Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Galesburg Community Unit School District No. 205, Petitioner v. N. T., Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of C. T., et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 4, 2026
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No. _________
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
Galesburg Community Unit School District No. 205,
Petitioner,
v.
N.T. and P.T., individually and as parents
and next friends of C.T.,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Caitlin Frazier Satterly
Counsel of Record
Michelle Amanda Todd
George Alonso Acosta
HODGES, LOIZZI, EISENHAMMER,
RODICK & KOHN LLP
401 SW Water Street
Suite 106
Peoria, Illinois 61603
(309) 671-9000
fsatterly@hlerk.com
mtodd@hlerk.com
gacosta@hlerk.com
LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com
QUESTION PRESENTED
The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act directs that a district court reviewing a state
hearing officer's decision "shall receive the records of
the administrative proceedings" and "shall hear
additional evidence at the request of a party." 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)–(ii). From the first command,
this Court inferred a requirement that the court give
"due weight" to the administrative proceedings.
Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206
(1982).
The question presented here is whether the
statutory language requiring a court to “hear
additional evidence at the request of a party" permits
a district court to set aside the required deference to
the administrative decision by receiving evidence of
events occurring after the fact and deciding the
question anew as of the time of trial. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(C)(i)–(ii)
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner Galesburg Community Unit School
District No. 205 is an Illinois public school district
organized under the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS
1/et seq.
Respondents N.T. and P.T., individually and as
parents and next friends of C.T., are natural persons
and citizens of the State of Illinois.
ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (C.D. Ill.):
N.T. and P.T., Individually and as Parent of C.T.
v. Galesburg Community Unit School District
No. 205, No. 4:24-cv-04124-JEH (Dec. 6, 2024)
United States Court of Appeals (7th Cir.):
N.T. and P.T., Individually and as Parent of C.T.
v. Galesburg Community Unit School District
No. 205, No. 25-1013 (May 6, 2026)
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented ..................................................... i
Parties to the Proceedings ......................................... ii
Related Proceedings .................................................. iii
Table of Authorities ................................................. vii
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari..................................1
Opinions Below ...........................................................1
Jurisdiction..................................................................1
Statutory Provisions Involved ....................................1
Introduction .................................................................2
Statement ....................................................................8
A. Legal Background ............................................9
B. Factual Background .......................................12
C. Proceedings Below ..........................................15
Reasons for Granting the Writ .................................18
I.
Rowley’s “Due Weight” Mandate is Inconsistently
Applied Across the Courts of Appeals ................18
A. The Rowley “Due Weight” Standard ..............19
iv
B. Rowley’s Due Weight Mandate is
Inconsistently Applied, Leading to
Uncertainty for Students, Their Families,
and School Districts. ......................................21
II. The IDEA and Rowley’s “Due Weight” Mandate
Dictate Review of the Administrative Decision at
the Time it was Made .........................................24
III. The Seventh Circuit Erred in its “Due Weight”
Analysis ...............................................................27
IV. Failure to Afford “Due Weight” Creates an
Untenable and Inconsistent Least Restrictive
Environment Standard.......................................31
A. The Statute Does Not Address When a School
District Can Recommend a Change in
Placement .......................................................32
i.
The Circuit Split .............................32
ii.
The Seventh Circuit’s “No-Test”
LRE Analysis Allows for New
Evidence to be Applied
Retrospectively ...............................34
iii.
The Appropriate LRE Test and
Importance of a Due Weight
Standard .........................................36
V. This Court Regularly Grants Review to Clarify
the IDEA .............................................................37
v
VI. This Case is an Excellent Vehicle for Resolving
the Questions Presented ....................................38
Conclusion .................................................................39
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Adams v. State of Oregon,
195 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) ...................................24
Alex R., ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty.
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 221,
375 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2004) .....................................22
Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy,
548 U.S. 291 (2006) ...............................................9, 38
Beth B. v. Van Clay,
282 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2002) .....................................34
Board of Education v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176 (1982) ............ 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 18, 19, 20-22
24, 28-30, 36, 37
Burilovich v. Board of Educ. of the Lincoln
Consolidated Schools,
208 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2000) .....................................22
Carlisle Area School v. Scott P.,
62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995) ........................................25
C.B. by & through K.B. v. Henry Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
167 F.4th 1134 (11th Cir. 2026) ...............................33
C.D. ex rel. M.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist.,
924 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2019) .....................................34
vii
Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F.,
526 U.S. 66 (1999) .....................................................38
Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
873 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1989) .....................................23
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ.,
874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989) ....................... 32, 33, 36
Dong v. Bd. of Educ. of Rochester Cmty. Schs.,
197 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 1999) .....................................22
Doyle v. Arlington County School Board,
953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991) .....................................23
D.S. v. Bayonne Board of Education,
602 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 2010) ......................................24
Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1,
580 U.S. 386 (2017) ..................... 3, 4, 8, 24, 29, 36, 38
Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) .................................................3, 20
Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305 (1988) ...................................................38
Kerkam v. McKenzie,
862 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ...................................23
Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. George L. on Behalf
of Brock L.,
102 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 1996) .....................................30
Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools,
598 U.S. 142 (2023) .............................................29, 37
viii
R.E. v. New York City Dept. of Educ.,
694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2802 (2013) ...............................................25
Reyes ex rel. R.P. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ.,
760 F.3d 211 (2d. Cir. 2014) .....................................21
Rockner v. Walter,
700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) .............................32, 33
Roland M. v. Concord School Committee,
910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990) .....................................24
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v.
Rachel H.,
4 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................. 33-34
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49 (2005) ...............................................10, 38
Shore Regional High School Bd. of Ed. v. P.S.,
381 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2004) ................................24, 29
Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass.,
655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1981) .....................................21
Town of Burlington v. Department of Education,
736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir.1984), affirmed,
471 U.S. 359 ..............................................................30
Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma Cty. Sch.
Dist.,
550 U.S. 516 (2007) ...................................................38
ix
Statutes and Regulations
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 .............................3, 9
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. .................. 1, 3, 8, 9
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) .................................................9
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) ...............................................10
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) .................................................9
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) .................. 2, 3, 4, 10, 31, 34
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)......................................................3
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) .......................................11
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) .......................................26
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A) ..........................................37
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(B)...............................................10
20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) .......................... 25-26
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) ...............................................11
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) ....................................................26
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) ......................................................3
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) .......................................2, 11
x
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)........................................26
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) ..............................................3, 4
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) .......................................2, 11
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) .......................................2, 11
105 ILCS 5/14-8.02c ..................................................11
34 C.F.R. § 300.115 ...................................................10
34 C.F.R. § 300.115(b)(1)-(2) .....................................35
34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) ...............................................26
Other Authorities
121 Cong.Rec. 19498 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Dole)...............................................................3, 20
Alexis Cherry, A Good “IDEA” With No Clear Plan:
The Lack of Uniformity in Evaluating Compliance
with the IDEA’s Least Restrictive Environment
Provision Has Led to Arbitrary Segregation of
Children with Disabilities Across the United States,
35 UC Law SF Gender & Just. 3 (2024).....................8
Daniel W. Morton-Bentley, The Rowley Enigma:
How Much Weight is Due to IDEA State
Administrative Proceedings in Federal Court?,
36 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 428
(2016) ...................................................................18, 21
xi
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Galesburg Community Unit School
District No. 205, respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Pet. App. 1a) is
published at 174 F.4th 1044. The opinion of the
United States District Court for the Central District
of Illinois (Pet. App. 31a) is unpublished but available
at 2024 WL 7035360. The opinion of the Illinois State
Board of Education (Pet. App. 50a) is also
unpublished.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was entered on May
6, 2026. Pet. App. 1a. This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., provides that
students with disabilities cannot be removed from the
“regular education environment” and placed into
“special classes,” “separate schooling,” or other
options, unless “the nature or severity of the disability
… is such that education in the regular classes with
1
the use of supplementary aides and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
Relatedly, when selecting a student with disabilities’
educational placement, school districts must select
the placement that “[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate,” places the child in “an educational
environment with children who are not disabled[.]”
Id.
Parents may bring complaints related to a
student’s education and “shall have an opportunity
for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be
conducted by the State educational agency or by the
local educational agency[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
“Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision of
a State educational agency or local educational
agency shall have the right to bring a civil action …
which action may be brought in any State court of
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the
United States[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In such
civil actions, the court: “(i) shall receive the records of
the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear
additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii)
basing its decision on the preponderance of the
evidence, shall grant such relief as the court
determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).
INTRODUCTION
This case presents a startling example of
federal courts intruding into substantive educational
decisions that are traditionally—and properly—
within the realm of state and local school officials.
Indeed, when Congress enacted IDEA, it emphasized
2
the primary role of the States in the formulation and
execution of educational policy. See 121 Cong.Rec.
19498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole) (“Historically, the
States have had the primary responsibility for the
education of children at the elementary and
secondary level.”). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education
in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities”).
For more than fifty years, federal law has
guaranteed children with disabilities a free
appropriate public education. Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94142, 89 Stat. 773; see Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. That education
must be provided, to the maximum extent
appropriate, alongside children who are not disabled.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Congress gave parents the
right to participate in developing their child’s
individualized education program, id. § 1414(d); the
right to challenge that program in an impartial
administrative due process hearing, id. § 1415(f); and
the right to judicial review of the hearing officer’s
decision, id. § 1415(i)(2).
In Rowley, and again in Endrew F., this Court
held that the education Congress guaranteed must be
meaningful. A school must offer a program
“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas County School
District RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017); accord Board
of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982) (an
3
IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits”).
This Court was equally clear about the limits
of the judicial role. The IDEA vests school officials
“with responsibility for decisions of critical
importance to the life of a disabled child.” Id. at 404.
Courts must not “substitute their own notions of
sound educational policy for those of the school
authorities which they review.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at
206. They must give “due weight” to the state
administrative proceedings. Ibid. And “the question is
whether an IEP is reasonable, not whether the court
regards it as ideal.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 387.
Judicial review under § 1415(i)(2) was never intended
to be a trial de novo.
Yet the decisions below permit exactly that.
The student at issue, C.T., was in first grade and
presented severe behavioral challenges while at his
neighborhood school, routinely causing physical harm
to his peers and school staff. Nor was C.T. making
meaningful educational progress. In formulating
C.T.’s original individualized educational program
(IEP) in December 2023, school officials determined
that C.T. required placement in a therapeutic day
school setting, which had the embedded behavioral
and structural support needed to manage C.T.’s
severe behaviors. C.T.’s parents challenged this
placement decision, arguing that C.T.’s proposed
placement violated IDEA’s substantive requirement
that students with disabilities receive their education
in the “least restrictive environment” (LRE). 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). After a multi-day
4
administrative hearing before an independent
hearing officer (IHO) with extensive experience in
educational matters, the IHO affirmed the school
officials’ proposed placement and ruled that the
placement did not violate IDEA’s LRE provision. The
IHO set forth her reasoning in a detailed written
opinion. The underlying administrative record in this
case is well over 1,600 pages.
The parents then challenged the IHO’s decision
in federal court. The district court received additional
evidence in a one-day bench trial. The majority of
testimony was from witnesses who had already
testified in the administrative due process hearing,
however, two of parents’ witnesses testified to their
observations of C.T. after the IHO’s decision and
while C.T. was in his stay-put placement in the selfcontained classroom at Silas Willard Elementary
School (“EBD classroom”). It was on the basis of this
new, after-the-fact testimony regarding the student’s
progress that the district court overturned the IHO’s
decision in December 2024. The court concluded that
the proposed placement of C.T. at a private
therapeutic day school violated IDEA’s LRE
requirement because, in the court’s view, the school
district failed to provide C.T. with a dedicated 1-to-1
aide. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the
district court “relied heavily on post-hearing
developments and new expert testimony not reviewed
by the hearing officer.” (Pet. App. 16a).
And therein lies the rub. The IHO decided
whether the school district’s December 2023
placement decision was sound when it was made.
5
The district court decided something else entirely—
whether, in light of everything that had happened in
the eight months since, C.T. should remain where this
litigation had kept him. Those are different questions,
and the latter is not contemplated by statute. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed based upon a “sliding scale”
of due deference, finding that because the district
court heard additional evidence, the IHO’s decision
should be given little to no weight—without any
consideration of the timing of the evidence. Under the
rule articulated by the Seventh Circuit, deference to
the administrative decision does not merely shrink, it
disappears altogether.
The line Congress drew (or attempted to draw)
is not hard to state. A reviewing court may hear
evidence bearing on the circumstances as they existed
when the administrative decision was made. It may
not decide the question over again on events that
came later—otherwise, what is the point of the
impartial due process hearing and procedural
safeguards afforded by the IDEA?
Moreover, the upshot of the lower courts’
rulings necessarily impacts the least restrictive
environment standard. Because of the improper
deference standard articulated, the courts have
created a rule requiring school officials to exhaust all
possible interventions and accommodations prior to
recommending a student’s change in placement to a
more restrictive educational setting. This does not
reconcile with any enunciated test regarding the least
restrictive environment (of which there are four
across the circuits) or the statute itself. Nor does it
6
take into consideration that the statute itself provides
for a meaningful way for the student’s IEP team to
evaluate additional data regarding a student’s
placement after the fact via the IDEA’s IEP annual
review mandate.
The practical implications of this decision
cannot be overlooked. A losing party now has every
reason to sue: a second evidentiary proceeding is
available as of right, the evidence it generates must
be heard, and the decision under challenge will be
discounted in proportion to that evidence. It is a
second bite at the apple with new evidence the IEP
team did not base its decision on at the time. The
child, meanwhile, remains where the litigation found
him—losing out on the benefits of the placement his
IEP team selected while the cost of litigation soars
and a process that should have been resolved
expeditiously drags on for months.
The inconsistent manner in which federal
courts are evaluating deference (and in turn, least
restrictive environment) issues is highly problematic
for students, their families, and the school districts
who are ultimately responsible for providing an
appropriate education to students with disabilities.
This case presents an optimal opportunity for this
Court to clarify the appropriate deference standard
owed to state officials that is paramount to IDEA’s
system of cooperative federalism. Consistent with the
statutory language and those principles, federal
courts shall take additional evidence, but give little to
no weight to post-hearing evidence unrelated to the
7
circumstances giving rise to the administrative
hearing officer’s factual findings at the time.
STATEMENT
Under IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., public
schools must provide children with disabilities a “free
appropriate public education” (FAPE) in the “least
restrictive environment” (LRE). This Court has, on
prior occasions, addressed what is required for a
school district to provide FAPE to students with
disabilities. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 (1982); Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty.
Sch. Dist., 580 U.S. 386 (2017). However, this Court
has never addressed IDEA’s LRE requirement. As a
result, the Courts of Appeals have become
significantly divided over the proper test to determine
compliance with IDEA’s LRE requirement, leading to
a wide range of outcomes for students with
disabilities based solely on the geographic location of
the student and his/her school district. See, e.g.,
Alexis Cherry, A Good “IDEA” With No Clear Plan:
The Lack of Uniformity in Evaluating Compliance
with the IDEA’s Least Restrictive Environment
Provision Has Led to Arbitrary Segregation of
Children with Disabilities Across the United States,
35 UC Law SF Gender & Just. 3, 11 (2024).
Additionally, in Rowley, this Court directed
that district courts must give “due weight” to the
results of IDEA administrative proceedings and must
not “substitute their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of the school authorities,” whose
decision the court is reviewing. Rowley, 458 U.S. at
8
206. Indeed, Rowley emphasized that “[t]he very
importance which Congress has attached to
compliance with certain procedures in the
preparation of an IEP would be frustrated if a court
were permitted to set state decisions at nought.” Since
Rowley was decided, however, this Court has not
further addressed what it means for district courts to
give “due weight” to administrative proceedings,
particularly in cases where district courts have
admitted
additional
evidence
beyond
the
administrative record. As a result, courts have not
consistently applied the “due weight” standard,
leading to wildly varied outcomes for the most
vulnerable of the student population.
A. Legal Background
Congress first passed the IDEA as part of the
Education of the Handicapped Act in 1970, 84 Stat.
175, and amended it substantially in the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 89 Stat.
773. IDEA offers states federal funds toward
educating children with disabilities. 84 Stat. 175, as
amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; see Arlington
Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
291, 295 (2006). In return for the funds, states pledge
to comply with a number of statutory conditions
under IDEA. IDEA and its implementing regulations
provide two substantive requirements. States shall
provide eligible students with a free appropriate
public education (FAPE), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1), in
the least restrictive environment (LRE), 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(5). IDEA is frequently characterized as a
model of “cooperative federalism” in that it leaves to
9
the states the primary responsibility for developing
and executing educational programs for students with
disabilities, but imposes significant requirements to
be followed in the implementation of that
responsibility. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
Under IDEA’s LRE provision, states can
remove a child from the “regular education
environment” and place the child into “special
classes,” “separate schooling,” or other restrictive
options, only when “the nature or severity of the
disability ... is such that education in regular classes
with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” Id. States must
also mainstream students with disabilities—that is,
provide them an education with non-disabled peers—
to the “maximum extent appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(5)(A). Accordingly, states must make
available “a continuum of alternative placements,”
ranging from more to less mainstreamed. 34 C.F.R. §
300.115.
When children are deemed eligible for special
education by local authorities, schools craft an
individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(4). This is a “written statement ... developed,
reviewed, and revised” by a team of stakeholders. 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). The stakeholders include a
child's parents, teachers, and other qualified
educators. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(B). An IEP must be
tailored to meet the individual needs of the disabled
child by stating the student's present levels of
performance, setting measurable annual goals, and
10
explaining how progress toward meeting those goals
will be measured. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
Parents who believe an IEP violates their
child's statutory rights are entitled to review. In the
first instance, relief must be sought in state
administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
Illinois enacted qualifications and guidance for the
independent hearing officers who conduct such
proceedings, which include requirements related to
educational background and knowledge of IDEA. 105
ILCS 5/14-8.02c. The hearing officer then determines
whether the school district has met IDEA’s
requirements, including, when applicable, whether
the school district has provided the student with
FAPE in the LRE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(1)(A).
Any party “aggrieved by the findings and
decision” of a hearing officer may sue in state or
federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In such cases,
the court “(i) shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional
evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its
decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall
grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). Though the
district court independently evaluates the witnesses
and evidence and can expand the record with an
evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer's findings and
decision are still entitled to “due weight.” See Bd. of
Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
11
B. Factual Background
At the time this dispute began, C.T. was a 1st
grade student who qualified for special education
services under the disability category of Other Health
Impairment (OHI), pursuant to an eligibility meeting
on December 5, 2023. (Pet. App. 51a). Prior to
becoming eligible for special education services in
December 2023, 1 C.T. initially attended Kindergarten
at Silas Willard Elementary, his local public school,
before transferring to King Elementary (another
public school in the District) at his family’s request.
(Pet. App. 33a). In October 2023, a Functional
Behavior Assessment was conducted, identifying
physical aggression, disruptive behavior, and
elopement as primary challenges. (Pet. App. 33a). The
resulting Behavior Intervention Plan was not
particularly successful in remediating these
behaviors, as daily behavioral incidents continued,
occasionally resulting in injuries to staff members.
(Pet. App. 33a).
In November 2023, per a mediation agreement,
C.T. returned to Silas Willard Elementary, this time
entering a self-contained classroom for students with
emotional
and
behavioral
disorders
(“EBD
Classroom”). (Pet. App. 33a). The EBD Classroom
provided C.T. with embedded social skills training
and therapeutic activities which comprised about 75%
of his day. (Pet. App. 34a). At the time C.T. entered
the EBD Classroom, there were seven students and
The School District sought to evaluate C.T. for special
education eligibility as early as February 2023, but his parents
refused consent for the evaluation at that time.
1
12
three adults (including one special education teacher,
and two paraprofessional aides). (Pet. App. 61a).
C.T.’s behaviors did not improve after his transfer to
the EBD Classroom, and he displayed difficult
behaviors every day including elopement, work
refusal, loud verbalizations, climbing on furniture,
and throwing items in the classroom. (Pet. App. 61a).
C.T.’s behaviors were some of the most severe in the
EBD classroom. (Pet. App. 61a). Moreover, academic
demands for C.T. were significantly reduced in order
to prevent C.T. from becoming frustrated, as
frustration caused his behaviors to escalate, including
physically aggressive behavior toward students and
staff. (Pet. App. 61a).
On December 12 and 15, 2023, an IEP was
developed for C.T. (Pet. App. 62a). The IEP provided
that C.T.’s educational placement would be at a
therapeutic day school (High Road Peoria). (Pet. App.
62a). The IEP team found that C.T. did not require a
dedicated 1:1 aide within the EBD Classroom as an
additional support. (Pet. App. 63a). Among other
reasons, the IEP team determined that this
arrangement would not allow a student with
behavioral difficulties like C.T. to appropriately
request assistance and attention from others. (Pet.
App. 63a). Further, the IEP team determined that
C.T. already had continual one-on-one adult support
within the EBD Classroom and still failed to make
progress. (Pet. App. 63a). Critically, the IEP team
found that High Road Peoria’s therapeutic model
would enable more intensive behavioral interventions
than the EBD Classroom could provide, addressing
13
C.T.’s need for a structured environment to support
replacement behaviors. (Pet. App. 34a).
The School District’s briefing in the Seventh
Circuit dedicates numerous pages to describing the
severe and violent nature of C.T.’s behavior within
the EBD classroom. The following uncontroverted
examples, all corroborated within the administrative
record, are a mere illustration and are not an
exhaustive list:
•
C.T.’s December 12, 2023, IEP, found that
within a two week period, C.T. engaged in
physical aggression 163 times.
•
One of C.T.’s goals within the December 2023
IEP was to reduce physical incidents from 40
episodes per day to 35 episodes per day.
•
During the fall semester of 2023, C.T. engaged
in the following behavior:
o Punching a student in the stomach and
kicking a staff member in the stomach
when she intervened.
o Hitting a peer multiple times and then
pushed the student into metal
playground equipment.
o Hitting staff members with open and
closed fists.
14
o Hitting staff members multiple times on
their heads, as well as kicking them and
pulling their hair, while stating that he
wanted to make them cry because he
“like[d] when they cried.”
o Grabbing a staff member by the throat
with such force as to leave a red mark
and bruise.
This
contextual
summary
is
essential
to
understanding the School District’s placement
determination.
C. Proceedings Below
After the December 2023 IEP meetings, where
the team determined that C.T. required placement at
High Road Peoria, C.T.’s parents requested a due
process hearing. (Pet. App. 35a). 2 The parents
contended that the District’s proposed placement of
C.T. violated the IDEA’s LRE requirement and that
the District failed to consider whether other inDistrict supports could be implemented for C.T., such
as assigning a 1:1 paraprofessional. (Pet. App. 35a).
After a three-day due process hearing in March and
April 2024, an impartial hearing officer (IHO) ruled
that the District met its obligations under IDEA,
affirming the IEP team’s determination that High
2 As a result of the Parents’ request for a due process hearing,
C.T. remained within the EBD classroom pursuant to the “stay
put” provision of IDEA, which allows a child to remain at his/her
current educational placement pending resolution of a dispute.
(Pet. App. 32a-33a).
15
Road Peoria, or a similar therapeutic setting, was the
appropriate LRE based on C.T.’s needs and
behavioral challenges. (Pet. App. 35a). In the written
opinion, the IHO expressly found that C.T. did not
require a 1:1 aide within the EBD classroom, and the
IHO thoroughly explained her reasoning for this
determination. (Pet. App. 74a-75a).
C.T.’s parents then sought judicial review of
the IHO’s decision in federal district court. (Pet. App.
8a). In October 2024, the district court held a bench
trial to supplement the administrative record with
additional evidence. (Pet. App. 8a). The additional
evidence included witness testimony from C.T.’s
parents, C.T.’s private counselor, C.T.’s occupational
therapist,
C.T.’s
classroom
teacher,
a
paraprofessional working in the EBD classroom, and
the School District’s Behavior Interventionist. (Pet.
App. 37a). 3 The district court heard conflicting
testimony about C.T.’s progress (or lack thereof) in
the EBD classroom since the due process hearing was
completed. (Pet. App. 37a-40a).
In December 2024, the district court reversed
the IHO’s decision, finding that the school district’s
placement of C.T. at High Road Peoria violated
IDEA’s LRE requirement. (Pet. App. 9a). Relying
almost exclusively on evidence produced at trial, the
district court found that C.T. had made progress
within the EBD classroom since the due process
hearing and that C.T. would benefit from the
implementation of a 1:1 aide within the EBD
3 The majority of these witnesses had already testified at the due
process hearing.
16
classroom,
contrary
to
the
IEP
team’s
recommendation and the IHO’s finding on that issue.
(Pet. App. 9a-10a). The district court thus ordered the
school district to “create an appropriate IEP” to
educate C.T. within the EBD classroom. (Pet. App.
49a).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. First, in
addressing Rowley’s “due weight” mandate—that is,
how much weight was the district court required to
give the IHO’s decision—the Seventh Circuit found
that the IHO’s decision was entitled to “less
deference” and that the district court did not err by
giving the IHO’s decision the weight it did (if any).
(Pet. App. 17a).
Regarding the substantive LRE analysis, the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme
Court has yet to interpret the LRE provision, and that
“without much guidance,” nearly every circuit has
adopted a multi-factor test for analyzing the IDEA’s
LRE mandate. (Pet. App. 20a). Applying its own
framework, the Seventh Circuit found that the
district court did not clearly err by finding that C.T.
could receive a satisfactory education within the EBD
classroom with additional supports, namely the
implementation of a dedicated 1:1 aide. (Pet. App.
24a-28a). Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s reversal of the IHO, as the school
district’s proposal to place C.T. at High Road Peoria
purportedly did not mainstream C.T. to the maximum
extent appropriate. (Pet. App. 30a).
17
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The inconsistent application of Rowley’s due
weight standard (458 U.S. at 206) undermines
confidence in local and state administrative
proceedings meant to expeditiously resolve special
education disputes, leaving families and school
districts in limbo. This case cleanly presents the legal
issues on a well-developed set of facts which should be
used to provide clarity on the weight that must be
given administrative decisions in IDEA cases.
I. Rowley’s “Due Weight” Mandate is
Inconsistently Applied Across the Courts of
Appeals.
IDEA does not specify how much deference
should be given by courts to administrative findings.
Nor does IDEA specify the standards governing the
admission of additional evidence in the district court,
and whether and to what extent deference to the
administrative decision is modified once additional
evidence is received in the district court. See, e.g.,
Daniel W. Morton-Bentley, The Rowley Enigma: How
Much Weight is Due to IDEA State Administrative
Proceedings in Federal Court?, 36 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDICIARY 428, *3 (2016). Notably, the statute does
not expressly provide for the introduction of new,
post-due process hearing evidence, nor should it.
This Court’s decision in Rowley set forth an
overarching standard for deference, but that standard
is ambiguous and has not been consistently
18
implemented by lower courts, warranting this Court’s
intervention and clarification.
A. The Rowley “Due Weight” Standard
In Rowley, this Court held that lower courts
must give “due weight” to the administrative
proceedings which they review, explaining that courts
lack the expertise to make decisions on educational
policy, and that IDEA’s procedural protections for the
creation of IEPs were of the utmost importance to
Congress. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-207. The facts and
procedural posture of Rowley are instructive. There,
the dispute centered on whether the school district
was required to provide a disabled student with a
qualified sign-language interpreter in all of her
academic classes. The school district determined that
the student did not require a dedicated interpreter in
all of her academic classes to receive FAPE, as she
was making adequate educational progress without
this requested accommodation. Id. at 184-186. The
school district prevailed in the administrative
proceedings. Id. In a subsequent judicial review
action, the district court reversed the administrative
decision, and the district court’s decision was upheld
by the Second Circuit. Id.
This Court reversed the Second Circuit’s
judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The
Court placed great emphasis on IDEA’s statutory
division of power between States and the federal
government, noting that IDEA charges States with
the responsibility of formulating substantive
educational programming for students. Indeed, the
19
Court cited legislative history that emphasized the
primary role of the States in the formulation and
execution of educational policy. See id. at n. 30
(“Historically, the States have had the primary
responsibility for the education of children at the
elementary and secondary level.” 121 Cong.Rec.
19498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole). See
also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968) (“By and large, public education in our Nation
is committed to the control of state and local
authorities”). In summary, the Court held that:
“[O]nce a court determines that the [procedural]
requirements of the Act have been met, questions of
methodology are for resolution by the States.” Rowley,
458 U.S. at 208. Applying this principle, the Court
reversed and remanded the Second Circuit’s decision
because there was no evidence that the school district
had violated any of IDEA’s procedural requirements,
and absent such a showing, it was improper for the
lower courts to reverse the substantive educational
judgment of state and local school officials. 4
Unfortunately, since Rowley was decided,
courts have strayed from these bedrock principles
and, in some cases, courts have substituted their own
notions of sound educational policy for those of the
qualified state officials which they review. This is one
of those cases.
4 The case was remanded so that the district court could reach a
final conclusion on whether the school district violated any of
IDEA’s procedural protections in creating the IEP at issue.
20
B. Rowley’s Due Weight Mandate is
Inconsistently Applied, Leading to Uncertainty
for Students, Their Families, and School
Districts.
Following Rowley, one key question has
emerged: how much “weight” does “due weight”
require? See Daniel W. Morton-Bentley, The Rowley
Enigma: How Much Weight is Due to IDEA State
Administrative Proceedings in Federal Court?, 36
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 428, *5 (2016). The
Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions.
For example, some courts have endorsed an approach
where district courts have almost infinite discretion
in whether to apply deference to the findings of
administrative decisions. See Reyes ex rel. R.P. v. New
York City Dep’t of Educ., 760 F.3d 211, 218 (2d. Cir.
2014) (“In deciding what weight is due to an IDEA
administrative decision, the analysis often will hinge
on the kinds of considerations that normally
determine whether any particular judgment is
persuasive.”) (internal citation and quotation
omitted). Likewise, in an influential First Circuit
decision, Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of
Mass., 655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1981), the court held
that the issue of deference to factual findings in IDEA
judicial review cases “must be left to the discretion of
the trial court.”
Similarly, in the Seventh Circuit, district
courts are instructed that hearing officers are entitled
to “no deference” on issues of law, and that on issues
of fact, “due weight” is evaluated on a sliding scale,
depending on whether the district court has admitted
21
additional evidence to supplement the administrative
record. Alex R., ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley
Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 221, 375 F.3d 603, 612 (7th
Cir. 2004). Under this approach, where no additional
evidence received, courts owe “considerable
deference” to the factual findings of the hearing officer
and may set aside the administrative order only if the
court “is strongly convinced that the order is
erroneous.” Id. (internal citation omitted). On the
other hand, where additional evidence is received by
the district court, “the administrative decision is
relatively less important and the district court
effectively acts as the factfinder. In such
circumstances, although the administrative record is
still part of the case and the district court therefore
must not go so far as to conduct a trial de novo, less
weight is due the administrative record.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
Conversely, in the Sixth Circuit case of
Burilovich v. Board of Educ. of the Lincoln
Consolidated Schools, 208 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2000),
the court took a reasoned approach—rooted in IDEA’s
division of power and Rowley—in articulating its rule
that: “[W]eight due will vary, depending on whether
the court is reviewing procedural or substantive
matters and whether educational expertise is
essential to the administrative findings.” Id. at 566.
Moreover, as to placement determinations, the Sixth
Circuit has expressly held that: “If the procedural
requirements of the IDEA are met, greater deference
is to be afforded to the district’s placement decision.”
Dong v. Bd. of Educ. of Rochester Cmty. Schs., 197
F.3d 793, 800 (6th Cir. 1999). See also Crocker v.
22
Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d
933, 935 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that federal courts are
generalists with no expertise in the educational needs
of students with disabilities, and that IDEA gives
federal courts the benefit of expert fact-finding by
state agencies with educational expertise).
The Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits
require an explanation if the reviewing court declines
to follow the findings of fact from the hearing officer.
In Doyle v. Arlington County School Board, 953 F.2d
100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit held that
a hearing officer’s regularly made factual findings
“are entitled to be considered prima facie correct,” and
“the district court, if it is not going to follow them, is
required to explain why it does not.” See also S.H. v.
State-Operated School Dist. of City of Newark, 336 F.
3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2003). The D.C. Circuit reversed
a district court for its “unexplained preference for the
conclusions of those who opposed the hearing officer’s
view.” Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 888-89
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
The Third Circuit affords special protection to
credibility
determinations
made
at
the
administrative level. When a hearing officer “has
heard live testimony and has found the testimony of
one witness to be more worthy of belief than the
contradictory testimony of another witness, that
determination is due special weight,” and a district
court “must accept the state agency’s credibility
determinations unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic
evidence in the record would justify a contrary
conclusion.” Shore Regional High School Bd. of Ed. v.
23
P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004); accord D.S. v.
Bayonne Board of Education, 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d
Cir. 2010). A court is “not at liberty to credit the
witnesses who expressed a contrary opinion without
a showing that there was a good reason to do so.” D.S.,
602 F.3d at 564.
II. The IDEA and Rowley’s “Due Weight”
Mandate Dictate Review of the Administrative
Decision at the Time it was Made.
The question the inconsistent application of the
Rowley “due weight” standard raises is brought into
sharper focus when viewed through the lens of the
IDEA’s overarching FAPE principles.
An IEP must be “reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light
of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas
County School District RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017).
“Reasonably calculated” is a prospective standard. It
asks what a team of educators could sensibly project
from what it knew, not what later turned out to be
true. This Court made the point directly: “the
question is whether an IEP is reasonable, not whether
the court regards it as ideal.” Id.
The courts of appeals have applied that
principle consistently. An IEP is “a snapshot, not a
retrospective.” Roland M. v. Concord School
Committee, 910 F.2d 983, 992 (1st Cir. 1990). Its
adequacy is examined “at the time the plans were
drafted.” Adams v. State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141,
1149 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts “must evaluate the
24
adequacy of an IEP prospectively as of the time of the
parents’ placement decision,” and the parties are
“limited to discussing the placement and services
specified in the written plan and therefore reasonably
known to the parties at the time of the placement
decision.” R.E. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 694
F.3d 167, 186–87, 195 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2802 (2013); accord Carlisle Area School v. Scott
P., 62 F.3d 520, 530 (3d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit
described this as the majority view. R.E., 694 F.3d at
186.
The weight a reviewing court affords a hearing
officer’s decision on substantive educational matters,
and the consideration of any additional evidence after
the fact, must therefore be considered in the same
way—how the additional evidence related to the
findings that were made at the time of the due process
hearing. In other words, the due weight afforded new
evidence must consider the facts and circumstances of
the hearing officer’s decision at the time it was made
as opposed to a blanket consideration of any new
evidence related to how the child may be faring at the
time of the court’s review.
This position does not conflict with the statute.
Section 1415(i)(2)(C) gives the reviewing court a
directive. It shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings; it shall hear the
additional evidence at the request of a party; and
basing its decision on a preponderance of the
evidence, shall grant such relief as the court
determines appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(2)(C)(i)(iii). The statute is conspicuously silent on the nature
25
and amount of the “additional evidence,” just as it is
silent on the deference to be afforded a hearing
officer’s decision (an entirely court-created construct
based on legislative intent). The key is that deference
to the hearing officer’s findings of fact should not
diminish based on the additional volume of evidence
received by the court. The courts are no more experts
on behavioral interventions after hearing seven
witnesses during a full-day trial than they were the
day before. It must not be a “sliding scale,” as
enunciated by the Seventh Circuit, but rather a
consideration of whether the evidence demonstrates
clear error by the hearing officer and the IEP team at
the time the administrative decision was made—not
based on the student’s status at the time the court is
considering additional evidence.
This is not a matter of the district court simply
ruling on better information. Again, if that were the
case, why hold an administrative hearing in the first
place? The school district’s position further comports
with Congress’s intent that the IEP process—
including the resolution of disputes—be collaborative
and expeditiously resolved. Parents are members of
the IEP team. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i). A
mediation process is available prior to the filing of a
due process complaint. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). The filing
of a due process complaint triggers mandatory
resolution session before any hearing may proceed (20
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)), and a decision must
ordinarily issue within 45 days thereafter. 34 C.F.R.§
300.515(a). The rulings below reroute that process
and judgment to a courtroom and beyond the scope of
the people on the child’s team who know him best.
26
III. The Seventh Circuit Erred in its “Due
Weight” Analysis.
With that framework in mind, we turn to the
proceedings below. The school district’s IEP team
proposed a therapeutic placement for C.T. in
December 2023. The hearing officer conducted a
three-day hearing and sustained that decision,
finding the school district’s evidence that C.T.
required a therapeutic setting “uncontroverted.” (Pet.
App. 74a). Specifically, she found that “based upon
the uncontroverted testimony and documentary
evidence presented at the hearing . . . the [C.T.] does
not require one to one aide support in his current selfcontained EBS classroom. That classroom cannot
provide [C.T.] with the support he needs. The Student
requires a therapeutic day school setting to address
his continued maladaptive behaviors.” (Pet. App.
75a).
The district court reached the opposite
conclusion on every one of those findings. It did so, as
the Seventh Circuit confirmed, “by relying heavily on
post-hearing developments and new expert testimony
not reviewed by the hearing officer,” including the
opinion of a private occupational therapist hired by
C.T.’s parents after the due process hearing and who
made a single observational visit to C.T.’s classroom.
(Pet. App. 16a).
The Seventh Circuit effectively endorsed a “no
deference” approach simply because additional
evidence was received by the district court. The court
reasoned that because the additional evidence was
27
“significant” and “material,” and because this new
evidence was “very important” to the district court’s
analysis, the district court did not err by affording the
administrative findings “the weight it did.” (Pet. App.
17a). The Seventh Circuit further noted that the
district court’s opinion stated that the court
“reviewed” the administrative record and that the
district court acknowledged the “due weight”
standard of review within its opinion. Accordingly, in
the Seventh Circuit’s view, the district court did not
violate Rowley’s “due weight” mandate.
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis misses the
mark. At the outset, Rowley placed great emphasis on
the State’s primary role in the formulation and
execution of educational policy, as enshrined in, inter
alia, the legislative history of IDEA. Likewise, Rowley
was clear that absent a procedural violation in the
IEP process, it was unlikely that Congress intended
federal courts to be second-guessing and overturning
the educational policy decisions of school officials,
including the IHO’s with special expertise in
educational matters. Indeed, Rowley found that
“adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed
would in most cases assure much if not all of what
Congress wished in the way of substantive content in
an IEP. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. Here, there were no
substantiated procedural violations.
By failing to distinguish that the new evidence
adduced at trial focused entirely on C.T.’s
development after the due process hearing, the
Seventh Circuit’s “sliding scale” analysis vitiates
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l);
28
see Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U.S. 142, 14648 (2023).
Congress intended for educational experts to be
the primary decision makers, not merely a first line of
defense. The courts were meant only to act as a
referee, making their own findings by a
preponderance of the evidence, while affording due
weight to the administrative hearing officer’s
determination. See, e.g., Shore Regional High School
Bd. of Ed., 381 F.3d at 199; see also Endrew F., 580
U.S. at 404 (By the time any dispute reaches court,
school authorities will have had a complete
opportunity to bring their expertise and judgment to
bear on areas of disagreement). School officials did
not have that same opportunity here. In this case, the
“sliding scale" approach enabled the district court to
become the star player, disregarding the
administrative record on judicial review simply
because the court received “additional evidence.” The
Seventh Circuit has endorsed an approach where
district courts can simply recite Rowley’s “due weight”
standard in their order and claim to have reviewed
the administrative record without having to
meaningfully engage with the administrative
findings, so long as the court receives additional
evidence and relies solely on such evidence. Moreover,
this approach is problematic in that it fails to draw
any distinction between deference to educational
findings and deference to non-educational findings. 5
5 Stated more in terms of Rowley’s discussion, the deference to
“substantive” findings should be greater than the deference
afforded to “procedural” findings. No matter which terms are
29
This approach flies in the face of IDEA’s cooperative
federalism model, Rowley’s holding, and must be
remedied.
Finally, this approach also violates the Seventh
Circuit’s rule on not allowing additional evidence in
IDEA cases to transform the case from one of judicial
review to a “trial de novo.” Monticello Sch. Dist. No.
25 v. George L. on Behalf of Brock L., 102 F.3d 895,
901 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Town of Burlington v.
Department of Education, 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st
Cir.1984), affirmed, 471 U.S. 359; Susan N. v. Wilson
School District, 70 F.3d 751 (3rd Cir.1995); Ojai
Unified School District v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467 (9th
Cir.1993), certiorari denied, 513 U.S. 825).
The Seventh Circuit attempted to distinguish
Monticello by drawing a line between the district
court’s admission of additional evidence as opposed to
the weighing of additional evidence. (Pet. App. 18a).
That is a distinction without a difference. It was not
the admission of the evidence that was necessarily
problematic—in fact, the school district also admitted
additional evidence related to C.T.’s behaviors in the
intervening months, including that he used a metal
power bank as a whip to strike a staff member in the
back of the head. It was that in applying the rule,
neither the district court nor the Seventh Circuit
believed that the district court had to meaningfully
engage with, or provide rationale for, disregarding the
IHO’s factual findings solely because the court heard
additional evidence. This result violates the central
utilized, the Seventh Circuit failed to make any distinction
between how deference is applied.
30
tenet of the IDEA—that the IEP team, not the courts,
make critical educational decisions for disabled
students.
IV. Failure to Afford “Due Weight” Creates
an Untenable and Inconsistent Least
Restrictive Environment Standard.
The
lower
courts’
rulings
regarding
deference—or the lack thereof—are necessarily
intertwined with the district court’s ruling that the
IEP team’s recommended placement of C.T. at a
therapeutic day school violated IDEA’s least
restrictive environment mandate. See 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(5)(A).
In affirming, the Seventh Circuit noted that
“the district court also found that C.T. would benefit
from a one-on-one aide,” based on the testimony of the
testimony of C.T.’s new private occupational
therapist. (Pet. App. 26a). The court also noted that
“a private counselor testified that a one-on-one aide
could
effectively
implement
recommended
interventions, which could help C.T. stay on task and
regulate his emotions.” Id. Without any deference to
the administrative record, the Seventh Circuit
effectively created a least restrictive environment
standard that requires school administrators to
exhaust all possible interventions, supports and
accommodations prior to recommending a change in a
student’s placement. This is not—and cannot be—the
test.
31
A. The Statute Does Not Address When a
School District Can Recommend a Change in
Placement.
We note that this Court has never addressed
what it means for a school district to provide an
education to students with disabilities in the “least
restrictive environment.” As a result, the circuit
courts are split on this issue and have implemented a
variety of multi-factor tests to address this key
statutory mandate.
i. The Circuit Split
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have
adopted the Rockner test, which first directs the
courts to determine whether it is feasible to provide
additional services in a regular classroom setting that
satisfies the child’s educational, physical, and
emotional needs. Rockner v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058,
1063 (6th Cir. 1983). If so, the benefit of both settings,
the child’s disruptive effect, and the costs of
mainstreaming are weighed. Id.
The Fifth Circuit expressly declined to adopt
the Rockner test, finding that it diverged too far from
the statutory language of IDEA and Congress’s intent
to give school officials more leeway in policy decisions.
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046
(5th Cir. 1989). Rather, the Fifth Circuit adopted its
own two-pronged test, where courts analyze whether
education in a regular classroom, with the use of
supplementary aids and services, can be achieved
satisfactorily for the child. Id. at 1048 Factors used to
32
analyze this prong include but are not limited to: (1)
efforts of the school to mainstream the child; (2)
whether the child would receive an educational
benefit in a regular education environment; (3)
balancing the benefits of both regular and special
education for the child; and (4) the impact a regular
classroom placement has on the regular education
students. Id. The Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have adopted the Daniel R.R. test, with the
Eleventh Circuit narrowing analysis even further and
finding that IDEA’s LRE provision does not apply
when the placement dispute is between two special
education classrooms. See C.B. by & through K.B. v.
Henry Cnty. Sch. Dist., 167 F.4th 1134, 1141 (11th
Cir. 2026). 6
The Ninth Circuit created a four-factor
balancing test, drawing on factors from both Rockner
and Daniel R.R., wherein the court considers: (1) the
educational benefits available to the child in a regular
classroom, supplement with appropriate aids and
services, as compared with the educational benefits of
a special education classroom; (2) the non-academic
benefits of interaction with children who are not
disabled; (3) the effect of the child’s presence on the
regular classroom; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming
the child in a regular classroom. Sacramento City
6 Obviously, if this rule of law applied in the Seventh Circuit,
C.T. would not have a viable LRE claim, since the instant
dispute does not involve C.T.’s removal from the “regular
classroom.” Indeed, the underlying dispute involves C.T.’s
removal from one special education placement (the EBD
classroom) and placement in another special education
placement (High Road Peoria).
33
Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d
1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)
Finally, the First and Seventh Circuits have
declined to adopt any multi-factor balancing test to
analyze LRE compliance, instead confining their
analysis to the statutory language of the IDEA,
utilizing a two-step framework. First, the court
examines whether the child received a satisfactory
education in the regular classroom or could receive
one with additional reasonable measures. If the
answer is yes, then removal from the regular
classroom violates the mandate. If not, then the
second step is to examine whether the new placement
mainstreams the child to the maximum extent
appropriate. See Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493
(7th Cir. 2002); C.D. ex rel. M.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch.
Dist., 924 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2019).
ii. The Seventh Circuit’s “No-Test” LRE
Analysis Allows for New Evidence to be Applied
Retrospectively
The problem with the Seventh Circuit’s “notest” approach is that the statute itself is silent as to
the type and amount of interventions required prior
to the IEP team making a recommendation for a
student’s change of placement. 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(5)(A) (removal of children with disabilities
from the regular educational environment occurs only
when the nature or severity of the disability of a child
is such that education in regular classes with the
use of supplementary aids and services cannot
be achieved satisfactorily.) (emphasis added).
34
As applied to C.T.’s case, the problem arises at
step one of the court’s two-step analysis,
demonstrating the impact the lack of deference had
on the least restrictive environment analysis. The
IHO made a factual finding that C.T. did not require
a dedicated one-to-one aide. (Pet. App. 63a). That was
the only additional supplementary aid or service that
was a certified issue at the due process hearing, and
that was subsequently considered by the district court
at trial. In fact, the IHO specifically found that “a
dedicated one-to-one aide does not allow a student
with behavioral difficulties to learn to appropriately
request assistance and attention from others. In the
EBD classroom, [C.T.] continually has one-on-one
adult support and he is not making progress in that
setting.” Id.
The school district had already attempted
every other possible means of support for C.T. along
the continuum of placements. See 34 C.F.R. §
300.115(b)(1)-(2). The school district completed a
functional behavior assessment for C.T., identifying
his target behaviors as physical aggression,
disruptive classroom behavior, and elopement. (Pet.
App. 62a). The school district subsequently developed
a behavior intervention plan for C.T. based on the
data collected during the FBA. Id. The school district
placed C.T. in a self-contained classroom for students
with emotional behavior disorders, where there were
seven students and three adults. (Pet. App. 61a).
Even after that placement, C.T. completed fifty
percent of his assigned classwork, but academic
demands were substantially reduced by the school
35
district in order to prevent C.T. from becoming
frustrated, which leads to an escalation of behaviors
and C.T. becoming physically aggressive to peers and
staff. Id.
What else was the school district to do? The
district court’s consideration and application of
evidence generated by experts who evaluated C.T.
after the IEP team’s placement decision and the
IHO’s findings turns the prospective standard of
Rowley and Endrew F. on its head. The IEP is no
longer a “snapshot” in time, but rather a moving
target, and it is the court who determines in hindsight
if the school district should have offered another
intervention—in this case, a one-to-one aide.
iii. The Appropriate LRE Test and Importance
of a Due Weight Standard
The test enunciated by the 5th Circuit in
Daniel R.R. more appropriately balances the factors
that make a least restrictive environment
determination, including the consideration of the
impact the student’s placement has on other students’
learning environments in the regular education
setting. Regardless of the LRE test applied, the
outcome likely would not have changed given the
district court’s myopic focus on the one-to-one aide,
thus underscoring the need for this Court to
enunciate the appropriate due weight standard.
Even so, the school district would be remiss not
to note that an IEP is a living document, not a final
judgment written in stone. By the same token, a
36
student’s placement is not permanent. The district
court, in reviewing extrinsic evidence compiled in the
months since the due process hearing, usurped the
role of the IEP team in conducting C.T.’s annual
review as required by statute. See 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(4)(A) (The IEP team is required to review the
child’s IEP no less than annually, and must revise the
IEP as appropriate to address any lack of expected
progress toward the annual goals, the results of any
reevaluation, information about the child provided to
or by the parents, and the child’s anticipated needs).
If C.T. was, in fact, making progress in his new
placement, both academically and socially, and was
benefitting from a new medication regimen (see Pet.
App. 38a, 46a-47a), that data would have been
included and evaluated in C.T.’s annual review while
he was placed at the therapeutic day school. At that
point, the IEP team could make a decision as to
whether this progress, or a change in C.T.’s
circumstances, warranted a change of placement back
to his home school. The goal is, and remains, to
mainstream C.T. as much as possible with his nondisabled peers.
V. This Court Regularly Grants Review to
Clarify the IDEA
Since Rowley, this Court has routinely
provided guidance on IDEA’s mandates. See, e.g.,
Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U.S. 142 (2023)
(clarifying
IDEA’s
administrative
exhaustion
requirement); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma
Cty. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (parents’ right to
37
prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf);
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548
U.S. 291 (2006) (entitlement to expert fees); Schaffer
ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (burden
of proof in IDEA administrative hearings); Cedar
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66
(1999) (entitlement to certain services for children
with disabilities); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988)
(clarifying IDEA provision authorizing child to “stay
put” pending resolution of placement dispute).
This Court most recently provided substantive
guidance on IDEA’s FAPE requirement in Endrew F.
ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School Dist. RE-1,
580 U.S. 386 (2017) (holding that the appropriate
standard for assessing FAPE is that the IEP is
“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress in light of the child’s circumstances.”).
Because the question of due weight is closely
connected to the FAPE and LRE requirements of the
IDEA, the foregoing decisions will be more accurately
and uniformly implemented if the Court resolves the
deference question presented.
VI. This Case is an Excellent Vehicle for
Resolving the Question Presented.
As set forth above, this case presents a critical
opportunity for the Court to provide clarity on what
level of deference is required to be given to
administrative decisions in IDEA cases, which ties
back to the “cooperative federalism” concept that
underlies IDEA itself.
38
In doing so, the Court will provide certainty to
all stakeholders, including students with disabilities
and their families, the school officials who are
responsible for ensuring a satisfactory education for
students with disabilities, and the lower courts who
are routinely asked to review administrative
decisions in IDEA cases.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Caitlin Frazier Satterly
Counsel of Record
Michelle Amanda Todd
George Alonso Acosta
Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer,
Rodick & Kohn LLP
401 SW Water Street, Suite 106
Peoria, Illinois 61603
(309) 671-9000
fsatterly@hlerk.com
mtodd@hlerk.com
gacosta@hlerk.com
39
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.