Emergency Application — Andrew Richard Lukehart, Applicant v. Florida

No. ________

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_________________________________________________________________________

ANDREW RICHARD LUKEHART,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_________________________________________________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida

APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE

WITH AN EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR

TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 2026, AT 6:00 PM

Adrienne Joy Shepherd*

*Counsel of Record

*Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court

Florida Bar Number 1000532

Email: adrienne.shepherd@ccrc-north.org

Alicia Hampton

Florida Bar Number 1026214

Email: alicia.hampton@ccrc-north.org

Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - North

1004 DeSoto Park Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Phone: (850) 487-0922

To the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit:

The State of Florida has scheduled the execution of Petitioner, Andrew Richard

Lukehart (“Lukehart”), for June 2, 2026, at 6:00 p.m. by Florida’s current lethal

injection procedures. The Florida Supreme Court denied relief on Lukehart’s postwarrant claims for relief on May 27, 2026. Lukehart respectfully requests that this

Court stay his execution, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f),

pending consideration of his concurrently filed petition for a writ of certiorari.

STANDARDS FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION

The standards for granting a stay of execution are well-established. Barefoot

v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). There “must be a reasonable probability that four

members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious

for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a

significant possibility of reversal of the lower court's decision; and there must be a

likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted).

PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED A STAY OF EXECUTION

“The proper role of courts is to ensure that method-of-execution challenges to

lawfully issued sentences are resolved fairly and expeditiously.” Bucklew v. Precythe,

587 U.S. 119, 150 (2019). “Courts should police carefully against attempts to use such

challenges as tools to interpose unjustified delay.” Id. Lukehart seeks to justly delay

his execution so that he may actually receive the full protection of the Eighth

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Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth

Amendment’s guarantee of due process. Lukehart presents three questions of

constitutional significance that only this Court can resolve. Lukehart has exhausted

all remedies in state court to no avail.

Courts' equitable discretion in handling stay requests is governed by wellestablished principles. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). The issuance of

a stay is left to this Court’s discretion, guided by four factors:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will

substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and

(4) where the public interest lies.

Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).

It is equally well established that “[d]eath is a punishment different from all

other sanctions in kind rather than degree.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.

280, 303–304 (1976). “For that reason, the equities in a death penalty case will almost

always favor the prisoner so long as he or she can show a reasonable probability of

success on the merits.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 172 (2019) (Sotomayor, J.,

dissenting) (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 434).

There is a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the issues raised in

Lukehart’s petition for writ of certiorari. In his first question presented, Lukehart

raises the issue of the Florida courts’ continued denial of due process to capital

defendants under active death warrants by denying them evidentiary hearings on

their post-warrant method-of-execution claims. “[F]undamental fairness is the

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hallmark of the procedural protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.” Ford v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 424 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the

judgment). Lukehart and all capital defendants in Florida are entitled to due process

at every stage of their capital proceedings, including their final chance to litigate for

their very lives while under an active death warrant and facing an imminent

execution. Yet, the Florida courts continue to deny capital defendants the

fundamental fairness that due process requires by pervasively denying them

evidentiary hearings on their post-warrant method-of-execution claims. See Lukehart

v. State, Florida Supreme Court Case No.: SC2026-0736 (May 27, 2026); see also Cole

v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054 (Fla. 2024); Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385 (Fla. 2025); Rogers

v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257 (Fla. 2025); Randolph v. State, 422 So. 3d 166 (2025).

Lukehart raised meritorious Eighth Amendment as-applied and facial

challenges to lethal injection following the signing of his May 1, 2026, active death

warrant based on, anesthesiologist, Dr. Joel Zivot’s expert opinions that Florida’s

“Etomidate protocol” would cause needless pain and suffering specifically for

Lukehart and for all capital defendants experiencing the protocol. Lukehart’s Eighth

Amendment method-of-execution claims were premised on the Florida Department

of Corrections’ current lethal injection procedures promulgated on February 18, 2025;

Lukehart’s severe kidney disease for which he suffered a medical emergency in

January of 2026; and Dr. Zivot’s review of Lukehart’s recent medical records, the

post-execution autopsy records of the nineteen Florida executions that occurred in

2025, and heavily redacted FDOC lethal injection drug logs obtained by counsel for

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the now-deceased Frank Walls in Walls v. Dixon, No. 4:25-cv-0488, ECF 1 (N.D. Fla.

Nov. 26, 2025). In his first method-of-execution claim, Lukehart raised an as-applied

challenge to the constitutionality of Florida’s lethal injection procedures based on

Lukehart’s severe kidney disease. Lukehart submitted an affidavit by defense expert

Dr. Joel Zivot, M.D., who opined that the interaction of Lukehart’s severe kidney

disease and Florida’s lethal injection protocol would cause an exaggerated negative

consequence on Lukehart’s heart and lungs, making his own death more painful and

cruel.

In his second method-of-execution claim, Lukehart raised a facial challenge to

the constitutionality of Florida’s lethal injection based on Dr. Zivot’s findings that the

protocol, as designed, creates an objectively intolerable risk of needless pain and

suffering. Florida’s lethal injection procedures, also called the “Etomidate protocol,”

call for the sequential intravenous injection of the following drugs: 1) 200 milligrams

of etomidate, 2) 1000 milligrams of rocuronium bromide, and 3) 240 milliequivalents

of potassium acetate. Dr. Zivot opined that the sequential use of the analgesic drug

etomidate followed by the paralytic drug rocuronium bromide guarantees that

inmates will experience a painful and terrifying death by internal suffocation as the

rocuronium bromide prevents the inmate from breathing by paralyzing the

diaphragm, which prevents air from being moved in and out of the lungs. Dr. Zivot’s

review of the post-execution autopsy records of the nineteen executions that took

place in Florida in 2025 showed evidence of pulmonary edema, or blood-filled lungs

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with frothy bloody fluid, in fifteen of the nineteen cases. Dr. Zivot opined that the

sensation of fluid in the lungs is akin to the feeling of drowning or waterboarding.

Despite the compelling evidence that there is an imminent risk that Florida’s

Etomidate protocol will cause Lukehart needless pain and suffering, the Florida

courts denied Lukehart due process and abdicated their responsibility to ensure that

Florida’s method of lethal injection comports with the Eighth Amendment by refusing

to hold an evidentiary hearing on either of Lukehart’s method-of-execution claims.

This Court has demanded that factfinding procedures in capital proceedings aspire

to a heightened standard of reliability. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411

(1986) (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984)). The need for heightened

reliability “is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most

irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.” See Ford, 477

U.S. at 411 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)). Despite the

obvious need for heightened reliability in the factfinding procedures caused by the

finality of Lukehart’s active warrant litigation, the Florida courts refused to engage

in full and fair factfinding on Lukehart’s claims, and so therefore the outcome of his

warrant litigation does not have the heightened reliability that it is due.

While the Florida courts abdicated their responsibility in Lukehart’s case to

ensure his execution comports with the Eighth Amendment, many other jurisdictions

are upholding their responsibility by holding full and fair evidentiary hearings on

their capital defendants’ post-warrant method-of-execution claims. See Black v.

Strada, 721 S.W.3d 223 (Tenn. 2025) (Tennessee capital defendant); Barber v.

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Governor of Alabama, 73 F.4th 1306 (11th Cir. 2023) (Alabama capital defendant);

Atwood v. Shinn, No. CV-22-00860-PHX-MTL (JZB), 2022 WL 1970017 (D. Ariz. June

4, 2022) (Arizona capital defendant); In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 946 F.3d

287 (6th Cir. 2019) (Ohio capital defendant); Williams v. Kelley, No. 5:17-CV-00103KGB (E.D. Ark. 2017) (Arkansas capital defendant). Lukehart’s case is the ideal

vehicle for this Court to resolve the constitutional issues caused by the Florida courts’

pervasive denial of evidentiary hearings on method-of-execution claims, and

Lukehart has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of this

question presented.

In his second question presented, Lukehart raises the issue that the

alternative method requirement of the Baze-Glossip test violates his First

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Florida courts refused to

engage with the merits of this issue, and this Court’s intervention is needed to

definitively answer the question. To succeed on his two Eighth Amendment methodof-execution claims, Lukehart is required to identify a method of execution other than

Florida’s current lethal injection procedures that is “feasible, readily implemented,

and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.” Glossip, 576 U.S.

at 877 (quoting Baze, 533 U.S. at 52). The requirement under this Court’s current

jurisprudence that Lukehart choose another less-painful method of execution is

morally repugnant, impossible to realistically meet, and violates Lukehart’s First,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.

Lukehart has a First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion, even

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as an incarcerated prisoner facing an imminent execution. See Ramirez v. Collier, 595

U.S. 411, 424–25 (2022) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)) (explaining the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act provides that no government shall

impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person confined to an

institution, including state prisoners); see also Murphy v. Collier, 587 U.S. 901 (2019)

(granting defendant’s application for stay of execution and finding the State could not

carry out the execution unless the State permitted a Buddhist spiritual advisor to

accompany the defendant in the execution chamber).

The alternative method requirement of the Baze-Glossip test violates

Lukehart’s right to the free expression of his religion under both the First

Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

(“RLUIPA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). “Several provisions of RLUIPA underscore

its expansive protection for religious liberty.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015).

“Congress defined ‘religious exercise’ capaciously to include ‘any exercise of religion,

whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”’ Holt, 574 U.S.

at 358 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A)). “Congress mandated that this concept

‘shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum

extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”’ Holt, 574 U.S.

at 358 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g)).

Lukehart is a long-time practicing Catholic. Having to choose an alternative

method for his own execution runs afoul of church doctrine which views both murder

and suicide as grave violations of the Fifth Commandment – “Thou shalt not kill.”

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This stems from the belief that human life is sacred, belonging to God, who is the sole

author of life and death. Forcing Lukehart to make such a choice in order to succeed

on his meritorious Eighth Amendment challenges to lethal injection prohibits his free

exercise of religion, which the First Amendment and RLUIPA sought to protect. The

Baze-Glossip alternative method pleading requirement cannot be validly applied to

Lukehart under these circumstances. Doing so would force Lukehart to make the

constitutionally repugnant choice of giving up his constitutional right to free religious

exercise to vindicate his constitutional right to be free from a cruel and unusual

execution, or vice versa. This Court has “[found] it intolerable that one constitutional

right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.” Simmons v. United

States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).

Despite this compelling constitutional question posed to the court, the Florida

Supreme Court failed to answer the merits. The FSC refused to rule on the actual

merits of the question, instead finding that it was “bound by the conformity clause of

the Florida Constitution to construe the state prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment consistently with pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court.”

Lukehart v. State, Florida Supreme Court Case No.: SC2026-0736 (Fla. May 27, 2026)

at 15, footnote 11. Lukehart’s case provides this Court with the ideal vehicle to

answer the question of whether the alternative method requirement of the BazeGlossip test violates capital defendants’ First Amendment right to the free exercise

of religion because Lukehart’s deeply held Catholic beliefs prevent him from pleading

an alternative method of execution.

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In his recent dissent in Hoffman v. Westcott in an analogous case to Lukehart’s,

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote that he would grant a stay of application and petition for

writ of certiorari on Louisiana capital defendant Jessie Hoffman’s claim that

Louisiana’s method of execution by nitrogen hypoxia violated his rights under

RLUIPA as a practicing Buddhist, explaining that

The Court of Appeals failed to confront the district court's apparent legal

error—or even to mention the RLUIPA claim Mr. Hoffman pressed on

appeal. Perhaps that claim ultimately lacks merit. But the Fifth

Circuit's unexplained omission leaves this Court poorly positioned to

assess it. I would therefore grant the stay application and petition for

writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, and remand

for that court to address Mr. Hoffman's RLUIPA claim in the first

instance.

Hoffman v. Westcott, 145 S. Ct. 797 (2025) (on application for stay) (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting). In addition to Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and

Jackson also would have granted the application for stay of execution. See Hoffman

v. Westcott, 145 S. Ct. 797 (2025). The FSC similarly refused to reach the merits of

Lukehart’s First Amendment challenge to the Baze-Glossip test by relying on

Florida’s “conformity clause.” This Court should therefore grant Lukehart’s stay

application and petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the FSC’s May 27, 2026 opinion,

and remand for the FSC to make an actual merits determination. Alternatively, this

Court should grant Lukehart’s petition in order to make the actual merits

determination of this important federal question that the FSC refused to make.

Lukehart has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of this

question.

In his third question presented, Lukehart raises the issue of the Florida courts’

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pervasive denial of lethal injection records to Florida capital defendants and the

growing concern that the Florida Department of Corrections is deviating from its own

execution procedures during recent executions. The Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution requires states to implement standards to ensure

fundamental fairness in judicial proceedings. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of

Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Florida Rule

of Criminal Procedure 3.852 governs requests for the production of records for capital

postconviction defendants.

Lukehart timely requested public records related to lethal injection from the

Florida Department of Corrections, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and

District Eight Medical Examiner’s Office on May 5, 2026. Additionally, Lukehart

requested, but was denied, the autopsy files from the last ten executions that have

occurred under FDOC’s current lethal injection procedures. In affirming the denial of

Lukehart’s records requests, the Florida Supreme Court held that the requests did

not relate to a colorable claim because the constitutionality of the current lethal

injection protocol has been consistently upheld. See Lukehart v. State, Florida

Supreme Court Case No.: SC2026-0736 (Fla. May 27, 2026) at 21. Further, the FSC

held that records related to the actions of lethal injection personnel in the past, do

not relate to a colorable claim for relief concerning future executions due to the

presumption that personnel will perform their duties properly. Id. The Florida courts

continual denial of capital postconviction defendants’ requests for lethal injection

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records essentially blocks defendants’ ability to effectively challenge Florida’s lethal

injection protocol and raise method-of-execution claims.

Further recent FDOC drug logs and the autopsy records from Florida

executions occurring in 2025 pierce the presumption that FDOC will follow its own

procedures. Heavily redacted records obtained from FDOC by counsel for the nowdeceased Frank Walls in Walls v. Dixon, No. 4:25-cv-0488, ECF 1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26,

2025) raise serious questions as to whether FDOC has deviated from the lethal

injection procedures, and highlight the need for disclosure of the requested lethal

injection records and greater transparency concerning the lethal injection process.

The potential risks of applying the Etomidate protocol to a medically vulnerable

individual like Lukehart are heightened because, while Florida shatters records for

the speed and volume of executions in 2025 and 2026, FDOC has demonstrated

repeated negligence and noncompliance with respect to its own protocol. The heavily

redacted records received by counsel in Walls v. Dixon raise serious concerns about

FDOC’s administration of its own procedures. For example, Florida executed Michael

Bell on July 15, 2025. However, the corresponding inventory log shows that FDOC

did not record removing rocuronium bromide or potassium acetate until the next day,

July 16, 2025. Even more concerning, the logs contain no entry indicating that

etomidate was removed for Bell’s execution at all, so it is not clear what amount of

etomidate Michael Bell received during his execution.

FDOC noted that they removed all three drugs used during Thomas Gudinas’s

execution on June 25, 2025, despite the execution taking place on June 24, 2025. For

11

the execution of Anthony Wainwright, FDOC recorded the removal of etomidate,

rocuronium bromide, and potassium acetate on June 12, 2025, despite the execution

taking place on June 10, 2025. FDOC consistently records that execution drugs are

removed from supply after executions take place, indicating that the records are

inaccurate and, for some reason, being filled out after the fact. On June 25, 2025, a

date corresponding to Thomas Gudinas’s execution (which actually occurred on June

24), the inventory logs only show 10 x 10 ml vials of rocuronium bromide were

removed (1000 mg), suggesting that FDOC may have only prepared half of the

required paralytic drug, in violation of the etomidate protocol, which requires that

2000 mg, or 20 x 10 ml vials, be prepared.

On June 12, 2025, a date corresponding to Anthony Wainwright’s execution

(which occurred on June 10, 2025), seven vials of potassium acetate were removed

from FDOC’s inventory. This suggests that FDOC may have prepared only 280

milliequivalents of potassium acetate in violation of the etomidate protocol, which

requires 480 milliequivalents (12 x 20ml vials) be prepared. The log sheets show that

during the executions of Edward James and Michael Tanzi, FDOC administered

lidocaine, an anesthetic drug not called for in the etomidate protocol.

Lastly, FDOC indicates on the log sheets that they used etomidate with an

expiration date of January 31, 2025, during the executions of Victor Jones on

September 30, 2025; David Pittman on September 17, 2025; Curtis Windom on

August 28, 2025; and Kayle Bates on August 19, 2025. The discrepancies in these

records expose the troubling absence of a mechanism to regularly ensure that FDOC

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is complying with its own etomidate protocol. Given that Lukehart is very likely

already at a heightened risk of severe pain and suffering due to his unique medical

conditions, these partial records from FDOC indicating potential deviation from its

own Etomidate protocol raise grave concerns that Lukehart may experience needless

pain and suffering during his execution currently scheduled for June 2, 2026.

Notably, in Dr. Zivot’s evaluation of the autopsies of now-deceased inmates

James Ford, Jeffrey Hutchinson, Glen Rogers, Anthony Wainwright, Thomas

Gudinas, Samuel Smithers, and Richard Randolph1, the physical evidence- notations

of intramuscular injections in the shoulder of each inmate- points to a high likelihood

that all these men received a mysterious dosage of an unknown substance. The FDOC

lethal injection protocol makes no mention of any option that permits an

intramuscular injection. This finding from Dr. Zivot’s evaluation provides further

support for the argument that FDOC is deviating from its lethal injection protocols,

and Dr. Zivot has opined that ad hoc polypharmacy as an adjunct to lethal injection

raises the serious and likely risk of needless pain and suffering.

The continued denials of records related to lethal injection place Lukehart and

all other Florida capital defendants in an impossible Catch-22 that can only be

remedied by granting defendants access to these records. Justice Sonia Sotomayor

recently wrote in the Melvin Trotter case “to express concern about Florida's

implementation of its execution protocol and the secrecy surrounding it.” See Trotter

1 James Ford was executed on February 13, 2025. Jeffrey Hutchinson was executed on May 1, 2025.

Glen Rogers was executed on May 15, 2025. Anthony Wainwright was executed on June 10, 2025.

Thomas Gudinas was executed on June 24, 2025. Samuel Smithers was executed on October 14, 2025.

Richard Randolph was executed on November 20, 2025.

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v. Florida, 146 S. Ct. 755, 755 (2026) (statement respecting the denial of the

application for stay and petition for certiorari). Justice Sotomayor further wrote in

Trotter’s case that

The record reflects at least the possibility that recent Florida executions

have involved—in addition to expired drugs—incorrect drug doses, the

use of nonprotocol drugs, and record keeping lapses that could mask yet

additional failings. The Florida Supreme Court, moreover, has thus far

not allowed further inquiry into these potential problems and has

recently denied requests for records that would prove or disprove claims

like Trotter's … In doing so, the Florida Supreme Court appears to be

placing prisoners in a Catch-22: It has affirmed the denial of requests

for records on these issues, at least in part, because the prisoners do not

yet have enough information to raise a “colorable” Eighth Amendment

claim … The very reason the prisoners are seeking the records, however,

is to gather enough information to raise a colorable Eighth Amendment

claim.

Individuals seeking to challenge the method of their execution should

not have to guess at whether the State is, or is not, following its

execution protocol. Nor does the State appear to have any legitimate

confidentiality interest in shielding from inspection basic facts about the

implementation of its execution protocol, such as whether the State is

using expired drugs. If the protocol is in fact being followed, then

transparency instills confidence in the protocol for everyone—prisoners,

the courts, and the public alike. If it is not, then secrecy is intolerable,

and disclosure of the relevant records is indispensable for determining

whether the lapses at issue are likely to lead to an Eighth Amendment

violation …

By continuing to shroud its executions in secrecy, Florida undermines

both the integrity of its own execution process and, potentially, this

Court's ability to ensure the State's compliance with its constitutional

obligations.

Trotter v. Florida., 146 S. Ct. 755, 755–56 (2026) (internal citations and footnotes

omitted). Lukehart’s case presents this Court with the opportunity to remedy this

Catch-22 situation that Florida capital defendants have been placed under by the

persistent denial of records related to lethal injection and also help ensure that the

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State of Florida is meeting its constitutional obligations related to executions.

Florida’s continued secrecy surrounding its lethal injection procedures and

whether those procedures are actually being following during executions must end

now. As of the filing of this stay application and corresponding petition for writ of

certiorari, Governor Ron DeSantis has signed ten active death warrants in the first

five months of 2026 alone. Based on the previous pattern of nineteen death warrants

signed in 2025, there is no indication that this exponential pace of executions in

Florida will end anytime soon. Justice Sotomayor’s recent statement expressing

“concern about Florida's implementation of its execution protocol and the secrecy

surrounding it” evidences that Lukehart has made a strong showing that he is likely

to succeed on the merits of this issue. Lukehart raises both meritorious as-applied

and facial challenges to Florida’s Etomidate protocol. His case presents the ideal

vehicle for this Court to grant certiorari and hold Florida to its constitutional

obligations by ending the secrecy shrouding lethal injection in this state.

Lukehart’s impending execution only four days from the filing date of this

stay application is plainly an irreparable injury because he cannot vindicate his

constitutional rights once he is dead. “The third requirement-that irreparable harm

will result if a stay is not granted-is necessarily present in capital cases.” Wainwright

v. Booker, 473 U.S. 935, 937 n.1 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring). As a result, this factor

“weighs heavily in the movant’s favor,” based on the “irreversible nature of the death

penalty.” See O’Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982). It is indisputable

that Lukehart will be irreparably harmed if his execution is allowed to go forward in

15

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the balance of equities

weighs heavily in favor of a stay.

Lukehart recognizes that “the State and the victims of crime have an

important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” Hill v. McDonough, 547

U.S. 573, 584 (2006). But the public has a strong interest in ensuring that the State

does not rush to implement a method of execution that violates fundamental

constitutional rights and federal law. The State and the public will not be harmed by

the full airing of Lukehart’s claims. Issuance of a brief stay of execution pending this

Court’s consideration of Lukehart’s petition serves the public’s interest in ensuring

that capital punishment is carried out in compliance with the United States

Constitution. Florida’s interest in the timely enforcement of judgments handed down

by its courts must be weighed against Lukehart’s continued interest in his life. See

Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (“[I]t is incorrect . . . to

say that a prisoner has been deprived of all interest in his life before his execution.”)

(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).

Florida has a minimal interest in finality and efficient enforcement of

judgments, but Lukehart has a compelling interest in and the right to ensure that his

execution comports with the Constitution. This right includes the ability to have

meaningful judicial review of the complex constitutional claims he raises. A stay of

execution would ensure a meaningful review process and make certain that Lukehart

is not denied due process during his last chance to litigate for his very life. “The

fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a

16

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Lukehart was

denied the opportunity for his meritorious post-warrant claims to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner because the Governor of Florida signed

his active death warrant on an expedited thirty-two-day timeframe. The

constitutional issues present in Lukehart’s case require judicial review that is not

truncated by the exigencies of an imminent execution and an expedited warrant

timeframe. In addition, the irreversible nature of the death penalty frequently

supports in favor of granting a stay. “[A] death sentence cannot begin to be carried

out by the State while substantial legal issues remain outstanding.” Barefoot, 463

U.S. at 888. Should this Court grant the request for a stay and review of the

underlying petition, Lukehart submits there is a significant possibility of the lower

court’s reversal.

CONCLUSION

This Court’s intervention is urgently needed to prevent Lukehart’s imminent

and unconstitutional execution. For the foregoing reasons, Lukehart respectfully

requests that this Court grant his application for a stay of his June 2, 2026, execution

to address the compelling constitutional questions in his case on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Adrienne Joy Shepherd*

ADRIENNE JOY SHEPHERD

*Counsel of Record

*Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court

Florida Bar No. 1000532

17

Assistant CCRC-North

Email: adrienne.shepherd@ccrc-north.org

/s/ Alicia Hampton

ALICIA HAMPTON

Florida Bar No. 1026214

Assistant CCRC-North

Email: alicia.hampton@ccrc-north.org

Capital

Collateral

Regional

Northern Region

1004 DeSoto Park Drive

Tallahassee, FL 32301

Phone: (850) 487-0922

May 29, 2026

Dated

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Counsel-