Amicus Curiae Brief — Daniel Grand, Petitioner v. City of University Heights, Ohio, et al.

No. 25-965

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DANIEL GRAND,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS, OHIO, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE UNITED

STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC

BISHOPS, THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE

ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, AND THE GENERAL

CONFERENCE OF THE SEVENTH-DAY

ADVENTISTS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ANDREW NUSSBAUM

Counsel of Record

FIRST & FOURTEENTH PLLC

2 N. Cascade Avenue,

Suite 1430

Colorado Springs, CO 80903

(719) 286-2475

andrew@first-fourteenth.com

JAMES COMPTON

FIRST & FOURTEENTH

PLLC

800 Connecticut

Avenue NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC

20006

(202) 998-1978

Attorneys for Amici

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................ ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .......................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................. 3

ARGUMENT ......................................................... 5

I.

Under Susan B. Anthony List v.

Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), Mr.

Grand has suffered a justiciable injury. ....... 5

A. Susan B. Anthony List is the

framework for measuring whether

there is a justiciable controversy in this

case............................................................... 5

B. Standing under Susan B. Anthony List

cannot be overridden by Williamson

County’s prudential ripeness exception

to Article III. .............................................. 12

II. Unless the Court grants review, the

Sixth Circuit’s broader doctrinal

confusion will recur. ................................... 15

A. There is a trend of state actors abusing

ripeness to burden religion. ...................... 16

B. Review is needed to clarify that the

Sixth Circuit’s finality rule is limited to

the takings context. ................................... 22

CONCLUSION ................................................... 24

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Tandon v. Newsom,

593 U.S. 61 (2021) ................................................... 7

Babbitt v. Farm Workers,

442 U.S. 289 (1979) ................................................. 8

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,

590 U.S. 644 (2020) ................................................15

Braidwood Mgmt. Inc. v. EEOC,

70 F.4th 914 (5th Cir. 2023) .................................... 9

Cath. Benefits Ass’n v. Burrows,

732 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (D.N.D. 2024) ............9, 17, 18

Christian Emps. All. v. EEOC,

2022 WL 1573689 (D.N.D. May 16, 2022) ...9, 20, 23

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) ................................................21

First Choice Women’s Res. Centers, Inc. v. Att’y Gen.

of New Jersey,

No. 24-3124, 2024 WL 5088105 (3d Cir. Dec. 12,

2024)........................................................................22

Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra,

47 F.4th 368 (5th Cir. 2022) ................... 9, 10, 11, 12

iii

Grand v. City of Univ. Heights, Ohio,

159 F.4th 507 (6th Cir. 2025) .........................8, 9, 23

Holt v. Hobbs,

574 U.S. 352 (2015) ................................................15

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

597 U.S. 507 (2022) ................................................. 7

Louisiana v. EEOC,

705 F. Supp. 3d 643 (W.D. La. 2024) .....................23

Louisiana v. EEOC,

784 F. Supp. 3d 886 (W.D. La. 2025) .................9, 18

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................. 6

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty.,

477 U.S. 340 (1986) ................................................14

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,

549 U.S. 118 (2007) ................................................. 7

N.L.R.B. v. Cath. Bishop of Chicago,

440 U.S. 490 (1979) ................................................24

Obria Grp., Inc. v. Ferguson,

No. 3:23-CV-06093-TMC, 2025 WL 27691 (W.D.

Wash. Jan. 3, 2025) ................................................22

Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon,

260 U.S. 393 (1922) ................................................14

iv

Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Becerra,

55 F.4th 583 (8th Cir. 2022) . 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 19, 22

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,

592 U.S. 14 (2020) ............................................16, 25

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ......................................5, 6, 7, 8

Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc.,

484 U.S. 383 (1988) ................................................. 9

Williamson Cty. Regional Planning Comm. v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,

473 U.S. 172 (1985) ............................................5, 13

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc ...........................................1, 15, 24

Regulations

29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(b) .................................................17

45 C.F.R. § 92.2 .........................................................19

45 C.F.R. § 92.3(c) .....................................................19

45 C.F.R. § 92.302 ...............................................19, 20

81 Fed. Reg. 31,376 (May 18, 2016) ..........................19

89 Fed. Reg. 37,522 (May 6, 2024) ............................19

89 Fed. Reg. 29,183 (April 19, 2024).........................17

v

88 Fed. Reg. 44750 (Jul. 13, 2023) ............................21

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici are nonprofit organizations dedicated to

safeguarding religious liberty as a universal right.

They submit this brief to urge the Court to clarify the

pre-enforcement standing framework applicable to

claims arising under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc et seq., and the First Amendment. The Sixth

Circuit’s decision, if left undisturbed, would hand

government actors a blueprint for simultaneously

burdening faith communities and insulating those

burdens from judicial review.

The United States Conference of Catholic

Bishops (USCCB) is a nonprofit corporation whose

members are the active Cardinals, Archbishops, and

Bishops of the United States and the U.S. Virgin

Islands. On behalf of the Christian faithful, the

USCCB advocates and promotes the pastoral teaching

of the Catholic Church in a broad range of areas, from

the free expression of ideas and the rights of religious

organizations and their adherents, to fair employment

and equal opportunity for the underprivileged,

protection of the rights of parents and children, the

value of human life from conception to natural death,

and care for immigrants and refugees. When lawsuits

touch upon important tenets of Catholic teaching, the

Conference has filed amicus curiae briefs to assert its

view, most often in this Court. In so doing, the

1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and

no person or entity other than amici curiae, their counsel, or their

members made a monetary contribution intended to fund the

brief’s preparation or submission. Amici provided timely written

notice of this brief.

2

Conference seeks to further the common good for the

benefit of all. It has frequently participated as an

amicus in this Court to further its particular interest

in the right of individuals and communities to freely

practice their faith.

The General Council of the Assemblies of

God (USA), together with Assemblies of God

congregations around the world, is the world’s largest

Pentecostal denomination. The Assemblies of God has

approximately 88 million members and adherents

worldwide. A voluntary cooperative fellowship, it

has nearly 13,000 churches voluntarily affiliated in

the United States. Twenty-two colleges and

universities are endorsed by the Assemblies of God in

the United States. The Assemblies of God seeks to

foster a society in which religious adherents of all

faiths may peaceably live out the dictates of their

conscience

The General Conference of the Seventh-day

Adventists is the worldwide administrative body for

the Seventh-day Adventist Church, a Protestant

Christian denomination with more than 24 million

members worldwide, 1.3 million members and over

5,400 congregations in the United States. It has a

longstanding commitment to religious liberty and was

one of the organizations that advocated for and

worked to help pass RLUIPA it has a strong interest

in plaintiffs being able to vindicate the rights it gives.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Religious freedom is not a privilege to be rationed

by administrative gatekeepers. It is a constitutional

right that federal courts are obliged to protect as soon

as the government threatens to burden it. This case

presents the Court with an opportunity to reaffirm

that principle and to foreclose a growing practice by

which government actors simultaneously burden

religious exercise and attempt to insulate that burden

from judicial review.

Daniel Grand is a Jewish man who opened his

home for prayer. The City of University Heights

responded by ordering him to stop in cease-and-desist

letter. That cease-and-desist letter was not an

invitation to negotiate; it was a credible threat of

enforcement against constitutionally and statutorily

protected religious exercise. Yet the Sixth Circuit held

Mr. Grand’s claims were unripe because he had not

first applied to the City for permission to practice his

faith, permission the City had given itself the power

to grant or deny.

That holding rests on a foundational error. The

Sixth Circuit imported Williamson County Regional

Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, a finality

doctrine developed for Fifth Amendment takings

claims, into a case arising under the Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the First

Amendment. Williamson County is ill-suited for

RLUIPA and First Amendment cases. The doctrine

ensures that courts do not adjudicate the economic

impact of a regulation before the government’s final

position is known. RLUIPA and the First

Amendment, by contrast, are violated the moment a

credible governmental threat chills protected religious

4

exercise, regardless of whether an exemption process

remains available. Forcing a religious plaintiff to

exhaust an administrative process before vindicating

his rights does not prevent premature adjudication; it

imposes the very burden the Constitution forbids.

Amici are large religious bodies whose members

encounter land-use ordinances, federal agency rules,

and other regulatory regimes that restrict religious

exercise while offering individual exemption processes

designed to forestall judicial challenge. The Sixth

Circuit’s reasoning, if left undisturbed, would hand

government actors a template for burdening faith

communities while keeping the courthouse door

closed. The Court should grant certiorari to make

clear that Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, not

Williamson

County,

governs

pre-enforcement

standing in religious freedom cases, and that a

plaintiff’s failure to seek an optional exemption does

not extinguish a credible threat of enforcement.

5

ARGUMENT

I. Under Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014), Mr. Grand has suffered

a justiciable injury.

The Sixth Circuit erred by evaluating Mr. Grand’s

injury under the prudential ripeness exception to

standing from Williamson County Regional Planning

Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473

U.S. 172, 193 (1985). Williamson County is a Fifth

Amendment takings case that held a takings claim is

not ripe until the land-use “decisionmaker has arrived

at a definitive position on” whether the requested

land-use will be allowed. Id. Mr. Grand’s case, by

contrast, raises questions of religious speech and

religious exercise. That his claim challenges the City

of University Heights’s zoning code is of no moment,

because Mr. Grand does not contend the code has

affected his property value or infringed on any

property right. He contends the code burdens his right

to speech and the free exercise of religion. Mr. Grand’s

standing thus should not be judged by case law

interpreting the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. It should be judged by this Court’s and

the lower courts’ pre-enforcement precedents arising

from cases pressing First Amendment arguments

similar to Mr. Grand’s.

A. Susan B. Anthony List is the

framework for measuring whether

there is a justiciable controversy in

this case.

Mr. Grand’s suit is a pre-enforcement challenge to

the City of University Heights’s zoning ordinances to

the extent those ordinances prohibit use of his home

6

for Jewish prayer meetings. The City’s cease and

desist letter, threatening to prohibit those prayer

meetings, prevents or at least substantially chills Mr.

Grand from using his home to practice his Jewish

faith in violation of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First

Amendment. In holding that Mr. Grand’s case was not

justiciable because he failed to exhaust an optional

City-established exception process, the Sixth Circuit

ignored pre-enforcement standing doctrine that

establishes Mr. Grand’s concrete constitutional

injury.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992) stated the modern three-part test for

determining whether a plaintiff has standing to bring

a claim. The plaintiff must show (1) an “injury in fact,”

(2) “a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of,” and (3) that his injury is

“likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”

Whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge a law on

a pre-enforcement basis primarily concerns the

injury-in-fact requirement. As a general matter, an

injury in fact exists if the Plaintiff has a “personal

stake in the outcome of the controversy,” Susan B.

Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158, and his claims are “not

conjectural or hypothetical,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

Pre-enforcement cases present a question of

timing: when does a threat of enforcement become

sufficiently imminent to give rise to an injury in fact

under Article III? On one hand, a plaintiff need not

wait for an actual enforcement action before his claim

is justiciable. Article III does “not require a plaintiff to

expose himself to liability before bringing suit to

7

challenge the basis for the threat.” Susan B. Anthony

List, 573 U.S. at 159 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v.

Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–129 (2007)). On the

other hand, a plaintiff who presents a purely

hypothetical threat of enforcement cannot invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. at 158. To

determine when a threat is sufficiently imminent to

create a justiciable case under Article III, the Court

has articulated three factors. Each of those factors is

present in this case.

First, the plaintiff must allege “an intention to

engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a

constitutional interest.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573

U.S. at 160. Mr. Grand’s prayer services easily exceed

this threshold requirement. This Court has repeatedly

ruled that prayer is core First Amendment speech and

religious exercise. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch.

Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 525 (2022). At-home religious

services also are squarely protected First Amendment

religious exercise. In Tandon v. Newsom, the Court

enjoined California’s Covid-19 regulations to the

extent they prohibited in-home worship services. 593

U.S. 61 (2021).

Second, the plaintiff’s conduct must be “arguably

proscribed by the” law he challenges. Susan B.

Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 162 (cleaned up and

emphasis added). A statute or ordinance that “sweeps

broadly” such that its prohibition “covers the subject

matter of” the plaintiffs’ conduct satisfies this element

of pre-enforcement standing. Id. So does an official

interpretation of the law that would prohibit the

plaintiff’s conduct. Id. Here, the University Heights

Code of Ordinances § 1250.02 prohibits “[h]ouses of

worship” in the U-1 zone where Mr. Grand’s home is

8

located. After he began his prayer meetings, the City

informed Mr. Grand that he was operating his home

as a “place of religious assembly” in violation of the

City zoning code and ordered him to cease services.

Grand v. City of Univ. Heights, Ohio, 159 F.4th 507,

510 (6th Cir. 2025). That is all that is required under

Article III: Mr. Grand has been told by City officials

that his conduct violates the law. While the Sixth

Circuit’s analysis turned on the possibility that the

City would grant Mr. Grand an exception in the form

of a special use permit, this potentiality does not alter

the conclusion that the City’s Code arguably

proscribed Mr. Grand’s conduct. The threat of

enforcement from the City officials responsible for

enforcing the Code is sufficient to hold that Mr.

Grand’s prayer meetings arguably fall within the

Code’s prohibition as an un-zoned use.

Third, the Plaintiff must allege a “credible threat

of enforcement.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at

159. This is a light burden once a plaintiff has

established that their conduct falls within a statute’s

prohibition; an actual threat of prosecution is not a

requirement. A statute that arguably proscribes the

plaintiff’s conduct and portends significant penalties

for its violation is sufficient to give rise to standing.

Id. Indeed, in Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289,

298 (1979), the State had taken no steps toward

prosecution, but this Court found a credible threat

because the State “had not disavowed” prosecuting

the law and plaintiffs had “some reason” to fear

prosecution. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302. In Virginia v.

American Booksellers Association, the Court found a

credible threat for the simple reason that “[t]he State

has not suggested that the newly enacted law will not

9

be enforced, and we see no reason to assume

otherwise.” Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484

U.S. 383, 393 (1988). In this case, not only does Mr.

Grand’s conduct fall within the statute’s prohibition,

he received a cease-and-desist letter from the City—a

literal threat of enforcement. Grand, 159 F.4th at

509–10. That the threat came from the Mayor rather

than the Planning Board is of no moment because it

came from an official with enforcement authority.

Indeed, not only was Mr. Grand served with a ceaseand-desist letter, police units were ordered to drive by

his house to search for violations, a local prosecutor

began an investigation into him, and a city inspector

actually searched his home. See Grand, 159 F.4th at

511. If any person has ever been credibly threatened

with enforcement of a law, it is Daniel Grand.

1. Lower

courts

regularly

find

preenforcement standing in free exercise

cases.

There is an extensive body of lower-court

precedent applying SBA List in pre-enforcement

religious freedom cases analogous to Mr. Grand’s.2

2 Some recent examples include: Braidwood Mgmt. Inc. v. EEOC,

70 F.4th 914, 929 & n.27 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding plaintiffs had

standing to bring pre-enforcement challenge where the EEOC

previously brought an enforcement action under similar

circumstances); Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Becerra, 55 F.4th

583 (8th Cir. 2022); Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 47 F.4th 368,

375 (5th Cir. 2022); Louisiana v. EEOC, 784 F. Supp. 3d 886, 903

(W.D. La. 2025) (USCCB has standing to challenge PWFA final

rule on pre-enforcement basis); Cath. Benefits Ass’n v. Burrows,

732 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1022 (D.N.D. 2024) (holding Catholic

employers had standing to bring pre-enforcement challenge to

Pregnant Workers Act Final Rule on pre-enforcement basis);

Christian Emps. All. v. EEOC, 2022 WL 1573689, at *4 (D.N.D.

10

Two of those decisions are worth highlighting because

their serpentine procedural history illuminates the

relatively low bar a litigant must clear to have preenforcement standing.

Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Becerra, 47 F.4th 368,

375 (5th Cir. 2022) and Religious Sisters of Mercy v.

Becerra, 55 F.4th 583 (8th Cir. 2022) were preenforcement challenges to final rules issued by the

Department of Health and Human Services in 2016

interpreting Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act

and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to require

coverage and provision of gender-transition

interventions for minors. In both cases, Catholic

employers and medical providers challenged the 2016

Section 1557 rule shortly after its promulgation,

arguing that the rule violated the First Amendment

and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Franciscan All., 47 F.4th at 372; Religious Sisters of

Mercy, 55 F.4th at 592. Shortly after filing suit,

however, presidential administrations changed, and

HHS issued a notice stating that it was reconsidering

the 2016 Section 1557 rule. Religious Sisters of Mercy,

55 F.4th at 592. In 2020, HHS substantially repealed

and replaced the 2016 rule. Id. at 594. The 2020 Rule

was then challenged by different plaintiffs arguing

that the 2016 rule properly interpreted Section 1557,

and district courts in New York and Massachusetts

issued injunctions of the 2020 Rule. Id. at 596.

In both cases, the government argued that the

repeal of the 2016 rule, and its replacement with the

May 16, 2022) (group of Christian employers had standing to

challenge EEOC rule on pre-enforcement basis).

11

2020 rule, made the plaintiffs’ claims non-justiciable.

In Franciscan Alliance, the government argued that

plaintiffs’ claims were made moot by the 2020 rule

because it repealed and replaced the 2016 rule.

Franciscan All., 47 F.4th at 374–76. In Religious

Sisters of Mercy, the government argued that there

was an insufficiently credible threat of enforcement of

the 2016 rule and thus plaintiffs lacked preenforcement standing to bring their claims. Religious

Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th at 602–03.

The government further argued that it “‘ha[d] not

to date evaluated’ whether it will enforce Section 1557

against [Catholic employers]” and thus the plaintiffs’

alleged injury was merely conjectural. Id. The

government also argued that its promise “to not

enforce the challenged policies” to the extent they

were contrary to the “Religious Freedom Restoration

Act” and the First Amendment meant plaintiffs could

not claim a credible threat of enforcement. Id.

The Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuit rejected the

government’s arguments and held that the plaintiffs’

claims were justiciable. Most notably, both courts held

plaintiffs had pre-enforcement standing because the

government refused to categorically disavow

enforcement of the challenged interpretation of

Section 1557 against Catholic employers and

healthcare providers, including plaintiffs. Religious

Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th at 603 (citing Franciscan

Alliance, 47 F.4th at 376). In addressing the

government’s argument that it “had not…evaluated”

enforcement against religious employers, the courts

explained that “the government’s assertion that it has

not to date evaluated’ whether it will enforce Section

1557 against the plaintiffs is actually a concession

12

that it may do so.” Religious Sisters of Mercy v.

Becerra, 55 F.4th at 605 (citing Franciscan Alliance,

47 F.4th at 376) (cleaned up). The government’s

refusal to disavow enforcement coupled with its prior

interpretation of Section 1557 to require coverage of

gender transition interventions meant plaintiffs had

standing. Id.

Franciscan Alliance and Religious Sisters of

Mercy are helpful guides here for several reasons.

First, they show that pre-enforcement standing is

appropriate in cases asserting free exercise claims

arising under statutes like RFRA and RLUIPA.

Second, both cases show that Article III’s standing

requirement is not hard to meet in the preenforcement context. A past unconstitutional

interpretation of a law coupled with a refusal to

categorically disavow enforcement is sufficient to give

rise to standing. And finally, as explained in Section

II below, both cases show that the possibility of an

exemption does not preclude standing.

B. Standing under Susan B. Anthony List

cannot be overridden by Williamson

County’s

prudential

ripeness

exception to Article III.

The Sixth Circuit dismissed Mr. Grand’s RLUIPA

and First Amendment claims as unripe, relying on the

finality requirement drawn from Williamson County,

473 U.S. 172, 193. That error was foundational

because Williamson County’s finality rule is a doctrine

of prudential ripeness, not a constitutional mandate.

Rejecting a case for prudential, as opposed to

constitutional reasons, is in substantial tension with

the “virtually unflagging” “obligation” of “a federal

court[] . . . to hear and decide a case” within its

13

constitutional jurisdiction. Where a plaintiff

independently satisfies the Article III test for preenforcement standing provided by Susan B. Anthony

List, no prudential doctrine should close the

courthouse door to adjudication of plaintiff’s claims.

Mr. Grand satisfies Susan B. Anthony List on this

record and thus the Court should reverse the Sixth

Circuit’s decision.

The finality requirement of Williamson County

was designed to serve a specific and narrow purpose:

preventing federal courts from adjudicating takings

claims before local authorities have determined the

extent of the challenged regulation’s application to the

property at issue. As this Court explained, requiring

absolute finality is “compelled by the very nature of

the inquiry required by the Just Compensation

Clause.” 473 U.S. at 188–90. Specifically, whether a

taking occurs turns on numerous “factors,” including

“the economic impact of the challenged action and the

extent to which it interferes with reasonable

investment-backed expectations.” Id. at 191.

The rationale for finality in the takings context is

straightforward. Whether a regulation affects a

taking turns on the economic impact to the property

owner—a fact-specific inquiry that is genuinely

indeterminate until the regulatory agency has made

all decisions affecting the land. See MacDonald,

Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 349

(1986) (“Until a property owner has obtained a final

decision regarding the application of the zoning

ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property,

it is impossible to tell whether the land retains any

reasonable beneficial use or whether existing

expectation interests have been destroyed.”). The

14

economic value of real property depends on

contingencies—the availability of variances, waivers,

and alternative uses—that may substantially alter

the ultimate regulatory footprint. Until those

contingencies are resolved, a court cannot know how

far the regulation goes, and thus cannot assess

whether it has “gone too far’” to affect a taking. Penn.

Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

None of that logic applies here. Mr. Grand is not

claiming that the City has taken his property without

just compensation, and he does not ask this Court to

calculate the economic diminution in the value of his

land. The contingencies that make takings claims

unsuitable for pre-final-decision adjudication are

irrelevant to his claims. His claim turns on whether

the City may constitutionally condition his religious

exercise on that permit in the first place and whether

the order to cease and desist is a credible threat of

enforcement that chills his right to religious exercise.

Nothing about Mr. Grand’s injury is indeterminate

pending resolution of the administrative process: he

has already been prevented from praying and

continues to be prevented from praying.

Additionally, applying the prudential Williamson

County inquiry to RLUIPA claims undermines its

protection of religious exercise. RLUIPA, like RFRA,

is a super-statute that displaces the ordinary

operation of local ordinances in the service of robust

protection for religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-3(e); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644,

682 (2020). The Act imposes a demanding standard. A

state actor that substantially burdens religious land

use must demonstrate that the burden is the least

restrictive means of advancing a compelling

15

governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). This

Court has emphasized that RLUIPA should “be

construed in favor of a broad protection of religious

exercise.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)). And it should be

considered at all stages of implementation of a landuse code, including, as here, responding to citizen

complaints about an allegedly improper land use.

Applying Williamson County’s finality rule to

RLUIPA claims inverts that command. It tells the

religious plaintiff: before you can vindicate your

statutory rights, you must complete a potentially

years-long administrative process and wait for a final

adverse decision—even though the act of subjecting

your religious practice to that process is itself the

constitutional and statutory injury. That result finds

no support in RLUIPA’s text, in this Court’s

precedents, or in the common understanding that the

loss of religious liberty, even briefly, is irreparable.

See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592

U.S. 14, 19 (2020) (“The loss of First Amendment

freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).

II. Unless the Court grants review, the Sixth

Circuit’s broader doctrinal confusion will

recur.

The Court should grant review to clarify proper

application of the finality doctrine and prevent state

actors from abusing doctrinal confusion to burden

religious freedom. Over recent decades, federal

agencies and state governments have realized that

they can manipulate ripeness doctrine by placing a

categorical burden on religious exercise but offer an

individualized accommodation process. Then, when

16

religious groups sue based on the burden, the agencies

invoke ripeness just like the City has done in this case.

This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the

federal courts’ jurisdiction, but it has proliferated in

recent years. The Court should stop it.

A. There is a trend of state actors abusing

ripeness to burden religion.

State actors who wish to deter robust religious

exercise have realized that they can potentially

manipulate the federal courts’ Article III jurisdiction

by enacting a general policy that on its face burdens

or prohibits religious exercise while allowing religious

individuals and entities to seek an exemption from the

policy on a case-by-case basis. Federal agencies, for

example, promised in the Religious Sisters of Mercy

and Franciscan Alliance litigation over the 2016

Section 1557 rule that they would determine whether

RFRA and the First Amendment require specific

exemptions on an individual basis. That individual

exemption process, the agencies argued, meant the

plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. And of course,

the City in this case has argued that notwithstanding

its blanket prohibition on houses of worship in Mr.

Grand’s zoning designation and its related cease-anddesist letter, Mr. Grand lacks standing because he has

failed to apply for an exemption. But a state actor’s

“reliance on [a] case-by-case standard” for religious

exemptions “constitutes ‘a concession that it may’ seek

enforcement.” Cath. Benefits Ass’n v. Burrows, 732 F.

Supp. 3d 1014, 1022 (D.N.D. 2024) (quoting Religious

Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th at 605).

Several examples illuminate the trend.

17

1. The 2024 rule implementing the Pregnant

Workers Fairness Act. A clear example of a policy

gerrymandered in an attempt to evade federal court

jurisdiction is EEOC’s 2024 final rule implementing

the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. That rule

required employers to accommodate, among other

things, employee abortions and immoral fertility

treatments. See 89 Fed. Reg. 29,183 (April 19, 2024).

The EEOC expanded the definition of “pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions” to include

“termination of pregnancy, including . . . abortion” and

“fertility treatment.” Id. at 29,106, 29,183; 29 C.F.R. §

1636.3(b). “Fertility treatment” included fertility

treatments like in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) that are

contrary to many employers’ religious faith. Id. at

29,102, 29,190. Many religious employers, including

amicus USCCB, oppose accommodation of abortion

and certain forms of artificial reproductive

technology,3 and yet the PWFA rule applied to such

employers on its face.

To evade federal court review of this policy, EEOC

purported to adopt a “religious exemption” that EEOC

would commit to determine whether an employer was

entitled to a religious exemption through a “factsensitive, case-by-case analysis” conducted by the

agency. Id. at 29,148-49. The government argued that

this commitment—to consider a religious exemption

on a claim-by-claim basis—rendered those religious

3 USCCB challenged the PWFA final rule under RFRA on a pre-

enforcement basis and ultimately won vacatur of the rule to the

extent the Rule required USCCB to accommodate employee

abortions. Louisiana v. EEOC, 784 F. Supp. 3d 886, 911 (W.D.

La. 2025).

18

employers who challenged the PWFA like amici

USCCB without standing. “For Plaintiffs’ or their

members’ injury to be credible, numerous

contingencies would all have to occur,” argued the

government, including that “EEOC must reject all of

the employer’s potential defenses, [such as] the

ministerial exception and RFRA.” Defendants’

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction at 14, Catholic Benefits Ass’n

v. Burrows, No. 1:24-cv-00142-DMT-CRH (D.N.D.

Aug. 22, 2024), ECF No. 22. Put another way, the

EEOC enacted a rule that facially burdened religious

employers but claimed that the rule could not be

challenged in federal court unless and until the EEOC

determined whether a specific employer was entitled

to a religious exemption.

2. The 2016 and 2024 rules implementing

Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. Another

example of a religious “exemption” strategically

employed to evade federal court jurisdiction are

HHS’s 2024 and 2016 rules implementing Section

1557 of the Affordable Care Act. Both rules required

healthcare

providers,

insurers,

third-party

administrators, and employers to provide and cover

gender-transition interventions, including puberty

blockers,

cross-sex

hormones,

and

surgical

interventions. 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,376 (May 18,

2016); 89 Fed. Reg. 37,522, 37,699 (May 6, 2024). And

both rules announced a blanket policy for all covered

entities within its scope, including Catholic

healthcare providers, hospitals, and employers that

hold sincere religious beliefs contradicted by the

provision of gender transitions. Nor did the 2024 or

2016 Section 1557 rules contain a religious exemption

19

for such employers and others who objected to the

provision of gender transition interventions on

religious grounds. Religious Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th

at 590.

The 2024 Section 1557 rule instead stated,

“[i]nsofar

as

the

application

of

any

requirement…would violate applicable Federal

protections for religious freedom and conscience, such

application shall not be required.” 45 C.F.R. § 92.3(c);

see also 89 Fed. Reg. at 37,532. The 2016 rule

contained a similar statement. 45 C.F.R. § 92.2 (2016).

The 2024 Section 1557 rule also adopted a procedure

that allows a conscientiously objecting religious

employer to “seek assurance” from HHS that it is

exempt from one or more of the religiously

objectionable mandates identified in this brief. 45

C.F.R. § 92.302. In subsequent litigation over the 2024

rule, the government argued that these provisions

deprived aggrieved plaintiffs of standing. “The new

assurance process under § 92.302 adds to an already

attenuated chain of events that must occur before any

CBA member might be injured and weighs heavily

against finding that any future injury is sufficiently

imminent to give rise to Article III jurisdiction.”4 HHS

and EEOC made this argument even though they

were actively enforcing Section 1557 and Title VII to

require covered entities to provide and cover gendertransition interventions. See, e.g., Christian Emps.

4 Combined Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary

Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ CrossMotion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ RFRA Claims or, in the Alternative,

for Summary Judgment on Those Claims at 23, Catholic Benefits

Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 3:23-cv-00203-PDW-ARS (D.N.D. Sept. 11,

2024), ECF No. 57.

20

All. v. EEOC, 2022 WL 1573689, at *5 (D.N.D. May

16, 2022) (noting that the government conceded that

“there have been complaints that have likely gone

through the conciliation process” concerning the

challenged interpretations of Section 1557 and Title

VII).

As with the PWFA rule, in the 2024 and 2016

Section 1557 rules HHS promulgated a blanket

mandate that uniformly burdened the religious beliefs

of thousands of healthcare providers and employers

across the United States, while at the same time

arguing that those providers and employers could not

challenge the rule under RFRA or the First

Amendment until each one of them had gone through

the optional “assurance” process one-by-one over a

course of years.

3. The 2023 Health and Human Services

grant regulation. The Department of Health and

Human Services employed the same device in its 2023

grant regulation. 88 Fed. Reg. 44750 (Jul. 13, 2023).

That regulation governs grants across a wide swath of

HHS programs, including preventative health

services, health education, refugee assistance,

assistance to low-income housing, and a host of other

government programs.

The 2023 rule prohibited any recipient of HHS

grant funds from discriminating on the basis of sexual

orientation or gender identity. This interpretation

placed an enormous burden on religious recipients,

who would have been required to eliminate single-sex

bathrooms, place foster children with same-sex

couples, and begin addressing their employees by

their preferred pronouns. See United States

Conference of Catholic Bishops, comment on Health

21

and Human Services Grants Regulation at 6–7

(September 5, 2023).

The grant regulation borrowed the exemption

regime from HHS’s Section 1557 rules. Thus, once

again, HHS imposed a rule that facially burdened

religious exercise. If a religious grant recipient failed

to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements,

they violated the rule. But, an individual grant

recipient could apply for its own religious exemption.

4. State agency administrative subpoenas.

Following this Court’s opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson

Women‘s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 228 (2022), state

attorneys general have begun leveraging ripeness

doctrine to insulate onerous subpoenas from judicial

review. The state officials will issue a subpoena to a

religious organization and, when the subpoena is

challenged in court, will argue that the challenge is

unripe because the religious organization has not yet

defied the subpoena and litigated its validity. This

creates functionally the same result as the rules

above: religious organizations cannot vindicate their

rights until they’ve once litigated their individual case

and lost.

Most notable of these cases is First Choice

Women’s Res. Centers, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of New Jersey,

No. 24-3124, 2024 WL 5088105, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 12,

2024), cert. granted sub nom. First Choice Women's

Res. Centers, Inc. v. Platkin, 145 S. Ct. 2793, 222 L.

Ed. 2d 1085 (2025). But other attorneys general have

used the same formula. See, e.g., Obria Grp., Inc. v.

Ferguson, No. 3:23-CV-06093-TMC, 2025 WL 27691,

at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2025); Judge rules attorney

general cannot enforce subpoena against Seattle

Archdiocese, National Catholic Reporter (July 18,

22

2024)

https://www.ncronline.org/news/judge-rulesattorney-general-cannot-enforce-subpoena-againstseattle-archdiocese.

The lower courts have largely seen through these

attempts to evade federal court review for what they

are. Such exemption processes are not a disavowal of

enforcement that deprives a plaintiff of standing. See

Religious Sisters, 55 F.4th at 606 (“Although the

government maintains that it ‘will comply’ with

RFRA, its promise is ‘so vague that the scope of

liability is both unknown by the government and

unknowable to the plaintiffs,’” (cleaned up)). And as

for the case-by-case approach, one lower court aptly

described the government’s position of forcing

religious organizations to “withstand a case-by-case

analysis . . . of their religious preferences” as

“[g]overnment harassment of religious organizations.”

Christian Emps. All. v. EEOC, 2022 WL 1573689, at

*5 (D.N.D. May 16, 2022). The burden of investigation

and possible litigation, at the very least, provides “a

substantial likelihood of added regulatory burden and

compliance costs.” Louisiana v. EEOC, 705 F. Supp.

3d 643, 664 (W.D. La. 2024)

B. Review is needed to clarify that the

Sixth Circuit’s finality rule is limited

to the takings context.

The decision of the Sixth Circuit below approves

the kind of jurisdictional skullduggery that has been

on the rise at federal agencies. On one hand, the City

of University Heights has promulgated a code that

proscribes Mr. Grand’s right to use his home for

prayer services and warned him to cease and desist

from doing so. Grand v. City of Univ. Heights, Ohio,

159 F.4th 507, 510 (6th Cir. 2025). On the other hand,

23

the City and the Sixth Circuit claim Mr. Grand has no

standing until he applies for and is denied a special

exemption from the rule. Id. The Sixth Circuit

couched this as a “finality requirement—a concrete

and final decision by the local authorities.” Id. at 512.

“This approach,” the Sixth Circuit argues “prevents

[courts] from swinging at a moving target.” Id.

If allowed to stand, the Sixth Circuit’s approach

would invite government actors to double down on

requiring religious objectors to jump through

administrative hoops before invoking the jurisdiction

of the federal courts. Religious plaintiffs will be

required to suffer an injury and then sit on their

hands while the very agency responsible for their

injury considers and rejects a request for religious

exemption. Only then will they be able to invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal courts.

This incentive structure is perverse. A

government actor wishing to burden religious practice

may do so freely, so long as it pairs the burden with a

discretionary

exemption

process.

The

more

cumbersome and uncertain that process, the more

effectively it deters religious exercise and the more it

also postpones judicial review. In the interim, the

believer must decide whether to submit to a

potentially costly and years-long administrative

process in hopes of obtaining permission to practice

their faith or abandon that practice to avoid

prosecution. Neither option is consistent with

RLUIPA’s command that religious exercise receive

broad protection at all stages of land use regulation.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).

To be sure, the Sixth Circuit attempted to cabin

its reasoning to the land use context. But while a

24

finality requirement might make sense of a takings

claim, it makes no sense to apply it to First

Amendment freedoms. Those freedoms are violated

not just by absolute prohibitions on religious exercise,

but also by temporary burdens or processes that make

exercising those rights more difficult. See N.L.R.B. v.

Cath. Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (“It

is not only the conclusions that may be reached by the

Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the

Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry

leading to findings and conclusions.”). . Indeed, this

Court has recognized that the loss of First

Amendment freedoms “for even minimal periods of

time,

unquestionably

constitutes

irreparable

injury.”Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,

592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020). A finality rule that delays

federal jurisdiction by months or years is therefore not

a neutral timing mechanism. It is itself a

constitutional harm.

The Court should grant certiorari to clarify that

pre-enforcement standing does not require a state

actor to expressly reject an individual’s request for

religious exemption. Rather, a plaintiff has standing

as soon as a credible threat arises: when a policy

arguably proscribes the plaintiff’s conduct and the

government threatens enforcement against him.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

the petition. The Court should clarify that Susan B.

Anthony List, not Williamson County, governs preenforcement standing in religious freedom cases, and

that a credible threat is not extinguished by an

optional exemption process.

25

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW NUSSBAUM

Counsel of Record

FIRST & FOURTEENTH,

PLLC

2 N. Cascade Avenue,

Suite 1430

Colorado Springs, CO

80903

(719) 286-2475

andrew@firstfourteenth.com

Attorneys for Amici

April 10, 2026

JAMES COMPTON

FIRST & FOURTEENTH,

PLLC

800 Connecticut Avenue

NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 998-1978