a

right.

INTRODUCTION

“Military reservists play a vital role in our nation’s

defense policy.” Myrick v. City of Hoover, 69 F.4th 1309,

1312 (11th Cir. 2023). “When called to service, these

men and women are expected to leave their civilian

jobs, sometimes for years on end.” Id. USERRA enables

servicemembers to strike a balance between fulfilling

their military duties and civilian obligations, including

5

civilian jobs, without suffering discrimination. Id. (citing

Travers v. Fed. Express Corp., 8 F.4th 198, 199 (3rd Cir.,

Aug. 10, 2021)). To alleviate the burden of serving in

the military, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services

Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994

(“USERRA”), which “recognizes that those who serve in

the military should be supported, rather than penalized,

for their service.” Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 59

F.4th 424, 429 (9th Cir. 2023).

Congress wrote a burden of proof into USERRA.

When an employee shows that military service was a

motivating factor in an adverse employment action, the

statute makes the employer liable “unless the employer

can prove that the action would have been taken in the

absence of such membership.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1). That

affirmative defense poses a single, objective question:

would the employer have treated the employee the same

way if the employee had never served in the military? Four

courts of appeals—the First, Third, Seventh, and Federal

Circuits—have held that the provision means what it says:

the employer must prove that the answer is yes.

In the published decision below, the Eleventh Circuit

adopted a fundamentally different rule. Importing the

“honest belief” doctrine from its Title VII precedents, the

court held that “[a]n employer who fires an employee under

the mistaken but honest impression that the employee

violated a work rule is not liable for discriminatory

conduct”—and affirmed summary judgment for Delta

Air Lines on that basis. App. 11a–12a (citing Damon v.

Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363

n.3 (11th Cir. 1999), and Flowers v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

803 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015)). Under that rule, the

6

employer need not prove what it would have done absent

the employee’s military service; it need only show that

it sincerely believed its own stated reason. A subjectivebelief inquiry has thus displaced the objective causation

inquiry Congress enacted.

The decision below also deepens a second, broader

conflict. The courts of appeals are openly divided over

whether the judge-made “honest belief” doctrine may

be used to take a discrimination case from the jury at

summary judgment at all, given the inherently factual

questions the doctrine asks a court to resolve. The D.C.

Circuit, sitting en banc, and the Third Circuit hold

that the credibility of an employer’s asserted belief is

“quintessentially” a question “for the finder of fact,” Aka

v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1299 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (en banc); see Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,

765 (3d Cir. 1994), while the Sixth and Seventh Circuits

apply the doctrine to withdraw such cases from juries

upon the employer’s assertion of sincerity. E.g., Majewski

v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117

(6th Cir. 2001); Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453

F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). The decision below places

the Eleventh Circuit at the far edge of that conflict—and

does so under a statute in which Congress assigned the

burden of persuasion to the employer, not the employee.

The question presented here is narrow, cleanly

presented, fully preserved, and outcome-determinative.

Because USERRA cases are overwhelmingly resolved

at summary judgment, the standards adopted below will

decide most such cases before any jury is empaneled. The

Court should grant the petition.

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statutory Framework

USERRA is the latest in an unbroken line of statutes,

dating to 1940, protecting those “who left private life to

serve their country in its hour of great need.” Fishgold

v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285

(1946). This Court has long instructed that these statutes

are “to be liberally construed for the benefit” of returning

servicemembers, ibid., and “Congress adopted this rule

of construction when it enacted USERRA.” Myrick,

69 F.4th at 1318; see King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502

U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991); Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.,

447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980).) “Thus, when two plausible

interpretations of USERRA exist—one denying benefits,

the other protecting the veteran—we must choose the

interpretation that protects the veteran.” Myrick, 69

F.4th at 1318 (citing Travers, 8 F.4th at 208 n.25 (“[A]ny

interpretive doubt is construed in favor of the service

member, under the pro-veteran canon.”); see also Boone

v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).

Congress codified a specific causation framework

for discrimination claims—the framework this Court

articulated in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of

Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), and approved

for labor cases in NLRB v. Transportation Management

Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401–03 (1983). See H.R. Rep. No. 10365, pt. 1, at 18–19 (1993). Under § 4311(c)(1), the employee

bears the initial burden of showing that military service

was “a motivating factor” in the adverse action.

“An employee proves a violation [of USERRA] by

establishing that his ‘service . . . in the uniformed services

8

[was] a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless

the employer can prove that the action would have been

taken in the absence of such . . . service.’” Thomas v.

Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 71 F.4th 1305, 1312 (11th

Cir., June 22, 2023)(citing §4311(c)(1)). “A person’s military

service is a motivating factor if ‘it is one of the factors that

a truthful employer would list if asked for the reasons for

its decision.” Id. “A wide range of evidence may prove that

an employee’s military status was a motivating factor in his

termination, including ‘an employer’s expressed hostility

towards members protected by the statute together

with knowledge of the employee’s military activity’ and

‘inconsistencies between the proffered reason and other

actions of the employer.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The burden then shifts to the employer, which escapes

liability only if it “can prove that the action would have

been taken in the absence of such membership.” 38

U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1); see Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S.

411, 417–20 (2011) (construing § 4311 by reference to

traditional tort-causation principles). The defense is an

affirmative one, on which the employer bears the burden

of persuasion, and its object is counterfactual causation—

what the employer would have done—not the employer’s

state of mind.

Congress recently reaffirmed USERRA’s protective

design, and strengthened the statute, in the Servicemember

Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (the “Dole Act”),

Pub. L. No. 118-210, 138 Stat. 2797 (Jan. 2, 2025).

9

B. Factual Background

1. Petitioners Adam McLean and James Doyle flew

for Delta Air Lines for nearly a decade while serving as

officers in the United States Air Force Reserve. App. 3a.

2. The summary-judgment record documented

sustained internal hostility at Delta toward military leave

and toward those whose military service required military

leave absences. Dist. Ct. dkt. 206 at 16-20. 2 Delta created

policies and practices designed to discourage and reduce

absences caused by military leave, to persuade pilots to

resign from military service, and to penalize pilots who

take military leave, with the goal of enabling Delta to

minimize its USERRA responsibilities and to enable Delta

to employ fewer pilots, thereby increasing its own profits.

Dist. Ct. dkt. 206 at 4, 11; Dist. Ct. dkts. 198-15, 198-17,

195-1, 195-3, 195-9, 195-11.

There are numerous examples of this company wide

hostility, including emails where Delta’s Chief Pilot wrote

that “[t]his is a case of the airlines subsidizing the military/

government,” that Delta would “start looking at whether

to hire [military] guys or not,” and that when “[Delta]

show[s] intent to be more discriminatory, [pilots] start

leaving the reserve/guard in droves. Cause and effect.”

App. 115a (Dist. Ct. dkt. 199-2 at 1); C.A. dkt. 50 at 11. 3

2. Citations to “Dist. Ct. dkt” refer to docket entries in the

District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta

Division, Case No. 1:17-cv-00541-ELR.

3. Citations to “C.A. dkt” refer to docket entries in the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Case

No. 24-11946.

10

Delta’s anti-military behavior was so egregious that even

Delta managers described the company’s treatment of

military pilots in emails as “boarders on harassment,” and

in writing observed that military commitments “make[]

one think twice about hiring Res and Guard guys.” App.

116a; Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-4 at 1; Dist. Ct. dkt. 199-2 at 2;

C.A. dkt. 50 at 11. Delta was even accused of waging a

“jihad” against pilots taking disfavored military leaves of

absences. C.A. dkt. 50 at 11; Dist. Ct. dkt. 207 at 18-19;

Dist. Ct. dkt. 197-2. Delta managers circulated by email

an offensive meme mocking pilots’ use of military leave.

App. 112a-113a.

3. To reduce its burdens and the inconveniences of

USERRA, Delta created and maintained a discriminatory

“concurrent duty policy” prohibiting a pilot from

performing military duty while being paid by or in a

paid status with Delta, but it did not restrict any other

activities. App. 10a. From 2006 until 2016, Delta’s

Concurrent Duty Policy was listed in Delta’s Flight

Operations Manual (“FOM”) as follows: “It is Delta’s

policy that a pilot participating in active military duty

is ineligible to perform Delta duties in any capacity,”

but was greatly expanded to the detriment of military

servicemembers after August 2016. Dist. Ct. dkt. 206-7

at 63. Factual evidence showed that the policy was applied

much more broadly than was written, such that military

pilots were prevented from performing both military duty

and working for Delta not just at the exact same moment

in time they are flying Delta aircraft, but on the same

calendar day, even when the two actions did not conflict

or overlap during that same day. Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-32.

In practice, and as used against the Plaintiffs, these

restrictions prevented individuals from performing

11

military duty during their own free time and/or on sick

leave, when notice under USERRA is not required to be

given to the employer; and these restrictions only applied

to those performing military work, and no other type of

work or activity. This policy was discriminatory because

the policy applied only to pilots with military obligations

and Delta imposed no analogous restriction on pilots

who pursued second jobs, side businesses, or any other

personal activities during or on the same day that Delta

compensated these employees, and the record showed such

“double-dipping” by non-military pilots was commonplace

and undisciplined. Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-36. This was not

a neutral policy applied to all employees, and military

affiliated pilots were subject to significant restrictions and

penalties based on what they did on their own time that

did not exist for any other pilots with second careers or

who participated in other activities outside of their Delta

employment. (see Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S.

549, 554 (1981).)

The concurrent duty policy overlapped with sick time

policies because if a pilot called in sick from Delta because

the pilot could not perform the duties of a commercial

airline pilot, and is paid by Delta for that sick time,

that pilot cannot do any type of military service, but

that pilot is not prohibited from doing anything outside

of the military while they are recovering on paid sick

leave. In fact, Delta’s written sick leave polices do not

address at all what a pilot can do, or not do, when they are

recovering on sick leave and cannot work for Delta. But

Delta’s concurrent duty policy prevented that person from

performing military duty while sick, unless the pilot goes

off of paid sick leave and on unpaid military leave. Dist.

Ct. dkt. 195 at 203:7-205:12. The concurrent duty policy

12

would allow a pilot to work as a dentist on the same day he

or she works for or is sick from Delta, but that same pilot

cannot perform work as a military dentist. Id. It would

allow a pilot to fly their own airplane, but that same pilot

could not fly a military airplane. The pilot can even drink

alcohol on the same day he or she is compensated by Delta,

but the person could not perform military duty. Delta

managers even acknowledged in writing that the policy

was “a slippery slope” the company had “gone down,” and

that managers enforcing it had themselves performed

concurrent duty. Dist. Ct. dkts. 198-32, 198-36, 202 at

46:14–47:18, 48:17–48:19.

4. Delta opened investigations into both petitioners—

Doyle in 2015, McLean in 2016 —because they took

military leave and performed military service, and only

later asserted that each had abused sick leave and military

leave. App. 3a–5a. Doyle’s investigation, which is clearly

described in email, was triggered because he took a “single

MLOA day in the middle of a reserve days block” which

reduced his availability and thus his productivity, so Delta

sought a pretext to punish him. App. 107a-111a; C.A. dkt.

30 at 16; C.A. dkt. 50 at 12. McLean was investigated

because frequent military duty impacted his Delta

availability, and following a hernia operation, McLean

was unable to perform all the duties of a commercial flight

crewmember, but he was well enough to perform other

activities with certain physical limitations. App. 71a-72a;

C.A. dkt. 50 at 12; C.A. dkt. 30 at 24–26; Dist. Ct. dkt. 17113. However, Delta’s contemporaneous internal records

illustrate what truly motivated the terminations, and if

military leave and military service was never performed,

the investigations would never have even begun. The

agenda for Delta’s August 24, 2016 “Deals Meeting”—a

working list of pilots facing discipline—identifies McLean

13

with the notation “MLOA abuse, manipulation, concurrent

duty” with the status “[p]reparing for termination,” and

identifies Doyle with the single notation “MLOA abuse”

with the status “[p]ending termination.” App. 103a, 106a

(Dist. Ct. dkt. 194-6). In this document Delta truthfully

lists it’s motivating factors for termination, and neither

entry mentions sick leave, sick leave abuse, or any other

company policy violations.

Only later did Delta’s subsequent notices of intended

termination mention misuse of military leave as an

“independent ground[] for termination” alongside asserted

sick-leave violations. App. 4a-5a. Only much later did Delta

find that Doyle flew for the military on a morning, and then

on the same day, injured his knee and called in sick for

Delta that afternoon, because he was unable to walk long

distances, and perform his duties as a commercial pilot.

C.A. dkt. 50 at 12–13; C.A. dkt. 30 at 17-18. This event

triggered a concurrent duty violation, even though the

facts show Doyle never actually worked for the military at

the same time he was on sick leave at Delta. Furthermore,

Delta never formally accused Doyle of skiing while on sick

leave, and Doyle never said or admitted he skied while

on sick leave, but during company investigations and his

deposition, he did discuss that people recovering from

illness are allowed to do other activities, including skiing,

even though they’re physically unable to perform other

duties as a flight crewmember. C.A. dkt. 50 at 13; C.A.

dkt. 30 at 18; C.A. dkt. 25. Both pilots felt forced to resign

rather than be terminated and risk their military security

clearances, their military careers, and future employment

at other airlines, and the courts below assumed they were

constructively terminated. App. 9a n.2.

14

C. Proceedings Below

1. Petitioners sued Delta in the Northern District of

Georgia, alleging (as relevant) that Delta constructively

terminated them because of their military service in

violation of § 4311. The district court granted summary

judgment to Delta. App. 19a–82a. On the § 4311 claim,

the court held that petitioners had “shown a prima facie

case that Delta pressured them to resign because of

their military service,” but that Delta was entitled to

judgment because it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons to discipline them, including admitted violations

of the concurrent duty policy, “disregard for Defendant’s

ability to schedule . . . [][military] leave (which no doubt

impacted other employees), lack of productivity, abuse

or misuse of Defendant’s leave systems” (App. 69a), and

“perform[ing] military duty while on paid sick leave”

(App. 71a), even though each reason is directly related to

USERRA protected military duty. App. 69a; C.A. dkt. 30

at 16; Dist. Ct. dkt. 207 at 10, 16, 25, nn. 3–4, 7; Dist. Ct.

dkt. 228-1 at 18–23.

2. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the

Judgment in a published opinion. App. 1a–18a. At the

second step of § 4311(c)(1), the panel held that Delta’s

proffered belief that petitioners abused sick leave was

dispositive—“even if that reason was mistaken” and

even if the alleged violations never actually occurred.

App. 11a. Quoting its Title VII decisions in Damon and

Flowers, the panel held that “[a]n employer who fires

an employee under the mistaken but honest impression

that the employee violated a work rule is not liable for

discriminatory conduct,” and that employers “are free

to fire their employees for a good reason, a bad reason, a

15

reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as

long as [the] action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Id.

(citations modified). The panel deemed petitioners’ denials

of sick-leave abuse irrelevant because “the focus of the

second step . . . is on the employer’s reason for terminating

the employee, not the employee’s conduct.” Id.

3. The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing and

rehearing en banc on June 10, 2026. App. 97a-98a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The Courts Of Appeals Are Now Divided Over

Whether An Employer’s “Honest Belief” Satisfies

§ 4311(c)(1)’s Same-Action Defense.

A.

Four circuits hold that § 4311(c)(1) imposes

a burden of persuasion on counterfactual

causation that subjective belief cannot carry.

The First, Third, Seventh, and Federal Circuits hold

that § 4311(c)(1) imposes on the employer a burden of

persuasion on counterfactual causation that a subjective

“honest belief” cannot satisfy. The Federal Circuit—

whose USERRA jurisprudence is the most developed

by virtue of its review of federal-sector claims—holds

that once discriminatory motivation is shown, the

employer bears “the burden of persuasion” to prove

“by a preponderance of the evidence[] that the action

would have been taken despite the protected status.”

Sheehan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013–14

(Fed. Cir. 2001). Because the “same-action” showing is

an affirmative defense, Sheehan explained, USERRA’s

scheme differs fundamentally from Title VII burden-

16

shifting, under which the burden of persuasion never

leaves the plaintiff: under USERRA, the employer must

do more than “articulat[e]” a legitimate reason—it must

prove the counterfactual. Ibid. And Sheehan identified the

very categories of circumstantial evidence that the honestbelief rule renders immaterial as the accepted means of

proving discriminatory motivation: “proximity in time

between the employee’s military activity and the adverse

employment action, inconsistencies between the proffered

reason and other actions of the employer, an employer’s

expressed hostility towards members protected by the

statute together with knowledge of the employee’s military

activity, and disparate treatment of certain employees

compared to other employees with similar work records

or offenses.” Id. at 1014.

The First Circuit follows the same rule. Under

Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc.,

473 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2007), once the employee carries his

motivating-factor burden, the employer “must prove, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that the action would

have been taken in the absence of the employee’s military

service.” Id. at 17. The court was explicit about what that

allocation means for the honest-belief question: under

USERRA—unlike Title VII—“the employee does not

have the burden of demonstrating that the employer’s

stated reason is a pretext. Instead, the employer must

show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the stated

reason was not a pretext.” Ibid. An employer’s sincere

belief in its stated reason therefore begins, rather than

ends, the second step: the employer itself must persuade

the factfinder that the proffered reason—and not the

employee’s service—was the real and sufficient cause of

the adverse action.

17

The Third and Seventh Circuits agree. In Carroll

v. Delaware River Port Authority, 843 F.3d 129, 132133 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit emphasized that

USERRA’s two-step framework differs materially from

the McDonnell Douglas regime precisely because both

the burden of production and the burden of persuasion

shift to the employer, and the employee at no point bears

the burden of proving pretext. And the Seventh Circuit

has expressly held that USERRA’s framework is “more

protective” than Title VII’s and that courts may not import

Title VII’s burden-shifting structure into USERRA cases.

Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 805 F.3d 278, 284286 (7th Cir. 2015). Applying that rule, Arroyo reversed

summary judgment for an employer that had discharged

an Army reservist for asserted attendance-rule violations

intertwined with her deployments, on a record containing

contemporaneous expressions of hostility to her military

obligations. In these four circuits, an employer’s sincerebut-mistaken belief that the employee broke a work rule

does not end the case; the factfinder must still decide

whether the employer has proved that, with military

service subtracted from the calculus, the same action

would in fact have been taken.

B. Four more circuits likewise enforce § 4311(c)(1)’s

employer-side burden of persuasion.

The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have

not yet confronted a square attempt to substitute the

Title VII honest-belief doctrine for § 4311(c)(1)’s sameaction showing. But each of those circuits likewise holds

that § 4311(c)(1) is an affirmative defense on which the

employer bears the burden of persuasion. See Bradberry

v. Jefferson Cnty., 732 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2013); Savage

18

v. Fed. Express Corp., 856 F.3d 440, 447 (6th Cir. 2017);

Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 551 (8th

Cir. 2005); Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895,

900 (9th Cir. 2002)(finding that the evidence only needs

to support an inference that military status or conduct

was a motivating or substantial factor in an employment

decision). In each, the second step is framed as an objective

showing about what the employer would have done—a

showing the employer must prove by a preponderance of

the evidence—not as an inquiry into the employer’s good

faith. Eight circuits thus enforce the employer-side burden

of persuasion Congress enacted; only the Eleventh Circuit

permits an employer to discharge that burden by attesting

to the sincerity of its stated reason.

C.

The Eleventh Circuit stands alone: no other

circuit permits an employer’s honest belief to

satisfy § 4311(c)(1).

No other court of appeals has adopted the honestbelief doctrine as a rule of decision under USERRA. The

decision below stands alone. At § 4311(c)(1)’s second step,

the panel asked not what Delta would have done absent

petitioners’ military service, but whether Delta honestly

believed petitioners had violated company policies (policies

that are directly related to military service)—expressly

extending to USERRA the “honest belief” rule of its Title

VII cases: “An employer who fires an employee under the

mistaken but honest impression that the employee violated

a work rule is not liable for discriminatory conduct.” App.

11a (citing Damon, 196 F.3d at 1363 n.3; Flowers, 803 F.3d

at 1338). On that holding, petitioners’ evidence disputing

the truth of the asserted rule violations—and their

evidence that the asserted violations were themselves

19

entangled with their military service—was immaterial

as a matter of law. App. 10a-11a.

The conflict is square and acknowledged in the

case law’s architecture. Damon and Flowers are Title

VII decisions; neither mentions USERRA or confronts

§ 4311(c)(1)’s text. The panel nonetheless made their

subjective-belief rule dispositive of a USERRA claim at

summary judgment—precisely what the Seventh Circuit

in Arroyo held impermissible, and precisely what the

Federal, First, and Third Circuits’ burden-of-persuasion

holdings foreclose. A USERRA plaintiff whose employer

honestly but wrongly believed him a rule-breaker survives

summary judgment in Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago,

but loses as a matter of law in Atlanta, Miami, and

Birmingham. Only this Court can resolve that conflict.

D.

The Eleventh Circuit’s rule is wrong.

1. The statutory text is unambiguous. Section

4311(c)(1) conditions the employer’s escape from liability

on its ability to “prove that the action would have

been taken in the absence of such membership.” Both

operative phrases point away from the honest-belief

rule. “Prove” imposes a burden of persuasion, not a

burden of articulation. And “would have been taken”

states a counterfactual-causation standard—an objective

inquiry into what this employer would in fact have done

in a world without the employee’s military service. An

employer’s honest belief in a proffered reason answers

a different question: what the employer thought. A

sincerely held reason may nonetheless be a reason the

employer would never have even acted upon absent the

employee’s protected status—particularly where, as here,

20

the evidence shows that Delta initiated its investigations

only because military service was performed, Delta’s

own contemporaneous termination worksheet listed only

military-leave-related grounds (App. 103a-106a), and the

“work rule” invoked applies exclusively to employees

performing military duty. App. 10a. If McLean and

Doyle were not members of the military and did not take

USERRA protected military leave, but instead behaved

similarly and worked at a regular civilian job for pay on

the same day they were paid by Delta, these investigations

would never have even begun.

The panel itself recited the governing standard: once

petitioners made “an initial showing . . . that military

status was at least a motivating . . . factor” in the adverse

employment actions, the burden passed to Delta, “upon

which the [employer] must” show “that the action would

have been taken despite the protected status.” App. 8a

(quoting Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1239). The court of appeals

was correct about that allocation—and that allocation

is fatal to the judgment, because Delta could not have

made the required showing on this record. The asserted

violations Delta labeled “sick leave” abuse were in fact

based on the performance of military duty while on

sick leave: the charge was not that petitioners engaged

in some outside activity unrelated to their service, but

that they performed military duty on days they were

medically unable to perform the duties of a commercial

flight crewmember. App. 4a–5a, 10a. But for petitioners’

protected status as military servicemembers, they would

not—and could not—have performed the military duty that

constituted the asserted violations, and Delta would not

have taken the adverse actions against them. An employer

cannot prove that the action “would have been taken” in

21

the absence of the employee’s military service when the

conduct underlying its stated reason is the performance

of military service. Cf. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379

U.S. 21, 23 (1964). Having recited Coffman’s standard, the

panel excused Delta from carrying it—accepting Delta’s

sincerity about a rationale that collapses into the very

protected status the statute shields.

The employer’s subjective state of mind is beside the

statutory point. Section 4311(c)(1)’s same-action defense

is a causation defense, not a good-faith defense. What the

employer honestly believed speaks, at most, to step one’s

motivating-factor inquiry; it cannot answer step two’s

question, because what an employer wrongly believed

says nothing about what it would have done absent the

employee’s military service obligations. Sincerity is not

sufficient to carry the defense: an employer may genuinely

believe an employee violated a work rule and still be unable

to prove that it would have acted on that belief absent

the employee’s military service—where, for example, it

tolerated identical conduct by employees without military

obligations, invoked the rule only against those who serve,

or, as here, would never have scrutinized the employee’s

conduct at all but for his performance of military service.

To “prove” the counterfactual is to carry a burden of

persuasion on an objective question of fact, see Dir., Office

of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries,

512 U.S. 267, 272–76 (1994) (“burden of proof” ordinarily

denotes the burden of persuasion), and an employer’s state

of mind—however honest—is not evidence of what it would

have done in a world where the employee never wore the

uniform. That is why the circuits that apply § 4311(c)(1) as

written hold that an employer’s proffer of a sincerely held

reason begins, rather than ends, the same-action inquiry.

22

2. The statutory history confirms the textual

reading. Congress modeled § 4311(c)(1) on the Mt. Healthy

same-decision framework, under which the defense is an

affirmative one carrying a burden of persuasion. H.R.

Rep. No. 103-65, pt. 1, at 18–19; see Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S.

at 287; Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 401–03. This Court in

Staub construed § 4311 by reference to traditional tortcausation principles, treating the same-action showing as

the employer’s affirmative defense—not as a deferential

review of the employer’s state of mind. 562 U.S. at 417–20.

When Congress wants an employer’s honest business

judgment to control, or wants the burden of persuasion

to remain with the plaintiff, it knows how to say so; it

wrote Title VII differently, and this Court has repeatedly

refused to homogenize distinct discrimination statutes’

causation standards. The Eleventh Circuit’s importation of

Title VII doctrine erases the very feature—an employerside burden of proof—that distinguishes USERRA’s

scheme.

3. The honest-belief doctrine cannot bear the

weight the panel placed on it even on its own terms. The

doctrine is a transplant. The panel borrowed it wholesale

from Damon and Flowers—Title VII cases in which

the burden of persuasion never leaves the plaintiff and

the doctrine serves only to blunt one particular form

of pretext evidence: proof that the employer’s asserted

factual premise was false. Even in that setting, an

employer’s honest belief is not an affirmative defense to

liability; it merely limits the inference a factfinder may

draw from the falsity of the employer’s explanation, and

it forecloses neither other proof of unlawful motive nor

a jury’s assessment of whether the asserted belief was

honestly held at all.

23

Courts applying the doctrine accordingly treat the

sincerity of the asserted belief as itself a question for

the factfinder: the inquiry is whether “the employer’s

explanation was so weak, implausible, inconsistent or

incoherent that a reasonable fact finder could conclude

that it was not an honestly held belief but rather was

subterfuge for discrimination,” Young v. Dillon Cos., 468

F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2006), and summary judgment

is unavailable where a jury could “disbelieve defendants’

claim” that a rule, like the concurrent duty policy and

its entanglement with sick leave, enforced against one

protected group but not others “was merely a mistake,”

Orr v. City of Albuquerque, 531 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir.

2008).4

4. Even under Title VII and other motive-based statutes,

courts—including the Eleventh Circuit—have refused to treat

an employer’s honest belief as a defense that forecloses liability

or removes the question from the jury. See, e.g., Miles v. S. Cent.

Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 890 n.5 (6th Cir. 2020)

(“[T]he ‘honest belief’ rule only applies as a defense to a lack of a

factual basis for the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered

by the employer.”); Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 400,

425 (6th Cir. 2021) (honest belief unavailing where the asserted

concerns “did not actually motivate” the decision); Westmoreland

v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 730 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven if

TWC honestly believed Westmoreland violated its policy, the jury

could reasonably infer (as it apparently did) that the company used

this as a pretext for discrimination”); Coleman v. Donahoe, 667

F.3d 835, 853 (7th Cir. 2012) (a stated reason, “even if actually

present to the mind of the employer,” is pretextual if it “wasn’t

what induced” the challenged action); Woodard v. Fanboy, L.L.C.,

298 F.3d 1261, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing summary

judgment where a reasonable jury could conclude the employer

“did not honestly believe” the facts underlying its stated reason);

Orr, 531 F.3d at 1216–18 & n.4 (reversing summary judgment

where the employer enforced against the protected group “a rule at

24

Transplanted to USERRA’s second step, the doctrine

does far more: it relieves the employer of the burden of

persuasion Congress expressly imposed and converts

a statutory causation defense into a good-faith defense

appearing nowhere in the statute’s text. Where Congress

has enacted a Mt. Healthy-style same-action defense,

courts have recognized that an honest belief cannot

carry it. Construing the Federal Railroad Safety Act’s

materially similar framework, the Eighth Circuit held

that “[l]iability will still exist notwithstanding such

a[n] [honest] belief if the employer’s retaliatory motive

also played a contributing role in the decision and if the

employer fails to carry the burden of proving” that it

would have taken the same action absent the protected

conduct—and it rejected a jury instruction that would

have directed a verdict for the employer upon a finding

of honest belief. Blackorby v. BNSF Ry. Co., 936 F.3d

733, 737 (8th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit likewise held

that a plaintiff may prevail “even if [the employer] had an

honestly-held, justified belief” in the asserted misconduct.

odds with Department policy and practice,” the written policy “did

not reflect what actually occurred in practice” (quoting Trujillo v.

PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2008)), and the employer’s

evidence of even-handed application post-dated notice of the

plaintiffs’ complaints and could be viewed as a “post-hoc effort

to cover up past discriminatory practices”); Young, 468 F.3d at

1251–52 (identifying, as proof that would defeat an asserted honest

belief, a reason “generated only after the termination,” a failure

to follow the employer’s own “written termination procedures,”

and evidence “deliberately suppressed from the decision makers

or ignored in order to further a discriminatory purpose”); see

generally Eric Schnapper, Honest Belief and Proof of Unlawful

Motive, 71 Buff. L. Rev. 769, 830 (2023) (“The existence of an

honest belief is not some sort of affirmative defense to a claim of

unlawful purpose.”).

25

Frost v. BNSF Ry. Co., 914 F.3d 1189, 1196–97 (9th Cir.

2019).

4. This Court’s precedents confirm that an employer’s

good faith cannot answer § 4311(c)(1)’s causation question.

Staub was itself a USERRA case in which the ultimate

decisionmaker acted on an honest assessment of the

information before her; the Court nonetheless held that the

employer may be liable where a supervisor’s antimilitary

animus was intended to cause, and proximately caused,

the adverse action. Staub, 562 U.S. at 414–23. Applying

Staub, the courts of appeals have repeatedly refused to let

employers invoke the honest-belief doctrine in cat’s-paw

cases, because “the decisionmaker’s intent does not matter,

and consequently the honesty of the decisionmaker’s belief

does not matter.” Marshall v. Rawlings Co., 854 F.3d 368,

380 (6th Cir. 2017). And where the asserted misconduct

arises out of the protected activity itself, this Court has

held that an employer’s good-faith belief that misconduct

occurred is no defense at all; the misconduct must actually

have occurred. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S.

21, 23 (1964). That principle speaks directly to this case:

the “concurrent duty” and leave “violations” Delta invoked

were not conduct independent of petitioners’ service—they

consisted of the performance of military duty itself. A rule

under which an employer’s mistaken belief about conduct

inseparable from protected service defeats liability as a

matter of law cannot be reconciled with Burnup & Sims,

much less with § 4311(c)(1)’s text.

5. Congress’s allocation of the burden also reflects

a reality this Court has long recognized: discrimination

rarely announces itself, is seldom open and notorious,

and an adverse employment action dressed in a facially

26

neutral justification may be nothing more than a pretext

concealing a discriminatory motive. A factfinder may

treat the falsity of, or inconsistencies in, an employer’s

explanation as affirmative evidence of discrimination.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.

133, 147 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502, 511 (1993). USERRA case law implements the same

principle: discriminatory motivation may be inferred

from, among other things, the timing of the adverse

action, inconsistencies between the proffered reason and

the employer’s other conduct, expressed hostility toward

those who serve, and disparate treatment of comparable

employees. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014.

The honest-belief rule dismantles that structure. By

making the employer’s sincerity dispositive, it places the

pretext inquiry—the principal means by which covert

discrimination against servicemembers is exposed—

beyond the factfinder’s reach: shifting explanations,

disparate enforcement, and contemporaneous expressions

of hostility all become immaterial the moment the

employer attests to its own good faith. This record

shows what is at stake. Delta’s contemporaneous “Deals

Meeting” worksheet identified only military-leave

grounds for the planned terminations, App. 103a-106a;

the sick-leave rationale surfaced only later, App. 5a; the

“concurrent duty” rule was enforced exclusively against

pilots performing military service while identical “doubledipping” by non-military pilots went undisciplined, Dist.

Ct. dkt. 198-36; and the deciding chain of command

documented its hostility to military leave in writing. App.

110a–116a; Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-4.

That is precisely the showing Orr held sufficient.

There the employer defended its differential treatment on

27

the ground that it was “merely applying a uniform policy

applicable to all employees,” 531 F.3d at 1212, and the

Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that

justification pretextual because the policy the employer

invoked was not the policy that in fact governed, and

because the employer’s practice for employees outside

the protected class diverged from the rule it enforced

against those within it. Id. at 1216–17. Delta’s concurrentduty policy presents the same proof and more: it was

written to bar a pilot from performing Delta duties while

“participating in active military duty,” but was enforced

to bar military service anywhere on the same calendar

day even absent any overlap; non-military pilots’ outside

work on Delta-compensated days went unrestricted and

undisciplined; the managers enforcing it had themselves

performed concurrent duty and described it in writing as

“a slippery slope”; and by its terms the rule reaches no

conduct except military service. App. 10a; Dist. Ct. dkt.

198-32; Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-36; Dist. Ct. dkt. 202 at 46:14–

47:18. The policy Delta invoked is therefore not a neutral

premise from which its good faith can be measured; it is

itself the evidence of pretext. Under the majority rule, that

is a textbook pretext case for a jury; under the decision

below, it is summary judgment for the employer.

6. Finally, the honest-belief rule inverts the statute’s

protective design. Under the decision below, any employer

that can articulate a plausible—even erroneous—workrule rationale obtains judgment as a matter of law,

no matter how strong the evidence of military-based

animus and no matter how disputed the underlying facts.

That converts an affirmative defense Congress made

deliberately demanding into a near-automatic exit from

liability at summary judgment.

28

E. The question is recurring, outcome-determinative,

and squarely presented in this case.

The § 4311(c)(1) standard is the fulcrum of virtually

every USERRA discrimination case: because such cases

are commonly resolved at summary judgment, the content

of the employer’s defense determines which cases reach

a jury at all. The decision below is published and now

binds every district court in the Eleventh Circuit. And the

question is dispositive here. The district court found—and

the panel accepted—that petitioners established a prima

facie case that military service was a motivating factor

in their constructive terminations. App. 6a, 9a. The case

turned entirely on step two. Petitioners’ evidence—the

termination worksheet identifying only “MLOA abuse,

manipulation, [and] concurrent duty” as grounds for

termination (App. 103a, 106a); a “concurrent duty policy”

that by definition applies only to pilots performing

military service (App. 10a); and documented hostility

to military leave within the deciding chain of command

(App. 110a-116a; Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-4)—created a genuine

dispute over whether Delta would have forced out these

pilots absent their military service. The honest-belief

rule applied below took that dispute from the jury. This

case accordingly presents the question cleanly, with no

antecedent or alternative ground obscuring it.

29

II. The Decision Below Also Implicates A Second,

Broader Conflict: Whether An Employer’s “Honest

Belief” May Be Resolved At Summary Judgment

At All.

A.

The circuits are divided over whether an

asserted honest belief presents a jury question.

Even on the honest-belief doctrine’s home ground—

Title VII and other motive-based statutes under which

the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion—the courts

of appeals are divided over whether the doctrine may be

applied at summary judgment at all, given the inherently

factual character of the questions it purports to resolve.

The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the notion that

an employer’s assertion of an honest belief can insulate its

explanation from a jury’s scrutiny: a jury may “conclude

that an employer who fabricates a false explanation has

something to hide,” and where an asserted belief appears

unreasoned or selectively applied, the jury may infer

pretext. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d

1284, 1292–93 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Credibility, the

court explained, is “quintessentially” an issue “for the

finder of fact.” Id. at 1299. The Third Circuit likewise

holds that whether an employer’s stated rationale is

“unworthy of credence” is a function reserved to the

factfinder. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir.

1994). The Ninth Circuit has never adopted the doctrine,

and it reverses summary judgment where circumstantial

evidence casts doubt on the employer’s explanation. Noyes

v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2007).

And the Tenth Circuit confines the doctrine narrowly,

Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1118 (10th

Cir. 2007), holding that the sincerity of the asserted belief

30

is itself for the jury whenever the explanation is “weak,

implausible, inconsistent or incoherent.” Young, 468 F.3d

at 1250; see Orr, 531 F.3d at 1216–18.

On the other side of the divide, the Sixth and Seventh

Circuits apply the doctrine robustly to withdraw cases

from juries, granting judgment as a matter of law where

the employer asserts a sincerely held belief in its stated

reason, even one that is factually mistaken. E.g., Majewski

v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117

(6th Cir. 2001); Babcock v. Michigan, 812 F.3d 531, 536

(6th Cir. 2016); Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453

F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (an “honest mistake, however

dumb,” is not pretextual); Little v. Illinois Department

of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2004).

The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits

recognize the doctrine in varying degrees. See RondaPerez v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria–P.R., 404

F.3d 42, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2005); McPherson v. New York

City Department of Education, 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir.

2006); Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208,

217–18 (4th Cir. 2007); Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987

F.2d 1160, 1165–66 (5th Cir. 1993); Scroggins v. University

of Minnesota, 221 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000). Where

a servicemember’s case is filed thus determines not only

who bears the burden of persuasion under § 4311(c)(1),

but whether an employer’s professed state of mind may

be resolved by a judge rather than a jury.

31

B. Resolving an employer’s state of mind at

summary judgment cannot be squared with

this Court’s precedents committing credibility

and motive to the factfinder.

This Court has held that circumstantial evidence of

discrimination suffices to take a case to the factfinder,

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003); that

the factfinder’s disbelief of the employer’s explanation—

together with the elements of the prima facie case—may

itself establish liability, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; and that

judge-made evidentiary frameworks may not be used to

impose atextual barriers on discrimination plaintiffs,

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S.

303 (2025). Those holdings rest on a much older principle:

determining “the weight and credibility” of testimony “has

long been held to be” a “part of every case that belongs

to the jury.” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S.

76, 88 (1891); accord United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.

303, 313 (1998). An employer’s state of mind—whether it

“honestly” believed its stated reason, and whether that

belief rather than the employee’s protected status in fact

produced the discharge—is the paradigm of a question

that turns on credibility and competing inferences, which

Rule 56 reserves to the jury.

C.

This record shows why: whether Delta’s

asserted belief was honest, and whether the

concurrent duty policy was lawful or violated

at all, are questions for a jury.

The courts below found that petitioners carried their

step-one burden: the investigations and adverse actions

32

against them were motivated by their performance of

military duty. App. 6a, 9a. And the “standalone” reasons

the district court articulated were dominated by asserted

violations of the concurrent duty policy—performing

military duty while in a paid status with Delta—and

related leave-system charges. App. 67a, 70a. That rule

prohibits nothing except the performance of military

service. Whether Delta honestly believed the concurrent

duty policy was lawful; whether Delta honestly believed

petitioners violated it; and whether that belief, rather

than hostility to their service, actually produced the

constructive terminations, are each questions of fact:

the managers who enforced the policy had themselves

performed concurrent duty and described the policy in

writing as “a slippery slope” the company had “gone down,”

Dist. Ct. dkt. 198-32; the policy as enforced diverged from

the policy as written, App. 10a; identical “double-dipping”

by non-military pilots went undisciplined, Dist. Ct. dkt.

198-36; and the sick-leave rationale surfaced only after a

termination worksheet that listed military-leave grounds

alone. App. 103a-106a. A court cannot resolve the honesty,

content, or operative force of that belief at summary

judgment without weighing credibility and choosing

among competing inferences—the very functions Rule

56 withholds from courts and preserves for juries. Even

the circuits most receptive to the honest-belief doctrine

treat the sincerity of an asserted belief as a jury question

on a record like this one. Young, 468 F.3d at 1250; Orr,

531 F.3d at 1216–18. The Eleventh Circuit resolved it as

a matter of law. On either side of either conflict, that was

error—and only this Court can restore uniformity.

33

III. The Question Presented Is Important, And This

Case Is A Clean Vehicle For Resolving It.

USERRA is the sole federal guarantee that the

hundreds of thousands of National Guard and Reserve

members employed by civilian employers will not suffer

for answering their country’s call. The statute rests on a

recognition of sacrifice: reservists are “expected to leave

their civilian jobs, sometimes for years on end,” Myrick,

69 F.4th at 1312, and Congress legislated “with the full

understanding” that their “frequent absences from work”

could “cause considerable inconvenience to an employer.”

Clarkson, 59 F.4th at 436 (quoting Monroe v. Standard Oil

Co., 452 U.S. 549, 555 (1981)). “Nevertheless, Congress has

provided that employers may not rid themselves of such

inconveniences and productivity losses by discharging

or otherwise disadvantaging employee-reservists solely

because of their military obligations.” Id. Because of the

sacrifice the Nation asks of those who serve, this Court

has instructed for eighty years that these statutes are

“always to be liberally construed to protect those who

have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up

the burdens of the nation.” Boone, 319 U.S. at 575; see

Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285; King, 502 U.S. at 220 n.9. The

honest-belief rule construes the statute in precisely the

opposite direction: it reads into § 4311(c)(1) a judge-made

escape from liability that Congress did not enact, and it

resolves every interpretive doubt against the veteran.

The nation’s reliance on the reserve components

has only deepened, and Congress underscored the point

by strengthening USERRA in the 2025 Dole Act. Pub.

L. No. 118-210, 138 Stat. 2797. This Court has recently

reaffirmed the seriousness of USERRA’s guarantees.

34

See Torres v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 597 U.S. 580

(2022). Yet the rules of decision that determine whether

USERRA claims ever reach a factfinder now differ openly

by circuit: the employer’s burden under § 4311(c)(1) is a

burden of persuasion in the First, Third, Seventh, and

Federal Circuits, but a subjective honest-belief showing

in the Eleventh. Servicemembers’ federal rights should

not depend on where their employer is headquartered.

This case is a clean vehicle. The courts below

accepted that petitioners established a prima facie

case that military service was a motivating factor in

their constructive terminations (App. 6a, 9a), so Delta’s

§ 4311(c)(1) defense is the only live issue, and the standard

governing that defense dictates the outcome. The decision

below is published and precedential. And the record

presents the honest-belief problem in unusually stark

relief: the employer’s own contemporaneous termination

worksheet identified only military-leave grounds (App.

103a-106a), yet the court of appeals held the employer’s

later-asserted belief in a different rationale dispositive

as a matter of law.

Nor does the brevity of the panel’s honest-belief

discussion obscure the question; it underscores how

settled the rule now is in the Eleventh Circuit. The panel

did not hold that Delta carried its affirmative defense by

proving that petitioners actually violated its sick-leave or

concurrent-duty policies. It held instead that the truth of

the asserted violations did not matter—Delta prevailed

“even if that reason was mistaken” (App. 11a)—and that

petitioners’ contrary evidence was beside the point because

“the focus of the second step . . . is on the employer’s

reason for terminating the employee, not the employee’s

35

conduct.” App. 11a. The honest-belief rule was therefore

the necessary ground of the judgment, not an alternative

holding. Had the panel instead required Delta to prove that

it would have taken the same actions absent petitioners’

military service, the disputed record—the military-leaveonly termination worksheet, the shifting explanations, the

selective enforcement, and the documented hostility—

would have precluded summary judgment. The question

presented is accordingly dispositive here.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles M. Billy

Law Offices of

Charles M. Billy, APC

22706 Aspan Street,

Suite 305

Lake Forest, CA 92630

Gene J. Stonebarger

Counsel of Record

Stonebarger Law, APC

101 Parkshore Drive,

Suite 100

Folsom, CA 95630

(916) 235-7140

gstonebarger@

stonebargerlaw.com

Counsel for Petitioners

August 28, 2026

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR

T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED

APRIL 22, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A PPEN DI X B — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

GEORGI A , AT L A N TA DI V I SION,

FILED MARCH 31, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19a

A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED

JULY 24, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83a

APPENDIX D — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR

T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED

JUNE 10, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97a

A PPENDI X E — J U DGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED

JUNE 26, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99a

A PPENDI X F — J U DGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED

SEPTEMBER 8, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101a

ii

Table of Appendices

Page

APPENDIX G — DELTA DEALS MEETING

AGENDA (D. CT. DOC. 19 4 - 6, FILED

MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103a

APPENDIX H — DOYLE INVESTIGATION

TRIGGER EMAIL (D. CT. DOC. 197-16,

FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107a

APPENDIX I — DELTA INTERNAL FOLLOWUP EMAIL RE DOYLE INVESTIGATION,

RECORD EXHIBIT (D. CT. DOC. 197-17,

FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109a

APPENDIX J — DELTA EMAIL CIRCULATING

MEME RE MILITARY LEAVE (D. CT.

DOC. 198-19, FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . 112a

A PPENDIX K — DELTA CHIEF PILOT

EMAILS RE MILITARY PILOTS (D. CT.

DOC. 199-2, FILED MAY 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . 114a

1a

APPENDIX A — Appendix

OPINIONAOF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 22, 2026

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-11946

JEREMY SORENSON, et al.,

AN INDIVIDUAL,

Plaintiffs,

ADAM MCLEAN, AN INDIVIDUAL,

JAMES DOYLE, AN INDIVIDUAL, ON BEHALF

OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS

SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

A DELAWARE CORPORATION,

Defendant- Appellee.

Filed April 22, 2026

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00541-ELR

Before Willia m P ryor , Chief Judge, and Luck and

Brasher, Circuit Judges.

2a

Appendix A

Luck, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves a dispute between an airline

and two of its former pilots. Adam McLean and James

Doyle worked for Delta Air Lines for nearly a decade.

At the same time, they also served in the United States

Air Force Reserve. The former pilots sued Delta alleging

that the airline pushed them out because of their military

service obligations, in violation of the Uniformed Services

Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. They also

claimed that Delta’s pension-contribution and vacationtime-accrual benefit programs violated the Act. The

district court sided with Delta and granted summary

judgment for the airline on all three claims. This is

McLean’s and Doyle’s appeal. After careful review, and

with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Delta’s Leave Benefits and Policies

As part of their collective bargaining agreement,

Delta’s pilots receive a package of benefits. Four benefits

in that package are relevant to this appeal.

First, Delta provides military leave to pilots who

have military service obligations. When a pilot informs

Delta that he has military duty, the company notes the

military leave on the pilot’s schedule and marks him as

unavailable for work during the leave period. The “pilot

performing military duty (on orders . . . or any other

duty that is paid by the state or the U.S. government) is

ineligible to perform Delta duties in any capacity (except

while on military terminal leave).” The prohibition against

3a

Appendix A

working for Delta while on military orders is called the

concurrent duty policy.

Second, Delta offers paid sick leave for pilots who are

unable to fly for medical reasons. “Delta pilots are entitled

to use sick leave only when a personal medical condition,

physical or mental, disables the pilot from performing

duties as a flight crewmember.”

Third, Delta’s compensation includes pension

contributions for its pilots, even when they are on military

leave. For pilots on military leave, Delta calculates the

pension contribution using the “average line value,” which

projects the average number of hours that the pilot would

work if he were not on leave and then multiplies that

number by the pilot’s hourly rate.

And fourth, Delta allows pilots on known leaves of

absence to accrue vacation time. Delta offers this type

of leave to pilots when it needs to reduce its labor costs.

During a known leave of absence, a pilot remains “active”

but does not fly any routes.

The plaintiffs, McLean and Doyle, worked as Delta

pilots for nearly a decade. While flying for Delta, they

also served as reservists in the United States Air Force.

McLean

In 2017, Delta investigated McLean for abusing

his military-leave and sick-leave benefits. During its

investigation, Delta learned that McLean had “routinely

misused military leave and sick leave in multiple ways.”

4a

Appendix A

Once, for example, McLean told Delta that he was too

sick to fly, took paid sick leave, and then went on to fly

jets for the military while on sick leave. McLean did so

despite an express warning from his Delta supervisor that

he could be fired if he did side work while on sick leave.

Delta discovered at least ten other times when McLean

took paid sick leave and then performed military duty on

the same day.

The investigation also revealed that, twenty-five

times, McLean falsely informed Delta that he had military

duty. Because Delta cannot prevent its employees from

fulfilling their military service obligations, McLean’s false

reports kept Delta from scheduling him for work on those

days—despite the fact he was available. McLean further

violated Delta’s military leave policies by failing to inform

the airline of his military orders on over one hundred

days. At least twice, McLean flew military jets while he

was being paid to be on standby for Delta, meaning that

if the airline had needed him, he wouldn’t have been able

to fly. When asked about these incidents, McLean denied

abusing his military leave, but acknowledged how Delta

could have thought he was doing so. In total, Delta found

that McLean received at least $53,628.70 in unearned pay

and benefits due to his abuse of sick and military leave.

Based on the findings of the investigation, Delta notified

McLean that it intended to terminate his employment.

The notice listed two reasons for termination. First, it

recounted McLean’s extensive “misuse of military leave”

as an “independent ground[] for termination.” Second,

it laid out McLean’s sick leave violations and explained

that his abuse of Delta’s sick-leave benefits provided an

5a

Appendix A

“independent basis for [his] termination.” McLean was

entitled to contest his termination, but instead he chose

to resign.

Doyle

In 2015, Delta investigated Doyle for abusing his

military-and sick-leave benefits. Delta became concerned

about Doyle’s use of sick leave when he told a supervisor

that he had gone skiing over the New Year when he was

supposed to be on sick leave with the flu. Another time,

Doyle told Delta he could not fly because of a knee injury,

but his military record showed that he flew test flights for

the Air Force that same day. Delta also suspected that

Doyle was abusing its leave policies by stringing together

sick days with military leave and vacation days to extend

his time off.

Based on his leave-request records, Doyle said he

could understand why Delta would be concerned that

he was abusing his sick-leave benefits, although he

thought it was a misunderstanding. Before Delta finished

investigating him, Doyle resigned.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

McLean and Doyle sued Delta for violating the

Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment

Rights Act. They brought three claims. First, they alleged

that Delta discriminated against them by constructively

terminating them because of their military service.

Second, the pilots claimed that Delta contributed less to

their pensions while they were on military leave than the

6a

Appendix A

Act required. And third, they alleged that Delta allowed

pilots on comparable types of leave to accrue vacation time,

but not pilots on long-term military leave. 1

Delta moved for summary judgment on all three

claims, which the district court granted. First, as to

the constructive-termination claim, the district court

explained that McLean and Doyle had shown a prima

facie case that Delta pressured them to resign because

of their military service. But, the district court wrote,

Delta was entitled to summary judgment because the

evidence was undisputed that the airline had legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the forced resignations:

McLean and Doyle were abusing their sick-leave benefits.

Second, as to their pension-contribution claim, the

district court determined that the pilots’ compensation

was not reasonably certain and fluctuated month-tomonth. Thus, for the periods McLean and Doyle were

away on military leave, Delta was obligated to contribute

to their pensions their average rate of compensation over

the last twelve months. See 38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3)(B).

Because the evidence showed that Delta contributed more

to McLean’s and Doyle’s pensions than they were entitled

to under the Act, the district court granted summary

judgment to the airline.

And third, as to the vacation-time claim, the district

court concluded that McLean and Doyle were not

entitled to accrue vacation time during periods of longterm military leave under the Act because there was no

1. There were other plaintiffs and other claims in the district

court, but they are not relevant to this appeal.

7a

Appendix A

evidence that Delta allowed pilots on a comparable type

of leave to accrue vacation time.

McLean and Doyle appeal the summary judgment

for Delta.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga.,

967 F.3d 1121, 1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a).

DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we

consider the summary judgment for Delta on McLean’s and

Doyle’s constructive-termination claim. Then, we address

the summary judgment on their pension-contribution

claim. Finally, we review the summary judgment on their

vacation-time claim.

The Constructive-Termination Claim

McLean and Doyle brought their constructivetermination claim under the general discrimination

provision of the Act. That provision says a “member

of . . . a uniformed service shall not be denied . . . any

benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that

membership.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). “An employer shall be

8a

Appendix A

considered to have engaged in actions prohibited . . . if

the person’s membership . . . in the uniformed services

is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the

employer can prove that the action would have been taken

in the absence of such membership. . . .” Id. § 4311(c)(1).

In the summary-judgment context, we’ve explained

that the general discrimination provision sets out a

two-step burden-shifting framework. At the first step,

the plaintiff may “establish his prima facie case” by

showing a genuine dispute that his military status “was

a motivating factor” in his termination (or any other

denial of an employment benefit). See Coffman v. Chugach

Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005),

superseded by statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 111275 § 702, 124 Stat. 2864, 2887-88 (2010). “[M]ilitary status

is a motivating factor if the defendant relied on, took into

account, considered, or conditioned its decision on that

consideration.” Id. (citation modified).

If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, at the

second step, “the burden shifts to the employer” to show

undisputed evidence “that legitimate reasons, standing

alone, would have induced the employer to take the same

adverse action.” Id. at 1238-39 (citation modified); see also

Thomas v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 71 F.4th 1305,

1312 (11th Cir. 2023). Put together, in evaluating summary

judgment under the Act’s general discrimination provision,

“there must be an initial showing by the employee that

military status was at least a motivating . . . factor” in the

adverse employment action, “upon which the [employer]

must” show “that the action would have been taken despite

the protected status.” Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1239.

9a

Appendix A

As to the first step, the district court concluded that

McLean and Doyle established a prima facie case that

their constructive termination was motivated, at least in

part, by their military service.2And, at the second step, the

district court ruled that Delta would have constructively

terminated both pilots—irrespective of their military

service—for the legitimate reason, standing alone, that

they abused their sick-leave benefits. The summary

judgment evidence supports the district court’s conclusion.

Starting with McLean, he admitted he used his sickleave benefits to perform military duties. McLean told

Delta that he was too sick to fly, took paid sick leave, and

then flew jets for the military while he was on leave. He

did so despite a warning from his supervisor that he could

be fired if Delta learned he was flying while on sick leave.

Delta’s investigation into McLean revealed ten other times

when he took sick leave but then worked for the military

while on leave. Delta expressed an intent to fire McLean

because he abused his sick-leave benefits. The airline’s

notice of intended termination included that his “misuse

of Delta sick leave provide[d] an independent basis for

[his] termination.”

Doyle, too, abused his sick-leave benefits. Doyle told a

supervisor that he went skiing over New Year’s while on

sick leave with the flu. As part of its investigation, Delta

found another incident where Doyle called in sick with a

knee injury but then flew jets for the military on the same

day. Delta questioned Doyle about his “sudden increase in

[sick leave] usage beginning in 2012 and use of [sick leave]

2. We assume (without deciding) that McLean and Doyle were

constructively terminated.

10a

Appendix A

in conjunction with” other types of leave “in what appeared

to be an attempt to extend time off.” Doyle later resigned.

Against this evidence, McLean and Doyle argue that

Delta’s independent, standalone reason for constructively

terminating them was really that they violated its

concurrent duty policy. Because the concurrent duty

policy only applies to those in military service, the

argument goes, a termination based on that policy is a

termination because of their military service in violation

of the Act’s general discrimination provision. But the pilots

confuse Delta’s concurrent duty policy with its sick-leave

benefits. The concurrent duty policy prohibits a pilot from

performing military duty while also being paid by Delta.

It has nothing to do with sick leave. The sick-leave benefits

allow a pilot to take paid time off only if he is medically

unable to perform his job.

McLean points to notes from a Delta meeting agenda

which lists his name next to “preparing for termination”

for “[military leave] abuse, manipulation, [and the]

concurrent duty [policy].” But all these notes show is that

McLean’s concurrent duty violations were one of several

reasons Delta had for firing him. Delta was also concerned

about McLean’s “manipulation,” which is consistent

with his abuse of sick leave. Indeed, McLean’s notice of

termination listed his abuse of military and sick leave as

separate, “independent” grounds for his termination.

Similarly, Delta questioned Doyle because he told

his supervisor that he abused his sick-leave benefits

and appeared to be stringing together sick leave

with other types of leave to extend his time off. The

11a

Appendix A

undisputed evidence supports Delta’s standalone reason

for constructively terminating McLean and Doyle:

notwithstanding their military service, they abused their

sick-leave benefits.

The pilots also argue that because they denied

abusing their sick-leave benefits there was a factual

dispute for trial. But the focus of the second step in the

burden-shifting framework is on the employer’s reason

for terminating the employee, not the employee’s conduct.

The question is whether the employer would have taken

the same action, for an independent, standalone reason,

regardless of the employee’s military status. “An employer

who fires an employee under the mistaken but honest

impression that the employee violated a work rule is not

liable for discriminatory conduct.” Cf. Damon v. Fleming

Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.3 (11th

Cir. 1999); Flowers v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d

1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[E]mployers are free to

fire their employees for a good reason, a bad reason, a

reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all,

as long as [the] action is not for a discriminatory reason.”

(citation modified)). Here, there’s no dispute that Delta’s

independent, standalone reason for pushing out McLean

and Doyle was that they abused their sick-leave benefits,

even if that reason was mistaken.

The Pension-Contribution Claim

The pilots’ pension-contribution claim involved a

different provision of the Act governing pension benefit

plans. Under that provision, where an employee’s

compensation includes pension benefits, while he’s on

12a

Appendix A

military leave, he must “be treated as not having incurred

a break in service.” 38 U.S.C. § 4318(a)(2)(A). In other

words, while on military leave, the employee must receive

the same pension benefits that he would have received had

he been working instead of on military leave.

The Act requires the employer to “compute[]”

the employee’s compensation in one of two ways. Id.

§ 4318(b)(3). By default, the employer must compensate its

employee on military leave using “the rate the employee

would have received but for the period of [military]

service.” Id. § 4318(b)(3)(A). But there’s a different rule

when “the determination of such rate is not reasonably

certain.” Id. § 4318(b)(3)(B). In that case, the employer

must compensate the employee on military leave “on the

basis of the employee’s average rate of compensation

during the [twelve]-month period immediately preceding”

the period of military service. Id.

In reviewing the summary judgment evidence, the

district court concluded that the pilots’ compensation—

including payments made for their pensions—did not

violate the Act’s pension-benefits provision because their

compensation was not reasonably certain. It also found

that Delta paid more than the pilots’ average rate of

compensation during the twelve-month period before their

military leave. The pilots challenge the district court’s

first conclusion.

But the summary judgment evidence is undisputed that

McLean’s and Doyle’s compensation was not reasonably

certain. Delta’s policies allowed pilots flexibility in fixing

their schedules, and McLean’s and Doyle’s hours varied

13a

Appendix A

considerably. During months without leave, for example,

McLean’s hours ranged from seventy to ninety-nine,

while Doyle’s hours varied between seventy-two and 104.

In January 2011, McLean worked seventy-one hours. In

February, he worked ninety-five hours. And in March,

he worked eighty hours. It was the same story for Doyle;

his hours were also inconsistent. In February 2012, for

instance, Doyle worked seventy-six hours. The next month

he logged 104 hours.

To rebut this evidence, the pilots point to their expert’s

report, which they argue shows that the average rate of

compensation for Delta’s non-military pilots, as a group,

was reasonably certain. But that testimony is immaterial

under the Act’s pension-benefits provision, which

focuses on the reasonable certainty of “the employee’s

compensation,” 38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3) (emphasis added),

and not the group the employee is in. The Act’s pensionbenefits provision requires the employer to compensate the

employee “at the rate the employee would have received

but for the period of service,” or, if the employee’s rate of

compensation “is not reasonably certain, on the basis of

the employee’s average rate of compensation” in the twelve

months before the military leave. Id. § 4318(b)(3)(A) 0-(B)

(emphasis added). The pilots’ expert didn’t do that. She

did not calculate the rate of compensation for McLean and

Doyle. While the average non-military pilot may have had

a reasonably certain rate of compensation, we know from

the record that McLean and Doyle did not.

So, under the Act’s pension-benefits provision,

Delta was allowed to compensate McLean and Doyle

while they were on military leave “on the basis of [their]

average rate of compensation during the [twelve]-month

14a

Appendix A

period immediately preceding” their military leave. Id.

§ 4318(b)(3)(B). It is undisputed that Delta did that and

more. Delta’s average-line-value formula, implemented “to

benefit military reservists,” resulted in greater pension

contributions for McLean and Doyle than a normal twelvemonth average would have. Delta was free to contribute

more to McLean’s and Doyle’s pensions than the law

required. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.7(a) (explaining the Act

“establishes a floor, not a ceiling, for the employment and

reemployment rights and benefits of those it protects” and

that “an employer may provide greater rights and benefits

than [the Act] requires”).

The Vacation-Time Claim

McLean’s and Doyle’s final claim was that Delta did

not allow them to accrue vacation time while they were

on long-term military leave but permitted pilots on other

types of comparable leave to accrue vacation time while

on leave. The different treatment for long-term military

leave, they say, violated the Act’s rights-and-benefits

provision. Under that provision,

a person who is absent from a position of

employ ment by reason of ser vice in the

uniformed services shall be –

(A) deemed to be on furlough or leave of

absence while performing such service; and

(B) entitled to such other rights and benefits

not determined by seniority as are generally

provided by the employer of the person to

employees having similar seniority, status, and

15a

Appendix A

pay who are on furlough or leave of absence

under a contract, agreement, policy, practice,

or plan in effect at the commencement of

such service or established while such person

performs such service.

38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1). The Act’s regulations explain that

“accrual of vacation leave . . . must be provided by an

employer to an employee on a military leave of absence

only if the employer provides that benefit to similarly

situated employees on comparable leaves of absence.” 20

C.F.R. § 1002.150(c).

“[T]o determine whether any two types of leave are

comparable, the duration of the leave may be the most

significant factor to compare.” Id. § 1002.150(b). But “other

factors such as the purpose of the leave and the ability of

the employee to choose when to take the leave” are also

relevant. Id. “It is up to the employee to demonstrate that

any given stretch of military leave is comparable to a form

of non[-]military leave that is accorded a benefit.” White

v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616, 624 (7th Cir. 2021).

The district court granted summary judgment for

Delta on the pilots’ vacation-time claim because they did

not demonstrate that their long-term military leave was

comparable to a form of non-military leave that accrued

vacation time. On appeal, McLean and Doyle argue that

this was error. They point to known leaves of absence

as a comparable form of non-military leave. Delta, they

explain, violated the Act’s rights-and-benefits provision

because pilots on comparable known leaves of absence

accrued vacation time while pilots on long-term military

leave did not.

16a

Appendix A

But the undisputed summary judgment evidence

shows that the two kinds of leave were not comparable.

First, as to duration, a known leave of absence is only

offered one month at a time. In contrast, long-term

military leave, as the name suggests, lasts a long time—

even years. For example, the evidence shows that Doyle

was on long-term military leave from February 2008 to

November 2011—more than three years.

Second, as to purpose, Delta offers senior pilots a

known leave of absence when the company is overstaffed

and needs to furlough employees. Pilots are considered

active while on a known leave of absence—and can be

recalled—but do not fly any flights. Long-term military

leave, on the other hand, allows a pilot to perform military

service and Delta cannot call the pilot back to work.

And third, as to the ability to choose when to take

leave, Delta pilots can decide for themselves if they want to

take a known leave of absence when it is offered. Military

pilots have no choice. They must take leave when they are

ordered to report to military service.

In short, none of the factors show that known leaves

of absence are comparable to long-term military leave.

Because they are not comparable, Delta was entitled to

summary judgment on the pilots’ vacation-time claim. 3Cf.

3. For the first time in their summary judgment response,

the pilots added to their vacation-time claim that long-term

military leave was comparable to special conflict military leave,

a different type of military leave offered by Delta. The district

court rejected this late amendment because a plaintiff “may

17a

Appendix A

Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 59 F.4th 424, 434

(9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that summary judgment is

appropriate where “the facts of a case suggest that no

reasonable jury could see enough commonality for a

meaningful comparison” (citation modified)).

AFFIRMED.

not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing

summary judgment.” See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382

F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004). We reject it for the same reason.

The proper procedure for the pilots to assert a new “basis for

entitlement” was to seek to amend their complaint. See Hurlbert

v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc. 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th

Cir. 2006). Because they didn’t, the vacation-time claim based on

special conflict military leave was not properly before the district

court and is not properly before us on appeal.

18a

Appendix A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-11946

JEREMY SORENSON, et al.,

AN INDIVIDUAL,

Plaintiffs,

ADAM MCLEAN, AN INDIVIDUAL,

JAMES DOYLE, AN INDIVIDUAL, ON BEHALF

OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS

SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

A DELAWARE CORPORATION,

Defendant- Appellee.

ERRATA SHEET

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00541-ELR

The opinion has been changed as follows:

The footnote on page 17 of the opinion toward the end

of the footnote the stray quotation mark has been removed.

19a

B THE UNITED

APPENDIX B —Appendix

ORDER OF

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION,

FILED MARCH 31, 2023

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

1:17-CV-00541-ELR

JEREMY SORENSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

A DELAWARE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Signed March 31, 2023

ORDER

There are several matters pending before the Court.

The Court sets forth its reasoning and conclusions

below.

20a

Appendix B

I.

Background1

This suit stems from employment disputes between

five (5) military-affiliated pilots and their former employer,

Delta Air Lines, Inc. See generally Compl. [Doc. 1].

Plaintiffs Jeremy Sorenson, Randal Reep, Randal Smith,

James Doyle, and Adam McLean initiated this suit on

behalf of themselves and a putative class of all others

similarly situated against Defendant, alleging claims

pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301, et

seq. (“USERRA”). 2 See generally id.

Plaintiff Sorenson has been employed as a pilot for

Defendant since he was hired on February 14, 2017; he

was also a member of the Indiana National Guard and

United States Air Force Reserves at the time Defendant

hired him until he retired from the armed services in

April 2020. See Deposition of Jeremy Sorenson (“Sorenson

1. The facts discussed herein are undisputed unless noted

otherwise. The Court excludes proposed facts that are immaterial,

includes facts drawn from its own review of the record, and

considers all proposed facts in light of the standard for summary

judgment. See LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2)(iii), NDGa.; see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials, but

it may consider other materials in the record.”); Tomasini v. Mt.

Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1260 n.11 (S.D. Fla.

2004) (explaining that a district court is not obligated to “scour

the record” to determine whether triable issues exist).

2. For factual and procedural history beyond that included

herein, the Court refers to its Orders dated February 16, 2018,

and April 29, 2022. [See Docs. 24, 191].

21a

Appendix B

Dep.”) at 28:11-30:15 [Doc. 175]. Plaintiff Reep worked for

Defendant as a pilot from April 16, 1998, through October

11, 2016; he was also a member of the Florida Air National

Guard during that time. See Deposition of Randal Reep

(“Reep Dep.”) at 17:7-19:21 [Doc. 172]; Declaration of Jason

Zawislak (“Zawislak Decl.”) ¶ 12 [Doc. 178-3]. Defendant

hired Plaintiff Smith as a pilot on September 3, 2007; he

was a member of the United States Navy at that time

and until he retired from military service on January

31, 2017. See Deposition of Randal Smith (“Smith Dep.”)

at 83:10-12, 42:15-43:2 [Doc. 174]. As explained further

below, Plaintiff Smith no longer works for Defendant.

Plaintiff McLean has been a member of the United States

Air Force Reserves since 2009 (prior to which he was a

member of the Iowa Air National Guard), and he worked

for Defendant as a pilot when it merged with another

airline that employed him during 2008 until he resigned

on February 22, 2017. See Deposition of Adam McLean

(“McLean Dep.”) at 91:16-92:4, 115:21-24, 274:24-275:5

[Doc. 171]. Defendant employed Plaintiff Doyle as a pilot

from April 16, 2007, until he resigned on September 8,

2016; he is also a member of the Air Force Reserves and

was during the time he was employed by Defendant. See

Deposition of James Doyle (“Doyle Dep.”) at 30:8-12,

49:22-50:2, 61:19-24 [Doc. 170].

A.

Plaintiffs’ Employment Relationship with

Defendant

Defendant’s pilots — such as Plaintiffs —work

pursuant to the terms of the Pilot Working Agreement

(the “PWA”), a collective bargaining agreement between

22a

Appendix B

Defendant and the relevant pilots’ union. See Defendant’s

“Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Def.’s

SOMF”) ¶ 4 [Doc. 178-1]; Zawislak Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant’s

pilots are paid based on the number of flight hours they

log each month—rather than a fixed salary—and each

pilot has an hourly rate that varies based on seniority,

the type of aircraft the pilot flies, and the routes the pilot

flies (for example, Defendant’s pilots receive bonus pay

for certain flight routes that are more difficult to staff).

See Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 5-11; Zawislak Decl. ¶ 5. A pilot’s

monthly number of flight hours per month necessarily

varies because, pursuant to the PWA, Defendant’s pilots

are able to use a Preferential Bidding System (“PBS”) to

shape their own schedules for the upcoming month. See

Def.’s SOMF ¶ 13; Zawislak Decl. ¶ 6.

As a result of this PBS, Defendant’s pilots “have

significant discretion and ability to choose the number,

type, and dates of [their] hours for the upcoming month[,]”

although ultimately, Defendant must approve a pilot’s

selections (or “bids”). See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 6; see also

Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s “Response to

Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement

of Additional Material Facts in Support of Opposition”

(“Pls. Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s Resp. to Def.’s SOMF”)

¶ 16 [Doc. 206-1]. 3 And even after a pilot’s initial work

3. Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean object to nearly all

of Defendant’s proffered material facts. See generally Pls. Smith,

Doyle, and McLean’s Resp. to Def.’s SOMF. Almost all of their

objections are argumentative (as are almost all of their responses,

23a

Appendix B

schedule has been established for the upcoming month

through the PBS, that schedule frequently changes

as pilots swap, drop, and pick up flights according to

“personal preferences[,]” or if out-of-the-ordinary events

require staff and schedule changes. See Zawislak Decl.

¶ 8; Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 15, 17. Regardless of seniority or role,

Defendant’s pilots typically are not assigned to fly (or be

“on call” to fly, which is called a “reserve day”) more than

eighteen (18) days per month and are often scheduled

to work even fewer days per month. See Zawislak Decl.

¶ 9; Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 19-20. Due to the flexible nature of

Defendant’s work schedule system, Defendant’s “pilots are

effectively part-time employees who have substantial,” but

not total, “discretion in setting their schedules and work

hours” and frequently “have other careers.” See Zawislak

Decl. ¶ 9; Def.’s SOMF ¶ 21.

even as to those facts they do not dispute), unsupported by the

record, immaterial, long-winded, or some combination of these.

E.g., id. ¶ 22 (disputing Defendant’s proffered fact that Plaintiff

Reep “was a practicing attorney while also flying for Delta” by

responding that “Reep was a practicing attorney while he was

also employed by Delta, but there is no evidence to suggest he

practiced law while flying for Delta” (emphasis in original)).

Such objections violate Local Rule 56.1(B)(2)(a), which requires a

response to the movant’s statement of material facts “contain . . .

concise, nonargumentative responses[.]” See LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(1),

NDGa. (emphasis added). The same Local Rule provides that the

Court “will deem each of the movant’s facts as admitted” where a

respondent fails to “directly refute[] the movant’s fact with concise

responses supported by specific citations to evidence[.]” See id.

56.1(B)(2)(a)(2). Thus, where the Court includes a proposed fact

with no comment on a corresponding objection, the corresponding

objection has been considered and overruled, or the proposed fact

has been deemed admitted. See id.

24a

Appendix B

At various times during their employment with

Defendant, all Plaintiffs took leaves of absence to

perform military duties, which, in this case, are referred

to as Military Leave(s) of Absence (“MLOA”). See Def.’s

SOMF ¶¶ 24-28. When military-affiliated pilots receive

notice of upcoming military duties, they provide notice to

Defendant, which notes the MLOA and does not schedule

the pilots to work that same day for which MLOA is

scheduled (pursuant to Defendant’s “concurrent duty”

policy). See Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 46-47, 65. Defendant does not

permit its pilots to work for Defendant or be on call for

Defendant during designated MLOA days.4 See id.; see

also Zawislak Decl. ¶ 10. According to Defendant, it does

not discriminate against military-affiliated pilots who take

MLOA and appropriately determines all employmentrelated benefits for such employees so that they are in no

way penalized for fulfilling their military obligations. See,

e.g., Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 48, 60. Conversely, Plaintiffs claim

that Defendant discriminated against them and deprived

them of employment benefits because they took MLOA.

See, e.g., Pls. Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s Resp. to Def.’s

SOMF ¶¶ 48, 60.

B. Overview of USERRA and Relevant Provisions

In 1994, Congress enacted USERRA:

(1) to encourage noncareer service in the

uniformed ser vices by eliminating or

4. It is Defendant’s position that it “cannot require [a] pilot to

perform any duties” for Defendant on “legally mandated MLOA

days[.]” See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 10; Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 63, 65.

25a

Appendix B

minimizing the disadvantages to civilian

careers and employment which can result

from such service;

(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of

persons performing service in the uniformed

services as well as to their employers, their

fellow employees, and their communities, by

providing for the prompt reemployment of

such persons upon their completion of such

service; and

(3) to prohibit discrimination against persons

because of their service in the uniformed

services.

38 U.S.C. § 4301(a). To achieves these ends, USERRA

makes it unlawful for any employer to deny “any benefit

of employment” to any “person who . . . has an obligation

to perform service in a uniformed service.” 38 U.S.C.

§ 4311(a). Specifically, in pertinent part, USERRA states:

A person who is a member of, applies to be a

member of, performs, has performed, applies to

perform, or has an obligation to perform service

in a uniformed service shall not be denied

initial employment, reemployment, retention

in employment, promotion, or any benefit of

employment by an employer on the basis of

that membership, application for membership,

performance of service, application for service,

or obligation.

26a

Appendix B

Id. In addition to prohibiting discrimination against

employees who perform military service, USERRA and

its implementing regulations provide guidelines as to how

employers must calculate employment benefits for the time

such employees are on MLOA. See 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1).

1.

Seniority-based benefits

In general, an employee “who is absent from a

position of employment by reason of service in the

uniformed services shall be[] deemed to be on furlough

or leave of absence while performing such service.” 38

U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(A). During any MLOA, USERRA

requires that an employee still accrue any seniority-based

benefits as if he or she was “continuously employed” with

the civilian employer and did not have any “break in

employment” by virtue of taking MLOA. See 38 U.S.C.

§ 4316(a) (“A person who is reemployed under this chapter

is entitled to the seniority and other rights and benefits

determined by seniority that the person had on the date

of the commencement of service in the uniformed services

plus the additional seniority and rights and benefits

that such person would have attained if the person had

remained continuously employed.” (emphasis added)). Put

differently, “the period of absence from employment due

to or necessitated by [MLOA] is not considered a break in

employment” for purposes of determining an employee’s

“seniority and seniority-based rights and benefits.” See

20 C.F.R. § 1002.210.

27a

Appendix B

2.

Non-seniority-based benefits

For those employment benefits that are not senioritybased, USERRA provides that employees who take

MLOA are “entitled to such . . . rights and benefits . . . as

are generally provided by the employer of the person to

employees having similar seniority, status, and pay[, and]

who are on furlough or leave of absence[.]”5 See 38 U.S.C.

§ 4316(b)(1)(B); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(a) (“The

non-seniority rights and benefits to which an employee

is entitled during a period of service are those that the

employer provides to similarly situated employees[,]”

including “those rights and benefits . . . that are provided

to similarly situated employees on furlough or leave

of absence.”). “If the non-seniority benefits to which

employees on furlough or leave of absence are entitled vary

according to the type of leave, the employee” on MLOA

“must be given the most favorable treatment accorded to

any comparable form of leave[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(b).

II. Procedural History

On February 13, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their original

Complaint. See Compl. They subsequently amended the

Complaint twice. See Am. Compl. [Doc. 12]; see also 2d Am.

Compl. [Doc. 84]. In their operative pleading, Plaintiffs

bring four (4) causes of action pursuant to USERRA,

5. “As a general matter, accrual of vacation leave is considered

to be a non-seniority benefit that must be provided by an employer

to an employee on [MLOA] only if the employer provides that

benefit to similarly situated employees on comparable leaves of

absence.” 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(c).

28a

Appendix B

which they label: (1) pension contributions, (2) vacation

time accrual, (3) profit sharing, and (4) discrimination.6

See generally 2d Am. Compl. Plaintiffs purport to bring

their claims on behalf of themselves and a potential class

of “pilots who are or were employed by [Defendant], and

were or are members of the United States Armed Services

or National Guard, who took [MLOA] from April 16, 1998[,]

to the present.” Id. ¶ 98.

On December 9, 2021, Plaintiffs Smith, McLean, and

Doyle submitted a “Motion for Appointment of Interim

Class Counsel” seeking to have their lead attorneys,

Mr. Gene Stonebarger and Mr. Charles Billy (together,

“Proposed Co-Lead Class Counsel”), appointed by the

Court as interim co-lead class counsel. [See Doc. 139].

Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep and their lead attorney,

Ms. Crystal Matter, did not join in that motion. [See

id.] Rather, Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep (through Ms.

Matter) submitted an “Ex Parte Notice and Motion for

Permission to File Motion for Injunctive Relief against

Mr. Gene J. Stonebarger and Mr. Charles M. Billy In

Camera or Under Seal, Also to be Heard Ex Parte[,]”

by which they sought to be heard regarding purported

misconduct by Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy. [See Doc.

137; 191 at 2-3]. Magistrate Judge Alan J. Baverman of this

district granted that motion in part and scheduled an ex

parte hearing with only Plaintiffs’ counsel for December

13, 2021. [Doc. 140].

6. Plaintiffs allege three (3) theories in support of their

USERRA discrimination claim, which they label as “counts”: (a)

“general harassment,” (b) “concurrent duty,” and (c) “five-year

limit.” See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 143-88.

29a

Appendix B

On December 13, 2021, Plaintiffs and their various

attorneys appeared before Magistrate Judge Baverman

for the ex parte hearing. [Doc. 141]. During that ex

parte hearing and in a minute order memorializing the

proceedings, Magistrate Judge Baverman “reminded

Plaintiffs that they must be represented in this court by

a member of the Bar of the Court and not just counsel

admitted pro hac vice.” [Id.]

The next day, on December 14, 2021, local counsel

for all Plaintiffs, Mr. Joseph Coomes, filed a motion to

withdraw from this case because “certain conflicts have

arisen among . . . Plaintiffs and their counsel (the nature

of which were disclosed to the Court in the context of the

ex parte hearing conducted December 13, 2021).” [See Doc.

142 at 2]. In his motion to withdraw, Mr. Coomes noted

that Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean (along with their

lead counsel, Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy) had already

obtained substitute local counsel: Mr. Stephen Anderson,

who entered his notice of appearance on December 9,

2021. [See Docs. 138 at 1; 142 at 2]. Further, Mr. Coomes

explained in his motion that he had advised Plaintiffs Reep

and Sorenson that “they are required to be represented

by local counsel admitted as a regular member of this

Court” and that their lead counsel, Ms. Matter, is not

such an attorney as she only appears before this Court on

a pro hac vice basis. [See Doc. 142 at 3]. Plaintiffs Reep

and Sorenson objected to Mr. Coomes’ withdrawal. [See

id. at 2-3].

At the request of Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson, the

undersigned scheduled an ex parte hearing for January 27,

30a

Appendix B

2022, to discuss (among other things) Mr. Coomes’ motion

and the issue of local counsel as it pertained to Plaintiffs

Reep and Sorenson. [See Doc. 147]. At the January 27,

2022 hearing, the Court discussed the local counsel

requirement with all Plaintiffs and their attorneys, and,

later that day, issued an Order granting Mr. Coomes’

motion to withdraw. [See Docs. 149, 150]. Thus, Ms.

Matter and her clients were put on specific notice of

the local counsel requirement contained in the Local

Rules of this district at least three (3) times: once by Mr.

Coomes prior to his withdrawal, once in a hearing before

Magistrate Judge Baverman, and once in hearing before

the undersigned. [See Docs. 141, 150]. Subsequently, Mr.

Alexander Cyclone Covey entered an appearance as local

counsel for Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson on February 7,

2022. [See Doc. 152].

Thereafter, on February 10, 2022, Plaintiffs Sorenson

and Reep filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs

Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s motion to appoint interim

class counsel and claimed that Messrs. Stonebarger

and Billy had engaged in “gross attorney misconduct”

by supposedly interfering with Ms. Matter’s ability to

represent them. [See generally Doc. 153]. In their response

brief, Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep request that Ms.

Matter be appointed interim class counsel or co-lead

interim class counsel alongside Messrs. Stonebarger and

Billy. [See id.] Although Defendant had not previously

challenged the motion to appoint Messrs. Stonebarger and

Billy as co-lead interim class counsel, it requested leave to

file a response after Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson brought

forth their allegations of attorney misconduct. [See Doc.

31a

Appendix B

160]. In an Order dated April 29, 2022, the Court accepted

Defendant’s response in opposition to the interim class

counsel motion attached to Defendant’s motion for leave

to file the same. [See Docs. 160-1; 191 at 11-14].

On March 14, 2022, Defendant filed its instant “Motion

for Summary Judgment” seeking judgment as a matter of

law on all five (5) Plaintiffs’ individual claims. [Doc. 178].

On May 12 and 13, 2022, Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy

timely submitted individual response briefs in opposition

on behalf of all five (5) Plaintiffs, even Plaintiffs Reep

and Sorenson, claiming they did so out of an “abundance

of caution.” 7 [See Docs. 191 at 23; 206; 207; 208; 209

at 1; 210 at 1]. Also on May 13, 2022, Ms. Matter filed

individual response briefs in opposition to Defendant’s

summary judgment motion on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep

and Sorenson. [See Docs. 211, 212].

7. The Court notes that Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy

signed the response briefs filed on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep

and Sorenson as “Attorneys for Plaintiffs Randal Reep, Randal

Smith, Adam Mc[L]ean, James Doyle, and the Putative Class[.]”

[See Docs. 209 at 26; 210 at 26]. However, in the response briefs

Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy submitted and signed on behalf

of Plaintiffs Smith, McLean, and Doyle, Plaintiffs Sorenson and

Reep’s names are noticeably absent from the text beneath the

attorney signature blocks. [See Docs. 206 at 25-26; 207 at 26; 208

at 25-26] (all indicating beneath Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy’s

signatures that they are “Attorneys for Plaintiffs Randal Smith,

Adam Mc[L]ean, James Doyle, and the Putative Class[,]” but not

Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep). Otherwise, at no point have Messrs.

Stonebarger or Billy indicated that they represent Plaintiff

Sorenson individually. [See, e.g., Doc. 210 at 26].

32a

Appendix B

Next, on May 19, 2022, through Ms. Matter, Plaintiffs

Reep and Sorenson each submitted a “Notice of Filing

of Errata to [Their] Response[s] in Opposition to Motion

for Summary Judgment[,]” by which they purport to

“promptly” correct multiple “clerical errors” in their

summary judgment response briefs. [See Docs. 214, 215].

And on July 7, 2022, Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean

filed a “Motion to File a Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Reply

Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.”

[Doc. 223]. Defendant opposes Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and

McLean’s motion to file a surreply. [See Doc. 224]. Having

been fully briefed, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment and Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and McLean’s

motion to appoint interim class counsel and motion to

file a surreply are ripe for the Court’s review. [Docs. 139,

178, 223].

III. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion

The Court now turns to Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, which Plaintiffs Smith, Doyle, and

McLean oppose (collectively, “Opposing Plaintiffs”).

[See Docs. 178-2, 206, 207, 208, 220]. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendant’s motion is deemed unopposed by

Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep. 8 The Court begins with the

relevant legal standard.

8. Although the Court considers Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment unopposed by Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep,

the Court still examine the merits of that motion as applied to

Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep’s claims. See United States v. One

Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Mia., 363 F.3d

1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004).

33a

Appendix B

A.

Legal Standard

The Court may grant summary judgment only if the

record shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute

is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable

jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,

106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute

is material if resolving the factual issue might change

the suit’s outcome pursuant to the governing law. See id.

At summary judgment, the moving party bears the

initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of

material fact exists. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson

Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court must

view all evidence in the record in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes

in the non-moving party’s favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097,

147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The moving party need not

positively disprove the opponent’s case; rather, the moving

party must show the lack of evidentiary support for the

non-moving party’s position. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

If the moving party meets this initial burden, it shifts

to the non-moving party to present competent evidence

beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue

for trial. See id. at 324-26, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The responding

party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is

34a

Appendix B

a genuine issue for trial.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2

F.3d 1112, 1116 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e)). “If the adverse party does not so respond, summary

judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the

adverse party.” Id. The essential question is “whether the

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-movant’s case is

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.

at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. There must be evidence on which

the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.

See id.

B. Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep’s Summary

Judgment Response Briefs

To clarify the scope of the summary judgment

analysis herein, the Court begins by addressing the

two (2) sets of summary judgment response briefs filed

on behalf of Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep, one set by

Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy and a second, later set

by Ms. Matter. [See Docs. 209, 210, 211, 212]. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds both sets of

response briefs—as well as the accompanying responses

to Defendant’s statement of material facts and statements

of additional material facts [Docs. 209-1, 210-1, 211-1, 2121]—to be improper and declines to consider the arguments

advanced within them.

35a

Appendix B

First, it was improper for Messrs. Stonebarger and

Billy to file briefs on behalf of clients they do not represent.

It is undisputed that Mr. Stonebarger represents neither

Plaintiff Reep nor Plaintiff Sorenson, as they both

terminated him. See Declaration of Jeremy Sorenson

(“Sorenson Decl.”) ¶ 16 [Doc. 153-2]; see also Declaration

of Randal Reep (“Reep Decl.”) ¶ 10 [Doc. 153-3]. It is

further undisputed that Plaintiff Sorenson terminated Mr.

Billy. See Sorenson Decl. ¶ 15 (“Mr. Billy is no longer my

attorney.”). Although it is less clear whether Plaintiff Reep

terminated Mr. Billy, Plaintiff Reep offers several sworn

statements that Mr. Billy “constructively abandoned”

him as a client in late 2021 “because [Plaintiff Reep]

terminated Mr. Stonebarger.” See Reep Decl. ¶¶ 12, 15,

17. Plaintiff Reep further states that Ms. Matter is “our

attorney” (referring to himself and Plaintiff Sorenson)

and he casts various aspersions on Mr. Billy’s course of

conduct during this litigation. See id. ¶ 11.

No attorney who has appeared in this case has

presented documents showing the status of their legal

representation of Plaintiff Reep, such as a letter of

engagement, termination, or withdrawal. However, in

view of Plaintiff Reep’s sworn statements to this Court,

Mr. Billy’s statement that he filed a summary judgment

response brief on behalf of Plaintiff Reep only out of “an

abundance of caution and in consideration of existing

circumstances[,]” and various other materials presented

to the undersigned, the Court finds that Ms. Matter is

Plaintiff Reep’s attorney and that he terminated Mr.

Stonebarger. [See, e.g., Docs. 137 at 2 (Ms. Matter stating

that she represents Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep); 191 at

36a

Appendix B

7 (“Plaintiff Reep is represented by Attorneys Matter and

Covey”); Doc. 209 at 1, 26]; Reep Decl. ¶ 10; see also Est.

of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga.App. 103, 796 S.E.2d 489, 493

(2017) (noting that whether an attorney-client relationship

exists in Georgia is determined by looking to the putative

client’s “reasonable beliefs” about whether an attorney

represents him or her). The Court accordingly declines

to consider the summary judgment filings Messrs.

Stonebarger and Billy filed on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep

and Sorenson.

Second, the filing of duplicate summary judgment

response briefs on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep and

Sorenson—one set by Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy, one

set by Ms. Matter—directly violates the Local Rules of

this district and the undersigned’s April 29, 2022 Order.

[See Doc. 191]; see also LR 56.1, NDGa. Local Rule 56.1

provides that “[i]n accordance with [Local Rule 7.1(C)], the

parties shall not be permitted to file supplemental briefs

and materials, with the exception of a reply by the movant,

except upon order of the court.” See LR 56.1, NDGa. The

Local Rules also limit response briefs to twenty-five (25)

pages. See id. 7.1(D). The Court did not give Plaintiffs

Reep and Sorenson leave to file supplemental briefs or

materials. And by filing two (2) sets of response briefs,

Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson far exceed this page limit.

[See Docs. 209, 210, 211, 212].

Additionally, in its April 29, 2022 Order, the Court

expressly directed “each individual Plaintiff, through

his chosen, individual attorneys, to file a response [to

Defendant’s summary judgment motion] regarding

37a

Appendix B

only their own individual claims[.]” [See Doc. 191 at

10-11, 23] (reiterating the directives for “the attorneys

representing . . . Plaintiffs to respond to Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on behalf of their individual

clients[,]” for “Plaintiffs to file individual responses [to

Defendant’s summary judgment motion] through their

respective counsel[,]” and that all Plaintiffs “file their

briefs in accordance with the instructions stated herein

and in accordance with the Local Rules of this district”

(emphasis added)). Thus, as Defendant correctly notes,

the Court’s April 29, 2022 Order clearly permitted “a

total of 5 [summary judgment response] briefs”—one

for each Plaintiff—and no more. [See Doc. 220 at 16].

Messrs. Stonebarger and Billy clearly flouted this Court’s

directives when they filed response briefs on behalf of

Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep. “Such disregard for the

procedural rules of this Court will not be tolerated.” Hill

v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:18-CV-05589JPB-WEJ, 2020 WL 12182139, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 5,

2020) (quoting Gainor v. Douglas Cnty., 59 F. Supp. 2d

1259, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 1998)). Messrs. Stonebarger and

Billy’s disregard for this district’s Local Rules and the

Court’s April 29, 2022 Order provides independent bases

for the undersigned to disregard the response briefs

they filed on behalf of Plaintiffs Reep and Sorenson even

absent any question about who represents them. See LR

7.1(E), NDGa.

Third, even if the only summary judgment response

briefs on behalf of Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep were

those filed by Ms. Matter, that set of briefs would still

be improper because neither contains the signature of

38a

Appendix B

local counsel. [See Docs. 211, 212]. The Court discussed

the local counsel requirement—and how it applied to Ms.

Matter and her clients specifically—during the January

27, 2022 ex parte hearing. [See Doc. 150]; see also LR

83.1(B)(4), NDGa. (“Local counsel must authorize and

sign all pleadings and other papers filed in the case by the

attorney appearing pro hac vice.”). Ms. Matter obtained

local counsel (Mr. Covey) on February 7, 2022. [See Doc.

152]. Yet, Mr. Covey’s signature is not present on any

of the summary judgment response filings Ms. Matter

made on May 13, 2022. [See Docs. 211 at 26-28; 212 at 2628]. Apparently realizing this error (and several others,

such as omitted exhibits, declarations labeled with the

wrong declarant’s name, and errors in multiple proffered

statements of material fact), nearly a week later, Ms.

Matter submitted “Notice[s] of Filing of Errata” which

purported to “correct” the “incomplete” signature pages

to add the signature of local counsel. [See Docs. 214, 215].

Ms. Matter’s filing are untimely attempts to amend the

summary judgment response briefs she filed on behalf of

her clients without the leave of Court. Thus, Ms. Matter’s

“Notice[s] of Filing of Errata” do not correct the crucial

error she made in omitting the signature of local counsel

from the filings at hand. [See Docs. 214, 215].

The Local Rules permit this Court, in its discretion,

to “decline to consider any . . . brief that fails to conform

to the requirements of” the Local Rules and to sanction

any party who fails to comply with the orders of the

Court. See LR 7.1(E), NDGa.; see also id. 16.5 (“failure to

comply with the court’s pretrial instructions may result

in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of the

39a

Appendix B

case”). And district courts have discretion in interpreting,

enforcing, and applying their Local Rules. See Ramion

v. Brad Cole Constr. Co., 805 F. App’x 948, 950 (11th Cir.

2020); see also Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d

1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that this district’s

Local Rule 56.1 “is designed to help the court identify and

organize the issues in the case”).

Therefore, the Court declines to consider the summary

judgment briefs submitted by Messrs. Stonebarger and

Billy on behalf of Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep because (1)

they were not authorized to make those filings and (2) the

filing of the duplicate set of briefs violated both the Local

Rules of this district and the express directives of this

Court. [See Docs. 209, 210]. Additionally, the Court finds

it proper to disregard the summary judgment briefs and

other associated filings Ms. Matter submitted on behalf

of Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep because (1) they do not

contain the signatures of local counsel in violation of both

the Local Rules of this district and the express directives

of this Court and (2) Ms. Matter’s “Notice[s] of Errata”

amount to no more than untimely, misguided attempts to

amend the pleadings she filed. [See Docs. 211, 212, 214,

215]. However, despite the veritable litany of failures

by Plaintiffs’ counsel that necessitate these decisions,

the Court is also mindful of its obligation to examine

the merits of the underlying summary judgment motion

and only enter summary judgment “when appropriate”

(instead of automatically) even though the motion is

deemed unopposed by Plaintiffs Sorenson and Reep. See

One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., 363

F.3d at 1101. Accordingly, the Court turns to the merits

of Defendant’s motion.

40a

Appendix B

C.

Discussion

In the matter at hand, Defendant argues it is entitled

to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. 9

[See generally Docs. 178-2, 220]. The Court examines

Defendant’s motion with regard to each claim in turn,

beginning with those claims stemming from senioritybased employment benefits.

1.

Seniority-based benefits

Defendant contends it is entitled to summary

judgment on both claims regarding Plaintiffs’ senioritybased employment benefits: specifically, Plaintiffs’ claims

related to the funding of their pension plans during their

periods of MLOA and their profit-sharing payments.

[See Doc. 178-2 at 5-10]. As the Court discusses further

below, the Parties dispute the lawfulness of Defendant’s

methodology for calculating pension contributions and

profit-sharing cash awards for pilots who take MLOA.

[See Doc. 206 at 6-12]. The Court addresses each benefit

in turn.

a.

Pension contributions

In their first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that

Defendant violated various provisions of USERRA by

9. Because the Opposing Plaintiffs’ briefs are identical, for

the most part, the Court primarily cites to the brief at Docket

Entry 206 in the analysis below. When addressing any Plaintiffspecific portion of an Opposing Plaintiff’s response brief, the Court

provides the citation to that Opposing Plaintiff’s brief.

41a

Appendix B

underfunding the pension plans of pilots who take MLOA.

See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-22. Defendant argues it is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim because

its methodologies for calculating Plaintiffs’ pension

contributions for periods of MLOA are in accordance with

USERRA. [See Doc. 178-2 at 3-10]. Defendant further

contends that it has actually provided Plaintiffs with

greater pension contributions than required by law. [See id.]

As discussed above, when a military-affiliated pilot

who works for Defendant takes MLOA, the military (but

not Defendant) pays that pilot during the MLOA period.

See 38 U.S.C. § 4331(a); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.210.

However, that military-affiliated pilot is still entitled

to accrue any seniority-based benefits provided by the

employer or required by USERRA as if he or she had

never been absent or had a “break in employment” due

to the MLOA. See 38 U.S.C. § 4316(a); see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 1002.210. Contributions to pension plans are one such

seniority-based benefit. See 38 U.S.C. § 4318(a)(2)(A)

(USERRA provision specific to pension plans).

The Parties’ dispute here centers on the proper

method for calculating the earnings Plaintiffs would have

received from Defendant “but for [their] MLOA.” [See

Docs. 178-2 at 3; 206 at 6]. This initial earnings calculation,

in turn, allows Defendant to calculate the appropriate

pension contributions for a given employee who has taken

MLOA so that the employee receives the same pension

contributions as those employees who did not take MLOA

during the same time period. [See Docs. 178-2 at 2-3; 206

at 6]; see also 38 U.S.C. § 4318.

42a

Appendix B

Pursuant to § 4318 of USERRA, the amount of funds

an employer must contribute to an employee pension plan

during the employee’s “period of [military] service . . .

shall be computed” either:

(A) at the rate the employee would have

received but for the period of service . . . , or

(B) in the case that the determination of such

rate is not reasonably certain, on the basis of

the employee’s average rate of compensation

during the 12-month period immediately

preceding such period (or, if shorter, the period

of employment immediately preceding such

period).

38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3) (emphasis added).10 The Parties

refer to the formula in 28 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3)(B) for

earnings that are not reasonably certain as the “twelve

(12)-month lookback” calculation. [See Docs. 178-2 at 3;

206 at 8]. The Parties disagree on (1) whether Plaintiffs’

compensation was “reasonably certain,” and, if not, (2)

whether the methodology Defendant previously used or

currently uses to calculate their pension contributions

comports with USERRA.11

10. It is undisputed that Defendant “contributes a fixed

percentage of a pilot’s pensionable earnings into the pilot’s

individual 401k account.” See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 18.

11. From 2005-2011, Defendant used a twelve (12)-month

lookback calculation to determine the pension contributions at

issue. See id. ¶ 19. From 2012 forward, Defendant has used the

Average Line Value calculation described below. See id. ¶ 20.

43a

Appendix B

i.

Reasonably certain

Thus, the first inquiry the Court must resolve is

whether Plaintiffs’ regular compensation was “reasonably

certain.” See id. Defendant contends it was not. [See Doc.

178-2 at 3-7]. Opposing Plaintiffs appear to suggest it was.

[See Doc. 206 at 6-8].

Defendant’s pilots are paid by the flight hour, and each

pilot has an hourly rate that varies based on seniority,

type of aircraft, and flight route. See Zawislak Decl.

¶¶ 3, 5. Additionally, due to the PBS system that allows

Defendant’s pilots to “bid” for the schedules they want

and pilots’ ability to change their own schedules later,

variations in monthly compensation are to be expected.

See id. ¶¶ 6, 8; Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 13, 15, 17. In arguing

that Plaintiffs’ monthly compensation is not “reasonably

certain,” Defendant presents evidence of the range of

hours Plaintiffs worked during months when they took

no MLOA. [See Docs. 178-2 at 5-7; 220 at 3]. Thus, any

months when a Plaintiff took any MLOA are excluded

from the below:

• The average monthly total pay hours for Plaintiffs

was sixty-five and a half (65.5). [See Doc. 204-2 at

13].

• Between August 2014 and October 2020, Plaintiff

Sorenson’s monthly pay hours ranged from fortytwo (42) to 137. See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 14.

Opposing Plaintiffs do not challenge Defendant’s method of

calculating such seniority-based benefits prior to 2005. [See Doc.

206].

44a

Appendix B

• Between November 2008 and October 11, 2016,

Plaintiff Reep’s monthly pay hours ranged from

zero (as was the case during five (5) months where

he also took no MLOA or personal leave) to ninetyfive (95). See id. ¶ 12; [see also Doc. 178-3 at 160-62].

• Between September 2007 and October 2020—

during which he only worked a short time for

Defendant, as he was on MLOA almost the entire

time—Plaintiff Smith only surpassed twenty (20)

pay hours per month a total of eight (8) times and

never exceeded sixty-eight (68) pay hours in a single

month. See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 17; [see also Doc. 178-3

at 165-68].

• Between April 2007 and September 1, 2016, Plaintiff

Doyle’s monthly pay hours ranged from zero to 104.

See Zawislak Decl. ¶ 15.

• From January 2010 through February 22, 2017,

Plaintiff McLean’s monthly pay hours ranged from

fifty-seven (57) to ninety-nine (99). See id. ¶ 16.

Additionally, Defendant’s expert witness (Robert B.

Speakman, Jr., Ph.D.) opines that the standard deviation

of Plaintiffs’ pay hours in months where they took no

MLOA or other personal leave is 27.4 hours. [See Doc.

204-2 at 10-12]. As a comparison, according to materials

from the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) (cited and

replicated in Dr. Speakman’s expert report), a standard

deviation of 11.8 hours per month is sufficient to render

45a

Appendix B

an employee’s monthly pay “not reasonably certain.”12 [See

Doc. 204-2 at 10-12].

In their response brief, Opposing Plaintiffs contend

that the volatility in Plaintiffs’ monthly pay hours described

above is attributable to Defendant including months where

they were on MLOA. [See Doc. 206 at 10-11]. However,

in reaching the above calculations, Defendant’s expert

specifically excluded from his analysis “months in which

a pilot had any military leave days or personal leave days

at any time during the month[.]” [See Doc. 204-2 at 10]

(emphasis added) (copy of Dr. Speakman’s expert report).

And in Excel spreadsheets Defendant provided to Plaintiffs

during discovery (the authenticity of which has been

stipulated to by the Parties) listing the total pay hours for

each of Plaintiffs by bid month, “MLOA days” and personal

leave days are clearly separated out. [See Doc. 178-3 at

156-168]. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has

demonstrated the absence of material fact on this issue

and shown that Plaintiffs’ monthly pay is not “reasonably

certain” pursuant to USERRA.13 See 38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3).

12. “A standard deviation . . . is a measure of how dispersed

the data is in relation to the mean. Low standard deviation means

data are clustered around the mean, and high standard deviation

indicates data are more spread out.” See Standard Deviation,

Nat’l Libr. Of Med., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/stats_tutorial/

section2/mod8_sd.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2023). Thus, here, a

lower standard deviation would indicate that a Plaintiff’s monthly

pay hours remained fairly consistent from month to month.

13. Perplexingly, much of Opposing Plaintiffs’ argument

on this issue relies on citations to the sworn statement of Mr.

Billy, Opposing Plaintiffs’ counsel. [See, e.g., Doc. 206 at 8-11;

46a

Appendix B

ii.

Lawfulness of calculations

Having determined that Plaintiffs’ earnings were

not “reasonably certain,” the Court turns to assess

whether the two (2) methods Defendant has used to

calculate pension contributions during the relevant

time period comply with the requirements of USERRA.

First, from 2005 through 2011, Defendant used a twelve

(12)-month lookback calculation to determine the pension

contributions at issue. [See Doc. 178-2 at 7]. Second, since

2012, Defendant has used the Average Line Value (“ALV”)

calculation described below. [See id. at 8-9]. And, as noted,

USERRA requires that if an employee’s compensation is

not “reasonably certain,” the amount of funds an employer

must contribute to an employee pension plan during

the employee’s “period of [military] service . . . shall be

computed” based on “the employee’s average rate of

207 at 8-10, 10 n.3; 208 at 8-11] (all citing to various paragraphs

of the Declaration of Charles M. Billy (“Billy Decl.”) [Doc. 2062]). However, Mr. Billy lacks personal knowledge of the evidence

Opposing Plaintiffs attempt to advance through his declaration.

E.g., Billy Decl. ¶¶ 47, 53 (merely two (2) of the numerous examples

of paragraphs concerning Plaintiffs’ experiences, which could

not possibly be based on Mr. Billy’s own personal knowledge and

contain assertions with no citations to supporting evidence). The

Court declines to consider this “evidence” for this reason. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Tishcon Corp. v. Soundview Commc’ns,

Inc., Civil Action No. 1:04-CV524-JEC, 2005 WL 6038743, at

*5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2005) (explaining that “[t]o have personal

knowledge means more than to have been told that something is

what it purports to be or to have collected the information from

one’s client” and that it is “an unnatural, if not virtually impossible,

task for counsel, in his own case” to present objective testimony

that can be considered on a motion for summary judgment).

47a

Appendix B

compensation during the 12-month period immediately

preceding such period (or, if shorter, the period of

employment immediately preceding such period).” See 38

U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3)(B).

Opposing Plaintiffs do not rebut Defendant’s argument

that both methods are lawful. [See Docs. 206 at 6-11; 207 at

6-11; 208 at 6-11]. Instead of asserting that either method

of calculation used by Defendant violates USERRA,

Opposing Plaintiffs contend that their alternative

proffered method of calculating these benefits is “the

most accurate [and] most fair[.]” [E.g., Doc. 206 at 9-11]

(discussing Opposing Plaintiffs’ proposed methodology

of “Average Pay Hours” or “APH” to calculate monthly

compensation). Standing alone, Opposing Plaintiffs’

failure to respond to Defendant’s lawfulness argument

is sufficient for the Court to grant summary judgment in

Defendant’s favor on this claim. See Coal. for the Abolition

of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d

1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that a party’s failure

to brief and argue an issue before the district court is

grounds for declaring it abandoned); Resol. Tr. Corp. v.

Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“When

a party fails to respond to an argument or otherwise

address a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim

abandoned.”).

Nevertheless, the Court evaluates this issue on the

merits and finds that both methods Defendant has used

to calculate pension contributions during the relevant

time periods comply with the requirements of USERRA.

The “12-month lookback” method that Defendant used

48a

Appendix B

to establish a pilot’s compensation (a fixed percentage of

which goes to that pilot’s pension) between 2005 and 2011

looked to the pilot’s average rate of compensation during

the preceding twelve (12) months. See Zawislak Decl.

¶ 19. This method tracks the plain statutory language

of 38 U.S.C.§ 4318(b)(3)(B), and thus, the Court finds it

complied with USERRA.

As for the ALV method Defendant has used since

2012, that method calculates the “deemed earnings for

long-term MLOAs by multiplying a pilot’s hourly rate in

effect during the MLOA by the ALV for each month of the

MLOA.” [See Doc. 178-2 at 8] (citing Zawislak Decl. ¶ 20).

Importantly, Defendant’s ALV formula assumes that a

pilot works at least seventy-one (71) hours per month. [See

id.] (citing Zawislak Decl. ¶ 20). Plaintiffs rarely reached—

much less surpassed—this number of monthly pay hours

during any non-MLOA month. [See, e.g., Doc. 204-2 at

10-13]. And Defendant presents evidence that its “change

to the ALV calculation resulted in much higher [pension]

contributions for MLOA periods” than the “12-month

lookback calculation” because “the ALV calculation

typically includes higher hourly rates and higher pay hours

than the 12-month lookback calculation.” Zawislak Decl.

¶ 21. Specifically, Defendant presents evidence that the

ALV method has resulted in Defendant contributing over

$11 million more to military-affiliated pilots’ pension plans

than it would have under the twelve (12)-month lookback

calculation. See id. “USERRA establishes a floor, not a

ceiling, for the employment and reemployment rights and

benefits of those it protects. . . . [A]n employer may provide

greater rights and benefits than USERRA requires[.]” 20

49a

Appendix B

C.F.R. § 1002.7(a). Thus, the Court finds the ALV method

to be lawful pursuant to USERRA because it provided

Plaintiffs with more pension contributions than they

would have received pursuant to the plainly legal twelve

(12)-month lookback method. Therefore, the Court grants

summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiffs’ first

cause of action related to pension contributions.14

b.

Profit-sharing claims

In their third cause of action, Plaintiffs claim that

Defendant undercalculates “profit-sharing [payments]

for pilots on MLOA” in violation of USERRA by using

14. As Defendant notes in its instant motion, the Second

A mended Complaint does not refer to “deemed earnings

calculations for short-term (30 days or less) MLOAs” and

Defendant “is uncertain whether Plaintiffs are claiming that

[it] violated USERRA with regard to such MLOAs.” [Doc. 178-2

at 10 n.8]. However, Defendant states that “when a Delta pilot

takes even one day” of MLOA during a given month, Defendant

“provides them pension contributions as if they flew either ALV

or a very similar number of ‘reserve monthly guarantee hours[,]’”

both of which credit pilots for a higher average of monthly hours

than Plaintiffs worked during non-MLOA months. [See id. at 10]

(emphasis in original). Opposing Plaintiffs abandon any claim they

have related to pension contributions for short-term MLOA by

failing to address that claim in their response briefs. [See Doc. 206

at 8] (mentioning such a claim only in passing when asserting that

using ALV “undercalculates deemed earnings” “for both shortterm and long-term MLOA”); Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana

Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1326; Resol. Tr. Corp., 43 F.3d at 599. For

the reasons explained above, even if Opposing Plaintiffs did not

abandon their pension claims as it relates to short-term MLOA,

the Court agrees with Defendant that any such claim would fail.

50a

Appendix B

the “f lawed” and “artificially low” ALV method to

calculate “the deemed earnings a pilot would have

earned but for MLOA[.]” [See Doc. 206 at 11]. Opposing

Plaintiffs argue that “[p]rofit-sharing compensation is

pensionable, so the undercalculation also leads to . . .

pension underfunding” and is properly considered part

of their annual compensation such that it must “be equal

to the earnings the [pilot] would have received had the

individual been” continuously and “actively employed by

[Defendant]” and not on MLOA.15 [Id. at 11-12].

In its instant motion, Defendant explains that its

“pilots are covered by the company’s Annual ProfitSharing Plan (the ‘Profit-Sharing Plan’)” and that “[u]nder

the Profit-Sharing Plan, a pilot may receive a cash award

for each year when Delta makes profit-sharing payments.”

[Doc. 178-2 at 15] (citing Zawislak Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. G).

“The Profit-Sharing Plan determines cash awards by a

set percentage of a pilot’s [a]nnual [c]ompensation.” [Id.]

(internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant further

proffers:

In general, the Profit-Sharing Plan does

not “impute earnings” that a pilot has not

actually earned during leaves of absence.

(Zawislak Decl. Ex. G, Article 2.3.) There is

one exception to this rule, however. The ProfitSharing Plan does impute earnings for MLOA

periods when determining a pilot’s [a]nnual

15. Importantly, “Plaintiffs are not claiming Delta’s profitsharing plan is an ERISA plan under Section 4318.” [Doc. 206 at

11].

51a

Appendix B

[c]ompensation. (Id. at Articles 2.3(b) and 2.6.)

This is another example of [Defendant’s] proreservist employment policies.

[Doc. 178-2 at 15] (emphasis in original). With this context

in mind, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ profit-sharing

claim fails as a matter of law because (1) the pension

benefits provision of USERRA (§ 4318) “does not apply to

profit-sharing plans” and (2) Defendant does not “impute

earnings” towards pilots’ profit-sharing payments when

pilots take any type of extended leave other than MLOA,

such that Defendant essentially provides an extra benefit

to military-affiliated pilots not available to civilian pilots.

[See id. at 15-16].

It is well-established that “while USERRA requires

employers to treat servicemembers equally with respect

to other employees, it does not require preferential

treatment.” See Case v. Judd, No. 8:19-CV- 607-T33TGW, 2019 WL 10966204, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23,

2019) (collecting cases); see also Gross v. PPG Indus.,

Inc., 636 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011); Crews v. City of

Mount Vernon, 567 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir. 2009); Rogers

v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 769 (5th Cir. 2004).

“While the Eleventh Circuit has not directly addressed

the issue presented here, other circuits have held that

USERRA does not cover benefits that are available only

to military-affiliated employees.” See Judd, 2019 WL

10966204, at *3 (citing Crews, 567 F.3d at 866). Where

an employer’s policy conveys preferential treatment to

military-affiliated employees that is “not available to

non-military employees, such policies are not ‘benefits

52a

Appendix B

of employment’ under USERRA” and, therefore, are not

actionable pursuant to USERRA.16 See id. The Court finds

that this authority squarely forecloses Plaintiffs’ profitsharing claim. Indeed, in the two (2) paragraphs of their

responses addressing this claim, Opposing Plaintiffs do

not refute Defendant’s argument that it only “imputes

earnings” toward profit-sharing payments for employees

who take MLOA—but not any other type of extended

leave—such that military-affiliated pilots who take MLOA

(like Plaintiffs) receive a “benefit” not available to other

employees on extended leave. [See Docs. 178-2 at 15; 206

at 11-12].

16. Further, the Court notes that Opposing Plaintiffs do not

argue—nor does the Second Amended Complaint allege—that

Defendant’s profit-sharing payments are automatically applied

to their pensions (as a type of deferred compensation) instead

of paid directly to pilots (as a bonus or extra compensation).

[See Doc. 206 at 11-12]; see also 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 136-42. Thus,

although Opposing Plaintiffs characterize Defendant’s profitsharing payments as “pensionable” because they may elect to

direct such payments to their pension plans, nothing in the record

suggests that the profit-sharing payments constitute “a deferred

compensation plan.” See Scanlan v. Am. Airlines Grp., Inc., 384

F. Supp. 3d 520, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2019); [see also Doc. 206 at 11].

And as at least one district court has observed, a plaintiff fails to

state a claim for relief pursuant to USERRA’s pension provision

(§ 4318) where “employees participating in [a] [profit-sharing

p]lan may place the lump sum payments in their retirement [or

pension] plans” but the profit-sharing plan is, in essence, “an

extra compensation or bonus plan where payments are awarded

in addition to regular compensation” instead of “a deferred

compensation plan.” See Scanlan, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (emphasis

added). This independent reason supports summary judgment in

favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs’ profit-sharing claim.

53a

Appendix B

The only argument Opposing Plaintiffs make in

an attempt to save their profit-sharing claim is that

Defendant should use their proposed APH to “calculate

deemed earnings . . . reflecting what a pilot would earn

but for MLOA.” [See Doc. 206 at 9-11]. For the reasons

explained above, the Court is not persuaded by this

argument. See supra part III.C.1.a. Accordingly, the

Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

as to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action related to profit

sharing payments.17

2.

Non-seniority-based benefit—vacation

accrual

In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs claim that

Defendant violated the USERRA provision pertaining

to non-seniority-based employment benefits because it

did not allow them to accrue vacation time during their

periods of long-term MLOA. See 2d Am Compl. ¶¶ 12635 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(B)). The Parties agree

that long-term MLOA lasts thirty (30) or more days, or

at least one “bid month” in the context of the monthly

schedule bidding system Defendant’s pilots use to create

their schedules. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant allows

17. In light of the above findings, the Court need not reach

Defendant’s alternative argument that “Plaintiffs’ profit-sharing

claims are not cognizable under USERRA Section 4316 (nonseniority benefits provision) or Section 4311 (antidiscrimination

provision) because the only leave for which De[fendant] provides

imputed earnings toward profit-sharing payments is MLOA.”

[Docs. 178-2 at 15; 220 at 25].

54a

Appendix B

“pilots on other forms of leave . . . [to] accrue vacation time

during their leaves of absences that are longer than a bid

month or greater than 30 consecutive days[,]” but excludes

pilots on long-term MLOA from this same benefit. See id.

¶¶ 131, 133. Other forms of leave (other than long-term

MLOA) during which Plaintiffs allege that Defendant

permits its pilots to accrue vacation time include if the

pilots are on “Association Business leave,” sick leave, jury

duty, “Known Personal Leaves [of Absence,] and certain

personal leaves of absence[.]” See id. ¶ 131.

In its motion, Defendant argues that it is entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ vacation accrual claim

because long-term MLOA is not comparable to any of

other the types of leave listed by Plaintiffs with respect

to the duration of the leave, purpose of the leave, and a

pilot’s ability to schedule the leave. [See Doc. 178-2 at

11-14]. As Defendant correctly notes, USERRA entitles

employees on MLOA to the same non-seniority-based

benefits afforded to “employees having similar seniority,

status, and pay who are on furlough or leave[.]” See

38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(B). The corresponding federal

regulation, promulgated by DOL, instructs that “[i]f the

non-seniority benefits to which employees on furlough or

leave of absence are entitled vary according to the type

of leave, the employee must be given the most favorable

treatment accorded to any comparable form of leave when

he or she performs service in the uniformed services.”

See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(b) (emphasis added); see also id.

§ 1002.150(c) (“As a general matter, accrual of vacation

leave is considered to be a non-seniority benefit that must

55a

Appendix B

be provided by an employer to an employee on a [MLOA]

only if the employer provides that benefit to similarly

situated employees on comparable leaves of absence.”).

To determine whether MLOA is “comparable” to another

form of leave, the Court should consider (1) “the duration

of the leave” (which “may be the most significant factor

to compare”), (2) “the purpose of the leave[,]” and (3) “the

ability of the employee to choose when to take the leave[.]”

Id. § 1002.150(b).

Defendant cites to two (2) recent federal cases that

addressed this very issue and held that MLOA is not

comparable to either jury duty or sick leave based on

the above factors.18 [Doc. 178-2 at 12-14] (citing Moss

v. United Airlines, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 768 (N.D. Ill.

2019), aff’d, 20 F.4th 375 (7th Cir. 2021) and Hoefert

v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 724 (N.D. Tex.

2020)). Additionally, Defendant contends that neither

“Association Business leave” nor sick leave are “leaves of

absence” (or furloughs) pursuant to the PWA govern

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