Emergency Application — Kristi Noem, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al., Applicants v. Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 7, 2025

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No. 25A

In the Supreme Court of the United States

───────────

KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., APPLICANTS

v.

PEDRO VASQUEZ PERDOMO, ET AL.

───────────

APPLICATION TO STAY THE ORDER ISSUED

BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AND REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY

───────────

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement ....................................................................................................................... 6

A.

Background ............................................................................................... 6

B.

Proceedings Below .................................................................................... 8

Argument ..................................................................................................................... 15

A.

B.

C.

The Government Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits ......................... 15

1.

Respondents lack standing to seek injunctive relief restricting

investigative stops for immigration enforcement....................... 16

2.

The district court grossly misapplied the

Fourth Amendment ..................................................................... 22

3.

The Central District-wide injunction vastly exceeds the district

court’s equitable powers .............................................................. 30

The Remaining Stay Factors Support Relief ........................................ 34

1.

This Court would likely grant certiorari .................................... 34

2.

The district court’s order inflicts irreparable harm on the

government .................................................................................. 35

3.

The balance of the equities weighs in the government’s

favor ............................................................................................. 38

An Administrative Stay Is Warranted .................................................. 39

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 40

(i)

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Applicants (defendants-appellants below) are Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Rodney S. Scott, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol; Michael

W. Banks, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol; Kash Patel, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Pam Bondi, Attorney General; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

Ernesto Santacruz Jr., Acting Field Office Director for Los Angeles, U.S. Immigration

and Customs Enforcement; Eddy Wang, Special Agent in Charge for Los Angeles,

Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

Gregory K. Bovino, Chief Patrol Agent for El Centro Sector, U.S. Border Patrol; Jeffrey D. Stalnaker, Acting Chief Patrol Agent, San Diego Sector, U.S. Border Patrol;

Akil Davis, Assistant Director in Charge, Los Angeles Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Bilal A. Essayli, U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California.

Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are Pedro Vasquez Perdomo; Carlos

Alexander Osorto; Isaac Villegas Molina; Jorge Hernandez Viramontes; Jason Brian

Gavidia; Los Angeles Worker Center Network; United Farm Workers of America; Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights; and Immigrant Defenders Law Center.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (C.D. Cal.):

Perdomo v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5605 (July 11, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order)

United States Court of Appeals (9th Cir.):

Perdomo v. Noem, No. 25-4312 (Aug. 1, 2025) (denying motion for stay pending

appeal)

In the Supreme Court of the United States

───────────

No. 25A

KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., APPLICANTS

v.

PEDRO VASQUEZ PERDOMO, ET AL.

───────────

APPLICATION TO STAY THE ORDER ISSUED

BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AND REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY

───────────

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

1651, the Solicitor General—on behalf of applicants Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.—respectfully files this application to stay the July 11, 2025 order

issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California (App.,

infra, 62a-113a). In addition, the Solicitor General respectfully requests an administrative stay of the district court’s order.

This case involves a district-court injunction that threatens to upend immigration officials’ ability to enforce the immigration laws in the Central District of California by hanging the prospect of contempt over every investigative stop of suspected

illegal aliens. Not only is the Central District the Nation’s most populous district

overall; at best estimate, it harbors some 2 million illegal aliens out of its total population of nearly 20 million people, making it by far the largest destination for illegal

aliens. Given the Administration’s commitment to enforcing the Nation’s immigration laws—under which illegal aliens are subject to investigative stops and detention

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to facilitate removal—it should be no surprise that the Los Angeles area is a top enforcement priority. When immigration-enforcement stops involve briefly detaining a

suspected illegal alien, they must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonablesuspicion requirement—a low bar that “is considerably less than * * * a preponderance.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Like most Fourth Amendment

tests, that context-specific inquiry requires considering the totality of the circumstances. And here, those circumstances necessarily include that illegal presence is

widespread in the Central District, where 1 in every 10 people is an illegal alien; that

many locations unlawfully employ illegal aliens and are known to hire them on a dayto-day basis; that certain types of jobs—like day labor, landscaping, and construction—are most attractive to illegal aliens because they often do not require paperwork; that the vast majority of illegal aliens in the District come from Mexico or Central America; and that many only speak Spanish.

Needless to say, no one thinks that speaking Spanish or working in construction always creates reasonable suspicion. Nor does anyone suggest those are the only

factors federal agents ever consider. But in many situations, such factors—alone or

in combination—can heighten the likelihood that someone is unlawfully present in

the United States, above and beyond the 1-in-10 baseline odds in the District. U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents are entitled to rely on these

factors when ramping up enforcement of immigration laws in the District.

The district court’s injunction now significantly interferes with federal enforcement efforts across a region that is larger and more populous than many countries

and that has become a major epicenter of the immigration crisis. Respondents—a

handful of individuals who allege they were previously stopped without reasonable

suspicion, and various organizations purporting to represent some indefinite number

3

of unidentified aliens—alleged that federal agents have an unlawful pattern or practice of considering some combination of four factors (apparent race or ethnicity;

speaking in Spanish or accented English; presence at a location where illegal aliens

are known to gather; and working or appearing to work in a particular type of job) as

sufficient for reasonable suspicion. The court then indefinitely and categorically enjoined federal agents from ever treating those four factors, alone or collectively, as

sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion of illegal presence as to any of the Central District’s 20 million residents. The district court and the Ninth Circuit both refused to stay that order. Now, ICE agents, under threat of contempt, cannot detain

anyone in the District solely based on those factors—not even after encountering

someone who speaks only Spanish and works as a day laborer at a worksite that has

been cited 30 times for hiring illegal aliens as day laborers.

That sweeping injunction defies a host of this Court’s precedents. Start with

Article III standing precedents. Even assuming arguendo that individual respondents or members of the organizational respondents were stopped previously without

reasonable suspicion (a point the government contests), this Court has long held that

allegations of past unlawful interactions with law enforcement do not show a sufficient risk of future unlawful interactions. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95

(1983). Just because respondents were previously detained does not mean that they,

out of the Central District’s 20 million people, will be detained again, let alone detained based solely on the four factors. The lower courts instead found standing based

on a supposed pattern or practice of unlawful stops (which, to be clear, does not exist)

and speculation about future harm, but neither supplies a sufficient, imminent, concrete risk that respondents will be unlawfully stopped in the future. And this Court

has rejected the court of appeals’ theory of standing based on mere “assessment of

4

statistical probabilities,” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009).

Meanwhile, on the merits, the injunction defies blackletter Fourth Amendment

law, imposing a straitjacket on law-enforcement efforts that is inimical to the contextand case-specific totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that this Court’s precedents

demand. The lower courts wrongly cabined the reasonable-suspicion inquiry by holding that no combination of the four factors can ever constitute reasonable suspicion,

no matter how those factors present in a given stop, because the lower courts viewed

those factors as too generalized and broadly applicable across the population. That

framework narrows reasonable suspicion through the sort of “overlay of a categorical

scheme on the general reasonableness analysis” that this Court has consistently rejected. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 42 (2003); see United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266 (2002). The lower courts’ approach also ignores the relevant factual

context: in a District where about 10 percent of all residents are illegal aliens, reasonable suspicion to stop suspected illegal aliens will necessarily encompass a reasonably broad profile. The result is a self-contradictory injunction: the lower courts

found standing based on the supposedly concrete likelihood that respondents—out of

millions—might be stopped on impermissible grounds, yet refused to find reasonable

suspicion because these grounds describe far too many people.

On top of all that, by imposing a universal, District-wide injunction applicable

to millions of people, the district court flouted this Court’s recent decision in Trump

v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025), prohibiting such universal injunctions. Rather

than limiting relief to the named respondents, the court enjoined the government as

to any detentive stops of anyone among the 20 million inhabitants of the Central District of California—whether those stops affect respondents or not. The lower courts

deemed a narrower injunction unworkable, but under their logic, universal injunc-

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tions would be the norm whenever law-enforcement officers are alleged to have employed any practice violating the Fourth Amendment. CASA is not so easily evaded.

Any one of these fatal flaws would warrant this Court’s review.

This injunction inflicts manifest irreparable harm on the government. The

injunction wrongly brands countless lawful stops as unconstitutional, thereby hampering a basic law-enforcement tool, while turning every single stop in the District

into a potential contempt trap. No agent can confidently enforce the law and engage

in routine stops when the district court may later refuse to credit that the stop reflected additional, permissible factors and instead treat virtually any stop as contemptuous misconduct. And that threat—unlike respondents’ fears of future stops—

is hardly speculative. The lower courts have already made clear that some obviously

permissible additional factors—like law-enforcement officers’ past experience—are

not additional factors at all, but fold into the four factors those courts considered insufficient. And the district court has already ordered the government to show cause

why it should not also be required to develop new policies, compel agents to undergo

training, and even share records of every stop with plaintiffs’ counsel going forward.

When lower courts have tried to stymie other areas of immigration enforcement with unlawful, blunderbuss injunctions, this Court has not hesitated to stay

those orders. E.g., Noem v. Doe, 145 S. Ct. 1524 (2025); Noem v. National TPS Alliance, No. 24A1059, 2025 WL 1427560 (May 19, 2025); Trump v. Sierra Club, 140

S. Ct. 1 (2019). This injunction warrants the same treatment. Absent this Court’s

intervention, a single district judge will micromanage immigration enforcement in

the Central District by injunction, at the expense of Executive Branch enforcement

priorities and the separation of powers. This Court should end this attempted judicial

usurpation of immigration-enforcement functions and issue a stay forthwith.

6

STATEMENT

A.

Background

Based on the latest census and Office of Homeland Security Statistics data, the

government estimates that at least 15 million illegal aliens—and likely several million more—are unlawfully present in the United States.1 Millions of them crossed

into the country illegally within the last four years. From 2021 to 2024, federal agents

encountered some 9 million illegal aliens along the border; many others illegally entered after evading detection entirely. See Office of Homeland Sec. Statistics, Dep’t

of Homeland Sec., Immigration Enforcement and Legal Processes Monthly Tables

(Jan. 16, 2025), https://ohss.dhs.gov/topics/immigration/immigration-enforcement/

monthly-tables. By current estimates, some 12.8 million aliens entered the country

illegally during the previous administration.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (8 U.S.C.

1101 et seq.), consistent with statutes enacted throughout the Nation’s history, authorizes immigration officers to search for and apprehend illegal aliens to facilitate

their removal from the United States. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 233

(1960) (collecting statutes “authoriz[ing] the arrest of deportable aliens by order of an

executive official”); see also, e.g., Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 2, 1 Stat. 571 (authorizing the President to “cause to be arrested and sent out of the United States such of

See also Steven A. Camarota & Karen Zeigler, Ctr. for Immigration Studies,

Foreign-Born Number and Share of U.S. Population at All-Time Highs in January

2025 (Mar. 12, 2025) (estimate of 15.4 million as of January 2025), https://cis.org/Report/ForeignBorn-Number-and-Share-US-Population-AllTime-Highs-January-2025;

Bryan Baker & Robert Warren, Office of Homeland Sec. Statistics, Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United

States: January 2018-January 2022, at 14 (Apr. 2024) (estimate of 11 million as of

January 2022), https://ohss.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/2024_0418_ohss_estimates-of-the-unauthorized-immigrant-population-residing-in-the-united-states-january-2018%25E2%2580%2593january-2022.pdf.

1

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those aliens as shall have been ordered to depart therefrom * * * in all cases where,

in the opinion of the President, the public safety requires a speedy removal”). The

INA authorizes agents to “interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as

to his right to be or to remain in the United States” and arrest any alien if they have

“reason to believe that the alien * * * is in the United States in violation of [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for

his arrest.” 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(1) and (2); see Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 n.2

(2019) (noting statutes vesting immigration-enforcement powers in the Secretary of

Homeland Security); see also 8 C.F.R. 287.5(a) and (c) (authorizing immigration officers to interrogate and arrest aliens).

Immigration officers can exercise those powers “without [a] warrant.” 8 U.S.C.

1357(a). And they can detain individuals for questioning consistent with the Fourth

Amendment based on “reasonable suspicion” of illegal presence in the United States,

as this Court held in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); see

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Reasonable suspicion requires “aware[ness] of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that the person is an “alien[] who may be illegally in the

country.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. The reasonable-suspicion inquiry “turn[s]

on the totality of the particular circumstances.” Id. at 885 n.10.

Such investigative stops have been a critical component of day-to-day federal

immigration-enforcement efforts for decades, across administrations. Federal regulations implementing the INA expressly contemplate such stops and codify the reasonable-suspicion requirement. 8 C.F.R. 287.8(b)(2) (“If the immigration officer has

a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned is, or is attempting to be, engaged in an offense against the United States or

8

is an alien illegally in the United States, the immigration officer may briefly detain

the person for questioning.”). ICE guidance for immigration officers likewise describes investigative stops supported by reasonable suspicion as one of the “principal

levels of encounters” that agents initiate in enforcing the immigration laws. ICE,

Homeland Sec. Investigations, Search and Seizure Handbook 16 (Sept. 14, 2012),

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/policy/hsi12-04_SearchSeizure_09.14.2012.pdf.

Immi-

gration officers receive training on what reasonable suspicion entails and are taught

to form reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances rather than

any particular facts or considerations in isolation. See D. Ct. Doc. 94-1, at 2-3 (July

14, 2025) (Quinones Decl.); 8 C.F.R. 287.1(g) (describing officers’ “[b]asic immigration

law enforcement training”); Search and Seizure Handbook 11.

B.

Proceedings Below

1.

The Los Angeles area is one of the most important regions for immigra-

tion enforcement in the country. According to estimates from Department of Homeland Security data, nearly 4 million illegal aliens are in California, and nearly 2 million are in the Central District of California. Los Angeles County alone had an estimated 951,000 illegal aliens as of 2019—by far the most of any county in the United

States. About 75 percent of those illegal aliens hail from Mexico, El Salvador, and

Guatemala. Migration Policy Inst., Profile of the Unauthorized Population: Los Angeles County, CA, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrantpopulation/county/6037. Illegal aliens form a significant proportion of California’s

workforce and are especially highly concentrated in certain sectors, such as agriculture, construction, food services, and transportation. See, e.g., Bay Area Council

Econ. Inst., The Economic Impact of Mass Deportation in California 24 (2025), https://

www.bayareaeconomy.org/files/pdf/EconomicImpactOfMassDeportation-June2025.pdf.

9

ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) field office for Los Angeles,

whose jurisdiction is coextensive with the Central District of California, comprises

“over 290 law enforcement officers in six offices who are responsible for enforcing

federal immigration laws in seven California counties with a combined population of

over 20 million people.” Quinones Decl. 2. Based on current estimates, illegal aliens

comprise about 10 percent of the entire Central District population. Thus, while the

previous administration carried out some 26,000 immigration arrests in the Central

District, those efforts did little to alter the broader dynamics of illegal aliens entering

the country and heading for the Central District, especially given its proximity to the

border with Mexico.

Complicating federal efforts further, in December 2024, the Los Angeles City

Council enacted a “sanctuary city” ordinance restricting Los Angeles law enforcement

and other personnel from cooperating with federal immigration enforcement or participating in such enforcement. L.A. Admin. Code § 19.190 et seq. (Ord. No. 188441).

For example, the law limits local officers’ ability to “[i]nquire into or collect information about an individual’s Citizenship or Immigration Status”; “[i]nvestigate, cite,

arrest, hold, transfer, or detain any person for the purpose of Immigration Enforcement”; or “[p]articipate in Immigration Enforcement in any operation, joint operation,

or joint task force involving any Immigration Agent.” § 19.191(a), (b), and (f ).

2.

In early June, ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) com-

menced efforts to intensify immigration enforcement in Los Angeles. See D. Ct. Doc.

94-2, at 3 (July 14, 2025) (Parra Decl.). Large crowds of protesters responded by

“thr[owing] ‘concrete chunks, bottles of liquid, and other objects’ at [federal] officers”

and launching “ ‘mortar-style fireworks with multiple explosions’ at them”; protesters

also “heavily vandalized” a federal building. See, e.g., Newsom v. Trump, 141 F.4th

10

1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2025) (per curiam). The President deployed the National Guard

to protect federal officers performing their duties. See id. at 1041-1042.

Despite these challenging conditions, from June 1 to mid-July, ERO “processed

approximately 2,805 immigration arrests and numerous criminal arrests in the Los

Angeles area.” Quinones Decl. 4. The Mayor of Los Angeles responded by describing

ICE’s enforcement activities as a “reign of terror.” Cheyanne M. Daniels, Mayor Bass

calls for end to ICE ‘reign of terror’ in Los Angeles, Politico (July 20, 2025),

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/20/karen-bass-ice-deployed-los-angeles-0046

4913. She directed all city departments to conduct trainings on compliance with the

sanctuary-city law and “to report any federal immigration enforcement activity on

City properties or facilities.” L.A. Exec. Directive No. 12 (July 11, 2025).

This case began on June 20, when three illegal aliens who were arrested in the

Los Angeles area filed a habeas corpus action in the United States District Court for

the Central District of California seeking their release from immigration detention.

D. Ct. Doc. 1. These three individual respondents work as day laborers; they were

arrested in Pasadena on June 18 in connection with “a targeted enforcement action

at a particular location” (a doughnut shop) “where past surveillance and intelligence

had confirmed that the target or individuals associated with him were observed to

have recruited illegal aliens to work on landscaping jobs.” Quinones Decl. 3; see Gov’t

C.A. Stay Mot. 4; App., infra, 11a-12a. All three have since been released from immigration detention on bond. App., infra, 13a-14a.

On July 2, respondents filed an amended class-action complaint adding two

U.S.-citizen individual plaintiffs and four organizational plaintiffs, plus several federal officials as defendants. D. Ct. Doc. 16. Respondents also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order on July 3. D. Ct. Doc. 45. Respondents’

11

filings vastly expanded the scope of the suit to challenge the government’s immigration-enforcement operations across the Los Angeles area. See D. Ct. Doc. 16, at 4-6.

As relevant here, respondents alleged that federal immigration officers “have adopted

a policy and practice of conducting immigration operations in violation of their obligation to stop individuals in public only if there is reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 13;

see id. at 58. Respondents in particular objected that ICE agents were targeting certain types of businesses, like car washes, which “past experiences have demonstrated”

are likely to employ illegal aliens. D. Ct. Doc. 71-2, at 3 (July 8, 2025); see D. Ct. Doc.

16, at 6, 13-15. Respondents also complained that agents “have conducted indiscriminate immigration operations, flooding street corners, bus stops, parking lots, agricultural sites, day laborer corners, and other places.” D. Ct. Doc. 16, at 4. The district

court gave the government two business days to respond to the TRO application and

held a hearing on July 10. See D. Ct. Dkt. 42 (July 3, 2025) (scheduling order).

3.

The next day, July 11, the district court granted respondents’ requested

TRO and enjoined federal agents from conducting any detentive stops anywhere

within the District without reasonable suspicion. App., infra, 62a-113a. The court

specified that the prohibition means agents cannot “rely solely” on apparent race or

ethnicity, use of Spanish or accented English, presence at a particular location, or

type of work, either “alone or in combination,” as grounds for reasonable suspicion.

Id. at 111a. The court acknowledged that there was no evidence of any official policy

authorizing stops solely on those bases, id. at 106a n.33, but inferred from anecdotal

evidence that immigration officers were engaged in a practice of stops based solely on

those four factors, id. at 100a-102a.

As to standing, the court reasoned that respondents “have standing for this

putative class action” based entirely on respondent Gavidia’s allegations that federal

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agents had detained and questioned him based on his ethnicity. App., infra, 95a-96a.

On the merits, the court concluded that respondents were likely to succeed on their

claim that the four factors respondents had identified could not suffice to establish

reasonable suspicion for a stop. See id. at 98a-106a. The court added that insofar as

agents relied on other factors, such as a suspect’s flight from federal officers, the government “do[e]s not show that they support reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 102a n.30.

As to the scope of relief, the court held that respondents were irreparably harmed by

the prospect of future detentive stops, and concluded that “to provide complete relief

to the named” respondents, the court “must enjoin the conduct of all law enforcement

engaged in immigration enforcement throughout” the entire Central District of California. Id. at 97a.

The district court accordingly enjoined the government “from conducting detentive stops in this District unless the agent or officer has reasonable suspicion that

the person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration

law.” App., infra, 111a. The order further provided that applicants, “except as permitted by law,” “may not rely solely on” the following four factors, “alone or in combination, to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop”:

•

“Apparent race or ethnicity”;

•

“Speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent”;

•

“Presence at a particular location (e.g. bus stop, car wash, tow yard, day

laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.)”; and

•

“The type of work one does.”

Ibid.

The district court denied applicants’ motion for a stay of the order pending

appeal. D. Ct. Doc. 108 (July 17, 2025). It scheduled a hearing on whether to issue

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a preliminary injunction for September 24, 2025, id. at 8, meaning the court’s order

will remain in effect for the foreseeable future.

4.

The court of appeals largely declined to stay the district court’s injunc-

tion pending appeal; the court only stayed one provision of the injunction authorizing

reliance on the four factors “as permitted by law,” which the court considered vague.

App., infra, 38a; see id. at 1a-61a. The court acknowledged the lack of “evidence of

an ‘official policy’ of making stops based only on the four factors and without reasonable suspicion,” but shared the district court’s view that officers “were routinely doing

so” by citing, for instance, public statements by a CBP official generally referring to

potential further enforcement operations in Los Angeles. Id. at 20a; see id. at 25a,

96a n.26.2

As to standing, the court of appeals held that all respondents could seek injunctive relief based on a “ ‘realistic threat’ ” that the individual respondents and

members of the associational respondents “will be stopped without reasonable suspicion” by immigration agents in the future. App., infra, 25a (brackets and citation

omitted); see id. at 22a-33a.

On the merits, the court concluded that the injunction “prohibit[s] sole reliance

on the four factors” identified by the district court but does “not prohibit reliance on

those factors in combination with unlisted factors.” App., infra, 40a-41a. The court

did, however, find the “except as permitted by law” clause to be vague, and granted a

stay as to that clause alone. Id. at 37a-39a, 61a.

The court then concluded that prohibiting the government from engaging in

The court of appeals also asserted that applicants “did not dispute that these

detentive stops have been based solely on the four enumerated factors,” App., infra,

21a, but that is incorrect—as the district court stated, “Defendants contest the idea

that they relied solely on these factors.” Id. at 101a.

2

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detentive stops based solely on the four enumerated factors comports with the Fourth

Amendment. App., infra, 39a-51a. The court held that such stops will never support

reasonable suspicion within the Central District of California, because “the four enumerated factors at issue * * * describe only a broad profile and ‘do not demonstrate

reasonable suspicion for any particular stop.’ ” Id. at 45a; see id. at 45a-51a. The

court added that, “[i]f future stops are based on additional, relevant facts” on top of

the four prohibited factors, “those scenarios will be unaffected by the TRO.” Id. at

41a. Yet the court then ruled out one particularly relevant factor, stating that additional knowledge obtained through an agent’s experience is categorically insufficient

to clear the reasonable-suspicion bar when paired with any or all of the prohibited

factors. See id. at 44a (“ ‘[E]xperience’ does not in itself serve as an independent factor

in the reasonable suspicion analysis.”) (citation omitted); id. at 47a (disallowing location-targeting based on agents’ “past experiences”).

The court of appeals also held that a district-wide injunction was appropriate.

App., infra, 51a-57a. The court described the scope-of-relief inquiry as “not whether

there is some conceivable injunction that is more tailored while providing equal relief,” but rather whether “ ‘no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the

trial court.’ ” Id. at 52a (citation omitted). The court concluded that although the

order provides relief to millions of nonparties, it is not an impermissible “universal”

injunction because it applies only in the Central District of California and because

“enjoining Defendants from stopping only the Plaintiffs would not afford the Plaintiffs

meaningful relief.” Id. at 53a-54a. Finally, the court found that the injunction did

not irreparably harm applicants, whereas a stay would substantially injure respondents. See id. at 57a-59a.

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ARGUMENT

Under Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651,

this Court may stay a preliminary injunction entered by a federal district court. See,

e.g., Brewer v. Landrigan, 562 U.S. 996 (2010); Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party,

555 U.S. 5 (2008) (per curiam). To obtain such relief, an applicant must show a likelihood of success on the merits, a reasonable probability of obtaining certiorari, and

a likelihood of irreparable harm. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010)

(per curiam). In “close cases,” “the Court will balance the equities and weigh the

relative harms.” Ibid. Those factors strongly support a stay here.

A.

The Government Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits

The district court upended immigration-enforcement efforts throughout the

entire Central District of California—a vast area encompassing some 20 million people and an estimated 2 million illegal aliens—by categorically enjoining immigration

officers from conducting investigative stops that rest solely on any combination of

four factors (i.e., a suspect’s apparent race or ethnicity; whether he speaks Spanish

or accented English; whether he is at a location where illegal aliens are known to

gather; and whether his job is prevalent among illegal aliens because of the lack of

documentation required). That legally flawed injunction warrants this Court’s review on several grounds. First, respondents—five individuals and four organizations—lack Article III standing to obtain an injunction barring investigative stops

based on the prohibited factors, because no respondent faces any immediate risk of

being subjected to such a stop. Second, the district court’s order contravenes bedrock

Fourth Amendment principles by imposing categorical rules that artificially limit inferences of reasonable suspicion, and by wrongly holding that the four factors—even

in combination—can never amount to reasonable suspicion. Finally, the scope of this

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injunction is plainly unlawful. By issuing an injunction encompassing anyone within

the Central District of California—an injunction encompassing potentially millions

of nonparties—the court defied Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025).3

1.

Respondents lack standing to seek injunctive relief restricting investigative stops for immigration enforcement

First, respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 412 (2013). To establish standing, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) that she has suffered or likely will suffer an

injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be caused by the defendant,

and (iii) that the injury likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief.”

FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380 (2024). Only “actual or imminent” injuries count, id. at 381—not allegations that are “too speculative” or merely

assert “ ‘possible future injury,’ ” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (citations omitted).

Here, respondents’ allegations are entirely speculative. They claim that ICE

has an unstated practice of relying on just four factors to supply reasonable suspicion

for immigration stops, and that those factors could describe broad swaths of the population. But respondents offer nothing to substantiate their premise that they—out

of the 20 million or so inhabitants of the Central District of California—would be

stopped again. Respondents and the courts below also acknowledge that ICE at least

sometimes relies on additional factors, and do not challenge stops that rely on the

four factors plus even one additional factor as lacking reasonable suspicion. See Resp.

The court of appeals correctly concluded that the district court’s order is

likely appealable despite its styling as a TRO. App., infra, 34a-35a. The order lasts

indefinitely; it was issued after briefing and an adversary hearing; the court’s “basis

for issuing the order is strongly challenged”; and the order imposes irreparable consequences in the meantime. Department of Educ. v. California, 145 S. Ct. 966, 968

(2025) (per curiam) (brackets and citation omitted).

3

17

C.A. Stay Opp. 17; App., infra, 40a-41a. That just aggravates the standing problem:

even if respondents were stopped in the future, they have no basis for alleging that

they would be stopped solely based on the four prohibited factors, not for some additional reasons.

a.

This Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983),

forecloses respondents’ past-is-prologue theory of standing. There, police officers

stopped the plaintiff for a traffic violation, seized him, and placed him in a chokehold.

Id. at 97. The Court held that, while the plaintiff could pursue a damages claim for

that past injury, he lacked standing for prospective relief because he had not shown

that “he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds by police

officers.” Id. at 105. There was no “immediate threat” that he would again be

“choke[d] * * * without any provocation or resistance on his part.” Ibid. That was

so even though the Court accepted that the police department had a policy of “routinely apply[ing] chokeholds in situations where they are not threatened by the use

of deadly force.” Ibid.

Respondents’ standing theory—particularly as embodied in the allegations by

respondent Gavidia, the sole plaintiff for whom the district court found standing, see

pp. 11-12, supra—is a redux of Lyons. As in Lyons, Gavidia alleges a past Fourth

Amendment injury from law enforcement. Compare D. Ct. Doc. 45-9, at 2-3 (July 3,

2025) (Gavidia allegedly stopped based on his “skin color”), with Lyons, 461 U.S. at

97-98. As in Lyons, Gavidia seeks prospective relief to enjoin the challenged practice

(here, reliance solely on the four factors in detentive stops). Compare App., infra,

111a, with Lyons, 461 U.S. at 99-100. And, as in Lyons, Gavidia cannot show standing because he has no basis beyond speculation to believe that he will be stopped

again without reasonable suspicion based solely on the four factors. “Absent a suffi-

18

cient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way,” he is “no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal court may

not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain

practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.

The remaining individual respondents even more clearly lack standing. Respondent Viramontes, for example, alleged that agents visited the carwash where he

works twice without stopping him, then detained him for about 20 minutes on their

third visit until they could verify his citizenship status. D. Ct. Doc. 45-4, at 1-2. That

single interaction provides no basis to believe Viramontes will be subject to any future

stops, let alone wrongful ones. For two other respondents, Perdomo and Molina, the

only specific “evidence” of their standing is respondent Perdomo’s “belie[f ]” that he

will be stopped again (D. Ct. Doc. 45-1, at 3) and respondent Molina’s “worr[y]” that

he will be arrested again for “look[ing] like an immigrant” (D. Ct. Doc. 45-3, at 3).

Subjective fear of a future allegedly illegal stop, however, “is not certainly impending”

and “cannot manufacture standing.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416.

The organizational respondents likewise lack standing to pursue prospective

injunctive relief. Associational standing requires proof (inter alia) that an organization’s “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right” and “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 398 (Thomas,

J., concurring) (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S.

333, 343 (1977)). But, just like the individual respondents, any risk of future harm

for the organizations’ members is speculative. See id. at 381 (citing Clapper, 568 U.S.

at 409). Absent any nonspeculative probability of injury to their members, the organizations lack standing. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which * * *

19

may not be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174

(1969); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-134 (1978).

b.

The lower courts attempted to brush Lyons away by emphasizing “a real

and immediate threat that the conduct complained of will continue.” App., infra, 96a;

see id. at 28a. But the courts failed to identify any realistic immediate threat to

respondents—the essence of the standing inquiry. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). It was insufficient in Lyons that the police department was

generally likely to continue to employ chokeholds; what mattered was whether the

plaintiff there would likely be subject to a chokehold again. So too here, it is insufficient that the lower courts deemed federal agents likely to continue a general, unstated policy of relying solely on the four factors. What matters is that respondents

cannot show they will likely be stopped and detained solely based on those factors

again. Indeed, respondents and the lower courts elsewhere all but admit as much by

alluding to other factors that federal officers sometimes rely on and acknowledging

that adding those factors to the mix would not present the same Fourth Amendment

problems. See, e.g., App., infra, 102a n.29 (acknowledging that “the surveillance and

intelligence data * * * share[d] with the agents” could give rise to reasonable suspicion but faulting the government for “fail[ing] to provide any concrete details” about

that sensitive law-enforcement data).

The lower courts attempted to paper over this gap by invoking circuit precedent holding that harm inflicted by “a pattern of officially sanctioned behavior” is

automatically likely to recur. App., infra, 25a (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d

990, 998 (9th Cir. 2012)). Never mind that, as the lower courts recognized, there is

no evidence of such an official policy. See id. at 20a (acknowledging “there being no

evidence of an ‘official policy’ of making stops based only on the four factors and with-

20

out reasonable suspicion”); id. at 106a n.33 (“Plaintiffs have not pointed to any ‘official’ policy that authorizes or ratifies the alleged ‘roving patrols’ for purposes of this

TRO.”). Even if the record were otherwise, Lyons rejected the court of appeals’ reasoning. Lyons accepted arguendo allegations that “police officers, ‘pursuant to the

authorization, instruction and encouragement of [d]efendant City of Los Angeles, regularly and routinely appl[ied]’ ” the chokeholds that the plaintiff sued to enjoin. 461

U.S. at 98; see id. at 113-114 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that “[t]he complaint clearly alleges that the officer who choked Lyons was carrying out an official

policy”). Nonetheless, Lyons dismissed as irrelevant to standing whether the plaintiff

“seeks to enjoin only an ‘established,’ ‘sanctioned’ police practice assertedly violative

of constitutional rights.” 461 U.S. at 108. The Court explained that, “to have a case

or controversy with the City that could sustain [his claim for injunctive relief ], Lyons

would have to credibly allege that he faced a realistic threat from the future application of the City’s policy.” Id. at 107 n.7 (emphasis added).

This Court reinforced the point in Clapper. The plaintiffs there challenged a

statutorily authorized surveillance program—a quintessential type of established,

sanctioned program—but their assertion of “an objectively reasonable likelihood that

their communications will be acquired under [that program] at some point in the future * * * [wa]s too speculative to satisfy the well-established requirement that

threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending.’ ” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401 (citation

omitted). Otherwise, under the lower courts’ meritless approach, whenever a plaintiff

alleges an “officially sanctioned” pattern or policy, he would have standing to seek to

enjoin, say, a small-scale ICE program that would result in detentive questioning of

a mere 100 Los Angeles residents per year, even though that plaintiff faced a vanishingly small chance of ever being affected by that program. Plaintiffs cannot circum-

21

vent the imminent-injury requirement just by alleging a pattern or policy.

The court of appeals also suggested that the individual respondents themselves, and at least some members of the organizational respondents, face an imminent threat of injury based on pure statistical inference. Because respondents are

sufficiently numerous, and the enforcement action is sufficiently “high-volume,” the

court projected some overlap between the former and the latter. See App., infra, 28a,

30a-31a (comparing immigration agents’ “high-volume, District-wide practice” with

the organizational plaintiffs’ “large scale of * * * Los Angeles-area memberships”).

But this Court has never accepted such a statistical-probability theory of standing,

particularly when the numbers involve thousands of unidentified organizational

members across the entirety of California who assert some risk of being detained by

immigration officers in a district populated by 20 million people. Id. at 14a, 16a, 18a.

On the contrary, this Court has held that organizational standing based on the mere

“statistical probability that some of [the organization’s thousands of ] members are

threatened with concrete injury” would “make a mockery of [the Court’s] prior cases,”

and it has instead required specific, concrete allegations of harm to one or more “identified member[s]” of an organizational plaintiff. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555

U.S. 488, 498 (2009) (emphasis added).

Further, this “statistical probability” approach to standing contradicts respondents’ theory of the merits. Respondents—and the lower courts—cannot have it

both ways: to the extent “the four factors establish only a ‘broad profile’ ” that encompasses too many people to justify individualized reasonable suspicion for Fourth

Amendment purposes, App., infra, 41a; but see pp. 30-31, infra, it is unclear why any

particular member of the large relevant population would have a nonspeculative likelihood of being encountered and detained again. Cf. Quinones Decl. 4 (noting ICE

22

ERO’s processing of about “2,805 immigration arrests” from June to mid-July).

Even if respondents had a nonspeculative prospect of being stopped again in

the future, they have made no showing whatsoever that they would likely be stopped

on the basis prohibited by the injunction—i.e., based solely on the four enumerated

reasonable-suspicion factors, to the exclusion of any of the myriad other factors on

which an agent might rely. The court of appeals thus wrongly found it “significant”

that a single anonymous individual has allegedly been stopped “twice.” App., infra,

26a. That only one anonymous person was stopped twice undercuts respondents’ theory of recurrent stops. Moreover, the court of appeals failed to analyze whether either

stop (much less both) lacked reasonable suspicion (much less was predicated on the

prohibited factors). All agree that any future stops that included even one additional

factor would not fall within the injunction—yet no one has offered any basis to think

that the same individual will be stopped for the same purportedly impermissible reasons, and only those reasons, in any future stop. “Absent a sufficient likelihood that

[they] will again be wronged in a similar way,” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (emphasis

added), respondents cannot establish standing to seek an injunction.

2.

The district court grossly misapplied the Fourth Amendment

Jurisdiction aside, the district court’s injunction also misapprehends the

Fourth Amendment by placing under judicial supervision all immigration-enforcement stops within the Central District and subjecting every such encounter between

agents and potential illegal aliens to the threat of contempt.

Under the injunction, federal immigration officials “may not rely solely on” four

factors, “alone or in combination, to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop” of

any of the nearly 20 million people in the Central District of California. App., infra,

111a. Those factors are: “[a]pparent race or ethnicity”; “[s]peaking Spanish or speak-

23

ing English with an accent”; “[p]resence at a particular location (e.g. bus stop, car

wash, tow yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.)”; or “[t]he type of work

one does.” Ibid. As the court of appeals confirmed, that injunction further bars consideration of officers’ experience in connection with the enumerated factors—for example, experience “ ‘demonstrat[ing] that illegal aliens utilize or seek work at the[]

locations’ ” or that certain jobs are “more often performed by illegal immigrants than

are other jobs”—because in the lower courts’ view, past experience never adds anything to the calculus. Id. at 43a; see id. at 50a n.13, 105a. The injunction contravenes

blackletter Fourth Amendment doctrine, which embraces a totality-of-the-circumstances, noncategorical approach that recognizes that the strength of particular factors may vary in context and that factors in combination can supply reasonable suspicion even if they do not individually.

a.

The Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and

seizures “extend[s] to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of

traditional arrest,” including stops of individuals suspected of being in the United

States illegally. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). By virtue of “the

limited nature of the intrusion,” however, “stops of this sort may be justified on facts

that do not amount to the probable cause required for an arrest.” United States v.

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975). Instead, an officer may conduct such a stop

based on reasonable suspicion—supported by “specific articulable facts, together with

rational inferences from those facts”—that a person is an illegal alien. Id. at 884; see

8 C.F.R. 287.8(b)(2). Reasonable suspicion requires only “ ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop,” a standard that is “obviously less demanding than that for probable cause,” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citation omitted)—which is itself “not a high bar,” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320,

24

338 (2014). Given that probable cause “is something more than a bare suspicion, but

need not reach the fifty percent mark,” reasonable suspicion requires even less certainty. See United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,

530 U.S. 1222 (2000).

The reasonable-suspicion inquiry “turn[s] on the totality of the particular circumstances.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 n.10; see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. By

definition, no particular circumstantial factor is categorically off-limits—whether

that factor is a person’s appearance, behavior, or the officer’s past experience with

the particular offense, location, or suspect. See, e.g., Quinones Decl. 3 (collecting examples of reasonable-suspicion factors in the immigration-enforcement context).

Reasonable suspicion is accordingly context-dependent and cannot be reduced to per

se rules that treat certain factors as categorically insufficient. Indeed, this Court has

repeatedly reversed decisions imposing such rules. In Arvizu, this Court rejected as

too rigid the court of appeals’ framework deeming seven particular factors as

“carr[ying] little or no weight in the reasonable-suspicion calculus.” 534 U.S. at 272;

see id. at 274. In Sokolow, the Court rejected a rule allowing officers to rely on certain

evidence of “ongoing criminal behavior” but not “probabilistic” evidence. 490 U.S. at

8. And in United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003), this Court similarly rejected a

reticulated judicial framework governing the police’s entry into a residence after

knocking and announcing their presence. Id. at 34, 41-42.

b.

The district court’s injunction contravenes those basic principles.

i.

To begin, the injunction ignores this Court’s repeated instructions by

categorically barring immigration officers in the Central District of California from

forming reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop based on the four enumerated

factors. App., infra, 111a. The court of appeals denied that the district court’s in-

25

junction “create[s] a categorical rule,” noting that it applies only in the Central District of California and does not prohibit stops based on the four enumerated factors

in conjunction with others. Id. at 41a. Those responses are non sequiturs. A categorical rule for a district the size of a small country is still categorical. So is a rule

providing that stops based solely on four identified factors are never permissible.

This Court considered the rule in Arvizu categorical because the Ninth Circuit refused to consider seven factors as relevant to reasonable suspicion; it was irrelevant

there that other factors might support a stop. 534 U.S. at 272-273.

The court of appeals defended the injunction’s categorical approach by contending that “[c]ourts routinely assess specific groupings of factors to determine whether

those factors together give rise to reasonable suspicion,” then apply that holding

across like circumstances. App., infra, 42a. But courts cannot convert those like

circumstances into a per se rule prohibiting particular factors from supporting reasonable suspicion as to any one of millions of people just based on ipse dixit, least of

all when the relevant circumstances themselves can vary (e.g., one suspect may not

speak English at all and be at a workplace known to have hired 100 illegal aliens the

prior week; another may simply be bilingual at a workplace known to have hired one

illegal alien years ago). Nor does the court of appeals’ cited authority, Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), hold otherwise. Ornelas simply observes that

different cases can occasionally, despite the intensely fact-dependent nature of the

reasonableness inquiry, turn on the same specific factors and require the same result.

See id. at 698; see ibid. (comparing two cases in both of which “the defendant traveled

under an assumed name; paid for an airline ticket in cash with a number of small

bills; traveled from Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; and appeared nervous in the

airport”). Ornelas was not referring to broadly framed factors like “location” and

26

“type of work,” App., infra, 111a, and does not endorse broad categorical limitations

of the kind imposed here. In Arvizu, this Court warned against similar overextension

of “the reasoning of Ornelas.” 534 U.S. at 275. The injunction exemplifies the kind

of categorical and discretion-limiting framework that “runs counter to [this Court’s]

cases and underestimates the usefulness of the reasonable-suspicion standard in

guiding officers in the field.” Ibid.

ii.

The injunction also violates basic Fourth Amendment principles and

common sense in evaluating the relevancy of the four factors here. Here, the question

is what constitutes reasonable suspicion for illegal presence in the United States—a

status that renders that alien subject to detention and removal under the INA, and a

status shared by an estimated 10 percent of the population of the Central District of

California, or about 2 million people within the district. In that context, the four

factors enumerated in the district court’s injunction are plainly relevant. To take one

example, if officers know based on their experience or past enforcement history that

a particular business has a history of employing illegal aliens and has, for instance,

been cited 20 times for failing to verify employees’ identification, officers may well

have reasonable suspicion to stop people gathering to seek employment there, especially given the concentration of illegal aliens in the Central District. See, e.g., United

States v. Montrero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (describing relevance of location to reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 889 (2000).

Similarly, if agents know that particular jobs are attractive to illegal aliens

because they do not require documentation or verification, that too can support reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Holder, 763 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2014)

(noting that day labor is “an occupation that is one of the limited options for workers

without documents”). The district court practically acknowledged as much by identi-

27

fying specific jobs and locations that are often associated with illegal aliens. E.g.,

App., infra, 111a (referring to “day laborer pick up site[s]”). Thus, if officers know

from past experience that illegal aliens seeking construction jobs congregate in a particular parking lot to meet prospective employers, they may well have reasonable

suspicion for investigative stops of non-English-speaking persons congregated there.

Likewise, apparent ethnicity can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion

in appropriate circumstances—for instance, if agents know that the members of a

criminal organization under investigation are disproportionately members of one ethnic group—even if it would not be relevant in other circumstances. See BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. at 885-886 (“apparent Mexican ancestry” did not “alone” supply reasonable suspicion). And, in context, officers might reasonably rely on the fact that

someone exclusively speaks Spanish to support reasonable suspicion that the person

is here illegally, not least because a disproportionate percentage of illegal aliens in

the Central District speak Spanish and do not speak English fluently or at all. See,

e.g., United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2006) (fact that group

was “speaking to each other only in Spanish” was “relevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry”). All of this reflects common sense: the reasonable-suspicion threshold

is low, and the number of people who are illegally present and subject to detention

and removal under the immigration laws in the Central District is extraordinarily

high and starts off at a 1 in 10 probability just among the general population. In that

context, the four factors at issue—especially when most illegal aliens in the Central

District hail from Mexico and Central America, often speak Spanish exclusively, and

seek out jobs that do not require documentation—can obviously support reasonable

suspicion for a brief investigative stop in at least some circumstances.

The lower courts instead wrongly dismissed the four factors (individually or

28

collectively) as categorically insufficient to supply reasonable suspicion in this context. The courts ticked off the four factors listed in the injunction, deemed each one

only marginally probative of reasonable suspicion, and then concluded that “[e]ven

taken together, the four enumerated factors describe only a ‘broad profile’ that does

not supply the reasonable suspicion required to justify a detentive stop.” App., infra,

48a (quoting Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 939); see id. at 103a-104a.

Just because the four factors may not supply reasonable suspicion in some circumstances, however, does not mean they will never do so. Take Manzo-Jurado,

which the lower courts relied on heavily. App., infra, 45a-50a, 101a-105a. There, the

Ninth Circuit gave little weight to the suspects’ location (a football stadium in Montana) and work-crew status because their particular location and employer were not

associated with illegal aliens—not because those factors can never combine to establish reasonable suspicion. 457 F.3d at 936, 938. By contrast, in Maldonado, the Second Circuit declined to suppress evidence from a stop in a park where groups of Latinos were known to gather to “to offer themselves for day labor, an occupation that

is one of the limited options for workers without documents.” 763 F.3d at 161; see id.

at 160.

Here, that the four factors—even in combination—might describe a “broad profile” is inevitable and unremarkable, given that 10 percent of the population in the

Central District, some 2 million people, are illegally present in the United States. See

pp. 8-9, supra. Again, reasonable suspicion is a low bar—lower than probable cause—

and the high prevalence of illegal aliens should enable agents to stop a relatively

broad range of individuals (even if the probability of any particular person actually

being stopped remains low, as discussed above). “[A] large segment” of the relevant

population is engaged in violating the law, and an even larger portion may validly

29

trigger reasonable suspicion—a standard that requires far less than 50-percent certainty. App., infra, 50a; see Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. By ignoring the context-dependent nature of the Fourth Amendment standard, the lower courts categorically dismissed factors that are relevant to this basis for detentive stops in this jurisdiction.

See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696.

Further, the lower courts wrongly dismissed the four factors in combination.

Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, requires consideration of “the sum total of

layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they

know, and what they observe as trained officers,” not particular factors in isolation.

Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.), cert. denied,

368 U.S. 1008 (1967). Yet, here, the district court’s injunction forecloses officers from

conducting even highly targeted stops based on factors that would not apply to most

of the population: for instance, the injunction forecloses reasonable suspicion to stop

an individual observed at length speaking exclusively Spanish, wearing the uniform

of an employer known to employ illegal aliens, and shopping at a business known to

be frequented by illegal aliens—simply because suspicion in such a case would be

furnished by the suspect’s language, job type, and location. On top of that, the injunction bars consideration of officers’ experience in connection with the enumerated

factors. App., infra, 43a, 50a n.13; see id. at 105a; cf. Quinones Decl. 3 (three original

respondents apprehended in connection with “a targeted enforcement action at a particular location where past surveillance and intelligence had confirmed that the target or individuals associated with him were observed to have recruited illegal aliens

to work on landscaping jobs”). That drastically raises the reasonable-suspicion bar

and defies the commonsense, totality-of-the-circumstances approach that governs investigative stops. That certain factors “alone” may be too generalized—e.g., Hispanic

30

ethnicity, the factor solely relied upon in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-886—does

not mean that the factors are always so “in combination.” App., infra, 5a, 111a. The

lower courts thus grievously misinterpreted the Fourth Amendment to invent improper limitations on reasonable suspicion.

3.

The Central District-wide injunction vastly exceeds the district court’s equitable powers

If nothing else, the district court’s grant of district-wide relief flagrantly violates this Court’s recent holding in CASA, forbidding the issuance of universal (i.e.,

non-party-specific) injunctions. The district court did not merely enjoin the government from detaining respondents without reasonable suspicion; it enjoined the government from conducting such stops of any of the 20 million people within the Nation’s most populous federal judicial district. That extreme mismatch between respondents’ asserted injuries and the district court’s universal relief flouts CASA,

which the lower courts barely addressed. See, e.g., App., infra, 91a n.21 (obliquely

acknowledging “the Supreme Court’s recent holding that district courts do not have

equitable power to issue a ‘universal injunction’ ”).

a.

In CASA, this Court held that the statutory grant of jurisdiction over

suits “ ‘in equity’ ” “encompasses only those sorts of equitable remedies ‘traditionally

accorded by courts of equity’ at our country’s inception.” 145 S. Ct. at 2551 (citations

omitted); see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527

U.S. 308, 319 (1999). “Neither the universal injunction nor any analogous form of

relief was available * * * at the time of the founding.” CASA, 145 S. Ct. at 2551.

Rather, “suits in equity were brought by and against individual parties.” Ibid. At

most, a court granting equitable relief “may administer complete relief between the

parties.” Id. at 2557 (citation omitted). Thus, “the question is not whether an injunc-

31

tion offers complete relief to everyone potentially affected by an allegedly unlawful

act; it is whether an injunction will offer complete relief to the plaintiffs before the

court.” Ibid. Even then, “[c]omplete relief is not a guarantee—it is the maximum a

court can provide.” Id. at 2558.

The district court’s injunction violates those limits on federal courts’ equitable

powers. Under CASA, any injunctive relief should have applied only to named respondents. Instead, the district court broadly enjoined applicants “from conducting

detentive stops in this District unless the agent or officer has reasonable suspicion

that the person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law,” defining reasonable suspicion to preclude sole reliance on the four factors. App., infra, 111a. The district court was not shy about the ultimate scope of its

order: its intent was avowedly to “enjoin the conduct of all law enforcement engaged

in immigration enforcement throughout the District.” Id. at 97a. That injunction

triggers all the classic problems with universal injunctions that CASA warned

against. By covering millions of nonparties, this injunction broadly “halt[s] the enforcement of federal policy” across the Nation’s most populous District. CASA, 145

S. Ct. at 2559. The inevitable disruptions necessitate emergency appellate relief.

And the district court’s micromanagement of Executive Branch policy and enforcement decisions effects an intolerable transfer of core executive functions to the Judiciary, generating needless and avoidable interbranch friction. See id. at 2561.

b.

The lower courts defended the scope of this injunction as “only District-

wide and not nationwide,” App., infra, 91a n.21; see id. at 53a-54a, but that misses

the point. Whether the injunction extends to the entire population of the United

States or merely the 20 million residents of the Central District of California, the

injunction goes well beyond providing complete relief to respondents.

32

The court of appeals went far astray starting with the basic legal standards.

The court conditioned the government’s ability to obtain relief on “establish[ing] that

‘no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court’ ” as to the scope

of the injunction. App, infra, at 52a. But “[a] district court by definition abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law,” such as ignoring an authoritative holding

of this Court. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). The court then went so

far as to say that the inquiry cannot even consider whether there is an “injunction

that is more tailored while providing equal relief .” App., infra, 52a. That too is

wrong. “A plaintiff ’s remedy must be tailored to redress the plaintiff ’s particular

injury,” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 73 (2018), and “no more burdensome to the

defendant than necessary” to provide such redress, Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.

682, 702 (1979). Hence, this Court in CASA directed the lower courts on remand to

consider “whether a narrower injunction is appropriate.” 145 S. Ct. at 2558. Fashioning injunctive relief of appropriate scope is the first duty of courts sitting in equity,

not an irrelevant sideshow.

The lower courts also justified the injunction’s breadth on the ground that “it

would be a fantasy to expect that law enforcement could and would inquire whether

a given individual was” a plaintiff in this case “before proceeding with a seizure,”

citing only a pre-CASA circuit case arising in a completely different factual context.

App., infra, 97a; see id. at 54a (similar). But other courts have granted party-limited

injunctions in similar contexts. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 557 (6th

Cir. 2023) (“Because an injunction limited to the parties can adequately protect the

plaintiffs’ interests while the case is pending disposition on the merits, the district

court abused its discretion in extending the preliminary injunction’s protection to

non-party contractors in the plaintiff States.”); Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Reli-

33

gious Soc’y of Friends v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 767 F. Supp. 3d 293,

336 (D. Md. 2025) (“Plaintiffs have provided no basis to conclude that they could not

provide to DHS, for purposes of enforcement of the injunction, a list of the locations

of their places of worship and of other sites at which they may hold their worship

services.”). Otherwise, a single plaintiff challenging similar law-enforcement practices could invariably get district-wide (or presumably even broader) relief. Under

that rule, federal courts would once again “exercise general oversight of the Executive

Branch” in a manner this Court deemed—just weeks ago—to “exceed [their] power.”

CASA, 145 S. Ct. at 2562.

The court of appeals was particularly concerned that “a list-of-protected-people

injunction” could not realistically or appropriately “include all of the members of the

plaintiff associations.” App., infra, 55a. If accurate, that is a feature, not a bug:

courts may not grant relief to members who were not identified in the complaint and

who did not agree to be bound by an adverse judgment. See FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 399, 403 (2024) (Thomas, J., concurring). On the contrary, to establish standing in the first place, organizational plaintiffs must “make

specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member has suffered

harm,” and “[t]his requirement of naming the affected members has never been dispensed with in light of statistical probabilities.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 498-99 (emphasis added). In any event, the court of appeals failed to grapple with the experience

of courts that have effectively tailored injunctive relief to only the organizational parties actually before them. See p. 32, supra. And any inconvenience of applying the

injunction on an associational basis follows directly from the fundamental unlawfulness of granting relief to a vast number of unidentified members, contrary to this

Court’s instructions in Summers, 555 U.S. at 498-499. Nothing in the record suggests

34

that it would be impracticable or unworkable to limit injunctive relief to the parties.

Cf., e.g., Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th Cir.) (holding that a district court

“appropriately tailored” and “properly limited” injunctive relief against retaliatory

prison practices “to just six inmates”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001).

B.

The Remaining Stay Factors Support Relief

In deciding whether to grant emergency relief, this Court also considers

whether the underlying issues warrant its review; whether the applicant likely faces

irreparable harm; and, in close cases, the balance of the equities. See Hollingsworth,

558 U.S. at 190. Those factors tilt decisively in favor of a stay here.

1.

This Court would likely grant certiorari

The issues presented in this application manifestly warrant this Court’s review

under its traditional certiorari criteria. See John Does 1-3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17, 18

(2021) (Barrett, J., concurring in the denial of application for injunctive relief ). To

start, this Court often grants review when lower courts contravene this Court’s precedent, and the decisions below do so in spades, violating this Court’s foundational

precedents on individual standing, organizational standing, Fourth Amendment

principles, and the scope of injunctive relief. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). Indeed, the Court

has repeatedly granted certiorari to review (and reversed) Ninth Circuit decisions

that limited consideration of the totality of circumstances in Fourth Amendment

analysis. See, e.g., Banks, 540 U.S. at 41-42; p. 24, supra.

This Court has also consistently granted stays when lower courts unduly interfered with enforcement of the immigration laws, which the Constitution and federal statutes commit to the Executive Branch. See, e.g., Noem v. Doe, 145 S. Ct. 1524

(2025) (granting stay of district-court order enjoining categorical revocation of parole

for aliens); Noem v. National TPS Alliance, No. 24A1059, 2025 WL 1427560 (May 19,

35

2025) (granting stay of district-court order barring partial termination of temporary

protected status for Venezuelan nationals); Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019)

(granting stay of district-court order enjoining the Department of Defense from undertaking any border-wall construction using funding the Acting Secretary transferred pursuant to statutory authority); see also INS v. Legalization Assistance Project, 510 U.S. 1301, 1305-1306 (1993) (O’Connor, J., in chambers) (granting stay of

district-court order requiring INS to engage in certain immigration procedures, as

“an improper intrusion by a federal court into the workings of a coordinate branch of

the Government”). This case fits that bill. The Los Angeles area is a crucial priority

for immigration enforcement where millions of aliens have broken the law and remain illegally. Yet the injunction has thrown a central element of immigration enforcement—investigative stops—into intolerable uncertainty.

2.

The district court’s order inflicts irreparable harm on the

government

The injunction inflicts irreparable harm on the government and public, whose

interests “merge” here, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Most immediately,

the district court’s order irreparably harms the government by thwarting enforcement of the immigration laws in a critically important region containing about 2 million illegal aliens. “The problems posed * * * by illegal immigration,” from “ ‘crime’ ”

and “ ‘safety risks’ ” to the consumption of limited public resources, “must not be underestimated.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012) (citation omitted).

Because illegal aliens “create significant economic and social problems” and are

“themselves * * * vulnerable to exploitation because they cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation,” “the public interest demands effective measures to prevent the illegal entry of aliens.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422

36

U.S. at 878-879. “To implement its immigration policy, the Government must be able

to decide (1) who may enter the country and (2) who may stay here after entering.”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018). Preventing the Executive Branch

from implementing a major enforcement priority and effectuating the immigration

laws Congress enacted constitutes irreparable harm. The universal injunction here

also inflicts irreparable harm by supplanting the political Branches’ judgments and

intruding on the separation of powers. See CASA, 145 S. Ct. at 2561.

Further, the injunction gravely chills enforcement efforts by improperly threatening federal officers with contempt and extensive judicial second-guessing even if

they comply with its terms. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (noting

the “public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority”) (citation omitted). Under federal law, the government conducts investigative stops of suspected illegal aliens only where officers have reasonable suspicion based on specific

articulable facts. See 8 C.F.R. 287.8(b)(2); Quinones Decl. 2-3; Parra Decl. 5-6. But

the injunction deters officers from stopping suspects even when they have reasonable

suspicion on other grounds to believe the individual is here illegally. As ICE and CBP

officials explained below, the injunction “fails to provide clear instructions to the Defendant law enforcement agencies as to how reasonable suspicion must be developed

going forward, how the enumerated factors such as location or employment can be

used under the [injunction] and what additional information, if any, would be needed

if those factors are used.” Quinones Decl. 4. Uncertainty over how the court might

later view an agent’s reliance on a mix of factors will “likely cause hesitation and

delay in the field, which in turn increases the risk of assaults on officers, escalations

during volatile encounters, and injuries to both officers and the public, particularly

in the already high-risk and unpredictable environment of Los Angeles.” Parra Decl.

37

4; cf. International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 389

U.S. 64, 76 (1967) (“The judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When it is

founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly one.”).

The court of appeals dismissed these concerns by stating that “[t]he TRO does

not expose Defendants to the threat of contempt when they make a stop based on

other factors—even if a court later concludes that Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop.” App., infra, 39a. And the courts below contended that the injunction does not harm the government because it merely bars agents from violating

the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 57a-58a, 108a-109a. But those rejoinders are empty

assurances. They rest on a misapprehension of the Fourth Amendment, and they

overlook that agents will obviously be deterred from conducting stops when they may

have to show after the fact that they relied on other factors, above and beyond the

four factors the lower courts deemed insufficient. Exposing agents to such judicial

micromanagement places extraordinary burdens on agents and will inevitably deter

valid investigative stops.

Illustrating—and vastly compounding—the problem, the court of appeals

preemptively concluded that a detentive stop relying on (any or all of ) the four prohibited factors plus additional knowledge obtained through the agent’s experience remains prohibited by the injunction—and thus subject to the threat of contempt. See

App., infra, 44a (“ ‘[E]xperience’ does not in itself serve as an independent factor in

the reasonable suspicion analysis.” (citation omitted)); id. at 47a (disallowing location-targeting based on agents’ “ ‘past experiences’ ” due to a purported lack of “evidence * * * that any of the public places or types of businesses they are targeting are

used exclusively, or even predominantly, by individuals illegally in the country”).

And it is anyone’s guess, based on that reasoning, what other factors might get rolled

38

into the four prohibited factors. The only safe harbor for an immigration agent in the

Central District of California would be to ignore the apparent race or ethnicity, language, location, and occupation of a suspected illegal alien—and thus to ignore factors

that may often support reasonable suspicion in context.

The contempt-trap risk is no mere hypothetical, and the prospect of interbranch friction is extraordinary. The district court has already directed the government to show cause why the government should not be further enjoined—by, for instance, being compelled to engage in court-supervised training of ICE officers; to develop “guidance” on reasonable suspicion; and (remarkably) to maintain and share

with respondents’ counsel, on a “regular schedule,” “documentation of detentive

stops” showing “factors supporting reasonable suspicion.” App., infra, 112a. The upshot of such flyspecking will be to overwhelm agents with onerous oversight and increase the risk of judicial second-guessing on pain of contempt until enforcement efforts are greatly curtailed. The court of appeals’ assurance that the district court’s

injunctive oversight “does not expose Defendants to the threat of contempt,” id. at

39a, rings hollow in light of this preview of coming injunctive actions.

3.

The balance of the equities weighs in the government’s favor

On the other side of the ledger, respondents’ asserted harms rehash their

flawed theories of standing and the merits and rest on conjecture that they will again

be stopped in alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. App., infra, 36a;

see id. at 107a. But irreparable harm requires a showing that immediate, concrete

injury is “likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Respondents’ allegations of past injury cannot show irreparable harm or provide an adequate basis for the “imposition of systemwide relief.”

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 359 (1996). Even if another future stop were reasonably

39

likely, moreover, the district court’s injunction is not designed to prevent such a stop

because it permits investigative stops that are based on more than the enumerated

four factors. The probability of any respondent being subjected to a future stop based

solely on those four factors is even lower. Because respondents cannot even show

Article III standing to seek an injunction, they necessarily cannot show irreparable

harm sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed

Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 162 (2010).

Nor do respondents need a sweeping injunction to protect them from speculative future stops. The Fourth Amendment already applies by its own terms to all

law-enforcement actions, and existing law already provides remedies for violations,

including monetary damages for wrongful detentions where appropriate. See generally Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). Those existing remedies suffice to protect

both respondents’ interests and the public interest. Isolated past interactions are no

basis for a universal, forward-looking injunction.

The district court egregiously

erred—and needlessly upended immigration enforcement in the most populous district in the country—by concluding otherwise.

C.

An Administrative Stay Is Warranted

The Solicitor General also respectfully requests that this Court grant an administrative stay of the district court’s July 11 order while the Court considers this

application. Every day that the district court’s order remains in effect, law-enforcement officers throughout the most populous district in the country are laboring under

the threat of judicial contempt, daunted by the prospect that their good-faith efforts

to enforce federal law will be retrospectively deemed to violate a far-reaching, unlawful, and ill-defined injunction. In these circumstances, an administrative stay is warranted while this Court assesses the government’s entitlement to a stay.

40

CONCLUSION

This Court should stay the district court’s July 11 order enjoining applicants

from conducting detentive investigative stops in the Central District of California

based on the four enumerated reasonable-suspicion factors. In addition, the Solicitor

General respectfully requests an immediate administrative stay of the district court’s

order pending the Court’s consideration of this application.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

AUGUST 2025

APPENDIX

Court of appeals order denying stay pending appeal (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) ........... 1a

District court order granting temporary restraining order

(C.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) ...................................................................................... 62a

1a

FILED

FOR PUBLICATION

AUG 1 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEDRO VASQUEZ PERDOMO et al.,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 25-4312

D.C. No.

25-cv-05605

v.

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, Department of

Homeland Security, et al.,

ORDER

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 28, 2025

San Francisco, California

Before: Ronald M. Gould, Marsha S. Berzon, and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

On June 6, 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents and officers were

sent to join officers from the Enforcement and Removal Operations directorate of

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to carry out “Operation At Large” in

Los Angeles, California. According to Defendants, this operation involves “contact

teams” that “typical[ly] . . . consist of three to five agents who contact individuals

in public places such as streets, sidewalks, and publicly accessible portions of

2a

businesses.” Defendants further explain, “Certain types of businesses, including

carwashes, were selected for [contact team] encounters because past experience

demonstrated that they are likely to employ persons without legal documentation.

During operations in Los Angeles, [federal] agents temporarily detained

individuals, and made arrests for immigration violations and federal criminal

statutes.”

Plaintiffs refer to these contact teams as “roving patrols” and allege they have

detained individuals without reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth

Amendment’s safeguard against unreasonable seizures by the government.

To give just one example, Plaintiff Jason Brian Gavidia is a U.S. citizen who

was born and raised in East Los Angeles and identifies as Latino. On the afternoon

of June 12, he stepped onto the sidewalk outside of a tow yard in Montebello,

California, where he saw agents carrying handguns and military-style rifles. One

agent ordered him to “Stop right there” while another “ran towards [him].” The

agents repeatedly asked Gavidia whether he is American—and they repeatedly

ignored his answer: “I am an American.” The agents asked Gavidia what hospital

he was born in—and he explained that he did not know which hospital. “The

agents forcefully pushed [Gavidia] up against the metal gated fence, put [his]

hands behind [his] back, and twisted [his] arm.” An agent asked again, “What

hospital were you born in?” Gavidia again explained that he did not know which

2

3a

hospital and said “East L.A.” He then told the agents he could show them his Real

ID. The agents took Gavidia’s ID and his phone and kept his phone for 20 minutes.

They never returned his ID.

On July 3, Plaintiffs filed an application for a temporary restraining order,

which Defendants opposed. After a hearing, the district court determined that

Plaintiffs had shown they are likely to succeed in proving that seizures requiring—

but not supported by—reasonable suspicion have occurred as part of Operation At

Large in Los Angeles, and that Defendants have authorized or approved that

practice. The district court issued the requested TRO on July 11.

On July 17, Defendants filed an emergency motion for a stay pending their

appeal of the TRO.1 Defendants focus their arguments on Plaintiffs’ standing to

seek equitable relief and the terms and scope of the TRO. For the following

reasons, we deny Defendants’ motion for a stay except as to a single clause.

I. BACKGROUND

In this putative class action, five individual plaintiffs and three membership

associations allege that Defendants, twelve senior federal officials who share

responsibility for directing federal immigration enforcement in the Los Angeles

area, “have an ongoing policy, pattern, and/or practice of conducting detentive

1

Defendants filed their first emergency motion for a stay pending appeal on

July 14. We denied that motion without prejudice for failure to comply with

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(2)(A).

3

4a

stops in [the Central District of California] without reasonable suspicion that the

person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration

law, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment.” Plaintiffs allege that government

agents are engaging in these “unlawful stop and arrest practices” when conducting

roving patrols and other immigration enforcement operations throughout the

Central District.2

2

Plaintiffs contend that these practices stem in part from an official target of

3,000 arrests per day by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

During oral argument, we asked Defendants’ counsel whether the federal

government has a policy of directing ICE field offices to make 3,000 arrests or

deportations per day—whether that directive may come from ICE, the President, or

some other official in the administration. Defense counsel replied that he was

aware of no such policy. We asked him to look into the matter and submit a 28(j)

letter with an answer.

Defendants submitted a 28(j) letter, which states:

In response to the Court’s inquiry at oral argument, DHS has

confirmed that neither ICE leadership nor its field offices have been

directed to meet any numerical quota or target for arrests, detentions,

removals, field encounters, or any other operational activities that ICE

or its components undertake in the course of enforcing federal

immigration law.

Plaintiffs’ allegation that the government maintains a policy

mandating 3,000 arrests per day appears to originate from media

reports quoting a White House advisor who described that figure as a

“goal” that the Administration was “looking to set.” That quotation

may have been accurate, but no such goal has been set as a matter of

policy, and no such directive has been issued to or by DHS or ICE.

To be sure, enforcement of federal immigration law is a top priority

for DHS, ICE, and the Administration. But the government conducts

its enforcement activities based on individualized assessments,

available resources, and evolving operational priorities—not volume

4

5a

The Central District includes Los Angeles County, Ventura County, Santa

Barbara County, San Luis Obispo County, Orange County, Riverside County, and

San Bernardino County. Those counties have a combined estimated population of

19,233,598 people, including 9,096,334 people that identify as “Hispanic or

Latino.” That means people who identify as “Hispanic or Latino” make up almost

half—about 47.3%—of the estimated population of the Central District.

Plaintiffs applied for an ex parte TRO seeking to prohibit federal officials

“from conducting detentive stops for the purposes of immigration enforcement

without first establishing individualized, reasonable suspicion that the person to be

stopped is unlawfully in the United States.” The district court did not grant the

application for an ex parte TRO and instead ordered full briefing and a hearing.

metrics. Enforcement activity is firmly anchored in binding legal

constraints—constitutional, statutory, and regulatory requirements

that apply at every stage, from identification to arrest to custody—

with multiple layers of supervisory review to ensure compliance with

the law. This framework, not anonymous reports in the newspapers,

governs ICE’s operations.

(footnote omitted).

We note that, on May 28, 2025, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen

Miller stated during an interview with Fox News: “Under President Trump’s

leadership, we are looking to set a goal of a minimum of 3,000 arrests for ICE

every day, and President Trump is going to keep pushing to get that number up

higher each and every single day.” Hannity, Stephen Miller says the admin wants

to create the strongest immigration system in US History, FOX NEWS (May 28,

2025, 6:29 pm PT), available at https://www.foxnews.com/video/6373591405112

(last visited July 31, 2025).

5

6a

In support of their TRO, Plaintiffs submitted 21 sworn declarations. Five were

from the individual named plaintiffs and described the circumstances in which they

were stopped by Defendants. Three were declarations from representatives of two

of the plaintiff organizations, describing the effect of Defendants’ operation on

their members, including instances in which particular members were subjected to

detentive stops. Five other declarants described being seized by Defendants

conducting roving patrols, and five described witnessing such seizures. Plaintiffs

also submitted social media posts and cited numerous news articles that

documented Defendants’ roving patrols.

Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ TRO application and submitted two

declarations in support of their opposition. One was from an official affiliated with

ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). It described training of ERO

officers and described ERO’s general practices of creating targeting packets for

individuals to be arrested and conducting consensual interviews with other

individuals they encounter. The other declaration came from an official affiliated

with Customs and Border Control (CBP). It described CBP’s participation in

operations in Los Angeles, including both consensual encounters and investigative

detentions. Neither declaration rebuts Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding any particular

stop.

6

7a

The district court held a hearing on the TRO on July 10. The parties discussed

the factors that Defendants use when making stops, the terms of Plaintiffs’

proposed TRO, and whether imposing those terms would be consistent with the

Fourth Amendment’s requirements for reasonable suspicion.

Based on all the evidence presented, including Defendants’ evidence opposing

the TRO, the district court determined that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in

proving their factual allegations regarding Defendants’ stop and arrest practices.

Defendants do not challenge that determination (either in whole or in part) in their

motion for a stay of the TRO pending appeal. Therefore, for purposes of deciding

that motion, we assume Plaintiffs will likely succeed in proving those factual

allegations and summarize the pertinent facts below.

A.

Since June 6, 2025, Defendants have been conducting “Operation

At Large” in Los Angeles.

On June 6, 2025, federal law enforcement arrived in Los Angeles to participate

in what federal officials have described as “the largest Mass Deportation

Operation . . . in History.”3 As part of this operation, Defendants are dispatching

Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem, Case No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP, 2025 WL

1915964, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (quoting Donald J. Trump

(@realDonaldTrump), TRUTH SOCIAL (June 16, 2025, 12:43 AM),

https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114690267066155731).

According to a declaration submitted by Defendants: “On June 6, 2025, in support

of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, CBP agents and officers were sent

to Los Angeles, California in support of Immigration and Customs EnforcementEnforcement and Removal Operations (ICE-ERO). As part of this operation, CBP

3

7

8a

what they call “contact teams,” and what Plaintiffs refer to as “roving patrols.” As

described by the Deputy Incident Commander for Defendants’ operation in Los

Angeles, Kyle Harvick: “CBP agents and officers are typically divided into teams,

composed of three to five agents, who contact individuals in public places such as

streets and sidewalks, parking lots, or the publicly-accessible portions of

businesses. Certain types of businesses, including carwashes, have been selected

for encounters because past experiences have demonstrated that illegal aliens

utilize and seek work at these locations.”4

B.

As part of Operation At Large, agents have stopped and

interrogated the individual plaintiffs.

i.

Jason Brian Gavidia

Plaintiff Jason Brian Gavidia is a U.S. citizen, born and raised in East Los

Angeles. He lives and works in Los Angeles County. He is of Latino ethnicity, a

proud Christian, and a businessman. He is also an active volunteer in his church

agents and officers, along with their federal partners, participate in a variety of

different law enforcement encounters and enforcement actions as part of the

operation in Los Angeles. These activities have included consensual encounters,

investigative detentions, warrantless arrests made where probable cause is

developed in the field, arrests carried out pursuant to federal immigration warrants,

and criminal arrests under judicial warrants.”

4

At oral argument, Defendants asserted that the contact teams engage only in

“voluntary interactions” with individuals who are not the subject of a “targeting

packet.” But the district court found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in

showing that those interactions occurred under objectively coercive circumstances,

making them detentive stops for which reasonable suspicion is required.

Defendants do not dispute that determination in their motion for a stay.

8

9a

and supporter of his community. He rents space from a tow yard in Montebello,

California, to work on cars. On June 12, 2025, around 4:30 p.m., he was working

on his car in the tow yard when he heard someone say that immigration agents

might be at the premises. Out of curiosity, he went outside to see whether agents

were present.

While standing on the sidewalk outside the tow yard gate, he saw agents

wearing green vests; some were carrying handguns, but at least two had militarystyle rifles. When Gavidia started to head back inside the tow yard, a masked agent

said, “Stop right there.” Gavidia stopped because he is a “law-abiding citizen,” and

he “felt [he] could not leave, and that the agent had stopped [him].” While the

masked agent approached him, another “unmasked agent ran towards [him]” and

questioned him, asking whether he is American. Gavidia told him, “I am an

American.” The agent repeated the question, and Gavidia responded the same way,

at least two more times. Then the agent asked Gavidia what hospital he was born

in. Gavidia “calmly replied that [he] did not know.” The agent repeated the same

question two more times, and each time, Gavidia explained that he did not know

which hospital he was born in. At that point, “the agents forcefully pushed [him]

up against the metal gated fence, put [his] hands behind [his] back, and twisted

[his] arm.” The agent asked again, “What hospital were you born in?” Gavidia

responded again that he did not know and said “East L.A.” He then told the agents

9

10a

he could show them his Real ID. When he showed his Real ID, an agent took it

from him. They also took his phone. After about 20 minutes, they returned his

phone, but they never returned his Real ID.

ii.

Jorge Luis Hernandez Viramontes

Plaintiff Jorge Luis Hernandez Viramontes is a 29-year-old resident of

Baldwin Park, California. He is a dual citizen of the United States and Mexico. He

is of Latino ethnicity. He has lived in the United States for about 11 years, and he

is married to a Legal Permanent Resident. They have two young children, both of

whom are U.S. citizens. Hernandez Viramontes has worked at a carwash in

Whittier, California, for about 10 years; he is currently a manager. On June 9,

2025, masked agents arrived at the carwash in unmarked vehicles, many wearing

“military style clothing.” When they arrived, “the agents started grabbing people

and asking their status.” On June 14, 2025, agents arrived again, this time driving

border patrol vehicles and wearing clothing that identified them as border patrol.

The agents asked both workers and customers if they were citizens.

On June 18, 2025, around 10:30 a.m., agents again arrived in unmarked

vehicles and started asking employees their status. Hernandez Viramontes and

some of his coworkers asked the agents if they had a warrant. The agents

responded only by saying, “Shut the fuck up.” An agent asked Hernandez

Viramontes if he was a citizen, and Hernandez Viramontes answered, “Yes.” The

10

11a

agent asked for ID, and Hernandez Viramontes gave him his California driver’s

license. The agent asked Hernandez Viramontes where he was born, and he

responded, “Mexico.” The agent asked Hernandez Viramontes if he had his

passport. Hernandez Viramontes asked if as a dual citizen he was required to carry

his passport. The agent told Hernandez Viramontes his driver’s license wasn’t

enough, and that because he didn’t have his passport with him, he had to go with

the agents. The agent grabbed his arm and escorted him to a silver SUV. Agents

took him to a warehouse area nearby. After about 20 minutes, they took him back

to the carwash. The agents never identified themselves, and they did not wear any

visible badges.

iii.

Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, Carlos Alexander Osorto, and

Isaac Antonio Villegas Molina

Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, Carlos Alexander Osorto, and Isaac

Antonio Villegas Molina live in Pasadena, California. Each is of Latino ethnicity.

Vasquez Perdomo is 54 years old and has lived in Pasadena since he was a young

man. Osorto is 50 years old; he has lived in Pasadena for about 14 years, and he is

the proud grandfather to seven U.S. citizen grandchildren. Villegas Molina is 47

years old; in 2010, he won a scholarship to study culinary arts and English in

Florida, and he moved to Pasadena about 13 years ago. The three men are day

laborers and coworkers. Villegas Molina is new to the trade; Vasquez Perdomo and

Osorto have built homes all over Los Angeles.

11

12a

On the morning of June 18, 2025, Vasquez Perdomo, Osorto, and Villegas

Molina waited to be picked up for a construction job at a Metro bus stop in front of

a Winchell’s Donuts in Pasadena. They were drinking coffee. Vasquez Perdomo

and Osorto sat on the bench, and Villegas Molina stood next to them. Suddenly,

four unmarked cars pulled up and surrounded them. The cars were large and black

with tinted windows and had no license plates. The doors opened and men in

masks with guns started running at them aggressively. One of the men had a

“large” military-style gun. The masked men wore regular clothes, they had no

visible badges, and they did not identify themselves. Vasquez Perdomo, Osorto,

and Villegas Molina were afraid they were being kidnapped. Vasquez Perdomo

tried to move away but was immediately surrounded by several men with guns.

They grabbed him, put his hands behind his back, and handcuffed him. Then, one

of the men asked him for identification. Vasquez Perdomo said in English, “I have

the right to remain silent.”

Villegas Molina stood still and tried to remain calm. A masked and armed man

came up to him and yelled, “Don’t run!” Villegas Molina responded calmly, in

English, “I’m not going to run.” The man asked Villegas Molina to show his ID,

and Villegas Molina provided his California Driver’s license. Then the man asked

Villegas Molina if he had any papers, and he said no. The man handcuffed Villegas

Molina.

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Osorto did not know the men were government agents. Terrified, he tried to

run. The men yelled “stop” but did not identify themselves as law enforcement

officers. Soon, one of the men caught up to Osorto, pointed a taser over his heart,

and yelled, “Stop or I’ll use it!” Osorto stopped immediately, and the man

handcuffed him.

The unidentified, masked, and armed men put Vasquez Perdomo, Osorto, and

Villegas Molina into separate cars and drove them to a parking lot where they

interrogated them further. Eventually, the men chained each plaintiff at the hands,

waist, and feet and took them to a Los Angeles detention center. The men never

identified themselves to the plaintiffs, never stated they were immigration officers

authorized to make arrests, never stated that they had arrest warrants, and never

informed the plaintiffs of the bases for their arrests.5 Vasquez Perdomo and

5

In opposing the TRO, Defendants submitted a declaration from Andre

Quinones, the Deputy Field Office Director of the Los Angeles Field Office ERO.

Quinones attested that ERO Los Angeles officers sometimes apprehend illegal

aliens by using “targeted investigations” which “focus on aliens with final removal

orders and/or serious criminal history.” “Individual targeting packages, consisting

of the targeted alien’s immigration history and/or status, criminal history, last

known residence and employment information are prepared during the targeted

investigation, prior to contact with the targeted alien.” “When non-targeted

individuals are encountered during the targeted operations, ERO Los Angeles

officers are trained to develop reasonable suspicion through consensual encounters.

ERO Los Angeles officers identify themselves to the arrestee at the time of

arrest/encounter or as soon as practicable when safe to do so.” Defendants did not

provide any evidence that any of the stops experienced by the individual Plaintiffs

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Villegas Molina have since been released on bond, and the district court ordered

that Osorto be released on bond on July 30, 2025.

C.

Because of Operation At Large, members of the plaintiff

associations have been detained and interrogated or credibly fear

they will be detained, regardless of immigration status.

i.

United Farm Workers of America

The United Farm Workers of America (UFW) is the largest farm worker

union in the country. As of June 2025, UFW has approximately 10,000 members,

the majority of whom reside in California, including counties across the Central

District. Elizabeth Strater, National Vice President of UFW, attests that the manner

in which immigration enforcement operations have been conducted—“including

by individuals hiding behind masks, who fail to identify themselves, and wearing

military gear—has UFW members and staff fearing for their safety,” regardless of

or described in Plaintiffs’ other evidence involved the detention or arrest of a

targeted individual.

When Defendants filed their motion for a stay of the TRO, they provided a

supplemental declaration by Quinones in which he states: “Regarding the

allegations of Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, Carlos Alexander Osorto, and

Issac Villegas Molina, all three arrests arose or were the result of a targeted

enforcement action at a particular location where past surveillance and intelligence

had confirmed that the target or individuals associated with him were observed to

have recruited illegal aliens to work on landscaping jobs. It was also determined to

be a location where the target and the workers would get food before heading off

for a job.” Notably, Quinones represents only that these Plaintiffs were at a

location where the target had been seen in the past. Quinones does not state that

any of the Plaintiffs are the target or associates of the target. Nor does Quinones

state that agents observed the target at or near the bus stop when they detained the

Plaintiffs there.

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their immigration status. UFW members who are U.S. citizens and lawful

permanent residents, and those who have employment authorization documents,

such as H-2A temporary agricultural visas, T-visas, Temporary Protected Status,

Deferred Action for Labor Enforcement, or Deferred Action for Childhood

Arrivals, nevertheless express fear about being swept up in enforcement actions

and seized, arrested, or detained without regard to their authorization to be in the

U.S. Through her role as a UFW officer, Strater received a report about a UFW

member, “Angel.”

Angel is a U.S. citizen who identifies as Latino. Angel was walking to a

community center with a coworker when two vehicles “pulled up to them

suddenly.” One was a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol truck, the other was a

“plain, white car filled with what appeared to be soldiers wearing military

clothing.” The agent driving the truck asked Angel where he was born. Angel

responded, “Simi Valley.” The agent then asked: “What hospital?” Angel provided

the hospital’s name. The agent then turned to Angel’s coworker, asking, “What

about you?” The coworker, Roberto, responded in Spanish. The agents exited their

vehicle, grabbed Roberto, and loaded him into their truck. Angel started walking

away, but the agents demanded that he return. Angel told them again that he is a

U.S. citizen. The agents directed Angel to show them his identification. They did

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not let him leave until he showed them his California ID. Angel fears that agents

will stop him again simply because of his apparent race or profession.

ii.

Los Angeles Worker Center Network

The Los Angeles Worker Center Network (LAWCN) has eight member

organizations. These include CLEAN Carwash Worker Center, the Garment

Worker Center, the Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance, the Los Angeles

Black Worker Center, the Philipino Workers Center, the Warehouse Worker

Resource Center, the UCLA Labor Center, and Bet Tzedek Legal Services.

LAWCN’s member organizations currently represent over 3,800 workers.

CLEAN has approximately 1,800 individual members, all of whom are

carwash workers in Southern California. CLEAN has members that live or work in

Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernadino, Ventura, and Riverside counties. CLEAN’s

members are “predominantly Latine, with many being immigrants or the children

of immigrants.” CLEAN’s Executive Director is Flor Melendrez.

Since Defendants’ operation commenced in June 2025, dozens of CLEAN

members who work at carwashes in Los Angeles and Orange counties have been

stopped or arrested by immigration agents. Melendrez is also aware of dozens

more carwash workers who work alongside CLEAN’s members who have been

detained or arrested by immigration agents. Based on reports from members,

members’ families, and staff, Melendrez understands that “carwashes have been a

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consistent and ongoing target of immigration agents” and that “agents have

targeted some carwashes more than once.”

Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from CLEAN member Jesus Aristeo Cruz

Uitz. Cruz Uitz has been a member of CLEAN since 2020. He is 51 years old and

has four U.S. citizen children, ages five to sixteen. Before the events at issue in this

case, Cruz Uitz had lived in the U.S. for more than 30 years, and he was a resident

of Inglewood, Los Angeles County, California. He had no criminal convictions,

and no encounters with immigration or law enforcement.

On Sunday, June 8, 2025, Cruz Uitz went to work at a carwash in Los

Angeles, where he had been working for about eight years. At about 3:30 p.m., six

vehicles pulled up in a “very fast and intimidating” manner and parked at the

entrance. Some vehicles were unmarked, others had green stripes that said Border

Patrol. About two agents came out of each vehicle, wearing masks. Some of the

carwash workers ran, but Cruz Uitz stayed where he was. One of the people who

got out of the vehicles approached Cruz Uitz “angrily and grabbed [Cruz Uitz’s]

arms. He was wearing green pants and a black vest. His clothes did not have any

symbols or letters. He had a pistol. He asked [Cruz Uitz] in Spanish, ‘Do you have

papers?’” As soon as Cruz Uitz answered, the agent began handcuffing Cruz Uitz

without saying anything else. Cruz Uitz told the agent, “You’re hurting me.” The

agent responded, “You’re not understanding. We’re kicking you out.” The agent

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pushed Cruz Uitz into the backseat of a vehicle, causing Cruz Uitz “to hit into a

metal median.” When Cruz Uitz explained that the handcuffs were hurting him, the

agent ignored him. About a minute later, the agents brought in one of Cruz Uitz’s

coworkers. Two of Cruz Uitz’s coworkers “have light skin”—one is Persian, and

the other is from Russia—and neither of them was approached by immigration

agents or arrested.

iii. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights

The Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) is a nonprofit and

membership organization headquartered in Los Angeles, California, with eight

offices throughout California.

CHIRLA’s activities include providing legal services and education. It has

approximately 50,000 active members across California. Its membership is

predominantly Latino and includes U.S. citizens, non-U.S. citizens with lawful

status, and non-U.S. citizens without lawful status. Many of its members belong to

mixed-status families—that is, families consisting of both individuals with

citizenship or lawful status and individuals without. Many of its members “are day

laborers who wait outside Home Depots, carwash workers, and street vendors who

sell their products on public sidewalks.”

CHIRLA’s Executive Director, Angelica Salas, attests that many of

CHIRLA’s members “are experiencing significant levels of fear over the

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possibility of being grabbed and snatched in immigration raids in public areas

based on racial profiling.” Even CHIRLA members with U.S. citizenship, work

authorization, or pending applications for legal permanent residency have changed

their daily routines out of fear that they will be detained based on their Latino

appearance.

D.

The District Court’s TRO

The district court found that Plaintiffs “are likely to succeed in showing [that]

seizures requiring reasonable suspicion have occurred.”6 Reviewing Plaintiffs’

evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the stops, it found that the

conditions were coercive enough that the interactions were not consensual. The

district court also found that Plaintiffs are “likely to succeed in showing that the

seizures are based upon the four enumerated factors” or a subset of them. Those

factors are (1) apparent race or ethnicity; (2) speaking Spanish or speaking English

with an accent; (3) presence at a particular location; and (4) the type of work one

does. The district court then concluded that “sole reliance on the four enumerated

6

Two of the association plaintiffs also challenge “denial of access to counsel

and illegal conditions of confinement” at a federal facility in Los Angeles.

Complaint at 6. Those plaintiffs applied for a separate TRO based on those

practices. ECF 38. The district court granted both TRO applications in a single

order. Defendants appealed only the district court’s grant of the Stop/Arrest TRO

application. Although the complaint also challenges Defendants’ stop-and-arrest

practices on statutory and regulatory bases, because the Stop/Arrest TRO was

based only on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, we do not address in detail

Plaintiffs’ other claims and allegations. ECF 89.

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factors does not constitute reasonable suspicion.” And, finally, the district court

found that Defendants’ stops based only on the four factors were part of an

officially-sanctioned “pattern of conduct.” Particularly, the court found that,

despite there being no evidence of an “official policy” of making stops based only

on the four factors and without reasonable suspicion, there was sufficient evidence

to show that Defendants were routinely doing so. The court also observed that “a

plethora” of public statements by high-level officials supported the finding that the

challenged practice was approved or authorized by officials. Based on those

findings, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ application for the TRO.

The TRO provides:7

a. As required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,

Defendants shall be enjoined from conducting detentive stops in this

District unless the agent or officer has reasonable suspicion that the

person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S.

immigration law.

b. In connection with paragraph [a], Defendants may not rely solely on the

factors below, alone or in combination, to form reasonable suspicion for

a detentive stop, except as permitted by law:

i.

Apparent race or ethnicity;

ii.

Speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent;

iii. Presence at a particular location (e.g., bus stop, car wash, tow

yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.); or

iv.

The type of work one does.

7

In the district court’s order, paragraph b. references “paragraph (1),” not

“paragraph a.” We think it obvious that the district court meant to refer to

paragraph a. Accordingly, we have corrected that typographical error in our

recitation of the TRO’s terms. We note that, in challenging the TRO, Defendants

do not rely on paragraph b.’s reference to “paragraph (1).”

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E.

Defendants’ Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal

Defendants filed a notice of appeal and an emergency motion to stay the

district court’s TRO pending appeal.

It is important to note the issues Defendants did not raise in their motion for a

stay. Defendants did not dispute the district court’s finding that detentive stops

requiring reasonable suspicion have occurred. They did not dispute that these

detentive stops have been based solely on the four enumerated factors. They did

not challenge the district court’s findings that those stops are part of a pattern of

conduct that has apparent official approval. And, finally, they did not meaningfully

dispute the district court’s conclusion that sole reliance on the four enumerated

factors, alone or in combination, does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of

reasonable suspicion. Their motion so states in a single sentence, without argument

or citation to any legal authority. In their reply, they addressed that issue in three

paragraphs, only one of which makes any reference to legal authority.

Here are the arguments that Defendants do make: They first argue that

Plaintiffs cannot show a sufficient likelihood of future injury to support standing

for injunctive relief and, even if they can meet the Article III threshold, they still

cannot show a “real and immediate threat” that they will be harmed again

sufficient to justify injunctive relief. As to the substance of the TRO, they argue

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that it is impermissibly vague, inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, and

exceeds what is necessary to provide the Plaintiffs “complete relief.”

II. JURISDICTION

We begin with two threshold questions: statutory jurisdiction and Article III

standing.

A.

Statutory Jurisdiction

We have jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to consider a

motion for a stay of a TRO pending appeal. Newsom v. Trump, 141 F.4th 1032,

1043 (9th Cir. 2025). The question whether the TRO is appealable informs the

likelihood Defendants will succeed on the merits of their appeal; the answer does

not affect our jurisdiction to consider a stay while the question is litigated. Id. at

1044.

B.

Article III Standing

We have jurisdiction to consider “Cases” and “Controversies” “in Law and

Equity.” U.S. Const. Art. III. For there to be a “Case,” a plaintiff must have a

“personal stake” such that he or she is “the proper party to bring [the] suit.” Raines

v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). Standing is jurisdictional; we consider it de

novo and sua sponte. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).

To satisfy the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” a plaintiff

“must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest

which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not

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conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61

(1992) (cleaned up). There also must be “a causal connection between the injury

and the conduct complained of,” and “it must be likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (cleaned

up).

“Because standing is ‘an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case,’ it ‘must be

supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the

burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the

successive stages of the litigation.’” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159

(9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). “At this very preliminary stage of

the litigation, [plaintiffs] may rely on the allegations in their Complaint and

whatever other evidence they submitted in support of their TRO motion to meet

their burden.” Id. “With these allegations and evidence, [plaintiffs] must make a

‘clear showing of each element of standing.’” Id. (quoting Townley v. Miller, 722

F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)).

The record shows—and Defendants do not dispute—that each of the individual

plaintiffs, and members of both UFW and LAWCN, were stopped by government

agents as part of the challenged operation. That is enough to make a “clear

showing” of injury in fact. Id. Defendants challenge only Plaintiffs’ standing to

seek prospective injunctive relief.

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To have standing to seek an injunction against future unlawful conduct, a

plaintiff must show a “sufficient likelihood” that they will suffer a similar injury in

the future. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also LaDuke

v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985). “Although questions of standing

are reviewed de novo, we will affirm a district court’s ruling on standing when the

court has determined that the alleged threatened injury is sufficiently likely to

occur, unless that determination is clearly erroneous or incorrect as a matter of

law.” Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010).

Here, the district court found that plaintiff Gavidia had standing to seek

prospective injunctive relief because “there is a real and immediate threat that the

conduct complained of will continue,” and “[a]ll of the evidence adduced suggests

a high likelihood of recurrent injury.”

In their motion for a stay, Defendants argue that none of the plaintiffs have

standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. We consider first whether the

individual plaintiffs have standing to obtain equitable relief, and then whether the

association plaintiffs have standing to obtain such relief on their members’ behalf. 8

8

Only one plaintiff with standing is sufficient for Article III. Still, we

consider the standing of each plaintiff to address Defendants’ argument about the

scope of relief. See infra, Section III.A.4.

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1.

Individual Plaintiffs

We conclude that each of the individual plaintiffs has standing to seek

injunctive relief because there is a “realistic[] threat[]” that each will be stopped

without reasonable suspicion as part of Defendants’ Operation at Large. Lyons, 461

U.S. at 106.

As we have explained, a plaintiff can show that an injury is likely to recur by

“demonstrat[ing] that the harm is part of a pattern of officially sanctioned behavior,

violative of the plaintiffs’ federal rights.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 998

(9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). The district court here found that Plaintiffs’ evidence

demonstrated “a pattern of conduct,” and that “a plethora of statements suggest[ed]

approval or authorization” of the challenged stop-and-arrest practices, including a

recent statement by Defendant Gregory K. Bovino, the Chief Patrol Agent for the

El Centro Sector of the CBP. Defendants do not meaningfully dispute these

findings, and they are well supported by the record. The sworn declarations

describe more than a dozen stops based on less than reasonable suspicion—

targeting Hispanic or Latino people in public places and at businesses like Home

Depots and carwashes. Defendants’ declarations corroborate key allegations

regarding the commencement of Operation At Large in Los Angeles and the

dispatching of “contact teams” to public places and businesses. Their general

descriptions of training regarding the requirements for a lawful seizure do little to

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overcome Plaintiffs’ specific evidence showing a series of similar detentive stops

without reasonable suspicion. On this record, we agree with the district court that

Plaintiffs have shown that the challenged conduct is “part of a pattern of officially

sanctioned behavior” and thus that the alleged injury is “likely to recur.” Id. at

997–98 (cleaned up).

Defendants argue that the record fails to show that any specific plaintiff is

likely to be stopped again. As they note, the record shows only one individual,

J.M.E., has been stopped by Defendants twice. But that one recurrence is

significant, especially considering that Defendants’ agents stopped J.M.E. twice in

just 10 days—first on June 9, and again on June 19. Gavidia and the other

individual plaintiffs were each stopped only once.9 But Defendants made all those

stops and dozens more in a single month. Defendants commenced Operation at

Large in Los Angeles on June 6, and Plaintiffs submitted their evidence of stops on

July 3. Additionally, the record shows that Defendants’ ongoing Operation At

Large involves sending contact teams to public places and types of businesses,

such as carwashes and Home Depots that they believe are “utilized” by illegal

immigrants. And, the record includes evidence that Defendants have sent teams to

the same place repeatedly. Accordingly, we conclude that there is a “real and

9

We agree with Defendants that the district court’s finding that Gavidia has

been subjected to multiple stops was clearly erroneous.

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immediate threat,” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, that Defendants’ patrols will send

contact teams to the same locations and encounter the same individuals.

Our conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Lyons. In

that case, police officers subjected Lyons to a chokehold during a routine traffic

stop. Lyons sought an injunction against future use of chokeholds by police

officers under circumstances “which do not threaten death or serious bodily

injury.” Id. at 100. The Supreme Court concluded that Lyons lacked standing to

pursue injunctive relief because it was “no more than speculation to assert [] that

Lyons himself” would again be subject to a chokehold. Id. at 108.

This case is a far cry from Lyons. To start, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the stops

themselves, not some subsequent conduct that might occur only after a stop, like a

chokehold. In Lyons and other cases where the asserted future injury was

insufficient to confer standing, “there was either little indication in the record that

the plaintiffs had firm intentions to take action that would trigger the challenged

governmental action, or little indication in the record that, even if plaintiffs did

take such action, they would be subjected to the challenged governmental action.”

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401,

1407 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (concluding that Lyons’s risk

of future injury was speculative, in part because his claim of future injury

depended on him being stopped for a traffic violation or some other offense). The

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same is not true here. Unlike in Lyons, the individual plaintiffs here cannot escape

future injury by avoiding unlawful activity. There is no predicate action that the

individual plaintiffs would need to take, other than simply going about their lives,

to potentially be subject to the challenged stops.

Further, the district court in Lyons did not make an explicit finding about the

likelihood of recurrence, and the record in Lyons did not establish a policy of

chokeholds “authorized absent some resistance or other provocation.” 461 U.S. at

110. Here, in contrast, the district court specifically found that the evidence

indicates that the challenged stops are part of an officially-sanctioned pattern and

that, as a result, there is “a high likelihood of recurrent injury.”

In sum, unlike in Lyons, the district court in this case made an explicit finding

of likelihood of recurrence, there is evidence that the complained-of conduct stems

from a pattern or practice by Defendants, and there is no specific predicate action

required by Plaintiffs to trigger Defendants’ challenged practice. We distinguished

Lyons on those same bases in Melendres v. Arpaio, explaining that the district

court did not err in finding that the threatened constitutional injury was likely to

occur again where “the district court expressly found that the Plaintiffs [were]

sufficiently likely to be seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment,” the

plaintiffs presented evidence that defendants “engaged in a pattern or practice of

conducting [the challenged] stops,” and the plaintiffs could not “avoid injury by

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avoiding illegal conduct.” 695 F.3d at 998 (cleaned up). Defendants suggest that

Plaintiffs must provide “direct evidence of an unlawful policy” to establish

standing. But no official statement or express policy is required to demonstrate a

“pattern of officially sanctioned behavior, violative of the plaintiffs’ federal

rights.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). In

Nicacio v. INS, for example, we held plaintiffs had standing to seek injunctive

relief where the district court found that “the INS was engaged in a pattern of

unlawful stops to interrogate persons of Hispanic appearance traveling by

automobile on Washington highways,” based on the plaintiffs’ testimony about

their experiences. 797 F.2d 700, 701–04 (9th Cir. 1985).

We therefore conclude that the individual plaintiffs have made a sufficient

showing of future injury to establish standing to seek injunctive relief.

2.

Association Plaintiffs

To establish “associational” standing and bring suit on behalf of its members,

an association must show that: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to

sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the

organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested

requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Students for Fair

Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 199

(2023) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343

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(1977)). Further, “[w]here it is relatively clear, rather than merely speculative, that

one or more members have been or will be adversely affected by a defendant’s

action, and where the defendant need not know the identity of a particular member

to understand and respond to an organization’s claim of injury,” the organization is

not required to “identify by name the member or members injured” to establish

associational standing. Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032, 1041

(9th Cir. 2015). See also Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153,

1163 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that, “[t]o satisfy the requirements of associational

standing, all that plaintiffs need to establish is that at least one member faces a

realistic danger of” being injured by the challenged practice).

a.

Members’ Standing

At least some of each association’s members would have standing to sue in

their own right. UFW and LAWCN each submitted evidence regarding individual

members’ experiences of detentive stops. As to CHIRLA, the district court found

that it has members who “reasonably fear being subject to the stop and arrest

practices challenged in this case.” Based on this reasonable fear, the record shows

that CHIRLA members have changed their routines and tried to avoid leaving their

homes.

As with the individual plaintiffs, we conclude that the associations’ individual

members can establish standing to seek injunctive relief based on a real and

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immediate threat of future injury. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105. The associations have

thousands of members across California and the Central District, and the evidence

suggests that Defendants are engaged in a high-volume, District-wide practice of

making detentive stops with less than reasonable suspicion. The large scale of the

association plaintiffs’ Los Angeles-area memberships “increases the threat of

future harm to [the association plaintiffs’] members.” Cal. Rest. Ass’n v. City of

Berkeley, 89 F.4th 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v.

U.S. E.P.A., 735 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013)). In these circumstances, it is highly

likely that at least one member of each association will be subject to Defendants’

challenged practices. See id.; see also Fla. State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P., 522 F.3d at

1163 (concluding that plaintiff associations had standing to seek prospective relief

against a state statute barring voter registrations in the event of social security or

drivers’ license number “mismatches” because it was “highly unlikely—even with

only a one percent chance of rejection for any given individual—that not a single

[association] member will have his or her application rejected due to a mismatch”).

b.

Associations’ Interests

The interests the association plaintiffs seek to protect are germane to their

purposes. Each of the association plaintiffs has a mission to defend the rights of

low-wage workers with various immigration statuses. The association plaintiffs’

stated “institutional goals” to protect “a broad range of rights” for their members is

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sufficient for purposes of establishing associational standing. Cal. Rural Legal

Assistance, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1990).

c.

Members’ Participation

Lastly, neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

participation of the associations’ individual members in this lawsuit. As a general

matter, membership organizations may bring constitutional claims on behalf of

their members. See, e.g., Students for Fair Admissions, 600 U.S. at 200–01;

Stavrianoudakis v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 108 F.4th 1128, 1143 (9th Cir.

2024) (holding organization had associational standing to seek injunctive relief to

protect its members’ Fourth Amendment rights). Because Plaintiffs allege an

ongoing pattern of unconstitutional detentive stops, demonstrating the likelihood of

future such stops does not require the participation of individual members. And

because Plaintiffs seek only prospective injunctive relief (not damages), individual

participation is not necessary for effective relief. See, e.g., id.; Columbia Basin

Apartment Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that

claims for injunctive relief “do not require individualized proof” of harm). Finally,

associational standing is particularly appropriate where the “constitutional rights of

persons who are not immediately before the Court could not be effectively

vindicated except through an appropriate representative before the Court.” NAACP

v. Ala. ex. Rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958). Here, the intense fear of

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discriminatory stops that Defendants’ roving patrols have provoked may prevent

the association plaintiffs’ members from active participation in the lawsuit.10

In sum, we have jurisdiction to decide whether to stay the district court’s TRO

pending appeal, and all Plaintiffs—the individuals and associations—have

established their standing to seek prospective equitable relief.

III. DISCUSSION

We next turn to the central question before us: Should we stay the district

court’s TRO during the appeal proceedings?

We consider the four “Nken factors” in deciding whether to grant a stay

pending appeal. The factors are: (A) “whether the stay applicant has made a strong

showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits” of its appeal; (B) “whether the

applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay”; (C) “whether issuance of the

stay will substantially injure the other parties”; and (D) “where the public interest

lies.” Newsom, 141 F.4th at 1044 (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426

10

The associations are bringing claims on behalf of their members to vindicate

their members’ personal rights; they are not seeking to benefit themselves by

asserting a third party’s rights. The cases cited by Defendants involving parties

seeking either to exclude evidence or to assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on

the violation of a third party’s Fourth Amendment rights are inapplicable. See

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–40 (1979) (third-party exclusionary rule);

Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th

Cir. 2001) (third-party § 1983 claim). Moreover, the practical considerations that

counsel against extending the exclusionary rule to third parties are not at issue

here. See Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d 525, 532 (8th Cir.

2005).

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(2009)). A stay pending appeal is “an exercise of judicial discretion”; “[a] stay is

not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” Nken, 556

U.S. at 433 (cleaned up). “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing

that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 433–34.

A.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits of Appeal

The first stay inquiry is whether Defendants have “made a strong showing”

that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.

Because Defendants cannot succeed on the merits of their appeal unless the TRO is

appealable, we begin by addressing that issue. Then we address each of

Defendants’ bases for appealing the TRO.

1.

Appealability of the TRO

We first address the threshold jurisdictional question that will be a

precondition to the merits of Defendants’ appeal: Is the district court’s TRO

appealable?

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1), we have jurisdiction over appeals of

“[i]interlocutory orders . . . granting . . . injunctions.” “Ordinarily, a TRO is not an

appealable order.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 762 (9th

Cir. 2018). But a TRO can be appealed if it has the “same effect as a preliminary

injunction.” Id. “We treat a TRO as a preliminary injunction where an adversary

hearing has been held, and the court’s basis for issuing the order is strongly

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challenged.” Id. (cleaned up). “Further, a key distinction . . . is that a TRO may

issue without notice and remains in effect for only 14 days.” Id. at 762–63.

Here, the district court entered the TRO on appeal after notice, expedited

briefing, and a hearing. Defendants “strongly challenged” the district court’s basis

for entering the TRO. Id. at 762. The TRO will remain in effect for longer than 14

days.

We therefore conclude that Defendants are likely to succeed in establishing

that the district court’s TRO is appealable under § 1291(a)(1).

2.

Sufficient Likelihood of Injury to Warrant Equitable Relief

Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiffs have shown injury sufficient for

Article III standing, “they cannot come close to showing the threat of immediate

and irreparable harm that is necessary for an injunction.”

For this argument, Defendants principally rely on Hodgers-Durgin v. de la

Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999). In Hodgers-Durgin, this court assumed that

even if plaintiffs had established a sufficient threat of future injury to confer

Article III standing to seek prospective relief, the asserted injury was not

sufficiently immediate to warrant an injunction as a matter of the law of equitable

remedies. Id. at 1042. In that case, the plaintiffs had sought an injunction against

Border Patrol practices. But the two named plaintiffs had each been stopped “only

once in 10 years.” Id. at 1044. Based on this record, this court concluded that the

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plaintiffs had not established that it was sufficiently likely they would be stopped

again. Id.

This case is decisively different. It is undisputed that Defendants have been

conducting a massive and ongoing immigration enforcement operation in the Los

Angeles region since early June. The record shows Defendants’ agents have

conducted many stops in the Los Angeles area within a matter of weeks, not years,

some repeatedly in the same location. For the association plaintiffs, the likelihood

of harm corresponds with the likelihood that one or more of their members will be

stopped by one of Defendants’ agents—which, for the reasons discussed above, is

considerable.

Based on this record, the district court did not clearly err in “affirmatively

find[ing] that there is a real and immediate threat that the conduct complained of

will continue.” (Emphasis added). And “[i]t is well established that the deprivation

of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres

v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d at 1002 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).

3.

Objections to the Terms of the TRO

Defendants primarily argue that portions of the TRO constitute an

impermissibly vague “follow-the-law” injunction. They also argue that the TRO is

inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. We address each argument in turn.

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i.

Vagueness

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1) requires that any injunction or

TRO be “specific in terms” and “describe in reasonable detail—and not by

reference to the complaint or other document—the act or acts sought to be

restrained.” “[T]he specificity provisions of Rule 65(d) are no mere technical

requirements. The Rule was designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the

part of those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a

contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.” Schmidt v. Lessard, 414

U.S. 473, 476 (1974). The terms of the injunction should be clear enough to be

understood by a lay person, not just by lawyers and judges. Reno Air Racing Ass’n

v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).

Whether the TRO is sufficiently clear is a context-specific inquiry that “must

be applied in the light of the circumstances surrounding the order’s entry,”

including “litigation history.” Id. at 1133-34 (cleaned up); see also Melendres v.

Skinner, 113 F.4th 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2024) (interpreting district court’s

injunction in light of previous orders and “the [district] court’s exchanges . . . at a

status conference before the issuance of the” injunction). When interpreting the

district court’s order, we consider the text of the order itself together with the

“accompanying opinion” and other documents attached to the order. See Schmidt,

414 U.S. at 476; cf. Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1132 (permitting incorporation

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by reference of an exhibit attached to an order). We will not set aside an injunction

under Rule 65 unless it is “so vague” that it has “no reasonably specific meaning.”

Skinner, 113 F.4th at 1140 (cleaned up).

As previously noted, the TRO at issue here provides:

a. As required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,

Defendants shall be enjoined from conducting detentive stops in this

District unless the agent or officer has reasonable suspicion that the

person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S.

immigration law.

b. In connection with paragraph [a], Defendants may not rely solely on the

factors below, alone or in combination, to form reasonable suspicion for

a detentive stop, except as permitted by law:

i.

Apparent race or ethnicity;

ii.

Speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent;

iii. Presence at a particular location (e.g., bus stop, car wash, tow

yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.); or

iv.

The type of work one does.

As Defendants point out, paragraph b. prohibits sole reliance on the four

factors to form reasonable suspicion to support a detentive stop, “except as

permitted by law.” We agree with Defendants that the “except as permitted by

law” clause makes paragraph b. impermissibly vague: what is “permitted by law”

is not clear to lawyers and judges, much less lay persons who are the “target of the

injunction.” Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1134. We therefore conclude that

Defendants are likely to succeed on the merits as to that specific clause.

Defendants, however, are not likely to succeed on their remaining arguments.

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Defendants contend that paragraph a. is impermissibly vague because it simply

“restates the constitutional requirement of reasonable suspicion.” The first

paragraph, standing alone, could be an impermissible follow-the-law injunction.

But, as the TRO states, paragraph a. must be read “[i]n connection with” with

paragraph b., which specifies exactly what Defendants are prohibited from doing.

When read together, paragraphs a. and b. prohibit Defendants from making

detentive stops based solely on the four factors, or some combination of them. The

TRO does not expose Defendants to the threat of contempt when they make a stop

based on other factors—even if a court later concludes that Defendants lacked

reasonable suspicion for the stop.

ii.

Fourth Amendment

As Defendants correctly note, when making reasonable-suspicion

determinations, “reviewing courts . . . must look at the ‘totality of the

circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a

‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449

U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Further, in light of Arvizu, we have recognized that “the

nature of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis” precludes courts from

“holding that certain factors are presumptively given no weight without

considering those factors in the full context of each particular case.” United States

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v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Thus, in ValdesVega, we concluded that earlier Ninth Circuit decisions “holding that certain

factors are per se not probative or are per se minimally probative do not now

comply with Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 1079. As the Arvizu Court

explained, a “divide-and-conquer” analysis of individual factors is inappropriate

because, even when each in a series of facts is innocent on its own, those facts may

give rise to reasonable suspicion when viewed together. 534 U.S. at 274.

Defendants primarily argue that the TRO runs afoul of Valdes-Vega because,

in their view, the TRO enjoins them from relying on the four factors at all, even in

combination with other factors. This argument misreads the TRO. The TRO does

not prohibit Defendants from relying on the four factors at all. Rather, the TRO

clearly states that “Defendants may not rely solely on the [four factors], alone or in

combination, to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop.” (Emphasis added.)

The TRO is clear, but if Defendants remain confused, they need only read the

accompanying opinion. In adopting Plaintiffs’ proposed TRO, the district court

explained that the proposed TRO would “enjoin reliance solely on these four

enumerated factors alone or in combination.” (Emphasis in original.) It would

“not . . . enjoin reliance on these factors along with other factors, nor—contrary to

Defendants’ mischaracterizations—[would it] require that Defendants ignore these

factors or ‘put blinders on’ when they run across these factors.” The district court

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clarified the same point in the TRO hearing, confirming that the proposed TRO

would prohibit sole reliance on the four factors, but it would not prohibit reliance

on those factors in combination with unlisted factors.

Defendants also argue that, even if the TRO prohibits only detentive stops

based solely on the four factors, the TRO creates a categorical rule about the

relevance of those factors which, in Defendants’ view, is inconsistent with the

general principle that reasonable-suspicion determinations depend on the “totality

of the circumstances.” This argument fails for several reasons.

To begin, the TRO does not create a categorical rule. Rather, the TRO

prohibits Defendants from relying solely on the four factors in the context of the

current enforcement activities in a particular place, the Central District. The district

court concluded that, in that context, the four factors establish only a “broad

profile” that, without “additional information that winnows the broad profile into

an objective and particularized suspicion of the person to be stopped,” “do[es] not

demonstrate reasonable suspicion for any particular stop.” Additionally, the TRO

does not establish an impermissible per se rule because it says nothing about how

to weigh the four factors in other circumstances or if other relevant factors are

present. If future stops are based on additional, relevant facts, those scenarios will

be unaffected by the TRO.

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Moreover, the TRO’s rule—that Defendants may not rely solely on the four

factors to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop in the Central District—is

entirely consistent with the general principle that reasonable-suspicion

determinations must be based on the totality of the circumstances. Courts routinely

assess specific groupings of factors to determine whether those factors together

give rise to reasonable suspicion. That is exactly what a reasonable-suspicion

determination entails. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698

(1996). Moreover, in Ornelas, the Supreme Court held that a de novo standard of

review for reasonable suspicion determinations is appropriate because “de novo

review tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing law enforcement

officers with a defined set of rules” regarding what constitutes reasonable

suspicion. Id. at 697. In so holding, the Court acknowledged that, “because the

mosaic which is analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is

multi-faceted, one determination will seldom be a useful precedent for another.”

Id. (cleaned up). “But,” the Court explained, “there are exceptions.” Id. The Court

went on to identify multiple pairs of cases in which the circumstances of two cases

“were so alike” that precedent compelled the same reasonable-suspicion

determination in the later case. Id. Consistent with Ornelas, the TRO provides

Defendants with appropriate guidance regarding a particular set of circumstances

that appears repeatedly in the record of this case.

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Finally, Defendants argue that the TRO is improper because “some

combination of the enumerated factors will at least sometimes support reasonable

suspicion for a stop.” Because Defendants “fail[ed] to develop” this argument by

offering any analysis, legal authority, or examples in support, we are not obligated

to consider it. See, e.g., Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 959 (9th Cir.

2021). We nonetheless address Defendants’ argument to explain why the TRO is

consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

The TRO prohibits Defendants from making a detentive stop based only on

the following four factors, or some subset of these factors: (1) the person’s

apparent race or ethnicity; (2) that the person speaks Spanish or speaks English

with an accent; (3) the person’s presence at a particular location—whether that be a

random location, such as a sidewalk or front yard, or a location selected “because

past experiences have demonstrated that illegal aliens utilize or seek work at these

locations”; and (4) the type of work the person does or appears to do, even if that is

a job that, in the officers’ experience, is more often performed by illegal

immigrants than are other jobs.

“The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including

seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.” United

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). In Brignoni-Ponce, the

Supreme Court considered the Border Patrol’s authority to stop automobiles in

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areas near the Mexican border. The Court held that, “[e]xcept at the border and its

functional equivalents,” the Fourth Amendment does not allow immigration

enforcement officers to make detentive stops unless they are “aware of specific

articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably

warrant suspicion” that the persons stopped or detained “may be illegally in the

country.” Id. at 884.

Reasonable suspicion must be “particularized and objective.” Arvizu, 534 U.S.

at 273. That is, an officer must have reasonable suspicion as to “the particular

person being stopped.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); accord Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). In

making a reasonable-suspicion determination, “the facts must be filtered through

the lens of the agents’ training and experience,” Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1079

(citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885), “but ‘experience’ does not in itself serve

as an independent factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Montero-Camargo,

208 F.3d at 1131. “In other words, an officer’s experience may furnish the

background against which the relevant facts are to be assessed,” id., but the

officers’ “rational inferences” and “permissible deductions” must “flow from

objective facts and be capable of rational explanation.” Nicacio, 797 F.2d at 705.

To form reasonable suspicion, an officer must rely on facts and inferences

specific enough that they do not describe “[l]arge numbers,” Brignoni-Ponce, 422

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U.S. at 886, or a “broad profile” of individuals, United States v. Manzo-Jurado,

457 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2006). Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on

“generalizations that, if accepted, would cast suspicion on large segments of the

lawabiding population.” Id. at 935. Rather, the specific facts articulated “must

provide a rational basis for separating out the illegal aliens from American citizens

and legal aliens.” Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994) (cleaned

up). Accordingly, “[a] characteristic common to both legal and illegal immigrants

does little to arouse reasonable suspicion.” Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 937.

We agree with the district court that, in the context of the Central District of

California, the four enumerated factors at issue—apparent race or ethnicity,

speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent, particular location, and type

of work, even when considered together—describe only a broad profile and “do

not demonstrate reasonable suspicion for any particular stop.”

The Central District’s demographics are relevant to this analysis. See, e.g.,

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885–87 & n.12 (considering probative value of

“apparent Mexican ancestry” near the Mexican border in light of the demographics

of the border states). Plaintiffs’ undisputed evidence shows that nearly half—about

47 percent—of the Central District’s population identifies as Hispanic or Latino.

In the United States generally, apparent Hispanic or Latino race or ethnicity

generally has limited probative value, because “[l]arge numbers of native-born and

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naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified with [Hispanic or

Latino ethnicity].” Id. at 886. That probative value is even less in an area like the

Central District in which “a substantial part . . . of the population is Hispanic.”

Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1132.

Speaking Spanish and speaking English with an accent are likewise

characteristics that “appl[y] to a sizable portion of individuals lawfully present in

this country.” Cf. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 936–37 (discussing the limited

probative value of observation that “group members spoke to each other

exclusively in Spanish and did not understand English”). These characteristics

have very little probative value in the Central District of California. See, e.g., U.S.

Census Bureau, Language Spoken at Home (Table S1601), Am. Cmty. Survey

(indicating that more than 55% of the population in Los Angeles County speaks a

language other than English at home, including 37.7% of the population that

speaks Spanish at home).

As to location, both the Supreme Court and this court have made clear that

an individual’s presence at a location that illegal immigrants are known to frequent

does little to support reasonable suspicion when U.S. citizens and legal immigrants

are also likely to be present at those locations. See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.

at 882–83 (holding that “roving” border patrols must have reasonable suspicion to

make stops even on roads “near the border,” because those roads “carry not only

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aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large volume of legitimate traffic

as well”); United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that an individual’s presence on a highway that “smugglers”

“common[ly]” used was “of only minimal significance” given that the highway

connected various cities and “substantially all of the traffic in and around these

cities is lawful” (cleaned up)).

The district court found that Defendants select certain types of public places

and businesses because their “past experiences” indicate that illegal immigrants are

present at and seek work at those locations. Defendants, however, provide no

evidence—not even a bald assertion—that any of the public places or types of

businesses they are targeting are used exclusively, or even predominantly, by

individuals illegally in the country. See Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 937–38 & n.

10.11 To the contrary, the evidence indicates that presence at such locations is “[a]

In Manzo-Jurado, we concluded that the group’s appearance as a work crew

was only “marginally relevant,” even though officers testified that Border Patrol

had encountered “numerous” work crews that contained illegal immigrants. Id. at

937–38. In so holding, we noted that the officers did not discuss “the proportion of

work crews in [the city] that have illegal aliens, even though they encountered

“numerous” work crews with illegal aliens, because they did not testify about how

many work crews they had encountered in the city “that did not have illegal

aliens.” Id. Further, even though “officials’ skilled judgment plays a significant

role in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion,” the officers’

“testimony regarding their prior encounters with works crews in [the city] which

had contained illegal immigrants does not explain how their experience and

11

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characteristic common” to legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and U.S. citizens

alike. See id. at 937. Consequently, the fact that a person is present at a business

(such as a carwash) or other location (such as a bus stop) “does little to arouse

reasonable suspicion,” even when paired with officers’ knowledge that illegal

immigrants have frequented or sought work at that location. See id.

Like location, the type of work one does is at most “marginally relevant to

establishing reasonable suspicion,” even if it is work commonly performed by

immigrants without legal status. See id. at 937–38. In Manzo-Jurado, we held that

a group’s “appearance as a work crew” was only “marginally relevant” because it

was a “characteristic common to both legal and illegal immigrants”—even though

officials testified they had encountered “numerous” individuals in that type of

work who were present in the country illegally. Id. We have also explained that

evidence that a particular employer is employing a large number of undocumented

workers does not create reasonable suspicion as to each individual employee.

Perez-Cruz v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019).

Even taken together, the four enumerated factors describe only a “broad

profile” that does not supply the reasonable suspicion required to justify a

detentive stop. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 939. We considered a very similar set of

expertise led to a reasonable inference of criminality that might well elude an

untrained person.” Id. at 938 n.10 (cleaned up).

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factors in Manzo-Jurado. There, we concluded that the Border Patrol lacked

reasonable suspicion that any individuals in a group were in this country illegally

where the officers observed that the individuals (1) appeared Hispanic;

(2) appeared to be a work crew; (3) spoke Spanish and were unable to speak

English; and (4) were within 50 miles of the Canadian border. Id. at 932, 939–40.

We held Border Patrol lacked reasonable suspicion to justify its stop based on

those facts even though “proximity to the Canadian border supports reasonable

suspicion,” id. at 936, and even though Border Patrol had encountered numerous

work crews in the city that employed illegal aliens, in some cases, “all illegal

aliens,” id. at 938 & n.9.12

As in Manzo-Jurado, the factors at issue here impermissibly “cast suspicion

on large segments of the lawabiding population,” including anyone in the District

who appears Hispanic, speaks Spanish or English with an accent, wears work

clothes, and stands near a carwash, in front of a Home Depot, or at a bus stop. Id.

at 935. This conclusion is amply supported by the record, which shows that U.S.

citizens and lawfully present immigrants were seized based on the four factors or a

See also, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1142 & n.2 (9th

Cir. 2002) (explaining that officer’s observation of ind

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