Amicus Curiae Brief — Daniel Grand, Petitioner v. City of University Heights, Ohio, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 6, 2026

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NO. 25-965

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DANIEL GRAND

Petitioner,

CITY OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS, OHIO, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

__________________________________

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF

NC VALUES INSTITUTE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

TAMI FITZGERALD

NC VALUES INSTITUTE

9650 Strickland Rd.

Suite 103-226

Raleigh, NC 27615

DEBORAH J. DEWART

Counsel of Record

111 Magnolia Lane

Hubert, NC 28539

(910) 326-4554

lawyerdeborah@outlook.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..............................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................ 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

THE ARGUMENT....................................................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 2

I. GRAND IS ENTITLED TO A FEDERAL FORUM

WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY................ ………2

A. Congressional intent to guarantee a

federal forum for the vindication of federal

constitutional rights is evident in § 1983

and predecessor statutes dating back to

the Civil Rights Act of 1871. ......................... 4

B. This Court’s opinion in Knick warrants a

ruling in Grand’s favor. ................................. 7

II.

GRAND’S FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS

ARE RIPE ...................................................…..9

A. Grand satisfies the ripeness requirements

for a pre-enforcement challenge. ................ 10

B. Grand can establish a Free Exercise

violation based on the City’s transparent

hostility to his religious exercise. ............... 13

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 15

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Babbitt v. Farm Workers,

442 U.S. 289 (1979) ................................... 2, 10, 11

Carey v. Brown,

447 U.S. 455 (1980) ............................................. 15

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of

Hialeah,

508 U.S. 520 (1993) ............................................. 14

Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347 (1976) ............................................. 12

Ex parte Virginia,

100 U.S. 339 (1880) ............................................... 5

First Choice Women's Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport,

146 S. Ct. 1114 (2026) ................................... 2, 5, 8

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,

482 U. S. 304 (1987) .............................................. 8

Frisby v. Schultz,

487 U.S. 474 (1988) ............................................. 15

Grand v. City of University Heights,

159 F.4th 507 (6th Cir. 2025) ............ 3, 5-8, 12, 14

Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne,

451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006) ............................... 3

Gregory v. Chicago,

394 U.S. 111 (1969) ............................................. 15

Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U. S. 477 (1994) .............................................. 6

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

597 U.S. 507 (2022) ............................................. 13

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) .................................. 3, 4, 6-10

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights

Comm’n,

584 U.S. 617 (2018) ............................................. 13

McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School

Dist. 187,

373 U. S. 668 (1963) .............................................. 6

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,

549 U. S. 118 (2007) ............................................ 12

Miles Christi Religious Ord. v. Township of Northville,

629 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2010) ............................. 6, 8

Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225 (1972) ............................................... 5

Monroe v. Pape,

365 U. S. 167 (1961) .............................................. 7

Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n,

402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................ 14

Pakdel v. City of San Francisco,

594 U.S. 474 (2021) ..................................... 7, 8, 10

Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents,

457 U.S. 496 (1982) ........................................... 5, 6

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,

530 U.S. 290 (2000) ............................................. 13

Steffel v. Thompson,

415 U. S. 452 (1974) ............................................ 12

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (“SBA”),

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ....................................2, 10-13

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,

592 U.S. 279 (2021) ............................................... 9

Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn. Inc.,

484 U.S. 383 (1988) ............................................. 11

Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v.

Hamilton Bank,

473 U.S. 172 (1985) ............................ 3, 5-8, 10, 15

Zorach v. Clauson,

343 U.S. 306 (1952) ............................................. 14

Constitutional Provisions

Free Exercise Clause, U.S. Const. amend. I ........ 3, 4,

6-10, 12-14

Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V ................. 2-4,

6-9

Statutes

Enforcement Act of Apr. 20, 1871,

§1, 17 Stat. 13 .............................................................. 4

42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 ........................................... 4, 5, 6, 7

Other Authorities

Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The

Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings,

Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 99 (2000)............................. 5

Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,

App. 68 (1871) ....................................................... 5

C. Dana & T. Merrill, Property:

Takings 262 (2002)................................................ 6

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Amicus curiae respectfully urges this Court to

reverse the Sixth Circuit ruling.

NC Values Institute, formerly known as the

Institute for Faith and Family, is a North Carolina

nonprofit corporation that works in various arenas of

public policy to protect faith, family, and freedom,

including parental rights. See https://ncvi.org.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Grand is a devout Orthodox Jew who merely

wanted to invite a few other men into his home for

prayer according to the requirements of their shared

religious tradition. Not a loud, raucous assembly, not

a large gathering that would generate traffic

congestion—but simply peaceful prayer in the privacy

of his home. Grand’s personal residence is not a public

forum where the government might impose

reasonable time-place-manner restrictions. Grand did

not propose structural changes to his home, nor did he

seek to construct a building or other structure. Under

these circumstances, the First Amendment does not

allow the government to require a “special use permit”

1 Amicus curiae certifies that no counsel for a party authored this

brief in whole or in part and no person or entity, other than

amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, has made a monetary

contribution to its preparation or submission.

or any other prior authorization for this type of

private meeting.

It is shocking to observe the City’s outright

hostility to the peaceful religious exercise of one of its

citizens. The City used its “cease-and-desist” order

(CADO) as a hammer to stamp out Grand’s religious

expression, even after he withdrew the SUP

application they had demanded he pursue. Neighbors

were encouraged to watch and report violations of the

patently unconstitutional CADO.

Grand’s claims fall well within the criteria this

court has established for First Amendment preenforcement challenges. See Susan B. Anthony List v.

Driehaus (“SBA”), 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014); Babbitt v.

Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979).

Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit found Grand’s claims

unripe by borrowing precedent from Fifth

Amendment land-use cases. This Court recently set

aside, for another day, “the question whether a

Takings Clause rule might be properly transposed

into the First Amendment context.” First Choice

Women's Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 146 S. Ct. 1114,

1128 (2026). That question is the primary focus of this

amicus curiae brief.

ARGUMENT

GRAND IS ENTITLED TO A FEDERAL

FORUM WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY.

The City and the lower courts transport holdings

from this Court’s Fifth Amendment land-use cases

into the radically different context of religious

expression protected by the First Amendment. Under

some circumstances, land-use regulations apply to

religious gatherings. "[A] church has no constitutional

right to be free from reasonable zoning regulations nor

does a church have a constitutional right to build its

house of worship where it pleases." Grand v. City of

University Heights, 159 F.4th 507, 516 (6th Cir. 2025)

(quoting Grace United Methodist Church v. City of

Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 652 (10th Cir. 2006)). But

this case does not fit that mold. Grand is not building

a church or any other structure. Personal religious

expression inside a private home does not require a

“special use permit” or any other government

authorization. On the contrary, the government may

not infringe the Free Exercise of religion.

This is not a land-use case.

The Sixth Circuit relied on Williamson County

Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473

U.S. 172 (1985). Williamson created a nightmarish

maze that trapped Fifth Amendment Takings

claimants and ultimately slammed the federal

courthouse door in their faces. In navigating the

complex interplay among procedural rules—including

removal, res judicata, and collateral estoppel—the

befuddled claimant was like a dog chasing its own tail

but never catching it. Meanwhile the ripened claim,

like a rotten tomato, fell to the ground.

Williamson, overruled in part by this Court’s

decision in Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019),

is inappropriate in a First Amendment case. Even

though Knick did not disturb Williamson’s finality

requirement, this Court’s rejection of its stateexhaustion requirement supports Grand’s position.

The City has already violated his Free Exercise rights

and he has an immediate right to seek remedies in

federal court.

This is not a Fifth Amendment Takings case.

“A property owner may bring a takings claim

under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 upon the taking of his

property without just compensation by a local

government.” Knick, 588 U.S. at 206. If a Fifth

Amendment Takings claimant has an immediate

cause of action when the government takes his

property without just compensation, then surely a

First Amendment Free Exercise claimant has a

similar right that ripens the moment the government

“takes” his right to personal religious expression.

Grand must not be required to wade through the

City’s procedural maze pursuing a special use permit

while his religious expression lays dormant. The City

has already violated his rights and his claims are as

ripe as a rotten tomato.

A. Congressional intent to guarantee a

federal forum for the vindication of

federal constitutional rights is evident in

§ 1983 and predecessor statutes dating

back to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.

Congress enacted § 1983 “with the express goal of

ensuring a federal forum to citizens who claim that

state actors have violated their constitutional rights.

See Enforcement Act of Apr. 20, 1871, §1, 17 Stat. 13.”

First Choice Women's, 146 S. Ct. at 1129. Williamson

County undermines this fundamental principle. The

federal government's role as "a guarantor of the basic

federal rights of individuals against incursions by

state power" was firmly established during the postCivil War era when Congress enacted the Civil Rights

Act of 1871, the predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patsy

v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982).

"Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private

citizens, offering them a uniquely federal remedy"

when states trampled their rights under the U.S.

Constitution. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239

(1972) (emphasis added). This early civil rights

legislation was enacted not only for those who were

previously enslaved, "but also to all people where,

under color of State law, they or any of them may be

deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the

Constitution by reason and virtue of their national

citizenship." Id. at 239 n. 30, quoting Representative

Shellabarger, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App.

68 (1871). The "very purpose of § 1983" was to protect

the people from state intrusions on their federal

constitutional rights. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242,

quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).

"Williamson County stands this doctrine on its head

by asserting that state courts not only may . . . but

indeed must be interposed" between the people and

the federal courts charged with guarding their rights.

Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The

Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 Wash. U. J.L.

& Pol’y 99, 126-127 (2000). In this case it is the City,

rather than the state, that is “interposed” between

Grand and the federal courts that should be available

to vindicate his First Amendment rights.

This Court’s decision in Knick confirmed that

“[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1871, after all,” guarantees

“a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional

treatment at the hands of state officials,” with no

requirement to exhaust state remedies. Knick, 588

U.S. at 185, quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477,

480 (1994) (quoting Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.,

457 U. S. 496, 501 (1982)). Williamson—in the

entirely different context of the Takings Clause—

replaced the right to just compensation with “a right

to a state law procedure that will eventually result in

just compensation.” Knick, 58 U.S. at 191. The Sixth

Circuit engaged in a similar error by demanding that

Grand pursue a final, enforceable decision “about the

application of the zoning rules to his home” from the

City. Grand v. City of University Heights, 159 F.4th

507, 515 (6th Cir. 2025). Erroneously treating the case

as a land-use challenge instead of a Free Exercise

challenge, the court reasoned that such cases are not

ripe until the "relevant administrative agency

resolve[s] the appropriate application of the zoning

ordinance to the property in dispute." Id. at 512

(quoting Miles Christi Religious Ord. v. Township of

Northville, 629 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2010)).

As a “general rule,” constitutional claims under

§1983 may be litigated “without first bringing any sort

of state lawsuit, even when state court actions

addressing the underlying behavior are available.”

Knick, 588 U.S. at 194, quoting D. Dana & T. Merrill,

Property: Takings 262 (2002). It would defeat the

purpose of §1983 if asserting “a federal claim in a

federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the

same claim in a state court.” McNeese v. Board of Ed.

for Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U. S. 668,

672 (1963) (emphasis added). See also Monroe v. Pape,

365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is

supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter

need not be first sought and refused before the federal

one is invoked.”). As Knick noted, “[t]his is as true for

takings claims as for any other claim grounded in the

Bill of Rights.” Knick, 588 U.S. at 194 (emphasis

added). Grand’s Free Exercise claim is one of those

“other claim[s] grounded in the Bill of Rights.”

B. This Court’s opinion in Knick warrants a

ruling in Grand’s favor.

It is now “the settled rule . . . that exhaustion of

state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under

42 U. S. C. §1983” in a Fifth Amendment takings case.

Pakdel v. City of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474 (2021);

see Knick, 588 U.S. 180.

This is not a Fifth Amendment land-use case, but

the Sixth Circuit improperly treated it as if it were

and held Grand’s claims unripe because he had

withdrawn his Special Use Permit application and

therefore had no “final” decision to substantiate his

claims. Although the court admits that “Grand did not

need to exhaust his local remedies” (Grand, 159 F.4th

at 513), the court and the City effectively resurrect

Williamson’s exhaustion prong by demanding that he

pursue the SUP application. Knick’s rationale,

overruling Williamson on that point, supports the

conclusion that Grand’s Free Exercise rights have

already been violated without the need for further

proceedings to determine “finality.”

“In the land-use context” finality is required—“a

concrete and final decision by the local authorities.”

Grand v. City of University Heights, 159 F.4th 507,

511 (6th Cir. 2025), citing Williamson County, 473

U.S. at 193, overruled in part on other grounds by

Knick, 588 U.S. at 188. The “relevant administrative

agency” must rule on “the appropriate application of

the zoning ordinance to the property in dispute” before

a land-use challenge ripens. Grand, 159 F.4th at 512

(quoting Miles Christi, 629 F.3d at 537). But even in

the absence of a “final” ruling, the City has

“committed itself to a position” by making clear that

the CADO will be applied to squelch his religious

practice. First Choice Women's, 146 S. Ct. at 1128

(2026), citing Pakdel, 594 U. S. at 478-479.

Knick overruled Williamson’s state-exhaustion

requirement, which “impose[d] an unjustifiable

burden on takings plaintiffs,” explaining that a

plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated “when

the government takes his property without just

compensation” (Knick, 588 U.S. at 186), i.e., “at the

time of the taking” (id. at 194). At that point,

“contrary to Williamson County,” the property owner

has a viable federal claim. Id. at 189. Indeed, shortly

after the Williamson ruling, this Court “returned to

the understanding that the Fifth Amendment right to

compensation automatically arises at the time the

government takes property without paying for it.” Id.

at 191-192 (emphasis added), citing First English

Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of

Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304 (1987). Similarly, Grand’s

Free Exercise claim automatically arose the moment

the City ordered him to “cease and desist” the prayer

meetings in his home, “[n]o matter what sort of

procedures” (Knick, 588 U.S. at 190) the City had in

place for Grand to continue seeking a special use

permit. The violation was complete at that point. “A

bank robber might give the loot back, but he still

robbed the bank.” Knick, 588 U.S. at 193. At the very

least, Grand is entitled to nominal damages on the

merits of his claim for a past, completed Free Exercise

violation. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279,

291 (2021).

Just as “[f]idelity to the Takings Clause” required

this Court to “restor[e] takings claims to the fullfledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned”

(Knick, 588 U.S. at 189), fidelity to the First

Amendment demands that religious liberty claims

maintain their prime constitutional status. Even preenforcement challenges are viable in cases of

immediate, credible threat (Sect. II). The City has

demoted the First Amendment to an inferior status

among other constitutional rights, including the Fifth

Amendment Takings Clause examined in Knick.

II. GRAND’S FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS

ARE RIPE.

The City, with a little help from the federal courts,

has taken a straightforward Free Exercise claim and

twisted it into a land-use mold where it simply doesn’t

fit. This case is about personal, constitutionally

protected religious expression, not land use. Grand

should not be required to risk criminal prosecution to

hold a prayer meeting in his home that causes no

disruption in the community and involves no

structural changes to his residence. Grand has

already suffered losses of his ability to engage in the

religious practices required by his faith, and the City’s

hostility is itself sufficient to constitute a Free

Exercise violation.

A. Grand

satisfies

the

ripeness

requirements for a pre-enforcement

challenge.

Williamson’s “finality” prong, which Knick did not

overrule, was clarified in Pakdel as “nothing more

than de facto finality,” to ensure there has been an

actual “injur[y] by the Government’s action” and the

claimant “is not prematurely suing over a

hypothetical harm.” 594 U.S. at 479. In a First

Amendment context involving personal expression,

this Court has set forth criteria for pre-enforcement

claims. See SBA, 573 U.S. at 159; Babbitt, 442 U. S. at

298. Placed in the appropriate analytical framework,

Grand easily satisfies these criteria. The CADO has

already caused harm that is not “hypothetical.”

First, Grand has alleged “an intention to engage

in a course of conduct arguably affected with a

constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute,

and there exists a credible threat of prosecution

thereunder.” Id. at 298; SBA, 573 U.S. at 159. A small

gathering for prayer in a private home is the epitome

of religious activity protected by the Free Exercise

Clause. Grand’s “fear of prosecution,” based on the

City’s cease-and-desist order (“CADO”) and additional

threats that followed, is not “imaginary or wholly

speculative.” Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298; SBA, 573 U.S.

at 159.

Second, Grand’s prayer meeting was allegedly

proscribed by the applicable City ordinance, as cited

and explained in the CADO. Pet. 3-4; Babbitt, 442

U.S. at 298; SBA, 573 U.S. at 159.

Third, “there exists a credible threat of

prosecution thereunder” (Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298;

SBA, 573 U.S. at 159). The Mayor’s coercive CADO

ordered Grand to cease the prayer meetings in his

home until he obtained a special use permit. Pet. 3. As

in Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, the “preenforcement nature” of the suit is not “troubl[ing]”

because Grand has “alleged an actual and wellfounded fear that the law will be enforced against

[hi]m.” 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988). The “administrative

cease-and-desist order . . . against [his] prohibited

conduct,” which Grand has already received,

demonstrates an impending creditable threat. SBA,

573 U.S. at 166; Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302, n. 13; Pet.

3-4 (describing the CADO).

In SBA, “any person with knowledge” could file a

complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission. 573

U.S. at 152. In this case, a neighbor’s complaint to the

City initiated the dispute (Pet. 9), and the Mayor later

encouraged residents to report violations of the CADO

(Pet. 4). Litigants in SBA faced potential criminal

penalties (misdemeanor charges). 573 U.S. at 153.

Criminal prosecution against Grand is a real threat if

he resumes the prayer meetings. Pet. 7. Under these

circumstances, “where threatened action by

government is concerned,” Grand need not “expose

himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge

the basis for the threat.” SBA, 573 U.S. at 158-159,

quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S.

118, 128-129 (2007). This is particularly true where

the challenged statute (or ordinance) “deters the

exercise of his constitutional rights”—as it clearly

does here. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459

(1974).

The Sixth Circuit makes the astounding claim

that “Grand will not be prejudiced by any delay”

(Grand, 159 F.4th at 512) even though the City has

already infringed his religious liberty. The court

insists that Grand has not been unfairly harmed by

the denial of pre-enforcement review, that “his

actions, not anyone else’s,” created the ripeness

problem, and that because the “dismissal on ripeness

grounds is without prejudice, . . . Grand remains free

to file a new action if the City applies the ordinance to

him in

a way that violates his statutory or

constitutional rights.” Grand, 159 F.4th at 514. This

conclusion blinks the reality of the constitutional

harm already done and the looming threat of criminal

prosecution against Grand for holding a small prayer

meeting in the privacy of his own home. “The loss of

First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods

of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable

injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). The

CADO and lower court rulings have combined to

“forc[e] [Grand] to choose between refraining from

core [Free Exercise activity] on the one hand or

engaging in that [activity—prayer] and risking costly

[City] proceedings and criminal prosecution on the

other.” SBA, 573 U.S. at 167-168.

B. Grand can establish a Free Exercise

violation based on the City’s transparent

hostility to his religious exercise.

Grand can readily demonstrate a Free Exercise

violation based on the City’s transparent hostility in

shutting down his small prayer meeting, threatening

punishment or even criminal enforcement, and

encouraging neighbors to report violations of its ceaseand-desist order. See Pet. 3-4, 8; Reply 2-3. “[E]ven

more disturbing” than the City’s conduct is “the tone”

of its correspondence, which “bristles with hostility”

toward religion. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530

U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In

such cases, where “laws or policies burdening

religious exercise” are accompanied by “official

expressions of hostility,” this Court has not hesitated

to “set [them] aside . . . without further inquiry.”

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 525 n.

1 (2022), citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.

Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 639

(2018). In Masterpiece, the Civil Rights Commission

had demonstrated “impermissible hostility” (id. at

634) that was “inconsistent with the First

Amendment’s guarantee” that the law be “applied in

a manner neutral toward religion” (id. at 640). The

same is true here. The City has demonstrated

“impermissible hostility” toward Grand’s religious

practices.

Hostility toward religion, which may be “masked

as well as overt” (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,

Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)),

defies our nation’s history and this Court’s Free

Exercise

jurisprudence.

The

City’s

“callous

indifference to [a] religious group[]” sharply departs

from “the best of our traditions” rather than following

them. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-314

(1952). Indeed, the City has already “dug in its heels.”

Grand, 159 F.4th at 513 (citing Murphy, 402 F.3d at

349), such that further pursuit of a special use permit

would be futile.

The City’s heavy-handed, hostile approach is

particularly alarming in the context of a personal

residence. Grand’s religious exercise occurs in the

privacy of his own home with personal friends. It

involves none of the structural changes or signage or

amplification or disruption or traffic congestion that

would normally be factors in a special use permit

application. Pet. 1. This does not mean that every use

of a home is automatically exempted from zoning

restrictions. Murphy is an example where—under

very different circumstances—restrictions potentially

applied to prayer gatherings in a residence. In

Murphy, the cease-and-desist order applied by its own

terms only to regularly scheduled gatherings of 25 or

more non-family members (id. at 345) and it would

have been stayed during an appeal. There were also

legitimate concerns about noise and traffic congestion

(“thirteen to twenty cars lined the Murphys' driveway,

their rear yard and the cul-de-sac,” id. at 345)—

factors that are absent in Grand’s case. Even under

the specific facts in Murphy, the Second Circuit

warned that “Williamson County should be cautiously

applied to these claims.” 402 F.3d at 350.

As this Court has repeatedly explained: "The

State's interest in protecting the well-being,

tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the

highest order in a free and civilized society." Frisby v.

Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988), quoting

Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980). The home is

uniquely "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and

the sick." Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969)

(Black, J., concurring); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. It is

“the one retreat to which men and women can repair

to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits,”

and thus "[p]reserving [its] sanctity . . . is surely an

important value." Ibid., citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 471.

This Court should consider the sanctity of Grand’s

home and protect his right to religious expression in

that personal space.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit

ruling.

Respectfully submitted,

Deborah J. Dewart