Application — Eric Drake, Applicant v. Texas

FILED

NOV 10 2025

No. 25A LG, 7 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

ERIC DRAKE,

Applicant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondents

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

TO THE HONORABLE SAMUEL A. ALITO JR., ASSOCIATE

JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND

CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF PENDING DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

IMMEDIATE RELIEF REQUESTED

Eric Drake

10455 North Central Expressway

Suite 109

Dallas, Texas 75231

directdrakeemail@gmail.com

912-281-7100

November 10, 2025 RECEIVED

NOV 1 2 2025

FICE OF THE CLER

UP REME COURT, U.S.

ESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Court may stay or render void, the entire state

deferred probation order entered by a judge who lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due-Process and Equal

Protection Clause, pending its disposition of Applicant's writ of certiorari.

2. Whether, in the alternative, the Court may stay all travel

restriction conditions, and the electronic-monitoring requirement imposed by

that order, in violation of the Fourteenth, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments,

because compliance would cause imminent, irreparable harm to the Applicant.

i

PARTIES, RULE 29.6 STATEMENT, AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Applicant, Eric Drake, was the Relator/Defendant. The Respondent: is

The State of Texas.

RELATED CASES

State Appellate Courts:

Ex parte Eric Drake, No. WR-95,163-03, Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals. Mandamus denied. (August 27, 2025)

Ex parte Eric Drake No. 05-25-00651-CR, No. 05-25-00652-CR, Fifth

Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. Mandamus denied. (June 11, 2025)

Ex parte Eric Drake No. 05-25-00542-CR, No. 05-25-00543-CR, Fifth

Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. Mandamus denied. (May 12, 2025)

Ex parte Eric Drake, No. 05-25-00360-CR, No. 05-25-00361-CR Fifth

Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. Mandamus denied. (May 2, 2025), Rehearing

denied. (May 5, 2025)

District Criminal Court:

State of Texas v. Eric Von Drake, Cause Numbers: F-22-76307 & F-24-

76901, 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas.

REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION TO THE FULL COURT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 22, 33, 34, and 23 and in light of the

life-threatening medical circumstances detailed herein, Applicant respectfully

requests that this emergency application be submitted to the full Court for

consideration.! The decision on this application will directly impact

Applicant's access to life-saving medical care and will determine whether he

is subjected to a medical risk that has already proven to be life-threatening.

Given the profound and irreversible nature of the harm at stake, Applicant

respectfully requests consideration by the full Court is warranted.

1 Applicant Eric Drake respectfully applies for an injunction, pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 23, to stay the enforcement of the conditions of his

community supervision—specifically the travel restriction and electronic

monitoring—pending this Court’s disposition of his accompanying Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari.

Iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED wissscsstsssesssccssscssssssnvsnccnsssntoncestssstacstansaesssscnvsvessrecsess li

PARTIES, RULE 29.6 STATEMENT, AND RELATED

PROCEEDING Bwisssessscisssscseasnnerscnssccnsoanveansensseniansiniaasoucsianesnitacsisepnanmbacomiiaesss ill

REQUEST PERMISSION TO SUBMIT TO FULL COURT ..................... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS civasissscsssetsciicasaonantaeapsnaicustespeiiesnacedaonansaiecasuucsencycessenstans Vv

APPENDIX EXHIBITS éisssssscssscssceonssuceterscsetesncnccseuaceeteassaaassnensatespeassssespessnesies vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... eeesceescsesceseneceseeeeseeeeeceeeeeasereaeseneeesarenseas ix

OPINIONS BELOW .. cctsisscsssnssscccsvescssssscasnssvsavousesxessnserersneswevsvessveasveerssseesessaves 3

JURISDICTION ssscsscsscssccnasascccasspacssassesuansasvanasaswerayesss sexcsivanencsscacsacisomanasacanieans 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE i vssscxcsssnsssancsoasvissosevsevaransovescossssnensaseoseswesiauevsncess 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE APPLICATION..........cccccesseceseseseeseseeeenee 8

I. Applicant Is Likely to Success And Standards for Emergency

Injunctive Relief..............:cccccessccceeeeeeeeeeesesceeeeeceesssseeeesceseaeeeeeeeeeeteneeeeeeeaeees 8

A. Void Judgment Doctrine (TeXx€@s) ...........cccceseeeeeececeeeeeceeeseeeeeeenteeneeeeees 8

B. Prior-Restraint Analysis .............c:ccccsssceeeseeeeesseeeeeeessseeeeceeeseeseeeeeenacers 9

C. Viewpoint Discrimination siccsccssccascccssiscanvccescesseiscuvsveeswictiecvitvassscariawess 10

II. Eighth-Amendment Deliberate Indifference .............00ceeeceeeteeeeeeeeeeeee 10

TE. Due Process Violation ssisciscisssissccsscscascsnscsssvacssssssssccusacasavasstcassassecssevasses 11

A. Lack of Jurisdiction and Void Judgment ...............:.ccceseeseeeeeeeseeeeeeee 11

B. Constitutional Violations and Prior-Trial Mandamus .................... 12

C. Probation Order Is Void By A Preponderance of Evidence ............ 13

IV. Exhaustion of State Remedies for Emergency Relief...................escccceeees 17

V. Younger Abstention Exception ...............ccseseeesessssenseceeeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeees 18

VI. Irreparable Harm & Balance of Equities .0..............cccccceeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 19

VIE. Public Interest sisssasssszsssssserensansuscessaepissieicsiasissyiscesinessnccstiecunssteta Ginsatessssseesscasee 21

Conclusion and Prayer sesssssssewsssessaccsrsssssnncerensicdsvvecadenavassacesscesssiesbisesadassssveness- 22

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS

APPENDIX EXHIBIT A: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Order Denying

Rehearing on Mandamus

(August 27, 2025)........ccccccccsssscecceesecessccaeeencncecersessceeeeesersceeseseeseeaeeeensaeeeoes App.la

APPENDIX EXHIBIT B: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Order Denying

Mandamus

(August 27, 2025)........ccccccccccsssssssrcececssssseseeececeesssessuaaeeeeeeseceeesessneseceeetene App.2a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT C: Texas Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas), Order

Denying Mandamus

(June 11, 2025)... ecccesssencscecseesseceecesscsccenseeeeeceeeecsesscneeesssneccesessseagees App.3a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT D: Texas Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas), Order

Denying Mandamus

(May 12, 2025)...........ccccsccccccccesesssesccecesesesrececeeceeesssessnaacceseessnseseeseaaeeeeeenens App.4a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT E: Texas Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas), Order

Denying Rehearing on Mandamus

(May 5, 2025)...........cccccssceecccececessssnccecessessnecececeeeeeseeesaaeaceeeceeeeeeesecuaeeeseres App.5a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT F: Texas Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas), Order

Denying Mandamus

(April 2, 2025).........cccccecsssssererscccessnsecccceeseseesnececesesesecesnsuceesssneceeceesseees App.6a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT G: Emergency Room Visit With Diagnosis of

Pneumonia

(Feb. 08, 2025) 200... ccceccsssseeseeeeeeeseeececeeeeeseeeeeeeecerseeeeeaeaeeeeeeeseesenens App.7a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT H: Emergency Room Visit With Diagnosis of

Loss of Sight

(Oct. 03, 2025) cccaccsosvssssnseeosssassnasedswese sovkvaseseeeaasssessonesseaianenmucescceveunse App.8a

v1

APPENDIX EXHIBIT I: Sworn Declaration of Dr. Larry Taub

(August 28, 2025) ........cceccsceceteceeenseeeeaeecseeeeeaneeseeeaeeeeeaeeenneeeeeesenaee App.9a—12a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT J: Photograph of Applicant’s leg (DVT)

In the Emergency Room at Baylor Hospital

(March 2025) .roconsrenssseosnantnasisansindassesiesisassasisasntntisueebapesuassavsaupeaunassieeise App.13a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT K: Clerk’s Entry of Guilty Plea of

The Applicant Before Judge Michael Snipes

(January 27, 2025) sscscossscssevsessvevoversecansrsvssvercvscssssviacsonesiweveccasssowassaceansee App.14a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT L: Clerk’s Entry of Sentencing of

The Applicant Before Judge Michael Snipes

(March 27, 2025) .cnssserssereeoncesscarnenenstngresensiconusnntvenesunnebaseehsaasishinisasvtasteses App.15a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT M: Order of Deferred Adjudication Signed

By Judge Tammy Kemp of the 204 District Criminal Court

(April 8, 2025).........ccccccccccessssseccesecssssaseccesssncnacacceeeeecceeseaceeeeseeeneess App.16a—17a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT N: Order of Deferred Adjudication Signed

By Visiting Judge Michael Snipes

(May 8, 2025)............ccccesscssscccccsensensecerecsseeeececeseesesseeaeuseeeeceescaaaneess App.18a—19a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT O: Order of Recusal of Judge Tammy Kemp

Of 204 District Criminal Court (Dallas County)

(OCtObER, 18, "2024) crcses. cacccese. «an ++ x. oc +++ +++ -@NDGDIAANEAAOREANRLR NESE ORGLEINDDONIENE NERO App.20a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT P: Excerpt from October 29, 2024 Transcript

Applicant Objection to Judge Snipes Jurisdiction

(October 29, 2OQA)...........:sscccesesscccessnceccensecesesneceeerseseceeceecaeseneeeereserersed App.21a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT Q: Excerpt from October 29, 2024 Transcript

Applicant Objection to Judge Snipes Jurisdiction

(October 29, 2024)...........ccccsssssseccecessecnsecesseseneceeceeeceeeseseseeeeeeeeeeee App.22a—23a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT R: Email From Judge Michael Snipes

Confirming That Appellant Had A Legal Right To View His Emails

(September 3, 2024) ssscsevsssscsassssssssessacssconsssternssccdosnsstavaustscscessctutssesseeess App.24a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT S: Email From Judge Michael Snipes

Confirming He Did Not Have Jurisdiction (September 13, 2024)

APPENDIX EXHIBIT S: Email From Judge Michael Snipes

Confirming That Judge Snipes Did Not Have Jurisdiction In

Applicant’s Cases. Snipes Is Pleading With Judge Wheless

To Allow Him To Preside In Applicant’s Case

(September 13, 2024) sscssssscsscccessssesvessccersansciacaresssertssvaccsvsssvecsvescuassssssues App.25a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT T: Judge Wheless Fraudulent Assignment

Order For Visiting Judge Michael Snipes (Backdated Order)

(Dated August 22, 2024 but Actually Signed May 2025) ...........::000 App.26a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT U: Judge Snipes Fraudulent Warrant for

Applicant’s Arrest

(September 16, 2024) -sccsscssssssocovessovsssvarscnccansstssavessasscvencsssecovancsecvcnssanss App.27a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT V: Excerpt from October 14, 2024 Transcript

Judge Michael Snipes Explanation of Why He Issued Warrant

For The Applicant’s Arrest

(October 14, 2024) sevcssescisisacsusncasinesexsstconsuassacaversrssvusssieevexsusnsasnecenasausasees App.28a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT W: Assistant District Attorneys Robin

Ogbonna and Shawnkeedra Houston-Martin Bogus, Conspired

Motion To Hold Applicant’s Bond Insufficient

(September 13, 2024) ceccccssvesrsssscassvassassccssscvosssavenaascaseciwssesansccusesas App.29a—30a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT X: Order of Deferred Adjudication That Is

Void Because Judge Tammy Kemp Recused Herself From The

Applicant’s Criminal Case an Judge Michael Snipes Never

Possessed Proper Assignment or Jurisdiction

(April 4, "2 025) reressssssnenonaurnennaesaesenanicon:cesutsmncnnnmanc namnaccnncenstaeeec App.3la—37a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT Y: October 28, 2024 Transcript Excerpt

Judge Michael Snipes admitting that Judge Tammy Kemp assigned

Him to Applicant’s criminal case

(October 28, 2024) wissssusssvevsseccnsssucosoerainnncksccenvucsvovasavaccnanteasenentnecerestneeney App.38a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT Z: January 27, 2025 Transcript Excerpt (Plea)

Judge Michael Snipes granting a PR Bond after he forced a guilty

plea from Applicant. Prior to the guilty plea—no bond was sufficient

(October 28, 2024) ........csvssnseneseswnnsoacccseveisonsweiievensveeveesnsevsevsvetacnentanssas App.39a

Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Babbitt v. United States,

543 U.S. 1150 (2005) .0......ccccceeeeceeesseececessesecenseeeceeseesceeeesaneeeeeeueecesseeenseceenees 20

Castro -Verdugo,

750 F.3d 1065

(Oth Cir. 2014)........ccccssccccessseceessssceccesssceseesssssececsaceceeeeaeersessssesessneesesareseeaeess 18

Cottrell v. St. John’s County,

877 F.2d 1040 (LOth Cir. 1989) -sccsssoxsscvssascvsesnvecuccosneaveveveessensdesvessroevessiavauacins 9

Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,

526 U.S. 629 (1999). ccassscusssasssnewscsienszessecnsuasascuspaveakauasavpancdaisaeteusecuiadusenanessvechaes 25

Elrod v. Burns,

A427 U.S. 347 (1976) scccussvormuannaninucresiiuesekceiascaniioseaninncesrncineaioinmnnans kenaweaniis 10

Erzoznik v. Jacksonville,

A422 U.S. 205 (1975) scvssscvvcsssancsvscvossrceresssviwevesssstasnsastevuivestavstatscuseveusecsusesertess 25

Freedman v. Maryland,

380 U.S. 51 (1965) scsscssssscransnvescssescancesasnseanraavcemnaniemnmwannees 1

Healy v. James,

408 U.S. 169 (1972) .....ccccceeeeeescccccecceceeecessseceeesessecceeeeesesseeeecescceeseeseeeseeseereeeeeses 9

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) ........cccceeeesseecececcesesssecseeessesecceceseeeenecseeeseeeeeeeeeserueeeees 8

In re Marriage of McClure,

B50 Tex. 121, 125 (2015) oe eeeeeeeeeececcececcessscceeseesseeeceeeecesnsnsaceceeeeesseeesecsenseeeeeees 8

Matal v. Tam,

582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017) .0.....ccccccscccsseesseccceeessersceceessseececeeceeceesseseeeeeeesneeeeeesaeas 10

Miller v. California,

413 U.S. 15 (1973) scssuncmaasicarsimecacansccsiawacmanaeniea iA 9

Murray v. United States,

473 U.S. 208 (1985) .....cccccecccecccsescessssssteeccecessesneceeeessececeeeeeeeeeenseececeessneneceeeeeeees 18

1x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart,

427 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1976) ccssssssssvsviscssseccasenvessavesssscsasssscscssescnasecocavunnecesssreeess 9

Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,

410 U.S. 667, 670 (1978) ooo. ccccceeeececeeeseceeeeeeeeeeeeeseseeeeeeensaeeeeeeeeseeeeseesereseeeee 9

Reid v. Pautler,

36 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 2014 WL 3845042 (D.N.M. 2014) oo... eee ccceeeeeeeeeeeenes 19

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,

592 U.S. 14 (2020) veeccccseccsecssecssecssuessecssesssessecssucssecsuessucessesesscsssecsuessneesesenesenvecees 21

Rosenberger v. Rector,

515 U.S..819,0828=301 199d) -ccosssscssecasasscennansscensnenaieccncensasr ences RiaiatanenNiNNSCRRE RM RPRUNSIERICEE 10

Smith v. Gohmert,

962 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ...........cccseeeseeecesseeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeereeenaeeeeens 13

Southeastern Promotions, Lid. v. Conrad,

420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) cceccccsccssecssessucesessucssessessssecsuessucssucssucssscsussueesecsneesueesees 9

Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm,

732 F.3d 535 (Sth Cir. 2018) ooo... cece ce ceceeeeceeseeeeeceeceeeeceeeeennneceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeees 21

Widmar v. Vincent,

454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) -.ccccecccsescseccsecssessucssscssessucssucssscsssesesseesucesucsaseeavenaceenecen 9

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

555 U.S. 541 (2008) scsiiccavcuncccvsceseasecsvessuvenanisvassiaanvesavicaesieveusunsasssessioiwenuasinenus 19

Williams v. Florida,

399 U.S. 78 (1970) ...sronconnseoncsursanssexsssuscassisscsneapuasestuedesecedseb ossasciseassesssssseassessun ete 11

Wood v. Sunn,

865 F.2d 982 (Oth Cir. 1989) ........cceceesseseeeeseeeeeeesseeceeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeseeaeeeeeees 10

Younger v. United States,

399 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) scscccssccseexcrpsrcassamwancetssnaacessencuseseisis aie tusscsevnanscsecacexcietascepes 18

State Statutes

Tex. Pen. Code § 37.10 sssscsssascccscsctssavavevewacsaacevesesssassavascssacscesusccassas 17

PexWen. COMES 37503 sanssasccncncansannnuane ne ncnaneNEe WeRNGieRERNRENON GNmLEeNCaeRD 17

Tex. Pen. Code § 39.08 ........cccccccccesessseececeeceeseeecsecseeeeeeeeesnaueeeeeeenaaeeeeeseeseesaas 17

Tex. Pen. Code § 39.02 ssgsssssscasssccccsoancasuscecusscasscecctucinwagussnrstacsarscistestiasaserectess 17

Tex. Pen. Code § 36.06 cccsssessasessesccennnvesucanmesvenacaivcsecemeaiarecvoreaniacsnsvcsstonecsusae 17

Tex..Pen! Code § 151.02 ravcasmmnanaapenunacons eenacasicendae ns mBSmExncnaS Et CONKAGDERADNOO 17

Tex. Pen. Code § 8.08 ........cccccceeeeecsessesecceeeeceeeeeeeeeseeeaeeeeeseeeaeeeseesesenceeeeeeneeenes 17

Federal Statutes

2B U.S.C. § 1292. .cccceccsescsecesecssseccesvscerecssucssecssectuecssucsssesessecssusesseeesavecsnecauecssses 5

28 U.S.C. §§ 125 Liceeccecsssecssecsssescssecsssesssscssvessscssesssueessecsssseesueessnecssvessnecsseeeseeees 3

28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) sccescsssscsscsvmnecepersasevesnsnacsisanectaesewenseieteacstiosnaysdenecuacssasiskawasaecs 3

18 U.S.C. § 816 lassssusiscaseranessecsssnusnsnvonvancasocsansssvsnneds ccantaeas eeconsenscaassnessaansnsenae 13

18 U.S.C. § 1512(C) .acuseonercsecneceneeenncornenrnesensadecnncnensoneendecensagunneninissnssviisssisiiasts 15

ZBU.G.C. § V2B7 cecsecccecesuecssecssuecsseccssecssvecsuscsusssscssusessecesscesuesersessscessessseeseveen 17

Rules

Supreme Court Rule 23.1 o........ccccccseeceesssseeeeeeeenseseseeeeeeeteeseeteeeeeeenseeeeesnes iv

Supreme Court Rule 22 ssssssvssesseasssavvssereccasssececsviverccersscevecentetanvivenmumaveans iv

Supreme Court Rule 33 ,.ccsssssessnvaessaacacacsnscsqnsedeanceaiashyesvesseseccssuaseseGaswwe iv

Supreme Court Rule 34. sssssscncassssnenmnsessosancenecnannnnaneewnainreneenenescomenennnnense iv

x1

To the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit:

Without the Court’s intervention before November 1, 2025, or

soon thereafter, the Applicant’s life will be in jeopardy, if he is unable

to attend his medical appointments that are outside the state of Texas.

Unfortunately, the Applicant is restrained from receiving professional

medical care because of a void deferred adjudicated probation order.

This Application presents to this Court an extraordinary circumstance in which, the Applicant has had over 20 episodes where he has

experienced brief blindness. Regrettably, his medical condition referred

to as Transient Loss of Sight has deteriorated and accelerated for the

worse. Physicians opined that the more recent developments confirm

these occurrences are mini stroke, which will expand to a full deadly

stroke. See App.9-12. The recent symptoms indicate that Applicant

may also have, “stroke of the eye,” which is capable of being fatal.

Currently, the Applicant 1s serving a 5-year suspended sentence

with community-deferred probation in Dallas County, Texas.

Applicant, Eric Drake, through this application, respectfully requests

that this Court issue an emergency injunction pending the full disposition

of his accompanying Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Applicant’s primary

request is for an order staying in its entirety the Deferred Adjudication Order

(1)

entered against him, which is void as a matter of law. The judge who entered

the order, visiting judge, Michael Snipes, lacked any subject-matter

jurisdiction, rendering every condition of the resulting community

supervision—including travel restrictions, any form of electronic monitoring,

mandatory counseling, and drug testing—an unconstitutional and ongoing

restraint on Applicant's liberty. See App.31-37. In the alternative, should the

Court decline to stay the entire void order, Applicant requests the more

limited relief of a temporary stay of two specific conditions that each pose a

direct and imminent threat of irreparable harm: (1) the travel restriction

prevent Applicant from obtaining essential specialized medical and dental

care for his serious health conditions, and (2) the potential re-imposition of an

electronic monitor that has already caused a life-threatening medical

complication (deep vein thrombosis-DVT). See App.13 (photograph of

Applicant’s right leg as a result of the deep vein thrombosis). The Fifth Court

of Appeals (Dallas) and the Court of Criminal Appeals have been made aware

of these specific dangers but have been callously reluctant in taking up these

issues. Hence, emergency relief from this Court is the only available remedy.

Applicant respectfully moves this Court for (1) a preliminary injunc-

tion to prevent imminent irreparable harm: blindness, deep-vein thrombosis

(DVT) or—stroke—which could be fatal; (2) an injunction to travel through-

out the United States to obtain medical and dental treatment and testing.

(2)

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denying Petitioner’s

petition for a writ of Mandamus is not reported and is included in the

Appendix. (App. la, 2a). The orders of the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals

(Dallas) denying Petitioner’s three separate petitions for a writ of Mandamus

are also not reported. 05-25-00651/0652-CR, Memorandum Opinion

Denied/Do Not Publish (June 11, 2025) (App.3a); 05-25-00542/00543-CR,

Memorandum Opinion Denied/Do Not Publish (May 12, 2025) (App.4a); 05-

25-00360/00361-CR, Memorandum Opinion Denied/Do Not Publish (May 5,

2025) Rehearing Denied (App.5a) and (App.6a) Denied/Do Not Publish.

JURISDICTION

The Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of certiorari

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251 and appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders

of a State court under §1253. The All Writs Act, 28U.S.C. §1651(a),

authorizes the Court to issue injunctions “necessary or appropriate in aid of”

its jurisdiction. The petition raises substantial federal constitutional

questions—prior restraint, viewpoint discrimination, deliberate indifference,

due-process violations, and the void-judgment issue—necessitating Supreme

Court review. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper.

(3)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts underlying this application, which establishes the deferred

probation order is void (See App.31-37), and the nature of the judgment and

the unconstitutional coercion of Applicant’s guilty plea, see (App.14) are set

forth in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. In summary:

Jurisdictional Defect: The visiting judge, Michael Snipes, lacked all

subject-matter jurisdiction over Applicant’s case, but he accepted his plea,

and sentenced him; and was never lawfully assigned. Judge Snipes did not

possess a shred of jurisdiction to preside over Applicant’s criminal cases.

Coerced Plea: Applicant was forced to plead guilty while suffering from

an untreated, critical case of pneumonia while incarcerated. (App.7). This

was the result of a scheme involving a fraudulent arrest warrant that was

issued by Judge Snipes on September 16, 2024; see App.27, and a punitive,

excessive $500,000 bail imposed by him. Judge Snipes admitted he issued the

09/13/24 warrant because Applicant failed to appear on 09/30/24. App.28, P

9, L4-6. Prosecutors filed a “sham” motion to hold Applicant’s bond insufficient. (App.29-30). Judge Snipes acted in concert with the prosecutors to

coerce a guilty plea from the Applicant. While representing himself in jail,

Applicant’s hands were secured to his side, preventing him from writing, or

taking notes during hearings—First Amend—and Due Process violation. Nor

could inmates bring paper, pen, or legal papers to court. (App.23, L, 4-19).

(4)

The State of Texas could not prove that Applicant was guilty of any

crimes. After Judge Snipes and prosecutor’s coerced Applicant to plea guilty,

Snipes allowed a PR bond. (App.39). The forced guilty plea led to the 5-year

deferred sentence, which was the product of an unconstitutional coercion.

Recent Medical Episodes. On October 3 and October 6, 2025, Applicant

experienced episodes of Transient Loss of Sight that caused numbness of the

left side of his body, double vision, followed by temporary loss of sight, severe

headaches, and other stroke-like symptoms. The episodes resolved after 20-

minutes, but the medical team at a local hospital concluded that the risk of a

future stroke is “substantial.” See App. 8-12 (medical records). Applicant has

an imminent appointment with a specialist in Missouri and Indiana. The

exact dates of flight and physician’s names, addresses, and other personal

information are available to the Court upon requests for safety reasons.

Deep-vein thrombosis. Subsequent evaluation revealed a deep-vein

thrombosis (DVT) in the Applicant’s lower right leg, which was swollen

almost double the left leg, painful, and potentially deadly. Photographs of the

affected limb were taken at the hospital for diagnostic purposes. App.13. The

Applicant needs to be examined by medical professionals who understand

this medical condition. These experts practice medicine outside of Dallas.

Whether Applicant is able to attend these critical appointments is

debatable because of the void deferred probation order.

(5)

Denial of Medical Care: Applicant is indigent and his dentist is located

in the state of Louisiana (three hour drive east of Dallas Texas). Applicant

needs a “crown” on his upper right tooth because the tooth is cracked. A

crown in Shreveport cost $600.00 and the dentist allows the patient to have a

payment plan, but in Dallas a crown cost at least $1,500.00.

The state district criminal courts, the court of appeals, and the court of

criminal appeals have refused to grant Applicant permission to travel to

these necessary medical appointments, effectively blocking his access to

essential, urgent life-saving healthcare. This refusal places Applicant in the

untenable position of risking permanent, irreversible damage to his health or

being placed in prison if he should travel outside the state of Texas to obtain

life-saving urgent medical help. Presently, there is no elected judge to grant

permission and this scheme appears deliberate.

Under established Texas law, a void judgment is a nullity that can be

challenged at any time and in any court. Despite this clear legal principle,

the state trial courts have failed to appoint an elected judge to hear

Applicant's meritorious claims, creating a procedural vacuum that renders

his right to challenge the order meaningless, which violates the Constitution.

In a diligent effort to exhaust all available state remedies, Applicant

has sought extraordinary relief by filing three separate petitions for a writ of

(6)

Mandamus with the Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) see (App.3, 4, 5, 6) and a

subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus with the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals. (Appp.1, 2). Each of these petitions sought: 1) ruling on Visiting

Judge Michael Snipes jurisdiction; 2) to compel the appointment of an elected

judge to rule on his motions and oversee his case. 3) Applicant’s requested the

appellate courts to allow him to travel for urgent medical issues. But in each

case, his efforts was denied or otherwise ignored, effectively leaving the

Applicant without any viable judicial forum. The state courts’ refusal to act

has created a dire and unconstitutional dilemma.

Furthermore, early in his probation, the state imposed a purely

punitive electronic ankle monitor on Applicant. This device caused a severe

blood clot in his leg, a life-threatening condition that required him to be

prescribed blood thinner (Eliguis 5mg) medication for months. (App. 13).

Applicant right leg remains numb from the blood clot. The emergency room

physicians at a local hospital cut the device off Applicant’s leg and warned

him that the blood clot originated from the device. The emergency room

doctor explained that the Applicant should not reinstall the device. The state

court eventually ordered the monitor removed specifically because of this

documented, dangerous medical complication. The monitor was removed over

six months ago, and there have been no issues or violations since, demon-

strating that it was never necessary for any legitimate supervisory purpose.

(7)

However, the Applicant lives under the constant threat that the state

may attempt to re-impose the monitor, which would place him at a direct risk

of another, potentially fatal—blood clot. Healthcare providers has informed

and warned Applicant that his loss of sight could likewise be associated with

a clot in his arteries that interrupts blood flow to the eyes and brain.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE APPLICATION

I. Applicant Is Likely to Success And The Standards for

Emergency Injunctive Relief In This Honorable Court

The Court may grant an emergency injunction where the movant

demonstrates (1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will vote to grant

certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that the Court will grant the injunction; (8) that

irreparable harm will result from denial of the stay; and (4) that the balance

of equities tips in the movant’s favor. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S.

183, 190 (2010) (Rule 23.1). Applicant pleadings have satisfied each prong.

A. Void-Judgment Doctrine (Texas)

A judgment entered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is a

nullity that may be challenged at any time. In re Marriage of McClure,

350 Tex. 121, 125 (2015). The backdated order of assignment for Judge Michael

Snipes (App.26) demonstrates that the 204th Criminal District Court never

possessed authority to impose the Deferred Adjudication Order. The Court

has recognized that a “void” state judgment may be reviewed in federal court

(8)

when Constitutional rights are implicated, Cottrell v. St. John’s County,

877 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1989).

B. Prior-Restraint Analysis

A prior restraint is “the most serious and the least tolerable

infringement” on the First Amendment. Neb. Press Assn v. Stuart,

427 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1976). The travel-restriction and the threat of

electronic monitoring effectively prevent Applicant from engaging in

protected expressive conduct out-of-state. While facially content-neutral,

the restriction operates as a viewpoint-based prior restraint because it is

predicated on the State’s disapproval of the expressive content of Applicant’s

performances. Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,

410 U.S. 667,670 (1973); Healy v. James, 408U.S.169 (1972); Widmar

v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).

The restriction fails the narrow-tailoring requirement articulated in

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) because it

is based on an unarticulated “ideology” and gives officials unfettered

discretion. No obscenity exception applies; the performance is not “patently

offensive” nor devoid of artistic value (Miller v. California, 413U.S.15

(1973)). Accordingly, the prior restraint is facially unconstitutional.

(9)

C. Viewpoint Discrimination

The First Amendment prohibits government action that discriminates

on the basis of viewpoint. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995)

(per curiam) holds that viewpoint discrimination is “presumptively unconstitutional.” Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017) affirms that “giving offense

is a viewpoint.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) bars conditioning

benefits on acceptance of a particular viewpoint. The State’s refusal to permit

travel and its threat to re-impose the ankle monitor are precisely such

conditions. Under Rosenberger and Maital, the order must be struck down.

II. Eighth- Amendment And Deliberate Indifference

Pursuant to Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,106 (1976) it establishes

that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment. In fact, in Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1989)

the same standard was applied to prison inmates. Applicant’s DVT was

caused by the previously imposed ankle monitor (App.13); the State’s threat

to re-impose the device despite clear medical contraindication is deliberate

indifference. The stroke-risk episodes (App.8-12) likewise demonstrate the

State’s knowledge of life-threatening conditions, which is applicable in the

Applicant’s case, satisfying the Gamble test.

(10)

IIT. Due-Process Violation

A judgment entered without jurisdiction is void under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s substantive due-process clause. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.

78 (1970) holds that a court lacking authority cannot deprive liberty.

Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114 Wis. 2d 575, 338 N.W.2d 861 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) —a

judgment void when the court lacks jurisdiction or denies due-process rights.

A. Lack of Jurisdiction and Void Judgment

A judgment entered by a judge who lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is

a nullity under Texas law. In re Marriage of McClure, 350 Tex. 121, 125

(2015) holds that “a judgment entered without jurisdiction has no legal effect

and may be challenged at any time.” This Court has similarly recognized that

a court may declare such orders void when jurisdiction is absent, Cottrell v.

St. John’s County, 877 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1989).

Statutory authority for this Court to address the void judgment derives

from its original and appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (original

jurisdiction over writs of certiorari) and § 1253 (appellate jurisdiction over

interlocutory orders of a State court), together with the All Writs Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1651, which empowers the Court to issue injunctions “necessary

or appropriate in aid of” its jurisdiction.

Enforcing a judgment that the Court itself can deem void violates the

(11)

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due-Process Clause because it deprives the

Applicant of liberty without lawful authority. The combination of (a) the

judge’s lack of jurisdiction, (b) the resulting void nature of the order, and (c)

the constitutional due-process violation provides a solid basis for this Court

to render the Deferred Adjudication Order void and enjoin its enforcement.!

B. Constitutional Violations and Prior-Trial Mandamus

Before the coerced guilty plea, Applicant filed Mandamus petitions for

a speedy trial and for dismissal of the indictment in both the Fifth Court of

Appeals (Dallas) Cause No. 05-24-00342-CV and the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals Cause No. WR-95,163-02. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied the

Mandamus on November 1, 2024, while the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

issued a procedural postcard denial of the Mandamus on May 29, 2024.

In the prior original petitions, Applicant was seeking a speedy trial and

dismissal because the State had not tried him in over 22-months. The district

courts would not grant a hearing on Applicant’s motion to dismiss. The COA

and TCCA denied all relief. Factually, the DA’s office in Dallas understood

they were unable to prove their case to a jury that Applicant was guilty of

any crimes. This is the reason why the prosecutors turned to conspiring with

Judge Snipes—to take the Applicant’s liberty—to force him into a guilty

plea. But on 09/29/24, Applicant declined the State’s offer. App.22, L 22-23.

(12)

The State’s silence on Applicant’s timely prior Mandamus requests—

despite clear statutory authority under the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161

etseq.) and analogous Texas provisions—demonstrates at minimum

bad -faith inaction and, at most, a conspiracy to deprive the Applicant of his

constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment or

dismissal of the indictment. Moreover, according to Smith v. Gohmert, 962 S.

W. 2d590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that mandamus is appropriate to

compel a trial court to honor a speedy -trial claim when the defendant’s right

is being thwarted).

The combination of (a) the State’s refusal to act on the Mandamus

petitions for a speedy trial prior to the coerced plea, (b) the subsequent forced

guilty plea while the petitioner was severely ill, (App.7), (c) the continued

enforcement of a void order underscores the urgency of this Court’s intervention. The unresolved prior-trial rights, coupled with the medical jeopardy,

create irreparable harm that can only be averted by an immediate injunction.

C. Probation Order Is Void By A Preponderance of Evidence

On or about June 27, 2024, the Applicant filed a motion to recuse

Criminal District Judge Tammy Kemp of the 204 District Court from his

criminal case, Cause No. F-22-76307. On July 312024, Judge Kemp rose

from the bench, claiming she needed to retrieve her book to set a trial date.

(13)

Next, Judge Kemp summoned former Dallas prosecutor Keith Harris

to the courtroom where Applicant and Dallas Assistant District Attorneys

Shawnkeedra Houston-Martin and Robin Ogbonna were waiting. Mr. Harris

whispered to Mr. Ogbonna that Judge Kemp wanted to speak with him alone,

(ex parte) without the Applicant being present. Ms. Houston-Martin

remained in the courtroom to watch Applicant. Judge Kemp has a history of

unethical behavior. While Applicant’s recusal was pending, Judge Kemp

quietly assigned Visiting Judge Michael Snipes to the case without notice. No

entry appears in the clerk’s record, and there are no notations from Judge

Kemp of such an assignment. Under Rule 18a of the Tex. R. Civ. P., a district

judge lacks authority to assign a visiting judge while a recusal is pending.

On August 26, 2024, the Applicant objected to Judge Snipes in writing

pursuant to the Texas Gov't Code.! Judge Snipes admitted during an October

28, 2024 hearing that Judge Tammy Kemp assigned him to Applicant’s case.

See excerpt of October 28, 2024, transcript, P. 15, L 7-17. App.38. On

October 18 2024, Judge Tammy Kemp recused herself from the Applicant’s

case. (App.20). Yet, Applicant’s case remains in her court purposely.

‘Attorney Franklyn Mickelsen of Dallas, advised Applicant that, “Judge

Snipes was going to have him arrested.” When the Applicant asked Mr.

Mickelsen for what reason would Judge Snipes arrest him, Mickelsen

responded by saying, “Judge Snipes don’t need a reason to have you

arrested.” Mickelsen then said, “You don’t understand the criminal justice

system in America.”

(14)

On 09/03/24 Judge Snipes authorized Applicant as a party to his email

chain. On 09/13/24, Judge Snipes emailed Administrative Judge Raymond

Wheless. In the email, Judge Snipes is pleading with Wheless to allow him to

preside over Applicant’s criminal case. (App.25) Judge Snipes’ email read:

‘I already accepted the transfer of Mr. Drake’s case to me and I am

happy and privileged to take the case. I have already presided over at least

two hearings.” (Signed Senior Judge Mike Snipes)

In violation of Texas and federal laws, Judge Wheless falsified an

assignment order on or about May 1, 2025, backdating it to August 22, 2024 to

enable Judge Michael Snipes to retain jurisdiction. See App.26. The order did

not appear in the clerk’s record until 2025, despite its 2024 date. However,

certified copies of the clerk’s record throughout the year 2024 and up and

until April of 2025 proves the August 22, 2024 order signed by Judge Wheless

was not in the clerk’s record until May of 2025. Also, if Wheless had signed

the alleged order in 2024, he would have perhaps, responded to Judge Snipes’

09/13/24 email by stipulating that he had already emailed the order to him.

Nevertheless, Judge Wheless committed multiple Texas offenses.”

Wheless conduct is “grossly abusive” and was intended to affect Applicant’s

criminal case—hence, he committed a third-degree felony, which carries up

to 10-years imprisonment. Under federal law, the same conduct may trigger

several obstruction of justice offenses such as 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).

(15)

For the reason that Judge Michael Snipes was the beneficiary of the

fraudulent scheme, he faces the same Texas offenses.

Logical Inference Regarding the August 22, 2024 Order

If the August 22, 2024 order granting Visiting Judge Michael Snipes

authority to preside over Applicant’s criminal case was authentic and truly

signed by Judge Raymond Wheless in 2024—Judge Snipes would have had

clear, lawful authority to act. Yet, on September 13, 2024—22 days after the

alleged order was signed by Wheless—Judge Snipes forwarded an email

pleading with Judge Wheless for permission to take over the Applicant’s case.

This request demonstrates that Snipes did not possess a valid, enforceable

assignment or jurisdiction? and needed Wheless assent to proceed. Applicant

has annexed convincing evidence to this petition that Michael Snipes at no

time possess subject-matter jurisdiction. See App.14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25,

26, 27, and 28. Rendering all orders signed by Judge Snipes—void.

Consequently, the Deferred Adjudication Order imposing five-year

community supervision on Applicant signed by Tammy Kemp on 03/27/25, is

void. (App.16-17). An identical order was later entered by Judge Michael

Snipes, confirming the same conditions on 05/08/25 (App.17-18), is also void.

3When state courts refuse to correct such a fundamental error, they violate

the Due Process Clause. The argument that Applicant’s plea was coerced by a

combination of a fraudulent warrant, excessive bail, and deliberate

indifference to his life-threatening illness is exceptionally strong.

(16)

IV. Exhaustion of State Remedies for Emergency Relief

Applicant has diligently sought relief at every level of the Texas

judiciary. He filed motions in the trial court. He filed three petitions for a

writ of mandamus in the intermediate appellate court. (App. 3, 4, 5, 6)

Finally, he filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals, the highest criminal court in the state. That petition

explicitly detailed both the void nature of the judgment and the urgent, lifethreatening need for medical relief from the travel restriction. The court's

entire response was to issue a postcard summarily denying the petition without a formal order or any reasoning. This postcard constitutes the definitive

exhaustion of all available state remedies and satisfy: 28U.S.C. § 1257,

(App. 1, 2) The state has made its final decision: it knows that Judge Snipes

did not have jurisdiction in Applicant’s criminal cases, and it will provide no

relief and will continue to enforce the unconstitutional void probation order,

2Tex. Pen. Code § 37.10 — tampering with a governmental record (false entry

in a court docket); Tex. Pen. Code § 37.03 — aggravated perjury (signing a false

order under oath); Tex. Pen. Code § 37.02 — perjury (making a false statement

under oath to a court official); Tex. Pen. Code § 39.03 — official oppression

(using official authority to impede a party’s rights); Tex. Pen. Code § 39.02 —

abuse of official capacity (knowing violation of duties attached to the judicial

office); Tex. Pen. Code § 36.06 — obstruction or retaliation (unlawful act that

impedes legal rights); Tex. Pen. Code § 151.02 — false statements to a public

servant (false filing with a court clerk); Tex. Pen. Code§ 8.03 — official

misconduct (any knowing violation of law while acting in official capacity).

(17)

coerce plea, unconstitutional sentence and travel ban, regardless of the

medical consequences. Applicant has nowhere left to turn but to this Court.

V. Younger Abstention Exception

Younger v. United States, 399 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) bars federal courts

from interfering with ongoing state proceedings except where the state

proceeding is “void on its face because the court lacked jurisdiction,” or where

a “patently unconstitutional” violation exists. Murray v. United States,

473 U.S. 203 (1985) confirms this categorical exception. Because the Deferred

Adjudication Order is void, the Younger doctrine does not preclude this Court

from granting injunctive relief. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2014)

applied the same analysis to a void probation order.

In addition, when a state probation order is void because the issuing

judge lacked jurisdiction, as in this case before the Court, the Younger

abstention doctrine does not bar a federal court from enjoining enforcement of

that probation. Younger v. United States, 399 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) expressly

holds that Younger’s bar “does not apply where the state proceeding is... void

on its face because the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it.”

The District Court for the District of New Mexico recognized that a

facially invalid probation order is subject to federal review and may be

enjoined, emphasizing that the probation officers could not rely on an order

(18)

that was void on its face. Reid v. Pautler, 36 F.Supp. 3d 1067, 2014

WL 3845042 (D.N.M. 2014). Accordingly, this Court may order the State of

Texas to refrain from enforcing the void probation against Applicant without

violating Younger.

VI. Irreparable Harm & Balance of Equities

Medical Harm: The stroke-like episodes, DVT, and risk of permanent

vision loss constitute “certain, imminent, and severe injury” (Winter v. Nat.

Res. Def. Council, 555U.S.541 (2008)). Monetary damages cannot cure

permanent loss of sight or death. See (App.9-12), Dr. Taub’s declaration.

If this injunction is not granted, Applicant will suffer immediate and

irreparable harm. Every day Applicant is forced to comply with the terms of a

void probation order, void plea and sentencing order, is a day he is

unconstitutionally deprived of his liberty. This includes the stigma and

burdens of mandatory counseling that is medically unnecessary, invasive and

unconstitutional drug testing, and other probationary conditions imposed by

a court with no authority. This ongoing violation of his fundamental right to

be free from an unlawful sentence is, in itself, irreparable harm. (App.15)

More acutely, the denial of access to necessary medical and dental care

is a harm that cannot be remedied by a later court decision. Applicant’s

worsening medical conditions will lead to permanent disability, loss of func-

(19)

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