Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Department of Labor, et al., Petitioners v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC

Supreme Court briefFeb 12, 2026

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. XX-XX

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND LORI CHAVEZ-DEREMER,

SECRETARY OF LABOR, PETITIONERS

SUN VALLEY ORCHARDS, LLC

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorney General

SARAH M. HARRIS

Deputy Solicitor General

VIVEK SURI

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. RAAB

DANIEL AGUILAR

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

The H–2A visa program grants U.S. employers the

privilege of “import[ing]” foreign aliens into the United

States for temporary agricultural work under special visas. 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). As a condition of granting petitions to import foreign workers, federal law requires

an employer to agree to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements governing workers’ living and

working conditions. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Labor to impose monetary remedies to assure

employer compliance with those “terms and conditions.” 8 U.S.C. 1188(g)(2). The question presented is:

Whether Article III of the Constitution precludes

Congress from assigning to the Secretary of Labor the

initial adjudication of proceedings to collect monetary

remedies from employers who violate the terms and

conditions of participating in the H–2A visa program.

(I)

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (D.N.J.):

Sun Valley Orchards, LLC v. U.S. Department of

Labor, No. 21-cv-16625 (Dec. 8, 2025)

United States Court of Appeals (3d Cir.):

Sun Valley Orchards, LLC v. U.S. Department of

Labor, No. 23-2608 (July 29, 2025)

(II)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below ................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 1

Statutory provisions involved ....................................................... 2

Introduction ..................................................................................... 2

Statement:

A. Statutory and regulatory background ............................ 6

B. Facts .................................................................................... 8

C. Proceedings below ........................................................... 10

Reasons for granting the petition............................................... 13

A. The decision below is incorrect ...................................... 13

1. Congress may assign adjudications involving

public rights to executive agencies ......................... 14

2. Immigration-benefits cases involve public

rights........................................................................... 16

3. Contrary to the court of appeals’ analysis, this

case fits within the public-rights doctrine ............. 23

B. The decision below warrants this Court’s review ....... 29

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 32

Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (July 29, 2025) ....... 1a

Appendix B — District court opinion (July 27, 2023) .......... 20a

Appendix C — Department of Labor Administrative

Review Board order (May 27, 2021) ...... 47a

Appendix D — Department of Labor ALJ order

(Oct. 28, 2019) ........................................... 77a

Appendix E — Department of Labor notice of

determination (June 22, 2016) .............. 183a

Appendix F — Court of appeals order denying

rehearing (Oct. 15, 2025) ....................... 200a

Appendix G — Statutory provision ...................................... 202a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

AFL-CIO v. Dole, 923 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ................. 30

(III)

Cases—Continued:

Page

Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152 (1870)......... 27

Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263 (1854) .................................... 28

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) ...................... 15, 21, 22

Department of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899 (2024)........... 20

Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902) ............ 20

Fong Yue Ting v. United States,

149 U.S. 698 (1893) ......................................................... 18, 27

Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 858 (1991) ................... 14

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization,

606 U.S. 1 (2025) ................................................................... 29

Garcia-Celestino v. Ruiz Harvesting, Inc.,

843 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2016) .............................................. 7

Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023) .......................... 29

Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) .......................... 29

Hispanic Affairs Project v. Acosta, 901 F.3d 378

(D.C. Cir. 2018) ....................................................................... 6

Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U.S. 388 (2019) ................................. 29

The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) ..... 20, 25

Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.,

606 U.S. 748 (2025) ............................................................... 29

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) .................. 20, 25

Lee Lung v. Patterson, 186 U.S. 168 (1902) ................... 20, 24

Lem Moon Sing v. United States,

158 U.S. 538 (1895) ........................................................... 3, 20

Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) ..................... 20

Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima per Azioni v.

Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932) .............................. 4, 5, 19, 25, 28

Louisiana Forestry Ass’n v. Secretary U.S. Department of Labor, 745 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2014) ......................... 6

Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela,

574 U.S. 1006 (2014) ............................................................. 29

Cases—Continued:

Page

Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement

Co., 18 How. 272 (1856) ........................................................ 31

Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,

142 U.S. 651 (1892) ............................................................... 18

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon

Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) ....................................... 16

Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,

214 U.S. 320 (1909) .......................... 3-5, 15, 19, 22-24, 26, 28

Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy

Services Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 325 (2018) ...... 12, 14, 15, 21

Passavant v. United States,

148 U.S. 214 (1893) ................................................. 2, 5, 15, 28

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ......................................... 26

SEC v. Jarkesy,

603 U.S. 109 (2024) ................... 2, 3, 12, 15, 21, 22, 27-29, 31

Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148 (2018) ............................. 17

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) ................................. 14

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (1819) .................. 27

Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13 (1822) .............................. 28

Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985) .................. 16

Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety,

597 U.S. 580 (2022) ............................................................... 29

Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024) ...................... 22

United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1 (2021) ................ 14

United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) ................ 20, 25

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 690 (2024) ............. 29

United States v. Vaello Madero,

596 U.S. 159 (2022) ............................................................... 29

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,

338 U.S. 537 (1950) ......................................................... 20, 22

United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams,

194 U.S. 279 (1904) ......................................................... 20, 25

Cases—Continued:

Page

Vidal v. Elster, 602 U.S. 286 (2024)....................................... 29

Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575

U.S. 665 (2015) ...................................................................... 22

Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912) ................................. 20

Constitution, statutes, and regulations:

U.S. Const.:

Art. III: ......................... 2, 4, 5, 12-14, 22, 24, 26, 28, 31, 32

§ 1 .................................................................................. 14

Amend. VII ........................................................................ 32

Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566 ........................... 18

Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 ................................... 16

§ 1, 1 Stat. 577 .................................................................... 16

Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 ................................ 16

§ 1, 1 Stat. 571 .................................................................... 16

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ............. 8

Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 ............. 18

Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084:

§ 8, 26 Stat. 1085-1086 ...................................................... 18

§§ 10-11, 26 Stat. 1086 ...................................................... 18

Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213:

§ 9, 32 Stat. 1215-1216 ................................................ 19, 20

§ 15, 32 Stat. 1217 .............................................................. 20

Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898:

§ 9, 34 Stat. 901 .................................................................. 18

§§ 20-21, 34 Stat. 904-905 ................................................. 18

Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874:

§ 9, 39 Stat. 880-881 .................................................... 19, 20

§ 18, 39 Stat. 887-888 ........................................................ 20

§ 35, 39 Stat. 896 ................................................................ 20

VII

Statutes and regulations—Continued:

Page

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,

8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. ............................................................... 6

8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) ............................................. 6

8 U.S.C. 1184(c) ............................................................... 6, 7

8 U.S.C. 1188 .................................................................. 202a

8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1) ................................2, 4, 6, 7, 23, 26, 27

8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1)(B) ....................................... 4, 23, 24, 30

8 U.S.C. 1188(c)(3)(A) ......................................................... 7

8 U.S.C. 1188(c)(4)............................................................... 7

8 U.S.C. 1188(g)(2) .............................................. 4, 8, 13, 23

8 U.S.C. 1201 ........................................................................ 7

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.

L. No. 99-603, Tit. III, Pt. A, § 301, 100 Stat. 3411 ............ 6

Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477-478 ................... 18

6 U.S.C. 202(3) ........................................................................... 7

6 U.S.C. 271(b) ........................................................................... 7

50 U.S.C. 21 .............................................................................. 16

20 C.F.R.:

Section 655.122(d) ......................................................... 7, 12

Section 655.122 (h)(4) .................................................... 7, 12

Section 655.122(g) ......................................................... 7, 11

Section 655.122(i)(1) ...................................................... 7, 11

Section 655.122(p)(1) ......................................................... 11

Section 655.122(p)(2) ..................................................... 7, 11

Section 655.122(q) ............................................................. 11

29 C.F.R.:

Section 501.5 ...................................................................... 11

Section 501.16 ...................................................................... 8

Section 501.30 et seq.......................................................... 23

Section 501.31 ...................................................................... 8

Section 501.32 ...................................................................... 8

VIII

Regulations—Continued:

Page

Section 501.33 ...................................................................... 8

Section 501.34-501.41 .......................................................... 8

Section 501.42 ...................................................................... 8

Miscellaneous:

9 Annals of Cong. 2987 (1799) ................................................ 17

William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III,

133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511 (2020) ............................................. 16

73 Fed. Reg. 76,891 (Dec. 18, 2008) ....................................... 30

85 Fed. Reg. 13,186 (Mar. 6, 2020) .......................................... 8

Elizabeth Weber Handwerker, Cong. Research

Serv., IF12979, Work Authorization Among Hired

Agricultural Workers (Apr. 30, 2025),

https://congress.gov/crs-product/IF12979 ........................ 30

John Harrison, Public Rights, Private Privileges,

and Article III, 54 Geo. L. Rev. 143 (2019) ....................... 16

John Marshall, The Address of the Minority

in the Virginia Legislature to the People

of that State (1799)................................................................ 17

U.S. Department of State, Report of the

Visa Office 2024, https://travel.state.gov/

content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics/

annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2024.html ......... 30

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. XX-XX

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND LORI CHAVEZ-DEREMER,

SECRETARY OF LABOR, PETITIONERS

SUN VALLEY ORCHARDS, LLC

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

The court of appeals’ opinion court of appeals (App.,

infra, 1a-19a) is reported at 148 F.4th 121. The district

court’s opinion (App., infra, 20a-46a) is available at 2023

WL 4784204. The Administrative Review Board’s decision and order (App., infra, 47a-76a), the administrative

law judge’s decision and order (App., infra, 77a-182a),

and the Administrator’s notice of determination (App.,

infra, 183a-199a) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

July 29, 2025. A petition for rehearing was denied on

October 15, 2025 (App., infra, 200a-201a). On December 23, 2025, Justice Alito extended the time within

which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and in(1)

cluding February 12, 2025. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory provisions are reprinted in the

appendix. App., infra, 202a-212a.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents an important question about the

constitutionality of a longstanding federal statute:

whether Congress can authorize an executive agency,

rather than a federal court, to assess monetary penalties against U.S. employers for violating the terms and

conditions under which the federal government grants

employers the privilege of “import[ing]” aliens to perform temporary work in the United States under the H–

2A visa program. 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). The Third Circuit below held that Article III of the Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning the initial adjudication

of such penalties to an agency. That decision warrants

this Court’s review because it incorrectly invalidates an

Act of Congress. Indeed, the court’s reasoning casts

doubt on all administrative adjudications of employers’

violations of conditions of H–2A and related programs.

Such administrative adjudications are permissible

because adjudicating the terms and conditions of an

immigration-benefits program involves quintessential

public rights. While Article III reserves cases involving

private rights to courts, Congress may assign certain

“historic categories of adjudications” involving public

rights to executive agencies. SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S.

109, 130 (2024). And if a case involves public rights,

Congress may empower the Executive Branch to issue

monetary penalties that Article III would otherwise

generally reserve to courts. See, e.g., Passavant v.

United States, 148 U.S. 214, 221-222 (1893).

Whether to allow aliens into the country as part of a

benefit program for employers, and on what conditions,

falls in the heartland of public rights. “The power of

Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United

States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon

which they may come to this country, and to have its

declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively

through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by [the Court’s] previous adjudications.”

Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547

(1895). Thus, Congress may impose “condition[s] to the

right to bring in aliens,” affix “a penalty” for violating

those conditions, and authorize “executive officers” to

assess such penalties “without the necessity of invoking

the judicial power.” Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.

Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339, 342 (1909). Jarkesy recognized that historical rule. See 603 U.S. at 129.

More broadly, the public-rights doctrine allows the

Executive Branch to adjudicate matters involving “public benefits,” because government-created privileges are

classic public rights. See Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 130. Thus,

Congress can assign cases involving “payments to veterans,” “pensions,” and “patent rights” to administrative agencies—including cases involving the terms and

conditions that beneficiaries must follow to obtain those

privileges. Ibid.

Those precedents make this a straightforward case.

Under the H–2A visa program, federal agencies grant

U.S. employers’ petitions to import foreign workers into

the United States for temporary or seasonal agricultural work. The Executive Branch thereby exercises its

broad power over the admission of aliens at the employers’ request, to confer a special benefit on employers.

In return, as a condition of granting employers’ petitions and issuance of the visas, the statute requires em-

ployers to comply with federal requirements governing

aliens’ living and working arrangements and to accept

agency procedures to enforce those requirements. Congress imposed those conditions to help ensure that, by

importing foreign workers, U.S. employers do not “adversely affect the wages and working conditions of

workers in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1)(B).

Congress has empowered the Secretary of Labor “to

take such actions, including imposing appropriate penalties,” “as may be necessary to assure employer compliance with [those] terms and conditions.” 8 U.S.C.

1188(g)(2).

This case thus concerns the “terms and conditions on

which [aliens] may come in” under the H–2A visa program

—implicating immigration-related public rights. See

Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted). And

this case further concerns employers’ breaches of terms

and conditions of a public benefit—the privilege of “import[ing]” foreign aliens for temporary work, subject to

the program’s conditions. 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). Just as

transportation companies that breach the conditions of

bringing aliens to the United States can be subject to

penalties imposed in administrative proceedings, see

Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 338-340; Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334335 (1932), administrative agencies can impose penalties on employers who breach the regulatory conditions

for obtaining visas for foreign workers.

The Third Circuit below instead held that Congress

violated Article III because only federal courts can assess monetary remedies against an H–2A employer.

The court acknowledged that “immigration is traditionally a matter of public rights” subject to Executive

Branch adjudication. App., infra, 13a. But it concluded

that this case falls outside the public-rights doctrine be-

cause it concerns “employment law” rather than “the

admission and exclusion of aliens.” Id. at 16a. That distinction is illusory. The public-rights doctrine encompasses not only the admission and exclusion of aliens,

but also the enforcement of conditions of admission.

And when the government grants an employer the privilege of bringing aliens to the United States to perform

certain work, the government may impose and enforce

conditions concerning the nature of that employment.

The court also emphasized that this case involves the

imposition of civil penalties, which are traditionally legal remedies. App., infra, 10a-13a. But that is beside

the point when a case involves public rights. As this

Court has repeatedly held, executive agencies may assess monetary penalties in public-rights cases; those

penalties do not in and of themselves transform the case

into one that Article III courts must adjudicate. See, e.g.,

Lloyd Sabaudo, 287 U.S. at 334-335; Oceanic Steam,

214 U.S. at 338-340; Passavant, 148 U.S. at 221-222.

The court of appeals’ decision warrants this Court’s

review. This Court ordinarily grants certiorari when a

court of appeals invalidates a federal statute, even absent a circuit conflict. That course is especially appropriate here because the decision below conflicts with

this Court’s public-rights jurisprudence. The significant practical consequences of the decision below likewise favor review. By one estimate, H–2A workers account for a sixth of the United States’ agricultural workforce. The decision below deprives the government of

an important tool for ensuring that employers comply

with the conditions for employing those workers. The

petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

STATEMENT

A. Statutory And Regulatory Background

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),

8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., regulates the admission of aliens

to the United States. As part of that statute, Congress

created the H–2 visa program, “which governed the recruitment of unskilled workers for agricultural and nonagricultural jobs.” Louisiana Forestry Ass’n v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, 745 F.3d 653, 659 (3d

Cir. 2014).

In 1986, Congress amended the INA to establish

separate visa classifications for agricultural and nonagricultural workers. See Immigration Reform and

Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, Tit. III, Pt. A,

§ 301, 100 Stat. 3411. Congress created the new H–2A

visa program, under which federal agencies can authorize U.S. employers to “import” foreign nationals into

the United States for temporary agricultural work. 8

U.S.C. 1188(a)(1); see 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a). To

obtain an H–2A visa, a worker must have “no intention

of abandoning” his permanent residence in a foreign

country. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a). The visa thus

does not provide a path to permanent residency or U.S.

citizenship. See Hispanic Affairs Project v. Acosta, 901

F.3d 378, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

The ability to “import an alien as an H–2 worker,” 8

U.S.C. 1184(c), is a privilege that the government confers upon employers through a multi-step petition process. First, the employer must obtain a certification

from the Secretary of Labor that “there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and

who will be available,” to perform the work, and that the

employment of the worker “will not adversely affect the

wages and working conditions of workers in the United

States similarly employed.” 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). Then,

the employer must file a “petition to import an alien as

an H–2A worker” with the Secretary of Homeland Security. Ibid.; see 8 U.S.C. 1184(c). 1 If the petition is

approved, the alien generally must obtain a visa at a

U.S. embassy or consulate and then travel to the United

States. See 8 U.S.C. 1201.

As a condition of obtaining the privilege of bringing

H–2A workers to the United States, federal law requires the employer to “compl[y] with criteria for certification,” including those prescribed by the Secretary of

Labor, and to offer workers certain minimum “terms

and conditions” of employment established by the Secretary. 8 U.S.C. 1188(c)(3)(A). Employers also must

“furnish housing in accordance with regulations.” 8

U.S.C. 1188(c)(4). As relevant here, the regulations require the employer to provide suitable housing, 20

C.F.R. 655.122(d); access to a kitchen or meal plan, 20

C.F.R. 655.122(g); safe transportation to and from the

worksite, 20 C.F.R. 655.122(h)(4); and guaranteed employment for at least three-quarters of the workdays included in the labor-certification period, 20 C.F.R.

655.122(i)(1). The employer may make certain reasonable deductions from a worker’s pay, but deductions may

not include a profit to the employer. 20 C.F.R.

655.122(p)(2). And when an employer provides meals to

its workers, the “job offer must state the charge, if any,

to the worker for such meals.” 20 C.F.R. 655.122(g).

Those requirements help “ensure that foreign workers

will not appear more attractive” than domestic workers

and undercut the domestic labor force. Garcia-Celestino

The applicable provisions refer to the Attorney General, but

Congress has transferred enforcement of those provisions to the

Secretary of Homeland Security. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. 202(3), 271(b).

v. Ruiz Harvesting, Inc., 843 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.

2016).

The INA authorizes the Secretary of Labor “to take

such actions, including imposing appropriate penalties

and seeking appropriate injunctive relief and specific

performance of contractual obligations, as may be necessary to assure employer compliance with the terms

and conditions of employment under [the statute].” 8

U.S.C. 1188(g)(2). The Secretary has issued regulations

establishing an administrative process to enforce program obligations, recover back wages, and impose civil

penalties. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 501.16.

If the Labor Department’s Wage and Hour Division

determines that an employer has violated the statute or

the implementing regulations, it issues a written notice

informing the employer of its findings and the remedies

sought. See 29 C.F.R. 501.31, 501.32. The employer

may then demand a hearing before an administrative

law judge (ALJ), see 29 C.F.R. 501.33, who conducts an

adversarial hearing and issues a decision, see 29 C.F.R.

501.34-501.41. Any party may appeal the ALJ’s decision

to the Administrative Review Board, see 29 C.F.R.

501.42, a multimember board of adjudicators appointed

by the Secretary, see 85 Fed. Reg. 13,186, 13,188 (Mar.

6, 2020). The Secretary, in her discretion, may review

the Board’s decision. See ibid. The employer may seek

judicial review of the agency’s final order in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. 701 et seq.

B. Facts

Respondent Sun Valley Orchards is a farm in New

Jersey that grows fruits and vegetables. App., infra,

4a. It relied on the H–2A program to hire 96 foreign

workers, alongside 51 U.S. workers, to pick asparagus

and peppers from April to October 2015. Id. at 4a, 50a.

The workers’ shifts lasted for 12 hours each day, with

only a single, one-hour break. App., infra, 50a. The

workers lacked consistent access to drinking water and

clean bathrooms while they worked in the fields. Id. at

50-51a. Respondent transported workers to and from

the fields in buses that were driven by unlicensed drivers and that had worn, unsafe tires and a broken taillight. Id. at 51a.

Respondent provided housing that consisted of six

bedrooms with 20 bunkbeds in each room. Administrative Record (AR) 1933.2 The bathrooms were dirty and

lacked sufficient hot water; the sinks were broken; the

windows and doors lacked screens; and the lidless garbage cans attracted pests. App., infra, 51a.

Respondent’s job posting promised workers “free

cooking and kitchen facilities” so that they could “prepare their own meals,” as well as “free transportation”

to a nearby grocery store. App., infra, 4a-5a (citation

omitted). But when the workers arrived at respondent’s

housing, they were told that they would need to pay $75

to $80 per week for a meal plan (deducted from their

weekly pay of $451.60). Id. at 140a-141a; A.R. 2720. If

workers wanted transportation to buy groceries, respondent would charge them $10 per trip. App., infra,

105a & n.123.

Though respondent’s housing did have a kitchen,

workers lacked access to it. App., infra, 62a. Instead,

a supervisor used the kitchen to sell beer and soft

drinks to the workers. Id. at 51a. The supervisor, who

lacked a state license to sell alcohol and who did not

http://dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/SOL/FOIA/Final-AdministrativeRecord-Sun-Valley-Orchards-v-DOL.pdf.

maintain records of the sales, “would take workers’

checks to the bank to cash them and then return the

money to the workers, minus any money owed for meals

and beverages.” Id. at 90a.

About a month after the work started, 19 workers

met with respondent’s owners and the supervisor to discuss their working and living conditions. App., infra,

51a. Workers testified that one of the owners became

angry and said that the workers would be fired. Id. at

51a-52a. Respondent then gave the workers pre-filled

departure forms to sign—forms that falsely stated that

the workers were voluntarily leaving because of personal issues, “like a sick or dying loved one.” Id. at 107a.

Respondent submitted the signed forms to the Department of Labor. Id. at 52a.

In August 2015, respondent laid off 44 workers midseason after a crop failure—before respondent had met

the three-fourths guarantee as to four of the workers.

App., infra, 52a. The supervisor testified that he chose

“troublemakers” to lay off. A.R. 1942. Respondent instructed all 44 laid-off workers to sign departure forms

stating, “Work has slowed down, and I would like to return home.” E.g., A.R. 1610. One of respondent’s owners later explained that he asked workers to sign those

forms “to protect against this, this lawsuit.” A.R. 3203.

The owner also acknowledged, however, that the workers had been fired and that he had not given them a

choice to continue working. A.R. 2484.

C. Proceedings Below

1. After an investigation, the Department of Labor’s

Wage and Hour Division issued a notice finding that respondent violated the H–2A program’s requirements

and owed civil penalties and back wages. App., infra,

183a-199a. Respondent requested a hearing before an

ALJ. Id. at 7a.

After a multi-day hearing, the ALJ affirmed the

Wage and Hour Division’s findings in part and modified

them in part. App., infra, 77a-182a. The Administrative

Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 47a76a. The ALJ and Board found that respondent had

committed the following violations:

• Respondent made false promises about kitchen

access and failed to disclose its meal charges, see

App., infra, 75a, in violation of regulations that

require employers to furnish either free meals or

free kitchen facilities, see 20 C.F.R. 655.122(g); to

disclose paycheck deductions in the job offer, see

20 C.F.R. 655.122(p)(1); and to disclose the work

contract, see 20 C.F.R. 655.122(q).

• Respondent deducted charges for drinks from

workers’ paychecks, see App., infra, 75a, in violation of a regulation that forbids deductions that

include a profit to the employer, see 20 C.F.R.

655.122(p)(2).

• Respondent fired workers before they completed

three-fourths of the workdays included in the laborcertification period, see App., infra, 75a-76a, in violation of a regulation requiring the employer to

guarantee employment for that period, see 20

C.F.R. 655.122(i)(1).

• Respondent attempted to cause workers to waive

the three-fourths guarantee, see App., infra, 76a,

in violation of a regulation that forbids seeking to

have a worker waive his rights under the H–2A

program, see 29 C.F.R. 501.5.

• Respondent provided housing and transportation

that violated the minimum standards set by the

regulations. See App., infra, 76a; 20 C.F.R.

655.122(d) and (h)(4).

The ALJ and Board found respondent liable for a total

of $211,800 in civil penalties and $344,945.80 in back

wages. App., infra, 7a.

2. Respondent sued the Department of Labor and

the Secretary of Labor in federal district court in New

Jersey. App., infra, 7a. It raised several statutory and

constitutional claims, including, as relevant here, the

claim that the agency adjudication violated Article III

of the Constitution. Id. at 7a-8a.

The district court granted the government’s motion

to dismiss respondent’s claims, including its Article III

claim. App., infra, 20a-46a. The court explained that,

under this Court’s cases, Congress has “significant latitude to assign adjudication of public rights to entities

other than Article III courts.” Id. at 31a (quoting Oil

States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Services Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 325, 334 (2018)). It held that

this case involves public rights because it concerns immigration. Id. at 33a.

3. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of respondent.

App., infra, 1a-19a. The court sustained respondent’s

Article III claim and did not reach its other claims. Id.

at 19a n.6.

The court of appeals first concluded that this case involves private rights because it “is made of the stuff of

the traditional actions at common law tried by the

courts at Westminster in 1789.” App., infra, 11a (quoting SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109, 128 (2024)). The court

reasoned that the Department’s claim is “like a suit for

breach of contract, which would have traditionally been

heard in common law courts.” Id. at 12a. The court

added that the remedies that the agency sought, civil

penalties and back wages, are “common law remedies.”

Id. at 13a.

The court of appeals then rejected the government’s

contention that this suit involves public rights because

it concerns immigration. App., infra, 13a-14a. Though

the court accepted that history permits “non-Article III

adjudication for certain immigration-related matters,”

it concluded that this case falls outside that tradition.

Id. at 14a. According to the court, “[r]ules about worker

hours, housing, cooking, and transportation” concern

“employment law” rather than immigration. Id. at 16a.

The government filed a petition for rehearing, which

the court of appeals denied. App., infra, 200a-201a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The INA and its implementing regulations authorize

employers to obtain special permission from the government to import aliens for temporary agricultural

work only if the employers fulfill specified conditions regarding those aliens. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Labor “to take such actions, including imposing appropriate penalties,” “as may be necessary to assure employer compliance with th[ose] terms and conditions.” 8 U.S.C. 1188(g)(2). In the decision below,

however, the Third Circuit held that the statute violates

Article III of the Constitution. That decision conflicts

with this Court’s precedents interpreting Article III.

Because it invalidates an important federal statute, it

warrants this Court’s review.

A. The Decision Below Is Incorrect

Article III allows Congress to assign adjudications

involving public rights to executive agencies rather than

federal courts. Immigration-benefits cases such as this

one lie at the core of that public-rights doctrine. The

court of appeals’ reasons for holding that this case falls

outside the doctrine’s scope lack merit.

1. Congress may assign adjudications involving public

rights to executive agencies

Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the

United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,

and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from

time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. Art. III,

§ 1. Congress may not confer the federal government’s

“judicial Power” on entities outside Article III. See

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011).

Not every adjudication involves the exercise of “the

judicial Power.” Executive officers, too, adjudicate—

i.e., “determine facts, apply a rule of law to those facts,

and thus arrive at a decision.” Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 858, 909 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in

part and concurring in the judgment). They have done

so since the beginning of the Republic; for instance, the

Patent Board, an executive agency created by the First

Congress, adjudicated disputes concerning the patentability of inventions. See id. at 910. Agency adjudications may take a “ ‘judicial’ for[m],” but they remain “exercises of * * * the ‘executive Power.’ ” United States

v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1, 17 (2021) (citation omitted).

The line between judicial power and executive power

turns in part on the distinction between “private rights”

and “public rights.” See Oil States Energy Services,

LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 325, 334

(2018). “Private-rights disputes * * * lie at the core of

the historically recognized judicial power,” Northern

Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,

458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982) (plurality opinion), and therefore

“may not be removed from Article III courts,” SEC v.

Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109, 127 (2024). But Congress may

decide whether to assign adjudications involving public

rights to courts or instead to executive agencies. See

Oil States, 584 U.S. at 334.

“This Court has not ‘definitively explained’ the distinction between public and private rights, and its precedents applying the public-rights doctrine have ‘not

been entirely consistent.’ ” Oil States, 584 U.S. at 334

(citations omitted). At its core, though, the concept of

“public rights” includes privileges or benefits conferred

by the government. See Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 130.

The public-rights doctrine allows the Executive

Branch to adjudicate disputes about the granting of

governmental privileges—for example, disputes about

eligibility for “pensions and payments to veterans.”

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). The doctrine

likewise allows the Executive Branch to adjudicate disputes about the withdrawal of those privileges—for example, proceedings involving “reconsideration of the

Government’s decision to grant a public franchise,”

such as a patent. Oil States, 584 U.S. 334.

Particularly relevant here, the public-rights doctrine

allows the Executive Branch to issue penalties that

would otherwise be reserved to courts or juries. More

specifically, the Executive Branch may assess monetary

remedies for violating the terms and conditions of the

conferral of a privilege. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 342 (1909). That

is so even though such a remedy deprives the party of

property. The executive power includes the power to

assess penalties in the course of administering public

rights. See, e.g., Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S.

214, 221-222 (1893). And Congress “has the power to

condition issuance” of a benefit on consent to “agency

procedures.” Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568,

589 (1985); see, e.g., William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1579 (2020);

John Harrison, Public Rights, Private Privileges, and

Article III, 54 Geo. L. Rev. 143, 183 (2019).

2. Immigration-benefits cases involve public rights

Immigration-benefits cases are the paradigmatic example of public-rights disputes. Founding-era history,

this Court’s cases, and the separation-of-powers principles underlying the public-rights doctrine establish that

Congress may authorize the Executive Branch to adjudicate disputes about the granting of immigration benefits, the withdrawal of immigration benefits, and (most

pertinent here) compliance with the conditions on which

immigration benefits are conferred.

History. Founding-era history establishes that the

ability of an alien to enter or remain in the United

States is a privilege and that Congress may therefore

assign decisions concerning the grant or withdrawal of

that privilege to the Executive Branch. In 1798, the

Fifth Congress enacted the Nation’s earliest immigration laws: the Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, and

the Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577. The Alien

Friends Act, which expired in 1800, authorized the

President to “order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States

* * * to depart out of the territory of the United

States.” § 1, 1 Stat. 571 (emphases omitted). The Alien

Enemies Act, which is still in effect, authorizes the

President, in specified circumstances, to “apprehen[d],

restrai[n], secur [e], and remov[e]” citizens of hostile

foreign nations. § 1, 1 Stat. 577; see 50 U.S.C. 21. Each

statute empowered the Executive Branch to adjudicate

disputes about whether aliens could be expelled from

the United States.

In debates over the constitutionality of those laws,

Federalists explained that disputes about the admission

and expulsion of aliens involve public rights and so need

not be assigned to courts. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 584

U.S. 148, 213-214 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). John

Marshall, for example, drafted an address arguing that

the Alien Friends Act did not “transfer to the President

powers belonging properly to the judiciary” because

“the right of remaining in our country is vested in no

alien; he enters and remains by the courtesy of the sovereign power, and that courtesy may at pleasure be

withdrawn.” The Address of the Minority in the Virginia Legislature to the People of that State 9-10 (1799).

And a committee of the House of Representatives issued a report observing that aliens “remain in the country” “not as matter of right, but merely as a matter of

favor and permission.” 9 Annals of Cong. 2987 (1799).

That founding-era history establishes that aliens

have no private right to enter or remain in the United

States—and, by extension, that American employers

have no private right to bring aliens into the United

States. The ability to bring in aliens is instead a benefit,

and Congress may require employers who seek that

benefit to satisfy specified terms and conditions. The

public-rights doctrine, in turn, allows Congress to authorize executive officers to enforce those terms and

conditions, including by assessing monetary penalties.

Precedent. Congress enacted few laws concerning

immigration in the decades after the Alien Acts. But

when Congress reasserted its prerogatives to regulate

immigration in the late 19th century, it began enacting

statutes empowering executive officers to adjudicate

immigration-benefits disputes. This Court has upheld

those statutes, rejecting claims that they improperly

vested judicial power in the Executive Branch.

To start, Congress has long enacted laws that authorize the Executive Branch to adjudicate whether an

alien is statutorily entitled to the privilege of entering

the United States.3 This Court upheld such a statute in

Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892),

explaining that, although “Congress may, if it sees fit,

* * * authorize the courts to investigate and ascertain

the facts on which the right to land depends,” “the final

determination of those facts may [also] be entrusted by

Congress to executive officers.” Id. at 660.

Congress also has long enacted statutes empowering

executive officers to adjudicate which aliens to deport

from the United States.4 This Court approved that procedure in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698

(1893), explaining that the “power * * * to expel, like

the power to exclude aliens, * * * may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or Congress may call

in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested

facts on which an alien’s right to be in the country has

been made by Congress to depend.” Id. at 713-714.

For over a century, Congress has likewise enacted,

and this Court has upheld, statutes that authorize the

Executive Branch to assess monetary exactions against

companies that violate the terms and conditions of the

See, e.g., Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477-478; Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214; Immigration Act of

1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1085-1086.

See, e.g., Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566; Immigration

Act of 1891, §§ 10-11, 26 Stat. 1086; Immigration Act of 1907, ch.

1134, §§ 20-21, 34 Stat. 904-905.

privilege of bringing aliens to the United States. 5 In

Oceanic Steam, the Court upheld a law that authorized

the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose monetary penalties on carriers that brought in aliens with

certain contagious diseases, rejecting a claim that the

imposition of such a penalty requires “the exertion of

judicial power.” 214 U.S. at 338; see id. at 331-332. The

Court explained that Congress’s “plenary power” over

“the admission of aliens” includes the power “ ‘to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may come

in.’ ” Id. at 335, 343. The Court then determined that

Congress may secure the “enforcement” of those terms

and conditions “by reasonable money penalties, giving

to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties

without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.”

Id. at 339.

Similarly, in Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima per

Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932), the Court upheld

a statute authorizing the Secretary of Labor to impose

monetary penalties on transportation companies that

brought in certain types of aliens, such as those suffering from insanity, chronic alcoholism, tuberculosis, or a

physical disability affecting the alien’s ability to earn a

living. Id. at 331-332. The Court stated that, in exercising “its plenary power to control the admission of aliens,” Congress “may lawfully impose appropriate obligations, sanction their enforcement by reasonable

money penalties, and invest in administrative officials

the power to impose and enforce them.” Id. at 334-335.

Congress has likewise authorized executive officers

to assess penalties for violations of other conditions of

See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, § 9, 32 Stat. 12151216; Immigration Act of 1907, § 9, 34 Stat. 901; Immigration Act of

1917, ch. 29, § 9, 39 Stat. 880-881.

bringing aliens to the United States. For example, the

Act in Oceanic Steam authorized executive officers to

assess civil penalties against transportation companies

that failed to provide manifests identifying the aliens on

board. See Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, § 15, 32

Stat. 1217. Similarly, the Act in Lloyd Sabaudo allowed

executive officers to impose penalties on transportation

companies that refused to bear the expense of returning

aliens who had been excluded from the United States.

See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 18, 39 Stat. 887888. The statute likewise allowed executive officers to

impose penalties on companies that employed crew

members with dangerous contagious diseases, § 35, 39

Stat. 896—illustrating that executive enforcement of

conditions of transporting aliens to the United States

may extend to conditions that do not directly concern

the aliens themselves.

Congress, in short, may “exclude aliens from the

United States,” “establish regulations for sending out”

aliens, “prescribe the terms and conditions on which [aliens] may come in,” and “commit the enforcement of

such conditions and regulations to executive officers.”

United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279,

289-290 (1904). This Court has reaffirmed those principles in a long line of cases. See, e.g., Department of

State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 907 (2024); Kleindienst v.

Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); United States ex rel.

Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912); United States

v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 261 (1905); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903); Lee Lung v. Patterson, 186 U.S. 168, 175 (1902); Fok Yung Yo v. United

States, 185 U.S. 296, 302 (1902); Li Sing v. United

States, 180 U.S. 486, 495 (1901); Lem Moon Sing v.

United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547-548 (1895).

More broadly, this Court has consistently treated

privileges granted by the government as public rights.

It has stated that “[f ]amiliar illustrations” of public

rights include “pensions” and “payments to veterans,”

as well as “immigration.” Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50. It has

determined that the public-rights doctrine encompasses

cases arising out of the “issuance of registrations and

licenses.” Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589. And it has explained that public rights include “public franchise[s]”

granted by the government, such as “[p]atents,” the

privilege of “erect[ing] a toll bridge,” and “permit[s]” to

“build railroads or telegraph lines.” Oil States, 584 U.S.

at 337-338.

Although the Members of this Court disagreed in

Jarkesy about the scope of the public-rights doctrine,

all nine Justices agreed that the doctrine encompasses

immigration and public-benefits cases. The Court explained that Congress could constitutionally “prohibit

immigration by certain classes of persons and enforce

those prohibitions with administrative penalties assessed without a jury,” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 129, and

that public rights include “public benefits such as payments to veterans, pensions, and patent rights,” id. at

130 (citation omitted). Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that the class of public rights has

“traditionally included” “immigration” and “the grant

of public benefits.” Id. at 152-153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). And the dissenters noted that the public-rights

doctrine permits executive officers to assess “fines for

violation of immigration law barring entry of certain

classes of individuals,” id. at 178 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), or to resolve matters concerning “public benefits,” id. at 183 n.6. Under this Court’s cases, in short,

Congress may require that employers who seek the

privilege of bringing in aliens comply with specified con-

ditions, and may authorize the Executive Branch to enforce those conditions through monetary penalties.

Separation-of-powers principles. The separation-ofpowers principles underlying the public-rights doctrine

confirm that Congress may commit the adjudication of

immigration-benefits disputes to the Executive Branch.

Immigration is a “distinctive are[a],” Jarkesy, 603 U.S.

at 120, in which Congress possesses “extensive authority,” id. at 160 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). That authority

includes the power to impose “condition[s] to the right

to bring in aliens” and enforce such conditions “by penalties [assessed] by administrative authority.” Oceanic

Steam, 214 U.S. at 340, 342.

Congress, moreover, shares the power to regulate

immigration with the President. See Knauff, 338 U.S.

at 542. The authority to exclude aliens “stems not alone

from legislative power but is inherent in the executive

power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.” Ibid.;

accord Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593, 607 (2024).

That matters because this Court has distinguished “between cases of private right and those which arise * * *

in connection with the performance of the constitutional

functions of the executive.” Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50. The

enforcement of the conditions of a visa program arises

“in connection with” the Executive Branch’s “constitutional functions” concerning immigration. Ibid.

Finally, allowing Congress to assign the adjudication

of immigration-benefits cases to the Executive Branch

would pose no threat to Article III. As explained above,

courts historically have not possessed the exclusive

power to administer immigration benefits or to enforce

the conditions on which such benefits are conferred.

Statutes assigning immigration adjudications such as

this one to executive officers thus do not imperil “the

constitutional birthright of Article III judges.” Well-

ness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S.

665, 689 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

3. Contrary to the court of appeals’ analysis, this case

fits within the public-rights doctrine

Under the principles discussed above, this case is in

the heartland of the public-rights doctrine. The H–2A

visa program offers employers a package of valuable

benefits. If the employer files a successful “petition to

import an alien as an H–2A worker,” 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1),

the alien sponsored by the employer may obtain a visa

that enables the alien to travel to the United States, enter the country, remain here for the duration of the visa,

and perform agricultural work for the employer. Neither the employer nor the alien has a private right to

those privileges.

As a condition of conferring those benefits, Congress

has required employers to comply with requirements

designed to ensure that the employment of H–2A workers “will not adversely affect the wages and working

conditions of workers in the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

1188(a)(1)(B). And employers who accept those benefits

do so with the understanding that Congress has authorized the Secretary of Labor to “assure employer compliance with [those] terms and conditions” by “imposing

appropriate penalties,” 8 U.S.C. 1188(g)(2), and that the

Secretary has established an elaborate administrative

procedure, with hearings and appeals, to impose those

penalties and to oversee compliance with program conditions, see 29 C.F.R. 501.30 et seq. Those provisions fit

comfortably within Congress’s power to “prescribe the

terms and conditions” of bringing in aliens and “commit

the enforcement of such conditions” “to executive officers.” Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted).

The court of appeals nonetheless concluded that this

case “does not fit within” the public rights doctrine. App.,

infra, 17a. The court gave three reasons for reaching

that conclusion, but none is sound.

Scope of the “immigration exception.” The court of

appeals principally reasoned that what it called the

“ ‘immigration’ exception to Article III” is limited to

matters that “directly address the admission and exclusion of aliens.” App., infra, 15a-16a. In the court’s view,

this case “falls outside the immigration exception” because the H–2A program’s regulations are designed to

“vindicate the domestic national policy goal of preserving ‘the wages and working conditions of workers,’ ” rather than to address the admission and exclusion of aliens. Id. at 16a (quoting 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1)(B)). The

program’s “[r]ules about worker hours, housing, cooking, and transportation,” the court stated, concern “employment law,” not immigration. Ibid.

That line of reasoning rests on an illusory distinction

that contradicts this Court’s cases. The executive power

to adjudicate disputes over “the admission and exclusion of aliens,” App., infra, 16a, includes the power to

enforce the “terms and conditions on which they may

come in,” Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 335, which are a

critical aspect of federal immigration law. This Court

has reiterated that settled principle many times. For

instance:

• “The power of Congress * * * to prescribe the

terms and conditions upon which [aliens] may

come to this country,” and to have those terms

“enforced exclusively through executive officers,

without judicial intervention, is settled by our

previous adjudications.” Lem Moon Sing, 158

U.S. at 547.

• “That Congress may * * * prescribe the terms

and conditions upon which certain classes of aliens may come to this country * * * and commit

the enforcement of such * * * conditions * * *

exclusively to executive officers, without judicial

intervention, are principles firmly established by

the decisions of this [C]ourt.” Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 97.

• “Repeated decisions of this [C]ourt have determined that Congress has the power * * * to prescribe the terms and conditions on which [aliens]

may come in * * * and to commit the enforcement of such conditions and regulations to executive officers.” Turner, 194 U.S. at 289-290.6

Consistent with that principle, this Court held in

Oceanic Steam, for example, that the Executive Branch

could assess a penalty against a steamship company

that had brought in passengers with contagious diseases, finding it “beyond all question constitutional” for

Congress, “as a condition to the right to bring in aliens,”

to impose “a penalty for every alien brought to the

United States afflicted with [a] prohibited disease.” 214

U.S. at 342. In Lloyd Sabaudo, the Court similarly held

that the Executive Branch could fine a steamship company that that brought in prohibited passengers, noting

that Congress may “impose appropriate obligations” as

a condition of the right to bring in aliens, “sanction their

enforcement by reasonable money penalties,” and “invest in administrative officials the power to impose and

enforce” those penalties. 287 U.S. at 334. Just as the

Executive Branch may enforce conditions on steamship

companies designed to ensure that aliens entering the

Accord, e.g., Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766; Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 261.

United States (or crew members traveling with them,

see p. 20, supra) do not spread contagious diseases, it

may enforce conditions on employers designed to ensure that such aliens do not undermine the domestic labor market.

This case indisputably involves enforcement of the

“condition[s] of the right” “to bring in aliens.” Oceanic

Steam, 214 U.S. at 342. The requirements at issue here

apply only to employers who seek “to import an alien as

an H–2A worker.” 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). An employer

who does not participate in the program is free to hire

domestic workers, such as U.S. citizens or permanent

residents, without complying with the program’s “[r]ules

about worker hours, housing, cooking, and transportation.” App., infra, 16a. Executive enforcement of the

program’s “terms and conditions,” 8 U.S.C. 1188(g)(2),

is thus fully consistent with Article III.

It makes no difference that the conditions here are

designed in part “to vindicate the domestic national policy goal” of protecting the domestic labor force. App.,

infra, 16a. Immigration laws often serve domestic goals

—including the goal of “protecting the domestic labor

market.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208 n.5 (1982).

Such a goal does not transform the ability to bring aliens to the United States into a private right. The law

in Oceanic Steam, which forbade bringing in aliens with

contagious diseases, was likewise designed to vindicate

a domestic goal: protecting the public health. Yet this

Court still held that the Executive Branch could assess

penalties for violations of that law.

In distinguishing between foreign and domestic

goals, the Third Circuit also failed to appreciate that the

public-rights doctrine allows the Executive Branch to

adjudicate matters arising out of “the granting of public

benefits”—even domestic benefits such as “pensions,”

“payments to veterans,” and “patent rights.” Jarkesy,

603 U.S. at 130. An employer’s ability to “import an alien as an H–2A worker,” 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1), is such a

benefit. Congress may therefore empower an agency to

assess monetary penalties to enforce the conditions of

receiving that benefit—regardless of whether those

conditions serve domestic or foreign goals.

Nature of the claim. The court of appeals cited the

“nature of [the Department’s] claim” in concluding that

this case falls outside the public-right doctrine. App.,

infra, 11a. The court was correct that the nature of the

claim is a pertinent (though not dispositive) factor. One

of the “hallmark[s]” of a suit concerning private rights

is that it is made of “ ‘the stuff of the traditional actions

at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in

1789.’ ” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 127-128 (citation omitted).

“If a suit is in the nature of an action at common law,

then the matter presumptively concerns private rights.”

Id. at 128.

That factor, however, cuts against respondent. The

traditional work of the courts at Westminster did not

include adjudicating immigration disputes such as this

one. That was instead the province of the Crown in

England, see Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 709, and of the

Executive Branch in founding-era America, see pp. 1617, supra.

Contrary to the court of appeals’ suggestion, this

case is not “like a suit for breach of contract.” App.,

infra, 12a. A contract claim seeks to enforce terms to

which the parties have agreed, see Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 197 (1819); this case, by contrast, involves the enforcement of terms imposed by the

government as a condition of bringing aliens into the

United States. A contract claim is typically brought by

a party to the contract, see Bank of the Republic v. Mil-

lard, 10 Wall. 152, 156 (1870); the administrative proceeding here, by contrast, was filed by the government.

And monetary penalties, one of the remedies the government sought here, generally are not available in contract cases. See Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, 1618 (1822).

Monetary remedies. Finally, the court of appeals

found it “significant” that the government “sought common law remedies: civil penalties and back wages.”

App., infra, 13a. The court was correct that, in general,

the imposition of such monetary remedies is the province of Article III courts. See Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 123.

But the public-rights doctrine is a well-settled “exception” to that general rule. Id. at 120. Applying that doctrine, Oceanic Steam explained that, “[a]s the authority

of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the

United States embraces every conceivable aspect of

that subject,” Congress may impose “restrictions on the

coming in of aliens” and enforce those restrictions “by

penalties [assessed] by administrative authority.” 214

U.S. at 340. Lloyd Sabaudo reaffirmed that, in exercising its “plenary power to control the admission of aliens,” Congress may “impose appropriate obligations,

sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, and invest in administrative officials the power to

impose and enforce them.” 287 U.S. at 334-335.

Immigration is not the only area in which the publicrights doctrine allows the government to “extract civil

penalties in administrative tribunals.” Jarkesy, 603 U.S.

at 131 n.2. For instance, Congress, in exercising its plenary power over foreign commerce, may authorize customs officers to assess penalties against importers who

undervalue their merchandise. See Passavant v.

United States, 148 U.S. 214, 221-222 (1893); Bartlett v.

Kane, 16 How. 263, 274 (1854). Similarly, Congress, in

exercising the taxing power, may empower the Internal

Revenue Service to assess tax penalties. See Helvering

v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 & n.7 (1938). The nature

of the remedies sought thus does not overcome the rule

that immigration is a matter of public right.

B. The Decision Below Warrants This Court’s Review

1. This Court’s review is warranted because the

court of appeals held a federal statute unconstitutional.

“[W]hen a lower court has invalidated a federal statute,” the Court’s “usual” approach is to grant certiorari.

Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U.S. 388, 392 (2019). Indeed, the

Court applies a “strong presumption in favor of granting writs of certiorari to review decisions of lower

courts holding federal statutes unconstitutional.” Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela, 574 U.S. 1006, 1007

(2014) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial

of the application for a stay).

This Court has thus recently and repeatedly reviewed decisions invalidating federal statutes, even in

the absence of a circuit conflict. See, e.g., Kennedy v.

Braidwood Management, Inc., 606 U.S. 748, 759 (2025);

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 606 U.S. 1,

11 (2025); Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 120; United States v.

Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 690 (2024); Vidal v. Elster, 602

U.S. 286, 292 (2024); Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255,

272 (2023); Torres v. Texas Department of Public

Safety, 597 U.S. 580, 586 (2022); United States v. Vaello

Madero, 596 U.S. 159, 164 (2022). The same course is

appropriate here, especially because, as discussed above,

the court of appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s

precedents on the public-rights doctrine. See pp. 17-22,

supra.

The practical significance of the decision below underscores the need for this Court’s review. In Fiscal

Year 2024, the most recent year for which statistics are

available, the United States issued more than 315,000

H–2A visas. See U.S. Department of State, Report of

the Visa Office 2024, Tbl. XV(B), Nonimmigrant Visas

Issued by Classification (Including Border Crossing

Cards): 2020-2024.7 According to one estimate, H–2A

workers account for 16% of the United States’ agricultural workforce. See Elizabeth Weber Handwerker,

Cong. Research Serv., IF12979, Work Authorization

Among Hired Agricultural Workers (Apr. 30, 2025). 8

The H–2A program’s terms and conditions balance

“competing goals.” AFL-CIO v. Dole, 923 F.2d 182, 187

(D.C. Cir. 1991). On the one hand, Congress sought “to

provide agricultural employers with an orderly and

timely flow of legal workers, thereby decreasing their

reliance on unauthorized workers.” 73 Fed. Reg.

76,891, 76,891 (Dec. 18, 2008). On the other hand, Congress sought to ensure that foreign labor “will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of

workers in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1)(B).

The statutory and regulatory rules governing working

and living conditions play a crucial role in promoting the

latter objective. The imposition of monetary remedies,

in turn, helps ensure that employers comply with those

rules. By invalidating the provision authorizing the

Secretary to assess those remedies in administrative

proceedings, the court of appeals upset the careful “balance” that Congress struck between “providing an adequate labor supply” and “protecting the jobs of domestic workers.” AFL-CIO, 923 F.2d at 187.

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visastatistics/annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2024.html

https://congress.gov/crs-product/IF12979

Finally, this case would provide this Court with an

opportunity to clarify the public-rights doctrine. The

Court first recognized that doctrine 170 years ago. See

Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,

18 How. 272, 284 (1856). Yet the Court still “has not

‘definitively explained’ the distinction between public

and private rights.” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 131 (citation

omitted). The Court has noted that its opinions on the

public-rights doctrine “have not always spoken in precise terms” and that “[t]his is an ‘area of frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.’ ” Id. at 130

(citation omitted). Although resolving this case would

not require the Court to adopt a grand unified theory of

public rights, it would enable the Court to delineate the

proper methodology for judging the doctrine’s scope.

2. This case is a suitable vehicle for resolving

whether the challenged statute complies with Article

III. The government invoked the public-rights doctrine

in both the district court and the court of appeals, and

both courts squarely addressed that issue. See App.,

infra, 9a-17a; id. at 31a-33a.

No threshold procedural obstacle would preclude

this Court from reaching the question presented. To be

sure, the government argued below that, by failing to

raise its Article III claim before the ALJ, respondent

had either forfeited the claim or failed to exhaust it. See

App., infra, 17a. But the court of appeals rejected those

contentions, see id. at 17a-19a, and the government has

not asked this Court to review that aspect of the court

of appeals’ decision. Because forfeiture and exhaustion

do not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction in this case,

moreover, this Court has no independent obligation to

consider those issues.

3. This Court need not hold the petition for a writ of

certiorari in this case pending the resolution of FCC v.

AT&T, Inc., cert. granted, No. 25-406 (oral argument

scheduled for Apr. 21, 2026), and Verizon Communications Inc., cert. granted, No. 25-567 (oral argument

scheduled for Apr. 21, 2026). Those cases present the

question whether a statutory scheme under which an

agency may initially assess a civil penalty, but a party

may obtain a de novo jury trial when the agency sues to

recover the penalty, satisfies the Seventh Amendment

and Article III. See Pet. at I, AT&T, supra (No. 25406); Gov’t Cert. Br. at I, Verizon, supra (No. 25-567).

That issue is distinct from the question whether the

public-rights doctrine allows Congress to assign an immigration adjudication such as this one to the Executive

Branch rather than an Article III court.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorney General

SARAH M. HARRIS

Deputy Solicitor General

VIVEK SURI

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. RAAB

DANIEL AGUILAR

Attorneys

FEBRUARY 2026

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (July 29, 2025) ... 1a

Appendix B — District court opinion (July 27, 2023) ...... 20a

Appendix C — Department of Labor Administrative

Review Board order (May 27, 2021) ..... 47a

Appendix D — Department of Labor ALJ order

(Oct. 28, 2019) .......................................... 77a

Appendix E — Department of Labor notice of

determination (June 22, 2016) ............. 183a

Appendix F — Court of appeals order denying

rehearing (Oct. 15, 2025) ...................... 200a

Appendix G — Statutory provision:

8 U.S.C. 1188 .......................................... 202a

(I)

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 23-2608

SUN VALLEY ORCHARDS, LLC, APPELLANT

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;

UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF LABOR

Argued: Apr. 10, 2025

Filed: July 29, 2025

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 1:21-cv-16625)

District Judge: Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez

OPINION OF THE COURT

Before:

Judges.

HARDIMAN , PORTER, and SMITH, Circuit

HARDIMAN , Circuit Judge.

The United States Department of Labor (DOL) alleged that Sun Valley Orchards, a New Jersey farm,

breached an employment agreement formed under the

H-2A nonimmigrant visa program. Instead of pursuing its case in a federal district court, DOL imposed hun(1a)

dreds of thousands of dollars in civil penalties and back

wages through in-house administrative proceedings.

Sun Valley challenged this order under the Administrative Procedure Act, but the District Court dismissed its

claims. Following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), we hold that

Sun Valley was entitled to have its case decided by an

Article III court. We will reverse.

Under the H-2A nonimmigrant visa program, domestic employers may temporarily hire foreign laborers

to perform seasonal agricultural work. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a). Because the program exists at

the intersection of labor and immigration law, it is administered jointly by DOL and the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS). Prospective H-2A employers must obtain two forms of authorization: a labor

certification from DOL and a visa petition approval from

DHS. See id. § 1188(a).

This case arises from regulations under the labor certification process. The Immigration and Nationality

Act (INA) requires prospective H-2A employers to demonstrate that:

(A) there are not sufficient workers who are able,

willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the

time and place needed, to perform the labor or services involved in the petition, and

(B) the employment of the alien in such labor or services will not adversely affect the wages and working

conditions of workers in the United States similarly

employed.

Id. § 1188(a)(1).

To satisfy that statutory requirement, employers

must first attempt to recruit U.S. workers. See id.

§ 1188(b)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(f ). To that end, employers must offer U.S. workers “no less than the same

benefits, wages, and working conditions” that the employer offers H-2A workers. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(a).

Regulations dictate what benefits H-2A workers—and

therefore, corresponding U.S. workers—must receive.

See generally id. § 655.122. Relevant here, employers

must provide no-cost housing, see id. § 655.122(d)(1), access to a kitchen or meal plan, see id. § 655.122(g), and

transportation to the work site, see id. § 655.122(h).

These conditions are incorporated into a “job order,”

which is posted domestically before it is circulated to

foreign workers. Id. § 655.121(f ).

The job order functions as a work contract absent a

written agreement, and DOL may enforce its terms.

See id. § 655.122(q). Federal law authorizes the Secretary of Labor “to take such actions, including imposing

appropriate penalties and seeking appropriate injunctive relief and specific performance of contractual obligations, as may be necessary to assure employer compliance with terms and conditions of employment under”

the H-2A program. 8 U.S.C. § 1188(g)(2). Relying on

that language, DOL has promulgated regulations authorizing its Wage and Hour Division to impose civil

penalties and back wages on participating employers. 1

See 29 C.F.R. § 501.16; 20 C.F.R. § 655.101(b).

DOL may enforce contractual obligations on behalf of both H2A workers and workers in “corresponding employment,” which

can include U.S. workers. 29 C.F.R. § 501.0; see also 20 C.F.R.

An employer targeted for enforcement may request

a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

See 29 C.F.R. § 501.33. ALJs are removeable by the

Secretary of Labor for cause, see 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a), and

the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to their proceedings, see 29 C.F.R. § 501.34. ALJ decisions become final unless review is taken by the Administrative

Review Board. See id. § 501.42.

Sun Valley is a farm in New Jersey. The farm grows

fruits and vegetables, including asparagus, zucchini, cucumber, eggplant, peppers, and peaches. Sun Valley relies on seasonal workers hired through the H-2A program.

Sun Valley first participated in the program in 2015,

hiring 96 foreign workers and 51 corresponding domestic workers. Through a job order, Sun Valley promised

at least forty hours of work per week for twenty-six

weeks of employment. Consistent with applicable regulations, Sun Valley guaranteed employment for “the

hourly equivalent of 3/4” of the hours contemplated by

the agreement. App. 203. It offered no-cost housing

and free transportation to the worksite. And it promised to “furnish free cooking and kitchen facilities to

those workers who are entitled to live in the employers’

housing so that workers may prepare their own meals”

§ 655.103(b) (defining “corresponding employment”). This “ensure[s] that foreign workers will not appear more attractive to the

‘employer’ than domestic workers, thus avoiding any adverse effects for domestic workers.” Garcia-Celestino v. Ruiz Harvesting, Inc., 843 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016).

and to provide “free transportation” to the closest grocery store. App. 193.

According to DOL, Sun Valley did not keep those

promises. After spending time at the farm in 2015,

agency investigators identified several job order violations. DOL confirmed those violations in a letter to

Sun Valley, assessing hundreds of thousands of dollars

in civil penalties and back wages.

DOL first identified violations concerning housing.

Sun Valley’s job order had promised its employees nocost housing satisfying “the full set of DOL Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards.”

App. 193; see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(d)(1). But the

investigation found that “the housing facility provided

for workers was missing window screens and had screen

doors not in good repair,” which contributed to an “insect infestation throughout the camp.”

App. 154.

The investigation also revealed that “[s]everal bathroom

sinks did not have hot water, refuse containers throughout [the] facility were missing fly tight lids and multiple

mattresses used by occupants for sleeping purposes

were directly on the floor without a bed frame.” Id.

DOL assessed $3,600 in civil penalties for these alleged

violations.

DOL also found violations related to Sun Valley’s

meal plan. Sun Valley’s job order had not mentioned a

meal plan, instead promising to “furnish free cooking

and kitchen facilities . . . so that workers may prepare their own meals” and to provide “free transportation” to nearby grocery stores. App. 193. The investigation revealed, however, that Sun Valley had failed to

provide meaningful kitchen access in violation of the job

order, instead deciding to charge workers for meals

without notice. The investigator also found that a supervisor regularly charged workers for drinks. Because Sun Valley did not provide kitchen access, failed

to give notice of its alternative meal plan, and sold drinks

at a profit, DOL assessed $198,450 in penalties and

$234,079.28 in back wages.

DOL identified a violation related to transportation,

as well. H-2A employers must provide workers with

transportation to the job site that “compl[ies] with all

applicable local, State, or Federal laws and regulations,”

including those governing “transportation safety standards, driver’s licensure, and vehicle insurance.” 20

C.F.R. § 655.122(h)(4)(i). Consistent with that requirement, Sun Valley promised its employees “free transportation” from the “housing facility both to and from

the daily work site.” App. 205. But DOL’s investigation revealed that “three of the five vehicles used to

transport workers had insufficient tread on the tires for

safe operation and one had a non-functioning rear directional.” App. 154-55. The investigation also revealed

that “the five vehicles used to transport H-2A and corresponding [domestic] workers were operated by drivers who failed to possess valid, unexpired driver’s licenses.” App. 155. DOL assessed $7,500 in civil penalties for this violation.

Finally, DOL claimed that Sun Valley violated the

“three-fourths guarantee.” Id. Consistent with regulations, Sun Valley had guaranteed employment for “the

hourly equivalent of 3/4” of the workdays contemplated

by the job order.

App. 203; see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 655.122(i). But DOL’s investigation revealed that,

following a dispute between workers and management,

Sun Valley “constructively forced [some employees] to

return home prior to the end of the contract period,” coercing them to “sign a form . . . stating that they

were leaving early for ‘personal reasons.’ ” App. 15556. This action, DOL alleged, violated both Sun Valley’s

job order and a regulation prohibiting employers from

“seek[ing] to have an H-2A worker . . . waive any

rights conferred under” laws and regulations governing

the program.

29 C.F.R. § 501.5.

DOL assessed

$2,700 in penalties and $135,623.94 in back wages for

these violations.

All told, Sun Valley was assessed $212,250 in civil

penalties and $369,703.22 in back wages, payable directly to DOL. DOL notified Sun Valley of its “right to

request a hearing” before an ALJ to contest the assessment. App. 150; see also 29 C.F.R. § 501.33. But if the

farm failed to request a hearing within thirty days,

DOL’s findings would become “the final and unappealable Order of the Secretary.” App. 150.

Sun Valley timely requested a hearing before an

ALJ. The ALJ affirmed in part and modified in part

DOL’s findings. In a lengthy written opinion, the ALJ

agreed with DOL that Sun Valley violated a host of job

order provisions. The ALJ parted with DOL’s view

only as to the amount of civil penalties and back wages

owed, modifying those figures to $211,800 and $344,945.80,

respectively. Sun Valley petitioned the Administrative

Review Board for review, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Sun Valley challenged DOL’s decision in the District

Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under

the Administrative Procedure Act. It alleged several

statutory and constitutional defects in DOL’s order, in-

cluding that: (1) it adjudicated private rights in violation of Article III of the Constitution, (2) the ALJ presiding over the case was appointed and insulated from

removal in violation of Article II of the Constitution, (3)

the penalties and back wages assessed by the order were

excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (4)

DOL lacked statutory authority to impose civil penalties

and back wages through administrative proceedings. 2

DOL moved to dismiss, and both parties cross-moved

for summary judgment.

The District Court granted DOL’s motion to dismiss

all of Sun Valley’s claims. The Court first addressed

Sun Valley’s Article III claim, holding that agency adjudication was appropriate because DOL’s action fit

within the “public-rights doctrine.” Sun Valley Orchards, LLC v. Dep’t of Lab., 2023 WL 4784204, at *6

(D.N.J. July 27, 2023). The Court next rejected Sun

Valley’s claim that DOL lacked statutory authority to

impose civil penalties and award back wages in-house,

reasoning that the “clear language of the statute” vested

DOL with that authority. Id. at *7, 10-11. As for its

Article II claims, the Court concluded that Sun Valley

failed to exhaust the issue before the agency and dismissed on that basis. But it also explained that ratification cured any Appointments Clause defect, and that

ALJs are shielded from removal by only one level of

good-cause protection. Finally, the Court held that the

civil penalty award did not violate the Excessive Fines

Clause, explaining that it was “not grossly disproporSun Valley also alleged that DOL’s order was “not supported

by substantial evidence,” “an abuse of discretion,” or “otherwise

not in accordance with law.” App. 136. The District Court dismissed that claim as well, but Sun Valley does not raise it on appeal.

tionate to Sun Valley’s offenses.”

ley filed this appeal.

Id. at *11.

Sun Val-

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

“A district court’s order dismissing a complaint is subject to plenary review.” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v.

White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1197 (3d Cir.

1993). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we

must “hold unlawful and set aside” DOL’s action if we

find it to be, among other things, “arbitrary, capricious,

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law”; “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity”; or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory

right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

III

We begin and end with Sun Valley’s Article III argument. The Constitution vests “[t]he judicial Power of the

United States . . . in one supreme Court, and in

such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to

time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. 3, § 1.

The judges of those courts enjoy life tenure and salary

protection, attributes that preserve an “independent

spirit” that is “essential to the faithful performance” of

their duty. The Federalist No. 78, p. 469 (C. Rossiter

ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Because non-Article III tribunals lack these important qualities, Congress may not

“withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which,

from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common

law, or in equity, or admiralty.” Murray’s Lessee v.

Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)

272, 284 (1855).

10a

On top of that rule, the Supreme Court has explained

that certain “public rights” cases may be adjudicated

outside Article III. Id. Because the public rights exception “has no textual basis in the Constitution,” it

must “derive instead from background legal principles.”

Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 131. History therefore looms

large in the public rights analysis, requiring courts to

pay “close attention to the basis for each asserted application of the doctrine.” Id. In evaluating whether a

given case fits within the public rights exception, we look

for “a serious and unbroken” history of non-Article-III

resolution. Id. at 153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

With these principles in mind, we turn to Sun Valley’s

Article III challenge. The farm contends that DOL violated Article III by adjudicating its private rights

through in-house proceedings. To resolve this claim,

we must decide (1) whether DOL’s action concerns private rights (that is, whether it is in the nature of a common law suit), (2) whether DOL’s action fits within the

public rights exception, and (3) whether Sun Valley

waived its right to Article III adjudication. 3

We first consider whether DOL’s enforcement concerns private rights, asking if it “is made of the stuff of

Sun Valley argues on appeal that DOL’s adjudication violates

“Article III and, by extension, the Seventh Amendment.” Sun

Valley Br. 3. The Supreme Court has long recognized the close

relationship between Article III and the Seventh Amendment.

See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53-54 (1989).

And in Jarkesy, the Court appeared to confirm their analytical similarity. See 603 U.S. at 134. But because Sun Valley’s complaint

did not allege a violation of the Seventh Amendment, we consider

only its challenge under Article III.

11a

the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts

at Westminster in 1789.” Id. at 128 (majority opinion)

(citation modified). As the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jarkesy explains, a party challenging enforcement under Article III need not match the agency’s action to an exact historical comparator. Id. at 134.

Jarkesy considered whether the SEC could, consistent

with Article III and the Seventh Amendment, enforce

federal antifraud statutes through in-house civil penalty

proceedings. Id. at 120. The Court said no. Id. at 121.

The SEC sought civil penalties, which traditionally

“could only be enforced in courts of law.” Id. at 134 (citation modified). And its action, though based on federal law, “target[ed] the same basic conduct as common

law fraud, employ[ed] the same terms of art, and operate[d] pursuant to similar legal principles.” Id. Because both the action and the remedies that the SEC

pursued could be traced to English common law, Jarkesy’s

case presumptively “involve[d] a matter of private rather than public right.” Id. (citation modified).

Those same considerations require Article III adjudication here. Start with the nature of DOL’s claim.

While regulations require H-2A employers to provide

housing, meals, transportation, and guaranteed work,

employee benefits are formalized in an employer’s “job

order.” See generally 20 C.F.R. § 655.122. Where, as

here, the employer does not pen another agreement

with its employees, the job order functions as a “work

contract” between them. Id. § 655.122(q). It is the violation of the terms of that work contract, rather than

the regulations that shape it, that supports H-2A enforcement actions. See 29 C.F.R. § 501.0 (authorizing

“the enforcement of all contractual obligations . . .

12a

applicable to the employment of H-2A workers and

workers in corresponding employment”). 4

Consistent with that scheme, DOL framed its enforcement action against Sun Valley in contractual

terms. For instance, DOL told the ALJ that “Sun Valley’s assurances formed part of the farm’s contract with

H-2A workers.” A.R. 145. It then alleged that Sun

Valley “violat[ed]” those “contractual obligations.” Id.

The ALJ’s decision, too, sounded partially in contract.

For example, the decision found that Sun Valley

“breached a material term of the job order” when it

failed to provide employees with kitchen access. App.

83-84. And it ordered penalties and back wages for

Sun Valley’s decision to terminate workers “before they

worked the guaranteed three-fourths of the hours promised in their contracts.” App. 92. DOL’s action was

therefore litigated like a suit for breach of contract,

which would have traditionally been heard in common

law courts. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon

Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing “breach of con-

This contractual framing distinguishes the enforcement action

here from the one we recently considered in Axalta Coating Systems

LLC v. FAA, --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 1934352 (3d Cir. July 15, 2025).

That case considered whether the Seventh Amendment permitted

the Federal Aviation Administration to seek civil penalties from a

paint supplier through in-house proceedings. Id. at *1. The action there involved “technical” hazardous materials regulations with

no common law origins, which made it relevantly similar to the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety

& Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). Axalta, 2025

WL 1934352, at *5. The enforcement action in this case, by contrast, resembles common law breach of contract, so Atlas Roofing

does not control.

13a

tract” as “the stuff of the traditional actions at common

law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789”).

We also think it significant that DOL sought common

law remedies: civil penalties and back wages. The Supreme Court has long maintained that “[a] civil penalty

was a type of remedy at common law that could only be

enforced in courts of law.” Tull v. United States, 481

U.S. 412, 422 (1987); see also Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 123.

And to the extent that back wages are designed “to punish or deter the wrongdoer,” they, too, are legal in nature. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 123 (citation modified). The

ALJ here assessed back wages at least in part “[t]o deter such harm from occurring in the future.” App. 88.

The Administrative Review Board likewise cited the

need to “deter other H-2A employers” when upholding

the award.5 App. 42. That DOL sought punitive remedies therefore only confirms that its action was “made

of the stuff of the traditional actions at common law,”

presumptively entitling Sun Valley to adjudication before an Article III court. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 128 (citation modified).

DOL resists this conclusion. Despite the appearance of a common law contract action, it contends that

this case is really about immigration. And because immigration is traditionally a matter of public rights, DOL

insists that Sun Valley was not entitled to adjudication

by an Article III court. We are unpersuaded. While

In a different context, we recently described back wages as an

equitable remedy. See NLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 125 F.4th 78, 96

(3d Cir. 2024). But because the back wages here were imposed to

deter wrongdoers, rather than solely to provide restitution, they

are properly characterized as legal. See Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 123.

14a

history does sanction non-Article III adjudication for

certain immigration-related matters, this case falls well

outside the heartland of that tradition.

The political branches have long asserted control

over the Nation’s borders. While the President has possessed some authority to remove aliens since the founding, see Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 912 (2024),

Congress first enacted general restrictions on immigration during the late nineteenth century, see Kleindienst

v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972). From the beginning, these statutes empowered executive branch officials to adjudicate issues surrounding admission and exclusion. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,

591 U.S. 103, 129-30 (2020) (collecting statutes).

Recognizing the political branches’ “plenary power”

over immigration, the Supreme Court largely endorsed

this regime of administrative enforcement. See Castro

v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422,

439-41 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United

States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu v. United

States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Fong Yue Ting v. United

States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). The Court observed long

ago that exclusion was an “incident of sovereignty belonging to the government,” so that issue was generally

not appropriate “for judicial determination.”

Chae

Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. The “plenary power” doctrine has undergone changes since then, see Castro, 835

F.3d at 441-44, but the Supreme Court has consistently

“recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign

nationals is a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised

by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control,” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S.

667, 702 (2018) (citation modified).

15a

This history provides the foundation for an immigration exception to Article III adjudication. See Jarkesy,

603 U.S. at 128-30 (listing “immigration” as an example

of “public rights”). But it also suggests limitations.

The public rights exception captures only matters that

“historically could have been determined exclusively by

the executive and legislative branches.” Id. at 128 (citation modified). And the above historical discussion

suggests that non-Article III adjudication was traditionally appropriate in cases closely related to the admission

and exclusion of aliens.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Oceanic Steam

Navigation Co. v. Stranahan exemplifies this limitation.

214 U.S. 320 (1909). The plaintiff there, a steamship

operator, was sanctioned under a statute authorizing the

Secretaries of Labor and Commerce to impose penalties

for “bringing into the United States alien immigrants

afflicted with ‘loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases.’ ” Id. at 332. The operator claimed that this order violated Article III, but the Court disagreed. Congress had “plenary power . . . as to the admission of

aliens,” so it could authorize executive branch officials

to impose a penalty without Article III adjudication.

Id. at 343. Oceanic Steam, the Court would later explain,

stands for the proposition that Congress may “prohibit

immigration by certain classes of persons and enforce

those prohibitions with administrative penalties assessed

without” an independent judge or jury. Jarkesy, 603

U.S. at 129. So Oceanic Steam related closely to the

admission and exclusion of aliens. See Lloyd Sabaudo

Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335

(1932) (observing that Oceanic Steam concerned the

federal government’s “plenary power to control the admission of aliens”).

16a

Sun Valley’s case falls outside the immigration exception and the tradition that shaped it. Although the H2A program facilitates temporary migration, its labor

certification regulations do not directly address the admission and exclusion of aliens. Instead, the labor certification process is designed to vindicate the domestic

national policy goal of preserving “the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States.” 8

U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(B). Rules about worker hours, housing, cooking, and transportation regard employment

law, not “Congress’ plenary authority to control immigration.” Dep’t Br. 36. This is especially true considering that H-2A labor certification rules apply to foreign

and domestic workers alike. See 29 C.F.R. § 501.0.

So while H-2A labor certification regulations may ultimately serve immigration-related goals, extending Oceanic Steam to reach this case would allow “the exception

[to] swallow the rule.” Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 131.

DOL disagrees. In its view, the H-2A program implicates “a variety of foreign-policy concerns” that situate

it comfortably within the public rights exception.

Dep’t Br. 33. For example, the Secretaries of State

and Homeland Security “determine which countries are

eligible to participate in the program,” using participation as leverage to achieve foreign and domestic policy

objectives. Dep’t Br. 8. Because of these quintessentially public interests, it says, adjudications under the

H-2A program need not take place in an Article III

court.

This argument proves too much. It is true that portions of the sprawling H-2A program implicate the President’s unique power over foreign affairs. But at best,

that shows that some H-2A-related actions may proceed

17a

in agency tribunals. For example, DOL could use

agency proceedings to bar Sun Valley from the program

or to remove ineligible foreign workers from its employ.

See 20 C.F.R. § 655.182. Those actions, to the extent

they vindicate the federal government’s critical interest

in border control, likely fall within the immigration exception. But the fact that DOL has some authority to

proceed in a non-Article III tribunal does not give it

carte blanche to do so for all violations. Such a rule

would eviscerate Jarkesy’s instruction that we “evaluate[] the legal basis for [DOL’s] assertion [of the public

rights] doctrine with care.” 603 U.S. at 131.

In short, because the H-2A labor certification regulations mainly concern the federal government’s local interest in domestic wages, DOL’s action does not fit

within the public rights exception to Article III adjudication.

DOL’s last-ditch argument is that Sun Valley did not

preserve its Article III objection during administrative

proceedings. By failing to raise this issue before the

ALJ, DOL says, Sun Valley “either waived any Article

III claim [] or failed to exhaust it.” Dep’t Br. 41. We

disagree.

For its waiver argument, DOL relies on Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015).

That case addressed whether Article III permitted bankruptcy courts to hear non-core proceedings “with the

consent of all the parties to the proceeding.” Id. at 671

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2)). The Supreme Court

answered yes, holding that “Article III is not violated

when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent

to adjudication by a bankruptcy judge.” Id. at 669.

18a

Although knowing and voluntary consent could be implied, the Court explained, “the key inquiry [was] whether

the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for

consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily

appeared to try the case before the non-Article III adjudicator.” Id. at 685 (citation modified).

These preconditions for implied consent are not present here. DOL points to no evidence that Sun Valley

“was made aware of the need for consent and the right

to refuse it.” Id. (citation modified). To the contrary,

DOL’s letter assessing civil penalties provided that “the

determination of the Administrator shall become the final and unappealable Order of the Secretary” if “a request for a hearing [before an ALJ] is not received

within the time specified.” App. 150. So Sun Valley

lacked any real choice about where it could challenge

DOL’s action, meaning that it “did not truly consent to”

adjudication before an ALJ. Wellness Int’l Network,

575 U.S. at 681 (citation modified).

We also reject DOL’s exhaustion argument. It is

true that a party sometimes must exhaust issues it intends to raise during administrative, and later, judicial

proceedings. See Carr v. Saul, 593 U.S. 83, 88 (2021).

But even assuming Sun Valley failed to exhaust its Article III claim before the agency, we may still consider it

here. That’s because a “nonjurisdictional, mandatory

exhaustion requirement functions as an affirmative defense, and thus can be waived or forfeited by the government’s failure to raise it.” Fleming v. United States

Dep’t of Agric., 987 F.3d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see

also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417 (2023)

(explaining that “[e]xhaustion is typically nonjurisdictional”). Because DOL did not raise a failure-to-exhaust

19a

defense before the District Court, we will “treat that argument as forfeited.” Simko v. United States Steel

Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021). DOL has not offered any exceptional circumstances to excuse this forfeiture, so we will not address its exhaustion argument.

Cf. Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d

240, 250 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The doctrine of appellate waiver

is not somehow exempt from itself. This means that a

party can waive a waiver argument by not making the

argument below or in its briefs.” (citation omitted)). 6

* * *

An administrative tribunal ordered Sun Valley to pay

civil penalties and back wages for breaching contractual

obligations under the H-2A nonimmigrant visa program.

Because Article III required the Department of Labor

to instead proceed before a federal district court, we will

reverse and remand with instruction to enter judgment

in favor of Sun Valley.

Because we hold that DOL’s enforcement action violated Article

III, we need not reach Sun Valley’s alternative statutory, Article II,

and Eighth Amendment arguments.

20a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil No. 1:21-cv-16625

SUN VALLEY ORCHARDS, LLC, PLAINTIFF

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Filed:

July 27, 2023

OPINION

Plaintiff, Sun Valley Orchards, LLC (“Sun Valley”),

moves for partial summary judgment to all claims that

are susceptible to the decision based on the administrative record but not as to Sun Valley’s additional claims

seeking a de novo trial before the Court. The defendants, U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”), move to dismiss and for summary judgment on all Sun Valley’s

claims.

Sun Valley is a New Jersey family farm owned and

operated by Joe and Russell Marino. During the 2015

growing season, Sun Valley hired nineteen H-2A workers to harvest asparagus. The workers left the farm

later that year and the Department of Labor investigated their departure and found several violations of the

H-2A program requirements. Following adjudications

against Sun Valley by the Administrative Law Judge

21a

and the Administrative Review Board, Sun Valley filed

the instant action.

The Court has considered the written submissions of

the parties and the arguments advanced at the hearing

on April 20, 2023. The record of that hearing is incorporated.

Background

a. The H-2A Visa Program

To appreciate the facts of this case, some legal background is necessary. The Immigration and Nationality

Act of 1952 established the modern framework for regulation of immigration in the United States, including provisions for the admission of permanent and temporary

foreign workers. See Immigration and Nationality Act

of 1952 (“INA”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.). One such

provision was the H-2 visa program, which governed the

recruitment of foreign workers for agricultural and nonagricultural jobs. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii). In 1986,

Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control

Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), which amended the INA by, among

other things, bifurcating the H-2 visa program into the

H-2A and H-2B programs,1 which govern the admission

of agricultural and non-agricultural workers, respectively. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 3359,

3411 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b)).

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides

temporary work authorization for foreign agricultural

workers under the H-2A program.

See 8 U.S.C.

The H-2A program is for agricultural workers, and the H-2B

program is for non-agricultural workers.

22a

§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a); § 1184(c)(1). The H-2A program

permits employers to temporarily hire foreign workers

upon certification that “(A) there are not sufficient

workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who

will be available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor or services involved in the petitioner” and

“(B) the employment of the alien in such labor or services will not adversely affect the wages and working

conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A)-(B).

“Congress directed the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) to promulgate regulations that would set the parameters of the program, particularly for temporary workers coming ‘to perform agricultural labor or services.’ ”

Overdevest Nurseries, L.P. v. Walsh, 2 F.4th 977, 980

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)).

Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary promulgated

regulations2 to protect American workers. Under these

regulations, employers must first offer the job to workers in the United States. 20 C.F.R. § 655.121. Furthermore, the employer must offer domestic workers

“no less than the same benefits, wages, and working conditions that the employer is offering, intends to offer, or

will provide to H-2A workers.” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(a).

Only if an American worker does not accept a position

The H-2A visa is also governed by regulations issued by the

Immigration and Naturalization Service. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).

H-2A workers are only admitted into the United States to work for

the designated employer and for the duration of the certified period of employment, which cannot exceed one year. If the employment relationship ends, whether the employee quits or the employer terminates the employment, the H-2A visa expires, and the

workers must leave the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(viii),

(h)(11)(iii)(A)(1), & (h)(13).

23a

offered through this process can the employer submit an

Application for Temporary Employment Certification

(an “H-2A Application”) to the Department of Labor

(“DOL”). See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a), (c)(3)(A).

Before submitting an Application for Temporary

Employment Certification, an “employer must submit a

completed job order.” 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(1). The

job order lists the “[j]ob qualifications and requirements[,]” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(b), and “[m]inimum

benefits, wages, and working conditions[,]” 20 C.F.R.

§ 655.122(c). Once the DOL certifies an employer’s petition, the employer can petition the Department of

Homeland Security to designate foreign workers as H2A workers. See Overdevest Nurseries, 2 F.4th at 980.

b. The H2-A Enforcement System

The Secretary of Labor is “authorized to take such

actions, including imposing appropriate penalties and

seeking appropriate injunctive relief and specific performance of contractual obligations, as may be necessary

to assure employer compliance with terms and conditions of employment” of the H-2A program. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1188(g) (2); 29 C.F.R. § 501.1. The Secretary of Labor may also initiate administrative proceedings as necessary, or alternatively may petition “any appropriate

District Court of the United States” for injunctive relief,

or “specific performance of contractual obligations.”

29 C.F.R. § 501.16. The Department’s Wage and Hour

Division Administrator (“Administrator”) investigates

possible H-2A violations. If the Administrator determines violations occurred, it may recover back wages,

debar the employer from receiving future H-2A labor

certifications, and impose civil money penalties. 29

C.F.R. §§ 501.15, 501.16(a)(1), 501.19(a), 501.20(a). The

24a

Administrator may also impose civil monetary penalties

for “each violation of the work contract, or the obligations imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1188, 20 C.F.R. part 655.”

29 C.F.R. § 501.19(a). “In determining the amount of

penalty to be assessed for each violation, the Administrator shall consider the type of violation committed and

other relevant factors.” 29 C.F.R. § 501.19(b).

To institute administrative proceedings, the Administrator issues a written determination explaining the

Wage and Hour Division’s findings and imposes sanctions and remedies. 29 C.F.R. §§ 501.31, 501.32. An

employer can request an administrative hearing before

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to review the Administrator’s determination. 29 C.F.R. §§ 501.33(a),

501.34, 501.35. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

are generally applicable to litigation before the ALJ.

In proceedings before the United States Department of

Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) apply in any situation not provided for or controlled by these rules, or a

governing statute, regulation, or executive order.” 29

C.F.R. § 18.10(a). The ALJ will prepare a decision on

the issues referred by the Administrator. 29 C.F.R. §

501.41(a). Any party wishing review of the ALJ decision can petition the Administrative Review Board

(“ARB”). 29 C.F.R. § 501.42(a).

c. Sun Valley’s H-2A Violations

During the 2015 growing season, Sun Valley hired

nineteen H-2A workers to harvest asparagus. In completing the H-2A paperwork, Sun Valley stated they

would provide the workers access to a kitchen on the

premises of the farm when instead, the workers’ supervisor cooked out of the kitchen adjacent to the crew

25a

quarters and charged the workers a flat rate of $75-$80

per week for food. The supervisor also sold beverages

to the workers.

The contract with the nineteen workers entitled them

to forty hours of work per week during the season, totaling 1,040 hours. However, if the workers left voluntarily or were fired for cause, they were not entitled to

those hours. Fired for cause included a failure “to perform the work as specified,” as well as failure “to meet

applicable production standard.” See Dkt. 19-1 at 5

(quoting A.R. 1516).

Upon a dispute between the workers and Russel Marino in May 2015, the workers left the farm. When the

workers left Sun Valley, they had to complete paperwork stating their reason for departure. The contractor, whom the Marinos hired to assist them with the H2A program, advised the workers would hamper Sun

Valley’s future employment opportunities if they stated

they quit because they did not like the work. Instead,

the contractor advised Sun Valley that the workers

should state they left for personal reasons. Sun Valley

then had the workers sign departure forms disclosing

they resigned due to personal issues.

After an investigation in July 2015, the Administrator concluded Sun Valley violated various aspects of the

H-2A program and assessed $369,703.22 in back wages

and $212,250 in penalties. Sun Valley timely requested

an ALJ hearing in July 2016, and Judge Theresa Timlin

was assigned to the case, holding a four-day evidentiary

hearing in July 2017. The Secretary of Labor ratified

Judge Timlin’s appointment “to address any claim that

administrative proceedings pending before, or presided

over by, administrative law judges of the U.S. Depart-

26a

ment of Labor violate the Appointments Clause.” See

Dkt. 22-1 at 6 (quoting Ltr. To Hon. Theresa C. Timlin

(Dec. 21, 2017)).

Almost two years later after the appointment on October 28, 2019, Judge Timlin issued the decision, finding

numerous H-2A violations and imposing $344,945.80 in

back wages and $211,800 in penalties, a reduction of over

$25,000 from the Administrator’s assessment. Sun Valley then appealed to the ARB, which affirmed the ALJ

decision.

Sun Valley argues the DOL’s adjudication of these

claims in agency courts, before agency judges, violated

Article III; the DOL’s award must be vacated because

the ALJ was neither appointed nor subject to removal

as required by the Constitution; the DOL’s award is contrary to law and cannot be sustained based on the evidence in the administrative record; and the DOL’s award

violates the Excessive Fines Clause. 3 The DOL argues

the adjudication does not violate Article III; the ALJs

do not violate the Appointments Clauses or the President’s removal power; the adjudicatory system is authorized by the statute and Sun Valley is not entitled to

a trial de novo; the imposition of back pay and penalties

is fully supported by the record and is neither arbitrary

nor capricious; and the DOL did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause.

Sun Valley states in addition to the claims presented in their motion for partial summary judgment, its complaint includes separate

allegations seeking de novo review of the DOL’s factual determinations after trial. Because Sun Valley cannot request summary judgment in its favor on those claims, they are not encompassed in the

motion for partial summary judgment.

27a

II.

Standard of Review

a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a

party to move for dismissal of a claim based on “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint should be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the alleged facts, taken as

true, fail to state a claim. Id. In general, only the allegations in the complaint, matters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint are taken

into consideration when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Chester County Intermediate

Unit v. Pa. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990).

It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977).

The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff

will ultimately prevail. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478

F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2007). Instead, the Court simply

asks whether the plaintiff has articulated “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility 4 when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they

This plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility

that unlawful conduct has occurred. “When a complaint pleads facts

that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short

of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ’ ’’ Id.

28a

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679.

The Court need not accept “ ‘unsupported conclusions

and unwarranted inferences,’ ” Baraka v. McGreevey,

481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), however, and “[l]egal conclusions made in the guise of factual allegations . . . are given no presumption of truthfulness.” Wyeth v. Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd., 448 F. Supp.

2d 607, 609 (D.N.J. 2006) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see also Kanter v. Barella, 489

F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher,

423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] court need not

credit either ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ in a

complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss.”)). Accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80 (finding that pleadings

that are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the

assumption of truth).

Further, although “detailed factual allegations” are

not necessary, “a plaintiff ’s obligation to provide the

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief ’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).

Thus, a motion to dismiss should be granted unless

the plaintiff ’s factual allegations are “enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true (even

if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “[W]here

the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the com-

29a

plaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the

pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

b. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56

Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Thus, the Court will enter summary judgment in favor of a movant who shows

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and supports the showing that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers,

or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A).

A fact is “material” only if it might impact the “outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Gonzalez v.

Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 261 (3d

Cir. 2012). A “genuine” dispute of “material” fact exists where a reasonable jury’s review of the evidence

could result in “a verdict for the non-moving party” or

where such fact might otherwise affect the disposition of

the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists, the court must view the

facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those

facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) bears the burden of demonstrating

the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.”

Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074,

30a

1080 (3d Cir. 1996). The moving party may satisfy its

burden by producing evidence showing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact or by showing there is

no evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s case.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once

the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving

party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.;

Maidenbaum v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp.

1254, 1258 (D.N.J. 1994). Thus, to withstand a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving

party. Andersen v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

256-57 (1986). “A nonmoving party may not ‘rest upon

mere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statements . . . .’ ” Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 825,

Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d

Cir. 1992) (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d

497, 500 (3d Cir. 1991)). Indeed,

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. That is, the movant can support the assertion that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed by showing that “an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the [alleged dispute of ]

fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); accord Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(2).

31a

III. Analysis

a. The Department of Labor’s Adjudication

does not Violate Article III

“The judicial power of the United States, shall be

vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts

as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art III, § 1. Congress cannot “confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside

Article III.” Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Greene’s

Energy Grp., L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011)).

“When determining whether a proceeding involves

an exercise of Article III judicial power, this Court’s

precedents have distinguished between ‘public rights’

and ‘private rights.’ ” Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C.,

138 S. Ct. at 1373 (quoting Executive Benefits Ins. Agency

v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 32 (2014)). “Those precedents

have given Congress significant latitude to assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III

courts.” Id.

The Supreme Court has not “ ‘definitively explained’5

the distinction between public and private rights,” id.

(quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon

Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)), and the Court’s

precedents “applying the public-rights doctrine have

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), attempted to list some of

the matters that fall within the public-rights doctrine: “Familiar

illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of such matters are found in connection with the exercise of

the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce,

taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities

of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans.” Id., 285

U.S. at 51.

32a

‘not been entirely consistent.’ ” Id. (quoting Stern, 564

U.S. at 488). However, precedents have recognized that

the public-rights doctrine covers matters “which arise

between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.” Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50.

The Supreme Court continues to limit the publicrights doctrine to “cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert Government agency is

deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.” Stern, 564 U.S. at 490. Thus,

the public-rights doctrine applies “when the right is integrally related to [a] particular Federal Government

action.” Id.

The public-rights doctrine applies to the DOL’s case

against Sun Valley for its H-2A violations because the

H-2A involves immigration, which is a matter that falls

within the doctrine. Under the Constitution, “control of

the admission of aliens is committed exclusively to Congress, and . . . may lawfully impose appropriate obligations, sanction their enforcement by reasonable money

penalties, and invest in administrative officials the power to impose and enforce them.” Lloyd Sabaudo Societa

Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932).

“Congress has often created new statutory obligations,

provided for civil penalties for their violation, and committed exclusively to an administrative agency the function of deciding whether a violation has in fact occurred.”

Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.

Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977).

33a

Sun Valley argues this is a private right case because

it involves “claims that historically were the subject action at common law, and because imposing over half a

million dollars in liability on a family farm (on a breachof-contract theory) is an inherently judicial matter.”

Dkt. 19-1 at 14. However, the enforcement action here

is by the federal government based on Sun Valley’s

DOL’s violations, which arise under the public-rights

doctrine. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 489 (The public rights

exception arises “between the Government and persons

subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or

legislative departments” and private rights involve “the

liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.”). Because this matter is based on Sun Valley’s

violations of DOL’s regulations, derives from a federal

regulatory scheme under the federal government’s immigration related powers, and is integrally related to a

particular Federal Government action, the enforcement

action is adjudicated outside Article III. Thus, the

DOL did not violate Article III and the claim is therefore dismissed. 6

Additionally, “Article III’s guarantee of an impartial and independent adjudication by the federal judiciary is subject to waiver.”

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834

(1986). “[A] party may impliedly consent through his “actions rather than [his] words.” In re Trib. Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 394

(3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 589-90

(2003)). Here, Sun Valley impliedly consented to a non-Article III

adjudication based upon the continued litigation through the DOL

for four years and never objected to the agency’s non-Article III

status.

34a

b. The Department of Labor’s Adjudicatory System is Authorized by Statute

Sun Valley argues “Congress has not authorized the

Agency adjudication in this case.” Dkt. 19-1 at 25. However, by the plain language of the statute:

The Secretary of Labor is authorized to take such actions, including imposing appropriate penalties and

seeking appropriate injunctive relief and specific performance of contractual obligations, as may be necessary to assure employer compliance with terms and

conditions of employment under this section.

8 U.S.C. § 1188(g)(2). Per the statute, the Secretary

could have just decided to impose such penalties. However, the Secretary may “prescribe regulations for the

government of his department” and “the distribution

and performance of its business.” 5 U.S.C. § 301.

Here, the Secretary prescribed regulations for the government of its department and the distribution and performance of its business by allowing H-2A violators to

challenge these assessments through an adjudicatory

process where ALJs can consider testimony and evidence. If a party is dissatisfied with the ALJ’s decision, they then may petition the ARB to review the decision. 29 C.F.R. § 501.42.

Based on the clear language of the statute, Congress

authorized the DOL to adjudicate

civil monetary penalties or back pay in administrative

proceedings.

35a

c. Sun Valley Bore the Responsibility to Develop Issues for the Adjudicator’s Consideration

“Administrative review schemes commonly require

parties to give the agency an opportunity to address an

issue before seeking judicial review of that question.”

Carr v. Saul, 141 S. Ct. 1352, 1358 (2021). “Where statutes and regulations are silent, however, courts decide

whether to require issue exhaustion based on ‘an analogy to the rule that appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.” Id. (quoting

Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 108-09 (2000)). When determining to impose an issue exhaustion requirement,

the court “depends on the degree to which the analogy

to normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular

administrative proceeding.” Id. at 1358 (quoting Sims,

530 U.S. at 109). Issue exhaustion is at its greatest where

the parties are expected to develop the issues in an adversarial administrative proceeding. Sims, 530 U.S at

110.

The ALJ does not look into its own issues. The DOL’s

H-2A enforcement proceedings require “formal adversarial adjudications.” 29 C.F.R. § 18.101. “Any person

desiring review of a determination referred to in

§ 501.32, including judicial review, shall make a written

request for an administrative hearing . . . .” 29 C.F.R.

§ 501.33(a). The request must “[s]tate the specific reason or reasons the person requesting the hearing

believes such determination is in error[.]” 29 C.F.R.

§ 501.33(b)(3). Additionally, within the prehearing

statement, it must state “[t]he issues of law to be determined with reference to the appropriate statute, regulation, or case law[.]” 29 C.F.R. §18.80(c)(2).

36a

Because issue exhaustion was required and Sun Valley bore the responsibility to develop issues for the adjudicator’s consideration and failed to raise its Appointments Clause and Removal Power objections in the

agency proceedings, the claims are deemed forfeited

and are hereby dismissed.

d. The Administrative Law Judge did not Violate the Appointments Clause

Despite, Sun Valley’s procedural missteps. Sun Valley argues the DOL’s award must be vacated because

the ALJ was not constitutionally appointed. See Dkt.

19-1 at 28. However, “ratification can remedy a defect

arising from the decision of ‘an improperly appointed official . . . when . . . . a properly appointed official has the power to conduct an independent evaluation

of the merits and does so.’ ” Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co. v.

Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 857 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

There are three general requirements for ratification:

(1) “the ratifier must, at the time of ratification, still

have the authority to take the action to be ratified[,]” (2)

“the ratifier must have full knowledge of the decision to

be ratified[,]” and (3) “the ratifier must make a detached

and considered affirmation of the earlier decision.”

Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 820 F.3d

592, 602 (3d Cir. 2016). Evidence of a detached and

considered judgment can be “implied from subsequent

conduct, [], such when a later act is necessarily an affirmation on an earlier act.” Id. at 603. Ratification may

be done by a properly appointed superior official or a

properly appointed official is capable of ratifying their

own decisions. Id. at 605. In determining whether

ratification has occurred, agency officials are owed

37a

“proper deference” under the “presumption of regularity.” Id.

Here, Judge Timlin’s appointment was ratified by the

head of her department, the Secretary of Labor, after

she held the hearing, but nearly two years before she

decided Sun Valley’s case. Upon her appointment, Judge

Timlin then ratified all prior proceedings. The knowledge requirement is easily satisfied since Judge Timlin

presided over Sun Valley’s case and the four-day hearing. The detached and considered affirmation of all

earlier decisions is also satisfied since Judge Timlin did

not decide anything of substance for nearly two years

after the Secretary ratified her appointment. Additionally, Judge Timlin’s later decision was an affirmation of the validity of her earlier actions in conducting

the case. Because Judge Timlin was a properly appointed inferior officer when she decided Sun Valley’s

case, there was no Appointment Clause Violation. 7

e. The Administrative Law Judge did not Enjoy

Impermissible Protections Against Removal

Sun Valley claims “[t]he ALJ who adjudicated Sun

Valley’s case [] was not subject to effective control by

the President through the removal power.” Dkt. 19-1

at 30. Article II provides “[t]he executive Power shall

be vested in a President of the United States of America[,]” and “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully

Because Sun Valley does not allege its previous claim in its complaint that the ALJs who make up the Review Board violate the Appointments Clause because they qualify as principal officers of the

United States insofar as their decisions are final decisions of the Labor Department and are not subject to review by a superior executive officer, the Court deems the alleged claim from Sun Valley’s

complaint abandoned.

38a

executed[.]” U.S. Const. art. II § 1; id. at § 3. “The entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone.”

Seila L. L.L.C. v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).

However, lesser executive officers will assist and “remain accountable to the President, whose authority they

wield.” Id. The President’s authority includes “the

ability to remove executive officials, for it is ‘only the authority that can remove’ such officials . . . .” Id.

(quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)).

As inferior officers, the DOL’s ALJs are appointed

by the Secretary of Labor, the Head of their Department. Such power of appointment of executive officers

comes with it “necessary incident of removal.” Myers

v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126-27 (1926). In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Supreme Court held

that Congress can, under certain circumstances, create

independent agencies run by principal officers appointed by the President, whom the President may not

remove at will but only for good cause. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Likewise,

in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), and

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Court sustained similar restrictions on the power of principal executive officers, themselves responsible to the President, to remove their own inferiors. Congress has the

power to limit and regulate removal of such inferior officers in the heads of departments. Perkins, 116 U.S.

at 485.

The Supreme Court has upheld limited restrictions

on the President’s removal power where “only one level

of protected tenure separated the President from an officer exercising executive power.” Free Enter. Fund v.

Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 495, (2010).

39a

When there is only one level of protected tenure separating the President from an officer, there is no removal

problem because “[i]t [is] the President—or a subordinate he [can] remove at will—who decide[s] whether the

officer’s conduct merit[s] removal under the good-cause

standard.” Id.

Despite the Merit Systems Protection Board (the

“Board”) determining whether there is removal for “good

cause,” the action is taken by the agency which the administrative law judge is employed. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). The

Board is simply there to make sure the agency properly

invoked “good cause” for removal. Because ALJs may

be removed by the Secretary of Labor for “good cause,”

there is no removal problem. See id. There is only one

level of protected tenure separating the President from

an officer since the Secretary of Labor is removable by

the President.

Further, there is no removal problem when the Secretary of Labor does not need to use ALJs at all. Thus,

“[t]he President has broad executive power to order the

Secretary of Labor to change DOL’s regulatory scheme

and remove ALJs from the adjudicatory process under

30 U.S.C. § 932a.” Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, 8

F.4th 1123, 1134 (9th Cir. 2021). For the above reasons,

Sun Valley’s removal-power claim is hereby dismissed.

f. The Department of Labor’s Imposition of

Back Pay and Penalties was Neither Arbitrary nor Capricious

Sun Valley makes two arguments regarding the

agency’s award for the meal plan and beverage issues:

(1) the ALJ and ARB did not adequately justify its imposition of monetary penalties, and (2) the DOL’s award

of back wages is not supported by substantial evidence.

40a

“Judicial review under [the arbitrary-and-capricious

standard] is deferential, and a court may not substitute

its own policy judgment for that of the agency.” Fed.

Commc’ns Comm’n v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141

S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). “A court simply ensures that

the agency has acted within a zone of reasonableness

and, in particular, has reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably explained the decision.” Id.

First addressing the imposition of monetary damages. “In determining the amount of penalty to be assessed for each violation, the WHD Administrator shall

consider the type of violation committed and other relevant factors.” 29 C.F.R. § 501.19(b). “The decision [of

the ALJ] shall [] include an appropriate order which

may affirm, deny, reverse, or modify, in whole or in part,

the determination of the WHD Administrator.” 29

C.F.R. § 501.41(b). Further, the ALJ must state the

reason or reasons for such order. Id.

Sun Valley complains that Judge Timlin deferred to

the enforcement personnel instead of conducting a de

novo review of the Administrator’s determination. Dkt.

19-1 at 33. However, the ALJ only had to affirm, deny,

reverse, or modify the determination of the WHD Administrator and state the reasons for such order. Such

requirements were met by the ALJ when she affirmed

the Administrator’s assessment of penalties for meal

and beverage violations and stated the reason for such

order is to “deter other H-2A employers from making

the same failure to disclose in a potentially exploitative

way.” See AR 4500-02.

Insofar as the regulatory factors considered by the

WHD Administrator, the Administrator assessed one

penalty for Sun Valley’s combined meal and drink viola-

41a

tions in the amount of $1,350 for each of Sun Valley’s 147

workers, where instead, the Administrator had the discretion to assess the meal and drink penalties separately. Judge Timlin found the Administrator applied

the factors appropriately and assessed the penalty in

this way due to the seriousness of the violation and great

impact on workers.

Secondly, addressing the award of back wages.

“The employer must make all deductions from the worker’s paycheck required by law. The job offer must specify all deductions not required by law which the employer will take from the worker’s paycheck.” 20

C.F.R. § 655.122(p)(1). “A deduction that is primarily

for the benefit or convenience of the employer will not

be recognized as reasonable and therefore the cost of

such an item may not be included in computing wages.”

20 C.F.R. § 655.122(p)(2).

In this matter, Sun Valley deducted meal-plan and

beverages charges from the workers’ pay without prior

disclosure in the job order. The undisclosed deductions

from the meal-plan charges reduced the workers’ wages

below the required wages specified in the job order.

Further, the meal-plan changed a material term of the

job order, which harmed both the workers’ reliance on

the H-2A program to ensure the protection of workers’

rights and the overall integrity of the H-2A program.

It is evident Sun Valley profited from the sales of the

meal-plan and beverages charges. Such profits are

clearly prohibited in the H-2A regulations noted above.

Thus, the award of back wages due to the unlawful deductions are not improper because it makes the workers’

whole in compensation.

42a

The ALJ reasonably considered the relevant issues

of Sun Valley’s H-2A violations and reasonably explained

the imposition of back wages and penalties. Thus, such

imposition of back wages and penalties in regard to Sun

Valley’s H-2A violations are neither arbitrary nor capricious.

g. Sun Valley Improperly Terminated Nineteen

Workers

“The employer must guarantee to offer the worker

employment for a total number of work hours equal to

at least three-fourths of the workdays of the total period

. . . and ending on the expiration date specified in the

work contract . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i)(1). The

employer is not responsible for paying the three-fourths

guaranteed if a “worker voluntarily abandons employment before the end of the contract period, or is terminated for cause . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(n).

Sun Valley argues the agency’s award for early termination is not supported by substantial evidence. See

Dkt. 19-1 at 36. The ALJ and ARB affirmed that Sun

Valley improperly fired nineteen workers after the May

2015 altercation. Judge Timlin relied on testimony of

various workers to determine they were fired. When

evaluating the witnesses’ credibility, Judge Timlin found

that “the [worker] witnesses were consistent in describing the heated events at the meeting while Joseph Marino was unable to remember specifically what was

said.” Dkt. 22-1 at 38; see AR 4343. Upon appeal, the

ARB reviewed Judge Timlin’s cited evidence and properly

deferred to the credibility determinations, affirming the

ALJ’s ruling.

43a

“[T]he ALJ must necessarily make certain credibility

determinations, and this Court defers to the ALJ’s assessment of credibility.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d

607, 612 (3d Cir. 2014); see Diaz v. Comm’r, 577 F.3d

500, 506 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In determining whether there

is substantial evidence to support an administrative law

judge’s decision, we owe deference to his evaluation of

the evidence [and] assessment of the credibility of witnesses . . . .”). However, the ALJ must specifically

identify and explain what evidence it found not credible

and why it found it not credible. Adorno v. Shalala, 40

F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Stewart v. Sec’y of

Health, Education and Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d

Cir.1983)); see also Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054

(9th Cir. 2006) (stating that an ALJ is required to provide “specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony”). An

ALJ cannot reject evidence for an incorrect or unsupported reason. Ray v. Astrue, 649 F.Supp.2d 391, 402

(E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d

1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993).

Because the Court owes deference to the ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence and assessment of the credibility

of witnesses, the Court agrees with Judge Timlin’s determination. Based on the workers’ testimony and explanation for why the ALJ found the workers’ testimony

credible, the ARB reasonably affirmed that Sun Valley

Improperly terminated nineteen workers in May 2015.

h. The Department of Labor is Authorized to

Assess Back Wages

Sun Valley argues the “Agency’s entire award of back

pay (for all the various violations) must be vacated because the statute does not authorize back pay.” Dkt. 191 at 38. “The Secretary of Labor is authorized to take

44a

such actions, including imposing appropriate penalties

and seeking appropriate injunctive relief and specific

performance of contractual obligations, as may be necessary to assure employer compliance with terms and

conditions of employment . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1188(g)(2).

Nothing in the statute prevents the agency from

awarding back wages. The statute merely includes a

list of some actions the Secretary of Labor is authorized

to take. See generally INCLUDE, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The participle including typically indicates a partial list.”). Additionally, when

8 U.S.C. § 1188 has been violated, actions including

“the recovery of unpaid wages” may be taken. 29 C.F.R.

§ 501.16(a)(1).

The Labor Department did not Violate the

Excessive Fines Clause

Sun Valley argues the “Agency’s award for the meal

plan and beverages violations also violates the Eighth

Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.” Dkt. 19-1 at 39.

The Eighth Amendment provides that: “Excessive bail

shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const.

amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment is applicable if

the forfeiture constitutes a “fine” and is violated only if

that fine is “excessive.” See Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty.

Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 2000). In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture of

a sum of money grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s offense constituted an Excessive Fines Clause violation and was therefore, unconstitutional. United States

v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 (1998).

The DOL’s award of penalties was not grossly disproportional to Sun Valley’s meal plan and beverages viola-

45a

tions. Sun Valley’s violations harmed the workers’ reliance and overall integrity of the H-2A program. Instead of imposing separate penalties for each of the meal

and drink violations, the DOL only imposed one penalty

of $1,350 per worker for Sun Valley’s combined violations. The DOL also applied a ten percent reduction to

the penalties due to Sun Valley not having a prior history with the H-2A program. Such reduction and imposition of one penalty is not grossly disproportionate

to Sun Valley’s offenses when the sum is less than legally permissible. See Tillman, 221 F.3d at 420-21.

Additionally, a reviewing court should evaluate “the

sentences imposed for commission of the same crime

in other jurisdictions.” United States v. Cheeseman,

600 F.3d 270, 284 (3d Cir. 2010). “From 2005 through

August 2021, the DOL [] imposed three civil monetary

penalties over $1 million; fifty-two penalties between

$100,000 and $1 million; 482 penalties between $10,000 and

$100,000; and 1,850 penalties under $10,000 for alleged

violations of the H-2A program.” Dkt. 19-1 at 3. Thus,

there is nothing out of the ordinary about Sun Valley’s

$198,450 penalties, and Sun Valley’s Excessive Fine

claim is dismissed.

IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss [Dkt. 22-1] is granted without prejudice, and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt.

19-1] and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 22-1] are denied as moot.

An appropriate Order shall issue.

46a

Dated: July 27, 2023

/s/ JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ

HON. JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ ,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

47a

APPENDIX C

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

200 CONSITUTION AVE. NW

WASHINGTON, DC 20210-0001

ARB Case No. 2020-0018

ALJ Case No. 2017-TAE-00003

IN THE MATTER OF ADMINISTRATOR, WAGE AND HOUR

DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

PLAINTIFF

SUN VALLEY ORCHARDS, LLC, RESPONDENT

Date: May 27, 2021

Filed: Sept. 8, 2021

DECISION AND ORDER

Appearances:

FOR THE COMPLAINANTS:

CHRISTOPHER J. SCHULTE, ESQ.

CJ Lake, LLC

Washington, District of Columbia

FOR THE RESPONDENT:

KATE S. O’SCANNLAIN, ESQ.

JENNIFER S. BRAND, ESQ.

SARAH K. MARCUS, ESQ.

48a

RACHEL GOLDBERG, ESQ.; AND

AMELIA BELL BRYSON, ESQ.

Office of the Solicitor

U.S. Department of Labor

Washington, District of Columbia

Before: JAMES D. MCGINLEY , Chief Administrative

Appeals Judge; JAMES A. HAYNES and STEPHEN M.

GODEK, Administrative Appeals Judges

PER CURIAM. This case arises under the worker

protection provisions of the H-2A temporary agricultural worker program of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the H-2A implementing regulations. 1

The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division,

United States Department of Labor (Administrator),

filed a Notice of Determination, finding that Sun Valley

Orchards, LLC (Respondent) violated multiple H-2A

program regulations through the actions of its agent,

Agustin Hernandez. The Administrator assessed back

wages and civil money penalties (CMPs) against the Respondent for violating the governing H-2A regulations.

Respondent requested a hearing, and the Administrator referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ). After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a Decision and Order

Affirming in Part and Modifying in Part the Administrator’s Findings (D. & O.). The ALJ found that Respondent violated several of the H-2A program requirements

and owed a total of $344,945.80 in back wages and

$211,800 in CMPs.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(c); 20 C.F.R. § 655, Subpart B; 29 C.F.R.

§ 501.

49a

Respondent appealed the ALJ’s findings to the Administrative Review Board (Board). After considering

the record and the parties’ arguments, we conclude that

the ALJ correctly determined that Respondent committed serious violations of the H-2A program requirements and, as a result of these violations, the ALJ

properly awarded back wages and assessed CMPs.

Therefore, we affirm the ALJ’s decision.

BACKGROUND

Respondent is a New Jersey farm owned by the Marino family, including brothers Russell and Joseph. 2 At

all relevant times, Respondent employed Hernandez as

its supervisor of the farmworkers. 3 Hernandez supervised the workers in every aspect of their lives and work.

Hernandez oriented the workers, maintained their housing facilities, sold them meals and drinks, oversaw transportation, and distributed pay. 4 Workers paid Hernandez for meals, drinks, housing, and transportation. 5

Respondent filed two job orders with the Department of Labor (Department) to hire H-2A workers to

pick produce crops from April 13 to October 10, 2015. 6

It was Respondent’s first time utilizing the H-2A program.7 In these job orders, Respondent represented to

the Department and the H-2A workers that it would

“furnish free cooking and kitchen facilities to those

D. & O. at 3. Both brothers play a role in the events that give

rise to this appeal.

Id. at 4, 9-11.

Id. at 9-11.

Id. at 11.

Id. at 3-4.

Id. at 20.

50a

workers who are entitled to live in the employer housing

so that workers may prepare their own meals.” 8

During the 2015 growing season, the H-2A workers,

and many of Respondent’s domestic workers, lived at

Respondent’s housing facility. 9 However, the kitchen

at the workers’ housing facilities was not large enough

to allow the workers to cook their own meals after returning from their shifts. 10 Instead, Hernandez managed a meal plan for the workers, as instructed by Respondent, in which Hernandez would provide cooked

food for a fee of $75 to $80 per week. 11 All of the H-2A

workers participated in the meal plan at some point. 12

Respondent owned the kitchen, paid its utility bills, and

directed Hernandez to maintain records of meal purchases and not to make a profit from the meal plan. 13

The workers did not pay Respondent directly for the

meal plan. Instead, Hernandez would take the workers’ checks to the bank to cash them and then return the

remaining money after deducting the amount owed for

the meal plan. 14

The farmworkers harvested asparagus and peppers.

The workers’ shifts lasted for twelve hours each day

with only a single, one-hour, break. 15 Potable drinking

water and clean bathroom facilities were not consistId. at 15.

Id. at 4.

Id. at 12.

Id. at 10.

Id. at 4, 40.

Id. at 8, 10.

Id. at 8.

Id. at 9.

51a

ently available to the workers while working in the

fields.16

Many other aspects of the workers’ living and working conditions were inadequate. The workers’ dormitories had dirty bathrooms without hot water and two broken sinks.17 The windows and doors lacked screens and

garbage cans lacked lids, which attracted flies and other

pests.18 Respondent transported the workers from the

dormitories in unsafe school buses that were driven by

workers who were not licensed drivers. 19 A Wage and

Hour Division (WHD) investigator found that three of

the five buses used by Respondent had worn, unsafe

tires and one that had a broken rear turn signal. 20

Hernandez sold non-alcoholic beverages to the workers in the kitchen and while he supervised them in the

fields. 21 He also sold beer to the workers from the

kitchen, though he did not have a state license to sell alcohol. 22 Hernandez did not maintain records of the

drink sales.

In May 2015, nineteen workers sought a meeting with

management to raise concerns about their living and

working conditions. 23 Workers testified that Russell

Marino was very angry at the meeting and fired the

Id. at 18-20.

Id. at 6-7, 29.

Id. at 46.

Id. at 8, 21.

Id. at 8.

Id. at 16.

Id. at 7.

Id. at 14.

52a

workers.24 Respondent subsequently distributed worker

departure forms that falsely stated the workers were resigning because of personal issues, such as a sick family

member. 25 Respondent did not allow the workers to

state on the forms that they were fired. 26 Respondent

provided the forms to Department and other government agencies after the workers signed them. 27 Russell Marino testified that he listed a false reason for the

workers’ departure because he did not want to make it

harder for the workers to find work later with a mark on

their record but he also admitted it was to “protect

against . . . this lawsuit.” 28 Respondent replaced

the workers with other H-2A workers.29

In August, Respondent laid off another group of

forty-four workers because of a pepper crop failure. 30

Respondent had these workers also sign forms falsely

stating their reasons for leaving. 31

The WHD investigated Respondent to ensure compliance with H-2A regulations during the 2015 growing

season.32 On June 22, 2016, the Administrator issued a

Notice of Determination after the investigation, alleging

multiple violations of the H-2A program and assessing

$369,703.22 in back wages and $212,250 in CMPs against

Id. at 14-15, 44.

Id. at 19-20.

Id. at 20.

Id. at 20, 49.

Id. at 19-20.

Id. at 17.

Id. at 12.

Id. at 20-21.

Id. at 6.

53a

Respondent.33 Respondent requested a hearing before

an ALJ, and the Administrator referred the matter to

the OALJ.34

ALJ DECISION

The ALJ held an evidentiary hearing on July 18

through 21, 2017 and issued her decision on October 28,

2019. 35 The ALJ made several narrative findings of

fact, including that “[k]itchen access was unavailable or

otherwise denied” to the workers and that Respondent

informed the workers that they could purchase a meal

plan for $75 to $80 a week. 36 The ALJ also found that

potable water and clean bathroom facilities were only

sporadically available, especially in the fields, and that

the workers’ housing was inadequate. 37 Further, the

ALJ found that Respondent fired the nineteen workers

in May 2015 after the contentious meeting and that Respondent provided the terminated workers with worker

departure forms that gave false reasons for leaving. 38

The ALJ then discussed the Administrator’s violation

findings and the back wages and CMPs assessed against

Respondent. As an initial matter, the ALJ found that

Hernandez acted as Respondent’s agent at all relevant

times with actual and apparent authority. 39 Under 20

C.F.R. § 655.122(p), the ALJ held that the Administrator properly found that Respondent unlawfully deId.

Id.

Id. at 2, 6.

Id. at 20.

Id.

Id. at 20-21.

Id. at 36.

54a

ducted from the workers’ wages for the meals, non-alcoholic beverages, and beer under 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(g),

(p), and (q). 40 Under 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(p), Respondent could not make deductions from the workers’ pay

that provided a profit or violated any law.

The ALJ found that Respondent was required to remit back pay for the deductions made from the workers’

wages for the meals and non-alcoholic beverages.41 Under 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(p)(1), job orders must list any

deduction not required by law. The ALJ found that Respondent failed to note the deductions for the meal plan

in the job orders, depriving the workers of the wage

promised to them in the job order. 42 The ALJ explained that the assessment of the entire amount deducted from the workers for the meal plan provided

them their contractual right to the wage promised in the

job orders and provided a deterrent effect to future employers who may also attempt to alter the terms of the

job order upon the workers’ arrival. 43 Thus, ALJ affirmed the Administrator’s $128,285 back wage assessment for the amount that Hernandez deducted for the

meal plan. The ALJ also upheld the Administrator’s decision to assess one $1,350 CMP per affected worker for

all of the meal and drink violations, totaling $198,450.44

The ALJ further found that Respondent profited

from the sales of the nonalcoholic beverages to the workId. at 35.

Id. at 39-40.

Id. at 39.

Id.

Id. Under H-2A regulations at the time of the assessment,

CMPs may not exceed $1,500 per violation. 29 C.F.R. § 501.19(c)

(2010).

55a

ers. The ALJ approved of the WHD’s use of the Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,45 method for calculating the back pay, in which an employee need only

show a just and reasonable inference of the amount

owed if the employer fails to keep records documenting

the unpaid wages. However, the ALJ found the preponderance of the evidence established the workers purchased an average of 4 drinks a day rather than the Administrator’s finding of 4.42. 46 Therefore, the ALJ

modified the back wages from $71,790.08 to $64,960. 47

The ALJ found that the beer sales were also unlawful

deductions because Hernandez sold beer without a license in violation of New Jersey law 48 and ordered Respondent to remit the $8,972.61 of profits from the sales.49

The ALJ next found the Administrator properly

found that Respondent discharged twenty-four workers

before they had been offered work for at least threefourths of the workdays specified in the job orders in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i)(1). 50 For the nineteen

workers who left after the meeting with management in

May 2015, the ALJ recalled the workers’ consistent testimony that Russell Marino became hostile to the work-

328 U.S. 680 (1946).

D. & O. at 41.

Id. at 42.

The parties stipulated that the beer sales violated New Jersey

state law. Id. at 38.

Id. at 42. Because Hernandez failed to maintain records for

the beer sold to workers, the Administrator also employed the Mt.

Clemens method in determining the profits from the beer sales,

which the ALJ found to be reasonable. Id. at 41.

Id. at 43.

56a

ers and terminated their positions in anger.51 The ALJ

credited the workers’ testimony over Joseph Marino’s

testimony regarding the meeting because he “was unable to specifically remember what was said” during the

argument.52 Therefore, the ALJ found that Respondent terminated the nineteen workers’ employment before they worked the three-fourths of the hours promised in the job orders and was liable for any back pay

because of the terminations. 53

The ALJ further found that Respondent violated the

three-fourths guarantee for four of the workers that

were laid off in August 2015 because of a crop failure.

The ALJ noted that counsel for Respondent agreed to

the Administrator’s calculations of the hours given to

the four workers at the hearing and did not defend

against the alleged violation in its post-hearing brief.54

The ALJ also found that Respondent failed to satisfy its

guarantee for one worker, Jose Islas Larraga, because

the record contained no evidence that he abandoned his

job.55

The ALJ affirmed the Administrator’s $142,728.22

assessment of back wages for the three-fourths violations, noting that Respondent did not contest the calculations for the nineteen workers and Larraga and was

unable to prove that the calculations for the four work-

Id. at 43-44.

Id. at 44.

Id. The ALJ also found in the alternative that Respondent

constructively discharged the workers through the poor working

and living conditions. Id. at 44-46.

Id. at 47.

Id.

57a

ers were unreasonable. 56 The ALJ further found that

the Administrator’s assessment of one $1,350 CMP for

the violations was reasonable.57

Next, the ALJ affirmed the Administrator’s single

$1,350 CMP for Respondent’s unlawful attempts to

cause the workers to waive their three-fourths guarantee. 58 The worker departure forms provided by Respondent to the Department falsely stated that the

workers left voluntarily for personal reasons, which Respondent admitted was false. 59 Though the forms did

not expressly state that they were giving up their threefourths guarantee, the ALJ noted that the misrepresentation that they left voluntarily would proximately cause

the workers to waive the guarantee under 20 C.F.R.

§ 655.122(n).60

The ALJ affirmed the Administrator’s $3,150 CMP

for Respondent’s inadequate housing conditions, including the missing screens, uncovered garbage cans, and

shortage of hot water, that violated § 655.122(d)(1). 61

The ALJ also affirmed the Administrator’s $7,500 in

Id. at 47-48.

Id. at 48. Respondent does not contest the back pay and CMP

calculations on appeal.

Id. at 49-50. Respondent does not contest the calculation of

the CMP on appeal.

Id.

Id. at 49.

Id. at 50. The ALJ did find that the Administrator’s $450

CMP for a mattress found on the ground of the dormitories was

unreasonable because the evidence did not establish that the mattress was unlawfully unclean. Id. at 51-52.

58a

CMPs for Respondent’s use of substandard transportation and unlicensed drivers in violation of § 655.122(h)(4).62

In total, the ALJ imposed $344,945.80 in back wages

and $211,800 in CMPs against Respondent. 63 Respondent petitioned for review of the decision thereafter.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Board has jurisdiction to hear appeals concerning questions of law or fact from ALJ final decisions in

cases under the INA’s H-2A provisions and its implementing regulations. 64 The Board will affirm the ALJ’s

factual findings if supported by substantial evidence but

reviews all conclusions of law de novo. 65 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 66

Id. at 52-53. Respondent does not contest the CMPs for the

transportation violations on appeal.

Id. at 53-54. The total back wages and CMPs included:

$128,285 in back wages and $198,450 in CMPs for the meal-related

violations; $64,960 in back wages for the soft drinks sold; $8,972.61

in back wages for the beer sold; $142,728.22 in back wages and

$1,350 in CMPs for the three-fourths guarantee violations; $1,350

in CMPs for the attempted waiver; $3,150 in CMPs for the inadequate housing; and $7,500 for the substandard transportation an

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.