Application — Simon Hessler, Applicant v. United States
Supreme Court briefAug 12, 2025
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No. 25A
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
SIMON HESSLER,
Applicant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On A pplication for Certificate of A ppealability to the
United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit
APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Stephen Bergstein
Counsel of Record
Bergstein & Ullrich
Five Paradies Lane
New Paltz, NY 12561
(845) 469-1277
steve@tbulaw.com
Michael H. Sussman
Sussman & Associates
One Railroad Avenue, Suite 3
P.O. Box 1005
Goshen, NY 10924
Counsel for Applicant
August 12, 2025
384507
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Whether reasonable jurists could debate whether the circumstances present in
this case present an extraordinary circumstances sufficient to extend the
limitations period for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
2.
Whether reasonable jurists could debate whether Simon Hessler is actually
innocent of the crime of production of child pornography, justifying grant of a
certificate of appealability.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................................................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT ................................................................................................................. 2
REASONS FOR GRANT OF THE APPLICATION ................................................... 15
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, FILED MAY 14, 2025 ...................... 1a
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, FILED
NOVEMBER 1, 2024 .............................................................................................. 2a
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Autry v. Estelle,
464 U.S. 1301 (1983) ................................................................................................ 1
Buck v. Davis,
580 U.S. 100 (2017) ................................................................................................ 21
Cosey v. Lilley,
62 F.4th 74 (2d Cir. 2023) .................................................................................. 9, 10
Davis v. Jacobs,
454 U.S. 911 (1981) .................................................................................................. 1
Lucidore v. New York State Div. of Parole,
209 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2000) .................................................................................... 13
McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U.S. 383 (2013) ............................................................................................ 9, 13
Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322 (2003) ................................................................................................ 21
Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473 (2000) .................................................................................................. 1
Triana v. United States,
205 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................ 3
United States v. Finley,
726 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2013) ................................................................................ 4, 20
United States v. Howard,
968 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2020) ............................................................ 3, 14, 19, 20, 21
United States v. Laursen,
847 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 4, 20
United States v. Levy,
594 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ..................................................................... 19
United States v. McCloud,
590 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2009) .............................................................................. 4, 20
United States v. Osuba,
67 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2023) ................................................................ 4, 18, 19, 20, 21
United States v. Torres,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2886 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) ........................................................ 13
iii
Wims v. United States,
225 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................... 2
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 2251(a) ............................................................................ 2, 3, 15, 17, 19, 20
28 U.S.C. § 2253 ............................................................................................................. 1
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) .............................................................................................. 4, 21
28 U.S.C. § 2255 ............................................................................................................. 5
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) ........................................................................................................ 2
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4) ..................................................................................................... 2
iv
HONORABLE SONIA SOTOMOAYOR, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE
OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 22.1, Applicant Simon Hessler respectfully
requests a Certificate of Appealability. The United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut issued an opinion denying habeas relief on November 12, 204.
A copy of that decision and order is attached as Exhibit A. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed
the appeal on May 14, 2025. A copy of that order is attached as Exhibit B.
A certificate of appealability should issue if “reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the [habeas] petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1983)
(White, J., in chambers) (concluding that a habeas Hessler had raised a “substantial
question” that did not “lack[] substance,” and thus “I am compelled to issue a
certificate of probable cause to appeal, as I am authorized to do under § 2253.”); Davis
v. Jacobs, 454 U.S. 911, 918 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (certificate should issue
if “any Member of this Court believes [the case] to be deserving of a certificate of
probable cause”).
INTRODUCTION
Applicant seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) on two questions: (1).
Whether reasonable jurists could debate whether the circumstances present in this
case present an extraordinary circumstances sufficient to extend the limitations
1
period for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Whether
reasonable jurists could debate that Simon Hessler is actually innocent of the crime
of production of child pornography, justifying grant of a certificate of appealability.
Both are questions that reasonable jurists could debate—indeed, the Seventh
Circuit has adopted Applicant’s position on the second question. A COA should thus
issue to permit the Second Circuit to consider in the first instance these issues of
broad importance.
STATEMENT
Simon Hessler, was charged with one count of production of child pornography
in violation of 28 U.S.C. sec. 2251(a). On December 11, 2019, Hessler took a plea to
this court and on August 13, 2020, he was sentenced to 30 years in federal prison.
Hessler did not take a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence. Rather, on
September 27, 2023, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), appellant challenged his conviction
and sentence. See Exhibit 1 for the Petition and the exhibits submitted in support in
Hessler v. United States, 23 cv 01270 (SRU)(District of Connecticut).
Appellant submitted that equitable tolling should extend his limitations period
and/or that the limitations period should be reset to one year following his discovery
of new evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4), Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 190 (2d
Cir. 2000), allowing him to demonstrate the substantial prejudice caused by the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, he submitted that if the district court
rejected these arguments, he still merited relief because he was actually innocent.
The government opposed the petition.
2
On November 1, 2024, the district court rejected the petition, holding that
appellant had not established by a preponderance of evidence, Triana v. United
States, 205 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2000), that equitable tolling applied or that he
presented newly discovered evidence or established that he was actually innocent.
The district court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability.
The district court’s decision avoided directly resolving appellant’s claim that
the law firm which represented him below through sentencing, Butler, Norris and
Gold of Hartford, Connecticut, rendered constitutionally ineffective counsel.
On May 14, 2025, the Court of Appeals for the second Circuit declined to issue
a certificate of appealability and, citing inter-Circuit conflict, Hessler/movant
requests that Your Honor grant him such a certificate and allow this Honorable Court
to entertain his appeal. The principal issues for review are [1] whether the
Hessler/movant presented sufficiently extraordinary circumstance to extend the
limitations period for the initiation of the habeas corpus action and [2] if not, whether
movant can demonstrate actual innocence because the photographs the government
has produced and claims represent prohibited child pornography do not do so as a
matter of law. This second issue implicates a notable circuit split on the
interpretation of "sexually explicit conduct" under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), particularly
regarding whether a minor must actively engage in such conduct or if passive
involvement (e.g., while sleeping) suffices when the depiction involves the adult's
actions. For instance, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Howard, 968 F.3d 717
(7th Cir. 2020) has adopted narrower interpretations requiring the minor to engage
3
in the conduct, contrasting with broader views in cases like United States v. Osuba,
67 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2023), United States v. McCloud, 590 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2009),
United States v. Laursen, 847 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Finley,
726 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2013), where passive roles by sleeping minors were deemed
sufficient under certain circumstances.
Respectfully, there is reasonable basis to conclude that the material
conclusions reached below are erroneous and that appellant has presented a
substantial claim that his continued imprisonment violates his constitutional rights,
warranting issuance of a Certificate of Appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2).
First, as to equitable tolling, appellant and his father did exercise due
diligence, retaining counsel Kent Mawhinney who represented that he had the
capacity to review the record and prepare the required habeas corpus petition only to
later learn that this attorney faced significant legal issues of his own [he was later
charged with murder and eventually incarcerated with appellant] and could not
deliver. The fact that the attorney they hired was himself later charged with a serious
felony is an extraordinary circumstance in itself. Hessler also explained below that
delays in mail and the incapacity to have contact with his father during COVID [the
year between September 2020 and September 2021 was the peak year of COVID
restricting such access] conjoined to make impossible early filing of a competent
petition.
Appellant’s father, a former high-ranking IBM executive in Europe,
unsuccessfully sought to identify new counsel, before eventually retaining the
4
undersigned in March 2022. However, by then, the one-year period for filing under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 had expired.
The district court held that ignorance of the law did not excuse Hessler’s late
filing and that he should have timely filed pro se a skeletal habeas corpus petition
and later amended it. By so concluding, the district court ignored significant record
evidence of Hessler’s depressed and impaired mental status, made more acute by the
isolation imposed by COVID.
In short, the conjunction of factors presents
extraordinary circumstances sufficient to trigger equitable tolling.
The further delay is also understandable and forgivable. Upon retention, new
counsel had to obtain and review trial counsel’s legal file to ascertain the nature and
quality of representation, ran into delays outlined in the papers submitted below,
including the disorganized nature of prior counsel’s files and the time it then took to
access the allegedly incriminating photographs secured in the Connecticut State
Crime Lab as well as critical information that lab had concerning access by prior
counsel to those photos. New counsel office exercised due diligence in these regards
and discovered that Hessler’s prior counsel never reviewed the relevant photographs
nor discussed their provenance or authenticity with the client. New counsel also
reviewed the photographs with experts in the area of child pornography in light of
the evolving legal standards defining child pornography.
The district court rejected the extensive “new evidence” presented below.
Specifically, Hessler showed that his attorney, Bethany Phillips, never viewed the
photos which allegedly constituted the child pornography at issue [as attested to by
5
the crime lab’s own record and its staff] and, therefore, could not have meaningfully
considered or determined whether they did, or did not, qualify as child pornography.
In this context, counsel could not have properly advised her client with regard to
appropriate resolution of the criminal charges she was retained to defend.
In
response, the government offered an Affidavit from attorney Phillips contradicting
the evidence supplied by the crime lab and raising a material issue of fact which
should have been the subject of an evidentiary hearing. The district court also
ignored the letters from both Mr. Gold and Ms. Phillips, which pointed the finger at
the other as the lawyer responsible for the matter. See Exhibits 32-34 to the Petition.
By rejecting these arguments, the district court rendered without consequence
very significant evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel and left for resolution
only the matter of actual innocence. This was an error of constitutional magnitude
because it assured that there could be no remedy for that ineffectiveness.
In fact as noted above, the evidence established that two attorneys in the firm
Hessler’s father retained to represent his son pointed fingers at the other as directing
Simon’s defense. When asked specific questions about the strategic decisions which
informed that defense, each directed the undersigned to the other and abdicated
responsibility. As significantly, the record reveals that neither counsel reviewed the
photographs which formed the heart of the government’s case nor discussed the
provenance or content of the photographs with defendant Hessler. Nor did either
raise any argument that the photographs did not qualify as child pornography under
the applicable federal statute and case law interpreting it.
6
After whitewashing the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by finding that
Hessler could have timely submitted a petition by himself, the district court held that
Hessler created and distributed the photos in question and that they do constitute
child pornography, rejecting any actual innocence argument.1 In fact, the photos
were not found by members of law enforcement who conducted an authorized search
of appellant’s premises. Rather, allegedly, after this authorized search, a friend of
appellant’s estranged wife claims to have found the images in a phone traced to
Hessler. The defense never challenged the provenance or origin of the photographs
or contested that they depicted appellant’s body parts.
The images do not depict the Hessler engaging in sexual activity, i.e.,
masturbation, fornication, or oral sex. Below, Hessler submitted that he was actually
innocent of the child pornography possession charge and had not produced child
pornography. The district court rejected the former argument, finding the photos
depicted Hessler engaging in sufficiently explicit sexual activity to fall within the
statute’s reach. As discussed in greater detail below, this finding is erroneous as the
photos do not depict an identifiable victim, allow any determination of the victim’s
age, any certainty as to whose penis is shown or depict sexual activity.
In reaching its conclusions, the district court made erroneous factual findings.
On page 8 of its opinion, the district court found that, on June 4, 2019, Phillips visited
1 Hessler cannot produce the photographs for this Court’s review because, upon pains
of contempt, the district court ordered me to ensure the return of all the photographs,
including those the Connecticut State Lab released to my investigator, sex crimes
expert Michael Archer.
7
the crime lab for one hour, suggesting without ever concluding that she reviewed the
relevant photos. But there is no dispute that during this hour, Ms. Phillips met with
attorneys representing the U.S. Attorney’s Office and State of Connecticut
prosecutors and none of those attending this meeting confirmed that they reviewed
any images. Nor do the contemporaneous meeting notes indicate that those attending
reviewed any photos. And, as noted above, the Connecticut Police Lab staff deny that
any counsel for defendant ever reviewed the relevant photos.
The district court noted that the visitor registry and the images underlying the
federal charges were already in existence when Hessler took his plea; however true
this may be, it does not undercut the claim that only through our investigation could
Hessler have learned that his lawyer NEVER reviewed those images and that the
visitor registry does not establish that she ever did so. Certainly, Ms. Phillips did not
tell Hessler or his father this.
Acknowledging that Hessler never was shown the photos for which he took
responsibility, the district court concluded that he was aware of the images’ existence
and quantity. But respectfully, this elides the issue: he was not aware of their content
and had never seen them. The district court concluded that had Hessler wanted to go
to trial on the ground that the images “did not meet the legal definition of child sexual
abuse images, [he] should have raised that argument with Attorney Phillips before
pleading guilty.” District Court Opinion at 8-9.
However, this ignores several critical issues: first, the district court knew why
appellant plead guilty – he desperately wanted to be removed from brutal conditions
8
of confinement in the State of Connecticut, which included repeated threats on his
life which were made known to the sentencing court when His Honor took the plea.
Second, how could Hessler be expected to have known whether images he had never
seen met or did not meet the evolving definition of child pornography? This was his
attorney’s function and, absent review of the photographs, no attorney would be able
to make an informed judgment or properly advise her client regarding the issue of
whether they met the statutory definition of child pornography. Finally, the district
court’s conclusion that Hessler should have known that his attorney did not provide
effective assistance and could himself have investigated the records of the
Connecticut Police lab is far-fetched. Appellant needed competent counsel to explore
whether his prior attorney effectively performed her role and unraveling what
actually occurred took time, effort, and access which an incarcerated individual
cannot reasonably be expected to have.
Having determined that equitable tolling does not apply and that appellant
failed to produce new evidence thereby extending the commencement of the
limitations period, the district court addressed the issue of actual innocence. This
Court has held that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which
a Hessler may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or, as in this
case, expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383,
386 (2013).
A guilty plea is not a bar to an actual innocence claim. Cosey v. Lilley, 62 F.4th
74, 85 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We disagree that Cosey's guilty plea is categorically
9
incompatible with his claim of innocence . . .petitioner is essentially claiming that the
criminal justice process has reached the wrong factual result, whether after a trial or
a guilty plea. A gateway claim of innocence is thus not barred per se by a Hessler's
guilty plea”) (internal quotations omitted). Instead, a guilty plea raises a rebuttable
presumption of factual guilt. Id.
In this case, the factual record rebuts any such presumption. First, Mr. Hessler
maintained his innocence throughout the pendency of his cases. Dr. Leslie Lothstein
noted that Mr. Hessler “tried to convince me” that he was “rescuing children,” that
Mr. Hessler’s prosecution has “led him to feel inescapably wronged by the legal
system that was charging him with fantasy crimes and wishes and intentions, and
not acts,” that Mr. Hessler “understood his story so differently than the police,” and
that Mr. Hessler’s account was “more associated with pseudo-logical fantastica than
a real plan to be a sex trafficker.” See Exhibit 41 to Petition for Dr. Lothstein Report,
at 1309-1311.
In addition, as noted above, there is ample evidence in the record that Mr.
Hessler ultimately pled guilty because of the imperative to have his custody
transferred from a state to a federal facility, where he believed he would be safer from
abuse. As previously noted, mere weeks before Mr. Hessler entered his pleas, by letter
addressed to Attorney Bethany Phillips, Dr. Lothstein wrote: “It is my opinion after
having talked with Mr. Hessler on three separate occasions, that he is so frightened
to remain in a Connecticut prison for any length of time that he signed the agreement
for 30 years to get into a federal detention center,” and further that Mr. Hessler
10
“stated that the main reason he accepted the 30-year plea agreement was to get out
of Connecticut State prisons as he fears for his safety from the corrections officers.”
Exhibit 23 to the Petition for Letter from Leslie Lothstein to Bethany Phillips. In
light of this, and in response to Mr. Hessler’s own statements at his federal
sentencing hearing regarding his abuse, AUSA Gifford took pains to assert that Mr.
Hessler’s desire to get out of Connecticut state custody was not the motivation for his
plea, stating, “I don’t want the Court left with the consideration that the defendant,
because he may have been treated poorly, was coerced into taking the plea, was
coerced into coming – you know, to say, oh, I’d rather be in federal custody.” Exhibit
28 to Petition for Federal Sentencing Minutes at 37:5-9. In addition, in Hartford
County on the date of Mr. Hessler’s plea, ADA Hodge took similar pains to make a
record in regards to this issue, stating that a “psychologist hired by the defense . . .
noted in the report that perhaps the defendant was entering a plea out of a desire to
be removed from State Department of Corrections Custody based on some reports of
harassment . . . if the court would just review that section and have the Defendant
answer in the affirmative that he’s not pleading under duress or out of any ulterior
motive simply to be removed or released from state custody.”
When the State Court Judge put this issue to Attorney Phillips, she replied
that “I did have conversations with all counsel of record in all three matters. And
your honor, he’s pleading guilty for one reason and one reasons only: that he is guilty.”
Exhibit 26 to Petition for Hartford Superior Court Plea Minutes, at 26-28.
11
Attorney Phillips’ assurance that Mr. Hessler’s desire to escape his abuse did
not motivate his guilty plea is undercut by her own statement at the federal
sentencing hearing that “one of the benefits afforded to Mr. Hessler is that he will be
a federal prisoner.” Exhibit 28 to Petition for Federal Sentencing Minutes at 31:2325.
In addition, by letter to Mr. Hessler dated June 12, 2020, attorney Phillips
wrote “first, regarding your question of whether the State of Connecticut has signed
off agreeing that your primary custody shall be with the federal system, the answer
is yes. That was a major part of the plea agreement . . . Second, you asked in your
letter whether or not I can send you a draft of the State of Connecticut Plea
Agreement with the language indicated that the State has agreed that your primary
custody shall be with the federal system.” Exhibit 27 to Petition for Letter from
Bethany Phillips dated June 12, 2020.
What is not reflected in the record, though it was known to Attorney Phillips,
is the fact that Mr. Hessler was directly threatened and coerced into accepting a plea
by a guard at the Connecticut facility where he was housed. Exhibit 6 to the Petition
for Affidavit of Simon Hessler, at ¶ 8. Plainly, the matter of where Mr. Hessler would
serve his sentence was at the forefront of his mind throughout this matter and this,
not his guilt, motivated his decision to accept the plea offer. Scant as it was, the
record below is replete with evidence of Mr. Hessler’s fear and duress, as well as
evidence of his protests and assertions of innocence, all tending to rebut any
presumption of guilt that may be raised by his guilty pleas and allocutions. This
12
strongly refutes the import of his guilty plea and cautions against over-reliance on it
in resolving the actual innocence issue.
Further, though, and entirely independent of that, any presumption raised by
Mr. Hessler’s guilty plea is easily rebutted by the evidence uncovered by Michael
Archer as part of his investigation as is discussed below
“[T]he actual innocence exception is ‘severely confined’ and applies only if the
new evidence shows that it would have been ‘more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would have convicted’” the petitioner. United States v. Torres, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2886, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013)).
“Where the defendant pleaded guilty (as in the instant case) and therefore did not
have the evidence in his case evaluated by a jury, the standard nevertheless remains
the same--i.e., the Hessler still must show that, in light of all the evidence, it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Lucidore v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted).
This high bar is met in this case. No reasonable jurist could have convicted the
Hessler of production of child pornography because the images Mr. Hessler allegedly
produced did not constitute child pornography. Michael Archer confirmed this;
movant’s prior counsel did not disclose this to Mr. Hessler and this provides a fact
clearly establishing his actual innocence which was not available to him at the time
of his plea and sentence. Indeed, had a jury voted to convict Mr. Hessler of the
13
production of child pornography based on these images, such conviction would be
subject to reversal on appeal as having been based on legally insufficient evidence.
Prior counsel’s representation before the sentencing court regarding the legal
definition of the images was inaccurate and was not based upon her review or
inspection of the images themselves. Mr. Hessler was not, and could not have been
aware of, the inaccuracy of prior counsel’s representation and the absence of any
factual foundation for them.
At Hessler’s federal sentencing, the following colloquy took place between
Attorney Bethany Philips and the Court:
MS. PHILLIPS: I would also be remiss, your honor, I appreciate the
Court—I wanted to put this on the record. As Your Honor knows,
Mr. Hessler was scheduled to be sentenced last Wednesday. On
August 3, the Seventh Circuit decided a case, United States v.
Howard, which had a differing opinion concerning the charges
compared to the Eighth Circuit and other circuits concerning was
constitutes production of child pornography. For the record, your
honor, I can tell you that I had a lengthy call with Mr. Hessler the
night before the sentencing was postponed. I then travelled to the
Cheshire correctional facility to explain the case, go over the
ramifications and his options at that point. Knowing the decision of
the case, Mr. Hessler wanted to move forward. Again, he’s prepared
to, he wants to place this behind him, and he was advised of the
case. I wanted to place that on the record.
The Court: What’s the case?
Ms. Phillips: Your Honor, it’s U.S. v. Howard, 2020 U.S. at Lexis
24360. And what it stood for was the proposition that certain
conduct did not arise to production of child pornography, which are
similar to the facts here. However, there’s a split in the circuits.
There’s a similar case on point in the Eighth Circuit which says, yes,
this is production of child pornography. Bu, nevertheless, the fact
that it was decided so close in time, I wanted to make sure Mr.
Hessler was explained about the opinion in that case.
14
Exhibit 28 to Petition for Minutes of Federal Sentencing Proceeding
before Judge Stefan Underhill, August 13, 2020.
Had attorney Phillips actually viewed the images in question, she would have
understood that the images did not represent a close case implicating a circuit split
but, in fact, were not child pornography under any Circuit’s precedent, and that Mr.
Hessler was therefore actually innocent of the crime charged. Instead, the fact of
actual innocence was concealed by her ineffectiveness, and the information she
conveyed to Mr. Hessler led to his false belief that he could have been found guilty of
the production of child pornography. Without reviewing the images and confirming
that what the government charged met the legal standards for child pornography
under the precedent of multiple U.S. Circuit Courts. Phillips advised Hessler. In
reality, those images were so far from meeting any legal definition of child
pornography that they were cleared by the Connecticut crime lab for release to Mr.
Archer. Having never been advised by anyone who actually viewed the images, and
having no access to the images himself, Mr. Hessler remained unaware of this
evidence establishing his actual innocence until Mr. Archer successfully initiated
contact with the Connecticut crime lab.
REASONS FOR GRANT OF THE APPLICATION
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) applies to any person who “employs, uses, persuades,
induces, entices or coerces any minor to engage in…any sexually explicit conduct for
the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.” Here, if the
photographic images do not depict a minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct,
15
they fall without the statute and Hessler is actually innocent of its violation. And
this raises an issue of significance meriting issuance of a certificate of appealability.
The district court’s contrary analysis is circular: because Hessler admitted,
without proper legal counsel, that he committed the requisite predicate acts, he must
be held to his admissions and, therefore, cannot establish actual innocence. However,
the district court knew that Hessler was prepared to say anything to escape the claws
of his confinement in Connecticut. Exhibit 25 to the Petition for report of Dr. Leslie
M. Lothstein, who wrote, “It is my opinion after having talked with Mr. Hessler on
three separate occasions, that he is so frightened to remain in a Connecticut prison
for any length of time that he signed the agreement for 30 years to get into a federal
detention center.” Id. at 2.
Phillips denied below that the horrendous conditions of appellant’s
confinement substantially motivated his plea, but her claim is hollow and contradicts
the developed record. See Exhibit 28 to the Petition in which Phillips responds to
Hessler’s inquiry as to whether Connecticut had agreed to allow him to serve his time
in federal prison and her response [in part], “that was a major part of the plea
agreement.” She repeated the same at sentencing. Exhibit 30 to the Petition at pp.
31-32 (explaining the advantages to her client of being placed in federal custody). The
compulsion which predicated the plea could not be more obvious and during the plea
allocution and sentencing, the district court judge certainly learned of this principal
motivation for the plea and Hessler’s serious claims about the horrendous terms and
conditions of his state confinement.
16
Further, appellant’s admissions do not explicate the nature of any sexually
explicit conduct in which any child victim engaged. The government speculates that
in one photo, a child is asleep but its limbs also could be “limp” because it is a doll
and it is well established that Hessler and his adult partners used dolls in their
fantasy sex play. Exhibit 25 to Petition. The undercover agent seeking to inculpate
Hessler pressured him for images demonstrating his credibility in this black market.
The metadata establishes that at least one of the images provided is a “known image”
to Dropbox, meaning that it is derived from an online source circulating the internet.
Additionally, multiple people had access to the studio apartment and the dolls
therein. There is no full face depicted in the photos in question and it is not possible
to know whose penis is depicted. In fact, there is good cause to doubt, due to certain
anatomical variants depicted, that the penis depicted belongs to Hessler.
Nor did Hessler allocute as to what sexually explicit conduct he engaged in, as
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) requires for a conviction. Likewise, Hessler’s allocution does not
state with specificity what image or images he admitted producing.
In this light and her further representation that he faced far more time than
thirty years, appellant’s understanding that his trial lawyer was not undertaking
steps required for a vigorous defense and the abhorrent conditions of his confinement
in Connecticut, assenting to the plea was the consequence of ineffectiveness, not proof
of the contrary. As Dr. Lothstein also noted, when he pled, Hessler was also in the
midst of withdrawal from substance abuse and PTSD from abuse he suffered while
incarcerated in Connecticut.
17
Apart from Hessler’s admissions, the district court found that the disputed
images represent child pornography since the photos at issue here show a penis near
or touching certain body parts of a sleeping child. However, the photos do not depict
either the male actor or the sleeping child engaged in any sexual conduct. One cannot
tell from the photos who is depicted. There is no “sexual activity” occurring in the
photos. There is no exposed sexualized body part of the minor pictured in any of the
photos. There is certainly no image of Hessler masturbating and the photos do not
depict anyone engaging in any sexually explicit [or implicit] conduct, the standard set
out in United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4h 56 (2d Cir. 2023), for defining the threshold
element of criminally culpable conduct. Simply stated, the photos do not cross the line
from “a simple display of adult genitalia around a sleeping minor” to showing his
victim as “an inanimate body” upon which he was “acting sexually.” Id.
Unlike Osuba, where an adult filmed himself masturbating close to a sleeping
fully clothed minor, standing over her and ejaculating toward her, nothing in the
photographs comes close to such active sexual conduct. Indeed, Hessler engaged in
no such “sexual act” and certainly did not photograph or video any sexualized conduct.
The photos do not show that Hessler ejaculated on his daughter and there is no such
behavior charged. And it is noteworthy that the images used to insinuate such
conduct is a “known image” to dropbox and therefore a product of the internet and
not Hessler.
Only by distorting and exaggerating what the photos show could the district
court bring them within the scope of the Osuba holding. Nor do the photos show a
18
sleeping child “manipulated “in such a manner as to make it appear that she is
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” United States v. Levy, 594 F. Supp. 2d 427,
443 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
In short, Hessler did not cross the line from a simple display of adult genitals
around a sleeping minor to showing his victim as an inanimate body upon which he
was acting sexually. Osuba, 67 F.4th at 63. Unlike the conduct held sufficient to
violate the statute in Osuba, Hessler was not engaged in any sexually explicit activity
in the photos. An honest description of the images shows they are much closer to
those considered in Howard and provide the basis for the finding of actual innocence
and dismissal of the charges. In Howard, the Seventh Circuit vacated the defendant's
conviction for production of child pornography under § 2251(a), where the evidence
consisted of videos depicting the defendant masturbating next to a fully clothed,
sleeping six-year-old girl. United States v. Howard, 968 F.3d 717, 719-20 (7th Cir.
2020). The court held that the statute requires the minor to engage in sexually
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of "such conduct,"
emphasizing that the sleeping child did nothing more than lie passively in bed, which
did not constitute sexually explicit conduct such as masturbation, sexual intercourse,
or lascivious exhibition of genitals. Id. at 721-22. The Howard court rejected the
government's argument that the defendant's own conduct sufficed, clarifying that the
statute focuses on the minor's engagement, not the adult's independent actions. Id.
at 722. This holding conflicts with the decision below, as the district court relied on
Osuba to find the images sufficient, despite their static nature showing no active
19
sexual conduct by anyone and no lascivious exhibition by the minor—facts even closer
to Howard than to Osuba, where active masturbation and ejaculation directed at the
minor were depicted. The images here depict mere proximity of adult genitalia to a
sleeping, clothed figure (potentially a doll), without any depicted sexual activity,
ejaculation, or manipulation, rendering them insufficient under Howard's narrower
interpretation.
In contrast, broader interpretations in other circuits, such as the Eighth
Circuit in United States v. McCloud, 590 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding
conviction for filming masturbation next to a sleeping child while touching her over
clothes, finding the minor's passive role sufficient), the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Laursen, 847 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding for rubbing penis on sleeping
child's hand during masturbation), and the Third Circuit in United States v. Finley,
726 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding for touching sleeping child's genitals during
adult's sexual conduct), allow convictions where the minor is passively used as a prop
in the adult's explicit activity. The decision below aligns with this broader view but
conflicts with Howard warranting Supreme Court review to resolve the split on
whether passive sleeping minors must be deemed "engaged" in sexually explicit
conduct under § 2251(a).
Below, the government again attempted to buttress its argument with the
claim that Phillips was not ineffective by arguing that she discussed the Howard
decision with Hessler and he agreed to proceed with the plea. But, again, at the time
of this conversation, itself prompted by the Assistant United States’ Attorney
20
informing her of the Howard case, Phillips had never seen the images in question and
was, by definition, unable to offer effective assistance of counsel. And while the
district court utilized other extraneous evidence to reject appellant’s claim of actual
innocence, see Exhibit 4 at 17, these do not independently or collectively establish the
elements of the charged offense.
In short, correct application of precedent, including the Second Circuit’s own
precedent, Osuba, inexorably leads to the conclusion that defendant’s counsel was
actually innocent and could not have predicated entry of a guilty pleas were
competent counsel engaged below.
Accordingly, A certificate of appealability should be issued because appellant
makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). The certificate of appealability analysis is not coextensive with a merits
analysis. The central issue is whether the claims appellant raises are “debatable.”
Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 110 (2017). Jurists could both disagree with the decision
reached below and conclude that the issues presented “are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective in developing a defense strategy and
his trial counsel failed to engage in basic investigative functions which would have
allowed her to properly assess the evidence against her client and then applicable
precedent. Instead, she failed to investigate either the provenance or legal
significance of the government’s evidence.
21
WHEREFORE, appellant makes out sufficiently serious constitutional issues
to warrant issuance of a certificate of appealability, this Court should issue one and
allow perfection of the appeal on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Stephen Bergstein
STEPHEN BERGSTEIN
Counsel of Record
BERGSTEIN & ULLRICH
Five Paradies Lane
New Paltz, NY 12561
(845) 469-1277
steve@tbulaw.com
MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN
SUSSMAN & ASSOCIATES
One Railroad Avenue, Suite 3
P.O. Box 1005
Goshen, NY 10924
Counsel for Applicant
Dated: August 12, 2025
22
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, FILED
MAY 14, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, FILED
NOVEMBER 1, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2a
Case: 24-2986, 05/14/2025, DktEntry: 20.1, Page 1 of 1
D. Conn.
23-cv-1270
Underhill, J.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
_________________
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
in the City of New York, on the 14th day of May, two thousand twenty-five.
Present:
Richard J. Sullivan,
Joseph F. Bianco,
Steven J. Menashi,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________
Simon Hessler,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
24-2986
United States of America,
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________________________________
Appellant moves for a certificate of appealability. Upon due consideration, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED because Appellant has not
shown that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling” as to the untimeliness of the Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
1a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
SIMON HESSLER,
Petitioner,
No. 3:23-cv-1270 (SRU)
v.
UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
ORDER ON PETITION TO
VACATE GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCE
UNDER28 U.S.C. § 2255
Petitioner Simon Hessler ("Hessler") has filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S. C.§ 2255. For the reasons that follow, I deny the
motion.
I.
Procedural History
On December 11, 2019, Hessler pled guilty to production of child pornography 1 in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 225l(a) before Magistrate Judge William I. Garfinkel. United States v.
Hessler, No. 3:19-cr-303 (SRU) ("Criminal Case"), Doc. No.4. I. approved and adopted the
gtiilty plea on January 10, 2020 and sentenced Hessler to approximately twenty-nine years in
prison on August 13, 2020. 2 Criminal Case, Docs. No. 12, 43. Judgment entered on September
2, 2020. Doc. No. 45. Attorney Bethany Phillips, then an associate at Butler, Norris, and Gold,
represented Hessler during the pendency of his state and federal criminal cases. Hessler now
1 "The term 'child pornography' is currently used in federal statutes .... While this phrase still appears in federal
law, 'child sexual abuse material' is preferred, as it better reflects the abuse that is depicted in the images and videos
and the resulting trauma to the child." Child Sexual Abuse Material, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 1 (June 13, 2023),
https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-06/child_ sexual_abuse_material_2.pdf.
2 I sentenced Hessler to 347 months of incarceration in order to account for the thirteen months he was detained
before sentencing. See Sentencing Hr'g Tr., Doc. No. 48 at 40:3-40:13.
2a
claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel from Attorney Phillips in federal plea
negotiations.
Hessler did not directly appeal the federal criminal conviction. He also pled guilty to
multiple state charges, e.g., Risk ofinjury to a Child, Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree, and
Attempt to Commit Commercial Sexual Abuse to a Minor. Conn. Conviction Case Detail, Nos.
HHD-CRIS-0265633-T, HHD-CR19-0181174-0. 3 Hessler's federal term of imprisonment runs
concunently with his state sentence. See Criminal Case, Doc. No. 45 at 1. He is cunently in
federal custody. 4
II.
Standard of Review
A section 2255 petition provides those in federal custody with an oppmiunity to
challenge the legality of their sentences. It is the "proper vehicle when the federal prisoner seeks
to challenge the legality of the imposition of a sentence by a court." Poindexter v. Nash, 333
F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). To obtain relief, a petitioner must show that his
sentence was invalid because (1) "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
the laws of the United States"; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the
sentence exceeded the maximum detention authorized by law; or (4) the sentence "is otherwise
subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
The standard is stringent; even constitutional enors will not be redressed through a
section 2255 petition unless they have had a "substantial and injurious effect" that results in
"actual prejudice" to the petitioner. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637(1993) (internal
citations omitted); see also Underwood v. United States, 166 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1999)
3 Hessler pled guilty to the state charges on August 18, 2020.
!d.
4 Inmate Locator, No. 26624-014, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc// (last visited Oct. 28, 2024).
2
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(applying Brecht's standard to section 2255 petitions). The petitioner bears the burden of
proving that he or she is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Blackmon v.
United States, 2019 WL 3767511, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2019) (citing Triana v. United States,
205 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2000)).
If a petitioner fails to raise an issue upon direct appeal, that issue will be deemed
procedurally defaulted and unreviewable absent a demonstration of ineffective assistance of
counsel, an "intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need
to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." United States v. Becker, 502 F.3d 122, 127
(2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)).
A petitioner is entitled to a hearing "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the
case conclusively show tl1at the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). "Mere
generalities or hearsay statements will not nom1ally entitle the applicant to a hearing .... The
petitioner must set forth specific facts which he is in a position to establish by competent
evidence." Dalli v. United States, 491 F.2d 758, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). In
the absence of supporting facts, the court may resolve a petitioner's claims without a hearing.
See id. at 760-62.
III.
Discussion
A. Timeliness
Section 2255 habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year of the conviction
becoming final-that is, when the petitioner has exhausted avenues for relief through direct
appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4); Superville v. United States, 171 F. App':k 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2019)
(quoting Moshier v. United States, 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)) ("For the
purposes of§ 2255(f)(l), 'an unappealed federal criminal judgment becomes final when the time
3
4a
for filing a direct appeal expires."'). "[T]he date on which the" section 2255 "limitations clock
beg[ins] to tick is a fact-specific issue." Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 190 (2d Cir.
2000)) (cleaned up); see Rivas v. Fischer, 294 F. App'x 677, 679 (2d Cir. 2008) (remanding to
the district court to make factual findings regarding "whether a duly diligent person in
petitioner's circumstances would have discovered the evidence ... ")(cleaned up). A habeas
petitioner bears the burden of "of persuading the court that he exercised due diligence in
discovering the factual predicate of his habeas claim." Shabazz v. Filion, 2006 WL 2792741, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006), affd, 402 F. App'x 629 (2d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).
Hessler's deadline to appeal expired on September 16, 2020. See Criminal Case, Doc.
No. 45 (judgment entered on September 2, 2020); see United States v. Wright, 945 F.3d 677, 683
(2d Cir. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(I)'and Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(l)(A)(i)) (when no notice
of appeal is filed, the deadline to file a section 2255 habeas petition runs one year and fourteen
days after judgment enters). Hessler did not file his habeas petition until September 27, 2023.
Doc. No. 1. He should have filed the instant petition on or before September 16, 2021, one year
after his deadline to appeal expired. Hessler nonetheless argues the petition is timely because (a)
he uncovered "new evidence," (b) equitable tolling principles apply, and (c) he is actually
innocent ofthe crime to which he pled guilty. Doc. No. 1 at 54-70.
1. Equitable Tolling
"To equitably toll the one-year limitations period, a petitioner must show that
extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time, and he must have
acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll." Hizbullahankhamon v.
Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.
2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4
5a
Hessler states in his petition-but not in his affidavit-PieiTe Hessler retained Kent
Mawhinney to represent Hessler in his postconviction proceedings on November 9, 2020.
Petition, Doc. No. 1 at 25; Hessler Aff., Doc. No. 1 at 302 ~ 29 ("My father, ... and I were
advised by Kent Mawhinney, . : . that Mr. Mawhinney was researching and developing a
collateral attack on my plea and sentence."); but see Mawhinney Email, Doc. No. 1 at 562
(Mawhinney emails Pierre Hessler that he "need[s] to tighten up my work before meeting with
counsel who specializes in post-judgment motions," suggesting that Mawhinney was not
prepared to represent Hessler for post-conviction proceedings). Mawhinney was purportedly
Hessler's cellmate, doc. no. 1 at 24, while Mawhinney faced criminal charges for conspiracy to
commit murder. 5 His law license was suspended at the time. See id.
After Hessler and his father were "[n]ot seeing any indication that Mawhinney was
perfonning as promised," they "sought assistance from other counsel." Petition, Doc. No. 1 at
26; see also Hessler Aff., Doc. No. 1 at 302 ~~ 29-30. Hessler does not specify when he
terminated Mawhinney's representation, although the record suggests it was sometime after
January 12, 2021. See Mawhinney Eniail, Doc. No. 1 at 561 (Mawhinney sent an email update
to Pierre Hessler on January 12, 2021). Hessler appears to have retained current counsel in
March 2022, about six months after the deadline to file his habeas petition. Petition, Doc. No. 1
at 26.
Attorney Mawhinney apparently never advised Hessler of section 2255's one-year statute
of limitations, id. at 25-26, but Hessler's ignorance of the limitations period is insufficient to
warrant equitable tolling. See United States v. Valdez, 2023 WL 2596911,at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
5 See Alana Seldon, Judge Suspends Kent Mawhinney's Law License, Appoints Clients New Attorney, Fox61.COM,
Jan. 28, 2020, https://www.fox61.com/article/news/judge-suspends-kent-mawhinneys-law-license-appoints-clientsnew-attorney/520-cf4b96b5-319b-4e 15-869b-ae80 19ffb 100 (last visited Oct 29, 2024).
5
6a
22, 2023) ("[T]o the extent [the petitioner] may be asserting that he was unaware of the specific
statutory deadline for his [§ 225 5] filing, courts have held that ignorance of the law ... is not
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.") (cleaned up). Negligence on part of Attorney
Mawhinney is also insufficient to toll the limitations period. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.
631' 651:.52 (20 10) (equitable tolling i's not warranted for missed deadlines resulting from "a
garden variety claim of attorney negligence") (cleaned up). Even if Hessler could demonstrate
that the period Mawhinney purportedly represented him should be equitably tolled, his habeas
petition-filed on September 27, 2023-was still filed 1 year, 7 months, ari.d 20 days too late.
Second, Hessler makes generalized assertions that the COVID-19 restrictions at his
prison and dismptions in court operations slowed his habeas efforts. Petition, Doc. No. 1 at 69.
The COVID-19 pandemic is not in itself an "extraordinary circumstan~e[]" that warrants
equitable tolling. Hines v. United States, 2021 WL 2456679, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2021)
(collecting cases).
Third, Hessler unsuccessfully solicited attorneys to represent him in postconviction
proceedings from sometime in March 2021 to June 2022. 6 See Petition, Doc. No. 1 at 26. I
decline to equitably toll the period Hessler searched for counsel. See Geritano v. United States,
2023 WL 3499511, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2023) ("Courts in this Circuit have routinely denied
equitable tolling based on an imnate' s pro se status.") (collecting cases). Although Hessler could
not find an attorney, he could have filed his habeas corpus petition pro se within the limitations
6 After Hessler retained Sussman & Goldman, he claims that further delays were due to missing outgoing mail in his
prison and his counselor's willful failure to accommodate his legal team's visitation. Hessler Aff., Doc. No. 1 at
302-03 ~~ 32-37. Hessler's complaint of missing outgoing mail from prison is insuffiCient. See Rivera v. United
States, 719 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234 (D. C01m. 2010), afj'd, 448 F. App'x 145 (2d Cir. 2011) (declining to toll the
habeas deadline because the petitioner's complaints regarding "delays caused by the prison mail system were
consistent with the ordinary inconveniences experienced by all prisoners") (cleaned up). "This is not to say that
such inconveniences could never amount to extraordinary circumstances, but to do so they would have to impose a
significant obstacle preventing petitioner from filing in a timely manner." Id.
6
7a
period and later amended or supplemented it with the assistance of counsel. See United States v.
Wright, 945 F.3d 677, 685 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 175 (2d Cir.
2004)) (when evaluating "reasonable diligence," courts "expect even prose petitioners to know
when the limitations period expires and to understand the need to file a habeas motion within that
limitations period") (cleaned up); cf Csanadi v. United States, 2016 WL2588162, at *6 (D.
Conn. May 4, 2016) (quoting Nelson v. Quarterman, 215 F. App'x 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2007))
(declining to equitably toll the limitations period because the petitioner "could have and should
have filed a pro se skeletal petition rather than only the motion for appointment of counsel")
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lawrence v.- Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007)
(incarcerated individuals have no constitutional right to bounsel in post-conviction proceedings).
I therefore decline to equitably toll the one-year limitations period.
2. New Evidence
Section 2255(±)(4) prescribes when the limitations period begins to run:
A 1-year period oflimitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation
period shall run from the latest of-
***
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S. C. § 2255(f)(4). "Section 2255[(±)](4) is not a tolling provision .... Rather, itresets the
limitations period's beginning date[.]" Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 2000).
Hessler argues that the limitations period runs from the date he discovered "new evidence" of
Phillips's ineffective assistance of counsel. Petition, Doc. No. 1 at 61.
Hessler claims Attorney Phillips was ineffective because she never viewed the images
underlying the federal charge, nor hired an expert to review the images or their metadata.
Hessler Aff., Doc. No. 1 at 301-02 ~ 23; but see Phillips Aff., Doc. No. 22-1 ~ 10 ("I ... traveled
7
8a
to the State Forensic Lab on June 4, 2019, to review the images of the child pornography ... I
recall observing many images of child pornography."). Phillips advised Hessler that under the
prevailing case law, Hessler had no reasonable defense. Hessler Aff., Doc. No. 1 at 302 ~ 24. A
postconviction forensic investigator retained by Hessler viewed the images in Februaty 2023 and
June 2023. Archer Aff., Doc. No. 1 at 367 ~ 9. Investigator Michael Archer formed an opinion
that the images did not meet the legal definition of child sexual abuse material. !d. at 369 ~ 11;
id. at 379-80 ~ 27.
Attorney Phillips's alleged failure to view the images is, according to Hessler, "new
evidence that ... could not have been discovered earlier through any additional exercise of
diligence[.]" Petition, Doc. No. 1 at 61.
Hessler's argument is unavailing. The Connecticut Forensics Laboratory's visitor
register indicates that Attorney Phillips visited the forensics laboratory for one hour on June 4,
2019. Doc. No. 22-4 at 2. The visitor register and the images underlying the federal charge were
already in existence at the time of Hessler's federal guilty plea-December 11, 2019-over three
years before he filed the habeas petition. Hessler knew of the images' content via secondary
descriptions in the plea agreement's stipulation of offense conduct. Redacted Plea Agreement,
Criminal Case, Doc. No. 10 at 13-14. Hessler was aware of those images' existence and
quantity. See id. Hessler admitted, in open court, that he had reviewed the plea agreement's
stipulation of offense conduct. Waiver & Plea Hr'g Tr., Doc. No. 22-8 at 43:15-48:17 ("The
Court: ... the stipulation of offense conduct, which is pretty detailed in this case. Have you
gone over those as well? The Defendant: Yes, your Honor."); id. at 50-51 (Judge Garfinkel
asked Hessler if he admits to committing some of the specific offense conduct outlined in the
plea agreement, and Hessler answers in the affirmative). If Hessler wanted to proceed to trial on
8
9a
the argument that the images of Minor Victim One ("MVl") did not meet the legal definition. of
child sexual abuse images, Hessler should have raised that argument with Attomey Phillips
before pleading guilty. If Hessler wanted to investigate whether Phillips had viewed the
images-or for how long she viewed the images-nothing prevented him from doing so well
within the limitations period. Section 2255's limitations period runs from the date "the facts
supporting the claim ... could have been discovered," not when new legal arguments can be
drawn from previously known or previously knowable evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(±)(4). The
argument that the petition was timely because the discovery of new evidence reset the start date
of the limitations period fails.
3. Actual Innocence
In the context of a habeas petition, "achml innocence" refers to factual innocence, not the
alleged legal insufficiency of the evidence presented in the underlying criminal proceeding.
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)). "[A] claim of
actual innocence could provide a basis for excusing a late filing even though petitioner pled
guilty." Cosey v. Lilley, 62 F.4th 74, 85 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d
142, 152 (2d Cir. 2010)) (cleaned up). "To make a threshold showing of actual innocence ... a
petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him." Dhinsa v. Krueger, 917 F .3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 20 19)
(quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)) (cleaned up). A petitioner's claim
that he is actually innocent "is not itself a constitutional claim. It serves instead as a gateway
through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise time-barred constitutional
claim heard on the merits." Cosey v. Lilley, 62 F.4th 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2023) (citing Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)).
9
10a
"The petitioner's burden in making a gateway showing of actual innocence is deliberately
'demanding.'" Hyman v. Brown, 927 F.3d 639, 656 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting House v. Bell, 547
U.S. 518, 538 (2006)). "It requires, first, that petitioner adduce new reliable evidence-whethet
it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical
evidence-that was not presented at trial." Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A habeas court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution" and determine if "any rational trier of fact coi1ld have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Dhinsa, 917 F.3d at 81 (quoting Coleman v.
Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 654 (2012)) (cleaned up). The court must evaluate the evidence's
trustworthiness on its own merits and in light of pre-existing evidence in the record. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 327-28.
Hessler pled guilty to Production of Child Pornography, which mandates a fifteen-year
term of imprisonment for "[a]ny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any minor to engage in ... any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
any visual depiction of such conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 225l(a). 7 When he pled guilty in both state
and federal court, Hessler admitted the essential elements of the felony charge. "[S]elfinculpatory statements made under oath carry a strong presumption ofverity." United States v.
Lam Peralta, 792 F. App'x 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d
1513, 1530 (2d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his federal case, Hessler admitted tmder oath that 26 separate images depict his "penis ·
on and near MVl 's hand, bare :feet, and bare stomach as well as Hessler's hand manipulating
7 The offender must have known, or had reason to know, that the visual depiction would be transmitted in interstate
commerce; was actually transmitted in interstate or foreign commerce, affected interstate or foreign commerce; or
was produced or transmitted using materials that had been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce. Id.
10
11a
MV1 's breast." See Redacted Plea Agreement, Criminal Case, Doc. No. 10 at 13 (emphasis
added); see also Plea Hr'g Tr., Doc. No. 22.:8 at 47:18-47:23, 49:14-49:17. He admitted that
MV1, as depicted in the images, was a human child who "was under twelve years of age at the
time." Redacted Plea Agreement, Crhninal Case, Doc. No. 10 at 13; see also Plea Hr'g Tr.,
Criminal Case, Doc. No. 22-8 at 47:24-47:25,49:14-49:17. He admitted that he "employed,
used, persuaded, induced, entiCed or coerced ... MVl to take part in sexually explicit conduct
for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct." Redacted Plea Agreement,
Criminal Case, Doc. No. 10 at13 (cleaned up).
Hessler admitted under oath at the Hartford state plea hearing that "the child in those
photos was a real child and not one of these anatomically correct dolls that he had purchased
.... So the sexual assault, the production charges involve an actual child." Hartford Case Plea
Hr'g Tr., Doc. No. 22-9 at 19; id. at 24 ("THE COURT: Are the facts that the state's placed on
the record ... essentially correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor."); id. at 28 ("THE
COURT: .... And I asked you about whether the facts that were placed on the record by the
state's attorney, if those wer~ essentially correct, and is your response still yes to that question?
THE DEFEND.i\.NT: Yes, Your Honor."). 8
At the Tolland state plea hearing, Hessler a&nitted to producing:
[!]mages ofthe defendant's penis touching a juvenile female's feet. ... th-at juvenile to be
12 years of age .... In one image, the child's hand is dangling at the wrist as iflimp, and
there is a penis touching her hand .... In another image it depicts an adult hand grabbing
the same child's breast. ... Lastly, ... there was an image noted with a penis that
appeared to be erect on top of the child's stomach and breasts.
8 At oral argument of the present motion~ Hessler suggests that the child dolls found by police in his "dungeon" that
could have been the subject in the picture, not MVl. See also Petition, Doc. No. 1 at 47 ("the images ... provided
insufficient evidence to conclude that the feet depicted even belonged to a minor child, ... not to an adult or a
lifelike doll"). But Hessler does not present affirmative evidence, in an affidavit or otherwise, to support the
suggestion that the subject of the photos was a doll and not a child.
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Tolland Case Plea Hr'g Tr., Doc. No. 1 at 486-87; id. at 494 ("THE COURT: ... Mr. Hessler,
you heard the facts as stated by the prosecutor. Do you essentially agree with those facts as
stated? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor."). Hessler admitted that those images depicted
his penis. See id. at 487. 9
Despite those self-inculpating statements made under oath, Hessler argues that he is
ilmocent because the images do not meet the statutory definition of child pornography.
. 4.
Whether the Images Depict Child Pornography
Section 2251 (a) requires that the offender "uses, ... any minor to engage in, ... any
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or
for the purpose oftninsmitting a· live visual depiction of such conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
"Sexually explicit conduct" includes "actual or simulated ... lascivious exhibition of ... genitals
... ofany person." 18 U.S. C. § 2256(2)(A)(v) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Dost
factors define "lascivious exhibition" by asking a court to consider, inter alia, "whether the
setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive ... whether the visual depiction suggests
sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity ... whether the visual depiction is
intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.'' United States v. Close, 2022 WL
17086495, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1043 (2023) (citing United
States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)).
A minor's engagement in the sexually explicit conduct ''can be active or passive."
United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4th 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 577 (2024).
"[P]hysical contact is not a necessary component of passive engagement[,]" nor must the minor
9 Furthermore, although not made under oath, Hessler wrote to a state probation officer, "I have not denied any of
my actions .... " Doc. No. 22-7 at 1.
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be unclothed. I d. at 64. "[B]ecause § 2256 defines sexually explicit conduct to include 'actual
or simulated' activity, if a sleeping child is used or manipulated in such a manner as to make it
appear that she is engaging in sexually explicit conduct, then[§ 2251] is violated." Id. at 63
(quoting United States v. Levy, 594 F. Supp. 2d 427, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In Osuba, the offender filmed a video ofhimselfmasturbating close to a minor, "standing
over the minor and ejaculating toward her, ... missing her arm only :p.arrowly." Id. at 60, 63.,
The offender did not physically touch the minor. Id. at 64. That conduct satisfied section
225l(a).
By creating a video depicting ... masturbation, the intended consummation of which was
visibly directed toward a minor who was physically present, Osuba crossed the line from
"a simple display of adult genitals around a sleeping minor" to showing his victim as "an
inanimate body" npon which he was acting sexually.
United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4th 56, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Lohse, 797
F.3d 515, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2015)) (cleaned up).
Hessler stakes his innocence claim on United States v. Howard, 968 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.
2020). In Howard, the governn1ent's sole argument on appeal was that section2251(a)
criminalized an individual "who made a video of his own solo sexually explicit content,"
regardless of if the minor was engaged in actual or simulated sexually explicit conduct. I d. at
721; id. at 723 ("The government staked its entire case for conviction on a mistaken
interpretation of the statute."). That interpretation, "taken to its logical conclusion, ... does not
require the presence ofa child on camera at all. The crime could be committed even if the child
who is the object of the offender's sexual interest is in a neighbor's yard or across the street." Id.
at 721. The Howard Court determined that the jury instructions had set forth an erroneous
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interpretation of the statute. !d. at 719, 723. Howard only reached the jury instructions issue.
ld. at 723.
Both Lohse and Osuba are more germane to the instant petition. In Lohse, the defendant
seemed to challenge both the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions. 797 F.3d at
521-22; see Howard, 968 F.3d at 723 ("Indeed, the Eighth Circuit [in Lohse] could not tell if the
defendant was challenging the jury instructions or the sufficiency of the evidence."). The Lohse
Court reached both issues and upheld both the jury instructions and the evidence's sufficiency.
Lohse, 797 F.3d at 521-22. Lohse analyzed the content of the child sexual abuse images. See id.
at 520-22. Osuba did the same. "[W]e address a question Howard did not reach, .... [W]e take
a step Howard did not, holding that on thefacts of this case, the minor's passive involvement as
the intended recipient ofOsuba's actions suffices .... " Osuba, 67 F.4th at 64. Hessler
essentially asks me to ignore Osuba in favor of Howard. But to ignore applicable and binding
circuit precedent in favor of ill-suited, out-of-circuit precedent would belie the duties of a district
court.
At oral argument, Attorney Sussman argued that the images cannot constitute child
pornography because they depict Hessler's flaccid penis. Even assuming that Hessler's penis
. was flaccid-a claim Hessler's own forensic investigator contradicts 10-a reasonable jury could
conclude that Hessler's conduct meets the legal defmition of child pornography. The images
depict a "sleeping child used 'as a sexual object.'" Osuba, 67 F .4th at 64 (quoting Lohse, 797
F.3d at 520-21); see Lohse, 797 F.3d at 521-22 (Dost factors met for images including a child
"wearing pajamas and sleeping on a bed" and the offender's "flaccid penis near the child's cheek
°
1 Compare Lothstein Report, Doc. No. 1 at 475 (Hessler "denied being erect or ejaculating"), with Archer Aff.,
Doc. No. 1 at 372 ("The image depicts: a semi-erect penis, in proximity to two bottoms of human feet .... There
are a number of photos showing Mr. Hessler in various states of erection.")
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or mouth, and he is pulling or holding her hair ... "because "the setting of the images was
sexually suggestive; the images were intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer; and K.S.
was portrayed as a sexual object."). 11
The Dost factors are "not mandatory, formulaic or exclusive." United States v. Rivera,
546 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2008). In cases where images only display "the adult defendant's
genitals, many of the Dost factors simply do not apply." Lohse, 797 F.3d at 520. There was no
reasonable explanation for Hessler to take photos of his genitals in close proximity to MVlflaccid or not, touching MVl or not-except to use MVl to produce sexually explicit content.
Hessler was no stranger to child sexual abuse images. Federal Plea Hr' g 1}., Doc. No. 22-8 at
49:3-49:6 ("[T]here were other child pornography images, unrelated to Minor Victim 1, that
appeared to have been downloaded from the internet or the Dark Web by Mr. Hessler, that
w[ere] also on the USB drive."); Redacted Plea Agreement, Criminal Case, Doc. No. 10 at 13
(Hessler possessed "eight hundred forty-nine images of suspected child pornography, with six
hundred eighty-eight tmique hash values .... [O]ne hundred thirty-five videos containing child
pornography, with one hundred thirty-one being unique hash values[.]") (cleaned up).
The only reasonable description of the child sexual abuse images-from an adult man
who possessed hundreds of other images and videos depicting child sexual abuse-is a
"lascivious exhibition" of Hessler's genitals. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v). Like in Osuba,
Hessler "crossed the line from a simple display of adult genitals aroun:d a sleeping minor to
showing his victim as an inanimate body upon which he was acting sexually." Osuba, 67 F.4th
at 63 (quoting Lohse, 797 F.3d at 521)) (cleaned up).
11 Lohse was decided before Hessler pled guilty to both the state and federal charges.
See Federal Plea Hr' g Tr.,
. Doc. No. 22-8 at 1 (December 20I9); see Hartford Plea Hr'g Tr., Doc. No. I at 402 (December 2019); see Tolland
Plea Hr'g Tr., Doc. No. I at 482 (December 20I9).
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It is Hessler's burden to prove otherwise. Dwyer v. United States, 2016 WL 6782739, at
*1 (D. Conn. Nov. 14, 2016). He does not.
5. Hessler's Proffered Evidence ofActual Innocence is Insufficient
Hessler's innocence claim 12 heavily relies upon Forensic Investigator Michael Archer's
factual and legal opinions. Archer claims that he "reviewed a substantial portion of the digital
evidence .... I have reviewed the images involving [MV1]." Archer Aff., Doc. No. 1 at 365.
But Archer only describes, in detail, one image depicting Hessler's penis near MV1 's feet and
lower legs. "The image depicts: a semi-erect penis, in proximity to two bottoms of human feet. .
. . There are a number of photos showing Mr. Hessler in various states of erection." ld. at 372.
"Only feet and lower extremities are seen in the photo. They are not clearly the feet and lower
extremities of a child." !d. at 371 (cleaned up). Archer agrees that the penis depicted in that
image belongs to Hessler. Id. at 372 ("I ... agree that it is Mr. Hessler's penis. Mr. Hessler has
distinct penile anatomy.").
Neither Archer nor Hessler proffer affirmative evidence in their affidavits that
approximately 25 other images depict, inter alia, "Hessler's penis on and near MV1 's hand, bare
feet, and bare stomach as well as Hessler's hand manipulating MV1 's breast." See Redacted
Plea Agreement, Criminal Case, Doc. No. 10 at 13; see also Plea Hr'g Tr., Doc. No. 22-8 at
47:18-47:23,49:14-49:17. Archer makes only conclusory remarks about those 25 other images.
E.g., Second Archer Aff., Doc. No. 30 at 3 ("I reviewed all the photos and find none of them to
raise to the level of the production of child pornography."). Archer's opinion that images cannot
12 I focus my discussion onHessler's factual innocence claim regarding the images themselves. Hessler additionally
argues that he is factually hmocent of Attempt to Commit Commercial Sexual Abuse to a Minor. See Doc. No. 1 at
62. I do not address the conduct underlying that state charge. Section 2255 only allows me to evaluate the conduct
underlying the federal production charge, not Hessler's state charges. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
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legally constitute child pornography. is wholly irrelevant to the instant habeas petition, especially
when Archer does not factually dispute the content of the 26 images. In any event, nothing in the
Archer affidavit proffers "new reliable evidence"; it only offers alternative interpretations of old
evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
Other evidence in the record buttresses Hessler's actual guilt. Before his guilty plea,
Hessler admitted to a clinical and forensic psychologist that he exposed himself to MVl.
Lothstein Report, Doc. No.1 at475. Hessler "admit[ted] to sexually touching [MVl] .... He
believes she was asleep the whole time." Id. (emphasis added). Attorney Phillips's affidavit
similarly indicates that Hessler made sexual contact with MVl in the images. Phillips Aff., Doc.
No .. 22-1 ~JO ("Thes~ included images of ... Simon's penis on [MVl 's] stomach/breast area.
There were also photos ofhis penis near her feet.") (cleaned up); see also id. ~ 14 ('Mr. Hessler
indicated to Lee Gold and to me that he was the person in the photos.").
I conclude that Hessler has not overcome the "strong presumption of verity" of his
"[s]elf-inculpatory statements made under oath" at the guilty plea proceedings. Lam Peralta,
792 F. App'x at 70 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hessler does not meet the demanding
standard required to sustain a claim of actual i1111ocence.
B. Ce1iificate of Appealability ·
"Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not
be taken to the court of appeals from ... the final order in a proceeding under section2255." 28
U.S. C.§ 2253(c)(1)(B). A "final order" is ail order "that dispose[s] of the merits of a habeas
corpus proceeding." Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).
Hessler may obtain a certificate of appealability "only if' he "has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The motion, files, and
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record of this case conclusively show that Hessler is entitled to no relief. Hessler has not
demonstrated that "reasonable jurists could debate whether ... the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further." Rhagi v. Artuz, 309 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned
up). I therefore decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Simon Hessler's 28 U.S. C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his conviction and sentence, doc. no., 1, is denied. The Clerk is instmcted to
enter judgment for the United States and close the case.
So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 1st day ofNovember, 2024.
Is/ STEPAN R. T.JNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.