Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ronald Bruce Myers, Petitioner v. United States

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

RONALD BRUCE MYERS, PETITIONER,

v.

UNITED STATES.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM MILES POPE

GODDARD POPE PLLC

967 E. Parkcenter Blvd.,

Ste. 1010

Boise, ID 83706

(208) 329-5671

miles@goddard-pope.com

R. STANTON JONES

ANDREW T. TUTT

Counsel of Record

TRIAL LAWYERS FOR

JUSTICE

421 W. Water Street

Decorah, IA 52101

(866) 854-5529

andrew@TL4J.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

This case presents a square and acknowledged

conflict over an important question of federal criminal

law. Section 3664(n) requires an incarcerated defendant

who “receives substantial resources from any source” to

apply “the value of such resources” to restitution. 18

U.S.C. § 3664(n). The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth

Circuits have held that § 3664(n) does not reach modest

funds merely because they accumulate over time. A

divided Ninth Circuit held the opposite, allowing the

government to aggregate years of modest deposits from

family and friends and seize them once the inmate’s

account balance becomes substantial.

Four judges dissented from the denial of rehearing

en banc. They explained that the case “involves questions

of exceptional national importance for prison

management, inmates, and the courts,” and that the

panel’s decision “creates a circuit split in an area of law

which is best applied uniformly nationwide.” Three more

judges wrote separately to express that “[a] principled

reading of the statute does not support [the panel’s]

result.” The panel’s rule follows inmates sentenced in the

Ninth Circuit wherever the Bureau of Prisons houses

them, subjecting inmates in the same federal prisons to

different restitution regimes based solely on where they

were sentenced.

The question presented is:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n), which requires an

incarcerated defendant who “receives substantial

resources” to apply them to restitution, applies only when

the defendant receives resources that are substantial at

the time of receipt, or also permits the government to

aggregate modest, periodic deposits over time and seize

them once the inmate’s trust-account balance becomes

substantial.

(i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner Ronald Bruce Myers was the defendantappellant below.

Respondent the United States of America was the

plaintiff-appellee below.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Washington:

United States v. Myers, No. 2:04-cr-00173-MKD

(turnover order entered May 10, 2023)

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Myers, No. 23-1034 (opinion filed

May 6, 2025; amended, and rehearing en banc

denied, Mar. 27, 2026)

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions Below ..................................................................... 1

Jurisdiction ........................................................................... 1

Statutory Provisions Involved ............................................ 1

Introduction .......................................................................... 2

Statement of the Case.......................................................... 4

Reasons for Granting the Petition ................................... 10

I. The decision below conflicts with the other

courts of appeals. ........................................................ 11

A. The Eighth Circuit treats gradual

accumulation as a § 3664(k) question. ................. 12

B. The First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits apply the

receipt-time rule. .................................................. 13

C. The conflict is acknowledged, and the

concurrence’s contrary view confirms it. ........... 14

II. The question is important and recurring. ................ 15

A. Section 3664(n) operates against the

nationwide federal trust-account system. .......... 15

B. The decision creates a geographically

arbitrary regime that disrupts uniform prison

administration. ...................................................... 17

C. The stakes for federal prisoners are high. ......... 18

III. The decision below is wrong. ..................................... 19

A. The text forecloses aggregation over time. ....... 19

B. The Dictionary Act’s singular-plural rule does

not license aggregation. ....................................... 21

C. Section 3664(k) is the better fit for gradual

accumulation.......................................................... 21

D. The concurrence’s contrary policy concern is

misplaced—and answered by § 3664(k). ............ 23

(iii)

iv

IV. This is a clean vehicle. ................................................ 24

Conclusion ........................................................................... 26

Appendix A: Amended Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

(Mar. 27, 2026) ............................................ 1a

Appendix B: Order of the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

(May 10, 2023) ........................................... 28a

Appendix C: Order of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Denying

Rehearing En Banc (Mar. 27, 2026) ....... 36a

Appendix D: 18 U.S.C. § 3664 ........................................ 64a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Brewster v. Gage,

280 U.S. 327 (1930) ....................................................... 23

Carr v. United States,

560 U.S. 438 (2010) ....................................................... 20

Comm’r v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co.,

111 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1940) ........................................ 23

Corley v. United States,

556 U.S. 303 (2009) ....................................................... 23

Dolan v. United States,

560 U.S. 605 (2010) ......................................................... 4

Drye v. United States,

528 U.S. 49 (1999) ......................................................... 23

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,

484 U.S. 49 (1987) ......................................................... 20

Helvering v. Horst,

311 U.S. 112 (1940) ....................................................... 24

Hewitt v. United States,

606 U.S. 419 (2025) ....................................................... 20

In re Lonstein,

950 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1991) ........................................... 23

In re Neuton,

922 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1990) ...................................... 24

In re Ryerson,

739 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984) ...................................... 24

Ivan Allen Co. v. United States,

422 U.S. 617 (1975) ....................................................... 15

Matter of Brown,

86 B.R. 944 (N.D. Ind. 1988) ....................................... 24

Miller v. Fenton,

474 U.S. 104 (1985) ....................................................... 15

(v)

vi

Cases—Continued

Page(s)

Niz-Chavez v. Garland,

593 U.S. 155 (2021) ....................................................... 21

North American Oil Consolidated v.

Burnet,

286 U.S. 417 (1932) ....................................................... 23

Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690 (1996) ....................................................... 15

Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II

Men’s Advisory Council,

506 U.S. 194 (1993) ....................................................... 21

Salve Regina College v. Russell,

499 U.S. 225 (1991) ....................................................... 15

Segal v. Rochelle,

382 U.S. 375 (1966) ....................................................... 23

Thompson v. Clark,

596 U.S. 36 (2022) ......................................................... 15

TRW Inc. v. Andrews,

534 U.S. 19 (2001) ......................................................... 23

United States v. Anwar,

662 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (E.D. Wash. 2022) .................... 17

United States v. Bruno,

329 U.S. 207 (1946) ....................................................... 15

United States v. Cantatore,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74932 (D.N.J.

Apr. 19, 2021) ................................................................ 17

United States v. Carson,

55 F.4th 1053 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................ 13-14, 16

United States v. Craddock,

2021 WL 3144818 (D. Kan. July 26,

2021) ............................................................................... 17

United States v. Evans,

48 F.4th 888 (8th Cir. 2022) ............................. 12, 14, 22

vii

Cases—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Hester,

2016 WL 1007335 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14,

2016) ............................................................................... 16

United States v. Hughes,

914 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 2019) ........................................ 13

United States v. Kidd,

23 F.4th 781 (8th Cir. 2022) .............. 6, 12, 14, 16-18, 22

United States v. Kimoto,

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69819 (S.D. Ill.

May 27, 2016) ................................................................ 17

United States v. Lazala,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35855 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 1, 2024) ................................................................. 16

United States v. Lemoine,

546 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) ...................................... 17

United States v. Lillard,

935 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2019) .......................................... 5

United States v. Myers,

170 F.4th 1180 (9th Cir. 2026) .......... 1, 11-12, 20, 22, 24

United States v. Myers,

136 F.4th 917 (9th Cir. 2025) ......................................... 1

United States v. Myers,

2023 WL 7017707 (E.D. Wash. May 10,

2023) ................................................................................. 1

United States v. Myers,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148382 (D.N.D.

Aug. 9, 2021) .................................................................. 17

United States v. Othman,

683 F. Supp. 3d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) .......................... 16

United States v. Price,

No. 17-CR-301 (NGG), 2023 WL

4599841 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2023) ............................... 16

viii

Cases—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Saemisch,

70 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023) ............................................. 14

United States v. Sweatt,

85 F.4th 1240 (7th Cir. 2023) ....................................... 16

United States v. Ware,

2022 WL 18024207 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,

2022) ............................................................................... 17

United States v. Wilson,

503 U.S. 329 (1992) ....................................................... 19

Statutes

1 U.S.C. § 1................................................................. 8, 20-21

18 U.S.C. § 513(b) ................................................................. 6

18 U.S.C. § 2312 .................................................................... 6

18 U.S.C. § 3663A ................................................................. 5

18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) ...................................................... 5

18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B) .................................................... 20

18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) ........................................................... 5

18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1) ......................................................... 20

18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) ............................. 1-2, 5, 9-14, 19, 21-24

18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) ....................................... 1-5, 7-17, 19-25

18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4) ......................................................... 18

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ............................................................... 1

Regulations

28 C.F.R. § 506.1................................................................... 6

28 C.F.R. pt. 545 ................................................................... 6

28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10-.11 .................................................. 6, 17

28 C.F.R. § 571.20............................................................... 19

88 Fed. Reg. 1331 (proposed Jan. 10, 2023) ............... 18-19

88 Fed. Reg. 77,064

(proposed Nov. 8, 2023) ........................................... 6, 19

ix

Legislative Materials

Page(s)

H.R. Rep. No. 104-518 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) ...................... 22

S. Rep. No. 104-179 (1995)................................................. 22

142 Cong. Rec. S3379 (daily ed. Apr. 16,

1996) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ............................. 22

Other Authorities

Anna VanCleave, Prison Banking,

112 Cal. L. Rev. 1699 (2024) ........................................ 18

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Population Statistics, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp (last visited Aug. 21, 2026) ........................................................ 15

Megan Schwartz, MDRC, Support for the

Journey Home: An Impact Study of

the Returning Citizens Stimulus Program (2025) ................................................................... 19

Sean Kolkey, People over Profit: The Case

for Abolishing the Prison Financial

System, 110 Cal. L. Rev. 257 (2022) ........................... 18

U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2025 Sourcebook of

Federal Sentencing Statistics tbls. 1617 (2026), https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2025............................................... 16

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

The amended opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a27a) is reported at 170 F.4th 1180, and amends and

supersedes the panel’s original opinion, reported at 136

F.4th 917. The order of the court of appeals denying

rehearing en banc, together with the concurring and

dissenting opinions respecting that denial (App. 36a-63a),

is reported at 170 F.4th 1180. The order of the district

court granting turnover (App. 28a-35a) is reported at 2023

WL 7017707.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on May 6,

2025, and denied a timely petition for rehearing en banc

on March 27, 2026. On June 17, 2026, Justice Kagan

extended the time to file this petition to and including

August 24, 2026. See No. 25A1407. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3664 are

reproduced at App. 64a-71a. Section 3664(n) provides:

If a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a

fine, receives substantial resources from any source,

including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment,

during a period of incarceration, such person shall be

required to apply the value of such resources to any

restitution or fine still owed.

Section 3664(k) provides:

A restitution order shall provide that the defendant

shall notify the court and the Attorney General of any

material change in the defendant’s economic

circumstances that might affect the defendant’s

ability to pay restitution.... Upon receipt of the

2

notification, the court may, on its own motion, or the

motion of any party, including the victim, adjust the

payment schedule, or require immediate payment in

full, as the interests of justice require.

INTRODUCTION

When a federal inmate comes into real money “from

any source” during his imprisonment—an inheritance, a

settlement, a legal judgment—the Mandatory Victims

Restitution Act requires him to apply those “substantial

resources” to any restitution he still owes. It does so

automatically and in full. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). For every

other change in an inmate’s finances, Congress provided

a different tool: a court may adjust the inmate’s payment

schedule as the interests of justice require. Id. § 3664(k).

The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have

recognized that distinction: all have held that § 3664(n)

does not reach funds that were modest when received

merely because they accumulate over time. App. 53a-57a.

In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit charted a

different path. It held that § 3664(n) authorizes the

government to aggregate years of modest deposits from

family and friends into “substantial resources from any

source” subject to mandatory turnover, even though no

individual deposit was substantial when received. The

panel thus transformed a provision directed at inmates

who “receive[] substantial resources from any source”

into one authorizing automatic seizure whenever an

inmate’s accumulated trust-account balance eventually

becomes substantial. Federal inmates keep their money

in Bureau of Prisons trust accounts, which hold family

deposits, prison wages, and release savings alike.

The decision creates an administrative nightmare for

the Bureau of Prisons. The Ninth Circuit’s rule does not

stop at the Ninth Circuit’s borders: it governs every

inmate sentenced there, and the Bureau houses those

3

inmates in federal institutions across the country.

Officials must therefore sort prisoners in the same

institution—inmate by inmate, account by account—into

different restitution regimes based solely on the

happenstance of where each was sentenced. For the

families who scrimp to send an inmate money for food,

hygiene, and phone calls, the rule is arbitrary in the

cruelest way: identical gifts to two inmates in the same

institution are safe for one and subject to seizure for the

other. Petitioner Ronald Bruce Myers illustrates the

point: sentenced in Washington, he was confined at the

United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas,

when the district court ordered his account turned over.

App. 35a. Uniform federal prison administration should

not depend on that happenstance. Every day the decision

remains in effect, Bureau of Prisons staff must administer

a fractured restitution regime that Congress never

contemplated.

Myers is a federal inmate who still owes restitution

imposed in 2005. In late 2022, his inmate trust account

held $1,622.53—most of it set aside in a pre-release

account reserved for his eventual reentry. App. 29a. The

government froze the account and asked the district court

to order the money turned over as restitution under

§ 3664(n). App. 29a-30a. Myers had been in federal

custody for nearly a decade by then, and the small sums

his family and friends deposited over those years added

up. But no individual deposit was substantial when

received, and Myers spent nearly all of them as they

arrived—on commissary necessities, subscriptions,

donations to charity, and support for others. App. 3a, 31a.

The government’s theory below, and the Ninth Circuit’s

logic, is that the small deposits that accumulated in

Myers’s account are together “substantial resources”

subject to mandatory seizure. The district court ordered

$1,233.73 turned over. App. 33a, 35a.

4

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding

that § 3664(n) reaches “substantial aggregated sums from

multiple sources—like family and friends—that gradually

accrue in an inmate’s trust account.” App. 5a. The court of

appeals denied rehearing en banc over the dissent of four

judges. App. 41a. Three more judges wrote separately

that “[a] principled reading of the statute does not

support” the panel’s result. App. 63a.

The panel also compounded the problem it created.

Having made turnover depend on an account’s

accumulated balance, it “le[ft] for another day” whether

prison wages count toward that balance. Prison wages are

the principal means by which many inmates accumulate

savings, and every court of appeals to decide the question

has placed those funds beyond § 3664(n)’s reach. App. 13a

n.3. Because trust accounts commingle wages with

outside deposits, the aggregation rule immediately

unsettles the administration of accounts funded by family

deposits, prison earnings, and release savings alike.

This case is a good vehicle for resolving the question

presented. The government expressly disclaimed any

effort to reach Myers’s prison wages, the district court

ordered turnover solely because modest outside-source

deposits had accumulated over time, and the court of

appeals squarely held that § 3664(n) permits such

aggregation. The question is purely one of statutory

interpretation, was fully litigated below, and cleanly

presents an issue of recurring national importance

affecting the administration of restitution throughout the

federal prison system.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statutory background

Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution

Act (MVRA) in 1996 to “help victims of crime secure

prompt restitution.” Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605,

5

613 (2010); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664. A sentencing court

must order restitution “in the full amount of each victim’s

losses,” § 3664(f)(1)(A), but Congress recognized that

defendants often cannot pay all at once. The court

therefore sets a payment schedule “in consideration of”

the defendant’s “financial resources,” “projected

earnings,” and “financial obligations.” § 3664(f)(2).

Because a defendant’s ability to pay can change, the

MVRA provides mechanisms to revisit the schedule.

Section 3664(k) directs that a restitution order “shall

provide that the defendant shall notify the court and the

Attorney General of any material change in the

defendant’s economic circumstances.” It further provides

that, “[u]pon receipt of the notification, the court may...

adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate

payment in full, as the interests of justice require.” 18

U.S.C. § 3664(k). Section 3664(k) thus supplies a

discretionary, court-supervised tool that operates

whenever a defendant’s economic circumstances change

over time.

Section 3664(n) is different. It provides that an

inmate who “receives substantial resources from any

source, including inheritance, settlement, or other

judgment, during a period of incarceration,... shall be

required to apply the value of such resources to any

restitution or fine still owed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). Unlike

§ 3664(k), § 3664(n) is automatic: it requires no judicial

finding of changed circumstances, no “interests of justice”

balancing, and no notice—the inmate simply “shall be

required” to turn the resources over. It is, as the Ninth

Circuit has recognized, the “harsher” mechanism,

requiring “immediate” disgorgement “of the full value of

newly-received substantial resources.” United States v.

Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2019).

6

These provisions operate against the backdrop of the

Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility

Program (IFRP), 28 C.F.R. pt. 545, under which BOP

staff help each inmate develop a financial plan to meet

obligations (including restitution) while saving for

necessities and reentry. Inmate funds—prison wages and

deposits from family and friends alike—are held in a

BOP-maintained “inmate trust account.” 28 C.F.R.

§§ 506.1, 545.10-.11. Inmates draw on those accounts to

buy commissary necessities, pay medical co-pays and

postage, maintain telephone contact with family and

counsel, and save for release. The BOP separately

earmarks a portion of those funds in a pre-release

subaccount intended to help inmates pay the costs of

reentry upon release, underscoring that inmate trust

accounts are intended not merely to collect money, but to

facilitate successful reintegration into society. See C.A. 2SER 71, 76 (Myers’s “pre-release encumbrance”

subaccount); App. 33a, 43a; Reservation of Funds for

Reentry Under the First Step Act, 88 Fed. Reg. 77,064,

77,065 (proposed Nov. 8, 2023) (funds reserved so that

they are available “on the inmate’s first day of reentry”);

United States v. Kidd, 23 F.4th 781, 783 n.1 (8th Cir. 2022)

(describing the BOP trust-fund structure).

B. Facts and proceedings

In 2005, petitioner Ronald Bruce Myers pleaded

guilty to possessing an implement for counterfeiting state

securities and to transporting a stolen motor vehicle

across state lines. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 513(b), 2312. The

district court sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment

and three years’ supervised release, and ordered him to

pay $40,406 in restitution, with payments to “begin

immediately” and to be “not less than 25% of [his] monthly

gross earnings” while incarcerated. App. 2a, 16a.

7

Myers completed that sentence in 2010, but he was

reincarcerated on unrelated charges in 2013 and has

remained in federal custody since. Because he still owed

restitution, the 2005 order’s conditions remained in effect.

Myers had a BOP trust account—the standard account

through which federal inmates receive prison wages and

outside deposits. As of late 2022, his account held

$1,622.53, most of it ($1,224) in a “pre-release

encumbrance” subaccount Myers had reserved to assist

his eventual reentry (C.A. 2-SER 71, 76)—and he still

owed $35,011.09 in restitution. App. 29a. Myers had been

in federal custody for many years, and his family and

friends sent him a steady stream of small deposits,

supplemented by modest prison wages. App. 3a, 31a. But

he spent nearly all of that money as it arrived. He donated

$1,580 to charity, sent $1,334 to support other individuals,

spent about $128 on subscriptions, and used much of the

remainder on commissary necessities—leaving only the

modest balance the government sought to seize. App. 3a.

In November 2022, the government froze Myers’s

account and, after he moved for a hearing, asked the

district court to order the BOP to turn the funds over as

restitution under § 3664(n). App. 29a-30a. The

government disclaimed any effort to reach Myers’s prison

wages. App. 3a. Because the account was commingled and

Myers’s spending each year exceeded his wages, no

dollar-by-dollar tracing was attempted. Instead, the

government proposed using only the 2022 transactions—

in which Myers received modest deposits from family and

friends and $388.80 in prison wages—and, in Myers’s

favor, assuming that all of the 2022 wages remained

unspent. Subtracting that $388.80 from the $1,622.53

balance, the district court ordered turnover of $1,233.73.

App. 33a, 35a. The court held that “substantial

aggregated sums,” including deposits from family and

friends, “satisfy the requirement of ‘substantial

8

resources’” under § 3664(n), even though the “gradual

accumulation of prison wages does not.” App. 31a-32a. No

individual deposit was found to be substantial when

received. The court denied Myers’s request for an

evidentiary hearing on the account’s composition. App.

34a-35a.

C. The decision below

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. App.

1a-27a. Judge Nelson, joined by Judge Boggs (sitting by

designation), wrote for the majority. The panel held that

§ 3664(n) “applies not just to one-time financial windfalls,

but also to substantial aggregated sums from multiple

sources—like family and friends—that gradually accrue

in an inmate’s trust account.” App. 5a. The majority

reasoned that, under the Dictionary Act, the singular

“source” “include[s] the plural,” 1 U.S.C. § 1, so “any

source” reaches deposits from multiple people. The

majority also relied on the Dictionary Act’s tense rule:

“words used in the present tense include the future as well

as the present.” Id. From that premise, resources that no

one would call substantial when received may “become”

substantial under § 3664(n) by sitting in an inmate’s

account long enough. App. 6a-8a. The panel “le[ft] for

another day” whether § 3664(n) also reaches prison

wages, App. 13a n.3. Prison wages are the principal means

by which many inmates accumulate modest savings for

commissary needs and eventual reentry. Allowing the

question to go unresolved leaves the Bureau of Prisons to

administer inmate trust accounts under an uncertain legal

standard.

On rehearing, the panel amended its opinion to add

that “[n]othing in this opinion should be construed as

preventing a future panel from agreeing with these other

circuits on the issue of exempting prison wages.” App. 13a

n.3.

9

Judge McKeown dissented. In her view, Ҥ 3664(n)

applies only to resources that are substantial at the time

of receipt.” App. 20a (McKeown, J., dissenting). She

explained that Congress’s use of the present-tense

“receives” “requires contemporaneity: the resources

must be substantial at the time of receipt.” App. 22a. She

also explained that the statute’s illustrations—

“inheritance, settlement, or other judgment”—are each

“a single event” in which substantial resources are

received in “a discrete instance.” App. 23a. Accumulation

of modest sums over time, she explained, is instead the

province of § 3664(k). That provision addresses a

“material change in the defendant’s economic

circumstances” and permits a court to “adjust the

payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full,

as the interests of justice require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k); see

App. 24a.

The court of appeals denied rehearing en banc. Judge

Wardlaw, joined by Judges Gould, Koh, and Mendoza,

dissented from that denial. She explained that the panel

had “muddled” §§ 3664(k) and (n). In doing so, the panel

swept “small sums deposited over time by family and

friends... that have become ‘substantial’ into the MVRA’s

automatic turnover provision,” App. 41a. But Congress

“made clear that material changes in a defendant’s

financial circumstances are governed by a different

provision: 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k).” App. 41a. The panel’s

decision, she wrote, “is incorrect, creates a circuit split,”

and “interfer[es] with the BOP’s carefully constructed”

IFRP. App. 41a. And because § 3664(n) turnover

proceedings take place in the sentencing court, the chaos

is system-wide. The rule governs every inmate sentenced

in the Ninth Circuit wherever the BOP houses him.

Inmates sentenced elsewhere—including those housed in

Ninth Circuit facilities—remain subject to other circuits’

rules, leaving the BOP to administer different restitution

10

regimes for inmates in the same federal institution based

solely on the circuit of sentencing. She concluded that the

case “involves questions of exceptional national

importance for prison management, inmates, and the

courts.” App. 59a. Judge McKeown, joined by Judges W.

Fletcher and Paez, separately wrote to agree that “[a]

principled reading of the statute does not support” the

panel’s result. App. 63a.

Judge Nelson concurred in the denial of rehearing en

banc. App. 36a-40a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision below authorizes the government to

aggregate an inmate’s modest, periodic deposits over time

and seize the resulting balance once it becomes

“substantial.” That rule now governs every inmate

sentenced in the Ninth Circuit, wherever the Bureau of

Prisons houses him, and it forces prison officials to

administer different restitution regimes inside the same

federal institutions. It also exposes family-and-friend

deposits set aside for hygiene, phone calls, commissary

needs, and release savings to automatic turnover without

the interests-of-justice review Congress supplied in

§ 3664(k). The other circuits have taken a different

approach. Four judges explained the point in dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc: “[u]ntil the panel

majority opinion” here, “each circuit to publish an opinion

addressing whether § 3664(n) applies to gradually

accumulated funds in an inmate trust account had held

that it does not.” App. 53a.

The question is important and recurring. Section

3664(n) reaches the trust accounts of federal inmates with

outstanding restitution or fine obligations throughout the

federal prison system. Yet the decision below now

subjects those sentenced in the Ninth Circuit alone to

automatic turnover of the modest savings they and their

11

families accumulate for necessities and reentry. And the

decision is wrong. It reads the present-tense “receives” to

reach resources received in the past. It reads the singular

“any source” to mean multiple sources. It also pulls

gradual accumulation into a turnover provision that

operates automatically once its predicate is found—

bypassing § 3664(k), the changed-circumstances provision

Congress wrote with an interests-of-justice safeguard, for

the very cases that provision fits best. This clean, purely

legal question is a good vehicle in which to resolve the

conflict and restore uniform administration of restitution

across the federal prison system.

I.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE

OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS.

The Ninth Circuit is the first court of appeals to hold

that § 3664(n) reaches “substantial aggregated sums from

multiple sources—like family and friends—that gradually

accrue in an inmate’s trust account.” Under that rule,

deposits “not... substantial at the time of receipt... can

reach that threshold if they accumulate over time.” 170

F.4th at 1185-86. The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth

Circuits have taken a different approach—measuring

substantiality at the point of receipt and treating gradual

accumulation as a matter for § 3664(k). The practical

consequences are immediate. Because the rule turns on

the circuit of sentencing rather than the place of

incarceration, the Bureau of Prisons must administer

different restitution rules to inmates housed in the same

federal institution based solely on where they were

sentenced. Families who make identical modest deposits

for inmates serving identical sentences face dramatically

different treatment depending only on the sentencing

circuit. This Court’s review is warranted now. The

fractured regime and its resulting chaos and unfairness

are now the daily operating reality of the federal prison

system.

12

A.

The Eighth Circuit treats gradual accumulation

as a § 3664(k) question.

The Eighth Circuit has twice indicated that the

gradual accumulation of modest deposits is governed by

§ 3664(k), not § 3664(n). In United States v. Kidd, the

court drew the § 3664(n) versus § 3664(k) line by the

character of the receipt. Section 3664(n) reaches the

“receipt of ‘substantial resources’ from outside sources.”

By contrast, “an accumulation of small amounts received

from various sources” that together amount to a

“‘material change’ in [the inmate’s] economic

circumstances” is a matter for the district court’s

discretion under § 3664(k). The court may “‘adjust the

payment schedule’... ‘as the interests of justice require.’”

23 F.4th 781, 787-88 (8th Cir. 2022). Confronting an

undifferentiated $5,500 balance, the Eighth Circuit did

not order turnover; it remanded, explaining that the funds

“could include” a § 3664(n) receipt from outside sources

or, “perhaps more likely,” a § 3664(k) accumulation of

small amounts. Id. at 787-88. The court reaffirmed the

point months later in United States v. Evans, explaining

that a “gradual accumulation of ‘small amounts received

from various sources’... would constitute a ‘material

change in the defendant’s economic circumstances’ under

§ 3664(k).” 48 F.4th 888, 891 (8th Cir. 2022).

Those holdings cannot be reconciled with the decision

below. The Ninth Circuit held that “substantial

aggregated sums from multiple sources... that gradually

accrue” are subject to § 3664(n)’s automatic turnover, 170

F.4th at 1185. That’s the very accumulation the Eighth

Circuit treats as a § 3664(k) question committed to the

district court’s interests-of-justice discretion. The sum

seized from Myers was the accreted remainder of modest

deposits, not one of which the district court found

substantial when received. Under the Eighth Circuit’s

approach, such an accumulation would not be swept up by

13

§ 3664(n)’s automatic turnover; it would instead require

the government to proceed under § 3664(k). Under the

Ninth Circuit’s rule, it was turned over automatically.

B. The First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits apply the

receipt-time rule.

The First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits apply the receipttime rule. As the en banc dissent explained, each asks

whether the resources were substantial when received

and requires a source-specific inquiry, rather than

aggregating an accumulated balance. App. 53a-58a.

The Fifth Circuit was the first court of appeals to

address the question. It held that the provision “refers to

windfalls or sudden financial injections,” not the “gradual

accumulation” of funds, reasoning that the statute’s

examples (“inheritance, settlement, or other judgment”)

share the quality of discrete, substantial receipts. United

States v. Hughes, 914 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 2019). A

“sudden financial injection” is, by definition, substantial

when it arrives—the opposite of a balance built up from

modest deposits over years.

The Sixth Circuit required a district court to “first

determine the source of the funds” and to ask whether “a

resource”—a given deposit—is “substantial.” It explained

that “a cash deposit of $2,663.05 from outside sources

would be ‘substantial’” to a prisoner earning no more than

about $100 per month in wages. United States v. Carson,

55 F.4th 1053, 1057-58 (6th Cir. 2022). Carson vacated the

turnover order and remanded for those findings. Its

analysis treated a single outside-source deposit—not an

accumulated balance—as the unit of substantiality, in a

case involving family deposits and possible stimulus

payments, not merely prison wages. Id. at 1055-58.

The First Circuit likewise held that a district court

“must examine the source or sources of an inmate’s

account before it may order the turnover of funds.” It also

14

held that if the account “consist[s] only of gradually

accumulated... funds that do not qualify as ‘substantial

resources,’ section 3664(n) is not implicated.” United

States v. Saemisch, 70 F.4th 1, 9-11 (1st Cir. 2023). Like

the Sixth Circuit, the First Circuit directed courts to

assess substantiality when the funds were received.

Those cases arose in varied postures—some

principally involving prison wages—but the analytical

premise each applied is the same: substantiality is

assessed when resources are received, from an identified

source. None of these courts has adopted the balanceaggregation rule of the decision below.

C.

The conflict is acknowledged, and

concurrence’s contrary view confirms it.

the

The judges of the court below recognized the split.

Judge Wardlaw, joined by Judges Gould, Koh, and

Mendoza, wrote that the decision “creates a circuit split.”

App. 41a. Judge McKeown’s panel dissent concluded that

Ҥ 3664(n) applies only to resources that are substantial at

the time of receipt.” App. 20a. At the en banc phase, Judge

McKeown, joined by Judges W. Fletcher and Paez, wrote

separately that “[a] principled reading of the statute does

not support” the result. App. 63a. Four judges thus

expressly identified the split, and seven judges in total

rejected the majority’s statutory analysis.

Judge Nelson’s concurrence in the denial of

rehearing en banc contended that the panel “created no

new circuit split” because the other circuits “only held

that accumulated prison wages were not substantial.”

App. 36a-37a. But Kidd did not turn on prison wages. The

Eighth Circuit distinguished the “receipt of ‘substantial

resources’ from outside sources” from the “accumulation

of small amounts received from various sources” that

belongs under § 3664(k). 23 F.4th at 787-88; accord Evans,

48 F.4th at 891. Carson addressed cash deposits from the

15

inmate’s family and possible stimulus payments—outside

sources—and asked whether such a deposit was

“substantial” at receipt. 55 F.4th at 1057-58. The premise

of the decision below—that modest outside deposits may

be summed until a balance is substantial—is one the

Eighth Circuit’s cases expressly reject and the First and

Sixth Circuits’ reasoning cannot accommodate.

At bottom, the disagreement here is over the

governing rule. And this Court grants review to resolve

conflicts over governing rules without waiting for mirrorimage outcomes on identical facts.1 The receipt-time

approach the other circuits apply and the balanceaggregation rule applied below cannot both be right, and

only this Court can resolve which governs. This Court’s

review is needed to restore uniformity to a statute that

Congress designed to apply identically throughout the

federal prison system.

II.

THE QUESTION IS IMPORTANT AND RECURRING.

A.

Section 3664(n) operates against the nationwide

federal trust-account system.

The MVRA applies nationwide, and § 3664(n)

operates against the uniform, BOP-administered inmate

trust-account system that every federal prisoner uses.

The legal question therefore has wide reach: the Bureau

of Prisons houses more than 153,000 federal inmates,2 and

See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 237 (1991)

(granting review to resolve conflict over legal test); Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (same); Miller v. Fenton, 474

U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (similar); Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 41

(2022) (similar); Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 623

(1975) (similar); United States v. Bruno, 329 U.S. 207, 208 (1946)

(similar).

1

See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Population Statistics,

https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp (last

visited Aug. 21, 2026).

2

16

in fiscal year 2025 alone the federal courts ordered

restitution in 8,866 cases, in amounts exceeding $25

billion.3 The question whether the government may

aggregate modest deposits and turn over an inmate’s

balance recurs throughout that system, and reported

decisions repeatedly involve comparably modest trustaccount balances. See, e.g., Kidd, 23 F.4th 781 ($5,500);

Carson, 55 F.4th 1053 ($4,037.89).

The question is also recurring. District courts

continue to confront whether § 3664(n) reaches the

gradual accumulation of modest outside-source deposits.

See, e.g., United States v. Price, No. 17-CR-301 (NGG),

2023 WL 4599841, at *2-4 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2023);

United States v. Othman, 683 F. Supp. 3d 207, 209-11

(E.D.N.Y. 2023); see also Kidd, 23 F.4th at 787-88; United

States v. Sweatt, 85 F.4th 1240, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 2023).

The frequency with which the courts confront the

question underscores the need for this Court to resolve

the governing rule.

And without a receipt-time anchor, courts have no

principled way to say how much is “substantial.” One

court has taken everything over $500; another, everything

over $151.59. One found $768.40 substantial; another held

that $1,032.53 was not. A third simply took three-quarters

of the inmate’s balance in its “discretion.” Another left an

inmate exactly $75, because “[t]he Government suggests

the Defendant be allowed to retain $75.” And another held

that the $3,714.61 initially sought “likely constituted a

substantial resource” while “the remaining amount

($235.59), does not.” See United States v. Hester, 2016 WL

1007335, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016); United States v.

Lazala, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35855, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y.

See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2025 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing

Statistics

tbls.

16-17

(2026),

https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2025.

3

17

Mar. 1, 2024); United States v. Kimoto, 2016 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 69819, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 27, 2016); United States

v. Ware, 2022 WL 18024207, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022);

United States v. Craddock, 2021 WL 3144818, at *3 (D.

Kan. July 26, 2021); United States v. Myers, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 148382, at *2 (D.N.D. Aug. 9, 2021); United

States v. Cantatore, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74932, at *2

(D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2021); see also United States v. Anwar,

662 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1179 (E.D. Wash. 2022) (“[T]here is

no authority setting forth how much money is required to

be considered ‘substantial’ under § 3664(n).”).

B. The decision creates a geographically arbitrary

regime

that

disrupts

uniform

prison

administration.

Federal inmates are often housed outside the circuit

in which they were sentenced. The decision below

therefore means that “different inmates in the same

federal prisons will be subject to different rules based on

the happenstance of whether they were sentenced in the

Ninth Circuit.” App. 59a (quoting Pet. for Reh’g En Banc

2). That disuniformity is not merely untidy; it “interfer[es]

with the BOP’s carefully constructed Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program.” Kidd, 23 F.4th at 787. The

IFRP depends on inmates and BOP staff working

together to set voluntary, flexible financial plans that

balance restitution against savings for necessities and

reentry. See United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042,

1050 (9th Cir. 2008); 28 C.F.R. § 545.11; App. 43a, 60a. A

rule that lets the government take accumulated savings

automatically whenever a balance crosses a “substantial”

line—without interests-of-justice review—cuts against

that program for defendants sentenced in the Ninth

Circuit while leaving it intact for everyone else.

Such a rule threatens administrative and disciplinary

havoc in the federal prison system. Instead of applying

18

one uniform set of criteria to all inmates, BOP counselors

must develop different IFRP plans for inmates sentenced

in the Ninth Circuit and inmates sentenced elsewhere.

This disuniformity plays out within individual federal

prisons—inmate by inmate and account by account:

different inmates in the same prison facility face different

automatic turnover regimes. That disparate treatment—

especially of emotionally freighted resources such as

friends-and-family deposits—risks creating morale and

disciplinary problems within the federal prison system,

and interfering with the BOP’s Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program. See Kidd, 23 F.4th at 787.

C.

The stakes for federal prisoners are high.

As the en banc dissent explained, the decision reaches

“questions of exceptional national importance.” App. 59a.

Inmate trust accounts hold the funds prisoners need for

hygiene, medical co-pays, postage and telephone contact

with family and counsel, and reentry—needs that families

fill at an average of roughly $2,500 per inmate per year.

App. 60a. See Anna VanCleave, Prison Banking, 112 Cal.

L. Rev. 1699, 1702-03 (2024) (inmate trust accounts are

compulsory, low-transparency accounts on which

prisoners depend for necessities); see also Sean Kolkey,

People over Profit: The Case for Abolishing the Prison

Financial System, 110 Cal. L. Rev. 257, 267-70 (2022)

(families and friends pay over $3 billion to stay in contact

with and provide necessities for incarcerated people);

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program: Procedures,

88 Fed. Reg. 1331, 1331-32 (proposed Jan. 10, 2023) (BOP

recognizing “the importance of planning for re-entry,

including the availability of financial resources”).

Congress itself has recognized the importance of

release savings, reserving 15% of certain prison wages “to

assist the inmate with costs associated with release.” 18

U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4). The decision below permits the

19

automatic turnover of an inmate’s modest accumulated

deposits without any consideration of the inmate’s

individual circumstances or the interests of justice. The

concurrence treated the small sum as a reason to deny

review, noting the government secured “just $1,200”—

“about four percent” of the funds Myers had received over

the prior decade of incarceration. App. 37a. That gets it

backwards: the modesty of the sums is precisely why the

aggregation rule is so consequential. Section 3664(k)

exists to let courts weigh exactly these equities. That

discretion is especially important where, as here, the

funds at issue are modest savings accumulated for

release, because financial stability during reentry is

widely recognized as a critical factor in successful

reintegration and reduced recidivism.4 The decision below

removes that safeguard for the class of cases—small,

gradually accumulated savings—where it matters most.

III. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG.

A.

The text forecloses aggregation over time.

Section 3664(n) applies to an inmate who “receives

substantial resources.” The present-tense “receives” fixes

the moment of analysis at receipt. “Congress’ use of a verb

tense is significant,” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S.

See Reservation of Funds for Reentry Under the First Step Act,

88 Fed. Reg. 77,064, 77,065–66 (proposed Nov. 8, 2023) (reserved

funds must be available “on the inmate’s first day of reentry” so that

“inmates will be more financially prepared for reentry”); Inmate

Financial Responsibility Program: Procedures, 88 Fed. Reg. 1331,

1331-34 (proposed Jan. 10, 2023); 28 C.F.R. § 571.20 (“It is the policy

of the Bureau of Prisons that an inmate being released to the

community will have suitable clothing, transportation to the

inmate’s release destination, and some funds to use until he or she

begins to receive income.”); Megan Schwartz, MDRC, Support for

the Journey Home: An Impact Study of the Returning Citizens

Stimulus Program 6 (2025) (cash assistance at release nearly

halved parole violations in the first six months).

4

20

329, 333 (1992). Although “words used in the present tense

include the future as well as the present,” 1 U.S.C. § 1,

“the present tense generally does not include the past,”

Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010). Nor does

the simple present reach wholly past conduct. See

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,

Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (a statute’s use of the simple

present—there, “to be in violation”—does not reach

wholly past conduct). A statute keyed to one who

“receives” substantial resources does not reach one who

“has received” modest deposits and accumulated them

into a substantial balance.

This Court has recently underscored that Congress’s

choice among tenses is deliberate and consequential—

particularly where neighboring provisions use a different

tense. See Hewitt v. United States, 606 U.S. 419, 427-30

(2025) (present-perfect “has not been imposed” connects

past and present, and “adjacent provisions’” differing

tenses are meaningful). Section 3664 proves the point:

where Congress meant to reach past events, it used the

present perfect. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1) (“has

received”); § 3664(f)(1)(B) (“has received”). Its choice of

the simple present “receives” in § 3664(n) fixes the inquiry

at the moment of receipt.

The majority’s move—reading “receives... now or in

the future” to license summing deposits until a balance

becomes substantial, 170 F.4th at 1185-86—does not

follow from the Dictionary Act. That the present tense

“include[s] the future” means the statute reaches

resources that will be received; it says nothing about

combining separate, non-substantial past receipts into a

later “substantial” whole.

Nor does the plural “resources” supply the missing

step. It confirms only that a single receipt may comprise

multiple resources—for example, a settlement paid by

21

several defendants at once—that together are substantial

when received; it does not detach the substantiality

inquiry from the moment of receipt. The statutory

modifier “substantial” attaches to what the inmate

“receives,” and “receives” is present tense. As the en banc

dissent put it, at the time of turnover Myers’s funds “were

not funds he would receive in the future but had not yet

received.” “[H]e was already in possession of the funds,”

which “were the aggregate of resources [he] had acquired

in the past.” App. 48a. Nothing in § 3664(n) directs a court

to measure substantiality against an accumulated balance

rather than the resources received.

B. The Dictionary Act’s singular-plural rule does not

license aggregation.

Congress’s use of the singular “source” instead of the

plural “sources” is further evidence of its narrow intent.

To avoid that commonsense reading the majority leaned

on the Dictionary Act to hold that the singular “source”

“include[s] the plural.” 170 F.4th at 1185. But “[t]he

Dictionary Act does not transform every use of the

singular... into the plural”; “[i]nstead, it tells us only that

a statute using the singular... can apply to multiple

persons, parties, or things.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593

U.S. 155, 164 (2021). The statute is not naturally read to

treat funds received from a “source” as funds received

from multiple “sources.” And where the Dictionary Act

would require a court to depart from the ordinary and

natural meaning of a statutory phrase, the statute’s text

controls. See 1 U.S.C. § 1; Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony,

Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 199-200

(1993).

C.

Section 3664(k) is the better fit for gradual

accumulation.

Context confirms that § 3664(n) reaches isolated

windfalls, not gradual accumulation. Congress supplied a

22

separate tool for the situation the decision below

addressed: gradual accumulation of funds into significant

resources. Under § 3664(k), when an inmate’s savings

grow over time, that is a “material change in the

defendant’s economic circumstances.” Section 3664(k)

empowers the court to “adjust the payment schedule, or

require immediate payment in full, as the interests of

justice require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k); see Kidd, 23 F.4th at

787-88; Evans, 48 F.4th at 891.

That division tracks the statute’s history: the Senate

Report Congress designated as the MVRA’s legislative

history treats § 3664(k)’s “material change” mechanism

and the incarcerated-defendant provision as distinct, the

latter addressed to “substantial resources acquired”

during incarceration. See S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 14-15, 21

(1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111-12 (1996) (Conf.

Rep.) (designating S. Rep. No. 104-179 as the subtitle’s

legislative history). Where the only basis for turnover is

that non-substantial receipts have accumulated into a

substantial balance, § 3664(k)—not § 3664(n)—is the

provision that fits: it addresses changed circumstances

and supplies a judicial check.

The floor history is more pointed still. What became

§ 3664(n) “drew on provisions in S. 1404,” a bill addressed

to prisoners who “file a prisoner lawsuit and receive a

windfall,” so that the “windfall will go to the victims and

not to the prisoner.” 142 Cong. Rec. S3379 (daily ed. Apr.

16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Grassley). As its sponsor

explained, the enacted provision reaches “windfalls

received by prisoners from all sources, including

lawsuits.” Id. “Any source” describes where a windfall

may come from. It is not a license to aggregate everyday

deposits until they resemble one.

The decision below dismissed overlap between

§ 3664(n) and § 3664(k) as harmless. 170 F.4th at 1190. But

23

by treating gradually accumulated modest savings as

“substantial resources” under § 3664(n), the Ninth Circuit

removes from § 3664(k), and its interests-of-justice

safeguard, the very cases for which Congress created the

provision. The result also renders § 3664(k) largely

superfluous: whenever an inmate’s accumulated deposits

amount to a “material change” in economic circumstances,

the same funds are automatically subject to § 3664(n)’s

mandatory turnover. Courts avoid superfluity when

possible. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001);

Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009).

D. The concurrence’s contrary policy concern is

misplaced—and answered by § 3664(k).

The concurrence warned that excluding aggregation

would let an inmate “carve up a $100,000 windfall... into

daily payments” to evade turnover. App. 40a. Not so. A

genuine windfall is substantial when the recipient

becomes entitled to it, however the obligor schedules

payment. That is how the law ordinarily treats such

rights: an heir acquires inherited property at the

decedent’s death even if distribution comes later and

income is received when its recipient “first became

entitled” to it.5 The substantial-at-receipt reading turns

5

See Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 334 (1930); Drye v. United

States, 528 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1999) (heir held “a valuable, transferable,

legally protected right” to the estate “at his mother’s death,”

making the inheritance “property” subject to federal collection);

North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424

(1932); see also Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966) (a

property interest “is not outside” the law’s “reach because it is novel

or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed”); cf.

Comm’r v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 111 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir.

1940) (obligation payable in installments “matured” in full at death);

In re Lonstein, 950 F.2d 77, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1991) (undistributed

bequest that vested at the testator’s death was property of the

debtor’s bankruptcy estate even though distribution came later); In

24

on the character of the resource received, not on the

mechanics by which a single award is disbursed. In any

event, any true accumulation of savings is a “material

change” in economic circumstances reachable under

§ 3664(k), which lets the court order immediate payment

in full “as the interests of justice require.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3664(k). The government thus loses nothing it is entitled

to. It must proceed under the provision Congress wrote

for accumulation, with the judicial check Congress

attached. The en banc dissent made the same points. App.

52a-53a.

IV. THIS IS A CLEAN VEHICLE.

This case is a good vehicle. The question is a pure

question of statutory interpretation, decided below on de

novo review. From the outset, Myers contended that

§ 3664(n) does not reach the gradual accumulation of

modest deposits in an inmate trust account; his opening

brief framed that contention in windfall and single-source

terms, and Judge McKeown’s dissent articulated its

receipt-time form. The panel majority squarely

considered and rejected the “substantial at the time of

receipt” reading, 170 F.4th at 1185-86, and Myers pressed

it in seeking rehearing en banc, so the question was

pressed and passed upon below.

The conflict is fully ventilated in published opinions—

a four-judge en banc dissent, a separate statement by

three more judges, and a panel dissent—and the

re Ryerson, 739 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1984) (interest contingent

at filing and not payable until a future event was estate property);

In re Neuton, 922 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1990) (same for a

contingent trust interest); Matter of Brown, 86 B.R. 944, 947-48

(N.D. Ind. 1988) (right to $1.5 million in lottery winnings payable

$1,000 per week was property of the estate at filing); cf. Helvering

v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940) (“The power to dispose of income

is the equivalent of ownership of it.”).

25

government defends the outlier rule. And this question

calls for this Court’s urgent resolution. Every day the

decision stands, the Bureau of Prisons must administer a

fractured restitution regime, and the families of inmates

sentenced in the Ninth Circuit—and only those inmates—

lose the modest sums they set aside for commissary needs

and release.

Nor does the modest amount at stake counsel against

review. Instead, the small sum is the point. Section

3664(n)’s automatic-turnover rule bites hardest on exactly

the modest, gradually accumulated balances the decision

below sweeps in. Those are the only kinds of balances that

the poorest inmates—the inmates most in need of some

financial lifeline while in prison and upon release—will

ever amass. And that so small an amount was turned over

without interests-of-justice review illustrates both the

legal error and its system-wide stakes.

The question will also recur: Myers remains

incarcerated and continues to receive modest deposits

from family and friends, as do countless federal inmates

with outstanding restitution obligations. As the dissent

from denial of rehearing en banc explained below, this

case “involves questions of exceptional national

importance for prison management, inmates, and the

courts.” App. 59a. It warrants this Court’s review.

26

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM MILES POPE

GODDARD POPE PLLC

967 E. Parkcenter Blvd.,

Ste. 1010

Boise, ID 83706

(208) 329-5671

miles@goddard-pope.com

AUGUST 2026

R. STANTON JONES

ANDREW T. TUTT

Counsel of Record

TRIAL LAWYERS FOR

JUSTICE

421 W. Water Street

Decorah, IA 52101

(866) 854-5529

andrew@TL4J.com