Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Garnell Walls, Petitioner v. Prince George's County, Maryland, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 21, 2026

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No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_________

GARNELL WALLS,

Petitioner,

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

_________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

_________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________

JORDAN HOWLETTE

Justly Prudent

420 Florida Ave., N.E.

Suite 27

Washington, DC 20002

J ONATHAN M. H OUGHTON

Counsel of Record

D EBORAH J. L A F ETRA

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.,

Suite 1000

Arlington, VA 22201

(202) 888-6881

JHoughton@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Petitioner Garnell Walls

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In this Fifth Amendment takings case, the court

below dismissed the property owner’s as applied claim

on prudential ripeness grounds. It held that an owner

cannot sue without first petitioning the legislature to

change the law responsible for the taking. The

decision presents two splits of authority.

First, courts conflict about whether a property

owner must exhaust legislative remedies to ripen a

regulatory takings claim. The Ninth Circuit, Virginia,

California, New York, Ohio, Michigan and Hawaii,

say no. However, the Fourth Circuit below, plus

Illinois, Florida, Georgia, and Wisconsin demand

legislative exhaustion.

Second, courts conflict about whether ripeness is

an element of jurisdictional standing or, instead, a

prudential doctrine that allows the court to dismiss

justiciable cases. On the jurisdictional side are this

Court’s decisions in Williamson County Regional

Planning Commission, Horne, and Pakdel, plus the

Third and Eighth Circuits. On the prudential side are

this Court’s decisions in Lucas and Suitum, and the

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.

The questions presented are:

1. Must a property owner exhaust legislative

remedies in order to ripen an as-applied

regulatory takings claim under the Fifth

Amendment?

2. When a property owner sufficiently pleads

jurisdictional standing for a Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim, may the

court nonetheless dismiss the case on

prudential ripeness grounds?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner Garnell Walls, a natural person, was

Plaintiff and Appellant below.

Respondent Prince George’s County, Maryland, a

government entity, was Defendant and Appellee

below.

Melinda Bolling, individually and in her official

capacity as Director of the Department of Permitting,

Inspections and Enforcement, was Defendant and

Appellee below.

Dawit Abraham, the current

Director, is substituted for Ms. Bolling as a matter of

law pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 35.3.

iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

These proceedings are directly related to the abovecaptioned case under Rule 14.1(b)(iii):

Walls v. Prince George’s County, No. 8:23-cv-01359DLB (D. Md., Southern Div.)

Walls v. Prince George’s County, No. 25-1121 (4th

Circuit Court of Appeals)

Walls v. Prince George’s County, No. C-16-CV-25001424 (PGC Cir. Ct.)

Walls v. Prince George’s County, No. ACM-REG1320-2025 (Md. App. Ct.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ............. 1

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 6

JURISDICTION.......................................................... 6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ........ 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 7

A. Walls’ Property and Governing Regulations 7

The Courts Below Demand Legislative

Exhaustion to Ripen the Case ...................... 9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 13

I. Courts Conflict as to Whether Property Owners

Must Pursue Legislative Change to Ripen

Takings Claims .................................................... 13

A. Most courts do not require property owners

to engage in the inherently political,

legislative process prior to seeking just

compensation for a regulatory taking......... 13

B. Other courts require exhaustion of legislative

remedies ....................................................... 17

C. Exhaustion of legislative remedies is in

tension with multiple doctrines .................. 18

II. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Between

Jurisdictional Standing and Prudential Ripeness

in Takings Cases ................................................. 21

A. This Court’s conflicting decisions about

ripeness ........................................................ 21

B. Lower courts conflict in their approach to

final decision ripeness in as-applied

regulatory takings cases ............................. 26

C. Certiorari is warranted to resolve the

conflict .......................................................... 32

Conclusion ................................................................. 35

APPENDIX

Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit, dated Feb. 23, 2026 ................................ 1a

Order, U.S. District Court for the District of

Maryland, dated Jan. 8, 2025 ........................... 12a

Incorporated Reasons for Order, Transcript of

Proceedings, Motions Hearing before Hon.

Deborah L. Boardman, U.S. District Judge,

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland,

dated Jan. 8, 2025 (excerpt) .............................. 13a

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,

dated Mar. 23, 2026 ........................................... 30a

Amended Complaint, U.S. District Court for the

District of Maryland, dated Mar. 1, 2024 ......... 31a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

A.C.L.U. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency,

493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) ............................. 24

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136 (1967) ........................................... 23

Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Cnty. of Santa Fe,

634 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2011) ......................... 30

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,

546 U.S. 500 (2006) ........................................... 33

Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham,

136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016) ...................................... 34

B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. BNSF Railway

Corp., 531 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2008) .............. 30

Bateman v. City of West Bountiful,

89 F.3d 704 (10th Cir. 1996) ............................. 30

Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty. v. Aspinwall,

65 U.S. (24 How.) 376 (1861) ............................ 24

Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154 (1997) ....................................... 4, 24

Bright v. City of Evanston,

10 Ill. 2d 178 (1956) ........................................... 17

Busse v. Lee Cnty.,

317 Fed. App’x 968 (11th Cir. 2009) ................. 32

Cath. Healthcare Int’l, Inc. v. Genoa Charter

Twp., 82 F.4th 442 (6th Cir. 2023) ................... 28

vii

Cherry v. Mayor and City Council of

Baltimore City,

475 Md. 565 (2021) ............................................ 20

Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v.

Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510 (1986) ......................... 32

City of Jacksonville Beach v. Prom,

656 So.2d 581 (Fla. App. 1995) ......................... 18

City of Las Vegas v. 180 Land Co., LLC,

546 P.3d 1239 (Nev. 2024)........................... 19, 27

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) ............... 2, 18

Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

547 U.S. 332 (2006) ..................................... 21, 33

Dep’t of Educ. v. Brown,

600 U.S. 551 (2023) ........................................... 22

Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett,

494 U.S. 715 (1990) ........................................... 33

Dillow v. Treasurer of Pennsylvania,

No. 24-2004, 2025 WL 2813596

(3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) ................................... 27, 28

Dolan v. City of Tigard,

512 U.S. 374 (1994) ............................................. 5

Doyle v. United States,

No. 2023-1735, 2024 WL 5154019

(Fed. Cir. Dec. 18, 2024) .................................... 31

F.P. Dev., LLC v. Charter Twp. of Canton,

16 F.4th 198 (6th Cir. 2021) .............................. 28

First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v.

Davenport, 146 S. Ct. 1114 (2026) .................... 22

viii

First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty.,

482 U.S. 304 (1987) ....................................... 3, 20

Fowler v. Guerin,

899 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2018) ..................... 27, 30

Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. E.P.A.,

693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012) .......................... 25

Hendershot v. Stanton,

162 F.4th 625 (6th Cir. 2025) ............................ 28

Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City of

Los Angeles,

12 Cal. 5th 458 (2021) ....................................... 16

Horne v. Dep’t of Agric.,

569 U.S. 513 (2013) ................................. 4, 23, 34

Horne v. Flores,

557 U.S. 433 (2009) ........................................... 19

Howard v. Cnty. of San Diego,

184 Cal. App. 4th 1422 (2010) ........................... 16

Indus. Energy Consumers of Am. v. FERC,

125 F.4th 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2025) ................. 25, 26

Iowa Coal Min. Co. v. Monroe Cnty.,

555 N.W.2d 418 (Iowa 1996) ............................. 32

Kiser v. Reitz,

765 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2014) ............................. 28

Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,

260 U.S. 226 (1922) ........................................... 24

Knellinger v. Young,

134 F.4th 1034 (10th Cir. 2025) ........................ 28

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ........................... 2, 15, 20, 34

Kolton v. Frerichs,

869 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2017) ............................. 29

Lance v. Coffman,

549 U.S. 437 (2007) .......................................... 33

Land Grantors in Henderson, Union, and

Webster Counties,

64 Fed. Cl. 661, 717 (2005) ................................ 14

Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,

17 Cal. 4th 1006 (1998) ..................................... 32

Leone v. Cnty. of Maui,

128 Haw. 183 (Ct. App. 2012) ........................... 16

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control

Components, Inc.,

572 U.S. 118 (2014) ............................... 25, 28, 33

Lora v. United States,

599 U.S. 453 (2023) ........................................... 10

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,

505 U.S. 1003 (1992) ............................... 4, 23, 30

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ..................................... 22, 33

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty.,

477 U.S. 340 (1986) ..................................... 22, 27

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Twp. of Manalapan,

272 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1994) ................... 19

Manufactured Home Communities Inc. v.

City of San Jose,

420 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) ........................... 32

Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer of Fla.,

136 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2025) .................. 28, 31

Martin v. United States,

894 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................... 30

McGuire v. United States,

707 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................... 31

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,

549 U.S. 118 (2007) ........................................... 22

Miller v. City of Wickliffe,

852 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2017) ............................. 28

Money v. City of San Marcos,

No. 24-50187, 2025 WL 429980

(5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2025) ....................................... 29

N. Mill Street, LLC v. City of Aspen,

6 F.4th 1216 (10th Cir. 2021) ............................ 30

N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen,

986 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2021) ................................ 27

Nat’l Brick Co. v. City of Chicago,

92 Ill. App. 2d 192 (1968) .................................. 17

Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Off. of

Comptroller of Currency,

No. 4:20-CV-04186-KAW, 2021 WL

4932548 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2021) .................... 30

New Pulaski Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor and

City Council of Baltimore,

217 F.3d 840, 2000 WL 1005207

(4th Cir. 2000).................................................... 14

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.

Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) ................................... 10

Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

594 U.S. 474 (2021) ........................... 4, 13, 22, 23

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,

533 U.S. 606 (2001) ..................................... 13, 27

Paris v. Mayfield Village,

14 Ohio App. 3d 450 (1984) ............................... 17

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,

260 U.S. 393 (1922) ........................................... 22

In re Quality of Service Standards for

Regulated Telecom. Services,

204 Mich. App. 607 (1994)................................. 17

Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga,

800 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) ........................... 29

Reilly v. City of Chicago,

24 Ill. 2d 348 (1962) ........................................... 17

Reno v. Cath. Social Servs., Inc.,

509 U.S. 43 (1993) ............................................. 23

Rinker v. City of Fairfax,

238 Va. 24 (1989) ......................................... 15, 16

San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San

Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) ............................... 20

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cnty. of

San Francisco,

545 U.S. 323 (2005) ........................................... 26

Seattle Pac. Univ. v. Ferguson,

104 F.4th 50 (9th Cir. 2024) .............................. 27

Shelley v. Town of Tyrone,

302 Ga. 297 (2017) ............................................. 18

Sherman v. Town of Chester,

752 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2014) ............................... 31

Simmonds v. I.N.S.,

326 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 2003) ............................... 24

xii

SK Finance SA v. La Plata Cnty., Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs,

126 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1997) ......................... 30

Snaza v. City of Saint Paul,

548 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 2008) ........................... 27

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

571 U.S. 69 (2013) ............................................. 24

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998) ............................................. 33

Stokeling v. United States,

586 U.S. 73 (2019) ............................................. 10

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,

520 U.S. 729 (1997) ........................... 4, 26, 29, 31

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ..................................... 25, 28

Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty.,

48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995) ............................... 19

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe

Reg’l Plan. Agency,

911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990) .................... 14, 20

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe

Reg’l Plan. Agency,

938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991) ............................. 14

Taylor v. Village of N. Palm Beach,

659 So.2d 1167 (Fla. App. 1995) ....................... 17

Tedford’s Tenancy, LLC v. City of New York,

238 A.D.3d 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025) .............. 29

Thorp v. Town of Lebanon,

225 Wis. 2d 672 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) ............... 18

xiii

Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton,

26 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................ 29

United States v. Windsor,

570 U.S. 744 (2013) ........................................... 24

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United

for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,

454 U.S. 464 (1982) ........................................... 33

Vandor, Inc. v. Militello,

301 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2002) ................................. 31

Variscite NY Four, LLC v. N.Y. State

Cannabis Control Bd.,

152 F.4th 47 (2d Cir. 2025) ............................... 24

Ward v. Bennett,

79 N.Y.2d 394 (1992) ......................................... 15

Washlefske v. Winston,

234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000) ............................. 29

Wilkins v. United States,

598 U.S. 152 (2023) ........................................... 33

Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,

473 U.S. 172 (1985) ................. 2, 4, 19, 23, 27, 31

Constitutional Provision

U.S. Const. amend. V................................................ 6

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ........................................................ 6

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................ 6

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) ............................................... 6

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................................ 6

xiv

Rule of Court

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .............................................. 9

Other Authorities

Berger, Michael M., Supreme Bait &

Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory

Takings, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 99

(2000) ................................................................... 5

Brown, Rachel, et al., Is Unpublished

Unequal?, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2021) ............ 10

Brown, S. Todd, The Story of Prudential

Standing, 42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 95

(2014) ................................................................. 26

Chemerinsky, Erwin, A Unified Approach to

Justiciability, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 677

(1990) ................................................................. 26

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

In 1978, Garnell Walls bought a vacant

development site in Brandywine, Maryland. From the

beginning, it was intended to be a long-term

investment and the site of his future retirement home.

After forty years as a mechanic, Walls retired and

then spent the next two years and close to $40,000

getting the necessary permits and approvals.

Walls performed a hydrological study, passed the

necessary soil percolation tests, and agreed to

dedicate a portion of his land to conservation. The

County also approved Walls’ site development plan

and his single-family dwelling permit. The last step

was to arrange for water and sewer services. There

are no public utilities nearby and connecting to the

closest available location would cost over $2 million

dollars. That is not a viable option for a single-family

home. Accordingly, Walls sought permission from

Prince George’s County to install a private well and

septic system. The County refused and as a result,

Walls’ property is left vacant, idle, and unbuildable.

Walls’ regulatory takings claim under the federal

and state constitutions was dismissed as unripe by the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court viewed

ripeness as a prudential determination that is

enforceable at the court’s discretion and distinct from

jurisdictional standing. To that end, it refused to hear

Walls’ constitutional claim unless Walls first goes to

the County legislature and tries to change the law

that caused the unconstitutional taking. The decision

joins two distinct splits of authority about when, and

under what circumstances, an as-applied regulatory

takings claim under the Fifth Amendment is ripe for

determination.

Legislative Exhaustion

Lower courts are divided about whether a property

owner must exhaust legislative remedies and attempt

to change the existing law in order to ripen its Fifth

Amendment claim. Most courts say no. Legislative

exhaustion is not required in the Ninth Circuit,

Virginia, California, New York, Ohio, Michigan and

Hawaii. However, other courts, including the Fourth

Circuit below, plus Illinois, Florida, Georgia, and

Wisconsin, require a property owner to first seek

legislative change as a condition precedent to an asapplied regulatory takings claim.

The Fifth Amendment’s protection should not

differ by jurisdiction. Only this Court can resolve the

conflict, as well as the tension between legislative

exhaustion and several established legal doctrines.

First, the judiciary’s “virtually unflagging obligation”

to hear and decide constitutional cases, Colo. River

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.

800, 817-18 (1976), is hard to reconcile with a ripeness

doctrine that defers to the legislature and compels

property owners to seek political relief in the first

instance. Second, legislative exhaustion is also in

tension with the property owner’s obligation to

establish final decision ripeness. Williamson Cnty.

Reg. Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,

473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985), overruled on other grounds

by, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019).

Legislative decisions are almost never “final” because

the legislature can always create, amend, or repeal a

law, irrespective of whatever decisions it may have

made in the past. Consequently, an owner cannot

show that it has exhausted legislative remedies when

the potential for legislative action is inexhaustible.

And third, it is well established that once a

government regulation strips away private property

rights, subsequent legislative amendments cannot

excuse the government’s liability.

First Eng.

Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los

Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[N]o

subsequent action by the government can relieve it of

the duty to provide compensation for the period during

which the taking was effective.”).

Legislative

exhaustion is in tension with that also, to the extent

that a property owner that has already suffered an

unconstitutional taking is denied the right to be heard

because of a hypothetical, future legislative action

that cannot erase the existing violation.

Jurisdictional versus Prudential Ripeness

The Fourth Circuit’s decision amplified a

substantial and persistent split of authority about

whether final decision ripeness is jurisdictional and

connected to standing and concrete injury; or instead,

prudential, discretionary, and distinct from standing. 1

For regulatory takings, standing and ripeness are

seemingly interrelated. Standing ensures that the

property owner has suffered a particularized and

concrete injury, as opposed to one that is speculative,

hypothetical, or contingent on future events.

Ripeness for a regulatory takings claim requires a de

facto final position by the government with respect to

the regulation and property at issue. Pakdel v. City &

Cnty. of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474, 478 (2021).

Accordingly, standing and ripeness are complementary, or even overlapping, requirements. Final

This issue is also presented in the pending Petition for

Certiorari in Tedford’s Tenancy, LLC, v. City of New York, et al.,

No. 26-____ (filed June 30, 2026).

decisions result in concrete takings injuries and

standing; conversely, the lack of a final decision

means that the claimed injury is merely speculative

such that no standing exists.

But that changes if ripeness is deemed prudential.

The prudential designation means that the court can

decline to hear a case for reasons that are judicially

self-imposed, discretionary, and mutable. Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). Under a prudential

ripeness doctrine, even when the property owner

establishes a concrete injury and standing, the court

can refuse to decide an undisputedly justiciable case

and demand that the owner undertake additional

procedural hurdles. That is what happened here.

Inconsistent decisions from this Court have cast

doubt on whether final decision ripeness is

jurisdictional or prudential. In three decisions, this

Court linked final decision ripeness to jurisdictional

standing. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 193; Horne v.

Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 525 (2013); Pakdel, 594

U.S. at 479. Conversely, in two other decisions, this

Court deemed final decision ripeness to be prudential

and discretionary. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505

U.S. 1003, 1013 (1992); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan.

Agency, 520 U.S. 729, 733 (1997). As a result, the

lower courts are both fiercely divided and utterly

confused. The Third Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and

Nevada have declared ripeness to be jurisdictional for

takings cases. 2 The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and

Tenth Circuits have declared it to be prudential. 3 An

Eleventh Circuit decision declared ripeness to be

jurisdictional and then decided the case on prudential

2 See infra at 27.

3 See infra at 29-30.

grounds, and California and Iowa courts have done

the same. 4 The Federal Circuit and Second Circuit

have issued inconsistent intra-circuit decisions. 5 And

in the Sixth Circuit, it remains an open question. 6

Considering the above, the Fourth Circuit’s

demand for legislative exhaustion on prudential

ripeness grounds impermissibly rejected the inherent

justiciability of Walls’ plausibly pled constitutional

claim. The access to courts was unfairly prejudiced

and it reduced property rights to the “poor relation” of

the Bill of Rights. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.

374, 392 (1994); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait &

Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3

Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 99, 131 n.136 (2000) (decrying

“a huge and unjustified difference between land use

ripeness cases and all other ripeness cases”).

Certiorari should be granted.

4 See infra at 31-32.

5 See infra at 30-31.

6 See infra at 28-29.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished decision of the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals is reprinted at App. 1a. The court’s

order denying rehearing is reprinted at App. 30a. The

district court’s unpublished ruling is reprinted at App.

13a.

JURISDICTION

The courts below had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and this

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

The unpublished decision of the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals was issued on February 23, 2026,

and the court denied rehearing on March 23, 2026.

Chief Justice Roberts granted an extension to file the

petition in this case until July 22, 2026. No. 25A1280.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment

provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for

public use without just compensation.” U.S. Const.

amend. V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Walls’ Property and Governing Regulations

Garnell Walls owns a vacant lot in a partially

developed neighborhood in Prince George’s County,

Maryland. App. 37a. When he bought the land in

1978, he intended to use the property to build a house

for himself upon retirement. In the years that

followed, he worked as a mechanic repairing police,

fire, and ambulance vehicles for Prince George’s

County. Now retired, and on disability, Walls set out

to build a single-family home on the land that he

bought for that purpose. Ibid.

Between 2019 and 2021, Walls expended close to

$40,000, plus a significant amount of time and

resources to obtain the requisite permits and

inspections. App. 38a-39a. He had a hydrological

study performed. App. 38a. He conducted, and

passed, soil percolation tests. Ibid. And Walls

recorded a woodland conservation easement for the

balance of the property. App. 38a-39a. The County

approved his Site Development permit and his singlefamily dwelling permit, and its Department of

Permitting, Inspections and Enforcement (DPIE) gave

Walls periodic assurances that he would be granted

the approval to build. App. 39a.

However, it was not feasible for Walls to connect to

public utilities. The nearest public sewer connection

is over one-half mile away and the nearest public

water connection is approximately 900 feet away.

App. 41a. Walls’ cost to connect would be in the range

of $2.1 million to $2.4 million, an amount that is not

economically viable for the construction of a singlefamily home. App. 39a. Consequently, the last step

in the process was permission from the County to

install an interim private well and septic system.

Ibid.

A private well and septic system cannot be

constructed without the County’s permission. App.

34a, 36a. That was not always the case. Prior to the

2018 revisions to the County’s land regulations, the

government historically allowed private well and

septic systems in areas not served by municipal

utilities, including for two of Wall’s similarly situated

neighbors. App. 34a, 37a, 41a, 43a. Now, though,

Walls must obtain permission in the form of a “waiver”

under the controlling law, codified as the 2018 Water

& Sewer Plan. App. 36a-37a. The “waiver process is

designed to eliminate unnecessary burden on an

individual owner of an existing . . . lot.” App. 36a.

Walls’ Complaint alleged that he satisfied the

necessary criteria. App. 35a, 37a, 41a. Nonetheless,

the County informed Walls that it would not permit

him to construct, and did not have the authority to

approve, an interim private well and septic system.

App. 40a, 43a; see Joint Appendix (JA) at 078-079,

Walls v. Prince George’s County, et al., No. 25-1121,

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Instead, Walls was

told that “it is possible,” JA 079, that he could connect

to public utilities that were anticipated to be built in

the future as part of the “Saddle Creek” subdivision

development. App. 42a.

Yet the Saddle Creek development is not forthcoming. Saddle Creek representatives informed Walls

that the project is still in the concept phase and that

construction is four-to-five years away, at best; and

further, that Saddle Creek had no plans to extend its

water or sewer lines to a location that would work for

Walls’ property. App. 42a-43a. Walls relayed this to

the County, but the County refused to change its

position. App. 43a. It informed Walls that his sole

avenue to build on his property was to seek a

legislative amendment to the County’s 2018 Water &

Sewer Plan and connect to a future development.

App. 40a, 42a-43a.

B. The Courts Below Demand

Exhaustion to Ripen the Case

Legislative

With his property left vacant and unbuildable, App.

44a. Walls filed a complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of Maryland against

Prince George’s County and the DPIE Director (the

“Government”). App. 31a-48a. He asserted as-applied

regulatory takings claims under the federal and state

constitutions and sought declaratory relief and

damages in the form of just compensation. App. 44a48a.

The Government filed a Motion to Dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). JA 005-20.

It argued that Walls’s claims were not ripe for judicial

review and that the Amended Complaint failed to

state a plausible claim for relief. Ibid.

The district court agreed that the case was not ripe

for determination. 7 App. 14a. It viewed ripeness as a

prudential consideration that did not implicate the

court’s jurisdiction. App. 18a-19a. With that context,

the court decided that Walls’ claim would not be heard

until the County issued an official denial of his waiver

application, App. 20a-21a, 23a, irrespective of Walls’

pleading that he filed a waiver application, App. 20a,

and the County’s subsequent confirmation in writing

The court read its prepared ruling into the record at the

conclusion of the hearing on the motions.

that no well and septic permit would be granted. App.

21a-22a; see also App. 21a (According to the trial

court, the County’s letter “does suggest that DPIE

might not approve a waiver if one were submitted on

the current facts” and should Walls “wish to pursue

[his] initial inquiry for interim systems usage, it will

necessitate the legislative amendment process.”). The

trial court made no ruling on legislative exhaustion

but expressed skepticism that it was required to ripen

his claim. App. 27a (“I won’t discuss here whether or

not the . . . legislative amendment process . . . is

required in order to obtain a final decision. Frankly,

under my reading of the law, I don’t believe it is.”). 8

The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished, per

curiam opinion. 9 The court did not require Walls to

file another waiver application simply for the sake of

getting an official denial. App. 7a, n.6. But the Fourth

Circuit did agree that ripeness is prudential and

concluded that Walls’ claim was not prudentially ripe

because he had not approached the legislature and

tried to change the County’s 2018 Water and Sewer

Plan. App. 2a, n.1. Unlike the district court, the

Fourth Circuit held that the legislative amendment

process was a prerequisite to Walls’ constitutional

8 In dicta, the district court stated that if the case were ripe, it

would invoke Burford abstention and remand it to state court to

determine the takings claims because it involves “local land use

issues.” App. 27a-29a. The Fourth Circuit did not comment on

this.

9 This Court grants certiorari in cases with unpublished decisions

that are controlled by binding circuit precedent. See, e.g., Lora

v. United States, 599 U.S. 453 (2023); New York State Rifle &

Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022); Stokeling v. United

States, 586 U.S. 73 (2019); see also Rachel Brown et al., Is

Unpublished Unequal?, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 139-45 (2021)

(listing 75 others).

claim being heard: “regardless of the status of Walls’

waiver request to DPIE, the County could not have

reached a final decision on Walls’ property until he

sought a ‘water and sewer category amendment.’ ”

Ibid. According to the court, “though this legislative

process . . . there is still an opportunity for the County

to change its position.” App. 9a.

The court recognized that the Legislative

Amendment process is not a review of the County’s

waiver denial, but “a separate procedure in which the

County Council conducts its own evaluation of the

property and has plenary authority to deny or grant

the requested relief.”

App. 8a.

The two-step

procedure is as follows. 10 JA 022-030. First, Walls

must ask for a Legislative Amendment that

redesignates his property from “Category 5” to

“Category 4.” 11 JA 079. It follows a quintessential

legislative process: (a) DPIE coordinates with County

and Bi-County agencies and evaluates, prepares and

submits proposed Legislative Amendments for the

County Executive’s review and recommendation;

(b) the recommendation is sent to the County Council

for consideration; (c) notice is given to the public, plus

County and State agencies; (d) a public hearing is

held; (e) the County Council Committee holds a work

session; (f) the County Council acts on the proposed

Legislative Amendments; and finally, (g) the County

Executive has 10 days to comment on the County

Council’s action before the resolution is effective. JA

023-026.

Notably, the County Council has no

10 The Fourth Circuit took judicial notice of the legislative

amendment process. App. 4a, n.3.

For

discussion

the

categories,

see

https://tinyurl.com/3ya2dwez at pp. 2-2 through 2-5 (visited July

18, 2026).

obligation to state its reasons for approving or

disapproving a Legislative Amendment. Ibid.

If Walls succeeds in obtaining legislative approval,

he must again pursue a slightly more streamlined

legislative process to seek an amendment redesignating the “Category 4” property to “Category 3.” JA

079. In this phase, he must submit the request along

with other documentation to the DPIE, JA 026-028,

which “reserves the right to determine what is

necessary before transmitting the evaluation to the

County Executive and the County Council.” JA 027.

Although this phase begins with the DPIE and is

designated an “Administrative Amendment,” the

County Executive and County Council ultimately

evaluate and decide the merits of the requested

amendment. JA 027. Unlike the first process, if the

County Executive and Council make no comment on

the submitted materials, the Director of DPIE is

authorized to approve the recategorization. Ibid.

However, the County Executive and County Council

retain discretion to transfer the request into the first

Legislative Amendment process described above.

Ibid. The process contains no criteria for the exercise

of that discretion. JA 026-028.

Walls cannot construct an interim private well and

septic system on his property, even if he succeeds in

obtaining a Category 3 designation. This legislative

process would allow Walls only to connect to the

Saddle Creek subdivision development, App. 42a-43a,

JA 079, which does not now, and may never, exist.

App. 42a-43a.

Nevertheless, regardless of Walls’ standing and

concrete injury, the Fourth Circuit considered the

above to be a “classic type of ordinary process required

to satisfy the finality requirement.” App. 8a (cleaned

up). Because Walls’ complaint did not allege that

“that the County Council had a practice of denying

legislative amendments as a matter of course,” as a

matter of prudential ripeness, he was required to go

through the process in order for his constitutional

claim to be heard. App. 10a.

Walls’ petition for rehearing en banc was denied.

App. 30a. This petition follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. Courts Conflict as to Whether Property

Owners Must Pursue Legislative Change to

Ripen Takings Claims

There is a split of authority, primarily amongst

state courts, about whether legislative exhaustion is a

necessary precondition for a Fifth Amendment

regulatory takings claim. It is a crucial divide about

the justiciability of constitutional property rights

claims that can only be resolved by this Court.

A. Most courts do not require property

owners to engage in the inherently

political, legislative process prior to

seeking just compensation for a regulatory

taking

A takings claim is ripe for determination once the

government’s regulatory position is known to a

reasonable degree of certainty. Pakdel, 594 U.S. at

478; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620

(2001). It is a modest, de facto, requirement. Pakdel,

594 U.S. at 479. Thus, numerous courts have held

that a property owner does not have to attempt

legislative change to satisfy final decision ripeness.

Once the government has committed to a position, it

is not a requirement for the legislature to then double

down on that commitment by also refusing to alter the

law.

For example, the Ninth Circuit held that a property

owner does not have to seek a legislative amendment

in order to ripen a temporary takings claim. TahoeSierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan.

Agency, 938 F.2d 153, 157 (9th Cir. 1991). That

decision adopted the dissent of Judge Kozinski from a

previous iteration of the case. Ibid., adopting TahoeSierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan.

Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 1344-46 (9th Cir. 1990)

(Kozinski, J., dissenting).

He explained that a

legislative amendment is “an exercise of political

judgment” that can never final, because it is subject to

“a change in the makeup of the legislative body, a shift

in the political winds, [] a change in attitude” or

equally, for “no ascertainable reason at all.” 911 F.2d

at 1345 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Thus, “once it is

clear that the proposed development plan does not fit

within the governing law, the owner has exhausted

and need not go the next step of asking for a change

in the law.” Id. at 1345, n.1 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

The Fourth Circuit, in contrast with its decision in

this case, relied on Judge Kozinski’s analysis in New

Pulaski Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mayor and City

Council of Baltimore, 217 F.3d 840, 2000 WL 1005207

(4th Cir. 2000). It noted that discretionary determinations by a City Council represent “the exercise of

political judgment” that cannot be described as

“administrative.” Id. at *4; see also Land Grantors in

Henderson, Union, and Webster Counties, 64 Fed. Cl.

661, 717 (2005) (The court was unaware of “any legal

precedent requiring plaintiffs to exhaust a potential

legislative remedy, when a legal claim has been

established, for which the court may enter a final

judgment and damages and the parties may seek

appellate review.”).

Most decisions on this issue come from state courts,

prior to Knick ’s abrogation of the state court

exhaustion requirement of Williamson County. Knick,

588 U.S. 180. Collectively, they reject the need for

property owners to seek legislative remedies to ripen

a takings claim.

The New York Court of Appeals rejected legislative

exhaustion in Ward v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 394, 400-01

(1992) (“the ripeness doctrine does not impose a

threshold barrier requiring pursuit of all possible

remedies that might be available through myriad

government regulatory and legislative bodies”). In

that case, the lower courts dismissed the property

owner’s takings claim as unripe because he did not

engage in “an elaborate demapping procedure, which

is costly, cumbersome, lengthy and requires the final

approval of the New York City Council, the ultimate

legislative body of the City.” Id. at 401. The high

court reversed, noting that “[a]n aggrieved property

owner could be effectively blocked from seeking

meaningful judicial review of a confiscation claim

until, for example, a change in governing law—a

possibly excessively burdensome course of action, such

as is presented in this case.” Ibid.

In Rinker v. City of Fairfax, 238 Va. 24, 27, 30

(1989), the court held that the trial court erred when

it ordered a landowner to seek a legislative

amendment to the challenged legislation as a

precondition to review. “Otherwise, a local governing

body could impose involuntary conditions and force

the landowner to seek legislative review to repair

those illegal conditions, a situation inimical to the

orderly process of zoning.” Id. at 29-30.

In Howard v. County of San Diego, 184 Cal. App.

4th 1422, 1426 (2010), the county refused a property

owner’s request to build a barn on his land because it

was designated in the General Plan as the future

location for a road. The trial court determined that

Howard’s takings claim was not ripe because he did

not seek a General Plan amendment to modify the

road standard. The appellate court reversed, holding

that “regardless of the process” by which landowners

may seek an amendment to the county’s General Plan,

“the ultimate decision is a legislative one to be voted

on, after notice and a hearing, by the County’s Board

of Supervisors.” Id. at 1432. The court distinguished

the

legislative

remedy

from

administrative

exhaustion and the lawsuit was allowed to proceed.

Ibid.

The California Supreme Court adopted

Howard ’s analysis in Hill RHF Housing Partners,

L.P. v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 5th 458, 477 n.5

(2021), citing Howard, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 1431-32

(describing “legislative actions as political in nature”

and in contrast with administrative or adjudicative

actions, which apply law that already exists) (cleaned

up).

Other state courts agree:

Leone v. County of Maui, 128 Haw. 183, 196 (Ct.

App. 2012), held that “[r]ipeness requires only that

landowners take advantage of any available variances

or waivers under existing law; it does not require them

to undertake changing the law itself.”

Paris v. Mayfield Village, 14 Ohio App. 3d 450, 452

(1984), held that property owners are not required to

“pursue an initiative referendum to change the

present village zoning ordinance before they may

raise the constitutionality of the subject zoning in a

declaratory judgment action.”

In In re Quality of Service Standards for Regulated

Telecommunication Services, 204 Mich. App. 607, 610

(1994), the court flatly stated that “exhaustion of

legislative remedies, [is] a doctrine unknown to our

jurisprudence.”

B. Other courts require

legislative remedies

exhaustion

Conversely, the Fourth Circuit below and certain

state courts demand attempted legislative solutions

before legal relief. In Nat’l Brick Co. v. City of

Chicago, 92 Ill. App. 2d 192, 196 (1968), the plaintiff ’s

action was dismissed as unripe for failing to petition

the City Council for a change to the zoning ordinance.

Said the Illinois court, “[w]e believe that under the

facts and circumstances of the instant case the

plaintiffs should first have exhausted their legislative

remedy before petitioning the courts for relief.” Ibid.

(citing Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d 178 (1956);

Reilly v. City of Chicago, 24 Ill. 2d 348, 350 (1962))

(Plaintiff “failed to seek relief by amendment, the only

procedure available to him under the ordinance [and

this] was a prerequisite to access to the courts.”).

Florida courts also may require property owners to

seek political, legislative relief to ripen a regulatory

takings claim. For example, in Taylor v. Village of N.

Palm Beach, 659 So.2d 1167, 1173-74 (Fla. App. 1995),

the court held that the availability of a “political

resolution” barred the landowner’s as-applied

regulatory takings claim “because she did not seek to

amend” the village’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan.

Similarly, in City of Jacksonville Beach v. Prom, 656

So.2d 581, 582-83 (Fla. App. 1995), the court noted

that although amending the comprehensive plan was

“a legislative act of the city council,” the council, staff,

or landowners may propose site-specific amendments.

Therefore, the court held that the landowner must

pursue that remedy to ripen a regulatory takings

claim. Id. at 583. Georgia and Wisconsin courts echo

this approach. See Shelley v. Town of Tyrone, 302 Ga.

297, 305 (2017) (rejecting a regulatory takings claim

as unripe because the property owner “did not

formally ask the council . . . to rezone the property in

question”); Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 225 Wis. 2d

672, 696 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (requiring property

owner to seek rezoning to ripen takings claim, but not

to appeal the denial).

C. Exhaustion of legislative remedies is in

tension with multiple doctrines

In addition to the split of authority above, a

legislative exhaustion requirement for Fifth Amendment cases sits in tension with multiple established

legal principles. First, the judiciary has a clear

obligation to resolve constitutional claims in the first

instance. See, e.g., Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18

(There is a “virtually unflagging obligation of the

federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given

them.”) (citations omitted).

Yet, when a court

bypasses that duty and designates the legislature as

the initial arbiter of constitutional disputes, it

unbalances the separation of powers and diminishes

the judiciary. Particularly when considering that the

legislative body is not required to explain its

determinations (as here, JA 022-030), and such

inherently political decisions are prone to the forces

that generally attend such acts.

For example,

legislative bodies often bend to public opposition and

refuse to allow property owners to develop their land.

See, e.g., Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d

810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing cases in which

legislative bodies acceded to public opposition and

refused development proposals by certain religious

and racial groups); City of Las Vegas v. 180 Land Co.,

LLC, 546 P.3d 1239, 1252 (Nev. 2024) (noting that the

city council’s hostility to the proposed development

reflected

the

neighboring

property

owners’

opposition); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Twp. of Manalapan, 272 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div.

1994) (noting that “the enactment or amendment of a

zoning ordinance is a legislative act, [and] a governing

body may respond to the views of its constituents in

performing this responsibility”).

Second, to the extent that property owners must

pursue legislative change in order to ripen a

regulatory takings claim, it is in tension with

Williamson County ’s final decision rule. 473 U.S. at

193 (The landowner is only required to show that the

government has reached a “definitive position” about

how the land use restrictions will be applied to the

property.). A legislative decision is rarely “final”

because the legislature is almost always free to

change its mind and do something different in the

future, particularly with respect to discretionary

determinations. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433,

449 (2009) (legislatures cannot bind the hands of

future legislatures); Cherry v. Mayor and City Council

of Baltimore City, 475 Md. 565, 623 (2021) (same).

Therefore, if legislature has the continuous ability to

act regardless of past decisions, then the property

owner can be perpetually compelled to ask for

legislative change, which would effectively bar the

resolution of its constitutional claim. See TahoeSierra Pres. Council, Inc., 911 F.2d at 1345 (Kozinski,

J., dissenting) (“A decision denying a variance is final,

whereas a decision not to amend a law never is.”).

Third, the demand for legislative exhaustion both

alters the nature of Fifth Amendment claims and

undermines this Court’s temporary takings doctrine.

Once a regulation causes a taking of private property,

future changes to that law do not erase the

constitutional violation that has already occurred.

First English, 482 U.S. at 317-18 (if the government

“abandon[s] its intrusion or discontinue regulations,”

the result is a temporary taking); San Diego Gas &

Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981)

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The fact that a regulatory

taking may be temporary, by virtue of the government’s power to rescind or amend the regulation, does

not make it any less of a constitutional taking.”)

(internal quotations omitted); Knick, 588 U.S. at 193

(“A later payment of compensation may remedy the

constitutional violation that occurred at the time of

the taking, but that does not mean the violation never

took place. . . . A bank robber might give the loot back,

but he still robbed the bank.”). That is in substantial

tension with a ripeness doctrine that renders the

original violation nonactionable and deprives the

owner of judicial review unless and until the

legislature, at the future date of its choosing, decides

whether to confirm, rescind, or alter the law. It also

changes the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s

protection, by grounding the claim upon the

legislature’s failure to cure as opposed to the original

violation itself.

II.

This Court Should Resolve the Conflict

Between Jurisdictional Standing and

Prudential Ripeness in Takings Cases

There is a substantial split of authority about

whether final decision ripeness is jurisdictional or

prudential for Fifth Amendment regulatory takings

claims. 12 On the jurisdictional side are this Court’s

decisions in Williamson County Regional Planning

Commission, Horne, and Pakdel, plus the Third and

Eighth Circuits. On the prudential side are this

Court’s decisions in Lucas and Suitum, and the

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.

The Federal and Second Circuits have intra-circuit

splits and in the remaining Circuits, it is an open

question. As a result, there is substantial uncertainty

about what a property owner must plead for its

constitutional claim to be heard on the merits.

A. This Court’s conflicting decisions about

ripeness

For regulatory takings claims under the Fifth

Amendment, property owners must establish standing and final decision ripeness. Both originate from

the same constitutional limitation that courts can only

adjudicate “case[s] or controvers[ies],” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 335 (2006), and

they “boil down to the same question” of whether the

plaintiff properly alleged an injury. MedImmune, Inc.

v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007).

With respect to standing, the owner must show

(i) an injury-in-fact, (ii) a causal connection between

the injury and the conduct complained of, and (iii) and

12 This question is also raised in Tedford’s Tenancy, LLC, v. City

of New York, No. 26-____. (filed June 30, 2026).

redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560-61 (1992). The injury-in-fact must be “concrete,

particularized, and actual or imminent.” First Choice

Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 146 S. Ct. 1114,

1122 (2026). Conversely, “conjectural or hypothetical”

injuries are insufficient. Dep’t of Educ. v. Brown, 600

U.S. 551, 561 (2023) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).

With respect to ripeness, under the Fifth

Amendment the government is liable for regulations

that have gone “too far.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property

may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes

too far it will be recognized as a taking.”).

Accordingly, the property owner must plausibly plead

that the government has committed to a de facto final

position, Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 479, so that the court

knows “how far the regulation goes.” MacDonald,

Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 348

(1986). Final decision ripeness is a modest requirement that reflects the limits of the regulation as

applied to the property and it does not demand

administrative exhaustion. Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 480.

For Fifth Amendment takings cases, final decision

ripeness is complementary of, or even duplicative of,

standing. If there is a final decision, then the claimed

injury-in-fact is concrete and particularized. And if

there is no final decision, then the injury is merely

speculative or hypothetical. In some cases, this Court

has equated final decision ripeness with standing and

concrete injury. See, e.g., Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S.

at 193 (“the finality requirement is concerned with

whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a

definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual,

concrete injury”); Horne, 569 U.S. at 525 (final

decision ripeness is based on whether the owner had

been injured by the government’s action and suffered

a concrete injury); Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 479 (ripeness

ensures that the owner has been injured and that the

case is not about a hypothetical harm).

However, this Court has also said the exact

opposite and characterized ripeness as a “prudential”

doctrine for takings claims. In Suitum, the Court

explained that final decision ripeness is reviewed

“under prudential ripeness principles” and it is an

“independent prudential hurdle.” 520 U.S. at 733; id.

at 734 and n.7 (ripeness is “drawn both from Article

III limitations on judicial power and from prudential

reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction”) (citing

Reno v. Cath. Social Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57, n.18

(1993)). 13 It did the same in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 101213 (“That there is a discretionary special permit

procedure . . . goes only to the prudential ripeness of

Lucas ’s challenge, and for the reasons discussed we do

not think it prudent to apply that prudential

requirement here.”).

The distinction between the two is extraordinarily

important because prudential considerations are

separate from “the immutable requirements of Article

III.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162. While they “bear on

the question of standing,” they are “self-imposed

limits” on the exercise of jurisdiction that can be freely

modified or abrogated by the legislature. Ibid.; United

States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 757 (2013) (prudential limitations are separate from standing and

“essentially matters of judicial self-governance.”). As

Suitum also held that the Abbott Laboratories’ two-prong

“fitness for review” ripeness test was “not on point” for takings

cases but otherwise stated that ripeness was prudential. 520

U.S. at 744 (discussing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

136, 148-153 (1967)).

one federal court explained, “when a court declares

that a case is not prudentially ripe, it means that the

case will be better decided later . . . . It does not mean

that the case is not a real or concrete dispute affecting

cognizable current concerns of the parties within the

meaning of Article III.” Simmonds v. I.N.S., 326 F.3d

351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003); Variscite NY Four, LLC v. N.Y.

State Cannabis Control Bd., 152 F.4th 47, 58 (2d Cir.

2025) (same); A.C.L.U. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d

644, 677 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[P]rudential principles are

‘limits’ on standing, they do not themselves create

jurisdiction; they exist only to remove jurisdiction

where the Article III standing requirements are

otherwise satisfied.”).

Jurisdictional standing and prudential ripeness

are therefore in substantial tension with each other.

Once jurisdiction is established, “a federal court’s

obligation to hear and decide a case is virtually

unflagging.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571

U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (internal citations and quotations

omitted); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234

(1922) (when a party properly invokes federal jurisdiction, the court is “bound to take the case and

proceed to judgment”); Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty.

v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376, 385 (1861) (“[N]o

court, having proper jurisdiction and process to

compel the satisfaction of its own judgments, can be

justified in turning its suitors over to another tribunal

to obtain justice.”).

That well-established judicial duty cannot be easily

reconciled with a prudential doctrine that gives the

court the discretionary power to refuse to decide a

justiciable case. In other words, it is unclear how a

court can be obligated to decide a case for which it has

jurisdiction; and at the same time, have the

discretionary prudential power to refuse to decide a

case for which it has jurisdiction. One of these two

rules must ultimately yield to the other.

This Court has repeatedly acknowledged the

doctrinal divide. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149, 167 (2014) (Prudential ripeness “is in

some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the

principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and

decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually

unflagging.”); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control

Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26 (2014) (same);

see also Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. E.P.A., 693 F.3d 169,

185 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)

(Stating in the context of a Clean Air case that “the

majority opinion here concludes that prudential

standing is jurisdictional. The majority opinion thus

creates a deep and important circuit split on this

important issue.”). And at least one federal judge has

sharply questioned whether prudential ripeness

should exist at all. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals

Judge Henderson explained that “ripeness is a

solution in search of a problem and a needlessly

muddied area of justiciability.”

Indus. Energy

Consumers of Am. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 1156, 1163

(D.C. Cir. 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring). “Insofar

as ripeness traces its lineage to Article III, it has

become absorbed by standing. Insofar as ripeness

rests on prudential considerations, it infringes on our

constitutional duty to adjudicate a proper case or

controversy.” Ibid.

Commentators also argue that the prudential

ripeness doctrine finds little support in the language

and history of Article III. “Its ‘tortured constitutional

discourse’ has been characterized, among other

things, as permeated with ‘doctrinal confusion,’

‘hopelessly incoherent and subject to manipulation,’ a

‘pointless constraint on the courts,’ and driven by

substantive or normative assessments masquerading

as threshold jurisdictional inquiries.” S. Todd Brown,

The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 Hastings Const.

L.Q. 95, 97 (2014) (internal citations omitted); Erwin

Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22

Conn. L. Rev. 677, 692 (1990) (The distinction between

constitutional and prudential requirements was

judicially created and “of quite recent origin.”). As

with the abrogated state court exhaustion requirement, the justifications for prudential ripeness “are

suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is

dramatic.” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cnty. of

San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 352 (2005) (Rehnquist,

C.J., concurring in the judgment).

B. Lower courts conflict in their approach to

final decision ripeness in as-applied

regulatory takings cases

This Court has not conclusively determined

whether final decision ripeness under the Fifth

Amendment

jurisdictional

prudential.

Consequently, federal courts are left with

extraordinary uncertainty, with Williamson County,

Horne, and Pakdel on the side of jurisdictional

ripeness; Suitum and Lucas on the side of prudential

ripeness; and unresolved tension between jurisdictional standing and prudential ripeness. See, e.g.,

N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38, 52 n.8 (1st

Cir. 2021) (“The Supreme Court has expressed doubt

about whether the doctrine of prudential ripeness is

consistent with the settled principle that a federal

court has a ‘virtually unflagging’ obligation to hear

and decide cases within its jurisdiction.”); Fowler v.

Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2018)

(“[P]rudential ripeness is a disfavored judge-made

doctrine” that is in tension with obligation to hear

justiciable cases and “[t]he Court has not yet had

occasion to ‘resolve the continuing vitality of the

prudential ripeness doctrine.’ ”); see also Seattle Pac.

Univ. v. Ferguson, 104 F.4th 50, 66 (9th Cir. 2024)

(Noting in a First Amendment case “that the Supreme

Court in dictum has questioned the ‘continued vitality’

of prudential ripeness doctrine . . . The Court appears

to have walked up to the line but stopped short of

abrogating the doctrine.”).

Overall, there are

numerous splits about what ripeness means and on

what side of line it belongs.

1. Ripeness is jurisdictional. The Third Circuit

deems ripeness to be jurisdictional in takings cases.

Dillow v. Treasurer of Pennsylvania, No. 24-2004,

2025 WL 2813596, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2025)

(ripeness is an element of Article III jurisdiction). The

Eighth Circuit and Nevada Supreme Court do so as

well. Snaza v. City of Saint Paul, 548 F.3d 1178, 1182

(8th Cir. 2008) (ripeness is jurisdictional with respect

to takings claims); City of Las Vegas v. 180 Land Co.,

LLC, 546 P.3d 1239, 1250 (Nev. 2024) (if a takings

claim isn’t ripe, the court exceeds its jurisdiction by

allowing the claim to proceed) (citing MacDonald,

Palazzolo, and Williamson County).

The Sixth Circuit is undecided but leans toward the

jurisdictional side. As it explained, “[w]hether that

ripeness argument can square with [Knick v.

Township of Scott] is an open question in our circuit.”

Hendershot v. Stanton, 162 F.4th 625, 628 n.1 (6th

Cir. 2025) (also noting the federal circuit split between

Knellinger v. Young, 134 F.4th 1034, 1044 (10th Cir.

2025), and Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer of Fla., 136

F.4th 1322, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2025), with Dillow,

2025 WL 2813596, at *2-3).

However, in several cases, the court has been

reticent to apply the prudential ripeness doctrine. In

Miller v. City of Wickliffe, although not a regulatory

takings case, ripeness turned on whether the plaintiff

had applied for a particular land use permit. 852 F.3d

497, 501 (6th Cir. 2017). The court noted that this

Court in Lexmark and Driehaus, and the Sixth Circuit

in Kiser, cast doubt on prudential standing and

consequently, “we are hesitant to ground our decision

in prudential-standing principles.” Id. at 503, n.2

(citing Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 125-26, Driehaus, 573

U.S. at 167, and Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 606-07

(6th Cir. 2014)). 14 See also F.P. Dev., LLC v. Charter

Twp. of Canton, 16 F.4th 198, 203 (6th Cir. 2021) (In

the context of a regulatory takings action, “we do not

think it prudent to apply the doctrine of prudential

ripeness sua sponte here. F.P. has standing under

Article III, and the status of the prudential ripeness

doctrine is uncertain.”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); Cath. Healthcare Int’l, Inc. v.

Genoa Charter Twp., 82 F.4th 442, 445-48 (6th Cir.

2023) (ripeness was determined by concrete injury

and the plaintiff was not required to show that it has

complied with the administrative process).

2. Ripeness is prudential. The Fourth, Fifth and

Seventh Circuits hold that ripeness is prudential and

distinct from standing. Washlefske v. Winston, 234

F.3d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Ripeness in this context

14 “Lexmark, Driehaus, and Kiser do not affirmatively state that

the prudential-standing doctrine is dead, and we cannot predict

its future. But, in view of the question, we choose to rely on a

more solid foundation for deciding the case—namely,

constitutional-standing principles.” Ibid.

does not refer to Article III’s case or controversy

requirement for that is plainly satisfied here. . . .

Rather, the question is one of prudential ripeness—

whether we should exercise federal jurisdiction.”)

(citing Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733 n.7); Money v. City of

San Marcos, No. 24-50187, 2025 WL 429980, at *3

(5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2025) (the finality requirement is a

prudential ripeness determination); Kolton v.

Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2017), as

amended (Nov. 9, 2017) (ripeness in a takings case is

prudential and waivable). New York courts have

followed suit. Tedford’s Tenancy, LLC v. City of New

York, 238 A.D.3d 624, 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025).

The Ninth Circuit similarly emphasizes the

prudential aspect. See, e.g., Rancho de Calistoga v.

City of Calistoga, 800 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015)

(“ripeness requirements are prudential rather than

jurisdictional, meaning that they are formulated by

the court rather than stemming from Article III”);

Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, 26 F.4th 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.

2022) (in the context of a First Amendment case,

holding that the fixed standard of constitutional

ripeness applies “less stringently” when constitutional

rights are asserted but simultaneously reasoning that

prudential ripeness is “amplified” when constitutional

rights are asserted).

But the Ninth Circuit has also strongly questioned

prudential ripeness, calling it a disfavored doctrine in

tension with the court’s obligation to decide justiciable

cases. Fowler, 899 F.3d at 1116 n.1; see also Nat’l

Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Off. of Comptroller of

Currency, No. 4:20-CV-04186-KAW, 2021 WL

4932548, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2021) (in an

Administrative Procedure Act case, noting that the

Ninth Circuit considers prudential ripeness to be “a

disfavored judge-made doctrine” and “declin[ing] to

address prudential ripeness when constitutional

ripeness is satisfied”) (citation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the tension

between jurisdictional and prudential ripeness and

declared it to be prudential in deference to Lucas,

Suitum, and Horne. See N. Mill Street, LLC v. City of

Aspen, 6 F.4th 1216, 1227-29 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding

that although the takings claim was ripe under Article

III and the owner had standing, it was “not

prudentially ripe,” and the case must be dismissed).

The tumult that preceded this decision is noteworthy.

The Tenth Circuit had been struggling for years with

respect to this issue and intra-circuit splits were

rampant. Id. at 1228 (citing to the jurisdictional

ripeness cases of Bateman v. City of West Bountiful,

89 F.3d 704, 706 (10th Cir. 1996); SK Finance SA v.

La Plata Cnty., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 126 F.3d 1272,

1275-76 (10th Cir. 1997); and the prudential ripeness

cases of B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. BNSF Railway Corp.,

531 F.3d 1282, 1299 n.20 (10th Cir. 2008); Alto

Eldorado P’ship v. Cnty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170,

1179-80 (10th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

3. The intra-circuit splits. The Federal Circuit is

divided. It has held that ripeness in takings cases is

jurisdictional, Martin v. United States, 894 F.3d 1356,

1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and that ripeness is prudential,

McGuire v. United States, 707 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed.

Cir. 2013).

The court explained its dilemma:

“Opinions from the Supreme Court, as well as our

own, show that it can be difficult to distinguish

between ripeness cases that involve jurisdictional

inquiries and those that turn instead on prudential

concerns.” Doyle v. United States, No. 2023-1735,

2024 WL 5154019, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 18, 2024)

(citing Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733 n.7).

The Second Circuit also has an intra-circuit split.

It has held that ripeness is prudential and

discretionary; and also, that it is jurisdictional and

mandatory. Compare Vandor, Inc. v. Militello, 301

F.3d 37, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We are obliged to

consider the ripeness question before reaching the

merits of Vandor’s claims because ripeness is

jurisdictional[.]”); with Sherman v. Town of Chester,

752 F.3d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Because Williamson

County [ripeness] is a prudential rather than a

jurisdictional rule, we may determine that in some

instances, the rule should not apply and we still have

the power to decide the case.”) (citation omitted).

4. Some courts are just confused. In a recent Fifth

Amendment takings case, the Eleventh Circuit held

that ripeness is jurisdictional. Maron, 136 F.4th at

1329 (“standing, ripeness, and sovereign immunity

. . . are jurisdictional issues”). Nonetheless, after

determining that the owner had sufficiently alleged

standing, id. at 1331, the court proceeded to evaluate

ripeness pursuant to the two-part prudential ripeness

test that this Court in Suitum said was inapplicable

to takings actions. Id. at 1332; see Suitum, 520 U.S.

at 744; 15 compare Busse v. Lee Cnty., 317 Fed. App’x

15 The Eleventh Circuit is not the only one to mistakenly apply

the two-part ripeness test (i.e., fitness for review and hardship to

the parties) that Suitum deemed inapplicable. The Ninth Circuit

and New York Court of Appeals have as well, Manufactured

Home Communities Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1033

(9th Cir. 2005); Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67

N.Y.2d 510, 519-20 (1986). This only amplifies the need for this

Court to clarify what ripeness means and whether it is

jurisdictional or prudential.

968, 972 (11th Cir. 2009) (ripeness is a matter of

subject matter jurisdiction). Iowa’s high court did the

same. Iowa Coal Min. Co. v. Monroe Cnty., 555

N.W.2d 418, 432 (Iowa 1996).

Similarly, the

California Supreme Court deemed ripeness to be a

prudential doctrine, while simultaneously stating

that ripeness only applies when the government is

“invested with great discretion, which it has not yet

even been asked to exercise,” which equally reflects

standing and the lack of a concrete injury. Landgate,

Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 17 Cal. 4th 1006, 1038

(1998).

C. Certiorari is warranted to resolve the

conflict

Certiorari should be granted to resolve the

persistent confusion and multiple splits in the lower

courts regarding whether final decision ripeness is

jurisdictional or prudential. It is a critical question of

justiciability for Fifth Amendment takings claims that

only this Court can resolve. The adequate, consistent,

and uniform protection of fundamental property

rights is dependent on a clear understanding of what

a property owner must show for its constitutional

claim to be heard.

The determination includes whether the characterization of final decision ripeness as prudential in

Lucas and Suitum was precedential or nonprecedential. If it was merely a “drive-by” reference,

it is to be given no effect. See, e.g., Wilkins v. United

States, 598 U.S. 152, 160 (2023) (Statements that lack

analysis and that are immaterial to the outcome are

understood to be “a drive-by jurisdictional ruling that

receives no precedential effect.”) (citing Arbaugh v.

Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006), and Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).

In other contexts, this Court has readily clarified

when certain prudential requirements were improper

or needed to be extinguished. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at

127 & n.3 (reviewing instances where “what we have

previously classified as an aspect of ‘prudential

standing’ but for which, upon closer inspection, we

have found that label inapt”) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 573-74); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007)

(per curiam); Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344-46; Dep’t of Labor

v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 n.** (1990); Valley Forge

Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of

Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)); see

also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510 (“Jurisdiction . . . is a

word of many, too many, meanings. [The Supreme]

Court, no less than other courts, has sometimes been

profligate in its use of the term.”) (internal citations

omitted).

To that end, in Knick, this Court explained that

final decision ripeness was not the intended target for

the prudential designation: “[B]ecause of its shaky

foundations, the state-litigation requirement has been

a rule in search of a justification for over 30 years. We

eventually abandoned the view that the requirement

is an element of a takings claim and recast it as a

‘prudential’ ripeness rule.’ ” Knick, 588 U.S. at 204;

see Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S.

Ct. 1409, 1411 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari) (“[W]e should reconsider

Williamson County because our attempts to

ameliorate the effects of its state-litigation rule have

spawned only more confusion in the lower courts. As

early as 1992, the Court began to recast the state-

litigation rule as a ‘prudential’ rather than

jurisdictional requirement.”).

Knick left final decision ripeness and its

prudential moniker in place because neither were at

issue. Knick, 588 U.S. at 188. Nonetheless, Knick ’s

reasoning suggests that the prudential classification

for final decision ripeness was merely a nonprecedential “drive-by” statement. That view is

supported by Pakdel, which, two years after Knick

was decided, re-coupled final decision ripeness to

standing and concrete injury. 594 U.S. at 479 (“this

[ripeness] requirement ensures that a plaintiff has

actually been injured by the Government’s action and

is not prematurely suing over a hypothetical harm”);

see also Horne, 569 U.S. at 525 (limiting its

designation of prudential ripeness to the state court

exhaustion requirement).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

J ONATHAN M. H OUGHTON

Counsel of Record

D EBORAH J. L A F ETRA

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.,

Suite 1000

Arlington, VA 22201

(202) 888-6881

JHoughton@pacificlegal.org

JORDAN HOWLETTE

Justly Prudent

420 Florida Ave., N.E.

Suite 27

Washington, DC 20002

Counsel for Petitioner Garnell Walls

J ULY 2026

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