Emergency Application — Victor Tony Jones, Applicant v. Florida, et al.

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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VICTOR TONY JONES,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA and

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondents.

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APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

══════════════════════════════════

CAPITAL CASE

DEATH WARRANT SIGNED

EXECUTION SET SEPTEMBER 30, 2025 AT 6:00 PM

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To the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of

the United States and Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit:

The State of Florida has scheduled the execution of Petitioner Victor Tony

Jones on September 30, 2025, at 6:00 p.m. The Florida Supreme Court denied state

court relief, as well as Mr. Jones’s request for a stay of execution on September 24,

2025. Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court stay his execution pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) pending consideration of his

concurrently filed Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

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STANDARDS FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION

The standards for granting a stay of execution are well established. Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). There “‘must be a reasonable probability that four

members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious

for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a

significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision; and there must be a

likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed.’” Id. (quoting

White v. Florida, 458 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1982) (Powell, J., in chambers).

PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED A STAY OF EXECUTION

The questions raised in Mr. Jones’s petition are sufficiently meritorious for a

grant of certiorari, present significant questions of constitutional law, and are not

subject to any legitimate procedural impediments. As demonstrated in his underlying

petition, Jones’s death sentence is unreliable and violative of this Court’s Fifth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.

Jones argues that his impending execution is violative of the Eighth

Amendment because he is intellectually disabled and the Florida courts have

routinely disregarded this Court’s opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),

and its progeny in order to deny his claim. This Court’s opinions in Hall v. Florida,

572 U.S. 701 (2014), Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 581 U.S. 1 (2017), and Moore v. Texas

(Moore II), 586 U.S. 133 (2019), establish that the Florida court’s rulings on Jones’s

intellectual disability claim is fundamentally wrong. The Florida Supreme Court

continues to disregard this Court’s precedent, and universally accepted clinical

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standards, in its assessment of intellectual disability.

Jones further argues that he was denied due process and his right to be heard

on a question of federal constitutional law, when Florida denied him a full and fair

postconviction proceeding under warrant. In so doing, the Florida Supreme Court

disregarded this Court’s precedent concerning the presentation and consideration of

mitigation evidence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Porter v. McCollum,

558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 525 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)

The Florida Supreme Court’s habitual diminution of fundamental Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment protections flouts clearly established federal law.

Jones’s claims in his petition are not subject to any legitimate procedural

impediments. This Court’s precedent is clear that if “the State has made application

of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law,” then it does not

rest on “independent” grounds. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985).

In denying Mr. Jones’s habeas petition, concerning his intellectual disability

claim, the court misstated Jones’s argument. In so doing, the court determined the

argument was procedurally barred as it was merely a request for the court to

reconsider its decision affirming the lower court’s denial of Jones’s ID claim pursuant

to Hall v. Florida. Jones v. State, Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., SC2025-1423,

2025 WL 2717027, *20 (Fla. Sept. 24, 2025). This was not Jones’s argument. Jones

sought habeas review in light of this Court’s decision in decisional law that was issued

after the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in 2017. Notwithstanding, the Florida

court’s analysis is both contrary to Florida law and this Court’s precedent.

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Absent this Court’s intervention, the irreparable harm to Jones is clear.

Wainwright v. Booker, 473 U.S. 935, 937 n.1 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding

the requirement of irreparable harm as “necessarily present in capital cases”). Given

the final nature of the death penalty there should be no point at which these

considerations

are

foreclosed.

“[E]xecution

is

the

most

irremediable

and

unfathomable of penalties; . . . death is different.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,

411 (1986) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of

Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.)). This Petition presents questions of great

importance regarding the analysis of a state court’s duty to give full effect to a federal

constitutional holding. It is an ideal vehicle for addressing the Florida Supreme

Court’s error, and the questions at issue are of life-or-death importance for Mr. Jones

and for the other death-row inmates in Florida whose claims have been denied based

on the same incorrect application of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against

executing the intellectually disabled. Should this Court grant Mr. Jones’s request for

a stay and review of the underlying petition, there is a significant possibility of lower

court reversal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Jones’s respectfully requests that this Court

grant his application for a stay of execution to address the important constitutional

questions in this case.

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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer

MARIE-LOUISE SAMUELS PARMER

Special Assistant CCRC-South

Fla. Bar No.: 0005584

Marie@samuelsparmerlaw.com

BRITTNEY N. LACY

Assistant CCRC-South

Fla. Bar No. 116001

lacyb@ccsr.state.fl.us

JEANINE L. COHEN

Staff Attorney

Fla. Bar No. 128309

CohenJ@ccsr.state.fl.us

Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South

110 SE 6th Street, Suite 701

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

(954) 713-1284 (Tel.)

(954) 713-1299 (Fax)

COUNSEL FOR MR. JONES

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