Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sinnissippi Rod & Gun Club, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, et al.

No. 26-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

SINNISSIPPI ROD & GUN CLUB, INC., AND

SIMON EICHELBERGER,

Petitioners,

v.

KWAME RAOUL, ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND BRENDAN

.

KELLY, DIRECTOR OF THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Illinois Appellate Court

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dmitry N. Feofanov

CHICAGOLEMONLAW.COM, P.C.

404 Fourth Avenue West

Lyndon, IL 61261

815/986-7303

Feofanov@ChicagoLemonLaw.com

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A – OPINION OF THE APPELLATE

COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT, FILED

MARCH 1, 2024…………………………………………1a

APPENDIX B – ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

WHITESIDE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, FILED

FEBRUARY 19, 2021………………………...….…...56a

APPENDIX C – ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME

COURT, FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2025…..….......58a

APPENDIX D – CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND STATUTES INVOLVED……………..…....….59a

1a

APPENDIX A – OPINION OF THE APPELLATE

COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT, FILED

MARCH 1, 2024

2024 IL App (3d) 210073

Opinion filed March 1, 2024

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2024

SINNISSIPPI ROD & GUN CLUB, INC. and

SIMON EICHELBERGER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

KWAME RAOUL, in His Official Capacity as

Attorney General; and BRENDAN F.

KELLY, in His Official Capacity as Director

of the Illinois State Police,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 14th Judicial

Circuit, Whiteside County, Illinois.

Appeal No. 3-21-0073

Circuit No. 19-MR-151

Honorable

2a

Patricia Ann Senneff,

Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the

court, with opinion.

Justice Albrecht specially concurred in the judgment,

with opinion.

Justice Holdridge dissented in the judgment, with

opinion.

OPINION

¶1

Plaintiffs—Sinnissippi Rod & Gun Club, Inc., and

one of its members, Simon Eichelberger—filed a

complaint in the circuit court of Whiteside County against

defendants— Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul and

Illinois State Police Director Brendan F. Kelly—

challenging the constitutionality of the criminal code

restrictions that prohibit them from openly carrying a

firearm in public. Specifically, plaintiffs requested a

declaration that the concealed carry provisions under

section 24-1(a)(10) of the unlawful use of weapons (UUW)

statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(10) (West 2020)) and section

24-1.6(a) the aggravated unlawful use of weapon (AUUW)

statute (id. § 24-1.6(a)) were unconstitutional under the

second amendment of the United States Constitution

(U.S. Const., amend. II). The trial court found that there

was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the

constitutionality of the statutory scheme and granted

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Applying the

text-and-history test recently advanced in New York State

Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct.

2111, 2120 (2022), we conclude that the public carry

restrictions imposed under the UUW and the AUUW do

not violate the second amendment and affirm.

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¶2

I. BACKGROUND

¶3

In 2013, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the

Firearm Concealed Carry Act (Concealed Carry Act) (430

ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2020)) allowing law-abiding

citizens to obtain a license to carry a concealed firearm in

public, so long as individuals seeking licensure satisfy

certain objective criteria. See Pub. Act 98-63 (eff. July 9,

2013). To qualify for a license, applicants must be at least

21 years of age, possess a valid card under the Firearm

Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq.

(West 2020)), complete firearm training, and avoid

criminal conviction for offenses involving violence or

driving while under the influence within five years

preceding his or her application. 430 ILCS 66/25 (West

2020). So long as these statutory requirements are met,

the applicant provides necessary documentation and fees,

and a review board determines the applicant is not a

danger to himself or the public, the Illinois State Police

“shall issue” a license to carry a concealed firearm.1 Id. §

10(a).

1

The Concealed Carry Act defines “concealed firearm” as

“a loaded or unloaded handgun carried on or about a

person completely or mostly concealed from view of the

public or on or about a person within a vehicle.” 430 ILCS

66/5 (West 2020).

¶4

A concealed carry license permits a licensee to

publicly carry a loaded or unloaded firearm, on or about

his or her person, fully or partially concealed from the

view of the public. Id. § 10(c)(1). A licensee may also keep

or carry a firearm on or about his or her person within a

vehicle. Id. § 10(c)(2). The concealed carry licensing

regime, however, does not allow an individual to openly

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carry a firearm in public.

¶5

Two provisions in Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal

Code) (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) proscribe the

open carriage of firearms in public. Section 24-1(a)(10) of

the Criminal Code provides that a person commits the

offense of unlawful use of weapons when he or she

knowingly “[c]arries or possesses on or about his or her

person, upon any public street, alley, or other public lands

within the corporate limits of a city, village, or

incorporated town, *** any pistol, revolver, stun gun, or

taser or other firearm” without a “currently valid license

under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.” Id. § 24-1(a)(10).

Similarly, section 24-1.6(a) of the Criminal Code2 states

that a person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful

use of a weapon when he or she knowingly “[c]arries or

possesses on or about his or her person, upon any public

street, alley, or other public lands within the corporate

limits of a city, village or incorporated town,” any “pistol,

revolver, or handgun” and “has not been issued a

currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed

Carry Act.” Id. § 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A-5); (a)(2), (a)(3)(B-5)

(West 2020).

¶6

Eichelberger and other members of Sinnissippi Rod

& Gun Club have complied with Illinois’s Concealed Carry

Act and possess licenses to carry concealed firearms in

public. Eichelberger and other members are also National

Rifle Association certified firearms instructors and Illinois

certified concealed carry license instructors.

2

Previous provisions of the AUUW (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)

(West 2020)) statute have been successfully challenged

and deemed unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme

Court. In 2013, the court held, in People v. Aguilar, 2013

IL 112116, ¶¶ 20-21, that the AUUW’s provision

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criminalizing possession of an operable firearm for selfdefense outside the home was a categorical ban in

violation of an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.

Provisions criminalizing firearm carriage in a vehicle and

in certain public contexts were deemed facially

unconstitutional two years later in People v. Mosley, 2015

IL 115872, and People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387.

¶7

In November 2019, Sinnissippi Rod & Gun Club

and Eichelberger filed a complaint for declaratory relief

against defendants, requesting a declaration that sections

24-1(a)(10) and 24- 1.6(a) of the Criminal Code were

unconstitutional to the extent they prevented “otherwise

qualified Illinois residents” from openly carrying firearms

in public. In their complaint, plaintiffs facially challenged

the concealed carry restrictions under the UUW and

AUUW statutes and asserted that Eichelberger and other

gun club members would “carry a loaded and functional

handgun openly in public for self-defense and defense of

others, but they refrain from doing so because they fear

arrest and prosecution.”

¶8

The parties agreed that no genuine issue of

material fact existed and filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. Plaintiffs claimed that District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), controlled the issue. They

argued that Heller stands for the proposition that open

carry is constitutionally permitted and maintained that

the open carry of firearms remains “the ultimate human

right” because it is “the mode that best effectuates” the

right of self-defense. Defendants argued that there is no

second amendment right to openly carry firearms in

public. In the alternative, defendants maintained that,

even if concealed carry laws fell within the scope of the

second amendment, the statutory scheme passed

intermediate scrutiny because concealed carry restrictions

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are substantially related to important public safety

interests. The trial court found the concealed carry

restrictions constitutional and granted defendants’ motion

for summary judgment.

¶9

II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10

A. The Bruen Decision

¶ 11 In June 2022, the United States Supreme Court

decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.

Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). In Bruen, the

Court reviewed a provision of New York’s concealed carry

statute requiring an applicant to demonstrate a

heightened need for self-defense or “proper cause” to

obtain a license. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney

2020). New York justified the proper-cause requirement

as “substantially related to the achievement of an

important governmental interest,” preventing gun

violence. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruen, 597

U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2125. Relying on the established

jurisprudence of Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010), the Court held that the second and

fourteenth amendments’ protection of the “right of an

ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun in the

home for self-defense” extended to “carry[ing] a handgun

for self-defense outside the home.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___,

142 S. Ct. at 2122; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (holding

that the second amendment guarantees law abiding

citizens the right to possess a handgun in the home for

self-defense); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (incorporating

the same understanding of the second amendment to the

states through the fourteenth amendment). The Court

also referenced, with approval, Heller’s historical

understanding of the amendment to demark the limits on

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the exercise of that right: “Like most rights, the right

secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From

Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators

and courts routinely explained that the right was not a

right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any

manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose....

[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on

longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by

felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the

carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools

and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions

and qualifications on the

commercial sale of arms.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2162

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.).

¶ 12 Following a review of firearm regulations from

1791 through 1890, the court struck down New York’s

discretionary licensing scheme, concluding that the

second amendment guarantees “the right to bear

commonly used arms in public subject to certain

reasonable, well-defined restrictions.” Id. at ___, 142 S.

Ct. at 2156 (majority opinion). Notably, however, the

Court found no fault with the nondiscretionary “shallissue” licensing schemes adopted by 43 other states,

including the Concealed Carry Act plaintiffs challenge

here. See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2123 n.1 (enumerating

43 “shall-issue” state statutes, including section 10 of

Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2123 (noting “the vast majority of States—43 by our count

— are ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions, where authorities must

issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy

certain threshold requirements, without granting

licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a

perceived lack of need or suitability”); id. at ___ n.9, 142 S.

Ct. at 2138 n.9 (emphasizing that “nothing in or analysis

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should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of

the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes”).

¶ 13 In ruling that New York’s proper-cause

requirement infringed on an individual’s right to public

carry under the second amendment, the Court held that

the constitutionality of a firearm regulation depends

solely on whether the restriction is consistent with “the

historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the

right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2127.

Bruen then set forth a new test courts must conduct when

evaluating a second amendment challenge:

“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an

individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively

protects that conduct. The government must then

justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is

consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm

regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the

individual’s conduct falls outside the Second

Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’ ” Id. at ___, 142 S.

Ct. at 2129-30 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of

California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961)).

This text-and-history standard is a two-part inquiry. The

first inquiry is: Does the plain text of the second

amendment cover an individual’s conduct? Id. If not, the

regulation is constitutional because it falls outside the

scope of protection. But if it does, the individual’s conduct

is presumptively protected by the second amendment, and

we move to the second inquiry: Is the State’s regulation

“consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation[?]” Id.

¶ 14 In their supplemental briefs, plaintiffs argue that

the concealed carry provisions of the UUW and the

AUUW statutes amount to a “categorical denial” of their

right to bear arms under the second amendment and are

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therefore inconsistent with America’s history of second

amendment liberties. Defendants maintain that the

statutes at issue do not implicate the second amendment

and, alternatively, if they do, the regulations are

consistent with historical tradition.

¶ 15 B. Applying the New Text-and-History Test

¶ 16 1. Is Plaintiffs’ Conduct Covered by the Second

Amendment?

¶ 17 The second amendment provides that “[a] well

regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free

State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall

not be infringed.” U.S. Const., amend. II. In Heller, the

Supreme Court held that the natural connotation of “bear

[a]rms” means “wear, bear, or carry ... upon the person or

in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose ... of being

armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case

of conflict with another person.” The Court declared that

the right to possess and carry weapons for defense of the

home was a protected second amendment right. (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Heller, 554 U.S. at 584, 636.

¶ 18 The Illinois Supreme Court extended that right

outside the home in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶

21. In Aguilar, our supreme court recognized that “the

second amendment protects the right to possess and use a

firearm for self-defense outside the home” and found

section 24- 1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute, which

prohibited carrying a loaded firearm in public, to be

unconstitutional. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

¶ 19 In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court agreed

that second amendment protections include the rights of

individuals to possess and carry handguns outside the

home for self-defense: “In District of Columbia v. Heller

[citation], and McDonald v. Chicago [citation], we

recognized that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments

protect the right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to

10a

possess a handgun in the home for self defense. In this

case, petitioners and respondents agree that ordinary,

law-abiding citizens have a similar right to carry

handguns publicly for their self-defense. We too agree,

and now hold, consistent with Heller and McDonald, that

the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an

individual’s right to carry a handgun for self defense

outside the home.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2122.

¶ 20 Plaintiffs claim that Illinois’s criminalization of the

public carriage of firearms infringes on their right to carry

a handgun in public for self-defense. Following Heller,

Aguilar, and Bruen, the rights expressed in the second

amendment include the right to carry commonly used

firearms in public, subject to reasonable government

restriction. See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2156. Plaintiffs

argue, however, that the protections provided by the

second amendment should be extended to include a

particular manner of public carriage. We find the

resolution of this issue unnecessary. Even if we assume

plaintiffs’ proposed conduct is covered by the second

amendment, the challenged regulations are historically

justified under the second part of the Bruen analysis.

¶ 21

2. Is the State’s Regulation Consistent with

the Nation’s Tradition of Firearm Regulation?

¶ 22 At the second step, the burden shifts to the State to

demonstrate that regulating the manner of public

carriage by requiring a concealed carry license is

“consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126.

¶ 23 To demonstrate that a challenged restriction is

consistent with America’s historical tradition of firearm

regulation, the government may identify historical

regulations that are “distinctly similar” to the regulation

at issue or use “analogical reasoning.” Id. at ___, 142 S.

11a

Ct. at 2131-32. As explained in Bruen, most cases “will

often involve reasoning by analogy.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

at 2132. Inquiry by analogy is not intended to impose a

“regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check.”

Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. Reasoning by analogy

“requires only that the government identify a wellestablished and representative historical analogue, not a

historical twin.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at ___, 142 S.

Ct. at 2133. “Like all analogical reasoning, determining

whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a

distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a

determination of whether the two regulations are

‘relevantly similar.’ ” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132

(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106

Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993)).

¶ 24 In determining whether the regulation at issue

and historical tradition are “relevantly similar,” courts

should consider “how and why the regulations burden a

law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” Id. at

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132-33. Considerations of how and why

translate into two primary factors: (1) how—whether

modern and traditional laws impose a “comparable

burden” on the right to carry firearms for self-defense—

and (2) why—whether that burden is “comparably

justified.” See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133 (“[W]hether

modern and historical regulations impose a comparable

burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether

that burden is comparably justified are ‘ “central” ’

considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry.

[Citation.]” (Emphasis in original.)).

¶ 25 According to Bruen, the best way to conduct an

historical analogue is by understanding the scope of the

second amendment when it was adopted in 1791 through

the ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 and

the Reconstruction Period. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2136.

12a

Courts should examine “a variety of legal and other

sources” in early American history to determine the public

understanding of the second amendment. (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 212728; Heller, 554 U.S. at 605. Those sources include (1)

English practices that prevailed immediately before and

after the framing of the Constitution; (2) similar rights to

bear arms in state constitutions during the adoption of

the second amendment; (3) public understanding of the

right to keep and bear arms at the time the second

amendment was enacted in 1791, as well as when the

fourteenth amendment was ratified in 1868; and (4)

interpretation of the second amendment from 1791

through the end of the nineteenth century. Bruen, 597

U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2127-28.

¶ 26 However, as is evident from a study of Bruen and

the cases that have followed, historical analysis is not

always easy; it can be difficult and nuanced. See id. at

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2130; see also Firearms Policy Coalition,

Inc. v. McCraw, 623 F. Supp. 3d 740 (N.D. Tex. 2022)

(finding state statute prohibiting 18- to 20-year-olds from

carrying a handgun unconstitutional under Bruen);

United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023)

(finding federal statute prohibiting possession by

individual subject to domestic violence restraining order

unconstitutional under Bruen); United States v. Hill, No.

H-22-249, 2022 WL 17069855 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2022)

(finding federal statute criminalizing possession of a

firearm by a felon constitutional under Bruen); Frey v.

Nigrelli, 661 F. Supp. 3d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (denying

injunctive relief and concluding plaintiffs were unlikely to

succeed in their challenge of state statute banning public

carriage under Bruen); United States v. Jackson, No.

ELH-22-141, 2023 WL 2242873 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2023)

(holding federal statute criminalizing possession while

13a

under indictment constitutional under Bruen). In

conducting a review, a precise match between a current

law and historical regulation is not required. “[E]ven if a

modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical

precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass

constitutional muster.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

at 2133.

¶ 27 Following the Bruen framework, the historical

regulations cited by the State do not provide a “distinctly

similar” statute that is, to quote Bruen, a “dead ringer”

for Illinois’s concealed carry statutory scheme. By

analogy, however, the State provides a plethora of

evidence that regulating the manner of public carriage

comports with historical tradition.

¶ 28 As the State maintains, the historical record from

the founding era to the ratification of the fourteenth

amendment consistently demonstrates a tradition of

restricting the manner of public carriage. The United

States Supreme Court recognized this long-standing

custom in Heller, citing a robust historical tradition of

regulating the right to “bear arms.” See Heller, 554 U.S.

at 626. In Heller, the Court explained that “[f]rom

Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators

and courts routinely explained that the right [to keep and

bear arms] was not a right to keep and carry any weapon

whatsoever in any manner whatsoever.” (Emphasis

added.) Id. And in Bruen, the Court reiterated, if not

emphasized, that public carriage has historically been

subject to reasonable restrictions. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2128 (declining to declare second

amendment right to public carriage of weapons in “any

manner whatsoever” (emphasis added and internal

quotation marks omitted)); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2138

(emphasizing that the right to keep and bear arms in

public has traditionally been subject to well-defined

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restrictions); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2150 (noting that

historical tradition from the Antebellum period

demonstrated that “the manner of public carry was

subject to reasonable regulation” (emphasis in original));

id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (concluding that “through the

Anglo-American history of public carry,” the second

amendment has been subject to restrictions that “limited

the intent for which one could carry arms, the manner by

which one carried arms, or the exceptional circumstances

under which one could not carry arms” (emphasis added));

see also id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring)

(emphasizing that the Court’s decision did not disturb

“anything that we said in Heller or McDonald [citation],

about restrictions that may be imposed on the possession

or carrying of guns”); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2162

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.)

(reiterating the holdings in Heller and McDonald that the

right to keep and bear arms does not guarantee the right

to carry a weapon in “ ‘any manner whatsoever’ ”

(emphasis added) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626)).

¶ 29 More specifically, as cited by the State, various

forms of public carry restrictions proliferated across our

newly formed Nation after ratification of the second

amendment in 1791. Between 1791 and the middle of the

nineteenth century, several states enacted laws that

restricted, and even banned, the public carriage of pistols

and other small weapons.3 As recognized in Heller and

repeated in Bruen, “ ‘the majority of the 19th-century

courts to consider the question held that [these]

prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful

under the Second Amendment or state analogues.’ ”

Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2146 (quoting Heller,

554 U.S. at 626).4

¶ 30 Plaintiffs argue that historical laws demonstrate a

tradition of requiring open carry because they proscribed

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the concealed carry of handguns. However, a review of the

cases considering those laws demonstrates that allowing

open carry while prohibiting concealed carry was not the

crucial factor in determining whether the restrictions

passed constitutional muster. In the vast majority of

those cases, courts struck down statutes that categorically

prohibited the public carriage of firearms, both open and

concealed, and ruled that the second amendment

permitted limited restriction but not a complete ban.

Courts concluded that the government could lawfully

eliminate one kind of public carry to protect and ensure

the safety of its citizens, so long as the people were

permitted to carry weapons in another manner that

allowed self-defense. The constitutional emphasis in those

cases was the nature of the restriction—categorical

(unconstitutional) versus limited (constitutional)—rather

than open versus concealed. See State v. Mitchell, 3

Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833) (Indiana Supreme Court upheld

Indiana law restricting public carriage of handguns);

State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 22 (1842) (Arkansas Supreme

Court held that restricted carry was constitutional,

concluding that “the [second amendment] right in

question possesses no such immunity as exempts it from

all legal regulation and control”); State v. Chandler, 5 La.

Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (Louisiana Supreme Court upheld

state statute restricting manner of public carry because

statute did not categorically ban public carriage in that it

did not interfere with the right to carry arms in another

manner); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 399-400 (1858)

(“The statute in question does not infringe the right of

people to keep or bear arms. It is a measure of police,

prohibiting only a particular mode of bearing arms which

is found dangerous to the peace of society.” (Emphasis

omitted.)).

16a

3

In the early to mid-1800’s, states began enacting laws

that proscribed the concealed carry of small weapons or

banned individuals from carrying weapons in public

altogether. See 1795 Mass. Acts 436; 1801 Tenn. Pub.

Acts 259, 260-61; 1813 Ky. Acts 100; 1813 La. Acts 172;

1820 Ind. Acts 39; 1821 Me. Laws 285; 1821 Tenn. Pub.

Acts 15; 1838 Ark. Rev. Stat. § 13, p. 280; 1837 Ga. Acts

90; 1838 Va. Acts 76; 1839 Ala. Acts 67; 1859 Ohio Laws

56; 1860 N.M. Laws 94. Bruen also cites two additional

statutes enacted in Tennessee in 1821 and the territory of

Florida in 1835. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___ n.16, 142 S.

Ct. at 2146 n.16.

4

Both Bruen and Heller cited State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf.

229 (Ind. 1833); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616 (1840);

State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga.

243 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850);

State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856); State v. Jumel, 13

La. Ann. 399 (1858).

¶ 31 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Bruen “does not prohibit States from imposing

licensing requirements” for concealed carry of a handgun

for self-defense. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2161

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.)

(“[T]he Court’s decision does not prohibit States from

imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun

for self-defense.”). Of relevance here, Bruen specifically

noted that “these antebellum state-court decisions evince

a consensus view that [s]tates could not altogether

prohibit the public carry of ‘arms’ protected by the Second

Amendment or state analogues.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2147 (majority opinion) (explaining that historical cases

demonstrated that the second amendment right to bear

arms publicly was subject to limits on the manner of

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carriage).

¶ 32 Further, the history of the colonies and the early

Republic demonstrate common practices of regulating

public carry by the general public to prevent “fear” and

“terror.” See 1692 Mass. Acts and Laws no. 6, pp. 11-12;

1699 N.H. Laws ch. 1 (“all Affrayers, Rioters, Disturbers,

or Breakers of the Peace, and such as shall ride or go

armed Offensively...by Night or by Day, in Fear or Affray

of Their Majesties Liege People”); see also Collection of All

Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, ch. 21, p.

33 (1794) (“no man, great nor small, [shall] go nor ride

armed by night nor by day, in fairs or markets, or in other

places, in terror of the County”). Moreover, during the

1800s, states commonly regulated the manner in which

individuals carried a firearm in public to reduce violence

and protect the public. See generally Chandler, 5 La. Ann.

at 489-90 (law restricting manner of carriage was

“absolutely necessary to *** prevent bloodshed and

assassinations”); Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99, 101 (1872)

(holding that it was “not unreasonable” for the legislature

to restrict the manner of public carriage based on public

safety concerns); State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 697, 700 (1882)

(finding public carry restriction constitutional because it

did not impose a complete ban and its goal was to promote

the “peace and safety of the public”).

¶ 33 In sum, a review of the analogous statutes and

cases between the ratification of the second amendment

and the late nineteenth century reveals that while a

categorical prohibition on public carriage of firearms

unquestionably violated an individual’s right to keep and

bear arms (Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 187 (1871)),

laws prohibiting one manner of carriage while allowing

another did not (Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229; Buzzard, 4 Ark.

at 22; Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490; Jumel, 13 La. Ann. at

399-400). Numerous states regulated the manner of

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public carriage, and these laws were widely enforced. See

State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26, 29 (1841); Walls v. State, 7

Blackf. 572, 573 (Ind. 1845); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 48

Va. 597, 598-99 (1850); Jackson v. State, 12 Ga. 1, 5

(1852); State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633, 634 (1856);

Commonwealth v. McClanahan, 59 Ky. 8, 10 (1859); State

v. Stanford, 20 Ark. 145, 146 (1859). In fact, through the

end of the nineteenth century, courts “almost universally

held that the legislature may regulate and limit the mode

of carrying arms.” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E.

138, 138 (Mass. 1896) (citing antebellum state courts that

upheld statutes regulating the manner of public

carriage).5 Like its historical counterparts, section 24-1(a)

(10) of the UUW statute and section 24-1.6(a) of the

AUUW statute lawfully regulate the manner of public

carriage. Illinois’s concealed carry licensing requirement

lawfully regulates the right to bear arms for self-defense

by proscribing one manner of carriage and permitting

another. As long as the regulation does not compel “an

absolute ban” that imposes a significant burden on the

right of self-defense, the statute passes constitutional

muster. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2128

(reviewing founding era historical precedent from Heller).

Here, the criminal statutes regulating open carriage and

the referenced Concealed Carry Act do not impose such a

categorical ban.

¶ 34 “The Second Amendment guarantee[s] to ‘all

Americans’ the right to bear commonly used arms in

public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined

restrictions.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2156 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 581). While we agree

that the plain text of the second amendment protects the

public carriage of firearms for self-defense, we cannot

adhere to plaintiffs’ argument that the criminal statutes

at issue represent a categorical and unconstitutional ban

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on that right. Under section 24-1(a)(10) of the UUW

statute and section 24- 1.6(a) of the AUUW statute,

individuals who are licensed under the Concealed Carry

Act are allowed to exercise their second amendment right

to bear arms in public, subject to reasonable regulations.

Applying the text-and-history test recently announced in

Bruen, we find the challenged criminal statutes

constitutional, based on this Nation’s historical tradition

of regulatory measures restricting the manner of public

carry.

¶ 35

C. Practical Implications

5

The majority of states to address regulations

criminalizing the manner of carriage upheld such statutes

and constitutional provisions, concluding, almost

uniformly, that the right to keep and bear arms was not

unlimited and could be regulated. See generally Andrews,

50 Tenn. 165; Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840);

Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878); Haile v. State, 38 Ark.

564 (1882); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840); State v.

Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528 (1881); Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229.

¶ 36 Legitimate restrictions have been imposed on each

constitutional amendment in the interest of creating

reasonable safeguards. No constitutional right is absolute.

Even in the context of the first amendment, an individual

cannot yell “fire” in a crowded theater. See Schenck v.

United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The right of free

speech is regulated for the safety and well-being of the

general public, as are other constitutional rights. As the

court in People v. Rodriguez, 171 N.Y.S.3d 802, 805-06

(Sup. Ct. 2022), noted:

“Americans are well acquainted with the truism that one

cannot falsely shout fire in a crowded theatre despite the

free speech protections of the First Amendment (see

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Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [citation]

(1919); U.S. Const., amend. I). The Free Exercise Clause

does not bar states from requiring that students in public

schools be immunized against various vaccinepreventable illnesses over religious objection (see Prince

v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-167, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88

L. Ed. 645 (1944); Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d

538 (2d Cir. 2015); U.S. Const., amend. I), or from

penalizing the use of hallucinogenic drugs, even though

ingested pursuant to religious ceremony (see Employment

Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S.

872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990); see also

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244

(1878) (rejecting claim that criminal laws against

polygamy could not constitutionally be applied to those

whose religion commanded the practice)). Freedom of the

press does not in all cases forbid a prior restraint on

publication (see Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S.

539, 570, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976) (“This

Court has frequently denied that First Amendment rights

are absolute”); U.S. Const., amend. I). The right of an

accused to confront witnesses does not

categorically prohibit a child witness in a child sexual

abuse trial from testifying by one-way closed circuit

television (see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct.

3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990); U.S. Const., amend. VI).

The Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant be

obtained in order to enter a private residence to effect a

search or seizure permits exceptions for exigent

circumstances (see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100

S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980); U.S .Const., amend.

IV).”

¶ 37 We appreciate that Bruen fundamentally changed

our analysis of laws that implicate the second

amendment. The Court rejected the “means-end” test or

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any form of interest balancing that lower courts typically

applied post-Heller. Compare Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142

S. Ct. at 2126 (“we decline to adopt [the] two-part

approach”), with People v. Chairez, 2018 IL 121417, ¶¶

32, 35 (applying a “heightened level” of intermediate

scrutiny), and Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th

Cir. 2015) (same). But, in doing so, it did not abandon the

long-standing principle that the right to bear arms is not

unfettered. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2130,

2133 (noting by analogy our nation’s “historical tradition

of firearm regulation”); id. at ___ n.9, 142 S. Ct. at 2138

n.9 (“To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be

interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43

States’ ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes, under which ‘a

general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a

[permit].’ [Citation.]”); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2161

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.)

(“[T]he Court’s decision does not prohibit States from

imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun

for self defense.”). Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention,

Bruen did not hold that states are powerless to

criminalize the unlicensed possession of firearms within

their jurisdictions. In reviewing plaintiffs’ constitutional

challenge under Bruen’s two-part inquiry, considering

historical

analogies of firearm regulations from 1791 to the

Reconstruction Period, we find no support for extending

Bruen’s holding that far.

¶ 38 To be clear, plaintiffs in this case are requesting to

carry firearms in public whenever and however they

please, a proposition that Heller, which is still good law,

specifically rejected. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (right of

citizens to carry arms is “not a right to keep and carry any

weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever”). They

are not challenging the right to carry in specific places,

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nor are they challenging the licensure process of the

Concealed Carry Act. Indeed, they cannot. Eichelberger

and other members of Sinnissippi Rod and Gun Club are,

in fact, licensed to carry handguns in public under the

Concealed Carry Act. Instead, plaintiffs are claiming they

have a constitutional right to openly carry a loaded

weapon in public whenever and wherever they choose and

that the UUW and AUUW statutes criminalizing such

conduct are unconstitutional. Plaintiffs’ claims are

unsupported by Bruen.

¶ 39 Analyzing plaintiffs’ challenge under Bruen, we

hold that the UUW and the AUUW statutes,

criminalizing the carriage of firearms in violation of

Illinois’s concealed carry licensing system, are consistent

with American historical tradition and do not violate the

second amendment.6

¶ 40

IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside

County is affirmed.

¶ 42 Affirmed.

¶ 43 JUSTICE ALBRECHT, specially concurring:

6

This holding is consistent with the First District’s recent

decision in People v. Thompson, 2023 IL App (1st)

220429-U, ¶¶ 51-60. There, the court held that Illinois’s

prohibition of the open carriage of firearms as contained

in the AUUW statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2018))

does not violate the second amendment. Thompson, 2023

IL App (1st) 220429-U, ¶¶51-60.

¶ 44 I agree that the State’s regulation of open carriage

is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of

regulating the manner in which an individual may

publicly carry a firearm. Therefore, I concur that its

prohibition within Illinois’s concealed carry licensing

23a

regime satisfies the second prong of the Bruen inquiry.

This holding is also consistent with the recent First

District decision, People v. Thompson, 2023 IL App (1st)

220429-U, ¶¶ 51, 60. I write separately to point out that,

as a threshold issue, plaintiffs’ appeal fails because the

definition of the right to “bear arms,” as adopted in Heller

and Bruen, does not presumptively protect a specific

manner in which an individual is entitled to exercise his

or her right of public carriage.

¶ 45 As the majority points out, the United States

Supreme Court has adopted a natural meaning of the

phrase to “bear arms,” which denotes the right to “ ‘

“wear, bear, or carry ... upon the person or in the clothing

or in a pocket, for the purpose ... of being armed and ready

for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with

another person.” ’ ” Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (quoting

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)

(Ginsberg, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, C.J., and

Souter, J.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed.

1990)). Utilizing this definition, the Bruen Court held that

the term “bear” naturally encompasses public carry and

the second amendment’s plain text presumptively covers

the conduct of “ ‘bear[ing]’ arms in public for self-defense.”

See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2134-35. This

does not mean, however, as the plaintiffs suggest, that

any manner of public carry is protected by the plain

language of the second amendment.

¶ 46 The Court’s adopted definition of “bear arms” reads

disjunctively in defining the right. That is, an individual’s

right to “bear arms” may be exercised through the

wearing, bearing, or carrying of a firearm either openly

upon his or her person or concealed inside one’s clothes or

pocket. See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2134. Nothing in this

understanding suggests that an individual is entitled,

based on the definition of “bear[ing] arms,” to publicly

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carry openly and concealed. Both textually and

historically, therefore, regulating one manner of public

carriage while permitting another does not strip an

individual of this constitutional guarantee. The Concealed

Carry Act is in accordance with this principle.7

¶ 47 The initial step in the Bruen inquiry requires a

determination of whether the plaintiffs’ proposed course

of conduct falls under the plain text of the second

amendment. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2134. The conduct

here is not whether open carry as a form of public

carriage is conduct that falls within this ambit. Distinctly,

the true nature of the conduct is whether open carry is a

protected activity when concealed carry remains

available. Based on the disjunctive definition of the right

to “bear arms,” I would answer this initial step in the

negative. Because plaintiffs’ conduct falls beyond our

judicially accepted understanding of the right to “bear

arms,” it is not presumptively protected, and I would

dismiss plaintiffs’ claim at the first step of the Bruen

inquiry. See supra ¶ 13. I find this view closest to the

limitations placed upon the second amendment right,

which is not a right to “carry any weapon whatsoever in

any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. A contrary holding would expand

an individual’s right to publicly carry a firearm in any

manner that he or she chooses, which frustrates the

natural meaning of the second amendment’s text.

¶ 48

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

¶ 49 The United States Supreme Court has made clear

that State restrictions on the public carry of firearms are

constitutional only if they are consistent with our nation’s

historical tradition of firearms regulation. Illinois’s

categorical ban on the open carry of firearms finds no

support in historical tradition. Indeed, it runs directly

contrary to the relevant historical precedents, which

25a

unequivocally hold that open carry is an indispensable

and uniquely effective means of exercising the second

amendment right to armed self-defense in public. As such,

open carry may not be categorically banned, even when

concealed carry is permitted.

7

A licensee may carry a fully or partially concealed

firearm in public. 430 ILCS 66/10(c)(1) (West 2020); supra

¶ 4.

¶ 50 The second amendment secures an individual’s

right to keep and bear arms for self defense. Heller, 554

U.S. at 595. This includes the right to carry commonly

used firearms in public, subject to “reasonable, welldefined” government restrictions. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___,

142 S. Ct. at 2156. These rights apply to the states

through the fourteenth amendment. See McDonald v. City

of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).

¶ 51 When the second amendment’s plain text covers an

individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively

protects that conduct. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

at 2126. To justify its regulation of such conduct, the

government may not simply posit that the regulation

promotes an important interest. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2126. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the

regulation is consistent with this nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2126; Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 43. Only if

a firearm regulation is consistent with this nation’s

historical tradition may a court conclude that the

individual’s conduct falls outside the second amendment’s

“unqualified command.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126.

¶ 52 The only questions in this case are (1) whether the

plain text of the second amendment encompasses the open

26a

carry of firearms in public and (2) if so, whether Illinois’s

categorical ban on open carry is consistent with our

nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. I find

that the plain text of the second amendment encompasses

the right to the open public carry of firearms and that

Illinois’s categorical ban is unconstitutional.

¶ 53

I. The Second Amendment’s Text

¶ 54 The text of the second amendment protects the

conduct at issue in this case, i.e., the open carry of

firearms in public. The majority does not address this

issue because it finds it unnecessary to the resolution of

the case. However, the special concurrence adopts the

State’s argument that the second amendment’s plain text

does not encompass the plaintiffs’ conduct. I disagree.

¶ 55 In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court held

that, by its plain terms, the right to “bear” arms

expressed in the second amendment includes the right to

carry commonly used firearms in public for self-defense.

Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2135. Open carry is

simply one manner of public carry. Accordingly, the

second amendment’s plain text presumptively protects the

conduct at issue in this case, open carry. Id. Therefore,

the only question is whether a categorical ban on one

manner of public carry (open carry) is consistent with this

nation’s historical tradition of gun regulations.

¶ 56 The State argues that the open carry of firearms is

not presumptively protected because the text of the

second amendment “says nothing about the right to bear

arms in a particular manner, such as openly.” As noted

above, however, the open carry of firearms is a type of

public carry, which, in turn, is presumptively protected by

the second amendment’s text. Because public carry is

presumptively protected as a general matter, all types of

public carry fall within the ambit of such protection. The

sole question is whether a particular restriction on a

27a

particular manner of public carry is constitutionally

permissible.

¶ 57 Further, if the Supreme Court had understood the

second amendment as protecting only concealed carry, it

would not have held that the amendment guarantees the

right to wear, bear, or carry “upon the person” or “in the

clothing or in a pocket.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)

See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2134. The Court’s use of the

word “or” conveys that there is a difference between

carrying a firearm “upon the person” and carrying it “in

the clothing or in a pocket,” and that both methods of

carry are constitutionally protected.

¶ 58 The special concurrence reads the Supreme Court’s

use of the disjunctive “or” to mean that the second

amendment protects either open or concealed carry, but

not both at the same time. This interpretation

contravenes the plain meaning of the language at issue.

The Supreme Court merely references two different types

of carry that are constitutionally protected.

¶ 59 The Supreme Court neither states nor implies

anything about the availability of one method when the

other method is prohibited. The most natural reading of

the Supreme Court’s use of “or” is that it identifies two

distinct methods of carrying firearms, both of which are

presumptively protected. Whether one method may be

banned when another method is prohibited is a separate

question that must be resolved by determining whether

such a restriction is consistent with our nation’s history of

firearm regulation.

¶ 60 To justify the special concurrence’s conclusion that

the text of the second amendment does not cover the

conduct at issue in this case, the special concurrence also

adopts an awkward and unduly narrow construction of

the term “conduct.” Rather than defining the conduct at

28a

issue as “the open carry of firearms in public” (which

would be the simplest and most straightforward

definition), the special concurrence contends that “the

true nature of the conduct is whether open carry is a

protected activity when concealed carry remains

available.” (Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 47.

¶ 61 By defining the “conduct” in reference to the

regulatory regime at issue, the special concurrence puts

the cart before the horse by presuming the

constitutionality of Illinois’s regulatory scheme during the

first phase of the Bruen analysis. However, during the

first phase, we must determine only whether the text of

the amendment covers the general type of conduct at

issue. If we find that it does, we then proceed to the

second phase to determine whether the regulation at

issue is constitutionally permissible.

¶ 62 The Supreme Court has ruled unequivocally that

public carry for self-defense is protected. Bruen, 597 U.S.

at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2135. Open carry is one species of

public carry, so it is presumptively covered. The question

then becomes whether the particular restriction on public

carry imposed by Illinois (a categorical ban on open carry

while allowing for concealed carry) is consistent with our

nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

¶ 63 The Supreme Court applied this method of analysis

in Bruen, and we are bound to follow it. In Bruen, the

Court did not ask whether the right to public carry as

regulated by New York’s licensing scheme was covered by

the text of the second amendment. Instead, it asked

whether public carry in general was protected. After

holding that it was covered, the Court proceeded to the

second phase of the analysis. Only then did it seek to

determine whether New York’s particular licensing

regime was constitutional. The special concurrence jumps

the gun (no pun intended) by presuming the

29a

constitutionality of Illinois’s regulatory regime before

applying the required historical analysis.

¶ 64 The remainder of the special concurrence’s

argument is premised largely on the proposition that any

particular manner of carry is subject to reasonable

regulation. I agree. I am not contending that open carry is

an absolute and inviolable right that may not be

restricted under any circumstances. However, I find that

the categorical ban imposed by Illinois is not a

“reasonable regulation” permitted under the second

amendment because it is not consistent with our nation’s

historical regulation of firearms. The special

concurrence’s suggestion that any challenge to Illinois’s

statutory scheme amounts to a denial of the legitimacy of

any regulation on open carry is a straw man argument.

¶ 65 The State and the majority further contend that, in

Bruen, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of

“shall-issue” licensing regimes like Illinois’s which limit

the discretion of State and local governments to deny

public carry licenses to law-abiding citizens. In support of

this argument, they point to Bruen’s statement that

“nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest

the unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’

licensing regimes, under which ‘a general desire for selfdefense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’ [Citation.]” Id.

at ___ n.9, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9. When read in its proper

context, this statement does not support the State’s and

the majority’s argument. In the statement at issue, the

Bruen Court merely noted that, although it found New

York’s “may-issue” law to be unconstitutional, it was not

addressing the constitutionality of any particular “shallissue” regime. Its holding did not determine whether any

such regimes were unconstitutional. Bruen did not hold

that all “shall-issue” licensing regimes are constitutional

per se. To the contrary, it held that a categorical ban on

30a

public carry was unconstitutional, and it did not limit

that holding to “may-issue” regimes.

¶ 66 The State maintains that the plaintiffs have

forfeited their arguments in this case because they have

“made no effort to satisfy their burden of showing that the

second amendment’s text covers the open carriage of

firearms” and have not “engaged with” Bruen’s historical

analysis. Although the plaintiffs’ arguments could have

been developed more extensively, I do not find their

arguments so skeletal and perfunctory as to be forfeited.

Regardless, forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not on

courts. People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 21.

Given the importance of the constitutional issue

presented in this case, the merits of the case should be

addressed notwithstanding any claim of forfeiture.

¶ 67

II. The Historical Tradition of Firearm

Regulation

¶ 68 Because the right to carry firearms in public is

presumptively protected by the second amendment, the

only remaining question is whether the State of Illinois’s

allowing for the concealed carry of firearms in public

while categorically banning the open carry of such

weapons is consistent with our nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation. The State bears the

burden to prove that it is. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S.

Ct. at 2135. Only if the State can successfully carry that

burden may it credibly maintain that the second

amendment does not protect the open carry of firearms.

Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2135. I find it cannot.

¶ 69 In determining whether the State’s categorical ban

of open carry is consistent with the nation’s traditional

firearm regulations, it is necessary to consider the

regulation of firearms during various historical periods,

31a

including (1) medieval to early modern England, (2) the

American Colonies and the early Republic, (3) antebellum

America, (4) Reconstruction, and (5) the late-nineteenth

and early-twentieth centuries. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2135-36.

¶ 70 However, “when it comes to interpreting the

Constitution, not all history is created equal.” Id. at ___,

142 S. Ct. at 2136. “ ‘Constitutional rights are enshrined

with the scope they were understood to have when the

people adopted them ***.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 63435).

¶ 71 The second amendment was adopted in 1791; the

fourteenth in 1868. “Historical evidence that long

predates either date may not illuminate the scope of the

right if linguistic or legal conventions changed in the

intervening years.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2136. The

most relevant and probative historical evidence is that

which illuminates the public understanding of the right to

bear arms that “prevailed up to the period immediately

before and after the framing of the Constitution.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

at 2136. Evidence from the antebellum period is

particularly “critical” because (1) it is relatively near the

time of the founding and closely predates the ratification

of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, and (2) “the public

understanding of the right to keep and bear arms in both

1791 and 1868 was, for all relevant purposes, the same

with respect to public carry.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2138.

The majority acknowledges this. See supra ¶ 25 (noting

that, in determining whether a modern regulation on the

public carry of firearms is constitutional, the most

important inquiry is whether the regulation comports

with “the scope of the second amendment when it was

adopted in 1791 through the ratification of the fourteenth

32a

amendment in 1868 and the Reconstruction Period”).

¶ 72 Prior to the antebellum period, no State statutes,

published judicial decisions, or legal commentators

addressed whether States may ban the open carry of

ordinary firearms for self defense while allowing the

concealed carry of such firearms. The State points to

various general bans on the public carry of firearms

imposed in England from enactment of the Statute of

Northampton in 1328 (Statute of Northampton 1328, 2

Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.)) through the enactment of the English

Bill of Rights in 1689. This historical evidence is of little

relevance to the question presented in this case.

¶ 73 None of the regulations at issue banned the open

carry of firearms while allowing concealed carry.

Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Bruen, the

majority of these regulations did not categorically ban the

open carry of all firearms in public, as Illinois has done.

Rather, they banned only certain limited and well-defined

methods of open carry, such as the open carry of

“unusual” weapons, the carry of weapons in certain

“sensitive” places, or the bearing of weapons with the

intent to terrify members of the public. See Bruen, 597

U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2138-42. The historical sources

upon which the State relies confirm this. See Abraham

Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike: Exemplifying the Praecepts

of Logike by the Practice of the Common Lawe 56

(London, William Howe 1588); 4 William Blackstone,

Commentaries on the Laws of England 148-49 (1769). In

Sir John Knight’s Case (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (KB),

Chief Justice Herbert explained that the English common

law tradition, which was codified in the Statute of

Northampton, established that a person going armed in

public would violate the Statute only when he acted with

malice or evil intent.

¶ 74 Nonetheless, to the extent that any centuries-old

33a

English statute or common law prohibited or broadly

restricted the public carry of firearms, including open

carry, such antiquated legal sources are of minimal

relevance unless similar regulations were in place shortly

before or after the ratification of the Bill of Rights in

1791. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2136

(ruling that “English common-law practices and

understandings at any given time in history cannot be

indiscriminately attributed to the Framers of our own

Constitution,” and that, in interpreting our own

Constitution, “it [is] [sometimes] better not to go too far

back into antiquity for the best securities of our liberties

[citation], unless evidence shows that medieval law

survived to become our Founders’ law”).

¶ 75 As the Supreme Court found in Bruen, few such

regulations existed in the Colonies before or after the

ratification of the second amendment. See id. at ___, 142

S. Ct. at 2142 (“there is little evidence of an early

American practice of regulating public carry by the

general public”). The Court added that “[t]his should come

as no surprise” because “English subjects founded the

Colonies at about the time England had itself begun to

eliminate restrictions on the ownership and use of

handguns.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2142.

¶ 76 The State identifies several regulations of public

carry that existed during the colonial period or shortly

after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. None of these

regulations banned open public carry categorically. For

example, the State points to an East New Jersey statute

that was enacted in 1686. That statute prohibited the

concealed carry of “pocket pistol[s]” or other “unusual or

unlawful weapons,” and it further prohibited “planter[s]”

from carrying all pistols unless in military service or, if

“strangers,” when traveling through the “Province.” An

Act Against Wearing Swords, &c., ch. 9, in Grants,

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Concessions, and Original Constitutions of the Province of

New Jersey 290 (2d ed. 1881) (Grants and Concessions).

These restrictions do not support the State’s argument.

¶ 77 As the Supreme Court noted in Bruen, the

foregoing statute “restricted only concealed carry, not all

public carry, and its restrictions applied only to certain

‘unusual or unlawful weapons,’ including ‘pocket pistol[s].’

” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2143 (quoting

Grants and Concessions, supra, at 290). Pocket pistols

were far smaller than the other belt and hip pistols that

were commonly used for lawful purposes in the 1600s and

were therefore capable of being concealed. Id. at ___, 142

S. Ct. at 2143. Moreover, “the law *** presumably did not

by its terms touch [on] the open carry of larger,

presumably more common pistols, except as to “ ‘planters.’

” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2144 (quoting Grants and

Concessions, supra, at 290). The Court noted that,

although the “planter” restriction may have prohibited

the public carry of pistols, “it did not prohibit planters

from carrying long guns for self-defense—including the

popular musket and carbine.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2144. For all of these reasons, the Court concluded that

the statute was not entitled to any “meaningful weight” in

determining the scope of the second amendment. Id. at

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2144.

¶ 78 The State points to other statutes enacted in

colonial Massachusetts and New Hampshire that

authorized justices of the peace to arrest “all Affrayers,

Rioters, Disturbers, or Breakers of the Peace, and such as

shall ride or go armed Offensively ... by Night or by Day,

in Fear or Affray of Their Majesties Liege People.” 1692

Mass. Acts and Laws no. 6, pp. 11-12; see 1699 N.H. Laws

ch. 1. In Bruen, the Supreme Court found that these

statutes “merely codified the existing common-law offense

of bearing arms to terrorize the people, as had the Statute

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of Northampton itself.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

at 2143. For instance, the Massachusetts statute

proscribed “ ‘go[ing] armed Offensively ... in Fear or

Affray’ of the people,” indicating that these laws were

“modeled after the Statute of Northampton to the extent

that the statute would have been understood to limit

public carry in the late 1600s.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2143 (quoting 1692 Mass. Acts and Laws

no. 6, pp. 11-12). In that time period, it was understood

that the bearing of firearms openly in public would terrify

people only if the firearm was unusual or was brandished

in an aggressive manner with the intent to terrify. Id. at

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2143.

¶ 79 The State points to a number of other pre-ratification

statutes that restricted or barred the method and manner

of public carry. These statutes generally did not bar

public carry or open public carry categorically. After

reviewing these statutes, the Supreme Court noted that

“[a] by now-familiar thread runs through [them]: They

prohibit bearing arms in a way that spreads ‘fear’ or

‘terror’ among the people.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2145.

The Supreme Court noted that “Chief Justice Holt in Sir

John Knight’s Case interpreted this in Terrorem Populi

element to require something more than merely carrying

a firearm in public.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2145. And

there was “no reason to think that the founding

generation held a different view.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2145. Similarly, Serjeant William Hawkins, in his widely

read 1716 treatise, confirmed that “no wearing of Arms is

within the meaning of [the Statute of Northampton],

unless it be accompanied with such Circumstances as are

apt to terrify the People.” (Emphasis added.) 1 William

Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 136 (1716);

Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2142. To illustrate

that proposition, Hawkins noted as an example that “

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‘Persons of Quality’ ” were “ ‘in no Danger of Offending

against this Statute by wearing common Weapons’ ”

because, in those circumstances, it would be clear that

they had no “ ‘Intention to commit any Act of Violence or

Disturbance of the Peace.’ ” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2142

(quoting 1 Pleas of the Crown 136); see also Theodore

Barlow, The Justice of Peace: A Treatise Containing the

Power and Duty of that Magistrate 12 (1745).

¶ 80 It is important to note that, after reviewing the

historical evidence, the Supreme Court explicitly held

“there is no historical basis for concluding that the

preexisting right enshrined in the Second Amendment

permitted broad prohibitions on all forms of public carry”

in the century leading up to the second amendment and

in the first decade after its adoption. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

at 2145.

¶ 81 Throughout the nineteenth century, numerous

States enacted laws banning the concealed carry of

firearms for self-defense but allowing the open carry of

such weapons. Several cases decided in the antebellum

period explicitly addressed the constitutionality of such

laws. These cases are the only legal authorities that

squarely address the question presented in this case, i.e.

whether the right to open carry is guaranteed by the

second amendment.

¶ 82 The Supreme Court has relied extensively on some

of these cases in determining the scope of the second

amendment. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 605 (ruling that “the

examination of a variety of legal and other sources to

determine the public understanding of a legal text in the

period after its enactment or ratification” is a “critical

tool” in “constitutional interpretation,” and relying on

several of the antebellum cases at issue to ascertain

whether the second amendment was understood to confer

a private right of self-defense (emphasis omitted)); Bruen,

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597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (relying upon the

same antebellum cases, among other sources, in

determining the nation’s historical tradition of regulating

public carry).

¶ 83 These antebellum decisions almost uniformly hold

that States may ban concealed carry without running

afoul of the second amendment, but they may not ban

open carry. The overwhelming majority of these cases

hold, either expressly or implicitly, that open carry is the

only manner of public carry that effectuates the right of

self-defense guaranteed by the second amendment and is,

therefore, the manner of public carry protected by the

second amendment.

¶ 84 In State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489 (1850),

the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a statute that made

it a misdemeanor to be “found with a concealed weapon

*** concealed in his bosom, coat, or any other place about

him, that does not appear in full open view.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) The court found the law to be

“absolutely necessary to counteract a vicious state of

society, growing out of the habit of carrying concealed

weapons, and to prevent bloodshed and assassinations

committed upon unsuspecting persons.” Id. at 489-90.

However, the court held that citizens had the right under

the second amendment to carry arms openly. Id. at 490.

The court noted that the statute at issue did not interfere

with a man’s right to “carry arms *** in full and open

view, which places men upon an equality.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court held that “[t]his

is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United

States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly

and noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their

country, without any tendency to secret advantages and

unmanly assassinations.” Id.

¶ 85 In Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846), the Supreme

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Court of Georgia reached the same conclusion. In that

case, the defendant was charged by indictment with a

misdemeanor for “having and keeping about his person,

and elsewhere, a pistol” that was not a horseman’s pistol.

(Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at

247. The statute under which he was charged and

convicted banned the keeping, carrying, sale, and use of

such a weapon and of certain other weapons, under any

circumstances. Id. The defendant was not charged with

carrying the pistol in a concealed manner. The Georgia

Supreme Court ruled that the statute violated the second

amendment to the extent that it banned open carry,

which the court characterized as the “natural right of selfdefence.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 251. Specifically, the

court ruled that, “so far as [the statute] seeks to suppress

the practice of carrying certain weapons secretly, that it is

valid, inasmuch as it does not deprive the citizen of his

natural right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right

to keep and bear arms. But that so much of it, as contains

a prohibition against bearing arms openly, is in conflict

with the Constitution, and void ***.” (Emphases in

original.) Id. Accordingly, the court held that, because the

defendant “ha[d] been indicted and convicted for carrying

a pistol, without charging that it was done in a concealed

manner, under that portion of the statute which entirely

forbids its use, the judgment of the court below must be

reversed, and the proceeding quashed.” Id. (Heller noted

with approval the Nunn court’s interpretation of the scope

the second amendment, at least as to Nunn’s holding that

the second amendment guaranteed an individual the

right to bear arms for his own self-defense.)

¶ 86 Similarly, in State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840), the

Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that a ban on concealed

weapons was permissible under Alabama’s constitutional

analogue to the second amendment, but that a ban on

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open carry would not be. The court concluded that the

legislature “cannot inhibit the citizen from bearing arms

openly” because the Alabama Constitution “authorizes

him to bear them for the purposes of defending himself

and the State, and it is only when carried openly, that

they can be efficiently used for defence.” (Emphasis

added.) Id. at 619. According to the court, a ban on

concealed carry did not violate a citizen’s constitutional

right to keep and bear arms for self-defense because, for

purposes of self protection in moments of immediate

danger, “there can be no necessity for concealing the

weapon.” Id. at 621. The court stated that it could not

conceive of “any supposable circumstances” under which

concealed carry would be “indispensable to the right of

defence.” Id. at 622.

¶ 87 The Tennessee Supreme Court reached a similar

conclusion in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840). In

that case, the court upheld the state’s concealed weapons

ban. Id. at 161-62. Finding that “the right to bear arms in

defence of themselves is coupled with the right to bear

them in defence of the State,” and that arms used in

defense of the State “must necessarily be borne openly,”

the court held that only the open carry of weapons could

be protected by Tennessee’s second amendment analogue.

Id. at 161. A categorical ban on open carry would infringe

upon the right to bear arms. Id. at 159-60. Further, in

Kentucky, Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822), held

that any ban on the public carry of firearms for selfdefense, whether open or concealed, violated Kentucky’s

state constitutional analogue to the second amendment.

¶ 88 These cases firmly establish that, by the time of the

antebellum period, the right to open carry was considered

an essential corollary of the right to bear arms in selfdefense guaranteed by the second amendment (or by its

state-law analogues). According to that understanding,

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open carry, and only open carry, effectuates the

constitutional right to armed self-defense, and it does so

in a way that avoids the threats to public safety posed by

the concealed carry of weapons.

¶ 89 Put simply, according to the antebellum cases, the

constitutional right to bear commonly used arms in public

for self-defense is the right to bear such arms openly.

Concealed carry was disfavored and deemed to be outside

of the scope of constitutional protections. Thus, the

antebellum courts held that, while a State may lawfully

ban concealed carry under the second amendment, it may

not ban open carry. The antebellum cases are the only

legal authorities to squarely address these issues either

before the enactment of the second amendment or during

the 70 years following its ratification. Accordingly, they

are the only sources that establish the public

understanding of the second amendment during the most

relevant historical periods, i.e., the period shortly after its

ratification and shortly before the ratification of the

fourteenth amendment. See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at

605.

¶ 90 Adopting the State’s argument, the majority

maintains that Illinois’s ban on open carry is consistent

with these antebellum cases and with the numerous state

statutes enacted in the 19th century that banned

concealed carry while allowing open carry. The majority

notes, correctly, that States have always had the

authority to regulate the manner of public carry and that

many States exercised that right during the nineteenth

century by prohibiting one type of carry while permitting

another. The majority and the State contend that,

because the Illinois laws at issue also prohibit one type of

carry while allowing another, the Illinois regulations are

equivalent to the nineteenth century regulations and are

therefore constitutionally permissible.

41a

¶ 91 However, all of nineteenth century statutes and

cases that distinguish between open carry and concealed

carry allow open carry but ban concealed carry.

¶ 92 Illinois, however, has taken precisely the opposite

approach by permitting concealed carry but prohibiting

open carry. This radical departure from historical

precedent is not constitutionally permissible. Even

assuming arguendo that a categorical ban on concealed

carry is constitutional (as historical precedents have

found), that does not mean that a categorical ban on open

carry passes constitutional muster.

¶ 93 In fact, the antebellum cases discussed above rule

out that possibility. The vast majority of the antebellum

cases that have address the issue either held or implied

that the right to armed self-defense enshrined in the

second amendment could be effectively exercised only

through open carry. Concealed carry was disfavored

because it was considered to be more dangerous than open

carry and a less effective means of self-defense. It was

therefore considered to be outside the scope of the second

amendment’s protections. The traditional approach of

banning concealed carry, while allowing open carry, was

not merely a random or fungible policy choice. It was

based on a public understanding of the meaning and

scope of the second amendment that precludes a

categorical prohibition of open carry.

¶ 94 The State’s and the majority’s argument presumes

that open and concealed carry are an interchangeable and

equally effective manner of exercising the second

amendment’s right to armed self-defense, such that either

manner may be prohibited without any diminishment of

that right. In other words, according to the State and the

majority, open carry and concealed carry are functionally

identical. Either manner, standing alone, would

adequately protect the second amendment right.

42a

Accordingly, it does not matter which manner is allowed

and which is barred, so long as one method remains

available.

¶ 95 However, as noted above, the majority of

authorities to address this issue reject the State’s

argument. They hold that open carry and concealed carry

are categorically different and that only open carry

effectuates the right to armed self-defense guaranteed by

the second amendment. See Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490;

Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251; Reid, 1 Ala. at 619; Aymette, 21 Tenn.

at 161; see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right

to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical

Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev.

1443, 1516 (2009) (“Heller stated that bans on concealed

carry of firearms are so traditionally recognized that they

must be seen as constitutionally permissible. *** The

same cannot, however, be said about general bans on

carrying firearms in public, which prohibit open as well as

concealed carrying.”); Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for

All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second

Amendment, 123 Yale L.J. 1486, 1527-28 (2014) (“[T]he

distinction between open and concealed carry was crucial

to [the 19th century courts’] understanding of what proper

self defense entailed. For them,” “[s]elf-defense inherently

required the open carry of weapons, because someone who

concealed a weapon must surely have some sort of

aggressive or sneaky intent.”).

¶ 96 All of the statutes and cases cited by the majority

and by the State involve either the categorical prohibition

of public carry in general or the barring of concealed carry

while allowing open carry. Neither the State nor the

majority have identified a single regulation in the nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation prior to or during

the antebellum period prohibiting open carry but

permitting concealed carry. Any such regulations were

43a

enacted long after the ratification of the Bill of Rights and

of the fourteenth amendment and are therefore not

probative of the public understanding of the second

amendment during the relevant time periods.

¶ 97 Moreover, to the extent that any categorical bans

on all forms of public carry (including open carry) existed

during the relevant historical periods, our Supreme Court

held in Bruen that such restrictions were rare and ran

contrary to the nation’s historical tradition of firearms

regulation. As the majority concedes, Bruen held that

such categorical bans on public carry are

unconstitutional. Therefore, the statutes and cases cited

by the majority enacting or upholding such bans may not

be relied upon to demonstrate our nation’s historical

tradition of “reasonable regulations” of the manner of

carrying firearms.

¶ 98 The majority asserts that the antebellum cases

support its argument. This assertion is based on a

misreading of the facts and holdings of these cases. I will

quote the relevant passage of the majority opinion in full.

The majority states that “a review of the cases

considering th[e] laws [proscribing concealed carry]

demonstrates that allowing open carry while prohibiting

concealed carry was not the crucial factor in determining

whether the restrictions passed constitutional muster. In

the vast majority of those cases, courts struck down

statutes that categorically prohibited the public carriage

of firearms, both open and concealed, and ruled that the

second amendment permitted limited restriction but not a

complete ban. Courts concluded that the

government could lawfully eliminate one kind of public

carry to protect and ensure the safety of its citizens, so

long as the people were permitted

to carry weapons in another manner that allowed selfdefense. The constitutional emphasis in those cases was

44a

the nature of the restriction—

categorical (unconstitutional) versus limited

(constitutional)—rather than open versus concealed.”

(Emphases in original.) Supra ¶ 30.

In support of its argument, the majority cites 15 cases

that were decided after the second amendment was

ratified and before the ratification of the fourteenth

amendment. Only one of these cases addressed a

categorical ban on the public carry of firearms or other

weapons. See Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251. Thirteen of the

remaining cases upheld a total or partial ban on concealed

carry where open carry was permitted. See Chandler, 5

La. Ann. at 489-90; Reid, 1 Ala. at 621; State v. Smith, 11

La. Ann. 633, 634 (1856); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 2425, 27 (1842); State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833);

State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858); Aymette, 21 Tenn.

at 159-61; State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26 (1841); Commonwealth

v. McClanahan, 59 Ky. 8 (1859); State v. Stanford, 20 Ark.

145 (1859); Jackson v. State, 12 Ga. 1 (1852); Haile v.

State, 38 Ark. 564 (1882); State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528

(1881); Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878). In several of

these cases, the courts explicitly held that such a ban was

constitutional because open carry was the manner of

carry that exercised the constitutional right to bear arms

guaranteed by the federal constitution or its State-law

analogues. See, e.g., Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490 (holding

that Louisiana’s prohibition of concealed carry did not

interfere with a man’s right to “carry arms *** in full and

open view,” which “is the right guaranteed by the

Constitution of the United States, and which is calculated

to incite men to a manly and noble defence of themselves,

if necessary, and of their country, without any tendency to

secret advantages and unmanly assassinations” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Reid, 1 Ala. at 619 (holding

that the legislature “cannot inhibit the citizen from

45a

bearing arms openly” because the Alabama constitution

“authorizes him to bear them for the purposes of

defending himself and the State, and it is only when

carried openly, that they can be efficiently used for

defence”); Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 159-61 (upholding the

State’s concealed weapons ban and ruling that the

citizens “right to bear arms in defence of themselves is

coupled with the right to bear them in defence of the

State,” and that arms used in defense of the State “must

necessarily be borne openly”). In Walls v. State, 7 Blackf.

572 (Ind. 1845), the court did not address concealed carry

but ruled that a ban on open carry was unconstitutional.

¶ 99 Although Nunn addressed a categorical ban on

public carry, it definitively rejects the majority’s

argument that one method of carry (either open or

concealed) may be banned so long as the other method

remains available. The statute at issue in Nunn

categorically banned the public carry of a pistol in any

manner. The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the

statute at issue violated the second amendment only to

the extent that it banned open carry, which the court

characterized as the “natural right of self-defence.”

(Emphasis omitted.) Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251.

¶ 100 The Nunn court could have found that the statute

was unconstitutional because it categorically banned both

methods of public carry and that the statute would have

been constitutional if either open carry or concealed carry

were permitted. It did not. Instead, the court held that “so

far as [the statute] seeks to suppress the practice of

carrying certain weapons secretly, that it is valid,

inasmuch as it does not deprive the citizen of his natural

right of self defence, or of his constitutional right to keep

and bear arms. But that so much of it, as contains a

prohibition against bearing arms openly, is in conflict

with the Constitution, and void ***.” (Emphases in

46a

original.) Id. Nunn, therefore, flatly rejects the majority’s

theory that open and concealed carry are equivalent and

that either may be banned so long as the other remains

available. Contrary to the majority’s argument, Nunn

unequivocally concludes that, while concealed carry may

be barred, the second amendment requires that open

carry be available.

¶ 101 Nor is there support for the majority’s and the

State’s theory in Bruen. The State cites Bruen for the

proposition that states were able to “lawfully eliminate

one kind of public carry *** so long as they left open the

[other] option.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2150.

However, the text that the State omits by ellipsis and

through brackets conveys exactly the opposite meaning!

Read in its entirety, the actual quote states that the

historical evidence from the antebellum period shows that

“States could lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry—

concealed carry—so long as they left open the option to

carry openly.” (Emphases added.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2150.

¶ 102 The State’s egregious misrepresentation of the

quote is disingenuous and disturbing. I remind counsel for

the State of their ethical duty of candor to this court

under the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010.

See Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R. 3.3(a) (eff. Jan. 1,

2010).

¶ 103 The majority’s contention that Bruen supports its

position is also unavailing. The passages in Bruen cited

by the majority merely indicate that the manner of public

carry is subject to reasonable regulation. They neither

state nor imply that open carry is functionally equivalent

to concealed carry, such that the former may be

categorically banned so long as the latter remains

available. In fact, as noted above, the Court in Bruen read

the antebellum cases as holding that states may lawfully

47a

eliminate concealed carry so long as open carry is

permitted.

¶ 104 In addition, contrary to the majority’s claim, Bruen

does not hold that a statute passes constitutional muster

“[a]s long as the regulation does not compel ‘an absolute

ban’ that imposes a significant burden on the right of selfdefense.” Supra ¶ 33. Although Bruen approved of

Heller’s reversal of a total ban on the possession of

commonly used weapons (Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S.

Ct. at 2128), neither Heller nor Bruen suggests that

regulations on public carry are constitutional unless they

proscribe public carry altogether. As Bruen makes

abundantly clear, regulations are constitutional only if

they are “reasonable,” i.e., only when they are consistent

with our nation’s historical tradition of gun regulation.

Regulations that stop short of a total ban on public carry

may still run afoul of the second amendment under this

standard. Even the extremely restrictive regulations that

the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional in Bruen

did not ban public carry categorically.

¶ 105 In the alternative, the State and the majority

maintain that Illinois’s licensing system for public carry is

analogous to the historical regulations approved in Bruen

and is therefore constitutionally permissible. To

determine whether a modern regulation is consistent with

our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,

courts must sometimes reason by analogy. See id. at ___,

142 S. Ct. at 2132. Such reasoning is often required in

“cases implicating unprecedented societal concerns or

dramatic technological changes.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2132. For example, a court may be required to determine

whether a modern communication over the Internet is a

constitutionally protected communication under the first

amendment, whether the use of a tracking device or a

thermal imaging device is a permissible “search” within

48a

the meaning of the fourth amendment, or whether the

banning of modern weapons that did not exist at the time

the second amendment was ratified is constitutional. See,

e.g., id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132; Heller, 554 U.S. at 582;

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012); Kyllo

v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

¶ 106 Such analogical reasoning is neither necessary nor

appropriate in this case because the issues presented here

involve the scope of the right to publicly carry arms in

general and the extent to which public carry may be

restricted under the second amendment. These are

fundamental questions that were familiar and were

repeatedly addressed by courts and legislatures before,

during, and after the framing. This case does not require

the application of a historical constitutional rule to a new

situation or to modern technologies that did not exist at

the time the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791.

Accordingly, like the issues presented in Bruen and

Heller, the issue presented in this case requires only a

“straightforward historical inquiry.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2131.

¶ 107 However, even assuming arguendo that analogical

reasoning is necessary, such reasoning does not support

the State’s and the majority’s argument. Ascertaining

whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a

modern firearm regulation requires a determination of

whether the two regulations are “relevantly similar.” Id.

at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. This involves an inquiry into

“whether modern and historical regulations impose a

comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and

whether that burden is comparably justified.” Id. at ___,

142 S. Ct. at 2133; see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767; Heller,

554 U.S. at 599. Courts should not “uphold every modern

law that remotely resembles a historical analogue,”

because doing so “risk[s] endorsing outliers that our

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ancestors would never have accepted.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2133. On the other hand, “analogical reasoning requires

only that the government identify a well-established and

representative historical analogue, not a historical twin.”

(Emphases omitted.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. “So

even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for

historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to

pass constitutional muster.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133.

¶ 108 The State and the majority contend that, under

these standards, the Illinois regulations at issue are

analogous to historical regulations. They argue that both

the Illinois laws and the traditional firearm regulations

impose a comparable burden on the right of armed selfdefense because both legal regimes ban one manner of

carry while permitting another. As noted above, however,

the two methods of carry at issue are not equivalent and

interchangeable. The antebellum cases and statutes

established that open carry, and only open carry, fully

and properly effectuates the right to armed self-defense

contemplated by the second amendment. Thus, Illinois’s

banning of open carry imposes a far greater burden upon

the right to armed self-defense than would a ban on

concealed carry.

¶ 109 The State and the majority further contend that

the burden upon the right to armed self defense imposed

by Illinois’s laws and by traditional historical regulations

are “comparably justified” because both sought to reduce

violence and promote safety in public places by regulating

the manner of the public carry of firearms. The State

acknowledges that several nineteenth century statutes

and the cases interpreting them attempted to promote

public safety by banning concealed carry, which was

historically considered to be more dangerous and more

likely to lead to violence than was open carry. The State

50a

notes that the Illinois General Assembly “made a slightly

different policy choice (prohibiting open carriage rather

than concealed carriage) than those reflected in historical

regulations” “[i]n view of shifting societal preferences and

evolving social science.” However, the State maintains

that this difference is immaterial because both legal

regimes sought to promote public safety.

¶ 110 I do not find these arguments to be persuasive. As

an initial matter, Illinois did not merely make a “slightly

different policy choice” regarding how to protect public

safety. It made the exact opposite choice than that

prescribed in the historical regulations. As noted, during

the relevant historical time periods, no jurisdiction

addressed the problem of gun violence by banning open

carry and allowing concealed carry, as Illinois does. To the

contrary, it was concealed carry, not open carry, that was

traditionally banned because it was thought that only

concealed carry threatened public safety.

¶ 111 The fact that the problem of gun violence has been

addressed so differently throughout the nation’s history

(and consistently so) is not irrelevant. Indeed, it is strong

evidence that Illinois’s approach is unconstitutional.

“[W]hen a challenged regulation addresses a general

societal problem that has persisted since the 18th

century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical

regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence

that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the

Second Amendment.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2131.

“Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal

problem, but did so through materially different means,

that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is

unconstitutional.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2131.

¶ 112 As the State acknowledges, public safety concerns

posed by gun violence have existed since the framing.

However, none of the historical regulations designed to

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combat that problem adopted the method that Illinois has

adopted here. Indeed, the traditional regulations

employed the exact opposite approach based upon the

traditional understanding of the relationship between

open carry, concealed carry, and the second amendment’s

right to armed self-defense. That traditional

understanding determines the meaning and scope of the

second amendment. Illinois’s law categorically banning

open carry is therefore unconstitutional. To the extent

that People v. Thompson, 2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U,

suggests (without analysis) that Illinois’s categorical ban

on open carry is constitutional, it was wrongly decided.

¶ 113 The State and the majority’s suggestion that

modern day sensibilities and policy preferences may alter

or supplant the original meaning and scope of the second

amendment is insupportable. As the United States

Supreme Court ruled in Heller, “the enshrinement of

constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy

choices off the table.” 554 U.S. at 636. The public

understanding of the second amendment during the 70

years following its ratification (including the two decades

immediately preceding the enactment of the fourteenth

amendment) was that the open carry of firearms in public

for self-defense may not be categorically banned. That

understanding fixed the meaning and scope of the second

amendment, and it may not be overridden merely because

it appears outmoded or runs contrary to contemporary

policy preferences. See id.

¶ 114 The Constitution leaves Illinois a variety of tools

for combating the problem of gun violence, including the

banning of concealed carry. However, a categorical ban on

open carry violates the second amendment and is

therefore “off the table.” See id. If three-fourths of the

States want to ban open carry, they may amend the

Constitution to reflect their policy preferences. However,

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they may not simply engraft those preferences into the

second amendment by judicial or legislative fiat, thereby

disregarding and impermissibly altering the amendment’s

original public meaning. The determination of whether

policies are good or bad is not for the judicial branch of

government to decide. Rather, its only job is to interpret

the second amendment and to prevent policies which

contravene the protections it affords.

¶ 115 In any event, I disagree with the State’s

assessment that banning open carry would reduce gun

violence and promote public safety. The State argues that

allowing open carry is bad policy because “common sense

dictates, and experience confirms, that the open carriage

of firearms makes it more difficult for law enforcement to

protect the public.” I find this proposition to be contrary

both to common sense and to experience.

¶ 116 The State argues that if law-abiding citizens were

allowed to carry firearms openly in public, it would be

more difficult for the police to know whether an individual

is carrying or using a firearm legally. To the contrary,

allowing concealed carry, while banning open carry, is

what places both the police and the public at a

disadvantage. If an individual is openly carrying a gun, a

police officer may approach him and ask him to show

proof that he is doing so legally. That cannot be done if

the person is carrying a concealed weapon. Concealed

weapons also pose a greater threat to the public because

they cannot deter would-be criminals, they increase the

likelihood that arguments will escalate into violence

(including gun violence), and, as the historical authorities

recognized, they make it easier for anyone carrying a

concealed weapon to ambush another person. As our

forebears rightfully concluded, allowing the open carry of

firearms is the only way to deter violence or the escalation

of violence effectively.

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¶ 117 The State further maintains that allowing open

carry would cause fear among the public, which is

“particularly likely for minority groups.” This is so, claims

the State, because “hate groups, such as white

supremacists, have long openly carried firearms to

threaten and intimidate others.” There is indeed a

shameful history in this country of racist acts of violence

and intimidation committed by whites against blacks,

particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth

century South. However, this violence was made possible

in large part by racist laws that barred blacks from

carrying firearms and other weapons for self-defense. See

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 771 (noting the “systematic efforts”

made to disarm blacks); Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

at 2151-53. Disarming blacks was a tool of oppression

that enabled whites to commit violence against blacks.

Although white-on-black gun violence is far less prevalent

in America today, blacks are still victims of gun violence

at highly disproportionate rates. See GianCarlo Canaparo

& Abby Kassal, Who Suffers the Most from Crime Wave?,

Heritage Found. (Apr. 12, 2022),

https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/w

ho-suffers-the-most-crime wave

[https://perma.cc/HM4G-2AQL] (relying upon crime data

compiled by the FBI). Open carry would empower blacks

and members of other minority groups, many of whom

live in high crime areas, to defend themselves and to

deter criminals of any race from committing acts of

violence against them. This may allay any fears that

blacks or other minorities might have of others who

openly carry firearms. Open carry would be the most

effective means to deter any aggression against them.

¶ 118 Regardless, this policy debate is moot because, as

noted above, the second amendment forecloses the

categorical ban on open carry adopted in Illinois. In

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determining the meaning and scope of the second

amendment, the Supreme Court relies solely upon the

text and history of the amendment, not upon a State

legislature’s or a court’s balancing of policy

considerations. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

2129 (stating that Heller and McDonald “expressly

rejected” the application of any “judge-empowering

interest-balancing inquiry” that “asks whether the statute

burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that

is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon

other important governmental interests” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at

634; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790-791 (the second

amendment does not permit—let alone require—judges to

“assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions”

under means-end scrutiny).

¶ 119 To be clear, I am not suggesting that open carry

may not be restricted. Reasonable restrictions may be

imposed so long as they are consistent with our nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulations. Illinois

presently requires all persons within the State to obtain a

Firearm Owner’s Identification card in order to lawfully

possess or use a gun. Bruen does not suggest that such

licensing requirements are unconstitutional. See Bruen,

597 U.S. at ___ n.9, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9; Thompson,

2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U (rejecting a facial challenge to

the constitutionality of the Concealed Carry Act’s

permitting requirement). The State may impose other

reasonable regulations as it sees fit. However, it may not

categorically ban the open carry of firearms.

¶ 120 This is an extremely important issue that affects

all citizens of Illinois as it affects the constitutional right

of all citizens to armed self-defense, one of the core rights

guaranteed by the second amendment and a bulwark

against threats to their safety and liberty.

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¶ 121 In determining whether Illinois’s categorical ban on

open carry violates the second amendment, jurists are

bound by the dictates and guidelines of the Supreme

Court and our nation’s historical tradition of firearm

regulation and are prohibited from imposing personal

policy preferences under the guise of constitutional

interpretation. To do so would violate their oath of office.

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APPENDIX B – ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT WHITESIDE

COUNTY, ILLINOIS, FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2021

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTEENTH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

WHITESIDE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

SINNISSIPPI ROD AND GUN CLUB, INC. and SIMON

EICHELBERGER,

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

KWAME RAOUL, in his official capacity as Illinois

Attorney General; and BRENDAN F. KELLY, in his

official capacity as Director of State Police,

Defendants. No. 19 MR 151

ORDER

This cause having come before the Court for a decision

upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment

and the parties, having agreed that this case involves a

question of law and having agreed that the Court may

make a ruling based upon their pleadings, and the Court,

having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties and the

responses, and noting the very effective and engaging

arguments presented by each party,

HEREBY FINDS:

The Court respectfully finds the Defendants' arguments

more compelling and, as a result, finds that there is no

genuine issue of material fact regarding the

constitutionality of the issue presented to the Court, and

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HEREBY ORDERS:

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is

allowed, and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

Judgment is denied.

Dated: February 19, 2021

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APPENDIX C – ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME

COURT, FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS WEDNESDAY,

SEPTEMBER 24, 2025

THE FOLLOWING CASES ON THE LEAVE TO

APPEAL DOCKET WERE DISPOSED OF AS

INDICATED:

***

130495 - Sinnissippi Rod & Gun Club, Inc., et al.,

petitioners, v. Kwame Raoul, etc., et al., respondents.

Leave to appeal, Appellate Court, Third District. 3-210073

Petition for Leave to Appeal Denied.

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APPENDIX D – CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES INVOLVED

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

SECOND AMENDMENT

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the

security of a free State, the right of the people to

keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Section 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of

the United States and of the State wherein they

reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

***

720 ILCS 5/24-1

(720 ILCS 5/24-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 24-1)

Sec. 24-1. Unlawful possession of weapons.

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful

possession of weapons when he knowingly:

***

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(10) Carries or possesses on or about his or her

person, upon any public street, alley, or other public

lands within the corporate limits of a city, village, or

incorporated town, except when an invitee thereon or

therein, for the purpose of the display of such weapon

or the lawful commerce in weapons, or except when

on his land or in his or her own abode, legal dwelling,

or fixed place of business, or on the land or in the

legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with

that person's permission, any pistol, revolver, stun

gun, or taser or other firearm, except that this

subsection (a)(10) does not apply to or affect

transportation of weapons that meet one of the

following conditions:

(i) are broken down in a non-functioning state; or

(ii) are not immediately accessible; or

(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a case,

firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other

container by a person who has been issued a

currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card;

or

(iv) are carried or possessed in accordance with

the Firearm Concealed Carry Act by a person who

has been issued a currently valid license under the

Firearm Concealed Carry Act.

A "stun gun or taser", as used in this paragraph (a)

means (i) any device which is powered by electrical charging

units, such as, batteries, and which fires one or several barbs

attached to a length of wire and which, upon hitting a human,

can send out a current capable of disrupting the person's

nervous system in such a manner as to render him incapable of

normal functioning or (ii) any device which is powered by

electrical charging units, such as batteries, and

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which, upon contact with a human or clothing worn

by a human, can send out current capable of

disrupting the person's nervous system in such a

manner as to render him incapable of normal

functioning ***.

720 ILCS 5/24-1.6

(720 ILCS 5/24-1.6)

Sec. 24-1.6. Aggravated unlawful possession of a

weapon.

(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated

unlawful possession of a weapon when he or she

knowingly:

(1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any

vehicle or concealed on or about his or her person

except when on his or her land or in his or her abode,

legal dwelling, or fixed place of business, or on the

land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an

invitee with that person's permission, any pistol,

revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; or

(2) Carries or possesses on or about his or her

person, upon any public street, alley, or other public

lands within the corporate limits of a city, village or

incorporated town, except when an invitee thereon or

therein, for the purpose of the display of such weapon

or the lawful commerce in weapons, or except when

on his or her own land or in his or her own abode,

legal dwelling, or fixed place of business, or on the

land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an

invitee with that person's permission, any pistol,

revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; and

(3) One of the following factors is present:

(A) the firearm, other than a pistol, revolver,

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or handgun, possessed was uncased, loaded, and

immediately accessible at the time of the offense; or

(A-5) the pistol, revolver, or handgun possessed

was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible at

the time of the offense and the person possessing the

pistol, revolver, or handgun has not been issued a

currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed

Carry Act; or

(B) the firearm, other than a pistol, revolver,

or handgun, possessed was uncased, unloaded, and

the ammunition for the weapon was immediately

accessible at the time of the offense; or

(B-5) the pistol, revolver, or handgun possessed

was uncased, unloaded, and the ammunition for the

weapon was immediately accessible at the time of the

offense and the person possessing the pistol,

revolver, or handgun has not been issued a currently

valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act;

or

(C) the person possessing the firearm has not

been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner's

Identification Card; or

(D) the person possessing the weapon was

previously adjudicated a delinquent minor under the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for an act that if

committed by an adult would be a felony; or

(E) the person possessing the weapon was

engaged

in a misdemeanor violation of the Cannabis Control

Act, in a misdemeanor violation of the Illinois

Controlled Substances Act, or in a misdemeanor

violation of the Methamphetamine Control and

Community Protection Act; or

63a

(F) (blank); or

(G) the person possessing the weapon had an

order

of protection issued against him or her within the

previous 2 years; or

(H) the person possessing the weapon was

engaged

in the commission or attempted commission of a

misdemeanor involving the use or threat of violence

against the person or property of another; or

(I) the person possessing the weapon was under

21

years of age and in possession of a handgun, unless

the person under 21 is engaged in lawful activities

under the Wildlife Code or described in subsection

24-2(b)(1), (b)(3), or 24-2(f).

(a-5) "Handgun" as used in this Section has the

meaning given to it in Section 5 of the Firearm

Concealed Carry Act.

(b) "Stun gun or taser" as used in this Section has

the same definition given to it in Section 24-1 of this

Code.

(c) This Section does not apply to or affect the

transportation or possession of weapons that:

(i) are broken down in a non-functioning state; or

(ii) are not immediately accessible; or

(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm

carrying box, shipping box, or other container

by a person who has been issued a currently valid

Firearm Owner's Identification Card.

(d) Sentence.

(1) Aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon is a Class 4

felony; a second or subsequent offense is a

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Class 2 felony for which the person shall be

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than

3 years and not more than 7 years, except as

provided for in Section 5-4.5-110 of the Unified Code

of Corrections.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (3)

and (4) of this subsection (d), a first offense of

aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon

committed with a firearm by a person 18 years of age

or older where the factors listed in both

items (A) and (C) or both items (A-5) and (C) of

paragraph (3) of subsection (a) are present is a Class

4 felony, for which the person shall be sentenced to a

term of imprisonment of not less than one year and

not more than 3 years.

(3) Aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon by

a person who has been previously convicted of a

felony in this State or another jurisdiction is a Class

2 felony for which the person shall be sentenced to a

term of imprisonment of not less than 3 years and

not more than 7 years, except as provided for in

Section 5-4.5-110 of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(4) Aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon

while wearing or in possession of body armor as

defined in Section 33F-1 by a person who has not

been issued a valid Firearms Owner's Identification

Card in accordance with Section 5 of the Firearm

Owners Identification Card Act is a Class X felony.

(e) The possession of each firearm in violation of

this Section constitutes a single and separate

violation.

(Source: P.A. 103-822, eff. 1-1-25.)