Amicus Curiae Brief — Daniel Grand, Petitioner v. City of University Heights, Ohio, et al.

No. 25-965

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_________

D ANIEL G RAND,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF U NIVERSITY HEIGHTS , O HIO, ET AL .,

_________

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

_________

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,

TEDFORD’S TENANCY, LLC, AND

GARNELL WALLS IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONER

_________

D EBORAH J. L A F ETRA

Counsel of Record

J ONATHAN H OUGHTON

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.

Suite 1000

Arlington, VA 22201

(202) 888-6881

DLaFetra@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation,

Tedford’s Tenancy, LLC, and Garnell Walls

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the First Amendment’s established

chilling-effect doctrine—under which a credible

government threat that deters the exercise of

fundamental rights constitutes a complete and

independently actionable constitutional injury—is

displaced by Williamson County’s land-use finality

requirement when a plaintiff alleges that government

threats both before and after a Planning Commission

meeting chilled religious exercise, worship, and

assembly.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity and Interest of Amici Curiae........................ 1

Introduction and Summary of Argument .................. 3

Argument .................................................................... 5

I. Courts Improperly Invoke Williamson County’s

Finality Ripeness Rule to Dismiss Otherwise

Justiciable Property Rights Cases .................... 5

II. Federal Courts Should Not Defer to State

Courts and Local Governments to Determine

Constitutional Cases Involving Property

Rights ................................................................. 8

Conclusion ................................................................. 12

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Axon Enter., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,

598 U.S. 175 (2023) ............................................. 11

Bay-Houston Towing Co. v.

United States,

58 Fed. Cl. 462 (2003)............................................ 4

Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154 (1997) ............................................... 6

BMG Monroe I, LLC v.

Village of Monroe,

93 F.4th 595 (2d Cir. 2024) ................................... 6

Boraas v. Vill. of Belle Terre,

476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev’d

416 U.S. 1 (1974) ................................................... 9

Brown v. Freedman Baking Co., Inc.,

810 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1987) ...................................... 9

City of Houston v. Hill,

482 U.S. 451 (1987) ............................................. 11

Confederated Tribes of Colville Rsrv. v.

United States,

964 F.2d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .............................. 9

Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp.,

309 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2002) ................................... 9

DiBiccari v. State,

352 A.3d 147 (R.I. 2026) ........................................ 7

Dolan v. City of Tigard,

512 U.S. 374 (1994) ............................................. 12

Haney v. Town of Mashpee,

70 F.4th 12 (1st Cir. 2023) .................................... 7

iv

Hikma Pharms. USA Inc. v.

Amarin Pharma, Inc.,

146 S. Ct. 1391 (2026) ........................................... 7

Hodel v. Irving,

481 U.S. 704 (1987) ............................................... 9

Horne v. Dep’t of Agric.,

569 U.S. 513 (2013) ............................................... 5

Jones v. Coleman,

848 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2017) ............................... 11

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ............................................... 1

Lumbard v. City of Ann Arbor,

913 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2019) ............................... 10

Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,

405 U.S. 538 (1972) ............................................. 12

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.

Yolo Cnty.,

477 U.S. 340 (1986) ............................................... 7

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803) ................................................... 8

Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v.

Harford Cnty.,

468 Md. 339 (2020) ................................................ 7

N. Mill St., LLC v. City of Aspen,

6 F.4th 1216 (10th Cir. 2021) ................................ 7

Owen v. City of Independence,

445 U.S. 622 (1980) ............................................. 10

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,

260 U.S. 393 (1922) ............................................... 6

Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of

San Francisco,

594 U.S. 474 (2021) ........................................ 1, 6-7

v

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla.,

457 U.S. 496 (1982) .............................................. 11

Penn Central Transp. Co. v.

City of New York,

438 U.S. 104 (1978) ............................................... 9

PPI Enters., LLC v. Town of Windham,

No. 2022-0707, 2024 WL 397790

(N.H. Feb. 2, 2024) ................................................ 7

R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,

312 U.S. 496 (1941) ............................................. 11

Reno v. Cath. Social Servs., Inc.,

509 U.S. 43 (1993) ................................................. 6

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v.

City and Cnty. of San Francisco,

545 U.S. 323 (2005) ............................................. 11

Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v.

Eagle Cnty.,

605 U.S. 168 (2025) ............................................. 11

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,

520 U.S. 725 (1997) ............................................... 6

SW Nashville EB Owner, LLC v.

Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville &

Davidson Cnty.,

No. 25-5781, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL

2364309 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2026) .......................... 4

Tedford’s Tenancy, LLC v.

City of New York,

238 A.D.3d 624 (N.Y. App. Div.

2025), cert. pending, No. 26-110

(U.S. June 30, 2026) .............................................. 2

Tran v. Dep’t of Plan. for Cnty. of Maui,

No. 19-00654, 2020 WL 3146584

(D. Haw. June 12, 2020) ...................................... 11

vi

United States v. Various Articles of

Obscene Merchandise,

Schedule No. 1303,

562 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1977) ................................... 9

Walls v. Prince George’s Cnty.,

No. 25-1121, 2026 WL 497988

(4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026),

cert. pending, No. 26-107

(U.S. July 21, 2026) ............................................... 3

Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning

Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of

Johnson City,

473 U.S. 172 (1985) .................................. 2-5, 7, 11

Wisconsin v. Constantineau,

400 U.S. 433 (1971) ............................................... 9

Zwickler v. Koota,

389 U.S. 241 (1967) ............................................... 8

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................ 11

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................... 10-11

Civil Rights Act of 1871 ............................................. 11

Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act,

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. ...................................... 3

Other Authorities

Whitman, Michael K., The Ripeness

Doctrine in the Land-Use Context:

The Municipality’s Ally and the

Landowner’s Nemesis,

29 Urb. Law. 13 (1997) .......................................... 8

1

IDENTITY AND INTEREST

OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public-interest law firm that has defended

individual liberty and limited government since 1973.

PLF has litigated tirelessly on behalf of property owners

whose takings claims are sent to procedural purgatory,

including victorious appearances before this Court in

cases such as Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180

(2019), and Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco,

594 U.S. 474 (2021), and currently represents co-amici

Tedford’s Tenancy and Garnell Walls on petitions

presently pending, who, like Petitioner in this case, are

victims of the “final decision” ripeness rules.

Tedford’s Tenancy, LLC, owns a 100-year-old, multifamily, mixed used building in Gramercy Park,

Manhattan. The principal owners are Lynette Amico

Ciner and Richard Ciner and the property has been in

Lynette’s family since the 1940s. The Ciners intend to

restore the building to its former glory, move back to

New York, and take up residence in one of the building’s

apartments. However, the City caps the rent, for all six

of the one- and two-bedroom apartments combined, at

$2,584 per month, or approximately $430 per

apartment. This is substantially below the market rates

in this Gramercy neighborhood, where the average rent

for a studio apartment is $3,500; a one-bedroom

apartment is $4,200; and a two-bedroom apartment is

$5,275. In other words, the allowable residential rent

for the entire building is less than the market rent for a

1 Amici curiae state that no counsel for any party authored this

brief in whole or in part and that no entity or person other than

PLF and its counsel made any monetary contribution toward the

preparation or submission of this brief.

2

single studio apartment. Under no circumstances does

the rent exceed operating expenses, and those expenses

do not include debt service, necessary maintenance, and

improvements. Moreover, the building requires lead

paint and asbestos remediation, an additional sprinkler

system, the repairing of leaks, and other fixes. These

additional expenses would cost at least $1 million.

Bleeding money hand over fist as a direct consequence

of New York’s price controls, Tedford’s Tenancy sued the

City of New York for a regulatory taking. They never

even made it past the complaint, however, because the

courts invoked for “prudential” reasons, the finality rule

of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193

(1985), to avoid considering their complaint. Tedford’s

Tenancy, LLC v. City of New York, 238 A.D.3d 624 (N.Y.

App. Div. 2025). Tedford’s Tenancy’s petition for writ of

certiorari challenging this “prudential” refusal to

consider the merits of this case is pending. Docket No.

26-110.

Garnell Walls, a retired mechanic, has owned a

vacant lot in Prince George’s County, Maryland, for

forty years, on which he intends to build his retirement

home. He has jumped through all the necessary hoops

at a cost exceeding $40,000 but has yet to break ground

because the county will not permit him to dig a well and

install an individual septic system. The county’s

position is dictated by its 2018 Water & Sewer Plan:

because of the categorization of Walls’ property, it is

ineligible for the well and septic system. Thus stymied,

Walls sued the county, alleging a regulatory taking.

Like the Ciners, Walls never got a chance to make his

case.

The district court dismissed his case on

“prudential” ripeness grounds. The Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in an opinion

3

explaining that Walls can only ripen his claim by

pursuing legislative amendments to the Water & Sewer

Plan to recategorize his property. Walls v. Prince

George’s Cnty., No. 25-1121, 2026 WL 497988, at *4 (4th

Cir. Feb. 23, 2026). Walls, too, seeks relief from this

Court, arguing that Williamson County’s prudential

ripeness doctrine wrongly foreclosed his constitutional

claims and that property owners are not required to

exhaust legislative (i.e., political) remedies. Docket No.

26-107.

Amici urge the Court that, in ruling for Petitioner (as

it should), the Court should remain mindful that

property owners’ rights to be free of uncompensated

takings are equal to other rights protected by the Bill of

Rights and warrant equal access to the courts. To the

extent Williamson County’s finality ripeness rule is

contrary to that fundamental principle, courts should

not employ it to dismiss otherwise justiciable

constitutional claims.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT

Owners of private property should not be singled out

to bear a pleadings burden that is greater than, or

distinct from, any other litigant asserting a civil rights

claim. The Sixth Circuit erred by viewing the critical

question as whether Grand had been involved in a “land

use” application, Pet. App. 7a-8a, as opposed to whether

he had been injured by government’s actions or inaction

in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights.

But in correcting that error, there is no reason to adopt

a rule distinguishing Grand’s free exercise, RLUIPA2

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.

2

4

and related claims, and takings claims; nor hold that

property owners are subject to unique requirements

that do not apply to others. See SW Nashville EB

Owner, LLC v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville &

Davidson Cnty., No. 25-5781, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL

2364309, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2026) (“ ‘land-use cases’

come with their own distinct rule for addressing

ripeness”). Subjecting property owners to procedural

hurdles only they—and no other civil rights claimants—

face effectively renders protection of private property a

second-class constitutional right. That reality is not

abstract, but concrete: The “final decision” requirement incentivizes governments to be opaque when

they should be clear, to repeatedly say “maybe” when

they mean “no,” and to urge courts to avoid property

cases even where they unquestionably have

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bay-Houston Towing Co. v.

United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 462, 471 (2003) (government

has “no incentive to issue a final decision”); SW

Nashville, 2026 WL 2364309, at *6-7 (government put

development on hold for the “ ‘indefinite’ future,”

rendering

the property

“undevelopable and

unsellable.”). Needlessly delaying constitutional and

civil rights claimants from having their claims heard

on the merits through procedural gamesmanship not

only allows governments to violate the First

Amendment without consequence, but deters needed

development of housing and commercial space and

deprives property owners of their right to adjudication

of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.

Williamson County’s finality ripeness rule, to the

extent it diverges from jurisdictional standing requirements, should not govern Free Exercise, RLUIPA, or

any other constitutional or civil rights claim, including

takings claims. The Court should not suggest that

5

takings claimants are uniquely subject to a requirement

that undermines the courts’ Article III jurisdiction and

duty to resolve disputes. Moreover, this Court should

fully and finally reject the trope that “land use” cases

are distinctly of local concern, such that federal courts

abrogate their jurisdiction to resolve constitutional

challenge in favor of deferring to the very government

being challenged.

The decision below should be reversed.

ARGUMENT

I.

Courts Improperly Invoke Williamson

County’s Finality Ripeness Rule to Dismiss

Otherwise Justiciable Property Rights

Cases

For regulatory takings, standing and ripeness are

seemingly interrelated. Standing ensures that the

property owner has suffered a concrete injury. The

claimed injury must not be speculative, hypothetical,

or contingent on future events. Thus, final decision

ripeness is complementary of, or even duplicative of,

standing. If there is a final decision, then the claimed

injury-in-fact is concrete and particularized. And if

there is no final decision, then the injury is merely

speculative or hypothetical. In multiple cases, this

Court has equated final decision ripeness with

standing and concrete injury. See Williamson Cnty.,

473 U.S. at 193 (“the finality requirement is concerned

with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at

a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an

actual, concrete injury”); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569

U.S. 513, 525 (2013) (final decision ripeness is based

on whether the owner had been injured by the

government’s action and suffered a concrete injury).

6

But the overlap between standing and ripeness can

disappear when ripeness is deemed prudential. See,

e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725,

733 (1997); id. at 734 and n.7 (ripeness is “drawn both

from Article III limitations on judicial power and from

prudential reasons for refusing to exercise

jurisdiction”) (citing Reno v. Cath. Social Servs., Inc.,

509 U.S. 43, 57, n.18 (1993)).

The prudential

designation means that courts can decline to hear a

case for reasons that are judicially self-imposed,

discretionary, and mutable. Bennett v. Spear, 520

U.S. 154, 162 (1997). Under a prudential ripeness

doctrine, even if the property owner has established a

concrete injury and standing, the court may abdicate

its duty to hear an undisputedly justiciable case and

demand that the owner undertake additional

procedural hurdles. See, e.g., BMG Monroe I, LLC v.

Village of Monroe, 93 F.4th 595, 600 (2d Cir. 2024)

(“we are free to affirm the district court’s dismissal of

a case on prudential-ripeness grounds without first

addressing jurisdictional issues such as standing”).

Under the Fifth Amendment the government is

liable for regulations that have gone “too far.” Pa.

Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“while

property may be regulated to a certain extent, if

regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a

taking.”). Property owners bear only a “relatively

modest” burden to demonstrate that the “initial

decisionmaker” has staked out a “final” position.

Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 478. It is a de facto determination

about “how the regulations at issue apply to the

particular land in question,” ibid. (internal citations

omitted), so that the court knows “how far the

regulation goes.” MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.

Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). Yet, many lower

7

courts rely on Williamson County to demand that

property owners seek a different answer to the

previously asked question, a process that may involve

multiple agencies,3 reapplications,4 and appeals,5

even though the property owner plausibly alleged the

effect of the regulation. See Hikma Pharms. USA Inc.

v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 146 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2026)

(a claim “that is plausible on its face” proceeds to

discovery). Allowing dismissal under these circumstances creates an improper hurdle that serves only to

nullify the protections of the Fifth Amendment. See

Michael K. Whitman, The Ripeness Doctrine in the

Land-Use Context: The Municipality’s Ally and the

3 See, e.g., Haney v. Town of Mashpee, 70 F.4th 12, 21-22 (1st

Cir. 2023) (holding a takings challenge unripe despite two

variance denials from the Town Board that precluded the owner

from building a single-family home because the property owner

did not seek approval from a different body for a separate matter

related to the proposed construction of the house).

4 See, e.g., N. Mill St., LLC v. City of Aspen, 6 F.4th 1216, 1229,

1234 (10th Cir. 2021) (owner whose development permit was

denied met Article III standing and ripeness standards, but case

was “not prudentially ripe” because the city might grant different

requests); PPI Enters., LLC v. Town of Windham, No. 2022-0707,

2024 WL 397790, at *3 (N.H. Feb. 2, 2024) (property owner’s

takings claim was unripe despite two denials of formal complete

site plan applications for a development permit because the

Town asserted that it would be willing to review yet another site

plan, modified in some unspecified way, should the property

owner “choose to resubmit” one).

5 See, e.g., DiBiccari v. State, 352 A.3d 147, 155 (R.I. 2026); Md.

Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cnty., 468 Md. 339, 410-11

(2020). Demands that property owners appeal permit denials

contradict Pakdel and Williamson County, both of which consider

only whether “the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a

definitive position on the issue.” Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 478 (citation

omitted) (emphasis added); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 192-93

(same).

8

Landowner’s Nemesis, 29 Urb. Law. 13, 39 (1997) (“a

plaintiff property owner should not be required to

waste his time and resources in order to obtain an

adverse decision that it can prove would have been

made if subsequent application were made”).

A ruling whereby First Amendment free exercise and

RLUIPA claims are welcomed into federal court should

not come at the cost of holding that property owners are

subject to a pleadings burden that is greater than any

other civil rights litigant or in excess of jurisdictional

standing requirements.

II. Federal Courts Should Not Defer to State

Courts and Local Governments to

Determine Constitutional Cases Involving

Property Rights

The federal judiciary’s basic purpose and duty is

protecting and vindicating federal constitutional

rights. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803)

(determining whether government action “be in

opposition to the constitution” is “the very essence of

judicial duty.”); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248

(1967) (“escape from that duty is not permissible

merely because state courts also have the solemn

responsibility, equally with the federal courts, ‘* * * to

guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or

secured by the constitution of the United States

* * *.’”) (citation omitted). Procedural doctrines that

effectively bar Americans with federal constitutional

and civil rights claims from pursuing vindication in

federal courts are hard to reconcile with the judiciary’s

fundamental role. Yet many federal courts routinely

defer to state courts when constitutional claims

involve laws or regulations affecting land use,

ostensibly because they are matters of “local” concern.

9

No such deference is required, Wisconsin v.

Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971), nor would

such a requirement be good policy because zoning is

an issue of local concern that must adhere to

constitutional guidelines.

This is standard practice.

Federal courts

frequently resolve local issues that implicate

constitutional rights, such as evaluating community

standards in matters ranging from obscenity, United

States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise,

Schedule No. 1303, 562 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 1977),

to excessive jury awards, Brown v. Freedman Baking

Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1987). Analogously,

they analyze complex and politically fraught matters

involving tribal lands. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,

712-13 (1987) (applying Penn Central to assess a

requirement that title to land within Indian

reservations escheat to the tribe upon a landowner’s

death); Confederated Tribes of Colville Rsrv. v. United

States, 964 F.2d 1102, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (taking of

water rights involved “complex issues of Indian land

law” coupled with “fact-intensive takings jurisprudence seeking just compensation”). Zoning and other

property rights-based disputes are no different. See,

e.g., Boraas v. Vill. of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 815

(2d Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1

(1974) (noting that district court “start[ed] by

examin[ing]” the zoning ordinance with reference to

“the interest of the local community in the protection

and maintenance of the prevailing traditional family

pattern . . . .”); Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington

Twp., 309 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying

“meaningful review” to local zoning ordinance).

The premise that federal court enforcement of

federal constitutional rights necessarily interferes

10

with local policy or decision-making misunderstands

of the role of the federal court in administering the

Section 1983 remedy. No local government has the

right or discretion to disregard the Constitution.

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 647-48

(1980) (“the municipality’s ‘governmental’ immunity

is obviously abrogated by the sovereign’s enactment of

a statute making it amenable to suit. Section 1983

was just such a statute.”). In these situations, federal

court review does not interfere with local policy

choices or discretion. Id. at 649-50.

When a property owner accuses the government of

unconstitutionally interfering with constitutionallyprotected property rights, a court’s deference to

governmental demands for additional administrative

process bypasses the judiciary’s primary purpose to

resolve constitutional questions. As Sixth Circuit

Judge Kethledge observed: “Federal courts have a

‘virtually unflagging’ obligation to exercise the

jurisdiction that Congress has given them. Congress

has given us jurisdiction to hear these takings claims.

Our constitutional order would be better served, I

respectfully suggest, if we simply adjudicated them.”

Lumbard v. City of Ann Arbor, 913 F.3d 585, 592 (6th

Cir. 2019) (Kethledge, J., concurring) (citation

omitted).

For all civil rights actions, including property rights,

the goal is not to prematurely bar the doors shut but to

“to ‘throw open the doors of the United States courts’ to

individuals who were threatened with, or who had

suffered, the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Patsy

v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982)

(referencing Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the

precursor to Section 1983); see also Axon Enter., Inc. v.

Fed. Trade Comm’n, 598 U.S. 175, 205 (2023)

11

(Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, providing that district courts “shall” have

jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the

Constitution, “is as clear as statutes get.”). Whether

courts employ the Williamson County finality ripeness

doctrine, Pullman abstention,6 or other prudential,

discretionary reasons to avoid deciding takings cases,

all of this comes at a dear cost to property owners

seeking to vindicate constitutional rights and to the

productive use of their land.

Cf. Seven Cnty.

Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 184

(2025) (Procedural “[d]elay upon delay” means

“[f]ewer projects make it to the finish line. Indeed,

fewer projects make it to the starting line. Those that

survive often end up costing much more than is

anticipated or necessary.”). In short, the Court can and

should rule in favor of Grand without throwing property

owners under the bus. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,

405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (“The right to enjoy property

Pullman abstention cases also improperly rank the

protections of the Bill of Rights: federal courts rarely abstain in

First Amendment cases, while equally important constitutional

rights are shunted to state court. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482

U.S. 451, 467 (1987) (collecting cases refusing abstention in First

Amendment cases); Jones v. Coleman, 848 F.3d 744, 753 (6th Cir.

2017) (noting this Court’s “strong aversion” to Pullman

abstention in First Amendment cases); Tran v. Dep’t of Plan. for

Cnty. of Maui, No. 19-00654, 2020 WL 3146584, at *9 (D. Haw.

June 12, 2020) (dismissal of First Amendment claim “eliminates

concerns about the propriety of Pullman abstention” for Fifth

Amendment takings claim). There is no constitutional basis for

this disparate treatment between takings claims and “challenges

to municipal land-use regulations based on the First

Amendment, or the Equal Protection Clause.” San Remo Hotel,

L.P. v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 350-51

(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citations

omitted).

6

12

without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to

speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a ‘personal’

right . . . . That rights in property are basic civil rights

has long been recognized.”).

CONCLUSION

The First Amendment rights in this case are

important and worthy of protection; that protection

need not and should not come at the expense of property

rights. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)

(property rights are not a “poor relation”).

The decision below should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

DEBORAH J. LA FETRA

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN HOUGHTON

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.

Suite 1000

Arlington, VA 22201

(202) 888-6881

DLaFetra@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation,

Tedford’s Tenancy, LLC, and Garnell Walls

S EPTEMBER 2026