Emergency Application — Martin Akerman, Applicant v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Supreme Court briefJun 16, 2025
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SA 2G
No. (23M44, 23A701, 23-6710)
In The
MARTIN AKERMAN, PRO SE,
Petitioner,
Vv.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent.
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR.,
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND
CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
ON APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF THE MANDATE
PENDING ENFORCEMENT
OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, INVESTIGATION,
AND CONSOLIDATED REVIEW OF RELATED CLAIMS
Martin Akerman, Pro Se
P.O. BOX 100057
ARLINGTON, VA 22210
(202) 656 - 5601
Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JUN 16 2025
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
RECEIVED
JUN 24 7025
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
| SUPREME C ‘TUS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
e Whether an appellate court's judgment may stand
when extrinsic evidence reveals that the
underlying administrative record was corrupted by
the adjudicating agency's own spoliation of
evidence.
e Whether the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) exercises “considerable executive power,”
as that term is used in Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U.S.
__. (2025), or functions as a “quasi-judicial” body
when it acts as counsel for the Department of
Defense in federal court, and what level of
deference its procedural findings are owed in light
of such actions.
e Whether a federal district court, possessing
evidence of agency misconduct and a breached
settlement agreement, is the proper forum to order
a global resolution, including a consolidated
remand of related whistleblower claims to the
MSPB for adjudication on a clean record.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner is Martin Akerman, Chief Data Officer of the
National Guard Bureau, who was the petitioner in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
appearing pro se (App D), vide 23M44.
Federal respondents under 50 U.S.C. § 3341(G)(8) were
never required to make an appearance (App E).
The States of Arizona, Arkansas, and Nevada were
blocked from being a party to these proceedings by
the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States,
on June 18, 2024 (App F).
Respondent Merit Systems Protection Board was the
respondent in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, under 5 U.S.C. § 1204), (App G).
Status Update will be provided to the Clerk of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada and to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (App. H).
Status Update will be provided to the Office of Special
Counsel (App. D
Separate service on the Solicitor General of the United
States is required, under 28 U.S.C. § 518 and Rule 29.
iti
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONS BELOW... cccscsseseseeseeeseseeeseseseesescatateeeeees 1
JURISDICTIONascsssnssenscusssnasscassesvnuavasvesisarsansvesieninascevecieces 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED. ..........c:c:eseseeese0+ 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE... ccecccsssssessscsesseeesseaenees 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE APPLICATION....... 1]
I. An Appellate Judgment Resting on a Corrupted
Administrative Record Cannot Stand... 11
II. The MSPB’s Conduct Vindicates the Gravest
Concerns of Both the Majority and Dissent in
Trump V. WilCOX.. .suscusssussseseceusecsiccdssouseasediesvebelviierite 13
This is not the conduct of a neutral
"quasi-judicial" DOY............c:ccccescesseeeeeeeeseeseeeeee 14
Ill. A Federal District Court is the Only Forum
Capable of Providing a Global Resolution............. 15
CONCLUSION ..... ssccsssnassuensnassnsisusenuanarnanvanesseansusreviteteiscests 17
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page(s)
Akerman v. Kerner, et al.,
No. 2:24-cv-01602-GMN-EJY (D. NeV.).....c:ccccee passim
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935) ssassssnaccceisonnsnenoconsancvannnronsnsereeeusnscssses 14
Trump v. Wilcox,
GOSIUES. __ (2025), -seesneesanensomnmanasersnenassceememaseseme 13, 14
STAT UT ESS wessscsssssvenssotcsussaasusssvrssonstcessnssenvaseesvansesins Page(s)
5 U.S.C. § 2302(D)(8)...cceesceeteteesesesesseteeseeseetensescesseeteees 4
BULS.C,. § TB B.eeeeeseeseteesceseseeseecsssseeserecaceesevscsaeeeees 4,9
10 U.S.C. § 12406 .cssesnunsnecanecencosnnnenssonenussanounniusisaveis.s- 4,16
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act)......cccccseeeeeeees 4
28 U.S.C. § 2101 (fssssseccacavssospsvacenpeccstensiataceooeneensnanerererenene 2
38 U.S.C. § A811 0D)... cecceesseeneeseeeeassceeeesasseeseatsceneeneneaes 5
BO U.S.C. § B34.1(j)(8)-scscsssssssesesssssssssvesecesssesescessessssssseseeee 5
OTHER AUTHORITIES Page(s)
U.S. Const. art. ID, § 2, CL. Licceeccceeccsceessseesseesseessseeenenseens 3
U.S. Const. amend. [sscccssssroususssensaasosessssreussvessevsevsavavevees 3
U.S. Const. amend. Vissssseccesssusssausssssusssensucconcsvansesscanaviense 3
Sup. Ct. R. 23. .casssivasspuacssspapessscapeayaspaansseyseesessscsncesteserncceares 2
OPINIONS BELOW
The nonprecedential decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (App. A, at
1-11) is not yet reported.
The order of the Federal Circuit denying a timely
petition for panel rehearing (App. B, at 12-14) is
unreported.
The order of the Federal Circuit denying the motion to
recall the mandate (App. C, at 15-17) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
April 15, 2025.
A timely petition for rehearing was denied on May 5,
2025.
A timely motion to recall the mandate was denied on
June 16, 2025.
This application is being filed within 90 days of the
denial of rehearing.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 2101) and Supreme Court Rule 23.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the First and Fifth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, as well as the following
statutory provisions:
e U.S. Const. art. H, § 2, cl. 1: 'The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States; he may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating
to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he
shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment."
e U.S. Const. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a _ redress of
grievances."
e U.S. Const. amend. V: "No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law...."
e 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (Whistleblower Protection):
This statute prohibits any employee with personnel
authority from taking, failing to take, or
threatening to take a personnel action against an
employee for any disclosure of information which
the employee reasonably believes evidences a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation; gross
mismanagement; a gross waste of funds; an abuse
of authority; or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.
e 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (Cause and procedure): "(a)... an
agency may take an action covered by this
subchapter against an employee only for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.
(b) An employee against whom an action is
proposed is entitled to—(1) at least 30 days’
advance written notice... stating the specific
reasons for the proposed action; (2) a reasonable
time... to answer orally and in writing...; (3) be
represented by an attorney...; and (4) a written
decision and the specific reasons therefor..."
e 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in Federal
service; call): "Whenever—(1) the United States...
is invaded or is in danger of invasion...; (2) there is
a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the
authority of the Government of the United States;
or (3) the President is unable with the regular
forces to execute the laws of the United States; the
President may call into Federal service members
and units of the National Guard... to repel the
invasion, suppress the rebellion, or execute those
laws. Orders for these purposes shall be issued
through the governors of the States...."
e 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act): "Whoever,
except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,
willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both."
e 50 US.C. § 3341(j)(8): This statute establishes
procedures for reviewing agency actions related to
security clearances, including retaliatory actions.
e Additionally, USERRA's whistleblower protection,
found in 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b), prohibits employers
from retaliating against anyone who takes action to
assist in a USERRA investigation, or exercises any
other right under the law. This protection extends
to individuals regardless of whether they have
served in the uniformed services, vide 23M44.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case began not with a single adverse action, but
with a broken promise. In the spring of 2021, while
serving as a Supervisory Information Technology
Specialist with the U.S. Air Force, I made protected
disclosures regarding what I reasonably believed to be
unauthorized personnel alignments and
mismanagement. (see Appendix F; see also Akerman v.
Kerner, et al., No. 2:24-cv-01602-GMN-EJY (D. Nev.),
ECF 67-1).
The response was a letter of admonishment, a classic
form of reprisal. Id.
This prompted me to file a whistleblower complaint
with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) on June 16,
2021. Id.
Through an OSC-brokered Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) process, the parties reached a
settlement on August 11, 2021. (Id. at 30, 42).
In exchange for dropping my claims, I accepted a
transfer to a new position as Chief Data Officer of the
National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the government
agreed to remove negative records and ensure no
further retaliatory input from certain officials. (Id. at
30).
The government breached this agreement almost
immediately. Two days later, on August 13, 2021, my
interim Top Secret security clearance was revoked
without explanation. (Id.).
I promptly notified the OSC of this new retaliation on
August 17, 2021. (Id.). This breach set the stage for all
that followed.
After transferring to the NGB, I continued my work,
including uncovering a wasteful double purchase of
data capabilities that threatened to expose the
underreporting of suicides across the National Guard.
(Id. at 29).
9
The retaliation for this new disclosure was severe, and
it took a constitutionally alarming form. Instead of
using civilian procedures, the Department of Defense
(DoD) deployed state National Guard officers, acting
under federal command, to execute personnel actions
against me, a civilian employee.
e On February 8, 2022, Brigadier General Joseph
Baldwin of the Arizona Army National Guard,
acting under federal orders, was instrumental in
suspending my access to classified information.
(Id. at 21).
@ On February 14, ‘2022, Colonel Bret Bassler of the
Arkansas Army National Guard physically detained
me and seized my equipment. (Id. at 19; App. E, at
17).
e On April 24, 2022, Brigadier General Caesar
Garduno of the Nevada Air National Guard
finalized my indefinite suspension, denying me the
due process rights guaranteed to _ federal
employees under 5 U.S.C. § 7513. (Id. at 20; App. G,
at 30).
10
This multi-state operation created a jurisdictional fog
that has allowed the government to evade review.
When I appealed to the MSPB, my case was dismissed
for failure to exhaust remedies before the OSC—a
procedural impossibility, given that the OSC had
closed its inquiry before the adverse actions were
finalized. (App. A, at 7-8). The OSC itself later
admitted in writing to a "harmful procedural error"
that "compromised the OSC's ability to protect the
Appellant as a whistleblower" and "prevented the
Appellant from receiving proper redress." (App. G, at
56).
The Federal Circuit affirmed the MSPB's dismissal,
perpetuating the jurisdictional catch-22. (App. A, at 8).
Now, the only court to recognize this procedural
morass is the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada, which has stayed its own proceedings and
contemplated a remand to the MSPB to correct these
very deficiencies. (App. H, at 81-82). This application
seeks a stay to allow that court to bring order to this
chaos.
11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
APPLICATION
A stay is warranted because this case presents
substantial legal questions of exceptional national
importance. The equities tip decisively in my favor,
and the public interest in a lawful, accountable
government demands this Court's intervention.
I. An Appellate Judgment Resting ona
Corrupted Administrative Record Cannot
Stand.
The Federal Circuit’s judgment rests on the procedural
findings of the MSPB. But that foundation is rotten.
The administrative record is not merely incomplete; it
has been actively corrupted by the very agency tasked
with its impartial adjudication.
The OSC has admitted in writing to "harmful
procedural error" that blocked my path to redress.
(App. G, at 56).
12
More egregiously, the MSPB itself has allegedly
deleted filings from the record and, in a profound
dereliction of its quasi-judicial role, acted as counsel
for the DoD in federal court proceedings. (App. I, at
89).
An appellate court’s deference to an administrative
agency is predicated on the assumption that the
agency has acted in good faith and created a reliable
record. Where, as here, there is extrinsic evidence of
spoliation and procedural manipulation, — that
deference is unwarranted. To allow the Federal
Circuit’s judgment to stand would be to sanitize a
corrupted process and reward agency misconduct. A
stay is necessary to prevent the finality of a judgment
built on such a compromised foundation.
13
Il. The MSPB’s Conduct Vindicates the Gravest
Concerns of Both the Majority and Dissent in
Trump v. Wilcox.
This case is a living embodiment of the constitutional
anxieties surrounding independent agencies that this
Court confronted in Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U.S. __
(2025). The majority granted a stay in that case,
reflecting its judgment that the MSPB exercises
"considerable executive power" and that "the
Government faces greater risk of harm from an order
allowing a removed officer to continue exercising the
executive power than a wrongfully removed officer
faces from being unable to perform her statutory
duty." Id. at 1.
My case demonstrates the peril of that executive
power when it is untethered from due process and
accountability. The .MSPB, rather than acting as an
impartial adjudicator, has functioned as an
enforcement arm of the DoD, allegedly deleting
evidence and acting as its lawyer. (App. I, at 89).
14
This is not the conduct of a neutral "quasi-judicial" body.
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Wilcox warned against
abandoning the ninety-year precedent of Humphrey’s
Executor, which undergirds the existence
independent agencies. She argued that the interest at
stake is not the officer's personal interest, but
"Congress’s and, more broadly, the public’s" interest in
having expert bodies that operate with "a measure of
independence from presidential control." Wilcox, 605
U.S. at__ (Kagan, J., dissenting).
My case shows what happens when that independence
collapses. The MSPB’s actions have not served the
public good; they have served to protect the executive
from scrutiny.
When the MSPB abandons its quasi-judicial role to act
as an advocate for the agency it is supposed to be
overseeing, it forfeits any claim to deference. The
question of whether the MSPB exercises "considerable
executive power" is answered by its conduct here. It
does. And in doing so, it has failed to provide the
independent check on that power that is the entire
justification for its existence.
15
Ul. A Federal District Court is the Only Forum
Capable of Providing a Global Resolution.
A stay is required to address this fundamental
breakdown in the administrative state.
The procedural history of this case is a testament to
the failure of the administrative system. I have been
shuffled between the OSC, the DoD OIG, the MSPB,
and multiple federal circuits, with no resolution. (App.
D, at 19-24). The only court that has demonstrated a
willingness to cut this Gordian knot is the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada. That court is already
in possession of evidence of the breached settlement
agreement and the subsequent agency misconduct,
and it has already contemplated a consolidated
remand to the MSPB to correct the record. (App. H, at
81-82). It is the only forum positioned to grant global
relief.
This is particularly true given the government’s
unprecedented use of 10 U.S.C. § 12406.
That statute is an emergency power, authorizing the
President to federalize the National Guard to repel an
"invasion" or suppress a "rebellion." 10 U.S.C. § 12406.
16
It is not a tool for managing civilian personnel. Using
uniformed officers from three states to suspend a
federal employee is a grotesque abuse of that authority
and raises profound questions about the limits of
executive power and the integrity of the federal-state
relationship. The MSPB has shown no capacity or
willingness to address this fundamental constitutional
issue. A federal district court, however, is perfectly
suited to do so.
Granting this stay would also serve the vital interest of
judicial economy.
As detailed in Appendix D, there are numerous
pending petitions and appeals across multiple circuits,
all stemming from this same nucleus of facts.
Allowing the District of Nevada to proceed with a
global resolution would render these duplicative
actions moot, conserving the resources of both the
judiciary and the parties.
17
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Applicant respectfully
requests that the Court stay the mandate of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This
stay is necessary to allow the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada to adjudicate Applicant's
motion to enforce the August 12, 2021, settlement
agreement, and investigation, through OSC, and to
consider a consolidated remand of all related
whistleblower matters to the MSPB for a full and fair
hearing on a complete and accurate record.
Respe Submitted, -
“ efman, Pro Se
P.O. Box 100057
Arlington, VA 22210
Tel: 202-656-5601
Email: makerman.dod@gmail.com
RULE 33.2 CERTIFICATION
This motion complies with the Court’s type-volume
limitation as it contains 2,269 words, which is within
the word limit for a motion to the Court.
An original and two copies were served on the Clerk in
8 % x 11 inch paper, stapled on the upper left-hand
corner.
The text of this supplemental brief has been prepared
in a proportionally spaced typeface using Google Docs
in Century, 12 point font size.
Dated and respectfully submitted, this 18th day of
June, 2025.
Marin Akerman, Pro Se
P.Q. Box 100057
Arlington, VA 22210
Tel: 202-656-5601
Email: makerman.dod@gmail.com
Case 2:24-cv-01602-GMN-EJY Document 78-3 Filed 06/18/25
APPENDIX A
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit was issued on April 15, 2025.
App. 1
Page 1 of 94
Case 2:24-cv-01602-GMN-EJY Document 78-3 Filed 06/18/25
Case: 24-1913 Document:55 Page:1 Filed: 04/15/2025
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
Qnited States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
MARTIN AKERMAN,
Petitioner
v.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent
2024-1913
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC-3443-22-0639-I-1.
Decided: April 15, 2625
MARTIN AKERMAN, I, Arlington, VA, pro se.
DEANNA SCHABACKER, Office of the General Counsel,
United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ALLISON JANE
BOYLE, KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH.
Before PROST, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
App. 2
Page 2 of 94
Case 2:24-cv-01602-GMN-EJY Document 78-3 Filed 06/18/25 Page 3 of 94
Case: 24-1913 Document:55 Page:2 Filed: 04/15/2025
2 AKERMAN vy. MSPB
In 2021, Martin Akerman, then an employee of the Air
Force, filed a complaint with the United States Office of
Special Counsel (OSC), alleging that the Air Force took retaliatory actions against him in violation of whistleblowerprotection laws, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and (b)(9). OSC terminated ita inquiry without providing the requested relief.
Mr. Akerman also pursued another potential route for relief—through the Department of Defense (Defense) Office
of Inspector General (Defense OIG). When Defense OIG
declined to open an investigation, he asked the Intelligence
Community Office of the Inspector General (Intelligence
OIG) to review the Defense OIG decision, but it declined.
Mr. Akerman then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), but the Board-assigned administrative
judge dismissed Mr, Akerman’s appeal for lack of jurisdicticn, Board Supplemental Appendix (S. Appx.) at 10-22,
and the full Board affirmed the administrative judge's decision, which became the final decision of the Board,
S. Appx. 1-3. We now affirm.
I
In 2021, Mr. Akerman was employed as a Supervisory
Information Technology Specialist in the Chief Data Office
of the Air Force. S. Appx. 43, 54. Starting in May 2021,
Mr. Akerman told employees throughout the Air Force of
his belief that certain officials were unlawfully reorganizing the staffing in the Chief Data Office. S. Appx. 38—
39, 43. In July 2021, Mr. Akerman was selected to be the
Chief Data Officer of the National Guard Bureau and was
tentatively offered the job, conditional at least in part on
his obtaining a top-secret security clearance. S. Appx. 37.
Before his scheduled transfer into the new job, however,
Defense informed Mr. Akerman and the Air Force of its intent to revoke his security clearance and access to confidential information. See S. Appx. 54, 59.
On August 26, 2021, Mr. Akerman filed a whistleblower complaint with OSC, alleging that Air Force
App. 3
Case 2:24-cv-01602-GMN-EJY Document 78-3 Filed 06/18/25 Page 4 of 94
Case: 24-1913 Document:55 Page:3 Filed: 04/15/2025
AKERMAN v. MSPB 3
officials took retaliatory actions against him in violation of
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and (b)}(9). S. Appx. 43, 53. On February 28, 2022, OSC sent a letter to Mr. Akerman stating
that it had terminated its inquiries into his allegations
against Air Force officials as well as retaliatory-action allegations he had made against National Guard Bureau officials (after August 26, 2021).1 S. Appx. 43-44. The OSC
letter also notified Mr. Akerman that he could appeal to the
Board for corrective action, invoking the individual right of
action (IRA) under 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3) and 1221, and
that including the OSC letter with such an appeal could
“help show that you have exhausted OSC’s administrative
procedures.” S. Appx. 43-44.
Mr. Akerman also sought whistleblower relief through
two other routes, pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive
19, Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information (PPD-19) (October 10, 2012), but he did not do so
until the very end of February 2022 (either February 27 or
28), and OSC did not have before it any PPD-19 decision
when it terminated its inquiry into the above-noted complaints. See S. Appx. 14, 57-58, 61; Informal Opening
Brief at 8. In particular, Mr. Akerman filed a complaint
with Defense, alleging that officials at the National Guard
Bureau restricted his access to confidential information in
reprisal for his protected disclosures. S. Appx. 58, 61. On
May 19, 2022, Defense OIG declined to open an investigation into his reprisal complaints. S. Appx. 58-59,
1 Before filing the OSC complaint relevant to this appeal, Mr. Akerman filed three other complaints with OSC
(on June 16, July 1, and August 11, 2021), alleging that Air
Force officials were retaliating against him. S. Appx. 39-
41. After filing this August 26, 2021 complaint, Mr. Akerman also alleged that the National Guard Bureau, upon
hearing of his OSC complaint, took retaliatory actions
against him. S. Appx. 43-44,
App. 4
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4 AKERMAN v. MSPB
Mr. Akerman then submitted to Intelligence OIG a request
for external review of Defense OIG’s decision, pursuant to
Section C of PPD-19 and 50 U.S.C. § 3236. S. Appx. 55-58.
On September 8, 2022, Intelligence OIG denied Mr. Akerman’s request. S, Appx. 58-59.
On September 12, 2022, Mr. Akerman appealed to the
Board, explaining that “[t]he [Intelligence Community] has
completed the review of the PPD-19 petition for review and
there appears to be no further recourse,” and thus he was
“[b]ringing back [the appeal] to MSPB under the” whistleblower statutes. S. Appx. 52. On September 14, 2022, the
Board-assigned administrative judge ordered Mr. Akerman “to file evidence and argument to prove that the Board
has jurisdiction over his appeal.” S. Appx. 45-
48. Mr. Akerman responded, stating that his new appeal
was an IRA appeal that was “a continuation of matters covered in” other IRA appeals he filed with the Board.
S. Appx. 33-34.
On October 28, 2022, the administrative judge dismissed Mr. Akerman’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
5S. Appx. 10-15. Mr. Akerman petitioned for review of that
decision (the initial decision), stating that “[t]his appeal is
a continuation of PPD-19 claims which were brought back
to MSPB under authority granted to handle 2302(b)(8)
claims.” S. Appx. 27-30. He also filed two motions for
leave to file new evidence. See S. Appx. 2n.3. On May 29,
2024, the Board denied the petition for review and affirmed
the administrative judge's initial decision, which became
the final decision of the Board. S. Appx. 1-3. Mr. Akerman
timely appealed.
I
“We review de novo whether the Board has jurisdiction
over an appeal.” Smolinski v. Merit Systems Protection
Board, 23 F.4th 1345,1350 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citations omit-
ted). “A petitioner bears the burden of establishing that
the Board has jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
App. 5
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a
AKERMAN v. MSPB
evidence.” McCarthy v. Merit Sysiems Protection Board,
809 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Serrao v. Merit
Systems Protection Board, 95 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1896) (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2))). We may set aside
the Board’s decision only if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise nat in aceordance with
law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule,
or regulation having been followed: or (3) unsupported by
substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We decide legal
issues de novo and review Board findings of fact for substantial-evidence support. MeIntosh v. Department of Defense, 53 F.4th 630, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2022). We see no basis
for setting aside the Board’s decision.
A
Although Mr. Akerman filed his appeal in this court
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b){1), he argues that this is a
“mixed case”—one involving certain discrimination claims
presented to the Board in an otherwise-authorized appeal
to the Board. Informal Opening Brief at 5; see also Petitioner’s Appendix (Appx.) at 23-28. Review of Board decisions in a mixed case is available only in district court
because a mixed case falls within the exception to our review authority stated in § 7703(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 7702). See Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420, 425-27, 492 (2017); Ash v.
Office of Personnel Management, 25 F.4th 1009, 1011 (Fed.
Cir. 2022). We conclude that this is not a mixed case, so we
have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision.
Mr. Akerman contends that the evidence he provided
in response to the Board’s September 2022 order “shows
discriminatory animus, and entitles (him] to mixed case
considerations.” Informal Opening Brief at 5 (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(2)); see also Informal Reply Brief at 6.
He has attached to his brief in this court a copy of a notice
of intent to file a civil action against Defense that he sent
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
App. 6
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