Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Neil Paul Noble, Petitioner v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles

FILED

JUL 3 0 2026

„.2fo-25l

3n tlje Supreme (Court ot tlie ®niteii States

Neil Paul Noble,

Petitioner,

c.

Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Neil Paul Noble

TDCJ# 02473212

Diboll Correctional Center

1604 S. 1st St.

Diboll, TX 75941

Pro Se Petitioner

July MMXXVI

United States Commercial Printing Company • www.uscpc.us • (202) 866-8558

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. What due process rights are Texas inmates en­

titled to during review for release to mandatory super­

vision under the Fourteenth Amendment?

2. Did the Texas Board of pardons and Paroles vi­

olate Noble’s Amendment due process rights when

they determined that Noble’s 2021 stalking conviction

constituted a crime of violence and/or had a vulnera­

ble victim?

3. Did the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles vi­

olate Noble’s Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights by considering Noble’s 2023 probation revoca­

tion when determining whether to release Noble to

Mandatory Supervision?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner, and plaintiff-appellant below is Neil

Paul Noble.

Respondent, and defendant-appellee below is the

Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Additional defendant below is the Texas Depart­

ment of Criminal Justice, and is not a respondent to

the instant petition.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (WD Tex.):

Neil Paul Noble v. Texas Board of Pardons and

Paroles; Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

No. l:25-cv-01303—ADA (Sep. 17, 2025) (dis­

missal)

United States Court of Appeals (CA5):

Neil Paul Noble v. Texas Board of Pardons and

Paroles; Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

No. 25-50809 (May 5, 2026) (district court af­

firmed)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented.......... ............................................... i

Parties to the Proceedings........................................

ii

Related Proceedings......................................................... ii

Table of Authorities.................................

vi

Opinions Below................... ................................. '............. 1

Jurisiction............................................................................ 1

Constitutional Provisions Involved........................

1

Statement................................................................

6

I.

Stalking Conviction.... .............. '......................6

II.

Probation............................................................. 7

III.

Denial of Release to Mandatory Super­

vision..............................................

9

Reasons for Granting thePetition...........................

9

I.

Parole Not Still in Experimental Stage.......9

II.

Allen Leaves Opening for Greater Due

Process Protections........................................ 11

III.

Eldrige Leaves Oepning for Due Process

Right of Fairness............................................. 11

IV.

Munoz Leaves Opening for Substantive Due

Process........................................... :................... 11

V.

Zadvydas Leaves an Opening for Court

Review of Denials..........................

12

Texas has Jury Instruction on Parole

Eligibility...................

...12

VI.

VII-

Texas Parole Release Data............................. 13

IV

VIII. Due Process Rights Evolve Over Time......13

IX.

Evolution of Due Process Rights for Parole

14

A.

Chronology of this Court’s Rulings.... 14

B.

Parole Discontinued in Federal System

for New Crimes....................

.....15

X.

Nature of the Offense is the Most Important

Factor in Release Determination................ 16

XI.

Noble’s 2021 Stalking Conviction...............16

XII.

A.

Classification is Arbitrary and Unfair 16

B.

Not a Crime of Violence........................ 17

Ankle Monitor and House Arrest Condition

of Probation Unconstitutional..................... 19

XIII. History of Parole................

24

A.

Texas......................................................... 24

B.

Federal...............................

C.

Older Cases Involving Other States—13

Examples.................................................. 26

D.

Mandatory Release Statute................. 27

E.

Cases Finding Denial of Parole

Arbitrary................................................... 29

25

XIV.

Due Process Case Law................................... 30

XV.

Danger to the Public Case Law....................32

XVI.

Rulings from Other United States Courts of

Appeals.............................................................. 35

XVII. Use of Artificial Intelligence in Making

Parole Release Determinations.................... 36

XVIII. Other Shock the Conscience Factors....... ..38

A.

Analogy to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine 38

B.

Arbitrary and Unjust Standard........... 38

Conclusion........................................................................ 38

Appendix

Appendix A

Opinion [not precedential], United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Neil Paul Noble

v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles; Texas De­

partment of Criminal Justice,

No. 25-50809 (May 5, 2026)....................

App-1

Appendix B

Order [dismissal of complaint], United States

District Court for the Western District of Texas,

Neil Paul Noble v. Texas Board of Pardons and

Paroles; Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

No. l:25-cv-01303-ADA (Sep. 17, 2025)..... App-5

VI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Addington v. Texas,

441 U.S. 418 (1979)...............................................33

Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266 (1994)...............................................12

Allee v. State,

Nos. 07-15-00246-CR and 07-15-00286-CR (Tex.

App. Apr. 13, 2016)......

22

Andrews v. Smith,

93 S. W. 2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)...

24

Baca v. Owens,

293 Fed. Appx. 247 (CA5 2008)..................... ....34-35

Ball v. Bohenski,

No. 1:25-CV—01293 (MD Pa. Sept. 12, 2025)... 36

Bank of Columbia v. Okely,

4 Wheat. 235 (1819)..............................

31

Barclay v. Florida,

463 U.S. 939 (1983)..........

30

Barnes v. Wenerowicz,

280 F. R.D. 206 (ED Pa. 2012).....................

29

Bevers v. Mabry,

No. 05-22-00713-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 7,

2024)........................................................................

Block v. Potter,

631 F. 2d 233 (CA3 1980).................................... 35

Board of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369 (1987)............................ 11, 15, 28, 31

7

vii

Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best

Freight System, Inc.,

419 U. S. 281 (1974)...............................

31

Boyd v. State,

899 S. W. 2d 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1995)........................................................

18

Bradford v. Weinstein,

519 F. 2d 728 (CA4 1974) ................................. ....28

Broadcast Music v. CBS,

441 U.S. 1 (1979).................................................... 11

Brown v. Mississippi,

297 U.S. 278 (1936)........................................ ?...... 32

Clark v. Orabona,

59 F. 2d 187 (CAI 1932)...............................

27

Coleman v. Dretke,

395 F. 3d 216 (CA5 2004)...................................... 20

Couch v. State,

245 S. W. 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922)................. 26

County of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U. S. 833 (1998)...... ........................... ...... 29, 32

Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327 (1986)......

.31

Department of State v. Munoz,

602 U. S. 899 (2024)......

11

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,

597 U.S. 215 (2022)........................................ 12, 31

Dreyer v. Illinois,

187 U.S. 71 (1902).................................................. 26

viii

Dufur v. United States Parole Commission,

34 F. 4th 1090 (CADC 2022)........ i................ 28, 35

Ex parte Carroll,

217 S. W. 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919).................27

Ex parte Evans,

338 S. W. 3d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)............... 20

Ex parte Good,

No. 05-22-01229-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas June 20,

2023)...................................

23

Ex parte Irsan,

No. 01—16—00315—CR (Tex. App.-Houston [1st

Dist.] Feb. 28, 2017).................................................... 23

Ex parte Nelson,

209 S. W. 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919)................. 24

Ex parte Randell,

257 S.W. 1101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1924):............. 27

Ex parte Retzlaff,

135 S. W. 3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)........... 24, 29

Finley v. California,

222 U.S. 28 (1911)................................................. 26

Foucha v. Louisiana,

504 U.S. 71 (1992).................................................33

Franklin v. Shields,

569 F. 2d 784 (CA4 1977)............................... 28-29

Fross v. County of Allegheny,

612 F. Supp. 2d 651 (WD Pa. 2009).................

27

Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

411 U.S. 778 (1973)................................................ 14

Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38 (2007)...................................................20

Garafola v. Benson,

505 F. 2d 1212 (CA7 1974).................................... 36

Garcia v. Neagle,

660 F. 2d 983 (CA4 1981)........................

25

Gardner v. State,

699 S. W. 2d 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)..... 17-18

Gerstein v. Pugh,

420 U.S. 103 (1975)...........

20

Gideon v. Wainwright,

372 U.S. 335 (1963)............................................... 14

Gille v. Emmons,

58 Kan. 118 (1897).....................................

38

Glover v. Wahl,

No. 4:24—CV-02073 (MD Pa. Aug. 11, 2025).....36

Goldsmith v. Aderholt,

44 F. 2d 166 (CA5 1930)...........

36

Grady v. North Carolina,

575 U.S. 306 (2015).............................

20

Graham v. West Virginia,

224 U.S. 616 (1912)................................................ 26

Green v. Castillo,

807 F. 3d 905 (CA8 2015)................................ .....36

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correc­

tional Complex,

442 U. S. 1 (1979)............... 9-11, 15-16, 28, 35, 38

X

Guerrero v. Barr,

589 U.S. 221 (2020)..................

12

Halligan v. Marcil,

208 F. 403 (CA9 1913)........................................... 25

Harrington v. Almy,

977 F. 2d 37 (CAI 1992)........................................ 32

Harris v. United States,

404U.S. 1232 (1971)......................................... ....34

Harrison v. Snook,

22 F. 2d 169 (ND Ga. 1927)...................................27

Hatfield v. Pennsylvania Board of Parole,

No. 3:24—CV—1531 (MD Pa. Sept. 17, 2025)......36

Hitt v. McLane,

854 Fed. Appx. 591 (CA5 2021).........

32

Hughes v. Pflanz,

138 F. 980 (CA6 1905).......................................... 26

Hurtado v. California,

110 U.S. 516 (1884)............................................... 31

In re Commitment of Fisher,

164 S. W. 3d 637 (Tex. 2005)................................ 33

In re Commitment of Stoddard,

619 S. W. 3d 665 (Tex. 2020)................................ 34

In re Naples,

142 F. 781 (ND Ohio 1905)................................... 26

Johnson v. United States,

576 U.S. 591 (2015)

....................................16

Johnson v. United States,

559 U.S. 133 (2010)............................................... 17

XI

Johnson v. United States,

529 U.S. 694 (2000)................................................ 35

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123 (1951).................... :.......................... 11

Jurek v. Texas,

428 U.S. 262 (1976)................................................ 14

Kansas v. Crane,

534 U.S. 407 (2002)..

..33

Kansas v. Hendricks,

521 U.S. 346 (1997).......................................

33

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,

312 U.S. 144 (1963).......

34

Kerry v. Din,

576 U. S. 86 (2015)..

31

Kindred v. Spears,

894 F. 2d 1477 (CA5 1990).................................... 31

Klopfer v. North Carolina,

386 U.S. 213 (1967)............

.......14

Lee v. Aderhold,

5 F. Supp. 950 (ND Ga. 1933)....

27

Lundy v. State,

Nos. 05-09-01192-CR and 05-09-01193-CR

(Tex. App.-Dallas May 27, 2010).............

20

Luquis v. State,

72 S. W. 3d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)............. 25

Luther v. Molina,

627 F. 2d 71 (CA7 1980).......

...35

xii

Malloy v. Hogan,

378 U.S. 1 (1964).................................................... 14

Martinez v. State,

130 S. W. 3d 95 (Tex. App. 2003)......................... 22

Massachusetts Correctional Institute v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445 (1985)................................................ 15

Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U. S. 319 (1976)......................................... 11, 30

Mathis v. State,

424 S. W. 3d 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)............. 22

Mayes v. Trammell,

751 F. 2d 175 (CA6 1984)......................................29

Medina n. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic,

388 U.S. 357 (2026)...

13

Monroe v. Pape,

365 U.S. 167 (1961)...............................

13

Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U. S. 471 (1972).....................

Mugler v. Kansas,

~ 123 U.S. 623 (1887)........

10, 14, 35

31

Noble v. State,

No. 05-21-00326-CR

(Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 1, 2022).................... 7, 17, 20

Olim v. Wakinekona,

461 U.S. 238 (1983)................................................ 31

People v. Tovilla,

No. B318970 (Cal. App. Feb. 14, 2023).............. 22

xiii

Peugh v. United States,

569 U.S. 530 (2013)................................................ 16

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,

505 U.S. 833 (1992)

....

31

Priore v. Nelson,

• 626 F. 2d 211 (CA2 1980)..............................

36

Reno v. Flores,

507 U.S. 292 (1993)................................................ 30

Robles v. Dennison,

745 F. Supp. 2d 244 (WDNY 2010)................29-30

Rochin v. California,

342 U.S. 165 (1952)................................................ 32

Rummel v. Estelle,

445 U.S. 263 (1980).............................................. 35

Schall v. Martin,

467 U.S. 253 (1984)............................................... 34

Sellers v. United States,

89 S. Ct. 36 (1968).............

34

Sheets v. Davoult,

No. 2:25-cv-130-KCD-DNF

(MD Fla. Apr. 9, 2026)........................................ ...12

State v. Christensen,

No. A23-1223 (Minn. App. Aug. 5, 2024).......... 22

State v. Keever,

2012-Ohio-4643 (Ohio App. 2012)..................... 21

State v. Sterling,

No. 26-AP-222 (Vt. July 10, 2026)...................... 19

XIV

Stevens v. Commonwealth,

No. 2014—CA-001114—MR

(Ky. App. Feb. 19, 2016)........................................ 27

Swarthout v. Cooke,

562 U.S. 216 (2011).........................................15, 29

Teague v. Quarterman,

482 F. 3d 769 (CA5 2007)...................................... 13

Thomas v. Montgomery,

140 F. 4th 335 (CA6 2025).........................

Ughbanks v. Armstrong,

208 U. S. 481 (1908)........

37

...26

United States ex rel. Humphries v. Hunt,

15 F. Supp. 608 (WD NY 1936)..........

27

United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220(2005)..

15

United States v. Comstock,

560 U.S. 126 (2010)..................................

33

United States v. Davis,

588 U.S. 445 (2019)............................................... 16

United States v. Dodson,

No. 22-3998 (CA6 Feb. 21, 2024)....

21

United States v. Fortson,

642 F. Supp. 3d 639 (ND Ohio 2022)................... 23

United States v. Hathorn,

920 F. 3d 982 (CA5 2019)..................................... 21

United States v. Haymond,

588 U.S. 634(2024)............................................... 16

XV

United States v. Hir,

517 F. 3d 1081 (CA9 2008).................................... 21

United States v. Lambics,

897 F. 3d 368 (CA2 2018)................................ 21-22

United States v. Lambics,

251 F. Supp. 3d 470 (EDNY 2017).................. .....21

United States v. Microsoft,

253 F. 3d 34 (CADC 2001)............................... 10-11

United States v. Proffit,

304 F. 3d 1001 (CA10 2002).................................. 18

United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez,

775 F. 3d 706 (CA5 2015)....................................... 17

United States v. Salerno,

481 U. S. 739 (1987)

12, 30, 32, 34

United States v. Smith,

115 F. 4th 370 (CA5 2024)............

;.............. 18

United States v. Taylor,

596 U.S. 845 (2022)..............

17

United States v. Topco,

405 U.S. 596 (1972)................................................. 11

Wallace v. Christensen,

802 F. 2d 1539 (CA9 1986).................................... 35

Wilkinson v. Dotson,

544 U.S. 74(2005)..........................

15

Williams v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole,

661 F. 2d 697 (CA8 1981)...................................... 28

Wolfv. Colorado,

338 U.S. 25 (1949).........................................

13

XVI

Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539 (1974)

14, 30

Woodson v. State,

191 S. W. 3d 280

(Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.)

20

Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678 (2001)

12

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules

U. S. Const., Arndt. IV

19-20

U. S. Const., Amdt. V

........................................... 14

U. S. Const., Amdt. VI

14

U. S. Const., Amdt. VIII

19, 34

U. S. Const., Amdt. XIV

................1, 13-14, 31-32

Tex. Const., Art. I, §lld

............... 34

18 U.S.C. §92

16-17

18 U.S.C. §3142

18 U.S.C. §3145

18 U.S.C. §3583

.................................. ...32

.............................

32

..................................................... 21

Former 18 U. S. C. §§4201-4218

...................... 25

Former 18 U. S. C. §4206

28

18 U.S. C. §4247

33

18 U.S.C. §4248

33

28 U.S.C. §1254

......................................................1

28 U.S.C. §2254

29

42 U.S.C. §1983 ..............................

13, 15

xvii

Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819............... 25

Armed Career Criminal Act...................................... 16

Bail Reform Act of 1984............................................. ...32

Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976,

Pub. L. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219.....................................25

Sentencing Reform Act of 1987..................................... 15

28 C. F. R. §2.20.......................

25

U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §3A1.1............ 18

Neb. Rev. Stat. §83-1,114...........................................28

Nev. Rev. Stat. §213.1215.......

..28

Ohio Rev. Stat. §2102 (1892)........................................ 26

S. C. Crim. Code §969 (1922)........................................ 27

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 37.07......

12

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 62.001................

19

Tex. Govt. Code §498.003.............................................. 24

Tex. Govt. Code §508.145 .................................

1

Tex. Govt. Code §508.147.......... .................. 1-2, 24, 29

Tex. Govt. Code §508.149.....................................2-4, 24

Tex. Health & Safety Code §841.001 ..........................33

Tex. Penal Code §22.04................... 18

Tex. Penal Code §38.112.................. 9

Tex. Penal Code §42.07............. 4-5, 7, 17

Tex. Penal Code §42.072............... 5-7, 17

Tex. Penal Code §46.05................... 17

xviii

Other Authorities

American Civil Liberties Union, Rethinking Elec­

tronic Monitoring: A Harm Reduction Guide 6-8

(Sept. 2022)

....................................... 23

Peter B. Hoffman, Federal Parole Guidelines: Three

Years of Experience 10 (U. S. Board of Parole Re­

search Unit Rep. No. 10, Nov. 1975)................... 25

The Echo Texas Prison Newspaper, Nov./Dec. 2025

Edition........................................................

13

“How IBM Became an Al Darling,” The Economist,

Jan. 31, 2026, p. 60.................................... ............37

OPINIONS BELOW

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion is reproduced in the Ap­

pendix at App. 1-4. The Western District of Texas’

dismissal order is reproduced in the Appendix at

App. 5-13.

JURISICTION

The Fifth Circuit’s decision was entered on May 5,

2026. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.

§1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth amend­

ment to the United States Constitution, in relevant

part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States. Nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process.”

U. S. Const., Arndt. XIV, §1.

Tex. Govt. Code §508.145, in relevant part:

“(f) Except as provided by Section 508.146, any

other inmate is eligible for release on parole when

the inmate’s actual calendar time served plus

good conduct time equals one-fourth of the sen­

tence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less.”

Tex. Gov. Code §508.145(f).

Tex. Govt. Code §508.147:

“(a)

Except as provided by Subsection (a-1)

and Section 508.149, a parole panel shall order

the release of an inmate who is not on parole to

mandatory supervision when the actual calendar

time the inmate has served plus any accrued good

2

conduct time equals the term to which the inmate

was sentenced.

(a—1) An inmate serving a sentence for an of­

fense punishable under Section 49.09(b—2)(2), Pe­

nal Code, may not be released to mandatory su­

pervision unless:

(1) the inmate’s actual calendar time

served, without consideration of good con­

duct time, equals at least 10 years; and

(2) the inmate is otherwise eligible for re­

lease under Subsection (a).

(b) An inmate released to mandatory super­

vision is considered to be released on parole.

(c) To the extent practicable, arrangements

for the inmate’s proper employment, mainte­

nance, and care must be made before the inmate’s

release to mandatory supervision.” Tex. Gov.

Code §508.147.

Tex. Govt. Code §508.149:

“(a) An inmate may not be released to man­

datory supervision if the inmate is serving a sen­

tence for or has been previously convicted of:

(1) an offense for which the judgment con­

tains an affirmative finding under Article

42A.054(c) or (d), Code of Criminal Procedure;

(2) a first degree felony or a second degree

felony under Section 19.02, Penal Code;

(3) a capital felony under Section 19.03,

Penal Code;

(4) a first degree felony or a second degree

felony under Section 20.04, Penal Code;

(5) an offense under Section 21.11, Penal

Code;

3

(6) a felony under Section 22.011, Penal

Code;

(7) a first degree felony or a second degree

felony under Section 22.02, Penal Code;

(8) a first degree felony under Section

22.021, Penal Code;

(9) a first degree felony under Section

22.04, Penal Code;

(10) a first degree felony under Section

28.02, Penal Code;

(11) a second degree felony under Section

29.02, Penal Code;

(12) a first degree felony under Section

29.03, Penal Code;

(13) a first degree felony under Section

30.02, Penal Code;

(14) a felony for which the punishment is

increased under Section 481.134 or 481.140,

Health and Safety Code;

(15) an offense under Section 43.25, Penal

Code;

(16) an offense under Section 21.02, Penal

Code;

(17) a first degree felony under Section

15.03, Penal Code;

(18) an offense under Section 43.05, Penal

Code;

(19) an offense under Section 20A.02, Pe­

nal Code;

(20) an offense under Section 20A.03, Pe­

nal Code;

(21) a first degree felony under Section

71.02 or 71.023, Penal Code;

4

(22) an offense under Section 481.1123,

Health and Safety Code, punished under

Subsection (d), (e), or (f) of that section;

(23) a second degree felony under Section

22.01, Penal Code;

(24) an offense under Section 22.01, Penal

Code, punished under Subsection (b)(2), (7),

or (8) of that section; or

(25) an offense under Section 21.03, Penal

Code

(b) An inmate may not be released to man­

datory supervision if a parole panel determines

that:

(1) the inmate’s accrued good conduct

time is not an accurate reflection of the in­

mate’s potential for rehabilitation; and

(2) the inmate’s release would endanger

the public.

(c) A parole panel that makes a determina­

tion under Subsection (b) shall specify in writing

the reasons for the determination.

(d) A determination under Subsection (b) is

not subject to administrative or judicial review,

except that the parole panel making the determi­

nation shall reconsider the inmate for release to

mandatory supervision at least twice during the

two years after the date of the determination.”

Tex. Gov. Code §508.149.

Tex. Penal Code §42.07, in relevant part:

“(a) A person commits an offense if, with in­

tent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or

embarrass another, the person:

(1) initiates communication and in the

course of the communication makes a com­

ment, request, suggestion, or proposal that is

obscene;

[• • •]

(7) sends repeated electronic communica­

tions in a manner reasonably likely to harass,

annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or

offend anotherf.]”

Tex. Pen. Code §§

42.07(a)(1) and (a)(7).

Tex. Penal Code §42.072:

(a)

A person commits an offense if the per­

son, on more than one occasion and pursuant to

the same scheme or course of conduct that is di­

rected at a specific other person, knowingly en­

gages in conduct that:

(1) constitutes an offense under Section

42.07, or that the actor knows or reasonably

should know the other person will regard as

threatening:

(A) bodily injury or death for the

other person; or

(B) that an offense will be committed

against:

(i) a member of the other per­

son’s family or household;

(ii) an individual with whom

the other person has a dating rela­

tionship; or

(iii) the other person’s property;

(2) causes the other person, a member of

the other person’s family or household, or an

6

individual with whom the other person has a

dating relationship:

(A) to be placed in fear of bodily in­

jury or death or in fear that an offense

will be committed against the other per­

son, a member of the other person’s fam­

ily or household, or an individual with

whom the other person has a dating re­

lationship, or the other person’s property;

or

(B) to feel harassed, terrified, intimi­

dated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tor­

mented, embarrassed, or offended; and

(3) would cause a reasonable person under cir­

cumstances similar to the circumstances of the

other person to:

(A) fear bodily injury or death for the

person;

(B) fear that an offense will be com­

mitted against a member of the person’s

family or household or an individual

with whom the person has a dating rela­

tionship;

(C) fear that an offense will be com­

mitted against the person’s property; or

(D) feel harassed, terrified, intimi­

dated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tor­

mented, embarrassed, or offended.

STATEMENT

I.

Stalking Conviction

Noble was convicted of stalking by a jury on May 3,

2021. See Tex. Penal Code 42.072. Noble agreed to a

7

sentence of four years to probation which turned out

to be a sentence of ten years probated over four years.

The victim was a 40 year old female criminal de­

fense lawyer who worked previously as a prosecutor

for 14 years for the Dallas County District Attorney’s

office and still had contacts there. She was the lead

named partner at a criminal defense law firm with a

office in the part of town where Noble lived. She was

married.

On direct appeal, the appellate court said that the

jury had to find Noble guilty harassment under Penal

Code 42.07 to find Noble guilty of stalking under

42.072. The Court of Appeals of Texas did not identify

any acts of assault or threats. Noble v. State, No. 05—

21-00326-CR, (Tex. App.—Dallas, Dec. 1, 2022).

Harassment is a Class B Misdemeanor with a sen­

tencing range of 0 to 6 months. Stalking is a Third

Degree Felony with a sentencing range of 2 to 10 years.

The Texas stalking statute prohibits two categories

of conduct: (1) conduct constituting an offense under

the harassment statute; and (2) conduct that the actor

knows or reasonably should know the other person

will regard as threatening bodily injury, death, or a

property offense. Bevers v. Mabry, No. 05-22-00713CV, slip op., at 7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 7, 2024).

IL

Probation

Probation was revoked on September 29, 2023. No­

ble cut off an ankle monitor on August 25, 2023. Noble

was forced to wear the ankle monitor for over 2 years

while on probation (about twenty-five and a half

months).

Noble’s

physical

health

had

deteriorated

significantly while Noble was on probation. Noble

8

gained 25 pounds. Noble’s blood pressure was above

150 over 90 when Noble was arrested on August 25,

2023 (155 over 93 I recollect). Noble’s cholesterol and

diabetes readings were above the normal ranges. No­

ble had a preexisting heart condition, a thickened/enlarged heart thought to be caused by high blood pres­

sure and being overweight.

Noble was not able to exercise adequately due to the

GPS ankle monitor. Noble needs regular cardiovascu­

lar exercise. CDC guidelines currently recommend

150 minutes per week, or 75 minutes of rigorous exer­

cise per week.

Noble has complained for many years about toxic

gas containing butane being pumped into Noble’s res­

idence. Prolonged exposure to butane can elevate

blood pressure. The gas also caused severe hunger

cravings similar to anti-psychotic medication which

contributed to the weight gain.

“[G]ot butane in my veins” is a lyric from the song

Loser by musician Beck

The ankle monitor was not part of the initial condi­

tions of probation that Noble signed in the morning on

May 4, 2023. Noble was called back down to the court

in the afternoon on May 4, 2023. Condition #20 was

added without an intervening violation. The condi­

tion required a house arrest, a GPS ankle monitor,

and intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment

for the full 4 years of probation. The Clerk’s Record

from the trial court is on file with the Court of Appeals

of Texas.

Noble cut the ankle monitor off before a new law

took effect on September 1, 2023 making it a new

crime to tamper with an ankle monitor. The new

9

charge is a State Jail Felony (6 months to 2 years). It

is a Third Degree

Felony is the person is under intensive supervision.

See Tex. Penal Code 38.112.

III.

Denial of Release to Mandatory

Supervision

Noble was denied release to Mandatory Supervision

by the Parole Board in June, 2025. Noble’s release

date would have been July 25, 2025. Noble’s projected

release date is now February 16, 2031. Noble could

have to serve 5 1/2 more years in jail due to the denial

of release. The Parole Board denied Noble release to

Mandatory Supervision for a second time in April,

2026.

The written denial of release provided 5 reasons.

The following two reasons are at issue in this Petition:

1. The record indicates that the instant offense

has elements of brutality, violence, assaultive behav­

ior, or conscious selection of a victim’s vulnerability

such that offender poses a continuing threat to public

safety;

2. The record indicates unsuccessful periods of su­

pervision on probation, parole, or mandatory supervi­

sion that resulted in incarceration.

This was Noble’s only revocation.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

Parole Not Still in Experimental Stage

Greenholtz limited an inmate’s due process rights

under Nebraska’s mandatory release statute to notice

of review and opportunity to be heard and a written

10

statement of reasons for denial. Greenholtz v. Ne­

braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979).

However, Greenholtz gave great deference to the

judgment of the Parole Board because parole was in

an experimental stage and involves a predictive judg­

ment about what is in the best interests of the inmate

and the community. Greenholtz, 442 U. S., at 8.

It is not clear what Greenholtz meant by parole be­

ing in an experimental stage. Parole has been used

since the early 1900’s at both the federal and state

level. The state mandatory release statutes were new

in the 1970’s. There was a revision to federal parole

law in 1976 that wanted less court review, but parole

was discontinued for new crimes in the federal system

in 1987 due to sentencing disparities.

Release of prisoners on parole has become an inte­

gral part of the penological system. Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 477 (1972).

Noble urges this Court to reevaluate what due pro­

cess rights inmates should be entitled to under man­

datory release statutes as well as regular/discretionary parole. Courts do have the capability to review

denials of release on parole for due process violations.

The Texas Release to Mandatory Supervision statute

was enacted 49 years ago in 1977. Courts have expe­

rience in determining whether person’s release will

pose a danger to the community in bail review and

mental health cases.

Noble draws an analogy to antitrust law on court

review. In antitrust law, this Court has said that it is

only after considerable experience with certain busi­

ness practices that courts could classify them as per

se violations rather than conducting a more thorough

review under rule of reason standard. United States

11

v. Microsoft, 253 F. 3d 34, 90 (CADC 2001) (citing

Broadcast Music v. CBS, 441 U. S. 1, 9 (1979), also cit­

ing United States v. Topco, 405 U. S. 596, 607—608

(1972).

II.

Allen Leaves Opening for Greater Due

Process Protections

Allen was a due process challenge to Montana’s

mandatory release statute. This Court affirmed the

Ninth Circuit’s remand of the case to the District

Court to determine the Due Process rights that should

apply. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369 (1987).

This implies that the Greenholtz rights were not

necessarily sufficient. Noble could not find any further

federal rulings in Allen.

III.

Eldrige Leaves Oepning for Due Process

Right of Fairness

Government action depriving a person of a liberty

interest must be implemented in a fair manner.

Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976).

A democratic government must practice fairness

and fairness can rarely be obtained by a secret, one­

sided determination of facts decisive of rights. Joint

Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S.

123,170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

IV.

Munoz Leaves Opening for Substantive

Due Process

The Court said it has not yet had to decide whether

there is any liberty interest to which only procedural

due process applies, but not substantive due process.

Department of States. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 910-911

(2024).

12

The Court has been reluctant to expand the concept

of substantive due process, but that applies more to

social issues such as abortion. See Albright v. Oliver,

510 U. S. 266, 271-272 (1994) and Dobbs v. Jackson

Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215 (2022).

V.

Zadvydas Leaves an Opening for Court

Review of Denials

The Constitution may preclude granting an admin­

istrative body unreviewable authority to make a de­

termination regarding fundamental rights. Zadvydas

v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 690 (2001).

Executive determinations are generally subject to

judicial review. Guerrero v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 229

(2020).

Due process challenge to one-year ban from City

Hall survived motion to dismiss because the city did

not have an appeals process. Procedural due process

ruling. Sheets v. Davoult, No. 2:25-cv—130-KCDDNF (MD Fla., Apr. 9, 2026)

Substantive Due Process rights to court review are

available in immigration cases, Zadvydas, and bail

determinations. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S.

739, 746 (1987).

VI.

Texas has Jury Instruction on Parole

Eligibility

Texas requires a jury instruction on parole eligibil­

ity during the penalty phase of a felony case. See Tex.

Code of Crim. Proc. §37.07(4)(c).

The dissent in Greeholtz said 88% of judges sur­

veyed consider the availability of parole when impos­

ing the sentence and 47% acknowledge they expect

13

defendants to be released after serving one-third of

their sentence. 442 U. S., at 30 (MARSHALL, J., dis­

senting).

VII.

Texas Parole Release Data

In 2024, the release rate was 39% for regular parole

and 45% for mandatory release. For non-violent

crimes, the rate was 44% for regular parole and 48%

for mandatory release. The Parole Board reviewed

66,204 inmates for regular parole and 16,365 inmates

for mandatory release. See The Echo Texas Prison

Newspaper, November/December 2025 Edition.

Noble argues that the release rate for release to

mandatory supervision should be higher.

The post 1996 Texas mandatory supervision

scheme is mandatory in large part, discretionary in

small part. Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F. 3d 769, 775

(CA5 2007).

VIII. Due Process Rights Evolve Over Time

Due process rights evolve over time as societal

norms change. Populations tend to become more civi­

lized over time so due process protections increase.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), broadened li­

ability under section 1983 and the Court has contin­

ued to broaden application of the Due Process Clause

and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Me­

dina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 388 U. S.

357, 388-93 (2026) (THOMAS J., concurring).

It is for the Courts to draw the line on application

of due process by the gradual application of inclusion

and exclusion. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27

(1949).

14

In the 1960’s, the Court began making rights in the

1791 Bill of Rights (the First Ten Amendments to the

United States Constitution) applicable to criminal

prosecutions in state courts under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Gid­

eons. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amend­

ment right to counsel for indigent defendants); Malloy

v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment right

to freedom from self-incrimination); Klopfer v. North

Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment

right to a speedy trial).

IX.

Evolution of Due Process Rights for

Parole

A.

Chronology of this Court’s Rulings

Due process applies to parole revocation. Opinion

mentions living a relatively normal life while on pa­

role. Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 482.

Due process applies to probation revocation. Gag­

non v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973).

Due process applies to revocation of prison good

time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974).

Prediction of future criminal behavior is an essen­

tial element in many decisions in the criminal justice

system such as bail, sentencing, and parole. Jurek v.

Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274-275 (1976).

Due Process applies to parole release determina­

tions if there is a liberty interest in release. There is

a liberty interest in mandatory release but not release

on discretionary parole. A statute is mandatory re­

lease if the inmate must be released when certain cri­

teria are met such as serving a specified portion of the

sentence. Under procedural due process, inmates are

entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard and

15

a written statement of reasons for denial. Greenholtz,

442 U. S., at 14-16, n. 6.

The “some evidence” requirement applies to revoca­

tion of good time credits. Massachusetts Correctional

Institute v. Hill, 472 U. S. 445 (1985).

This Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s remand to

the District Court for a determination of due process

under the Montana Mandatory release statute. Allen,

482 U. S., at 372. Noble could not find any subsequent

rulings in the case.

Prisoner claims to render invalid state procedures

used to determine parole eligibility and suitability

were cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The Ohio

Parole Statute does not create a liberty interest. Wil­

kinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74 (2005).

The “some evidence” standard is not a component of

federal due process for state parole decisions even if a

liberty interest is involved. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562

U. S. 216, 220-221 (2011).

B.

Parole Discontinued in Federal

System for New Crimes

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1987 eliminated pa­

role in the Federal system for crimes committed after

the Act’s effective date and directed the U. S. Sentenc­

ing Commission to promulgate guidelines for sentenc­

ing. The changes were intended to reduce sentencing

disparities. The guidelines were mandatory at first,

but were made discretionary in United States v.

Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 245—246 (2005). The sentenc­

ing court must justify any deviation from the Guide­

lines range. The sentencing judge determines both

the term of imprisonment and the period of supervised

relief. The Guidelines sentencing range provides a

16

baseline for an appeal. On appeal, sentences are re­

viewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See

Peugh v. United States, 569 U. S. 530, 535—537 (2013).

18 U. S. C. §924(c) unconstitutionally vague.

Threatened long prison sentences. The case involves

the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act

and the definition of a “crime of violence”. Johnson v.

United States, 576 U. S. 591, 606 (2015); see also

United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 449, 470 (2019)

(invalidating §924(c)(3)(B)’s residual-clause definition

of “crime of violence” as unconstitutionally vague).

Courts rarely sentence defendants to the maximum

sentence. Only about 1% of the cases in federal court.

United States v. Haymond, 588 U. S. 634, 655 (2024).

X.

Nature of the Offense is the Most

Important Factor in Release

Determination

The gravity of the offense of incarceration, the in­

mate’s prison disciplinary record, and the inmate’s

prior criminal history are the most important factor in

the parole release determination. Greenholtz, 442

U. S., at 15.

XI.

Noble’s 2021 Stalking Conviction

A.

Classification is Arbitrary and Unfair

It is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and fundamen­

tally unfair for the Parole Board to consider Noble’s

2021 stalking conviction to be a crime of violence

and/or as having a vulnerable victim when making the

determination whether to release Noble to mandatory

supervision.

The Parole Board clearly did not consider the appro­

priate factors and legal standards.

17

B.

Not a Crime of Violence

In 2013, the Texas stalking statute was amended to

make a misdemeanor harassment offense under Tex.

Penal Code 42.07 sufficient to support a stalking con­

viction under Tex. Penal Code 42.072.

The statute now prohibits a course of conduct that

constitutes an offense under 42.07 OR that the actor

knows or reasonably should know that the victim will

regard as threatening bodily injury, death, or property

damage. See § 42.072(a)(1).

There is nothing in the Court of Appeals of Texas’

ruling on direct appeal that supports a crime of vio­

lence determination. No acts of assault. No true

threats of bodily injury or death. See Noble, supra.

A federal felony qualifies as a “crime of violence” un­

der 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(A) if it “has as an element

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person or property of another.”

United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845, 848 (2022).

“Physical force” means “violent force—that is, force ca­

pable of causing physical pain or injury to another

person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 140

(2010).

The Fifth Circuit held that a conviction under the

Texas stalking statute, as narrowed by the indictment,

was not a crime of violence under the applicable Sen­

tencing Guideline. United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 775 F. 3d 706, 712-713 (CA5 2015).

Under former Tex. Penal Code §46.05, whether a

burglary involved an act of violence depended on the

facts and circumstances of the particular case. Gard­

ner v. State, 699 S. W. 2d 831, 836 (Tex. Crim. App.

18

1985); Boyd v. State, 899 S. W. 2d 371, 374 and n. 3, 5

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995).

The victim is clearly not a vulnerable victim. She

was 40 years old. She worked as a prosecutor for the

Dallas County District Attorney’s Office for 14 years

and still has contacts there. She is married.

Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a vulner­

able victim means a person who is unusually vulner­

able due to age, physical or mental condition, or who

is otherwise particularly susceptible to criminal con­

duct. The enhancement applies to offenses in which

the defendant knew or should have known of the vic­

tim’s unusual vulnerability. USSG §3A1.1(b)(1), com­

ment. (n. 2).

A vulnerable victim means a person who is unusu­

ally vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condi­

tion, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to

criminal conduct. A vulnerable victim has an im­

paired capacity to detect or prevent a crime or is less

able to resist than the typical victim. United States v.

Smith, 115 F. 4th 370, 376-377 (CA5 2024).

The vulnerable-victim enhancement is reserved for

exceptional cases in which the victim is unusually vul­

nerable or particularly susceptible to the crime and

unable to protect himself or herself. United States v.

Proffit, 304 F. 3d 1001, 1007 (CA10 2002).

Tex. Penal Code §22.04 prohibits injury to a child,

elderly individual, or disabled individual. It defines a

child as a person 14 years of age or younger and an

elderly individual as a person 65 years of age or older.

Stalking statutes in many other States contain a

sentencing enhancement if the victim is under 18. No­

ble included a list in the April 2025 parole package

submitted to the Parole Board and the District Court.

19

Defendant was held without bail pending trial on a

charge of aggravated stalking while possessing a

deadly weapon. The Supreme Court of Vermont re­

versed. State v. Sterling, No. 26-AP-222, slip op., at 1,

9 (Vt. July 10, 2026). The court held that aggravated

stalking is not a felony containing an element involv­

ing an act of violence. The offense may be established

by a course of conduct that solely interferes with prop­

erty, and its mens rea may be satisfied by proof that

the defendant “should have known” the conduct would

cause harm. IcL, at 4-6. To hold a defendant without

bail, the State must establish by clear and convincing

evidence both that the defendant’s release poses a

substantial threat of physical violence to any person

and that no condition or combination of conditions of

release will reasonably prevent the violence. Id., at 4,

6-7.

XII.

Ankle Monitor and House Arrest

Condition of Probation Unconstitutional

Probation Condition No. 20 required house arrest

and a GPS ankle monitor for up to the full four years

of probation. Noble had worn the ankle monitor for

over two years on probation when Noble cut it off.

The use of ankle monitors can be challenged under

both the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable

search and the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unu­

sual punishment.

Stalking is not a sex offense in Texas. A stalking

conviction, standing alone, does not require registra­

tion. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 62.001(5), (6).

Stalking is not included among the offenses listed in

those provisions.

20

Courts have invalidated sex-offender conditions im­

posed on persons released on mandatory supervision

who had not been convicted of a sex offense. Coleman

v. Dretke, 395 F. 3d 216, 223—225 (CA5 2004); Ex parte

Evans, 338 S. W. 3d 545, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Use of ankle monitors as a condition of community

supervision in Texas stalking cases is not common.

Noble found only two cases, both of which involved

revocation for violations of monitoring conditions. See

Lundy v. State, Nos. 05—09—01192-CR and 05-0901193-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas May 27, 2010) (mem.

op., not designated for publication); Woodson v. State,

191 S. W. 3d 280, 283-284 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no

pet.).

The Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient

only for a misdemeanor-harassment violation. Noble,

supra.

Attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person’s

body without consent for the purpose of tracking that

person’s movements constitutes a search under the

Fourth Amendment. Grady v. North Carolina, 575

U. S. 306, 309-310 (2015). The Court did not approve

lifetime GPS monitoring; it remanded for the state

courts to determine whether the monitoring was rea­

sonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id.,

at 310-311.

Federal sentences are reviewed for reasonableness

under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United

States, 552 U. S. 38, 46, 51 (2007).

The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter­

mination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an ex­

tended restraint of liberty following a warrantless ar­

rest. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975).

21

Noble previously challenged the ankle monitor be­

fore this Court in Noble v. Texas, No. 22-980 (cert, de­

nied May 22, 2023).

A parole official testified that, in most cases, six

months would be a sufficient monitoring period.

United States v. Lambus, 897 F. 3d 368, 379—380 (CA2

2018).

A condition of supervised release cannot impose a

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably nec­

essary. United States v. Hathorn, 920 F. 3d 982, 984

(CA5 2019). See 18 U. S. C. §3583(d)(2).

Two conditions of supervised release were vacated.

United States v. Dodson, No. 22-3998, slip op., at 2228 (CA6 Feb. 21, 2024).

Pretrial detention may be justified where there is

an “unacceptably high risk” that the defendant will

not comply in good faith with proposed release condi­

tions. United States v. Hir, 517 F. 3d 1081, 1092-1093

(CA9 2008).

Even assuming that Noble could reasonably have

been required to wear an ankle monitor for a limited

period, there was no justification for requiring him to

wear one for the full four-year term of probation. No­

ble had already worn the monitor for over two years.

The district court reasoned that GPS surveillance

grows more problematic the longer it continues.

United States v. Lambus, 251 F. Supp. 3d 470, 495

(EDNY 2017), rev’d, 897 F. 3d 368 (CA2 2018).

Three counts of menacing arising from stalking con­

duct. Multiple victims. Five years’ probation. Ankle

monitor for the first year. State v. Keever, 2012-0hio4643, H 1-6 (Ohio App. 2012).

Stalking in violation of a protective order. Four-year

prison sentence, with execution suspended during

22

four years’ probation. Ankle monitor for the first six

months. A prior robbery conviction was alleged for en­

hancement purposes, but that allegation was dis­

missed. Peoples. Tovilla, No. B318970, slip op., at 23 (Cal. App. Feb. 14, 2023) (unpublished).

Harassment treated as a felony because of prior

qualifying domestic-violence-related convictions.

Sentenced to 23 months’ imprisonment, with execu­

tion stayed during three years’ probation. Thirty days

in jail or electronic home monitoring. State v. Chris­

tensen, No. A23-1223, slip op., at 4 (Minn. App. Aug.

5, 2024) (nonprecedential) (reversing the conviction

for insufficient evidence).

SCRAM alcohol-detection ankle monitor used for

the first two years of ten years’ probation. Sexual-as­

sault case. Mathis v. State, 424 S. W. 3d 89, 91—92

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

In less serious cases, ankle monitors are often im­

posed after violations.

A parole official testified that electronic monitoring

was used for recalcitrant parolees, short of returning

them to prison, as a graduated sanction. Lambus, 897

F. 3d, at 376.

Ankle monitor added for 60 to 180 days after com­

munity supervision was extended. Charges were pos­

session of methamphetamine and marihuana in a

drug-free zone. Allee v. State, Nos. 07—15-00246—CR

and 07-15-00286-CR, slip op., at 1—2 (Tex. App. Apr.

13, 2016) (mem. op.).

Electronic monitor added during community super­

vision for felony DWI. Martinez v. State, 130 S. W. 3d

95, 96-97 (Tex. App. 2003).

Ankle monitor added after a failed marijuana test

while Fortson was serving state supervision for

23

sexual-battery and drug-trafficking convictions.

United States v. Fortson, 642 F. Supp. 3d 639, 641642 (ND Ohio 2022).

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) pub­

lished a report on ankle monitors in September 2022.

The report concluded that electronic monitoring has

not demonstrably improved public safety and in­

creases the risk of technical violations that may re­

turn monitored persons to jail or prison. The report

also explained that electronic monitoring can impose

particular difficulties on persons with disabilities and

chronic health conditions. American Civil Liberties

Union, Rethinking Electronic Monitoring: A Harm Re­

duction Guide 6-8 (Sept. 2022).

Here are two rulings involving bail:

Bail of $500,000 was imposed in a stalking case.

The Court of Appeals initially held that amount exces­

sive and remanded for the trial court to set reasonable

bail. The court later withdrew that opinion and dis­

missed the appeal as moot after learning that the trial

court had already reduced bail to $150,000, which

Irsan posted. Ex parte Irsan, No. 01—16—00315—CR,

slip op., at 1-3 (Tex. App.—Houston[lst Dist.] Feb. 28,

2017) (mem. op.).

The case involved a GPS-monitor condition of bail

for a defendant charged with indecency with a child.

The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld the condition

and cited other cases involving alleged sexual offenses

against children. Ex parte Good, No. 05-22—01229CR, slip op., at 1-2, 8—10 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 20,

2023) (mem. op.).

24

XIII. History of Parole

A.

Texas

The first Texas case that Noble located that men­

tioned parole is Ex parte Nelson, 209 S. W. 148, 149

(Tex. Crim. App. 1919). Under the statute quoted

there, parole required approval of the Governor.

The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles was cre­

ated in 1929 (the year of the Great Depression). The

original act dated to 1905. Andrews v. Smith, 93 S. W.

2d 493, 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).

The current parole system in Texas incentivizes

good behavior in prison by allowing good-conduct time

to affect eligibility for parole or mandatory supervi­

sion. See Tex. Govt. Code §498.003(a).

The mandatory-supervision provision was enacted

in 1977. For eligible inmates, release was automatic.

Ex parte Retzlaff, 135 S. W. 3d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004); see Tex. Govt. Code §508.147. In 1987, inmates

convicted of certain serious offenses and inmates with

deadly-weapon findings became ineligible for manda­

tory supervision. Retzlaff, 135 S. W. 3d, at 48; see

Tex. Govt. Code § 508.149(a). In 1995, another limita­

tion was added for otherwise eligible inmates whose

accrued good-conduct time did not accurately reflect

their potential for rehabilitation and whose release

would endanger the public. Retzlaff, 135 S. W. 3d, at

48-49; Tex. Govt. Code § 508.149(b).

In Texas, good-conduct time applies only to eligibil­

ity for parole or mandatory supervision. It does not

otherwise reduce the length of the sentence. Tex.

Govt. Code § 498.003(a). For inmates convicted of cer­

tain offenses, good-conduct time does not advance

25

parole eligibility. Luquis v. State, 72 S. W. 3d 355, 362

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

B.

Federal

Federal parole for federalprisoners was established

by the Act of June 25, 1910, entitled “An Act to Parole

United States Prisoners, and for Other Purposes.” Act

of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819; Halligan v.

Marcil, 208 F. 403, 404 (CA9 1913).

The Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of

1976 was a major revision of federal parole law. Pub.

L. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219; see former 18 U. S. C. §§42014218. Substantive decisions to grant or deny parole

were committed to the Commission’s discretion and

were not reviewable for abuse of discretion. Garcia v.

Neagle, 660 F. 2d 983, 988—989 (CA4 1981); see former

18U.S.C. §4218(d).

Parole guidelines were established on a pilot basis

in October 1972 and extended to all federal parole-se­

lection decisions by the end of 1973. Peter B. Hoffman,

Federal Parole Guidelines: Three Years of Experience

10 (U. S. Board of Parole Research Unit Rep. No. 10,

Nov. 1975). Their purpose was to establish a national

paroling policy, promote a more consistent exercise of

discretion, and enable fairer and more equitable deci­

sionmaking. 28 C. F. R. § 2.20(a).

Confederate prisoners of war were released on pa­

role during the Civil War on condition that they not

return to combat until formally exchanged.

26

C.

Older Cases Involving Other States—

13 Examples

Ohio’s parole law appeared in §2102 of the Revised

Statutes of Ohio of 1892. In re Naples, 142 F. 781, 782

(ND Ohio 1905).

The Illinois Indeterminate Sentence Act, approved

April 21, 1899, provided for a system of parole. Dreyer

v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 75-76 (1902).

An Indiana prisoner was released on parole after

serving slightly more than four years of an indetermi­

nate sentence. Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 F. 980, 981, 983984 (CA6 1905).

Michigan enacted a new indeterminate-sentence

law on June 7, 1905, repealing its 1903 law. Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481, 486 (1908). The

1903 law had provided for applications for parole after

expiration of the minimum sentence. Id., at 487—488.

Counsel’s argument in Finley referred to Califor­

nia’s parole law as providing a possible avenue of re­

lease for prisoners serving life sentences. Finley v.

California, 222 U. S. 28, 29 (1911).

The sentence concerning an Arizona prisoner alleg­

edly placed on parole in 1911 should be deleted.

Couch v. State, 245 S. W. 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922),

was a Texas manslaughter case and does not mention

Arizona or parole.

The Governor of West Virginia granted the prisoner

parole in October 1906, conditioned on his remaining

law abiding. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616,

620-621 (1912).

A Massachusetts parolee violated the conditions of

his parole, and the parole board revoked his

27

permission to remain at liberty. Ex parte Carroll,

217 S. W. 382, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919).

The Governor of South Carolina released the pris­

oner under the State’s parole law, then codified at

§969 of the 1922 South Carolina Criminal Code. Har­

rison v. Snook, 22 F. 2d 169, 169-170 (ND Ga. 1927).

The New York State Board of Parole released Hum­

phries on parole on September 30, 1918. United

States ex rel. Humphries v. Hunt, 15 F. Supp. 608, 609

(WDNY 1936).

The relator alleged that the proceeding was in­

tended to return him to Missouri for an alleged parole

violation. Ex parte Randell, 257 S. W. 1101, 1102 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1924).

Release was granted by the Rhode Island Parole

Board on May 28, 1931. Clark v. Orabona, 59 F. 2d

187, 188 (CAI 1932).

The Act of July 15, 1932, established the Board of

Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for the District of

Columbia. Lee v. Aderhold, 5 F. Supp. 950, 951 (ND

Ga. 1933).

A challenge to an Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,

ordinance restricting the residency of registered sex

offenders. Fross v. County of Allegheny, 612 F. Supp.

2d 651, 658 (WD Pa. 2009).

Counsel’s alleged misinformation concerning parole

eligibility did not warrant relief because the defend­

ant failed to establish prejudice. Stevens v. Common­

wealth, No. 2014-CA-001114-MR, slip op., at 13-16

(Ky. App. Feb. 19, 2016) (not to be published).

D. Mandatory Release Statute

Reported decisions beginning in the 1970s ad­

dressed statutes and regulations containing

28

mandatory-release language. Here are examples from

nine jurisdictions. Nevada currently retains a man­

datory-release statute. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §213.1215.

Some States later amended or eliminated comparable

provisions.

Missouri. Enacted in 1969. The statute provided

that the Board “shall release” a prisoner when the

specified criteria were satisfied. Williams v. Missouri

Board of Probation and Parole, 661 F. 2d 697, 698-699

(CA8 1981).

North Carolina. 1974. The statute guaranteed re­

view and consideration for parole but expressly did

not make release mandatory. Bradford v. Weinstein,

519 F. 2d 728, 731 & n. 2 (CA4 1974), judgment va­

cated as moot, 423 U. S. 147 (1975).

Federal. 1976. Former 18U. S. C. § 4206(d) pro­

vided that a qualifying prisoner “shall be released on

parole” unless the Parole Commission made one of two

specified findings. Dufur v. United States Parole

Commission, 34 F. 4th 1090,1092-1093 (CADC 2022).

Nebraska. 1976. Neb. Rev. Stat. §83-1,114(1) re­

quired release unless the Board found one of four spec­

ified grounds for deferral. Greenholtz, 442U.S., at

11-12 (1979).

Virginia. The statutory scheme created a protected

interest in fair parole consideration, rather than an

entitlement to mandatory release.

Franklin v.

Shields, 569 F. 2d 784, 789-790 (CA4 1977).

Montana. The mandatory-release statute was en­

acted in 1955, not 1977. Allen, 482 U. S., at 376-381

(1987).

Texas. 1977. Eligible inmates were automatically

released on mandatory supervision when their calen­

dar time and accrued good-conduct time equaled their

29

sentences. Ex parte Retzlaff, 135 S. W. 3d 45, 48 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004).

Tennessee. The parole statute itself did not create a

liberty interest, but the Tennessee Board of Parole’s

rule created a protected entitlement to release. Mayes

v. Trammell, 751 F. 2d 175, 178-179 (CA6 1984).

California. The statute provided that the Board

“shall set a release date unless” public-safety consid­

erations required a longer period of incarceration.

Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U. S. 216, 217, 220 (2011).

The prisoner’s concern is avoiding the arbitrary de­

nial of parole. Franklin, 569 F. 2d, at 790.

E.

Cases Finding Denial of Parole

Arbitrary

A magistrate judge recommended granting relief

under 28 U. S. C. §2254 after concluding that the

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole’s denial

of reparole rose to the level of a substantive due pro­

cess violation. The Board relied on decades-old parole

violations, a recent technical violation, and a prosecu­

tor’s letter urging continued punishment for conduct

of which a jury had acquitted the petitioner. The mag­

istrate judge concluded that the Board lacked a rea­

sonable justification for its decision. Barnes v. Wenerowicz, 280 F.R.D. 206, 220, 222-223 (ED Pa. 2012)

(report and recommendation); see County of Sacra­

mento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 846—847 (1998).

The New York Parole Board acted arbitrarily by re­

peatedly denying parole based essentially on the

static circumstances of the petitioner’s original of­

fense. Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 287,

297—298 (WDNY 2010). The court nevertheless de­

nied habeas relief because the state-court

30

adjudication was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Id., at 302.

XIV. Due Process Case Law

“The touchstone of due process is protection of the

individual against arbitrary action of government.”

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 558 (1974).

One function of legal process is to minimize the risk

of erroneous deprivation. In determining what pro­

cess is due, courts consider the risk of erroneous dep­

rivation and the probable value of additional or sub­

stitute procedural safeguards. Mathews v. Eldridge,

424U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

Due process has both procedural and substantive

components. Under procedural due process, govern­

ment action depriving a person of life, liberty, or prop­

erty must be implemented in a fair manner. Substan­

tive due process prevents the government from engag­

ing in conduct that “shocks the conscience” or inter­

feres with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481U. S. 739, 746

(1987).

Substantive due process requires infringements on

fundamental liberty interests to be narrowly tailored

to serve a compelling state interest. Reno v. Flores,

507 U. S. 292, 301-302 (1993).

Federal review of state-court findings is limited to

whether they are so unprincipled or arbitrary as to vi­

olate the Constitution. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S.

939, 946—947 (1983) (plurality opinion).

Under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, a re­

viewing court must consider whether the decision was

based on the relevant factors and whether there was

31

a clear error of judgment. Bowman Transportation,

Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419U.S.

281, 285-286 (1974).

The Parole Commission’s discretion is not unfet­

tered. This Court in Allen explained that the Board

retains discretion to apply the standards set for it.

Kindred v. Spears, 894 F. 2d 1477, 1481 (CA5 1990)

(citing Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369, 376

(1987)).

The Due Process Clause has its origin in Magna

Carta. Kerry v. Din, 576 U. S. 86, 91 (2015) (plurality

opinion).

The Due Process Clause, like its forebear in Magna

Carta, was intended to secure the individual from the

arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. Dan­

iels v. Williams, 474U. S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting

Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527 (1884), in

turn quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235,

244(1819)).

Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional

purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which

the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.

Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 250 (1983).

The Due Process Clause has been understood to

contain a substantive component since Mugler v. Kan­

sas, 123 U. S. 623, 660—661 (1887). Planned Parent­

hood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 846—

847 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Dobbs v.

Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215

(2022).

Conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifia­

ble by any government interest is the sort of official

action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking

32

level. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833,

849 (1998).

Convictions cannot be brought about by methods

that offend “a sense of justice.” Rochin v. California,

342 U. S. 165, 173 (1952) (citing Brown v. Mississippi,

297 U. S. 278, 285-286 (1936)).

State action can violate substantive due process

when the conduct is arbitrary or conscience shocking

in a constitutional sense. Persons civilly committed

under Texas’ sexually violent predator statute have

substantive due process rights independent of their

procedural due process rights.

Hitt v. McLane,

854 Fed. Appx. 591, 596 (CA5 2021) (per curiam).

To support a substantive due process claim, a plain­

tiff must establish either that the defendant’s actions

were sufficient to “shock the conscience” or that they

violated an identified liberty or property interest pro­

tected by the Due Process Clause. Harrington v. Almy,

977 F. 2d 37, 43 (CAI 1992) (citing Rochin v. Califor­

nia, 342 U. S. 165, 172 (1952)).

XV.

Danger to the Public Case Law

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 authorizes pretrial de­

tention of persons charged with certain serious of­

fenses when, after an adversary hearing, the Govern­

ment proves by clear and convincing evidence that no

conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety

of any other person and the community. 18 U. S. C.

§3142(e), (f). Congress specified the factors to be con­

sidered and provided for expedited appellate review.

§§ 3142(g), 3145(c); United States v. Salerno, 481U. S.

739, 742-743 (1987).

Federal law authorizes the civil commitment of a

federal prisoner who is nearing the end of his sentence

33

and is found to be sexually dangerous. 18 U. S. C.

§4248. The statutory definition requires proof that

the person suffers from a serious mental illness, ab­

normality, or disorder and would have serious diffi­

culty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child

molestation. §4247(a)(6); United States v. Comstock,

560 U. S. 126, 130-131 (2010). Comstock upheld Con­

gress’ authority to enact §4248 but did not decide

whether the statute satisfies procedural or substan­

tive due process. Id., at 149-150.

Commitment under a sexually violent predator

statute requires proof of serious difficulty in control­

ling behavior. Kansas v. Crane, 534U.S. 407, 413

(2002) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521U. S. 346, 358,

360 (1997)).

Due process requires proof by clear and convincing

evidence in an involuntary civil-commitment proceed­

ing. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431—433

(1979).

An insanity acquittee may not be confined solely on

a finding of dangerousness after he is no longer men­

tally ill. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504U.S. 71, 77—79

(1992).

The definition of “behavioral abnormality” in the

Texas Sexually Violent Predator Act satisfies sub­

stantive due process because it is virtually identical to

the definition of “mental abnormality” upheld in Hen­

dricks. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S. W. 3d 637,

655-656 (Tex. 2005). The Texas Legislature found

that a small but extremely dangerous group of sex­

ually violent predators requires long-term supervision

and treatment. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

§841.001.

34

The Supreme Court of Texas clarified the factualsufficiency standard governing sexually violent pred­

ator commitments and remanded for review under

that standard; it did not hold the evidence insufficient.

In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S. W. 3d 665, 674678 (Tex. 2020).

Bail pending appeal was granted by a Justice of the

Supreme Court in the following cases:

1. The appeal was nonfrivolous, and there was

no substantial evidence that the applicant

posed a flight risk. Harris v. United States,

404U.S. 1232, 1232-1233 (1971) (DOUGLAS,

J., in chambers).

The Eighth Amendment requires bail to be

denied only for the strongest reasons. Sellers

v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (1968)

(BLACK, J., in chambers).

In 2025, Texas amended its Constitution to require

denial of bail under specified circumstances for per­

sons accused of certain offenses when the State satis­

fies the prescribed burden concerning flight or public

safety. Stalking is not among the listed offenses. Tex.

Const., Art. I, § lid.

Pretrial detention for the purpose of preventing

danger to the community is regulatory rather than pu­

nitive. Salerno, 481U. S., at 747 (citing Schall v. Mar­

tin, 467 U. S. 253, 269 (1984)).

There are seven factors relevant to determining

whether a statutory sanction is punitive or civil. Ken­

nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372U.S. 144, 168-169

(1963).

Revocation of parole is part of the penalty for the

original offense. Baca v. Owens, 293 Fed. Appx. 247,

2.

35

250 (CA5 2008) (per curiam) (citing Johnson v. United

States, 529 U. S. 694, 700 (2000)).

Parole is an established variation on imprisonment

of convicted criminals. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S.

263, 280 (1980) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.

471, 477 (1972)).

XVI. Rulings from Other United States Courts

of Appeals

Block explained that Greenholtz did not disturb

cases holding that courts may review whether a parole

board exercised its authority arbitrarily. The use of

arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible criteria in

denying parole may violate substantive due process.

Block v. Potter, 631 F. 2d 233, 236, 240 (CA3 1980).

Parole authorities deprive an offender of due pro­

cess only if their decision is totally lacking in eviden­

tiary support or so irrational as to be fundamentally

unfair. The nature and seriousness of the offense may

be relevant to the probability that a parole candidate

will commit another offense. Dufur v. United States

Parole Commission, 34 F. 4th 1090, 1100—1101

(CADC 2022).

A court may consider whether the Parole Commis­

sion acted outside its statutory limits and whether the

grant or denial of parole was so arbitrary as to violate

due process. Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F. 2d 1539,

1551-1552 (CA9 1986) (en banc) (citing Luther v. Mo­

lina, 627 F. 2d 71, 76 (CA7 1980)).

Courts may review whether the Parole Commission

considered impermissible factors, but review is lim­

ited to whether the Commission exceeded its author­

ity, violated the Constitution, or reached a decision so

36

arbitrary and capricious as to violate due process.

Green v. Castillo, 807 F. 3d 905, 908-909 (CA8 2015).

The guidelines of the United States Parole Commis­

sion focus in part on the severity of the offense. Priore

v. Nelson, 626 F. 2d 211, 216 (CA2 1980).

The parole guidelines were intended to promote a

more consistent exercise of discretion and fairer, more

equitable decisionmaking. Id., at 216. Indeterminate

sentencing also was intended to reduce disparities

among sentences imposed by different judges. Garafola v. Benson, 505 F. 2d 1212, 1217-1218 (CA7 1974).

The court assumed that relief might be available in

an appropriate proceeding against arbitrary action by

the Parole Board, but held that habeas corpus was not

an available remedy. Goldsmith v. Aderholt, 44 F. 2d

166, 167 (CA5 1930).

Three recent decisions from the Middle District of

Pennsylvania applied the substantive-due-process

framework when reviewing denials of state parole and

cited Block. All three decisions rejected the petition­

ers’ claims:

1. Hatfield v. Pennsylvania Board of Parole, No.

3:24-CV-1531, slip op., at 2—4 (MD Pa. Sept. 17,

2025).

2. Ball v. Bohenski, No. l:25-CV-01293, slip op.,

at 5-8 (MD Pa. Sept. 12, 2025).

3. Glover v. Wahl, No. 4:24-CV-02073, slip op., at

3-6 (MD Pa. Aug. 11, 2025).

XVII. Use of Artificial Intelligence in Making

Parole Release Determinations

Artificial intelligence (Al) could be used to assist in

making parole-release decisions. Al models could

help apply established criteria more consistently.

37

The Parole Board could start by using Al software

to summarize inmates’ parole files for Board members

to review before voting on release. The Al functional­

ity could be enhanced over time to include decision­

support functions, such as making recommendations

whether to grant parole and what conditions of super­

vision should be required. The Board, rather than the

Al model, would remain responsible for the ultimate

decision.

Prior parole files could be used to train Al models to

assist in evaluating inmates currently under review.

The models could be refined using updated recidivism

data. Any system would require validation, human

review, and safeguards against inaccurate or biased

information. The Board could establish evaluation

metrics, but prescribing a predetermined percentage

of inmates who should be granted release would be in­

consistent with individualized parole determinations.

IBM has released a series of small language models,

known as Granite, that are tailored to business appli­

cations and require less computing power. “How IBM

Became an Al Darling,” The Economist, Jan. 31, 2026,

p. 60.

Tennessee uses a computer assessment known as

STRONG-R to evaluate inmates’ risk and fitness for

parole. Thomas v. Montgomery, 140 F. 4th 335, 337—

338 (CA6 2025). The Sixth Circuit noted “serious is­

sues” with the technology, including alleged inaccura­

cies and the lack of an opportunity to challenge them,

but held that Tennessee’s parole statutes did not cre­

ate a protected liberty interest in parole. Id., at 345—

346.

38

XVIII. Other Shock the Conscience Factors

A.

Analogy to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine

Greenholtz observed that “the very institution of pa­

role is still in an experimental stage,” even though pa­

role had appeared in reported decisions since the early

twentieth century. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska

Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1, 8 (1979).

B. Arbitrary and Unjust Standard

Due-process review of parole denials could evolve

toward an “arbitrary and unjust” standard.

Gille quoted the proposition that a judgment ad­

dressing a matter outside the issues presented “must,

of necessity, be altogether arbitrary and unjust, as it

concludes a point upon which the parties have not

been heard.” Gille v. Emmons, 58 Kan. 118, 123

(1897).

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant certiorari.

Neil Paul Noble

TDCJ # 02473212

Diboll Correctional Center

1604 S. 1st St.

Diboll, TX 75941

July 2026

Pro Se Petitioner